Petronas Technical Standards: Petronas Risk Based Inspection (Prbi) Implementation

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PTS 30.27.10.

30
February 2010
Page 1

PETRONAS TECHNICAL STANDARDS


DESIGN AND ENGINEERING PRACTICE

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION

PETRONAS RISK BASED INSPECTION (PRBI)


IMPLEMENTATION

PTS 30.27.10.30

FEBRUARY 2010

© 2010 PETROLIAM NASIONAL BERHAD (PETRONAS)

All rights reserved. No part of this document may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any
means (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise) without the permission of the copyright owner.
PTS 30.27.10.30
February 2010
Page 3

PREFACE

PETRONAS Technical Standards (PTS) publications reflect the views, at the time of publication, of
PETRONAS OPUs/Divisions.

They are based on the experience acquired during the involvement with the design, construction,
operation and maintenance of processing units and facilities. Where appropriate they are based on,
or reference is made to, national and international standards and codes of practice.

The objective is to set the recommended standard for good technical practice to be applied by
PETRONAS' OPUs in oil and gas production facilities, refineries, gas processing plants, chemical
plants, marketing facilities or any other such facility, and thereby to achieve maximum technical and
economic benefit from standardisation.

The information set forth in these publications is provided to users for their consideration and
decision to implement. This is of particular importance where PTS may not cover every requirement
or diversity of condition at each locality. The system of PTS is expected to be sufficiently flexible to
allow individual operating units to adapt the information set forth in PTS to their own environment and
requirements.

When Contractors or Manufacturers/Suppliers use PTS they shall be solely responsible for the
quality of work and the attainment of the required design and engineering standards. In particular, for
those requirements not specifically covered, it is expected of them to follow those design and
engineering practices which will achieve the same level of integrity as reflected in the PTS. If in
doubt, the Contractor or Manufacturer/Supplier shall, without detracting from his own responsibility,
consult the owner.

The right to use PTS rests with three categories of users:

1) PETRONAS and its affiliates.


2) Other parties who are authorised to use PTS subject to appropriate contractual
arrangements.
3) Contractors/subcontractors and Manufacturers/Suppliers under a contract with users
referred to under 1) and 2) which requires that tenders for projects, materials
supplied or - generally - work performed on behalf of the said users comply with the
relevant standards.

Subject to any particular terms and conditions as may be set forth in specific agreements with users,
PETRONAS disclaims any liability of whatsoever nature for any damage (including injury or death)
suffered by any company or person whomsoever as a result of or in connection with the use,
application or implementation of any PTS, combination of PTS or any part thereof. The benefit of this
disclaimer shall inure in all respects to PETRONAS and/or any company affiliated to PETRONAS that
may issue PTS or require the use of PTS.

Without prejudice to any specific terms in respect of confidentiality under relevant contractual
arrangements, PTS shall not, without the prior written consent of PETRONAS, be disclosed by users
to any company or person whomsoever and the PTS shall be used exclusively for the purpose they
have been provided to the user. They shall be returned after use, including any copies which shall
only be made by users with the express prior written consent of PETRONAS.

The copyright of PTS vests in PETRONAS. Users shall arrange for PTS to be held in safe custody
and PETRONAS may at any time require information satisfactory to PETRONAS in order to ascertain
how users implement this requirement.
PTS 30.27.10.30
February 2010
Page 4

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1.0  INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................... 5 


1.1  SCOPE ..................................................................................................................... 5 
1.2  DISTRIBUTION, INTENDED USE AND REGULATORY CONSIDERATIONS ......... 5 
1.3  DEFINITIONS ........................................................................................................... 5 
1.4  CROSS-REFERENCES ........................................................................................... 5 
2.0  PRBI OVERVIEW ..................................................................................................... 6 
2.1  BACKGROUND ........................................................................................................ 6 
2.2  OBJECTIVES ........................................................................................................... 6 
3.0  PRBI DESIGN .......................................................................................................... 8 
3.1   CONCEPT ................................................................................................................ 8 
3.2  PRBI METHODOLOGY .......................................................................................... 11 
3.3   RISK MATRIX......................................................................................................... 12 
3.4  INSPECTION PRIORITY ........................................................................................ 13 
4.0  ORGANISATION .................................................................................................... 14 
4.1  TEAM DESIGNATION ............................................................................................ 14 
4.2  ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES ......................................................................... 14 
5.0  PRBI IMPLEMENTATION ...................................................................................... 16 
5.1  ASSET REGISTER................................................................................................. 16 
5.2  CORROSION ASSESSMENT ................................................................................ 18 
5.3  RISK MODULE ....................................................................................................... 20 
5.4  INSPECTION.......................................................................................................... 30 
6.0  MONITORING ........................................................................................................ 33 
7.0  FEEDBACK, REVIEW AND UPDATING ................................................................ 34 
8.0 MANAGEMENT REVIEW ............................................................................................... 35 
9.0  REFERENCES ....................................................................................................... 36 
10.0  APPENDICES ........................................................................................................ 38 
PTS 30.27.10.30
February 2010
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1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1 SCOPE
This PTS is intended as a reference guideline for PRBI philosophy and its methodologies
to be implemented in PETRONAS Group-wide.
The document outlines methods for:
1) evaluating probability of failure and consequence of failure
2) making an assessment of the risk level
3) strategising the appropriate inspection actions that should be taken to manage that risk.
4) periodically reviewing and updating the P-RBI analysis

1.2 DISTRIBUTION, INTENDED USE AND REGULATORY CONSIDERATIONS


Unless otherwise authorised by PETRONAS, the distribution of this PTS is confined to
companies forming part of PETRONAS or managed by a Group company, and to
Contractors nominated by them (i.e. the distribution code is "C", as described in PTS
00.00.05.05).

This PTS is intended for use in oil refineries, gas plants, chemical plants and, where
applicable in exploration and production facilities and supply/marketing installations.

If national and/or local regulations exist in which some of the requirements may be more
stringent than in this PTS, the Contractor shall determine by careful scrutiny which of the
requirements are the more stringent and which combination of requirements will be
acceptable as regards safety,environmental, economic and legal aspects. In all cases the
Contractor shall inform the Principal of any deviation from the requirements of this PTS
which is considered to be necessary in order to comply with national and/or local
regulations. The Principal may then negotiate with the Authorities concerned with the
object of obtaining agreement to follow this PTS as closely as possible.

1.3 DEFINITIONS

1.3.1 General definitions


The Contractor is the party which carries out all or part of the design, engineering,
procurement, construction, commissioning or management of a project, or operation or
maintenance of a facility. The Principal may undertake all or part of the duties of the
Contractor.
The Manufacturer/Supplier is the party which manufactures or supplies equipment and
services to perform the duties specified by the Contractor.
The Principal is the party which initiates the project and ultimately pays for its design and
construction. The Principal will generally specify the technical requirements. The Principal
may also include an agent or consultant authorised to act for, and on behalf of, the
Principal.
The word shall indicates a requirement.
The word should indicates a recommendation.

1.4 CROSS-REFERENCES
Where cross-references to other parts of this PTS are made, the referenced section
number is shown in brackets. Other documents referenced by this PTS are listed in (11).
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February 2010
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2.0 PRBI OVERVIEW

2.1 BACKGROUND
The RBI Task Force recognised the advantages of implementing PRBI as a single
methodology throughout PETRONAS as follows;
1) Adopting a common database for materials, corrosion and inspection group
activities
2) Enable future development, upgrading and customisation of the software tool
3) Enable benchmarking of best practices and results amongst OPUs.
4) Group-wide audit
5) Centralised Technical Support Group

In 2004, a new task force, namely the PRBI Task Force, was formed under SKG15 to
spearhead the PRBI implementation Group-wide. The task force has the following
objectives;

1) To provide leadership and direction for the respective OPU RBI Teams towards
performance improvement and to realize benefits.
2) To plan, develop and implement P-RBI initiatives for Group wide performance
improvement.
3) To provide networking platform for members to synergise their efforts, exchange
ideas, experience and share best practices for plant performance improvement to
achieve Superior Performing Assets.
4) To provide technical support for continuous development and upgrading of the software

The deliverables of the task force are;


1) Implementation of Standard RBI Methodology Group wide.
2) Continuous improvement in plant integrity performances.
3) Regular updates to Maintenance Managers’ Panel.
4) Culture of sharing and learning from each other.
5) RBI Best Practices are documented, disseminated and practiced Group wide.

2.2 OBJECTIVES

The objectives for adopting a risk-based approach for inspection planning are:
1) To prioritise and focus inspection effort on items where the safety, environment or
economic risks are identified as being high, and similarly to reduce the effort applied for
low risk items.
2) To manage the risks as per PETRONAS HSEMS asset integrity requirements.
3) To achieve optimum intervals for inspection activities.
4) To identify and apply the appropriate inspection or monitoring methods/techniques
according to the identified degradation mechanisms.
5) To enhance technical know-how, broaden the knowledge and promote better
understanding of plant integrity across all disciplines.
PTS 30.27.10.30
February 2010
Page 7
PTS 30.27.10.30
February 2010
Page 8

3.0 PRBI DESIGN

3.1 CONCEPT

PRBI is a multi-disciplinary approach that requires involvement mainly from operations,


maintenance, inspection, and engineering personnel to provide input on design, materials
of construction, operating parameters, inspection data, failure history, etc.

PRBI involves the planning of an inspection on the basis of the information obtained from a
risk analysis of the equipment. The purpose of the risk analysis is to identify the potential
degradation mechanisms and threats to the integrity of the equipment and to assess the
consequences if the failure occurs.
The inspection programme can then be focused on the high-risk equipment and
appropriate technique(s) is applied to assess potential degradation mechanisms. Where
further analysis is required, fitness-for-service analysis can be applied.

PRBI’s aim is to focus management action on prioritising resources to manage the risk
associated with the equipment. P-RBI is a logical and structured process of planning and
evaluation. See Figure 3.1 next page.
C orros ion Module

Damage Mechanis m G uide


Interface Module
C orrosion Prediction

Interfacing with other softwares
C orrosion Loop

Interfacing with DC S
C orrosion R ate C alculation

Interfacing with S AP
C orrosion C ontrol & Monitoring

Interfacing with Data Logger
C orrosion Mitigation

Interfacing with Digital Image/Video

Link with intranet and internet 

Management Module R BI Analysis  Module

R eporting S ystem R isk Matrix

User  Privilege R isk Analys is ‐ PoF

S ecurity & Tracking Wall thickness C alculation

Trending & Alarm R emaining Life C alculation


Database
R isk Analys is ‐ C oF
Bus iness S trategy

R elease R ate C alculation E quipment Identification


Performance Analys is
Affected Area C alculation Design & C ons truction
Value C reation calculation
Process  & Operation
Link to As set Integrity & PS M
Maintenance & Inspection

Ins pection Module R isk Analys is R esult

Ins pection Planning Pers onnel Previlege & qualification


Figure 3.1 : Basic Components and Functional Tasks of P-RBI

Ins pection S trategy C orrosion Mechanis m 

Basic Components S pecific detailed scheme of Inspection Task & Tracking

Ins pection R es ult E valuation


& Functional Tasks
Tracking & Managing of NC R
February 2010
PTS 30.27.10.30

Page 9

Of P-RBI F itness for S ervices  Analys is

Ins pection E ffectivenes s Analysis


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February 2010
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3.1.1 PRBI in Relation to Asset Integrity Management System


PRBI should form part of an integrated strategy for managing the reliability, integrity, safety
and life cycle cost of the systems and equipment of the installation (asset) as a whole as
illustrated in Figure 3.2 below:

Figure 3.2 : P-RBI in Relation to Asset Integrity Management System

In Asset Management system where risk is a driving factor, P-RBI becomes an essential tool in
prioritizing asset management strategies. P-RBI analysis result is used for preparation of cost
effective inspection program of assets. For a newly constructed plant P-RBI is also used as
part of analysis tool to develop Corrosion and Inspection Management strategies.

The P-RBI program takes the first step toward an integrated risk management program. In the
past, the focus of risk assessment has been on-site safety-related issues. Presently, there is
an increased awareness of the need to assess risk resulting from;

1) On-site risk to employees.


2) Off-site risk to the community.
3) Risk of damage to the environment.
4) Business interruption risks.
5) Risk of damage and loss to asset.

The P-RBI approach allows any combination of these types of risks to be factored into
decisions concerning what, when, where, and how to inspect a process plant.
PTS 30.27.10.30
February 2010
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3.2 PRBI METHODOLOGY

PRBI methodology balances between the complexity of a fully quantitative analysis, which
is data dependent, and lack of discrimination of a fully qualitative analysis, which is subject
matter expert (SME) dependent. See Figure 3.3 below.

Figure 3.3 : Illustration of Discrimination vs. Complexity

PRBI processes focus on continuously improving and optimising inspection program. The
methodology incorporates inspection planning strategies to provide consistency in optimizing
operating cost and managing risk.

In PRBI, software analysis tool and integrated inspection database are used to automate the
analysis and planning work steps and develop recommendations but it is recommended that
SMEs are consulted by the P-RBI Team before decision is finalised.

PRBI software incorporates several features that help inspection team manage full cycle of
inspection activities such as:

1) Non-conformance reporting system


2) ‘What if’ feature to model and simulate risk level due to time progression, change in corrosion
rates, change in process parameter etc., which help improve decision making ability.
3) Level 1 Fitness-for-Service (FfS) assessment for evaluation of inspection finding
PTS 30.27.10.30
February 2010
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4) Task tracker
5) Scheme of Examinations derive from the inspection planning

PRBI implementation approach is illustrated in Figure 3.4.

Figure 3.4 : PRBI Implementation

3.3 RISK MATRIX


PRBI uses a 6 x 5 Risk Matrix to present the risk distribution of equipment analysed and to
prioritise the inspection planning, as illustrated in Figure 3.5 below.
Figure 3.5 : Risk Matrix
PTS 30.27.10.30
February 2010
Page 13

The matrix has Probability Category on the vertical axis and Consequence Category on
the horizontal axis. The overall risk for an equipment item is the combination of the
Combined Probability and Combined Consequence.

The risk matrix is divided into four categories – High, Medium, Low and Very Low

The calculated risk is described as the product of Probability of Failure (PoF) and
Consequence of Failure (CoF), where:
• PoF is estimated on the basis of the types of degradation mechanisms operating in the
component, and is calculated as the area of overlap in the distributions of the
degradation rate for each degradataion mechanism (based on uncertainties in rate) with
the distribution of the resistance of the componenent to failure.
• CoF is defined for all consequences that are of importance to PETRONAS such as
safety, economy, & environment.CoF is evaluated as the outcome of a failure based on
the assumption that such a failure will occur.

3.4 INSPECTION PRIORITY


Each of the twenty-five boxes in the matrix is assigned a number called the Inspection
Priority. Items with the highest risk category are assigned an Inspection Priority of 1 and
items with the lowest risk category are assigned an Inspection Priority of 30, i.e. the lower
the number, the higher the Inspection Priority. The purpose of assigning inspection priority
is to enable prioritisation of inspection between different equipment items. When developing
the inspection plan, priority is given to items with higher Inspection Priority over those with
lower Inspection Priority.
PTS 30.27.10.30
February 2010
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4.0 ORGANISATION

4.1 TEAM DESIGNATION

P-RBI requires participation of competent personnel for the execution of the work. P-RBI
approach is a multidisciplinary activity involving mainly the following disciplines as lay-out
in Table 4.1:
Table 4.1: Team Designation
DISCIPLINE QUALIFICATION & EXPERIENCE
Experience in the field of inspection of piping, pressure
Inspection engineers vessels, heat exchangers, welding, non-intrusive inspection
(NII) and non-destructive testing (NDT) techniques.
Expertise in materials applicability, corrosion control,
Materials and corrosion
corrosion monitoring techniques, chemical treatment,
engineers
coating systems and fitness for service analysis.
Experience in formal HAZOP study, incident accident
HSE engineers investigation, management audit system and facilities
engineering and safety I??? (FESI).
Operation engineers Operations and process experience.
Maintenance engineers Maintenance experience.
Process engineers Production process, process simulation and FESI.
Financial/Business
Knowledge in production and business interruption cost.
personnel

4.2 ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES


The roles of the various P-RBI Team members are laid out in Table 4.2.
Table 4.2 : Roles of P-RBI Team members
Designation Roles

P-RBI Results Manager 1. Responsible for RBI implementation

1. To lead implementation of P-RBI project


P-RBI Team Leader 2. To provide coordination between P-RBI
Team members.
3. Review RBI results
4. Communicate with management

Inspection Engineer 1. Updates the inspection database.


2. Communicate inspection task planning and
risk mitigation action to the Team.
3. Custodian of the RBI system and database
4. Perform RBI analysis
5. Review RBI result

HSE Engineer 1. To provide inputs on HSE related matters


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Designation Roles
1. To provide design and operating parameters
2. To provide history on process upsets
Operation Engineer 3. To provide operating philosophy
4. To provide input for production loss calculation

1. To provide equipment data and maintenance


history
Maintenance Engineer
2. To provide data for maintenance cost calculations

1. Provide technical input in-terms of degradation


mechanism
Materials/Corrosion 2. To provide material specifications as per code and
Engineer standard, corrosion control and mitigation programme
3. Review RBI result

1. To provide process stream data and drawings


Process Engineer/ 2. To provide MSDS
Technologist 3. Review RBI result

1. To provide data on the cost of the facility/


pressurized
Financial/Business
equipment being analysed and the business
personnel
interruption impact of having pieces of pressurised
equipment shut down.
2. To recommend methods for mitigating the financial
consequence of failure.
Other relevant parties 1. To provide input on MOC status
2. Lab analysis results
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February 2010
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5.0 PRBI IMPLEMENTATION

A reliable assessment of the risk requires the Plant’s Owner to have and maintain an
adequate dossier of essential data relating to the plant. This essential data provides the
RBI team with a basis on which to judge the continued safe operation. If accurate or
complete records have not been maintained, then the assessment will inevitably become
conservative which could indicate the risks to be higher than if more information were
available.

The essential data will vary from plant item to plant item. The RBI team carrying out the
assessment will need to decide which factors are relevant and which are not relevant in
each case. One important aspect in the use of such data is that, wherever possible, all data
should be validated. It is best to treat hearsay, assumptions or unconfirmed data with
caution and make due allowances for uncertainty in the risk assessment. All assumptions
made should be properly documented. The integrity of the input data will directly influence
the accuracy of the assessment.

5.1 ASSET REGISTER


This module is function as a database or the engine of the whole PRBI implementation. All
data and relevant information require are to be input in this module.

5.1.1 Asset Data Hierarchy


The hierarchy of the data includes 7 layers as per Figure 7.1

Figure 7.1: Data Hierarchy


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5.1.2 Among the essential data/information that should be available to the RBI Team carrying
out the evaluations is as per follow:

Essential Data Details

(a) Design basis memorandum (DBM)


(b) P&IDs, PFDs, MDRs
(c) Piping list, specifications & isometric drawings.
(d) Engineering specification sheets.
(e) Materials of construction records.
(f) Construction QA/QC records.
(g) Codes and standards used.
Design and (h) Protective instrument systems.
1. Construction (i) Leak detection and monitoring systems.
Records/Drawings (j) Isolation systems.
(k) Inventory records.
(l) Emergency depressurizing and relief systems.
(m) Safety systems.
(n) Fire-proofing and fire fighting systems.
(o) Layout.
(p) Equipment drawings.
(q) Coating, linings and insulation specifications
(a) Operating parameters e.g. pressure, temperature, flow rates
- Design
- Operating
- Upset conditions
(b) Fluid composition analysis including contaminants or trace
components.
Process Data (c) Distributed control system data e.g. operating parameters
2.
trending, boiler tube skin temperature
(d) Start-up and shut-down procedures, operating procedures
(e) Operating logs and process records.
(f) Process safety reports e.g. Process Hazards Analysis (PHA),
HAZOP, HAZID.
(g) Materials Safety Data Sheet (MSDS)/Chemical Safety Data
Sheet (CSDS)
(a) Inspection history & findings.
(b) Types and coverage of inspection.
(c) Schedules and frequency.
(d) Repairs, replacement, re-rating and alterations.
Inspection Records. (e) Materials verification records.
3.
(f) Bad actors records
(g) Fitness for service records
(h) Corrosion monitoring records
(i) Plant and equipment specific failure data.
(j) Root cause failure analysis (RCFA) reports.
Management of
change (MOC) (a) Process changes
4.
records. (b) Equipment modifications

5. Site conditions (a) Climate.


Economic impact (a) Loss of production/opportunity.
6.
(b) Product prices.
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February 2010
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Data shortages should be documented and require follow-up action by the relevant P-RBI
Team members. In case of inconsolable unavailability of data, conservative assumptions
can be made and agreed by the Subject Matter Expert.

5.1.3 Quality Check


The data quality has a direct relation to the relative accuracy of the RBI analysis. Although
the data requirements are quite different for the various types of RBI analysis, quality of
input data is equally important. It is beneficial to the integrity of a RBI analysis to assure
that the data are up to date and validated by knowledgeable persons.

As is true in any inspection program, data validation is essential for a number of reasons.
Among the reasons are outdated drawings and documentation, inspector error, clerical
error, and measurement equipment accuracy. Another potential source of error in the
analysis is assumptions on equipment history. For example if baseline inspections were not
performed or documented, nominal thickness may be used for the original thickness. This
assumption can significantly impact the calculated corrosion rate early in the equipment’s
life. The effect may be to mask a high corrosion rate or to inflate a low corrosion rate. A
similar situation exists when the remaining life of a piece of equipment with a low corrosion
rate requires inspection more frequently. The measurement error may result in the
calculated corrosion rate appearing artificially high or low.

This validation process stresses the need for a Subject Matter Expert comparing data from
the inspections to the expected deterioration mechanism and rates. This person may also
compare the results with previous measurements on that system, similar systems at the
site or within the company or published data. Statistics may be useful in this review. This
review should also factor in any changes or upsets in the process.

5.2 CORROSION ASSESSMENT

The objective of having corrosion module in RBI is to have reliable input that directly link to
the risk analysis and inspection module. PRBI corrosion module consists of several items
which include corrosion group, corrosion study,corrosion prediction and corrosion
management plan. All this items have their own roles to support RBI and the process of
evaluation should be a one-time activity, but a continuous process where the information
should be maintain and updated.

5.2.1 Corrosion Group Development


Corrosion Group (CG) shall be developed for static equipment and piping during the
materials and corrosion study. The groups’ development is based on the material of
construction, the operating conditions and the properties of the chemicals (fluids). Prior to
developing the loop, it is recommended for a short plant visit to have a better picture on
plant operation besides having understanding on historical problematic areas.

5.2.2 Development of Piping Circuits


Due to complexity and large number of piping involved, the piping in the corrosion groups
are further divided into piping circuits. Piping circuits are defined as sections of continuous
piping exposed to an environment of similar internal corrosivity, similar operating
conditions, and similar materials of construction. Piping circuits are identified on P&IDs to
organise the piping into manageable segments as an intermediate step in the development
of an RBI programs.
Data of a selected piping from each piping circuit that best represent the circuit will be
entered into the PRBI database for analysis.
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February 2010
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5.2.3 Corrosion Study


The damage mechanisms of interest are those which develop over a period of time,
gradually weakening the pressure boundary integrity of components until failure occurs.
Based on an assessment of the components, the following potentially active damage
mechanisms will be identified based on the damage mechanism as per API 571 which are
categorised as per below detail;
• Thinning
• Environmental Cracking
• Other Damage Mechanism

Subject matter expert will identified the damage mechanisms and damage rates during the
materials and corrosion study and the finalised information will be used in the risk analysis
module

5.2.4 Corrosion Rate

Actual (Inspection data) vs. Prediction


In PRBI, there are two types of measured corrosion rates to be considered, namely Short
Term Average and Long Term Average Corrosion Rates, which are defined as follows:

t initial − t actual
Long Term Average CR =
time (years) between t initial and t actual

t previous − t actual
Short Term Average CR =
time (years) between t previous and t actual

In absence of measured corrosion rates, an expert rate shall be used for P-RBI
assessment.
The logic applied to selecting a corrosion rate is shown in Figure 5.1. The approach is
conservative for the following reasons:
1) The “expert corrosion rate” is based on a review of a literature source

2) In the case where there are multiple measured corrosion rates available, the Subject
Matter Expert shall decide on the most appropriate corrosion rate to be used that best
reflect the current condition.

3) In cases where a measured corrosion rate as well as an expert corrosion rate are
available the approach is as below:

i) If the measured corrosion rate value is higher than expert corrosion rate
then the measured corrosion rate value will be applied.
ii) If the measured corrosion rate value is lower than the expert corrosion
rate but the inspection carried out had a high confidence factor as
defined in Inspection Confidence Criteria then the measured corrosion
rate value will be applied.
iii) If the measured corrosion rate value is lower than expert corrosion rate
and also the inspection carried out had a low confidence factor as
defined in Inspection Confidence Criteria then the expert corrosion rate
value will be applied.
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Page 20

Figure 5.1: Flowchart for Corrosion Selection

Select Equipment or
P iping Circuit

Established Expert
Corrosion Rat e
Available

N
Measured Equipment
CR Available

Measured CR great er N High Confidence in N


than Expert CR? Measured CR

Y
Y

Use Expert CR
Use Measured CR

5.3 RISK MODULE

5.3.1 PROBABILITY OF FAILURE


The probability of failure of an item shall be carried out by analyzing all types of damage
mechanisms present as a result of its operations (temperature, pressure, etc.), process
environment (corrosive gases, contaminants, water, etc.), materials of construction, type of
equipment (e.g. column, vessel, heat exchanger, storage tank, piping, etc.) and its physical
configurations.
Corrosion often concentrates at certain locations such as at dead legs, stagnant areas,
condensation areas, bends, impingement areas, injection location, liquid-gas interface,
under insulation and etc. As such all these potential locations shall be considered when
undertaking corrosion study and determining the probability of failure.
For PRBI, the probability analysis shall be carried out for the following analysis whichever
appropriate:
1) Internal Assessment
2) External Assessment

The combined effect of more than one damage mechanisms above is considered when
evaluating the overall probability result.
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5.3.1.1 Thinning
Internal Wall Ratio
The minimum wall thickness shall be calculated based on pressure, mechanical and
structural considerations using the appropriate design formula and code allowable stress.
Once the minimum allowable wall thickness has been determined, the remaining wall
thickness is calculated based on initial thickness less the wall loss due to internal corrosion
(that is internal corrosion rate multiplied by the number of years it is in the current service).
A ratio of the remaining wall thickness to the minimum wall thickness is calculated and for
any value of less than one, the item being evaluated shall be reviewed whether the data
used is correct and it is safe for on-going operation through Fitness for Service (FFS)
analysis.

External Wall Ratio


The wall ratio calculation for external corrosion is similar to the wall ratio calculation for
internal wall ratio
However, instead of the number of years in service, the external age shall be considered
as the years since the exterior surface of the equipment was known to be in “like new”
condition. This could be based on installation age, or the date the equipment was
recoated and insulated. A paint or coating provides credit by reducing the “external” age in
service to the original age less the anticipated life of the coating. Coating life is anticipated
to be 1 to 10 years, depending on the type of system that has been applied as per
tabulated in Table 5.1
Table 5.1 : Coating External Proatection Credit
Coating Condition External Protection Credit (years)
None 1
Average 5
Best 10

Fractional Wall Loss

The fractional wall loss is determined as follows:

Fractional Wall Loss = estimated wall loss / initial thickness


= ar/t

where;
a = age in years
r = corrosion rate
t = initial thickness

For insulated equipment and piping, the corrosion rate can be determined based on actual
measurement of wall loss found during inspection or based on external corrosion prediction
model which are based on the operating temperature, humidity of the external environment
and insulation condition. The CUI corrosion rate model for carbon steel material is included
in the P-RBI software.
PTS 30.27.10.30
February 2010
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For non-insulated equipment and piping, the rate can be determined based on actual
measurement or an expert value provided by the corrosion engineer.

Inspection Confidence
The number of internal and external inspection and its associated level of confidence
performed on the item shall be determined. For internal corrosion probability analysis, only
the inspection for detecting and quantifying internal corrosion are counted. The confidence
level ranging from very high, high, medium or low is determined by evaluating the damage
mechanism, type of equipment, type of inspection done and its coverage. A reference
standard on how to evaluate the effectiveness shall be used to ensure consistency in
assigning the confidence level. For the evaluation, the allowable Inspection Confidence
categories and their capabilities to assess damage are defined in Table 5.2
Table 5.2 : Inspection Confidence
Correctly Identify Damage (at
Confidence Category
least)
Very High 90%
High 70%
Medium 50%
Low 35%

As an example, a very high inspection confidence shall be able to provide the evaluator
confidence to determine whether damage is present and assess its extent with 90%
probability.

Internal and External Corrosion Factor and Probability Category


The Internal Corrosion factor is determined based on fractional wall loss, number of
inspection and inspection confidence undertaken as specified in API 581 tabulated in
Appendix 1.

The Thinning Probability Category is determined as tabulated in Table 5.3.

Table 5.3: Thinning Probability Categogry

Thinning Corrosion Factor Thinning Probability


Category

1-9 B

10-99 C

100-999 D

1000 + E

For P-RBI, the Thinning Probability Category can then be reduced by one category
(such as from “B” to a “A”) if the wall ratio is greater than 1.5 and the corrosion rate
is less than 0.125 mm/yr.
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February 2010
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5.3.1.2 ENVIRONMENTAL CRACKING PROBABILITY ANALYSIS


The probability analysis for environmental cracking shall consider the combined effect of
materials, process environment (including upsets), and mechanical stresses on the item
being evaluated.
A Probability Category for an environmental cracking mechanism is calculated by
evaluating the initial potential for environmental cracking and the prior inspection history,
determining the current potential for environmental cracking, and calculating the corrosion
factor due to the current environmental cracking potential and the adjusted years since the
last environmental cracking inspection.
Environmental cracking mechanisms shall be considered during RBI assessment which
shall include but not limited to the following:
• Wet H2S,
• Chloride Stress Corrosion Cracking
• Caustic Cracking,
• Amine Cracking,
• Polythionic Acid (PTA) SCC,
• Carbonate Cracking,
• Hydrogen Stress Cracking from Hydrofluoric Acid.

If Probability Category for the equipment being calculated for the first time, the initial
potential for Environmental Cracking, which is assessed prior to considering the item’s
inspection history, can be evaluated by using Table in Appendix 2.
If the Probability Category has previously been calculated and saved as driving risk, then
the prior potential for Environmental Cracking will be adjusted instead of the initial potential
as described above. The prior potential is the same as the current potential used in the
latest calculation of the environmental cracking probability category.
The prior environmental cracking inspection history is evaluated for each piece of
equipment by identifying the number of prior inspections, their corresponding inspection
confidence, and any damage found as a result of the inspection. This information is then
used in conjunction with the initial potential or prior potential and Table inAppendix 3 to
determine the current potential for environmental cracking and to adjust the number of
years since the last inspection.
The corrosion factor for environmental cracking is calculated by using the current potential
for environmental cracking and the adjusted years since the last inspection. As included in
Appendix 4.
The Environmental Cracking Probability Category is determined as per Table 5.4:

Table 5.4 : Environmental Cracking Probability Category

Environmental Cracking Environmental Cracking


Corrosion Factor Probability Category

1-9 B

10-99 C

100-999 D

1000 + E
PTS 30.27.10.30
February 2010
Page 24

5.3.1.3 Other Damage Mechanisms


All types of Damage Mechanisms that are identified as potential or active for the item being
evaluated shall be considered during probability analysis. The following is a list of damage
mechanisms to be included in probability analysis, but not limited to:
• Brittle Fracture
• Carburization
• Creep
• Erosion
• Graphitization
• Hot Hydrogen Attack
• Hydrogen Embrittlement
• Liquid Metal Embrittlement
• Mechanical Fatigue
• Phase Change Embrittlement
• Temper Embrittlement
• Thermal Fatigue

The user shall assign the probability of failure category for the damage mechanisms based
on operator’s experience and engineering assessment. A qualified corrosion engineer shall
be consulted when determining the item’s susceptibility to any damage mechanisms.

Prior inspection data or published data of other units that operate with similar operating
conditions can be used to determine the item susceptibility to the damage mechanism. The
assigned category ranges from A (Low) to E (Very high).

FIRED HEATER TUBES CREEP PROBABILITY ANALYSIS


The probability analysis for Fired Heater tubes shall include creep. The analysis starts by
determining the load history based on past operation and future planned operation. If
different operating loads and events were applied to the component, the worst case
scenario (higher temperature, pressure and/or corrosion rate) shall be assumed.

The next step is to determine operating temperature and pressure, corrosion rate, time in
service, outside diameter, nominal thickness and fabrication material. Next the principal
and effective stresses are calculated for the component. The effective stress is then used
to calculate the remaining life or time to rupture. This is used to determined the
accumulated creep damage and subsequently, the creep factor and creep probability of
failure.

5.3.2 CONSEQUENCE OF FAILURE (CoF)


The Consequence of Failure (CoF) analysis in P-RBI is performed to aid in establishing a
relative ranking of the equipment items on the basis of risk. Generally, the CoF analysis is
evaluated as loss of fluid or containment to the external environment and the consequence
effects is generally considered for the following:
1) Safety and health impact (Flammability and toxicity)
2) Asset
3) Environmental
4) Reputation

For example, if a pressure vessel is subjected to deterioration of general or localised


corrosion either from internal or external part that causes a leak, a variety of consequences
could occur. Some of the possible consequences are:
PTS 30.27.10.30
February 2010
Page 25

• Formation of a vapour cloud that could ignite causing injury and equipment damage.
• Release of a toxic chemical that could cause health problems.
• Result in a spill and could cause environmental deterioration.
• Force a shutdown and have an adverse economic impact.
• Incidents that result in minimal safety, health, environmental and/or economic impact.

In P-RBI, the CoF is calculated by taking into account the Safety Consequences of a
release of a hazardous fluid that generally falls into either Flammability or Toxicity
categories, or both, and the Production Loss Consequences of the equipment being
evaluated. The final consequence category (A to E) is based on the highest of the
flammable, toxic and production loss consequences, which provide a relatively ranking of
CoF of the equipment item. The five CoF categories as tabulated in Table 5.5:

Table 5.5: CoF Category


Category Consequence
5 Catastrophic
4 Very Serious
3 Serious
2 Significant
1 Minor

5.3.2.1 Safety Consequences


The following data is required to perform the safety consequence rating for the fixed
equipment items:
• Representative fluid
• Initial state of representative fluid
• Final state of representative fluid
• Mixed toxic fluid, if any
• Percentage (%) of toxic composition
• Operating pressure
• Operating temperature
• Fluid inventory
• Leak duration

The contents of the equipment need to be characterized as a representative fluid. The main
constituent of the process will generally also be the representative fluid. There are two
categories of safety consequence that are analyzed in P-RBI, namely flammable and toxic
categories.

Flammable category
The consequences of flammable fluid are measures in terms of the area affected by the
ignition of a release. There are several potential outcomes for any release involving a
flammable fluid, however, P-RBI determines a single combined result as the average of all
possible outcomes, and weighted according to how likely the release is to be ignited.

The probability of ignition is a function of the representative fluid being considered for
release and its operating temperature. In general, as the temperature of the released fluid
increases, the probability of ignition increases. Proximity to ignition sources is covered in
the analysis by allowing a selection of “Near Ignition Source”, which sets the probability of
ignition for that release scenario to 1.0. The probability of an outcome represents the
PTS 30.27.10.30
February 2010
Page 26

probability that a specific physical phenomenon (outcome) will be observed after the
release has occurred.

Flammable consequence results are not highly sensitive to the exact fluid selected,
provided the molecular weights are similar, because air dispersion properties and heats of
combustion are similar for all hydrocarbons with similar molecular weights. It is important to
the consequence calculation that the correct initial state of the fluid (i.e. gas or liquid) be
selected that is generally determined from the process conditions (pressure, temperature
and fluid composition).

Toxic category
For toxic fluids, consequence is also measured in terms of the area affected by the
release. Release outcomes are simplified by assuming that a release in which the final
phase is a gas can be estimated from pre-calculated dispersion modelling using a standard
set of atmospheric and topographical conditions where the assumptions are as follows
(based on a release rate modelled using the methods developed in the Risk Management
Programme Guidance For Offsite Consequence Analysis Guidance Document, published
by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) on May 24, 1996) :
a) Atmospheric stability is Class F (stable atmosphere)

b) Wind speed of 5.47 km/hr (3.4 miles/hr)

c) Ambient air temperature of 25 deg C (77 deg F)

d) Topography is assumed to be urban (congested) conditions.

A release with a liquid final phase can be modelled as a liquid pool with a release rate from the
pool to atmosphere estimated as the rate of evaporation from the pool.
The toxic endpoint (in mg/l in air) for each regulated substance is established based on the
threshold for serious injury from exposure to the substance in air. The distance to the toxic
endpoint for each listed substance is provided as a lookup table. The distance is converted
into an affected area by assuming an elliptical release pattern with a 10 to 1 aspect ratio.
Both flammable and toxic affected area can be converted into a consequence category by using
the following Table 5.6:
Table 5.6: Affected Area and Consequence category
Consequence
Toxic Affected Area (m2)
Category
5 > 464,515
4 46,451 – 464,515
3 4,645 – 46,451
2 464 – 4,645
1 < 464

Occasionally a stream may contain a mixture of flammable or inert fluids and a toxic fluid, such
as a natural gas containing H2S. With such a mixed stream, models have been developed
to simultaneously analyze both the flammable and toxic consequences. The representative
fluid is selected as the major component of the mixed stream, and the flammable and toxic
consequences are both modelled.
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February 2010
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5.3.2.2 Asset Consequences


In addition to the safety consequences of a release of a hazardous fluid, a production loss
consequence can be assigned to the equipment being analyzed. For production loss
category, the calculation is based on total downtime of equipment when the equipment
experienced a failure. Specifically, the downtime for equipment is the total time taken to
shutdown the plant, carry out repair works, perform an inspection and resume normal
operation. In other words, it is a “product to product” situation. The downtime is measured
in hours and the total hours are converted to production loss value, in terms of money, by
taking into account the production cost per day for the plant or platform.
The production loss consequence category shall be assigned y into the P-RBI software
based on the category selected as shown in Table 5.7 below.

Table 5.7: Asset Categories

Consequence Category Asset Loss (USD) per event

5 > 10,000,000.00

4 1,000,000.00 – 10,000,000.00

3 100,000.00 – 1,000,000.00

2 10,000.00 – 100,000.00

1 < 10,000.00

5.3.2.3 Environment Consequences


The user shall assign the consequence of failure category for environment based on
operator’s experience and engineering assessment. A qualified HSE engineer shall be
consulted when determining the consequences

5.3.2.4 Reputation Consequences

The user shall assign the consequence of failure category for reputation based on
operator’s experience and engineering assessment. A qualified HSE engineer shall be
consulted when determining the consequences

For a combined CoF, P-RBI analysis will always go for the worst case between
Flammability, Toxicity, Asset, Environment and Reputation where the software will choose
the highest CoF ranking of the three categories.

Determining CoF ranking for heat exchanger tube bundles


The consequence ranking for heat exchanger tube bundles are based on an estimate
impact or cost of the failure. The CoF of the item is a function of the type of fluid on both
sides of the tube bundle, how much might be released in the event of a failure and the
effect of such a release, which will then be defined based on these measures:
• Safety/Flammable
• Safety/Toxic
• Product Loss
• Loss of Production
PTS 30.27.10.30
February 2010
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The following data is required to perform the CoF analysis for tube bundle in P-RBI:
• Fluid final state – Shell
• Fluid final state – Channel
• Flammable Leak Type
• Toxic Leak Type
• Unit Value – Leaking Product ($/kg)
• Time to Detect Leak (yrs)
• Production Loss Category

Note – for shell and channel of heat exchanger, the CoF model are similar like other
pressure vessel consequence models.

Safety Consequence
The safety consequence analysis looks at the likely leak direction (shell-to-tube or tube-to-
shell) and the hazard of the combined fluids. The analysis includes fluids which are
flammable such as hydrocarbons, or toxic such as H2S, or a combination of both. Reactive
and inert fluids are not considered as a safety consequence for heat exchanger tube
bundles. The following table provides an overview of the safety consequence ranking.

Measures of Safety Consequences


Category Flammable Toxic
A Tube leak could cause a Tube leak could cause a catastrophic
catastrophic loss of containment or loss of containment or violent chemical
violent chemical reaction reaction. Major toxic leak into a utility
system (Toxic leak rate > 2.27 kg/min)
B Major flammable HC vapour leak Minor toxic leak into a utility system
into a utility system (Leak rate > (Toxic leak rate < 2.27 kg/min)
45.36 kg/min)
Major toxic leak into a process system
(Toxic leak rate > 2.27 kg/min)
C Major flammable HC liquid leak Minor toxic leak into a process system
into a utility system (Leak rate > (Toxic leak rate < 2.27 kg/min)
45.36 kg/min)

Minor flammable HC vapour leak


into a utility system (Leak rate <
45.36 kg/min)
D Minor flammable HC liquid leak Leak into a toxic system
into a utility system (Leak rate <
45.36 kg/min)

Major utility leak into a HC system


(Leak rate > 45.36 kg/min)
E Minor utility leak into a HC system
(Leak rate < 45.36 kg/min)

The Leak Direction defines whether a leak in the bundle would be expected to allow fluid to
leak from the shell side of the exchanger to the channel side or vice versa. The logic used
in the calculation is:
• If the shell operating pressure > channel operating pressure then the Leak Direction = S
-> T
• If the channel operating pressure > shell operating pressure then the Leak Direction = T
-> S
• If the shell operating pressure = channel operating pressure then the Leak Direction =
N/A
PTS 30.27.10.30
February 2010
Page 29

The Initial Leak Rate is leak rate of the representative fluid based on the initial leak size.
The Initial Leak Rate is based on an initial leak diameter that equal to the nominal tube wall
thickness and its calculated using the release equations for the normal consequence
analysis. The simplified P-RBI consequence analysis models all release as continuous. A
continuous release is one which occurs over measurable period of time, allowing a liquid to
form a pool on the ground or a gas to disperse in the atmosphere. Release rate depend
upon the physical properties of the material, the initial phase and the process conditions.
The liquid and gas discharge rate calculation are the same as for fixed equipment shown in
Appendix ??? (calculations for liquid and gas discharge)

Product Leak Consequence

Determining CoF ranking for Storage Tank Bottom

A leak in the tank bottom should be considered a persistent leak to the ground, resulting in
an environmental consequence. The interesting case is when a low volatility liquid leaks
directly to the ground, with no membrane or slab to prevent the fluid from contaminating the
soil, and making it difficult to detect the leak. In that case, the fluid leak rate is a function of
the hole size in the bottom of the tank.

The leak is modeled as starting at a diameter equal to the tank floor thickness at a
predicted failure date and enlarging with time. The predicted failure date is the last tank
floor inspection date plus half of the planned inspection interval. The rate of increase of the
leak size is based on the combined corrosion rate on the internal and external of the tank
floor.

The volume released will be calculated taking soil type and condition in the affected area
into consideration. The total volume of liquid that leaks into the ground is the product of the
leak rate multiplied by the time it takes to detect and correct the leak. The detection time is
assumed to be the tank bottom inspection frequency unless other formal methods are in
place for monitoring for tank bottom leaks. It is conservatively assumed that the tank could
start leaking at ½ the inspection interval. The effect of the release will include an evaluation
of where the leak might ultimately end up, such as ground only, public surface water
(stream, river or lake), or underground water table. Credit will be applied for leak detection
systems when applicable. The following table can then be use to establish the leak rate as
a function of soil type and inspection interval:

Average Leak Rate Estimates in Gal / Day

Inspection Interval Clay Sand or Silt


5 years 08 15
10 years 11 22
15 years 16 31
20 years 23 44
PTS 30.27.10.30
February 2010
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The consequence will be based on the cost to clean up the affected area plus any other
associated costs. The Storage Tank Bottom Environmental Consequence is estimated as
the average leak rate multiplied by the duration of the leak (1/2 the inspection interval)
multiplied by the unit clean up cost. The consequence category is determined from the
following table:

Clean up Costs Consequence Category

Clean-up Cost (USD) per


Consequence Category
event

5 > 10,000,000.00

4 1,000,000.00 – 10,000,000.00

3 100,000.00 – 1,000,000.00

2 10,000.00 – 100,000.00

1 < 10,000.00

The Combined Consequence Category for the item being evaluated is the highest category
of any of the individual consequences that have been evaluated.

5.4 INSPECTION

5.4.1 Inspection Locations


Each inspection location shall be specified and marked on the drawing. Relevant locations
most susceptible to the actual degradation mechanism should be selected. The following
items should be considered when selecting the inspection locations:
• Access to the inspection locations
• Presence of insulation
• Coating condition
• Number of inspection locations

5.4.2 Inspection Planning


An Inspection Work Plan (IWP) shall be developed for each equipment item based on the
results of the RBI analysis. For each degradation mechanism, the P-RBI software will
recommend the inspection method(s), extent and frequency of inspection based on the
Inspection Priority. This is done using a set of inspection strategies built into the software.

The Inspection Engineer shall review the software generated inspection plan and may
accept or modify the recommended plan as necessary. The finalised inspection plan shall
contain the following items:

• Damage Mechanism
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February 2010
Page 31

¾ The software will identify the respective degradation mechanisms for which scheduled
inspection is required. This is based on the degradation mechanism identified and
analysed in the P-RBI analysis

• Inspection Priority

¾ The inspection priority is generated based on the criticality result for each degradation
mechanism

• Location

¾ The selection of appropriate inspection location will be determined by RBI engineer,


based on input from relevant resources such as qualified Piping or Vessel inspectors,
available information on critical spots from inspection records, and experience learnt from
similar units or pipings at same or other plants.

• Method

¾ The inspection engineer shall review the method recommended by the software to
determine whether the method is appropriate for the equipment component, taking into
account factors such as accessibility, availability and cost. If deemed necessary, the
inspection method recommended may be substituted with another inspection method that
can give equivalent or higher confidence of inspection. However, if there arise cases where
the method recommended need to be replaced with another method with lower inspection
confidence, the inspection interval should be decreased, so that an equivalent cumulative
inspection confidence will be reached over time.

• Extent

¾ The extent of inspection should be adequate to achieve the desired inspection


confidence for the respective criticality rating. For example, for a vessel with an ICPC of
Medium, a medium confidence internal inspection is required, in this case 50% internal
visual inspection coverage with spot UT measurements.

• Availability

¾ For each inspection method, the inspection engineer shall identify whether the
inspection can be performed online, whether the equipment needs to be taken off-line, or
whether a plant shutdown is required.

• Last Inspection Date

¾ The last inspection date is recorded in the inspection plan based on the inspection
history of the equipment item.

• Due Date

¾ The due date for each inspection method is identified, which is obtained by adding the
inspection interval (in years) to the last inspection date.

• Inspection Interval (Frequency)

¾ The software recommends the inspection interval based on the criticality rating e.g. for a
criticality rating of High, the software recommends an interval of 5 years, while for a
criticality rating of Medium, the software recommends an interval of 10 years.
¾ If NDE data has been recorded for the equipment, the software will use the half-life as
calculated by the NDE module, if the half life is less than the interval calculated based on
the criticality rating.
PTS 30.27.10.30
February 2010
Page 32

¾ The Inspection Engineer shall review the recommended inspection interval to comply
with statutory requirements and company business strategy.

• Preparation

¾ The inspection engineer may indicate what preparations, if any, are needed in order to
perform the inspection e.g. erection of scaffolding.

5.4.3 NDT Evaluation


All UT data shall be analyse to calculate the actual short term and long term corrosion rate
as per layout in Corrosion Assessment.

5.4.4 Inspection Pack


Inspection findings shall be reported and recorded in the systematic manner to ensure
consistent evaluation of findings.
Inspection reports must contain, as a minimum, the following:
• Equipment details
• Inspection techniques
• Inspector
• Inspection findings (to be as quantitative as possible)
• Inspection date & time

The findings shall be recorded into the P-RBI database.


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February 2010
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6.0 MONITORING
For non-age related degradation mechanisms, the critical parameters (e.g. moisture,
chloride, temperature) should be monitored accordingly. Any excursion shall be
documented in the P-RBI database and reported to P-RBI Team for follow-up action.
PTS 30.27.10.30
February 2010
Page 34

7.0 FEEDBACK, REVIEW AND UPDATING

Since P-RBI database is a life record, a continuous review and feedback is needed to
ensure that the data in the system is valid. Review sessions shall be conducted at
specified interval of not more than 3 years or shall be initiated if:
• Deviation from the agreed operating conditions occur or have occurred
• The basis of the evaluation is found to be incorrect (e.g. degradation due to unexpected
mechanisms has occurred, or actual degradation is significantly faster than the predicted)
• Major modifications have been made or new equipment is being introduced.
• Upon completion of any inspection activities where inspection data and verification has
been performed.

The review should be carried out by P-RBI team by assessing the process and inspection
data together in order to evaluate whether these data support or contradict the P-RBI
results and recommendation. Furthermore, this reviewing process will also determine if
there has been any new degradation noted that was not considered.
PTS 30.27.10.30
February 2010
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8.0 MANAGEMENT REVIEW

The MD/CEO / Plant Manager is responsible for P-RBI management review. The Plant
Management Committee or designated committee, as representatives of the MD/CEO,
shall review the implementation and effectiveness of P-RBI at intervals of not more than
three (3) years.

The Committee shall assess the effectiveness of the tool by reviewing the objective
evidence pertaining to asset integrity. Such evidence shall comprise, but may not be
limited to:

• Recommendations made in the Compliance Assessment (by PETRONAS P-RBI Task


Force) and the system effectiveness review and their implementation
• Trends in asset integrity performance through given KPIs and benchmarking with similar
plants

• The continuous improvement and the need for changes arising from:
¾ Changes in legislation
¾ Changes in the needs and expectations of the shareholders, customers, and employees
¾ Advances in technology
¾ Major changes to the manufacturing process or mode of operation
¾ Advances in the understanding of reliability
¾ Opportunities for risk reduction and mitigation

During the review, the Management shall set the asset integrity improvement objectives
and targets. These objectives shall be cascaded to relevant personnel and used as the
basis for developing the asset integrity improvement plans.

Minutes of the Committee meeting shall be taken at each meeting and proposed actions
shall be assigned to individuals for implementation. These shall be communicated to the
line.
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February 2010
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9.0 REFERENCES

In this PTS reference is made to the following publications:


NOTES: 1. Unless specifically designated by date, the latest edition of each publication shall be used,
together with any amendments/supplements/revisions thereto.

MALAYSIAN STANDARDS
The Factories and Machinery Act 1967 Act 139

The Factories and Machinery 1970


(Notification, Certificate of Fitness and
Inspection) Regulation

Factories and Machinery (Steam Boiler and 1970


Unfired Pressure Vessel) Regulations
The Occupational Safety and Health Act 1994 Act 514
The Occupational Safety and Health (Control of 1996
Industrial Major Accident Hazards) Regulations

AMERICAN STANDARDS

Risk-Based Inspection API 581 May 2000


Base Resource Document

Fitness-For-Service June 2007


API 579-1/ASME FFS-1

Damage Mechanisms Affecting December 2003


Fixed Equipment in the
Refining Industry, RECOMMENDED PRACTICE 571
PTS 30.27.10.30
February 2010
Page 37
PTS 30.27.10.30
February 2010
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10.0 APPENDICES

10.1 Appendix 1 : Calculated Corrosion Factors Based on Percent Wall Loss and Number and
Confidence of Inspections

10.2 Appendix 2 : Criteria to determine Initial Potential for Environmental Cracking Mechanism

Initial Potential Criteria

Amine Cracking (ASCC)


PTS 30.27.10.30
February 2010
Page 39

Initial Potential Criteria

Carbon steel PWHT regardless of operating temperature and


Low
concentration.
Carbon steel not PWHT and operating temperature 125 to 150°F for all
Medium
types of amines.
Carbon steel not PWHT and MEA all concentrations and temperatures or
High
DEA/MDEA > 140°F.
Carbonate Cracking
Operating Temperatures < 110°F and up to 50% caustic concentration, or
Low
temperatures < 150°F and caustic concentration < 20%.
Carbon steel at temperatures < 200°F and < 30% caustic concentration,
Medium
PWHT of CS welds and bends.
Carbon steel or 300 series SS at temperatures > 200°F and all
High concentrations of caustic. Steaming out caustic systems, and operation
upsets, Not PWHT.
Caustic Cracking
Operating Temperatures < 110°F and up to 50% caustic concentration, or
Low
temperatures < 150°F and caustic concentration < 20%.
Carbon steel at temperatures < 200°F and < 30% caustic concentration,
Medium
PWHT of CS welds and bends.
Carbon steel or 300 series SS at temperatures > 200°F and all
High concentrations of caustic. Steaming out caustic systems, and operation
upsets, Not PWHT.
Chloride Stress Corrosion Cracking (CSCC)
Chloride (Cl-) concentration 5 - 25 ppm, dissolved O2 < 0.1 ppm, pH >
Low
9.0, temperature > 120°F.
Chloride (Cl-) concentration 25 - 50 ppm, dissolved O2 < 10 ppm,
Medium
temperature > 140°F plus residual stress.
Chloride (Cl-) concentration > 50 ppm, temperature > 140°F plus residual
High stress and dissolved O2 > 10 ppm, all austenitic stainless steels (304,
316, 321, 347).
Hydrofluoric Acid (SOHIC, HIC, HSC)
Low Carbon steel PWHT regardless of concentration
Carbon steel PWHT with > 50 ppm O2, or with > 20 ppm Arsenic, or for
Medium
concentrated HF with > 7% H2O, or for trace amounts of HF (up to 5%)
Carbon steel not PWHT with > 50 ppm O2, or with > 20 ppm Arsenic, or
High for concentrated HF with > 7% H2O, or for trace amounts of HF (up to
5%)
Polythionic Acid SCC (PTA)
A chance for Sensitized SS and thermally stabilized 321 and
Low 347 when: surface has iron sulfide scale, stable operation (no
process upsets), good caustic wash procedures.
Sensitized austenitic SS and non-thermally stabilized 321 and
Medium 347 are possible when: surface has iron sulfide scale, higher
upset temperatures, some process upsets with air and water
PTS 30.27.10.30
February 2010
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Initial Potential Criteria

ingress, good caustic wash procedures.


Sensitized austenitic SS are likely when: surface has iron
High sulfide scale, operating temperature > 800°F process upsets
with air and water ingress, poor caustic wash procedures.
Wet H2S (Blistering, SOHIC, HIC, SCC)
H2S > 20 ppm and < 50 ppm, free H2O, PWHT or complies with
Low
MR-0175, HCN < 20 ppm.
H2S > 50 ppm, free H2O, PWHT, HCN > 20 ppm or pH < 5.5.
Medium Or Cracking Agent > 50 ppm, free H2O, Not PWHT, HCN < 20
ppm, no erosion (i.e. stable scale).
H2S > 50 ppm, free H2O, Not PWHT, HCN > 20 ppm or pH <
High
5.5.
PTS 30.27.10.30
February 2010
Page 41

10.3 Appendix 3 : Current Potential and Adjusted Years


No of Prior Inspection Damage Current Potential Adjusted Years since Last
Environmental Confidence Found for Inspection
Cracking (Last Environmental
Inspections Insp) Cracking
0 N/A N/A Initial / Prior Date of analysis – Date in
Potential Environmental Cracking Service =
(Years in Environmental Cracking
Service)
>0 Low No Initial / Prior Years in Environmental Cracking
Potential Service
>0 Low Yes One category Years in Environmental Cracking
Higher than Service
Initial / Prior
Potential up to
High
1 Very High Yes One category Date of analysis – Date of Last
Higher than Environment Cracking Insp. =
Initial./Prior (Yrs since last environmental
Potential cracking Insp).
>1 Very High Yes Two categories Date of analysis – Date of
Higher than Environmental Cracking Insp. =
initial / Prior (Yrs. Since Last Environmental
Potential, up to Cracking Insp.)
High
1 High Yes One Category Yrs. Since Last Environmental
Higher than Cracking Insp. + (Yrs. In
Initial/Prior Environmental Cracking Service –
Potential up to Yrs. Since Last Environmental
High Cracking Insp.)/4
>1 High Yes Two Categories Yrs. Since Last Environmental
Higher than Cracking Insp. + (Years in
Initial / Prior Environmental Cracking Service –
Potential, up to Yrs Since Last Environmental
High Cracking Insp.)/4
1 Medium Yes One Category Yrs. Since Last Environmental
Higher than Cracking Insp. + (Years in
Initial / Prior Environmental Cracking Service –
Potential up to Yrs Since Last Environmental
High Cracking Insp.)/2
>1 Medium Yes Two Categories Yrs. Since Last Environmental
Higher Than Cracking Insp. + (Years in
Initial/Prior Environmental Cracking Service –
Potentia Yrs Since Last Environmental
Cracking Insp.)/2
1 Very High No One Category Yrs. Since Last Environmental
Lower than Initial / Cracking Insp.
Prior Potential (If
Initial / Prior
Potential = Low,
Current Potential
= Low)
PTS 30.27.10.30
February 2010
Page 42

No of Prior Inspection Damage Current Potential Adjusted Years since Last


Environmental Confidence Found for Inspection
Cracking (Last Environmental
Inspections Insp) Cracking
>1 Very High No Low Yrs. Since Last Environmental
Cracking Insp.
1 High No Initial / Prior Yrs. Since Last Environmental
Potential Cracking Insp. + 5 (with a
maximum = (Years in
Environmental Cracking Service))
>1 High No One Category Yrs. Since Last Environmental
lower than Initial / Cracking Insp. + 5 (with a
Prior Potential (If maximum = (Years in
initial / Prior Environmental Cracking Service))
Potential =Low,
Current Potential
= Low
1 Medium No Initial / Prior Yrs. Since Last Environmental
Potential Cracking Insp. + 10 (with a
maximum (Years in
Environmental Cracking Service))
>1 Medium No One Category Yrs. Since Last Environmental
Lower than Initial / Cracking Insp. + 10 (with a
Prior Potential (If maximum = (Years in
Initial / Prior Environmental Cracking Service))
Potential=Low)
PTS 30.27.10.30
February 2010
Page 43

10.4 Appendix 4 : Corrosion Factor

No Damage Mechanisms Corrosion Factor


Environmental Cracking Corrosion Factor High Current
o Chloride Stress Corrosion Potential = 10(Adjusted Years/2.5)
Cracking
o Caustic Cracking
o Polythionic Acid Stress Corrosion Environmental Cracking Corrosion Factor Medium Current
1 (Adjusted Years/5)
Cracking Potential = 10
o Carbonate Cracking
o Hydrofluoric Acid mechanisms
Environmental Cracking Corrosion Factor Low Current
Potential = 10(Adjusted Years/10)
Environmental Cracking Corrosion Factor High Current
(Adjusted Years/5)
Potential = 10

Environmental Cracking Corrosion Factor Medium Current


(Adjusted Years/10)
2 o Amine Cracking and Wet H2S Potential = 10
mechanisms

Environmental Cracking Corrosion Factor Low Current


(Adjusted Years/15)
Potential = 10

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