KRISTO FRASHERI

THE HISTORY
OF ALBANIA
(a brief survey)

TIRANA
THE HISTORY
OF ALBANIA
(A Brief Survey)

TIRANA 1964
 CONTENTS

PREHISTORIC ALBANIA 1
THE ILLYRIANS 10
THE GREEK COLONIES 15
ILLYRIAN STATE FORMATIONS (5TH-2ND CENTURY B.C.) 19
ILLYRIA UNDER THE ROMAN RULE 27
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE BYZANTINE RULE 31
ALBANIA, 8TH-11TH CENTURY 36
THE PRINCIPALITY OF ALBANIA 42
FEUDAL RELATIONS IN ALBANIA 46
ALBANIAN FEUDAL PRINCIPALITIES OF THE 14TH
CENTURY 52
THE TURKISH CONQUEST OF ALBANIA 56
THE GENERAL REVOLT OF THE YEAR 1443 66
THE FIRST VICTORIES OF SCANDERBEG 72
THE CREATION OF THE INDEPENDENT ALBANIAN
STATE; THE WARS AGAINST THE TREASON OF THE
FEUDAL LORDS 76
THE BRILLIANT VICTORIES OF THE ALBANIANS
AGAINST SULTAN FATIH 82
THE CONTINUATION OF THE ALBANIAN RESISTANCE 86
THE STRENGTHENING OF THE TURKISH REGIME OF
TIMARS IN ALBANIA 89
ALBANIA, 17TH CENTURY 96
THE FORMATION OF ALBANIAN PASHALLEKS 99
THE GREAT PASHALLEK OF SHKODER —THE BUSHAT­
LIES 102
THE GREAT PASHALLEK OF JANINA —ALI PASHA
TEPELENA 107
THE DEFEAT OF THE GREAT PASHALLEKS AND THE
END OF THE REGIME OF TIMARS IN ALBANIA 113
THE FIRST STEPS OF THE NATIONAL MOVEMENT; THE
REVOLTS AGAINST THE TANZIMAT 117
THE LEAGUE OF PRIZREN (1878) 127
THE STRUGGLE OF THE LEAGUE OF PRIZREN AGAINST
THE PARTITION OF ALBANIA 136
THE STRUGGLE OF THE LEAGUE OF PRIZREN AGAINST
THE SUBLIME PORTE FOR THE AUTONOMY OF
ALBANIA 140
THE STRUGGLE FOR A NATIONAL SCHOOL AND
ALBANIAN LITERATURE 145
RESUMPTION OF THE ALBANIAN ARMED MOVEMENTS 153
THE GREAT REVOLTS OF 1910 AND 1911 163
THE GENERAL UPRISING OF 1912; THE DECLARATION
OF ALBANIAN NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE 171
THE FIRST YEARS OF INDEPENDENT ALBANIA 179
THE PLOTS OF FOREIGN POWERS TO HARM ALBANIA —
PRINCE WIED’S REGIME 186
ALBANIA DURING THE FIRST WORLD WAR 194
THE CONGRESS OF LUSHNJE AND THE WAR OF VLORA 202
THE POLITICAL LIFE IN ALBANIA IN 1920-1923 213
THE DEMOCRATIC BOURGEOIS REVOLUTION OF JUNE
1924 223
THE YEARS OF THE ZOGIST REPUBLIC 230
ALBANIA — ZOG 1ST MONARCHY 241
THE CONQUEST OF ALBANIA BY FASCIST ITALY 258
THE BEGINNING OF THE ANTI-FASCIST NATIONAL­
LIBERATION MOVEMENT 267
THE PATRIOTIC ARMED STRUGGLE AND THE DEVELOP­
MENT OF THE POPULAR REVOLUTION IN ALBANIA 280
THE CONTINUATION OF THE NATIONAL-LIBERATION
WAR AGAINST THE HITLERITE INVADERS; THE
LIBERATION OF ALBANIA AND THE TRIUMPH OF THE
POPULAR REVOLUTION 303
ALBANIA, A PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC 326
 PREHISTORIC ALBANIA

The remotest traces of man, discovered up to now in the

territory of Albania, appertain to the end of the middle
paleolithic age. They were found in 1939 in the vicinity of
the Xarra village, near the lake of Vivari, eight kilometres
from Butrint, in the southern extremity of Albania. They
are primitive tools of flint and jasper-coarsely worked blades
and scratchers; beside them there are found chips, produced
during the shaping of these tools, too.
In Xarra objects belonging to the late paleolithic age, too,
have been found — typical scrapers with “snouts” and some
blades cut out with chisel technique. The existence of man
during the late paleolithic age is attested especially by the
objects discovered in the Shen Marina Cave, likewise situated
in the vicinity of Butrint. A flint worked out with the pur­
pose of giving it the shape of a scraper and a blade of jasper
with notches in its sharp side as a result of use, have been
found within the cave beside a great number of fossilized
bones, among which the teeth and tibiae of a wild goat (capra
ibex) can be identified. Fragments of blades of bone and of
tools made of stone, incidentally found during the construc­
tion of a road at the foot of the Dajti mountain near Tirana,
belong to the same prehistoric epoch.
The materials of the neolithic age, too, are scarce and have
been discovered by mere chance. They are mainly stone
clubs and axes found in different parts of the country — at
Gruemira (Shkoder), Dushmani (Dukagjin), Nepravishta
(Gjirokaster), Finiqi (Delvina), Butrint and elsewhere —
belonging, all of them, to the late neolithic period, and some
of them even to the neolithic period.
Prior to the Second World War, all our knowledge on the
neolithic human society in Albania based on the materials
1
discovered in Velsha of the Vlora district, was poor and un­
certain. Fragments of ceramics discovered at this neolithic
station are divided into two groups — the pictured ceramics,
with geometrical motives of straight lines and usually in red,
grey, brown and black colours, and the incised achromatic
ceramics, the decorations of which generally consist of arched
lines, especially spirals. Today, however, the human society
of that prehistoric period is better known, thanks to the
relatively rich materials discovered by the Albanian
archaeologists these recent years at the station of Maliq
(Kor^a) of Balkan interest.
In Maliq the first materials were discovered casually in
1948 while the works for irrigation of the zone and the
drainage of the Maliqi lake were being carried on. In 1961,
the Albanian archaeologists started in this region systematic
excavations, which still continue. The large amount of
materials found, which as yet have not been made public,
are kept in the archaeological-ethnographical Museum of
Tirana. According to preliminary information given by
them, the excavations in Maliq, which have reached up to
4 m. in depth, have revealed in the lower part of the alluvial
soil two cultural strata with features distinct from one an­
other, belonging to the neolithic period (the third millennium
B.C.), whereas on the upper part a dwelling place of the
bronze age (the second millennium before our era).
In the lower strata, that appertain to the neolithic period,
there were discovered working-tools of stone (hammers, axes,
hatchets, mill-stones), of flint (knives, scrapers), of horn
(hammers, hoes), of bone (awls and arrow-heads), of clay
(spools for spinning and weights for fishing-nets) and of cop­
per (chisels, axes and hooks). The greater part of the
materials are earthen wares, in the major part without han­
dles, whereas the others have vertical handles reaching up
to the mouth of the jar. As in Velga, here also many of
these wares are embellished with ornaments — for the most
part pictured with lineary geometrical motives, others en­
graved with small holes, furrows or reliefs. In these strata,
traces of pile dwellings and, beside them, traces of build­
2
ings with only ground floor are found. There were found,
too, anthropomorphic and zoomorphic plastic figures, beads
and children’s toys; beside them, cereal seeds and bones of
domestic animals.
The materials discovered in the lower strata of the Maliq
station represent, in a more emphatic manner than at Vel^a,
two different cultures of the neolithic period. One of them,
chronologically older because it is found in the deeper
stratum of the soil, is represented mainly by the pictured
ceramics, the pile dwellings, the jars without handles and,
probably, also by the anthropomorphic and zoomorphic
plastic figures. The other, belonging to a later time, perhaps
to the end of the neolithic period, is represented by the
engraved ceramics, the ground-floor buildings and the pots
with vertical handles.
From the ethnic-linguistic point of view, these two groups
of cultures represent in themselves two groups of different
populations, which is practically verified also by the results
obtained through other means by a number of linguist­
scientists.
The pictured ceramics of Maliq or Velca, diffused in this
prehistoric period not only in the Balkans (especially in
Thessaly, Macedonia, Bulgaria) but also in all the Mediter­
ranean basin up to Ukraine (the Tripoli culture), may hint at
the existence of a population of the Mediterranean ethnic-
linguistic trunk in the Albanian territory at the beginning or
the middle of the neolithic period. Perhaps it is by this
population that ought to be sought the origin of linguistic
elements of the Mediterranean group inherited by the Al­
banian language of the Indo-European group, such as the
words: mat (mountain), hardhi (vine), shege (pomegranate),
shkabe (eagle), bisht (tail), etc., the toponyms Buna, Nish,
Ishem (in antiquity: Barbana, Naissus, Asimos), the numbers
njezet (twenty), dyzet (forty) which are considered as rem­
nants of the pre-Indo-European “vingtesimal” system of
numbering, the suffixes — assa, ua, anna, at, etc.
On the contrary, the incised ceramics discovered both in
Maliq and in Vel^a, which are alike in manifold respects
3
Site of Maliq, near Korea, in the Neolithic and Bronze Ages.
View of excavations made in 1961-1963
 Typical Illyrian pottery of the first millennium B.C.

with the incised ceramics discovered in Thessaly, Mace­

donia, Serbia and, in general, with the ceramic culture of
the Danubian zone, lead us to presume the existence of a
population of the Indo-European ethnic-linguistic trunk,
which had no knowledge of the pictured ceramics and which,
as it is believed, had migrated from central Europe or the
northern Balkans, about the end of the neolithic period,
mingling in their new home with the earlier Mediterranean
population. Here, perhaps, we have got to do with that
same population called by the scientists as proto-Indo-
European or pre-Hellenic Indo-European and by some others
even as pre-Illyrian, which, as it is supposed, had settled in
the Balkans some centuries before the Greek migration. For
altogether practical reasons, some scientists attribute to this
population the name of Pellasges, about whom the ancient
writers have transmitted to us a numbei’ of legends and con­
fused and contradictory information. Among these writers,
Herodotus informs us that he found the traces of the pre­
Greek inhabitants — the Pellasgs— also in Epirus (a name
which, in ancient times, comprised also the regions of the
southern Albania of today), who had come here from adja­
cent Thessaly; whereas Strabo, relying on Efor, Hesiod e,
Aeschylus and Euripides, says that the former home of the
Pelasgs was Arcadia and that they migrated from here to
Epirus as well as to Thessaly, Crete, Lesbos and Troado.
Elements of this proto-Indo-European language have been
inherited, according to the opinion of many linguists, by the
Albanian language also.
Nevertheless, the question whether the material cultures,
documented especially in the field of ceramics in Maliq,
Vel^a and other parts of the Albanian territory, have been
products — the one of the “Mediterranean” population and
the other of the “proto-Indo-European” (Pelasgic) popula­
tion — is still a matter open for discussion.
Apart from the ethnicity problem of the neolithic station
of Maliq, there may be drawn some conclusions of particular
interest in connection with the stage of economic and social
development of the inhabitants of this prehistoric period,
until now almost entirely unknown. The objects found in
great numbers in a limited surface indicate that in the third
millennium B.C., at least in this zone, the population was
relatively dense and settled. The inhabitants of this period
practised hunting, but by the bones of domestic animals we
assume that cattle-herding was known to them. Primitive
diggers, horn hoes, clay sieves, mill-stones and the very
cereal seeds testify that they had begun to practise agricul­
ture. They also knew fishing with hooks and nets, which is
to be attested by the hooks of horn (later of copper) as well
as by the net-weights of clay discovered at this station. Bone
needles, horn awls and the spinning-spools of clay indicate
that they knew spinning and weaving. The pile houses lead
us to believe that they knew sailing. The earthen ware with
smoothed surface, worked with care and taste, witness for
6
 a quite advanced stage of pottery. This is also proved by
the ornaments, which in themselves represent the remotest
traces of decorative art discovered up to now in Albania.
The anthropomorphic and zoomorphic plastic figures prob­
ably are signs of a polytheistic cult. Finally, the character
of the tools and the uniformity of the ornaments and chil­
dren’s toys demonstrate that in the third millennium the
human society of this or these cultures led a collective life
and that within it there did not exist any differentiations
between them.
Concerning the bronze age (the second millennium B.C.)
our knowledge was likewise very limited. Before the Sec­
ond World War the attention of the archaeologists and his­
torians was attracted by two types of bronze axes, called by
them the “ Dalmato-Albanian,’’ and the “Scutarine” axes, with
typological characteristics different from the axes found in

Bronze axe heads of the “Dalmato-Albanian” type

7
the adjacent regions and believed to have been produced
within Albanian territory, which hypothesis is confirmed
also by a badly cast axe found in the vicinity of Shkoder. On
the contrary today our knowledge of this epoch has been en­
riched in a satisfactory manner by the excavations carried
out in recent years by the Albanian archaeologists and by
the material found especially in Maliq, Pazhoku (Elbasan)
and Gajtani (Shkoder).
The materials of Maliq, which were found above the neo­
lithic stratum, belong to the beginnings of the bronze age
and are quite interesting as far as ceramics is concerned.
Here the pictured ceramics with characteristic holes on the
sides become gradually fewer until, in the upper stratum,
they vanish altogether. Whereas, the engraved ceramics
with vertical handles become more numerous, without
swerving from the ceramic forms and decorative ornaments
of the former neolithic stratum. On this stratum only traces
of ground-floor buildings and house-hearths are to be
found. These materials witness the continuity of the
earlier proto-Indo-European (Pelasgic) population.
In the Pazhoku plain, about 25 km. to the southwest of
Elbasan, in 1960 the Albanian archaeologists proceeded to
uncover more than 25 tumuli scattered between a marsh and
the river Devolli, the same river which passes through the
Maliqi lake. During these excavations characteristic data
were obtained on the construction of graves and of tumuli,
as well as on considerable inventory materials — arms
(knives, daggers, swords, lance points) of bronze, a spiral-
shaped ornament of gold for women, an arrow-head of
flint and many earthen wares, some of which had been im­
ported from the Aegean basin, some had been produced on
the spot after the Creto-Mycenaean types, and some pro­
duced according to the traditions inherited from the
neolithic period. These objects, which seem to belong to
the same population, appertain to a period posterior to
that of Maliq; they belong to the later centuries of the
bronze age, some of them even to the middle of the second
millennium B.C.
 Ornamental brooch worn by women

The materials discovered during the excavations of the

years 1961-1963 in the village of Gajtani, about 5 km. to the
east of Shkoder, belong to a more recent period. The ma­
terials found in the lower strata belong to the end of the
bronze age and to the beginning of the iron age; those of
the upper stratum reach up to the time of the Roman oc­
cupation of this locality (3rd century B.C.). In Gajtani we
find traces of a citadel, which — together with the citadels
of Dorzi, Shkoder, Marshej, etc. — are the most ancient
9
fortified inhabited places of the Illyrians discovered in Al­
bania up to now. In the fragments of ceramics, which seem
to belong to the beginning of the iron age (the beginning
of the first millennium B.C.) interesting similarities can
be noticed — especially in the decorations (incised geomet­
rical ornaments) — with the incised ceramics of Maliq.
which constitutes ample evidence for an uninterrupted in­
heritance from the end of the neolithic period and con­
sequently for the same population, too, which by the early
Greek writers is no longer called Pelasgic but Illyrian.

THE ILLYRIANS

According to the general prevailing opinion in historical

sciences, during the bronze age and the beginning of the
iron age, the Illyrians lived in central Europe. The Aunje-
tic, Lausic and Halstat cultures, discovered in Austria, rep­
resent, according to the archaeologists, the Illyrian cultures,
respectively, of the middle of the bronze, the end of the
bronze and the beginning of the iron ages. Again ac­
cording to the opinion of the scientists, during the migration
of the Indo-European populations, which occurred in the
second millennium B.C. from the north to the south of
Europe, after the Hellenes who settled in the south of the
Balkans and after the Thracians who stretched themselves
to the north of the Hellenes, at the end of the bronze and
the beginning of the iron age, large masses of Illyrians
migrated too. At the termination of these migrations,
young Illyrian populations covered all the western
Balkans, approximately the territories of Albania and
Yugoslavia of nowadays, fusing with the former, very
similar, “proto-Indo-European” or “Pelasgic” or “proto­
Illyrian” populations. This circumstance can help to ex­
plain the similarity of the material culture of the new
Illyrians settled in the Balkans — on one side with the cul­
10
tures of Maliq and Pazhoku, and on the other with the cul­
tures of Lausic and Halstat. From the Balkans, some Illy­
rian tribes (the Mesaps, the Japygs, etc.) crossed the Adriatic,
probably from the seacoast of Albania of today, and settled
in southern Italy, where later they were assimilated by the
Romans.
The most ancient Hellenic literary sources (Homer, He-
siode, Scyllaks, Herodotus, Hecateus, Thucydides, etc.)
mention the Illyrians as divided into different tribes. The
ancient Roman writers Pomponius Mela and Pliny the Elder
point out a certain difference between the Illyrians of the
north and those of the south; they call the latter “Illyrians
in the real sense of the word” (Illyri proprie dicti). From
ancient literature and from the inscriptions discovered in
their homes we come to learn the names of many large and
small Illyrian tribes. Such were, for example, in southern
Illyria: the Enkeleys, the Ardians, the Taulants, the Dardans,
the Parthins, the Pirusts, the Labeats, the Kaons, the Thes-
prots, the Molosses, whereas in northern Illyria, the Liburns,
the Japods, the Dalmats, the Desidiats, the Antariats, etc.
The Illyrians called themselves by the name of the tribe to
which they belonged. They were called with the collective
name of Illyrians and their country Illyria by foreigners —
the Greeks, the Romans, etc. Only the territories to the
south of the river Viosa up to the Ambracian Gulf, inhabited
by a number of Illyrian tribes such as the Kaons, Thes-
protes, Molossi and others, were called Epirus, after the
Greek word which means continental land. They were
called thus by the Greek inhabitants of the Ionian Islands
to differentiate their insular land from the continental land
facing them.
The Illyrians had a language of their own: Illyrian. Up
to the present no Illyrian text has been discovered. From
the Illyrian we know only a few words, which have been
transmitted to us from authors of antiquity, a few chiselled
inscriptions and considerable anonyms, toponyms and
hydronyms. This constituted a special branch of the Indo-
European family and was closely related to the Thracian.
11
The similarity with it was so great that a number of scien­
tists have come to the conclusion that the Illyrian and the
Thracian were two dialects and not two separate languages.
Through the study of glossological material of the Illyrian
language the linguists since long have arrived at the con­
clusion that present Albanian is derived directly from the
Illyrian. Many Illyrian words and names can be explained
accurately by means of the corresponding Albanian words,
such as: “bile” — bile, bie (daughter); “brention” — brini
(horn); “barka”—barku (belly); “bauria”—burri (man), etc.,
the name of the tribe “Delmat” by the Albanian “delme':
or “dele” (sheep); that of the tribe “Dardan” by the Al­
banian “dardha” (pear); the toponym “Dimalum” by the
Albanian “dy-male” (two mountains); the anonym “Bardus"
by the Albanian “bardhe” (white); “Bardhylis” by the Al­
banian “bardhe ylli” (white star), etc. The genetic connec­
tion between the Illyrian and the Albanian is likewise dem­
onstrated by other grammatical elements. This connection
has been illustrated by scientists through different elements
from the sphere of material and spiritual culture, too.
In the Illyrian ethnical sea there were to be met with
Thracian isles, too, probably superseded from the period of
migration of Thracian tribes which had been assimilated by
the Illyrians in the course of time. Probably it is in these
isles that have had their origin some Thracian words pre­
served in present Albanian which have induced a limited
number of linguists to consider the Albanian as derived
from the Thracian. Partially the origin of these words is to
be explained by the proximity of the Illyrians with the
Thracians, who in some of the bordering districts had created
a symbiosis. An intermediary solution has been chosen by
a number of other linguists, who maintain that the Albanian
is a progeny of an Illyrian-Thracian symbiosis. But every­
one knows that linguistic materials alone are not sufficient
to conclude on the genesis of a people. Archaeological,
ethnographic and historical materials convince us that the
Albanian people constitute a continuation of the Illyrians.
12
 When the Illyrians migrated, they brought into the Bal­
kans the knowledge of the use of bronze. After the elapse of
some time from the beginning of the first millennium, in
their new home they started to make use of iron. The Illy­
rian tribes who came to the Balkans at a later period brought
with them from their former abode their iron age culture.
This is evidenced by the discoveries made in the city of
Halstadt of Austria.
It is by the material discovered in a number of inhabited
centres and in many tumuli dating from that period, that
we come to know about the Illyrian society of the early
centuries of their history in the Balkans up to the time when
written sources appeared (approximately until the 7th-6th
century B.C.). Our knowledge of the Illyrian society of
that period has been enriched by the excavations undertaken
in these recent years by the Albanian archaeologists. The
iron pickaxes, axes, scythes, discovered in the different
places of habitation of the Illyrians, lead to the presumption
that agriculture was not in a low and backward state. They
were cognizant of several agricultural cereals such as
wheat, oats, millet; fruits such as apples and grapes; vege­
tables such as horse-beans, peas, etc. A great source of
wealth of their economy was cattle-raising. Spades, axes,
hammers, lances, shields, knives, chains, nails, etc. of
bronze and iron, buckles, rings, bracelets, earrings, badges
and other ornaments of gold and silver, that decorate the
shelves of the Museum of Tirana, witness for the relatively
advanced handicraft of the Illyrians. In pottery they
made use of hand-lathes with which they produced wares
in series. The Illyrians of the seacoast were bold sailors.
Their crossing en masse to Italy demonstrates that since
early periods they had ships big enough to traverse freely
and unhindered the Adriatic. The fact that Liburnian
sailors undertook in the 7th century voyages from north­
ern Dalmatia to the island of Corfu leads to the supposi­
tion that they were well acquainted with speedy and light
ships. The Illyrians had fortified hamlets. Such fortified
strongholds, constructed with huge stones, have been dis­
13
covered in recent years by Albanian archaeologists within
the territory of Albania. In those centuries the Illyrians
had started to barter with foreign lands also. The dis­
covered materials demonstrate that barter was carried on
with different territories of the Mediterranean basin,
primarily with the Phoenician, Hellenic and Italian cities.
To their Balkan homeland the Illyrians brought with them
their system of primitive community. But documents lack
that would throw light on their social organization in this
period. Still, on the basis of their material culture, we can
deduct it in general lines. The growth of productive forces,
which followed as a result of the new implements and tools
in bronze and in iron, brought about the dissolution of the
primitive community. Within its frame the private property
emerged which, on its part, gave rise to the process of social
differentiation. From the surplus in the production some
families derived great wealth for themselves; thus, tribal
nobility was born which marked the end of the former equal­
ity of the members of the community. We perceive the
social differentiation at the inventories of the tumuli. Some
sepulchres have rich inventories and precious ornaments,
others are entirely poor. At the end of this process, the prim­
itive community was dissolved. The society with classes
took its place. At the same time within the tribes the first
state organisms also made their appearance. In order to
defend themselves from the attacks of stronger tribes, as
well as with the aim to assail wealthier tribes, some of the
Illyrian tribes banded themselves in temporary alliances
with each other. With the elapse of time these alliances
were transformed into federations, each one known by the
name of the most important tribe that took part in it. The
most ancient federations that wTe know of are those which
were created with the Enkeleys and Taulans as centre fig­
ures. Initially the chief of the federation elected by the
common assembly, retained office for a certain period of
time. But later, in some of the federations, the chief became
a monarch. At the head of the federations of the Enkeleys
and of the Taulans stood a king as early as the 7th century
14
B.C. In some cases, at the head of the federation stood also
women, as it was the case with the Liburns, or else there
stood two kings, as it was with the Molossi.
On the origin of these federations and their first mon­
archs, early Greek authors have transmitted to us many
legends. Some of these legends treat, for example, the ad­
ventures of the early monarchs of Epirotic tribes during the
Trojan War.

THE GREEK COLONIES

From the point of view of social and political organization,

the colonies of the Illyrian coast had the same development
as the cities of Greece. Each one of them constituted an
independent “polis”. The language of the colonies was
Greek. The customs and religion were the same as those of
the place from which they had come. In these colonies
from the earliest time relations expanded based on slave­
ownership. As a result of their relations, in these colonies
the same institutions were implanted that had been adopted
in Greece, especially in Korkyra and Corinth.
At the beginning, the supreme organ of the colony was
the assembly of the citizens, which met regularly at fixed
periods, and chose the “Council of the Phylarches”. At the
head of the council stood an archon and a prutan. The coun­
cil conducted the administration of the city-state. But with
the economic prosperity and the spreading of the relations
based on slave-ownership, there came also a change in the
social structure of the colony. At the head stood the aris­
tocracy, composed of proprietors of land and of slaves. The
bulk of the population was constituted by the demos, which
comprised artisans, merchants, sailors, etc. who were free
by law and enjoyed the right to participate in the helie.
Amidst them there were also quite wealthy craftsmen and
merchants. At the bottom stood the slaves and persons
deprived of all rights. In the Hellenic colonies there were
15
Illyrian residents, too. These, though they were not slaves,
did not enjoy any of the citizens’ rights.
By further growth of power, the landed aristocracy, who
were at the same time slave-owners, usurped, almost in all
the colonies, the magistracy of the city-state, by dwindling
the traditional rights of the people’s assembly. The oligar­
chic domination of the aristocracy gave rise in these colonies
to a series of internal wars on the part of demos.
Of these wars the most important one was that which
broke out in Dyrrachion in the year 496 B.C., led by the
craftsmen and rich merchants who, taking advantage of the
discontent of the demos, expelled the aristocrats from the
city.
The banished aristocrats took shelter at the Illyrian neigh­
bours’, the Taulants, and solicited their aid, promising them
that after the recapture of the city, they would grant to
their leaders the citizenship within Dyrrachion. The
Taulants accepted this offer and, together with the aris­
tocrats, they started to assail the city by land and by sea.
In the civil war of Dyrrachion other cities of Greece, too.
took part. Corinth sided with the demos, while Korkyra
helped the aristocrats. In this conflict, Athens too took
part by intervening in favour of the aristocrats. The war
lasted over a number of years. In 433 the fleets of Athens
and of Korkyra defeated the Corinthian fleet. Afterwards,
the aristocrats, with the help of the Taulants and of the
Korkyrians, attacked and captured Dyrrachion, re-establish­
ing the oligarchic rule. On account of the help they had
given, the Taulant chiefs obtained the rights of citizenship
and started living in Dyrrachion. The Civil War of Dyr­
rachion became, as is well known, the starting point of a
war of nearly a quarter of a century that broke out some
years later between the Greek cities and which is known
under the name of “Peloponnesian War”. During this war.
Dyrrachion backed Athens.
Thanks to the profits extracted from the exploitation of
the slaves and from the trade with the Illyrians, the colonies
achieved a speedy cultural development. Ever since the
16
 Site of the ancient city of Apollonia (founded 588 B.C.) with
a 16th century Byzantine-style church in the background

early centuries of their foundation, in the colonies were

erected beautiful buildings of marble, stone and brick. In
the cities dwellings were built with courts, temples con­
secrated to the deities of the Greek mythology, amphithea­
tres, where dramas and comedies were staged, odeons for
music and song, gymnasiums and palestrae, where the youth
acquired mental and physical culture. The traces of these
buildings discovered by archaeologists can be seen even in
our days, more especially in Apollonia, Bathrot and Foinike.
The cities were surrounded by walls constructed with chis­
elled stones. In the centre of the city usually there was
the agora, paved with marble slates, encircled by chiselled
columns and adorned with statues of marble. The agora
served as a square where the citizens met for commercial
transactions, for the festive gatherings and different cere­
monies. In some colonies ruins of stadiums too have been
discovered.
17
 The homes, the temples and the public buildings were
embellished with paintings and mosaics and were adorned
with sculptures. In the colonies, along with the chiselling
of columns and of their capitals with decorations, the mon­
umental sculpture, too, had most conspicuous development.
The busts and the statues of gods, goddesses, leading per­
sonages, high officials, philosophers, writers and of aristo­
crats, discovered nowadays, demonstrate the level and the
high artistic taste of these colonies. Especially valuable are,
among others, the Goddess of Butrint (Apollonia), which is
to be found in the Museum of Rome, the heads of Silenus,
of Ares and of Demosthenes, discovered in Apollonia, which
are kept in the Archaeological Museum of Pojani.

ILLYRIAN STATE FORMATIONS

(5TH-2ND CENTURY B.C.)

The social differentiation that took place within the Illy­

rian tribes led also to the establishment of relations based on
slave-ownership.
As elsewhere, with the Illyrians also the slavery had at
the beginning a patriarchal character. But later on some
of the tribes achieved the more advanced forms of slavery.
Among the Ardians, for example, the Spartan type of slavery
was spread. The Ardians had subjugated a whole popula­
tion and had made of them mere “prospelates”, by exacting
from them, as the Spartans did with the Helots, part of their
produce. On the contrary, the Dardans, after they had
subdued a neighbouring land, had turned its inhabitants into
slaves (dullos) and had shared them among themselves. Some
chief Dardans had a thousand “dullos” each, and sometimes
even more. The slaves of the Dardans in time of peace

Apollonia, “Goddess of Butrint”,

discovered in Butrint (Bufroton)
19
tilled the land for the benefit of the proprietor, whereas in
time of war they had to serve as soldiers under his command.
In the 5th to the 2nd century, there were deep in the inland
of the country Illyrian tribes that knew nothing about
slavery.
The development of the slave-owning relations had af­
fected the whole economy of the country. The craftsmen's
production increased still more; so did trade. This brought
about the foundation, during the 5th to the 3rd centuries,
of a number of towns with Illyrian inhabitants, such as
Skodra (Shkoder), Amantia (Pllo^a, Vlora), Bylis (Hekali.
Mallakastra), Foinike (Finiqi, Delvina) and many other
smaller towns. From the beginning of the 4th century B.C..
the Illyrian towns started the coinage of their own currency.
But the most important result of the diffusion of the
slave-owning relations was the passage from the tribal fed­
erations to state formations. The most important of these
formations were the realms of the Enkeleys, of the Taulants.
of Epirus and of the Ardians.
In the 5th century B.C. the Enkeleys who dwelt in the
Korga and Devolli plains, founded a strong kingdom, and by
stretching towards the east they became neighbours of the
Macedonian kingdom. There were long wars between these
two kingdoms. For more than 60 years (420-360 B.C.) the
Enkeleys had the supremacy. Their kingdom grew strong­
er, particularly when at the beginning of the 4th century
Bardhylus, who distinguished himself as a political leader
and as a military commander, ascended to the throne. Bar­
dhylus wrested from Macedonia large tracts of land, he
obliged its king to pay him a tribute, and often interfered
in matters relating to the throne. Bardhylus was success­
ful in his wars with other neighbours, too.
From the year 360, however, when Philip II ascended to
the throne of Macedonia, there was a reverse in the relations
between the two neighbouring kingdoms, to the detriment
of the Enkeleys. Philip II did not approve of the conditions
of submission which had been accepted by his predecessors.
At the head of his phalanxes, he attacked several times one
20
after the other his western neighbours, who defended stub­
bornly their countries until in 344, taking advantage of the
death of Bardhylus, he subjugated the Enkeleys.
After the death of Philip in 335 the Enkeleys, under the
leadership of Klit, heir to Bardhylus, freed themselves from
the dependence on Macedonia. With the aim to defend their
freedom, Klit entered into an alliance with Glaucus, king
of the Taulants. But the son of Philip II, Alexander of
Macedonia, assailed-that same year the Illyrian forces. The
decisive battle was fought at Pelion (Vangonji Passage, near
Korga), and was crowned, through an artifice of Alexander,
with the victory of the Macedonians.
After the death of Alexander, when his big empire was
split up, the Enkeleys regained once again their indepen­
dence. But their realm, besides being small in size, contin­
ually got weaker, and could not play any important role.
In the 5th century B.C. the Taulants, too, who had oc­
cupied the territories along the coastline of Albania of today,
established likewise an independent kingdom. About the
middle of the 4th century, the Taulant kings captured Dyr­
rachion, and later Apollonia also. But at the same time, they
had to fight against the kings of Macedonia, who aimed to
reach the Adriatic coast. In order to frustrate the Mace­
donian attempts, the most renowned king of the Taulants,
Glaucus, entered into an alliance with Klit. As has been
explained above, the armies of the two Illyrian allies, how­
ever, were beaten at Pelion by Alexander of Macedonia,
who, though victorious, did not continue his push towards
the coast.
The conflicts with Macedonia continued even after the
death of Alexander. One of the reasons that aggravated
the relations between Glaucus of the Taulants and Cassan-
der of the Macedonians, was the struggles to secure suprem­
acy in Epirus.
Towards the end of the 5th century B.C., the Epirotic
tribes had united themselves with the Molossi and had
created a federation, which was called by the ancient Greek
authors as “Koinen of the Molossi” (League of the Molossis).
21
At the head of the league stood a hereditary monarch,
whose power was limited by a council of notables and by
the people’s assembly. Sometimes at the head of the Mo-
lossi League there were two kings.
The Epirots too had to fight against the Macedonian kings.
But in the year 345 the Molossi were defeated. Philip II
placed on the Epirotic throne his brother-in-law Alexander
Molossus, and later the son of the latter, Neoptolem II, thus
affirming his influence and authority.
After the death of Alexander of Macedonia, the Molossi
banished Neoptolem II and chose as king in his stead Ayakid
of the ancient Epirotic dynasty, who conducted an indepen­
dent policy. But in the year 317 Cassander of Macedonia
invaded the country with his armies, chased away Ayakid
and installed Neoptolem II as king. Cassander’s rival, Glau-
cus of the Taulants, took under his protection into his court
the son of Ayakid, the two-year-old Pyrrhus, whom he re­
fused to surrender even after Cassander had menaced him
with war. On the contrary, feeling himself strong enough,
in 307 Glaucus invaded Epirus, upset the authority and the
rule of the party friendly to the Macedonians, and put onto
the throne his ally, the 12-year-old Pyrrhus. The unrest
and the troubles continued in Epirus further on. In 302
Pyrrhus was chased out by his opponents who brought back
Neoptolem to the throne. For a number of years Pyrrhus
resided in various places, in Egypt, Syracuse, Macedonia,
where he acquired culture and learned the art of war. In
296, the 23-y ear-old Pyrrhus returned once again to Epirus.
For some time he reigned as king together with Neoptolem,
and after Neoptolem was killed, he became the only ruler
of the Molossi League. Pyrrhus consolidated the royal au­
thority, put a limit to the prerogatives of the Council of the
Notables, and made out of the Molossi League a powerful
state. He conducted an independent policy in respect both
of the Macedonians as well as of the Taulants, who had sup­
ported him. Pyrrhus extended the boundaries of Epirus:
on the east deep into Macedonia up to the Vardar river, on
the south in the territories of Greece up to the Peloponne­
sian Gulf, on the north, in the homeland of the Taulants up
to the Shkumbin river.
After these successes, Pyrrhus, who dreamt of building an
empire as vast as that of Alexander, cast his eyes on Italy.
The opportunity was offered to him when Tarento solicited
his support in order to defend itself against Rome. In
280 B.C., at the head of 3,000 men and 20 elephants, he
crossed over to Italy, and that same year he obtained at
Heraclea a brilliant victory over the Roman army. A year
later, in 279, at Ausculum, the Epirotes had another clash
with the Roman army, which this time comprised 70,000 men.
The Epirotes were victorious, but their losses in men were so
great that Pyrrhus said: “If I obtain another similar victory,
there will remain no one to go back with me to Epirus!”
In the third encounter that he had with the Roman army
in 275, Pyrrhus was defeated and returned to Epirus. Here
he undertook a series of campaigns against Macedonia, then
he crossed over to Peloponnese in order to assail Macedonia’s
ally, Sparta. But in an encounter in the city of Argos, he
was killed in 272.
Pyrrhus has been one of the most remarkable military
leaders not only of the Illyrians, but of the whole of the
ancient age. He distinguished himself as a statesman, too.
With him Epirus reached the climax of its power. But
after Pyrrhus’ death, the Epirotic aristocracy, discontented
with his ruler, rose against the monarchic regime. On ac­
count of these internal conflicts, the kingdom of Epirus was
gradually weakened. The conquertsd lands broke off one
after the other. In 230 the aristocracy at last upset the
monarchic regime and re-established the former league
called “Koinen of the Epirus”, with its capital in Foinike.
Instead of the king, at the head of the league was put a chief
who was elected once every year. However, the “League of
the Epirotes” too, was considerably weak.
During the 3rd century B.C., while the states of the En-
keleys, of the Taulants and of the Epirotes were weakening,
another Illyrian state, that of the Ardians, which occupied
the coast regions between Dalmatia and Montenegro and
23
had its capital in Rizon, was speedily acquiring strength and
power.
During the reign of their king Agron (250-231 B.C.), the
Ardians conquered the Hellenic colonies which were founded
on the Dalmatian coast. After that they expanded south­
ward up to Shkoder, which they made the new capital of
their realm. From here they spread further to the south at
the expanse of the territories of the Taulant kingdom, which
in these circumstances was dissolved entirely. During
Agron’s reign, the Ardian kingdom became a mighty sea
power.
Agron died in the year 231, leaving as heir an under-age
son, Pines. The management of state affairs was taken up
by Teuta, Agron’s second wife, who reigned as guardian of
her step-son Pines. The queen, young and energetic, con­
tinued in the policy of conquests that had been initiated by
Agron. With the army and the big fleet which she had
prepared, she assailed the League of the Epirotes by land
and by sea, conquered their capital Foinike, and inflicted on
the Epirotes a number of defeats, but at the moment of the
victory she had to conclude peace with the Epirotes and to
withdraw her forces in order to protect her domains from
the Dardans who attacked from the east.
Through a series of alliances she concluded with the rulers
of Macedonia, Epirus and Akarnania, Teuta strengthened
the positions of her state. However, the successes of Teuta
did not last long. The strengthening of the Ardian kingdom
and its equipment with a powerful fleet, which undertook
courageously actions on the sea, annoyed Rome, which en­
deavoured to bring the Adriatic Sea under its control. For
this purpose Rome decided to break down the supremacy of
the Ardians at sea.
The pretext for war soon was found. As some Roman
ships were assailed on open sea by Illyrian ships, the Roman
senate sent to Shkoder two envoys, who demanded from
Teuta indemnity for the losses sustained and threatened her
seriously in case she neglected taking measures against the
Ardian sailors. Teuta refused to satisfy this claim. On the
24
other hand, on the way back to Rome, one of the two envoys
was murdered during the journey. Exploiting this murder
as “casus belli”, Rome declared war on the Ardian kingdom.
The military operations began in the autumn of the year
229 B.C.
The war did not proceed in the favour of the Ardians.
The commander of the Illyrian fleet, Dhimiter Fari, betrayed
and surrendered to the enemy without fighting. Left with­
out-a fleet and without allies, Teuta was constrained after
a year to sign an onerous peace treaty. The boundaries of
the Ardian kingdom were dwindled down, and it assumed
the obligation not to entertain any war fleet.
After some years Teuta died. Dhimiter Fari succeeded
her, in the capacity of guardian to Pines, who was still
under-age.
Dhimiter did not agree to the submission of the country to
Rome, and accordingly he disengaged himself from it and
allied his country with Macedonia. Within a short period
of time, after he had restored an efficient army, he built a
new fleet and extended the state up to its former boundaries.
Rendered uneasy by these actions, especially by the alliance
with its rival Macedonia, in 219 B.C. Rome declared war
once more against the Illyrian state. The military opera­
tions extended, this time also, almost over a year. In this
occurrence Rome bribed and made for itself the other re­
nowned commander of the Ardians, Scerdilaides. In 218,
after a reckless battle, which was fought on the island of
Fari, Dhimiter was beaten and fled to Macedonia. With his
departure, Rome at once concluded peace with Scerdilaides,
because its position in the Italian peninsula was becoming
precarious on account of the war preparations Hannibal of
Carthage had undertaken. The peace terms of 218 were the
same as those of the peace of 228.
Scerdilaides, who on behalf of Pines was placed at the
head of the Ardians, observed fidelity to the alliance with
Rome. He took part, on the side of Rome, in the prolonged
war it waged against Macedonia. Further, he bore the main
burden of the wars that were fought within the territory of
25
Albania against Philip V of Macedonia. The wars were car­
ried on sometimes in favour of Scerdilaides, and sometimes
in that of Philip V, and continued until Macedonia was de­
feated and was constrained to accept the terms of the peace
treaty imposed by Rome.
Scerdilaides and after him his son Pleuriat pursued the
policy of dependence on Rome. Whereas the son of Pleu­
riat, Genth, who acceded to the throne about the year 181,
strove for a long while to break away from this dependence.
With this aim in view he strengthened the ties with the
neighbouring states, especially with Macedonia, whose ruler
Perseus fostered the ambition to break the Roman power.
In the year 170 B.C., after the war had been rekindled
between Rome and Macedonia, Genth decided to enter into
the war on the side of Perseus. According to the military
agreement concluded between them, the Ardians would fight
mainly with the fleet, the Macedonians with land troops.
They were joined also by the Epirotic League.
In compliance with the agreement, Genth began the war
operations on sea. But in the year 168, the Romans landed
many troops on the coasts of Illyria, and instead of directing
them to Macedonia, assailed with great speed Shkoder.
which they besieged. At the same time, through bribes in
money which they distributed, they split the ranks of the
chiefs of the various Illyrian tribes which were subdued by
Genth. Because of the underestimation of the forces of
the enemy Genth, instead of prolonging the fighting until
the arrival of Macedonian troops, led his army out of the
castle of Shkoder and attacked the Romans on open ground,
where he suffered a complete defeat. Genth surrendered
with his whole family and was sent to Rome as a prisoner-
of-war.
After the victory of Shkoder, the Roman army were riv­
eted on Perseus, who suffered a decisive defeat in Pydna.
The following year, 167 B.C., after strenuous fighting, the
Romans subdued Epirus too. During the operations in
Epirus, the Romans destroyed 70 towns and sold into slavery
150 thousand persons.
26
 Different from how it had acted previously, this time
Rome proceeded to the definite conquest of the territories
of southern Illyria. Thus in the years 168-167 B.C. the
Illyrian states and the Macedonian state came to an end.
From that date begins for the Illyrians the long period of
Roman rule, which lasted more than five and a half cen­
turies— up to the year 395 A.D.

ILLYRIA UNDER THE ROMAN RULE

After it had annihilated the Ardian state and the Epirotic

League, Rome undertook in the following decades a series
of campaigns with the aim of destroying the other Illyrian
states and federations and of conquering their territories.
Through great efforts it succeeded during the 2nd century to

Amphitheatre of Butrint (Bufroton) as it is today

27
break the resistance of the Illyrians and to conquer only
the regions along the Adriatic coast. The Illyrians who
lived in the inner regions of the Balkans preserved for
a considerable time their freedom.
In the course of these campaigns the Romans caused
great damage to the countries they had conquered. The
slave-owning Rome established in the captured regions its
iron rule. The Illyrians, who formerly had enjoyed the
rights of freemen, became inhabitants without any rights at
all. Whole tribes were removed from their homelands, were
sold as slaves or were exterminated, as it was the case,
for example, with the Ardians. Roman soldiers and peas­
ants were installed in the most fertile tracts of land of
the peasants.
The Illyrians frequently revolted against the system of
oppression and exploitation of slave-owning Rome. In some
cases the revolts took large proportions and were connected
with the revolts which took place in other regions or that
had broken out when Rome found itself in difficult situa­
tions. In the year 134 B.C. the Ardians, together with other
tribes, seized arms in order to regain their freedom. Enor­
mous damage was caused to the Romans by the revolt of
the Dalmatians in the year 119 B.C., and in uncommon
degree their other revolt which broke out in the year 78
B.C., for the suppression of which Rome had to fight for
two whole years. During the civil war between Caesar and
Pompey, the Illyrians once again availed themselves of the
opportunity to seize arms and won their freedom for some
time.
However, the most noteworthy revolt of the Illyrians was
the one that broke out during the reign of Augustus, in the
year 9 A.D., which under the leadership of Bato lasted three
years. The insurgents, approximately 200 thousand strong,
set free the major part of Illyria and prepared to march into
the Italic peninsula. The Roman rulers were so much
alarmed by the impetus of the revolt, that they ordered
general mobilization. Against the insurgents they sent the
greater part of the imperial army. The Illyrians resisted
28
with heroism. In the fighting Illyrian women too took part..
However, at the end, the Romans succeeded through treason
in undermining the revolt and then in crushing it.
In the first centuries A.D., when Rome became a world
empire, Illyria had an economic revival. This was partly
due to the favourable geographic position of Illyria. It was
through this territory among others that passed the principal
road, known by the name of “Via Egnatia”, which bound
Rome with the eastern regions of the Empire.
In particular the towns came to enjoy in these centuries
a certain prosperity. The most conspicuous among them
was Dyrrachion. The Roman laws gave an impulse to the
speedy development of the relations based on slave-owner­
ship. Senators and high officials came over to Illyria and
founded here vast estates. In the towns as well as in these
large estates the number of Illyrian slaves rose continually.
Yet a part of the Illyrian population escaped from be­
coming slaves. This free population resided in the inner
mountainous regions, and was organized in the majority of
cases in shepherd or peasant communities. These com­
munities preserved to a certain degree their tribal feature.
Rome issued special laws for their administration. This
population juridically was free. It stood between the Ro­
man population who enjoyed the citizen’s right and the
mass of slaves who had no rights whatsoever. The geog­
rapher of the 2nd century A.D., Ptolomy from Alexandria
of Egypt, gives us a list of these Illyrian tribes. He men­
tions among them a tribe with the name of “Albanoi” who
dwelt in the mountainous regions between Durres and
Dibra, and their town Albanopolis.
From this mass of free peasants, who obtained the right
Of citizenship with the decree of Caracalla of the year 212
A.D., Rome tried to recruit soldiers for the defence of its
frontiers, which barbarian tribes had started to assail. Their
forces grew in manpower to that extent that Illyrian mili­
tary chiefs began to play important roles in the political
life of Rome, by succeeding to fill even the post of the
29
emperor. For nearly one hundred years (247-361 A.D.).
emperors, of Illyrian origin ruled one after the other.
The most renowned of these emperors was Diocletian from
the Illyrian region of Diode. One of the most important
measures taken by him was the reorganization of the Empire
administration. According to this reorganization, the ter­
ritories of Albania were divided into three provinces: the
province of Preval with its headquarters in Shkoder, which
depended on the diocese of Dakia; the province of New Epi­
rus (Epirus Nova) with its headquarters in Dyrrachion from
the river Mati up to Vjosa; the province of former Epirus
(Epirus Vetus) with its headquarters in Nikopoje, from the
river Vjosa up to the gulf of Preveza. These two provinces
depended on the diocese of Macedonia. The dioceses of
Dakia and of Macedonia were comprised in the Prefecture
of Illyricum, which included the whole of the Balkans.
Simultaneously with the big landlords, various Roman
citizens, craftsmen, merchants, sailors, peasants, soldiers,
officials, etc., had established themselves in Illyria. Their
number continually increased. They brought with them not
only the language, but also the customs, culture and religion
of Rome. With their increase, Latin spread speedily in the
towns of the country, not only as the official language, but
also as the language of social intercourse. With the spread
of Latin and through the adoption of Roman habits began
the romanization of the Hellenes of the colonies and of the
Illyrians of the towns. Outside the towns, particularly in
the regions further inland, the process of romanization was
frustrated. The Illyrians in major part preserved their
language. Many Latin words, however, permeated into
the Illyrian language. A number of these words are pre­
served even at present in the Albanian language. The Chris­
tian religion, which had appeared in the 1st century A.D.
as the doctrine of the slaves and of the poor against the
oppressive apparatus of slave-holding Rome, found sup­
porters also in Illyria. Since the 2nd century mention is
made of clandestine committees of Christians in Dyrrah
and in Aulon (Vlore). In this century two of the earliest
30
Illyrian proselytes of the new faith preached St. Ast in
Dyrrah and St. Donat in Aulon, whom the Christian
church has canonized.
With the lapse of time the Christian religion, from an
ideology of the oppressed masses, became an ideology to
delude these masses in the interest of the slave-owning state
authorities, and as such was proclaimed in the year 373 by
Emperor Constantine, who too was of Illyrian origin, as
the official religion of the Roman Empire. The earliest
episcopates of Albania mentioned in documentary sources
appertain precisely to the 4th century. Up to the 8th cen­
tury these episcopates were subordinated, through the
archbishops of their respective provinces, to the Roman
Catholic Church.
As in the year 395, Emperor Theodos divided the empire
into two independent parts: the Roman Empire of the West,
with Rome as its capital, and the Roman Empire of the East,
with Constantinople as its capital. The territories of Alba­
nia were comprised in the Eastern, or, as it was called later,
in the Byzantine Empire.

THE BEGINNINGS OF THE

BYZANTINE RULE

In the Byzantine Empire the crisis in the system of slave­

ownership had not taken so extensive proportions as in the
West. Here still were to be met masses of free peasants and
of free craftsmen, interested in the increase of the produc­
tion. The Byzantine Empire, to which a series of cir­
cumstances had been propitious, not only opposed strenuous
resistance to the attacks of the barbarians, which brought
the complete annihilation of the Roman Empire in the West
in 476, but it succeeded in prolonging its life for another
thousand years. Thus, as soon as it freed itself from the
sway of Rome, Albania fell under the domination of the
31
powerful Byzantine state. This domination lasted several
centuries. By entering under the Byzantine yoke in the
territories of Albania no changes at all took place in its
economic and social structure. The system of slave-owner­
ship was preserved both in the cities and in the countryside.
The administrative division, too, carried through during the
reign of Diocletian, remained unchanged. For a considerable
period of time Latin prevailed as the official language. Only
the geographic position of the territories of Albania within
the empire had changed. While formerly they were located
almost at the centre of the Roman Empire, now they were at
the boundary line of the Byzantine Empire.
Under the rule of the Byzantine Empire there was an
increase in the number of the large estates and in that of the
slaves and tenant-farmers. Yet in the 5th century and later,
there still existed whole masses of free peasants, organized
in communities of peasants and shepherds; and in the
towns, along with the slaves who laboured in the workshops
of craftsmen, there were still craftsmen and workers who
were juridically free.
The existence of free citizens and of free peasants made
it possible for the country to preserve further the economic
vitality. This vitality was favoured also by the roads of
communication which run across the territories of Albania,
especially by Via Egnatia, which was travelled by various
caravans that carried on the commerce between the East
and the West. Because of this vitality some of the cities
grew still more. Dyrrachion in this century reached the
climax of its prosperity. It became the most important port
of Byzantium in the West, there came ships from all parts
of the Mediterranean Sea. With its numerous workshops,
beautiful buildings, amusement places and its vitality, Dyr­
rachion attracted the admiration of all contemporary peo­
ples and was called “the flower-garden of the Adriatic”.
According to the tradition, it had at this period 80 thou­
sand inhabitants. While Apollonia lost its former impor­
tance, the city of Foinike grew still more. A legend of this
time relates for this city that it was so huge that it had
32
 Holy Mary Church in Byzantine style, in a monastery
at Apollonia (now Poyan), built in the 14th century

9,000 women who were called “Maria” Along the Via

Egnatia, some of the former halting-places for the caravans
developed into towns. Such were, for example, Scampa
near Elbasan, which name is preserved at present by the
river Shkumbin, Deabolis, the site of which is not known
for certain, but its name is preserved in our days by the river
Devoll, etc.
But this prosperity was of short duration. The more the
relations of slave-ownership extended, the more the inner
crisis of this system grew in intensity. The slave-owners
raised to such a degree the obligations of the tenants to them
that the latter began to desert the farms. The Byzantine
state issued special laws whereby the tenants were bound
to the soil and they were no more free to leave the land.
In the cities also the craftsmen were constrained to band
themselves in guilds, thus losing also their freedom. In
great need of money, the Byzantine state raised the rate of
taxes and extended the labour without remuneration. Under
33
the burden of these measures, poor peasants and citizens
began to be ruined, to abandon their business and to swarm
to the big estates or to the workshops of wealthy proprie­
tors. The economic situation of Illyria, in general, was
shaken. But it received the decisive blow from the inva­
sion of the barbarians.
Until the end of the 4th century, the territory of Alba­
nia was almost entirely spared from these attacks. But in
the year 395 great hordes of Visigoths, led by Alaric, in­
vaded it without encountering any opposition, and sacked
and plundered Illyria, Macedonia, Epirus and Greece, where
they remained up to the year 408. In 441 the Illyrian re­
gion of Dardania (at present Kosova) experienced the
ravaging onrush of Attila’s Huns, while in 461 the Ostro­
goths invaded the territories of Albania, aiming prevalently
at the cities. The terror felt from the former invasions
was so great that the news in itself of the approach once
again of the barbarians caused panic in the native popula­
tion who deserted the cities and the castles and fled either
to the mountainous regions or to the Dalmatian islands.
Dyrrachion and Scampa were conquered by the Ostrogoths
and thoroughly pillaged by them. In the year 479 the
Ostrogoths invaded once again the territories of Albania,
and remained there nine years. However, though the
country had not as yet recovered from the damages it had
suffered from these attacks, at the end of the 5th century
other barbarian hordes, composed of Turanic-Bulgarian
tribes, after crushing the resistance of the Byzantine army,
overran the Balkans from east to west.
The barbarian invasions affected deeply Albania. The
country in its major part was devastated, the population
decreased, many villages were abandoned, a good number
of the cities, excepting those that had fortifications, were
pillaged.
The barbarian invasions shook to the root the Byzantine
Empire. Everywhere a sense of insecurity prevailed, which
produced calamitous effects on the economic life. The
Byzantine Empire began to take measures for the protec-
34
tion of its boundaries and for the normalization of the
internal situation. With this aim in view, three emperors
who reigned from the year 492 to the year 565 — Anastas,
Justin and Justinian, all three of Illyrian origin — con­
structed a series of fortifications in order to strengthen the
defence of the boundaries and of the cities in the Balkans
and in Illyria. Emperor Anastas ordered the construction
of a system of defence for Dyrrachion, consisting of three
rows of walls. Nevertheless vaster constructions were com­
pleted during the reign of Emperor Justinian. In the prov­
ince of New Epirus alone 32 new fortresses were erected
and 26 old ones were restored; in the Ancient Epirus a vast
number of these were constructed, whereas in Dardania
eight new fortresses were constructed and 61 old fortresses
restored.
However, in spite of all these constructions, the Byzan­
tine Empire, exhausted on account of the endless wars, was
no longer able to protect its boundaries. In 450 the coun­
try was flooded once again by Huno-Bulgarian hordes,
which captured and demolished 32 fortresses in New Epirus
and in Prevails. It was not able to stop even the Slav
populations from crossing the river Samb and invading the
different regions of the Balkans. In the year 548, Slavs
appeared even before the gates of Dyrrachion.
Attached to agriculture much more than the other bar­
barians, the Slavs started to search fertile land to settle
down. By taking advantage of the weakness of the em­
pire, they spread themselves thoroughly in the Balkans.
The Slavs began to settle down in the territories of Albania
towards the end of the 6th century and colonized the tracts
of land best fit for agriculture. But more extensive col­
onization took place during the 7th century.
As the country was ruined by the former invasions, the
Slavs founded, wherever they settled, a vast number of vil­
lages. The names of Slav origin of certain villages, plains,
hills, mountains and rivers of Albania, as is the case also
with other sites throughout the Balkans, are derived partly
from that time.
35
 By settling down on arable lands, the Slavs ejected defi­
nitely the proprietors of big estates and constrained them
either to take refuge in cities or to migrate from Albania,
thus destroying the slave-ownership institutions. With
their cancellation the slaves and tenants returned to be in­
dependent peasants. At the same time, the Illyrian tribes,
who had been enslaved in the mountainous districts inland,
were also liberated from the slave-owners’ pressure. Thus,
as a result of the barbarian invasions and particularly of
the Slav colonization on the one hand, and of the revolts of
the slaves and of the tenants on the other, the system of
slave-ownership in the territories of Albania came to an
end.
Though on the seashore districts there remained some
institutions related to slave-ownership, these existed as
remnants of the former system and did not play any im­
portant role. The dominant mass of the population who
resided in the territory of Albania in the 7th century con­
sisted of free peasants and mountaineers, organized in rural
communities of peasants and shepherds. Ethnically this
population was a mixed one: along with the Illyrian popu­
lation, which constituted the majority, now there were
strong Slav colonies, whereas on the coast there were Roman
colonies or else romanized Illyrians.

ALBANIA, 8TH-11TH CENTURY

The end of the Roman domination in 395 and of Roman

institutions in the 6th-7th century brought to an end also
the process of romanization in Illyria. However the set­
tlement of new Slav populations created the danger of
slavization. The life in common with them for a long
period of time slavized entire Illyrian tribes. In the dis­
tricts of present Slovenia, Croatia, Dalmatia, Bosnia, Serbia
and Macedonia, the Illyrian population was entirely assimi­
36
 lated. Whereas in the regions of southern Illyria, especial­
ly in the districts of Albania of today, of Kosova, of Dukag-
jini highland, of Dibra, the Illyrian populations preserved
their ethnical character.
Still, this age-old population, by imbibing linguistic and
cultural elements in ancient times from the Thracians and
from the Romans, and now in the Middle Ages from the
Slavs and the Byzantines, achieved its own evolution. This
young population, which was wrought during the first mil­
lennium A.D., entered into the history of the Middle Ages
with a new name — with the name of the Illyrian tribe
Albanoi which dwelt in ancient times in the regions be­
tween Durres and Dibra. Albanoi, Albanenses, Arban, are
the designations usually employed by the strangers. The
Albanians in the Middle Ages called themselves Arber or
Arbereshe.
In the 8th century the overwhelming majority of the
population which dwelt in the territory of Albania was or­
ganized in communities partly of peasants and partly of
cattle raisers. Each community comprised a certain num­
ber of families, which in some of the cases had tribal re­
lations between them, and in others only neighbourly
relations. Initially the fields, pastures, woodlands, water­
courses, gardens were all kujri, i.e. property of the whole
community. The arable lands were allotted and re-allotted
from time to time to each family. Each single family itself
produced almost all the necessaries of life — agricultural,
dairy and industrial products. They felt scarcely any need
for bartering. In cases of necessity they exchanged between
them through bartering — product for product. The cir­
culation of money was extremely limited. They had prac­
tically no relations with the town.
Thus, by the disappearance of the slave-ownership system,
Albania turned back to natural economy. On account of
this, the towns that were ruined during the barbarian inva­
sions could not recover. They remained either demolished
or diminished in size. With the exception of Durres, they
possessed neither craftsmen, merchants or cultural institu­
37
tions. They had principally an agricultural feature, with
a certain amount of importance as military and administra­
tive centres.
In the time, during the 7th-10th century, a part of the
grounds of the community, the fields, gardens and vine­
yards became private property of the family, while the
kujri began to diminish.
With the strengthening of private proprietorship on land,
the member of the community, when he got impoverished,
began to sell his land and to remain without it. In order
to secure the means to live, these impoverished peasants
were constrained to labour on the fields of others, as lease­
holders, paying the landlord one-tenth of the produce
(morte). From the term used morte to designate what
was due to be paid, these peasants came to be called mor-
tite. After the emergence of the mortites, the commu­
nity began to dissolve.
The lands of the impoverished peasants were acquired by
the religious institutions, by military officers and by wealthy
landlords, who constituted a special class, the class of
dinati. The Byzantine emperors themselves bestowed on
dinats vast tracts of land. On the other hand also the
dinats, particularly clerical dinats, began to encroach on the
lands of the peasants and, in some cases, on those of the en­
tire communities.
After acquiring economic and political power, the
dinats in due course extended over the mortites the
feudal system. Thus during these centuries in Albania
emerged feudal relations. These relations in the 8th-10th
century were considerably limited. We find the first mor­
tites turned into serfs (parike), juridically in bondage,
mentioned in written documents only in the beginning of the
10th century.
The measures taken by the Byzantine Empire for the re­
inforcement of its military power and for the resistance
against the attacks from outside the boundaries included
also Albania. In the 9th century, with the aim of defend­
ing the provinces of Albania imperilled by the Bulgarians,
38
who had founded their state alongside the Danube some
time before, and against the Arabs, who had landed in
southern Italy, Byzantium created here two “themes1’. One
of them comprised the former regions and provinces of
Preval and of New Epirus, and was called after its chief
town the Theme of Durazzo. The other comprised the ter­
ritories from the river Vjosa up to the Gulf of Corinth, and
was called, this too, after its chief town the “Theme of
Nikopoja”.
But these measures did not give any result. In 851 under
the king Presian the Bulgarians captured Ohri (Ohrida) and
Devol, under the king Boris (852-889) Berat and Malla-
kastra, reaching the seacoast to the north of Vlora; and
under Czar Simeon (893-927) they conquered all the lands
of the “Theme of Nikopoja” and 30 castles in the “Theme
of Durres”, but they failed to capture the city of Dur res
itself.
After the death of Czar Simeon, the Bulgarian kingdom
declined for nearly half a century. But it maintained un­
der its control the conquered territories of Albania. To­
wards the end of the 10th century, under the command of
Samuil, the Bulgarian kingdom recovered itself, having now
as its capital the city of Ohri. Samuil extended still fur­
ther the boundaries of his realm. In 989 he captured also
Durres, the chief town of the “theme” However, these
conquests did not last. The Byzantine emperor, Vasil II,
by means of the steps he took, inflicted on Samuil a series
of defeats. The last fighting between them took place in
the territory of Albania, in the neighbourhood of Berat, and
ended in the year 1018 with the victory of the Empire of
Constantinople. Thus, after a century and a half, Byzan­
tine rule was re-established in Albania.
Nevertheless, in the 11th century the Byzantine Empire
was traversing a very serious economic, social and political
crisis. In order to restore its military power, the Byzantine
state raised the taxes, besides establishing a tax to be paid
in money, which the peasants with their system of economy
of exchange in kind were unable to pay. The state taxes
39
 and the arbitrariness of the officials in the exaction of the
taxes along with the exploitation and the extortions by the
dinats as everywhere else in Albania also gave grounds for
revolts.
Of these, the most momentous was the uprising of the
years 1040-1041, which had been started in the districts of
Macedonia by the Slav population under the leadership of
Peter Deliani and later spread in the “themes” of Durres,
where the insurgents had as leader an impoverished stratiot
by the name of Timomir.
Within a short period the two revolts were blended into
a single mighty uprising under the command of Delian.
The rebels were almost 40 thousand in number, and
achieved important successes. They even liberated Durres.
However the Byzantines with their numerous armies crush­
ed the revolt of the year 1041.
The discontent of the peasants was exploited also by the
dukes of the “theme” of Durres in concord with the local
dinats, who after they were strong enough, aimed at
usurping the imperial power. In 1044 the Duke of Durrer,
Gjergj (Georges) Maniakes, by securing the support of the
population of the “themes” through promises, revolted and
proclaimed himself emperor and marched on Constantino­
ple, but on his way was routed by the imperial armies.
The Byzantine chronicler Mihai Ataliades says that amid
the rebels there were Arbreshes, too. Similar revolts broke
out also later in 1077, led by Duke Nikifor Brienis and in
1080, led by his successor Duke Vasilakios of Paflagonia.
But this rising failed too.
The energetic Pope of Rome, Gregory VII tried to take
advantage of the deep political crisis, into which the By­
zantine Empire had sunk, by extending on the Balkan terri­
tories the authority of the Western Church at the expense
of the Oriental Church, the two churches being separated
from one another definitely in the year 1054. With the aid
of the Prince of Zeta, he founded at Tivar in 1077 a Catholic
Archbishopric, to which were attached bishoprics of north­
ern Albania, thus paving the way to the spreading of
40
Catholicism in these districts. Almost at the same time, he
incited against the Byzantine Empire the Normans, who had
settled down in Italy some time previously.
Under the command of Robert Guiscard, 30 thousand
rapacious Norman warriors greedy for plunder, landed in
May of the year 1081 on the Albanian coast. After captur­
ing the districts on the coast, they marched on Durres,
which they besieged. The Venetian allies of the Byzan­
tines assailed with their fleet the Norman fleet north of
Durres near “Bishti i Palles” and annihilated it. In Octo­
ber, the Byzantine Emperor Alex Comneni came to' Albania
with his armies, but at the encounter he had with Guiscard
south of Durres near “Shkembi Kavajes” (Kavaja Rock),
the Byzantines suffered an ignominious defeat. For several
months besieged Durres remained in the hands of the Al­
banian functionary who held the Byzantine title of “Comes
Cortis”. In February of the year 1082 through the treason
of Venetian residents of Durres, the Normans captured the
city. Later they extended their domination over other dis­
tricts of Albania and pillaged the country. However, the
Normans did not hold these regions long. Constrained by
an insurrection that broke out in southern Italy, Robert
Guiscard in 1083 withdrew his armies from Albania.
In 1096, some of the first groups of Crusaders passed
through Albanian territory, among whom were the Nor­
mans with their king, Boemund, the son of Robert Guiscard.
The passage of the famished Crusader throngs caused great
damage to the country.
In 1107 Boemund organized the second Norman expedi­
tion against Byzantium. Norman armies in great strength
landed at Vlora and thence they marched once again on
Durres. In spite of the vast military means he made use
of during this expedition, Boemund did not succeed in cap­
turing the town. Fighting took place between the Normans
and the Byzantines in a number of localities of Albania. In
1108 the Normans were beaten; Boemund made peace and
then together with his armies he left for Italy.
41
 Albania suffered great despoliations from the Norman at­
tacks. It suffered losses also from the two attacks made by
the Normans in the 12th century — in 1149 when they looted
and demolished a number of towns on the coast, and in
1185 when they marched once again against Byzantium
without achieving any success.

THE PRINCIPALITY OF ALBANIA

During the 12th century feudal relations penetrated into

the inner mountainous regions of Albania. Here, too, feu­
dal nobility was created. In these districts the nobility in
general was of Arbresh origin. In the process of its
growth it had clashes with the power of Byzantine and Slav
feudals. In order to open a way for itself for further de­
velopment and reinforcement, it strove to break away from
the foreign domination and to create an independent state.
The opportunity for the creation of this state presented it­
self in the latter part of the 12th century, when in the
Byzantine Empire germinated again a deep political crisis,
which brought in its train the decline of the empire. The
Albanian nobles freed themselves from the Byzantine con­
trol and founded in 1190 their independent principality,
which is the first Albanian feudal state known as yet. The
territories of this principality extended over the present-
day districts of central Albania. Its capital was at Kruja.
The first ruler of the Principality of Arberia was Archon
Progon (1190-1198) about whose life and doings we know
nothing in detail. After Progon, his son Gjini (1199-1206)
was proclaimed as ruler, during whose reign the Byzantine
Empire was crushed altogether by the Crusaders of the
fourth expedition. By this dissolution, the Arbresh Prin­
cipality got rid of the Byzantine oppression. On the other
hand, it fell under the pressure of neighbouring feudal
states, such as the Despotate of Epirus in the south, the
42
Zetan state on the north, and the duchy of Durres on the
west, this latter created by the Republic of Venice. In or­
der to cope with the Republic of St. Mark, which aimed at
including within the boundaries of the duchy of Durres the
territories of independent Arberia too, Dhimiter (1206-1216),
who had succeeded his brother Gjini, solicited the support
of the Pope by promising him that he would be converted
to Catholicism and established bonds of friendship with the
ruler of the Serbian state of Rasha by marrying his daugh­
ter, Comneni, who was the niece of the Byzantine emperor.
And at the same time he drew closer to the Despotate of
Epirus and to the Republic of Ragusa. The friendship with
the Pope was of short duration and soon turned into ill-
feeling. In spite of it, by the steps he had undertaken,
Dhimiter succeeded to face the pressure on the part of the
Venetian Republic, as well as that of its ally, the Zelan
state, and the interference of Rome.
Concerning the short life of this principality, we actually
have the deed of the commercial accord signed between it
and the Republic of Ragusa. On behalf of the principality,
Dhimiter and fourteen other Arbresh nobles affixed their
signatures pledging to respect the agreement, which pro­
vided peace with Ragusa and assured the Ragusian citizens
of free passage through the territory of Arberia without
having to pay any toll and without being molested. Dhimi­
ter signs himself as the '‘great Archon”, which means feudal
overlord. The titles of Dhimiter and of his nobles demon­
strate that the Arbresh state was organized on the basis of
the feudal hierarchy.
Nevertheless the Principality of Arberia was unable to
keep its independence for a long period. After the death of
Dhimiter in 1216, a native noble by the name of Grigor
Kamona was elected as ruler of Arberia. This latter could
not withstand the pressure of the neighbour on the south,
the Despotate of Epirus which, expanding towards the
north, brought under its control the Arbresh Principality
also.
43
 After extending his authority over the Principality of Ar-
beria, the Despot of Epirus, Theodor Angelos Komenas
(1216-1230) undertook a series of campaigns for restoring
the Byzantine Empire, which was overthrown. However
his plans met with opposition from the Tsar of the Bul­
garians, Ivan Asen. In the war between them in 1230,
Theodor was overwhelmingly beaten. The Macedonian and
the Albanian territories fell under the sway of the Bul­
garians.
Some years later, the successor of Theodor, Mihai II
(1230-1266), restarted the campaigns. This time the Des-
potate of Epirus clashed with the emperor of the Byzantine
Empire of Nicaea, who had crossed over from Asia Minor
to the Balkans. Between them endless wars took place,
which terminated in the defeat of Mihai II. In 1253, the
emperor of Nicaea, by promising to the Arbreshes self-
government, extended his authority over Albania too.
But the emperor of Nicaea did not keep his promise; there­
fore the Albanians revolted in the year 1257 and chased
from their country the Nicaean armies. The Arbreshes
defended their freedom for nearly a year. Only in 1258,
after the emperor of* Nicaea had brought over numerous
Nicaean armies, was the insurrection crushed.
The Arbresh insurrection gave the possibility to Mihai II
of Epirus to start afresh the struggle against the Nicaean
emperor. At the same time he concluded an alliance with
the king of Sicily, Manufred Hohenstaufen, to whom he
granted the hand of his daughter Helena in marriage, and
gave as dowry a number of cities, such as Corfu, Vlora,
Kanina, Berat and others. In spite of the aid of Manufred,
Mihai II met with failure. In 1261 the emperor of Nicaea
conquered Constantinople, restored the Byzantine Empire
and not long after subdued the Despotate of Epirus.
Manufred Hohenstaufen together with his German and
Arab vassals maintained his possessions in Albania only
for a short while. In the clash he had in 1266 with Charles
d’Anjou he was defeated and killed. Charles d’Anjou, who
became king of Sicily, seized also the possessions of Manu-
44
fred in Albania, Vlora, Kanina, Berat, and later extended
these possessions by capturing in 1272 also Durres, the
principal city of mediaeval Albania.
In the hope to win the good-will and the favour of the
native population, Charles proclaimed at Naples on Feb­
ruary 21, 1272, the creation of the “Kingdom of Arberia”
and declared himself king of Arberia. To the Albanian
nobles he granted fiefs and large estates and bestowed upon
them nobility titles in conformity with the feudal hierarchy
of the West. To the citizens he promised that he would
acknowledge the rights enjoyed by them in the past and
would reduce a number of existent taxes.
However Charles kept for a very short time the promises
he had given. French and Italian feudals who came to
Albania filled all the offices of the “Kingdom of Arberia”
and usurped the largest fiefs of the country, which caused
the discontent of the Arbresh nobles. The ruthless exploi­
tation on the part of French adventurer feudals engendered
likewise the discontent of the peasants and citizens. In
order to break the resistance of the Albanian feudals,
Charles arrested a great number of them and kept them as
hostages in the prisons of Italy. In spite of it, when fight­
ing began between the Byzantines and the Anjous, the
Arbresh population rose up in revolt against the Anjous.
Taking advantage of this opposition of the Arbresh popula­
tion, the Byzantines at last obliged the Anjous to evacuate
Albania in the year 1286.
In 1304 the Anjous under the lead of Philip, prince of
Taranto, came back to Albania. Unlike his grandfather
Charles, Philip did his best to genuinely win the support
of the Arbresh nobles, with the aim of thus securing allies
not only against the Byzantines, but also against the Ser­
bians, who likewise attempted to expand in Albania. The
Arbresh nobles too, scared by the growth of the Serbian
state, had great interest in hindering the advance of this
latter state with the help of the Anjous, especially now
that the Byzantine Empire was thoroughly weakened.
These common interests induced Philip to divide the power
45
in Albania with the Arbresh nobles. One of these.
Gulielm Blinishti, was appointed marshal of the Anjouine
armies in Albania; Tanush Thopia received the title of
count and was recognized as the feudal lord of the lands
between the rivers Mat and Shkumbin, and Andrea Mu-
zaka was given the title of Despot of Arberia, and the lands
between the rivers Shkumbin and Seman.
The Anjouine-Albanian alliance, however, did not hinder
the Serbian Kingdom from expanding in Albania. Under
the reign of Stephan Dushani (1331-1355), through con­
quests, it became a Balkan empire. In the years 1343-1347
Tsar Stephan Dushan captured the territories of Albania
also, with the exception of Durres, which remained under
the Anjouine rule.
But the Serbian Empire did not last long. As soon as
Stephan Dushan had died (1355), feudal quarrels broke out,
which led to its dissolution. The feudals of the oppressed
nations broke loose one after the other from this enfeebled
empire and founded independent principalities. Such prin­
cipalities were created in Albania also.

FEUDAL RELATIONS IN ALBANIA

During the 12th-14th century, conspicuous progress was

achieved in the economic life of Albania. In agriculture
the area of arable lands was extended, better implements
for husbandry were introduced, and along with the cereals,
flourished the cultivation of orchards including olive
groves, vineyards, and of silk. At that period Albania
was the home of big herds. The agricultural and dairy
products increased to such an extent that a part of them
were exported.
The development of the economy was manifested also in
the extension and the prosperity of the cities. A number
of cities from antiquity such as Durres (Dyrrachion),
46
 Shkoder (Skodra), Vlora (Aulon), Berat (Antipatria) were
restored, alongside them new cities were built such as
Kruja, Kanina, Drishti (Drivash), Deha (Dagno), Shurdhahu
(Sarda), etc. In the 14th century the cities of Albania
reached their climax of prosperity during the Middle Ages.
The first place was always occupied by Durres, which had
approximately 25 thousand inhabitants. The principal
economic basis of the cities was artisan production, and in
connection with it, the barter between the city and the vil­
lage, the barter between various cities of the country as
well as the trade with foreign countries. The artisans plied
various metals, such as iron, copper, bronze and lead, manu­
factured agricultural implements, weapons, household furni­
ture, etc. They made ornaments and various articles of
gold and silver. A number of craftsmen produced articles
of vestment — woollen cloth and mantles, silk and linen
tissues, leather shoes and sandals, etc. In the cities there
were tailors, fur-traders, saddlers, embroiderers and next to
them bakers, butchers, potters, carpenters, candle manufac­
turers, painters and, further, masons and mechanics who
constructed houses and ships, artists who chiselled the stone,
carved the wood and adorned with them the temples, the
public buildings and the houses of the wealthy citizens.
But the development of feudal relations in Albania was
not at the same level in all parts of the country. These
relations held sway overwhelmingly only in the low coast­
land and in the valleys of the inland of Albania. Here the
greater part of the land was changed into feudal fiefs. The
fiefs that had the widest extension in Albania in the 14th
century were the proles, the bashtlnas and the me-
tohes. The prole was the fief granted by the overlord,
was charged with military duties, and as such could not be
inherited nor alienated. The bashtlna, on the contrary,
was a fief that could be inherited and alienated. The me-
toh was the fief of religious institutions.
The peasant-farmers, settled in a proie, bashtlna or
metoh, were bound to the soil and were dependent on
the feudal lord. They had to pay their* lord the feudal rent
47
and could not depart in any case from the fief. They were
serfs. In Albania these were called parikd, serfs or merops.
In some of the fiefs, the rent in periodic forced labour con­
stituted the major part of what the serfs were due to render.
In these cases, the feudal landlord divided his lands into
two parts; in the lands called paraspor, which he kept for
himself, and the lands of the peasants, which he gave to the
farmers, split in tracts. Each farmer had to labour a number
of days each week for the benefit of the landlord in a definite
parcel of the paraspor, to till, to sow, to reap and to harvest
the grain and to transport it to the storehouse of the
landlord. Besides this forced labour, the serf had to fulfil
a number of other obligations both in kind and in money.
In other fiefs the landlord exacted the major part of the
rent in obligations in kind. In these fiefs there existed no
paraspors. The serf received a more extensive parcel, and
from the yield he had to give a portion to the pronial or
bashtinal or ecclesiastical landlord. However, even in this
case the serf had to pay to the land-owner sums of money
as sok, brok, travina, etc., and to render service through
statute-labour (the big and the small statute-labour).
The further development of the feudal relations increased
the economic and political power of a number of Albanian
feudal lords who, in some cases with the consent and in others
against the will of the foreign sovereigns who ruled in Al­
bania, not only extended their fiefs but with the lapse of time
brought under their dependence also neighbouring feudal
lords. Whereas this class of great feudal lords constituted
the Albanian feudal nobility, the territory over which they
extended their authority was changed into an autonomous or
semi-autonomous feudal domain. The feudal domain of
Tanush Thopia, for example, included in the thirties of the
14th century the territories between the rivers of Mat and
of Shkumbin, while the feudal domain of Andrea Muzaka
included at that same time the territories between the rivers
of Shkumbin and of Seman. In various feudal domains, for
example in that of the nobles of Dukagjin, alongside small
fiefs, there existed entire villages, and even whole districts,
48
 with entirely free peasants. The great nobles lived in the
dwellings within their castles, such as the Thopias in Kruja,
the Muzakas in Berat, the Dukagjinas in Lezhe. The more
powerful nobles started to keep in their dwellings a court
with officials. Various nobles such as the Balshas, the
Gropas, coined also money of their own with their emblems.
They had their banners, too: the Thopias a crowned lion, the
Muzakas a two-headed eagle with a star between them, the
Dukagjinas a white eagle with one head, and the Kastriots
in the 15th century a two-headed black eagle on red back­
ground, which became the national flag of the Albanians.
In the 14th century, in the mountainous regions of Al­
bania also the greater portion of the population was com­
posed of free peasants, small proprietors attached to cattle
raising rather than to agriculture, who still preserved the
former community ties. However, these highlanders, who
were altogether free in their mountainous abodes, during
the part of the year when they were obliged to wander with
their herds of cattle to the winter pastures, entered into
relations with the feudals who were the owners of these
grazing grounds, paying them the travnina (rental of the
pasture) besides other taxes in kind and in money. In some
of the cases one or more powerful nobles had succeeded in
including within their feudal domains a part of these moun­
tainous regions also. But the relations between the feudal
lord and the highlanders were confined only to the payment
of the tax for the “smoke”.
In the mountainous regions there were also masses of
highlanders who paid no taxes at all to anyone whatso­
ever— neither to the state, nor to the nobles, nor to their
chieftains. Though entirely free, these highlanders, squeezed
as they were in their districts where the population grew in
number and got denser, were extremely poor. The need to
insure their livelihood induced these poor highlanders to
descend to lower districts. Too often, the wanderings of
famished highlanders took the aspect of migrations and of
assaults on cities and feudal estates. When the Byzantine
governor of the district of Berat, Nikola Hanza, strove to
49
hinder these wanderings, the highlanders of central Albania
resorted to open insurrection. In 1330 the highlanders laid
siege to the Byzantine governor in the castle of Berat, but
on account of lack of weapons they were constrained to
withdraw. In 1336 a still greater rebellion burst afresh,
which spread over southern Albania also. This time the
Byzantine army with Emperor Andronik III at its head
came to Albania, together with Turkish mercenaries, who
chased the Albanians up to the higher mountains and treated
them most barbarously. The captives were killed and the
women and the children were sold into slavery. The Byzan­
tine army seized their big herds of cattle. The Byzantine
historian Fw Kantakuzen, who was an eyewitness of this
war narrates that the Byzantine army seized from the Al­
banians 1,200,000 sheep and hundreds of thousands of oxen
and horses.
The migrations of the Albanian mountaineers, however,
were not interrupted. Together with their cattle, many Al­
banians continued to wander north up to the gates of Ragusa
and to the River Danube, and south down to Epirus and
Thessaly. A vast stream of wanderings took place especially
during the conquest of Albania by the Serbian Empire.
Through the instigation of the Serbian governors, vast masses
of Albanians, both highlanders and peasants, from almost all
the districts of the country undertook wanderings towards
the south, migrating into Thessaly, Attica, the Peleponnese,
crossing over even to various islands of the Aegean Sea, such
as Eubos, Hidra, Speza, Paros. The major part of them
settled in the depopulated lands of the Greek and French
feudal lords, whereas the other part entered into their
armies. The Albanian populations thus occupied the
devastated Greek territories, founded a series of Albanian
villages, and by plying their vocation of agricultural labour­
ers, helped to improve the wretched economic conditions of
mediaeval Greece. Their descendants, who succeeded to
escape the long and pressing process of hellenization, live to
this day in those same districts of Greece.
50
 In the cities the artisans were organized in guilds and
associations. The guild defended the interests of its mem­
bers by monopolizing the produce of their respective craft.
It decided upon the amount each artisan should produce, and
the price of each product. The guild regulated the social
and economic relations of its members within the workshop.
The increase in the exchange of wares gave birth in the
cities to a special class of population which occupied itself
exclusively with trading. With particularly great speed
developed the commerce between the districts in the Al­
banian lowland and the prosperous centres of the Adriatic,
in the first place with Venice and Ragusa. The growth of
these relations brought with it the foundation not far from
the ancient ports of Durres, Ulqin, Vlora, Lezha, of a num­
ber of new commercial ports along the coast such as Spinarica
at the mouth of the river Shkumbin, Pirgu at the mouth of
the river Seman, Bashtova at the mouth of the river Shkum­
bin, Medua at the mouth of the river Drin, Shingjin at the
mouth of the river Buna, etc. The thriving trade furnished
the occasion for holding fairs.
Since their foundation the cities enjoyed a special regime,
which was distinct from that of the feudal lords. On the
basis of the privileges granted them previously by the By­
zantine emperors and confirmed by the other later foreign
rulers, the citizens were not slaves; on the contrary they
enjoyed to a certain degree political and social rights,
especially the right to take part in the assembly of the citi­
zens, which continued to exist as a tradition from the antique
tribes. The entire population of a city created a community
of citizens, which enjoyed the right of self-administration.
Each city thus constituted a citizens’ commune with local
autonomy.
For the administration of the affairs of the city, the as­
sembly of the people elected a council of eight to ten citizens
and a number of magistrates. The city council was the
organ designed to assist the governor who was appointed by
the sovereign who had Albania under his authority. The
city^had numerous other officials, among whom the captain,
51
the militia commander, the commander of the castle, the
admiral, the camerarius, etc.
With the economic development of the cities deepened the
social differentiation between their inhabitants. In the
cities there were three distinct classes: the class of the nobles,
which comprised the wealthy citizens, the class of the citi­
zens which comprised the mass of artisans, traders, sailors,
who possessed little property, the class of the poorer popu­
lation, which comprised the lowest set of the citizens, ap­
prentices, day-labourers, porters, and all those who had no
property at all. After it had grown stronger, the higher
class of nobles usurped the authority and the government
of the city, thus diminishing the importance of the people’s
assembly. And therefore the citizen communes were
changed into aristocratic communes.

ALBANIAN FEUDAL PRINCIPALITIES

OF THE 14TH CENTURY

On account of the development of the feudal relations, the

economic and political position of the Albanian nobles got
so strong that they attempted to become independent rulers
in their respective fiefs. Favourable opportunity for the
realization of these ambitions presented themselves after the
first half of the 14th century when, after the death of
Stephan Dushan (1355), the Serbian empire that had con­
quered Albania rapidly got weaker and fell into decay.
Taking advantage of the enfeeblement of the Serbian em­
pire, the Albanian nobles chased out of the country or sub­
jugated the Serbian governors, regained their former fiefs
and became independent rulers. The cities too benefited by
these circumstances. Various important cities such as Dur­
res, Shkoder, Ulqin, Drishti, etc., won the right of indepen­
dent administration and were turned into autonomous com­
munes.
52
 After having regained their former lands, the Albanian
nobles started fighting each other with the aim of expanding
their possessions, and at the same time fought against the
cities for subjugating these important centres. Conse­
quently, in the second half of the 14th century, Albania was
plunged into a deep feudal chaos. From these fights the
stronger nobles, who subdued the weaker nobles, derived
benefit, stretched their authority over the cities and thus
created large feudal fiefs, three of which succeeded in be­
coming principalities.
One of these principalities was founded in central Albania.
In these regions, after the dissolution of the Serbian empire,
Karl Thopia, son of Tanush, in 1358 became independent
ruler. At the beginning, his authority extended over the
territory around the fortress of Petrela, but later he ex­
panded the boundaries of his estate by subjugating his feudal
neighbours. In 1362 he laid siege, by land, to Durres, city
of political and economic importance. However, as he had
no fleet, he could not capture the city. After constraining
the inhabitants to pay a yearly tribute, he withdrew his
forces from Durres, and at the same time he built a shipyard
on the shore for the construction of the indispensable fleet.
The construction of the shipyard on the Adriatic coast
brought Karl Thopia in conflict with the Republic of Venice,
as this later foresaw that the creation of an Albanian fleet
would constitute a hindrance to its trade and imperil its own
fleet in the Adriatic Sea. His assault on Durres disclosed
the discord of long standing with the Anjous, who once again
aimed at bringing the “Kingdom of Arberia” under their
sway. In 1364 while the Venetian fleet started operations
at sea, the ally of the Republic of St. Mark, Gjergj (Georges)
Balsha, attacked with his troops on the north. However
Karl proved to be an energetic ruler. In the Mati valley
he defeated Gjergj Balsha and seized him as a captive. In
1368 with the fleet he had constructed, Karl assailed and
captured Durres. In 1372, after another victory he had won,
he routed a military expedition instigated by the Anjous,
which had landed and captured Durres for a short period.
53
 In this manner Karl Thopia, by endless wars he waged,
after he had subdued the feudal lords of central Albania and
after he had offered resistance to foreign armies, extended
the boundaries of the north up to the river Mat, on the south
up to the Shkumbin. Acting as an independent ruler, he
turned his estate into an independent principality. The
capital of the principality was Durres. Various foreign
powers acknowledged him as the Prince of Albania.
At almost the same period, in the struggles between rival
feudal lords, which took place in the districts of northern
Albania after the dissolution of the Serbian empire, a new
feudal family emerged as victorious — the family of Balshas,
from the village Balez, situated on the east of the lake of
Shkoder. The elder Balsha who had served as zhupan of
Stephan Dushan, after the death of the latter, subdued one
after the other, Albanian and Serbian feudal lords of north
Albania and of Montenegro, and established an extensive
domain with its centre in Shkoder. After the death of the
aged Balsha (1362) his three sons Strazimir (1361-1372),
Gjergj (1372-1378) and Balsha II (1378-1385) extended the
boundaries of the domain — on the north beyond Montene­
gro, on the east up to Prizren, and on the south up to the
river Mat, beyond which started the principality of Durres.
During the reign of Balsha II, the principality of Shkoder
reached the climax of its power. By marrying Komita, the
only daughter of the ruler of Vlora, who died without leav­
ing other heirs, he received as dowry Vlora, Kanina and
Berat. Thence he stretched his rule over the domain of
Muzakas and of Matrangas up to the river Shkumbin, thus
becoming neighbours with the principality of Durres also on
the south. Balsha II dreamed of becoming king of Albania
and of conquering the whole country. But the obstacle on
his way was the principality of Durres. The ruler of Shkoder
was far more incited against the ruler of Durres by the
enemies of Karl Thopia: the Republic of Venice and along
with it the Pope of Rome, who in view of establishing the
influence of his church, was interested that Balshas who
were converted to Catholicism in 1369 should rule over Al­
54
bania, instead of Karl, who had remained faithful to the East
Byzantine Church.
The war between the two principalities began in 1382.
Balsha II seized the territories of Karl Thopia, and that same
year captured Durres. Karl, who had no allies at hand,
called on the Turkish armies, which had reached up to
Macedonia, and in 1385 with their help defeated Balsha, who
was also killed in the battle of Savra to the south of Lushnja,
and took possession once again of the lost lands and of
Durres. The Turks, on their part, after they had thoroughly
pillaged the land, withdrew from Albania.
The arrival and presence of the Turks, though it had been
only for a while, persuaded Venice as well as the Pope to
end their quarrels with Karl Thopia, who also, on his part,
had drawn a lesson from the rapacity of the Turks. How­
ever, after these events Karl Thopia did not live long. He
died in 1388 and was buried in the Monastery of Shen Gjon
Vladimir, near Elbasan, which had been founded by him.
Even at present are to be seen on the walls of the church of
this monastery three inscriptions written in Latin, Greek
and Slavic. In these inscriptions he is given the title Prince
of Albania.
The dissolution of the Serbian empire induced and en­
couraged the Greek. Albanian and Vallahian feudal lords of
Epirus, too, to revolt and to attempt to create independent
principalities.
The first who rose in rebellion against the Serbian ruler
Stephan Uroshi, the brother of Stephan Dushan, were the
Greek nobles, “Archons”. The aim of the Greek feudal lords
to restore the “despotism” of the past of Epirus and to
recover their former fiefs lost during the Serbian conquest,
alarmed particularly the Albanian peasants, who were settled
in various parts of these districts. Relying on the peasants
of their own nationality, the Albanian feudal lords took arms
against the Greek archons and in the momentous struggle
which took place at the river Aheloos (1358) inflicted on
them ignominious defeat.
55
 After the danger on the part of Greek archons had been
averted, a long conflict started between the Albanian feudal
lords, led by Gjin Bue Shpata (1360-1400) and the Serbian
feudal lords led by the ruler Stephan Uroshi and later by his
son-in-law Thoma Preljubivich. By withstanding the as­
saults of the Serbian rulers, who in some cases solicited the
aid of the Turks, Gjin Bue Shpata extended the boundaries
of his domain and founded an independent principality with
Arta as its centre, which is known under the name of the
Despotate of Arta. The boundaries of this realm extended
on the north up to Gjirokastra, and on the south up to the
Corinthian Gulf.
However, the further development of the feudal chaos
which would have led to the fusion of all the principalities
and detached domains into one single state formation — into
the national state of the Albanians — was interrupted by
the conquest of Albania by the Ottoman Turks.

THE TURKISH CONQUEST OF ALBANIA

The Ottoman Turks who, taking advantage of the decay

of the Byzantine empire, had created in Asia Minor, in the
first half of the 14th century, a military feudal state, crossed
in the year 1354 the Dardanelle Straits without molesting
Constantinople and without encountering any serious resist­
ance on account of the feudal anarchy and turmoil into
which the Balkan states had fallen. Often aided personally
by the native princes, they spread themselves within a couple
of decades over the greater part of the peninsula.
From none of the Turkish campaigns was Albania saved.
After the first incursion they undertook in the year 1358 as
the allies of Karl Thopia, the Ottoman Turks reappeared in
Albania in the year 1388. In the year 1389 numerous Ser­
bian, Bulgarian, Albanian, Roumanian and Hungarian feudal
rulers united under the leadership of the Serbian King Lazar
56
 in a coalition against the Turkish plunderers. From the Al­
banian nobles, Gjergj II Balsha of Shkoder and Theodor
Korona Muzaka of Berat took part in this coalition. But in
the bloody encounter that took place that year in the plain
of Kossovo, the armies of the Balkan coalition suffered a
grave defeat.
During the reign of Sultan Bayazid, surnamed “Yilderim”
(Thunderbolt) who succeeded Sultan Murat I, killed in the
battle of Kossovo, the furious onrush of the Turks by no
means could be restrained.
The critical situation that was created for the Albanian
nobles by the Ottoman invasion, was exploited for its own
interest by the Republic of Venice, which planned to get
hold of the prosperous cities along the coast of Albania,
before they passed into the hands of the Turks. In order
to convince the nobles to surrender these cities, the senate
of Venice promised them rewards and material support. As
these gave no result, then the senate made use of various
means of pressure, created troubles within the feudal do­
mains, organized attempts to kill them, instigated rival
nobles to fight against them, and in some of the cases incited
against them even the Turks by means of substantial bribes.
Under the double Turkish and Venetian pressure, the Al­
banian principalities began to vacillate. The young ruler
of the principality of Durres, Gjergj Thopia, the son of Karl,
who succeeded his father who had died in 1388, young, ill
and inefficient as ruler, capitulated in face of the Venetian
pressure. In 1392 Gjergj made his testament in which he
bequeathed, after his death, Durres to Venice as heritage.
Some months after the testament had been drawn, he died
suddenly. Thus Durres passed into the hands of the Repub­
lic of St. Mark, whereas the other lands of the principality
were divided among a great number of small feudal domains.
Almost the same thing happened with the principality of
Shkoder. After the death of Balsha II, his widow Komita
separated from the Balshas, and the southern domains were
separated from Shkoder. As ruler of the northern portion
was elected his nephew Gjergj II Balsha (1385-1403). But
57
this latter was not capable to keep even the former bound­
aries. He was constrained to fight against the Turks, who
in the year 1388 began to penetrate into the territories of
Albania. In 1389 Gjergj II, as has been mentioned above,
took part with the Balkan coalition in the bloody battle of
Kossovo, which terminated with the victory of the Turks.
A great number of vassal nobles — the Dukagjins, the Za­
har ias, the Jonims, the Spans and others, profiting from the
enfeeblement of Gjergj II, began to break loose from the
principality and to create independent domains. In later
years the Turks seized temporarily the districts on the coast
of the principality also. Under these conditions Gjergj II
yielded, as Gjergj Thopia had done before him, to the pres­
sure of the Venetians, and surrendered to them the principal
cities that he still retained — Shkoder, Drishti, Danja and
Shasi. Under the pressure of the Turks and on account of
the internal feuds, the Despotate of Arta, too, began to dis­
integrate. After the death of Gjin Bue Shpata (1400), the
Despotate was divided into two parts: the northern part
became an independent domain with Gjirokastra as its chief
town under the rule of his son-in-law Gjin Zenebishti,
whereas the southern part, with its chief town further on at
Arta, was inherited by Gjin Shpata’s brother, Maurik Bua.
Some years later, these two domains were divided up into
still smaller domains. In this manner within the last dec­
ade of the 4th century the Republic of St. Mark extended
its domination over the most important cities of Albania one
by one. In this same time, a vast number of Albanian nobles
were appointed vassals of Venice.
In the conquered cities, the Republic established its own
administration, enforced its own laws and appointed Vene­
tian officials. In the surrounding country, tco, it established
Venetian “proniars”. With these measures it violated the
autonomy of the city-communes. The cities were saddled
with onerous taxes and forced labour. The Venetian trades­
men who settled down in these cities, monopolized the com­
merce and speculated wildly at the expense of the citizens
and of the peasants. Consequently in the year 1399 broke
58
 out in north Albania an insurrection of vast dimension
against the Venetian rule. The rebels freed Shkoder and
Drishti. But this insurrection was crushed by the military
forces sent by Venice.
Some of the feudal overlords preferred rather to come to
an understanding with the Turks. It became possible to
come to a settlement for the reason that Sultan Bayazid did
not deem himself strong enough to enforce, in all the vast
territories he had conquered, the Turkish military feudal
administration. In Albania and in the other recently con­
quered territories, the Turks left the native nobles in pos­
session of their domains, but they reduced them to vassalage,
obliged them to acknowledge and to accept the Sultan as
overlord, to pay a yearly tribute and to take part with their
armies in the campaigns of Turkey whenever the overlord
called on them.
The defeat the Turks suffered at Ankara in 1402 and then
the struggle for the throne, that broke out between the three
sons of Bayazid, furnished the occasion to the Albanian
nobles to free themselves from Turkish bondage. The Al­
banian nobles once again seized the opportunity to recom­
mence unhindered their campaigns for the expansion of
their feudal domains. These campaigns were not directed
only against each other, but against the Republic of Venice
also with the object of recapturing the lost cities. The most
violent and the longest war against the Republic was waged
by Balsha III (1403-1421), the son of Gjergj II, who nursed
the desire to restore the former principality of Shkoder.
But the Venetian diplomacy, by inciting one noble against
the other, succeeded in extricating itself from the difficult
situation that was created for the Republic.
On account of these wars, Albania was plunged once again
into anarchy. The country was split into a still greater
number of feudal domains, the boundaries of which were
diminished or extended from year to year, and even, often
enough, from month to month.
In 1413 the Turks practically overcame the political crisis.
Sultan Mehmet I by profiting from the feudal anarchy
59
into which Albania had sunk, re-established in the years
1415-1419 without any difficulty the previous Turkish au­
thority. This time the Turks acknowledged as vassals in
their respective estates only the nobles of north and central
Albania. In south Albania they chased away the native
grand nobles, suppressed their domains, and in these estates
they settled their feudal military regime of the timars and
of the zeamets. Sultan Murat II, who ascended the throne
in the year 1421, for a certain time brought no changes in
this situation.
In the meantime the map of the feudal domains had'
thoroughly changed. The three great principalities of the
14th century had completely decayed. As a result of the
feudal struggles, by now three other great domains were
created. One of them was that of the Dukagjin nobles which
stretched on the present districts of Lezha, Mirdita, Dukagjin
and Puka. The other was that of the Aranit nobles, which
stretched over the regions of Shpat, Qermenika and Mokra.
Between the two lay the large domain of Kastriots, which
in later years played an important role.
The Kastriots, as a noble family, did not have an origin of
long standing. They were Albanians from the village of
Kastrat of the district of Has which lies in the highlands
of Tropoja. In the second half of the 14th century Pal Kas-
trioti, a feudal lord of little importance, did not reside in
Has, but in the district of Dibra, where he had in his pos­
session only two villages. The son of Pal, Gjon Kastrioti,
started his activity at the time when the Turks invaded the
territories of Albania. In the beginning he became vassal
of the Sultan, but after the battle of Ankara, Gjon broke
loose from this bondage. By means of continuous fighting,
he extended his rule over the district of Dibra, then over
that of Mat, until he reached the sea. To counterbalance
the pressure of the Turks, Gjon entered into friendly rela­
tions with Venice. But as he realized that Venice did not
have in mind to wage war against the Turks, Gjon accepted
again in 1410 the status of vassal to the Sultan and sent
60
him as a pawn of fidelity a son who, as it appears, was his
eldest son Stanish.
In later years Stanish was released. Gjon Kastrioti contin­
ued to manage in an independent manner a policy which
had for its object to strengthen and to extend his authority.
In 1420 the boundaries of the Kastrioti domain stretched
from the seashore on the west to near Prizren on the east. It
seems that this independent policy awakened the suspicion
of the Turks, because in 1423 Sultan Murat II constrained
Gjon, the lord of Mat and of Dibra, to send as pawn to the
capital of the Turks at Edrene (Adrianopolis), as warrant
for his fidelity, three of his four sons, Stanish, Konstantin
and Gjergj (the fourth, Reposh, had entered a monastery as
a monk).
While the war between Turkey and Venice was being
waged for the possession of Selanik (Salonica) (1428-1430),
Gjon Kastrioti, as it appears in agreement with the Republic
of St. Mark, rejected the status of vassal to the Sultan and
declared war on Turkey. But the insurrection did not have
good result. In 1430 the Republic of St. Mark, after it had
yielded Selanik to the Turks, concluded a peace treaty with
the Sultan, thus abandoning its ally. That same year the
victorious Sultan sent his armies against the districts of
Morea and of Albania which had revolted. Gjon Kastrioti
was defeated. His castles were either razed to the ground
or seized by the Turkish garrisons. The Principality of
Kastriotis was divided up, the major part of it passing under
Turkish administration. Only a small part of it, principally
a mountainous zone, remained under the rule of the defeated
Gjon.
After they had crushed the insurrection of Gjon Kastrioti,
the Turks started to enforce in central Albania too their
regime of timars.
The enforcement of this regime began with the feudal
administrative organization of the country. The previous
feudal estates were suppressed. Districts of central Albania
together with those of south Albania, from the river Mat
on the north up to Qamuria on the south, were united in the
61
 year 1431 into one single sandjak, which was called the
sandjak of Albania (sandjak of Arnavid with its chief town
at Gjirokastra, with a sandjakbey at its head, who was sub­
ordinated to beylerbey of the eyalet of Rumeli (European
Turkey).
The sandjak of Albania was divided, in turn, into smaller
districts, 10 vilayets or kazas (the vilayet of Gjirokastra, of
Kanina, of Berat, of Kruja, etc.) at the head of which was
placed a subash, who fulfilled the feudal military functions,
and was subordinated to the sandjakbey. In each kaza, be­
sides the subash there was also a kadi who was the chief
magistrate of the civil, religious and judicial administration,
and was dependent directly on the Sultan.
The northern districts of Albania remained outside the
boundaries of the sandjak. Here the previous conditions
prevailed.
As everywhere else in the Balkans, so in Albania the
Turks proclaimed all the arable and non-arable lands of the
sandjak as miri property (state land property). Only a
limited portion of the lands were considered mulk property
(private real estate) and vakuf property (real estate owned
by religious institutions — consecrated real estate).
That same year 1431, Turkish emins began the registration
■of the landholding peasant and citizen families, of the fruit
orchards, vineyards, olive groves, of the cattle, bee-hives, and
of other property which they held, thus calculating the in­
come each peasant and citizen family derived. On the basis
of this census of the income were decided and registered the
duties that each peasant-farmer and citizen had to pay. The
census terminated in the middle of the year 1432.
The Sultan divided the lands of the sandjak of Albania
into 335 fiefs (tunars., zeamets and bases) and these he dis­
tributed to 335 feudal lords (vassals). Each fief included
one, two or more villages, and in some cases tens of villages
near or far from each other. Each feudal lord had the right
to collect from the peasants or citizens of his fief the regis­
tered duties. The fiefs were divided according to the general
amount of the registered revenues collected by the feudal
62
lord into timars (when they were less than 20 thousand ak­
ches yearly), into zeamets (when they were from 20 thousand
to 100 thousand akches yearly) and into bases (when they
were more than 100 thousand akches in a year).
Most of the fiefs were timars. Zeamets were endowed
habitually on subashes of the vilayets and any other distin­
guished feudal lord. The has was bestowed on the sand-
jakbey.
In compensation for the revenues they collected from their
fiefs, the feudal lords were obliged to serve in war as armed
cavalry (the spahi with a certain number of soldiers in pro­
portion to the revenues collected) at once and as often as the
Sultan asked them to. In case the spahi did not respond to
the call, he was deprived of the timar, zeamet or has, and
this was given to another spahi. During the war operations,
the timarlies together with their soldiers under the lead of
the subashi of the vilayet to which they appertained, march­
ed under the banner of the sandjakbey.
The timarlies, the subashes and the sandjakbeys, laden
with military duties, constituted the class of the feudal lords
of the sword. But besides them there were feudal lords as
for example the kadi, the imam, the emin, etc., who were
endowed with timars, and in compensation for the revenues
they collected, were laden, not with military obligations but
with various duties in the civil administration of the sandjak.
These latter formed the feudal class of officials. The pre-
ponderous mass of the feudal lords of the sandjak of Albania
(about 90 per cent) constituted the feudal lords of the sword.
(Among them were Turks, Albanians, Mohammedans and
Christians.)
The lands of the timar, of the zeamet and of the has were
miri property. The overlord was the Turkish state, repre­
sented by the Sultan. By bestowing the fief to the spahi,
the Turkish state did not renounce the right of full proprie­
torship, but ceded only the right of feudal tenure. For this
reason the spahi did not have the right either to sell or
to bestow the lands of the timar, zeamet or has. He merely
enjoyed the right to exact from the peasant of his fief a
63
series of fixed duties. On the other hand, the peasant en­
joyed on the land that he cultivated and that was situated
within the limits of the timar, zeamet or has, only the right
to make use of it, in other words the right to till and to
exploit it with the condition to hand over to the feudal lord
the fixed duties.
The peasant that lived within a timar, zeamet or has was
called raya. His obligations to the spahi were manifold. In
the first place the raya could enjoy the right of making use
of the land only in case he paid to the spahi, as feudal land­
lord, the tax of the property title. He was obliged to tender
one-tenth of all his agricultural produce (urush) and of his
dairy products (ispendje), which were the contribution of
the serfdom, the tapi which was the tax for enjoying the
possession of the land, the mijab, which was the fine for
the damages and various trespasses of the peasants. The
raya enjoyed limited rights.
Besides the obligations to the spahi, the raya peasant had
obligations to the Sultan and to the Turkish state also. Of
these obligations the most onerous was the tribute of the
djiza which was paid each year by every Christian male in­
habitant that had attained the age of 14.
The census of the lands and the heavy burden of duties,
the reduction into rayas not only of the previous serfs but
also of a great number of peasant freeholders, the settlement
of rapacious spahis in their villages and their constant in­
terference in the daily life of the villagers, increased to a
still greater degree the resentment and wrath of the Al­
banians. This resentment could be observed even at the time
of the introduction of the timar regime. Numerous vil­
lages opposed the registration. In some cases the villagers
killed the Turkish emins and did not allow the spahis to
settle in their villages.
Discontented also were the Albanian nobles, who through
the census and registration of the lands had lost their do­
mains, partially as in the case of the Arianits and Kastriots,
or totally as in the case of Thopias, Muzakas, Strazimirs,
Balshas, etc. In the hope of recovering their former do­
64
mains, these nobles spurred by the readiness of the peasant
masses, headed the rebellions that broke out as soon as the
registration of the lands had terminated.
Of these insurrections the greatest was that which burst
out in the domain of the Arianits in the summer of 1432.
Under the command of Gjergj Arianit, the peasants seized
arms, killed or chased away the spahis, and within a short
period liberated their districts. The Turks that same year
sent armies, but in the encounter with Gjergj Arianit they
were beaten. Some months later, in the middle of winter,
Sultan Murat II sent other armies against Arianit. However,
this time also, in the bloody clash that took place in the
Shkumbin valley, the Albanians reaped a brilliant victory.
In the year 1433 Gjergj Arianit won in Laberia a third vic­
tory against fresh Turkish armies.
The victories resounded with great clamour. Arianit re­
ceived messages of congratulations and of excitement from
various European courts. Within the boundaries of Albania
they kindled the fire of revolts in other districts of the coun­
try also. Large proportions took the rebellion especially in
the district of Gjirokastra under the leadership of Depe
Zenebishi. Alarmed by the succeeding waves of insurrec­
tions, the Sultan sent to Albania in the year 1434 large
armies, which after crushing the revolt of Gjirokastra,
marched against Gjergj Arianit. The fighting lasted more
than a year. At the end of these wars the Albanian insurrec­
tion was crushed in the year 1435 and Gjergj Arianit was
constrained to withdraw into the mountainous regions. In
1437 another revolt broke out in the district of Berat, led by
Theodor Korona Muzaka. However, this revolt, too, was
mercilessly crushed by the Turks.
In spite of the active participation of the masses of people,
the Albanian revolts were crushed, because they were poorly
organized and lacked a plan for common action. On the
other hand they were led by separatist nobles, who in their
struggles against the Turks endeavoured to defend only their
personal feudal interests. Against the Turks greatly su­
perior in number and much better organized, the war might
65
have been crowned with success only if all the reserves in
manpower, economic resources and financial means of the
country could have been united under one single command
for the liberation of Albania. These conditions were
achieved only some years later, under the leadership of
Gjergj Kastriot Scanderbeg.

THE GENERAL REVOLT OF THE YEAR 1443

Gjergj Kastrioti, the younger son of Gjon Kastrioti, was

born, as it is surmised, about the year 1405. He passed his
childhood with his family in Albania. Still as a youngster
he was handed over as a pawn together with his brothers to
the Turks. The humanist from Shkoder Marin Barletius,
his monumental work in Latin on Scanderbeg, which was
published between the years 1508-1510, says that Gjergj
was surrendered as pawn to Sultan Murat II when he was
nine years old. A series of other documents dating from
the 15th century admit likewise that he was given as pawn
to Sultan Murat II when he was still a boy (puer). However.
Murat II ascended to the throne in the year 1421 and the
surrender as pawn, as it is believed, took place in the year
1423 when the Turkish Sultan had completed the subjuga­
tion of the Albanian nobles. At that period Gjergj Kastrioti
was approximately 18, and not nine years old, as is claimed
by Barletius.
Sturdy, dexterous, comely and intelligent, as the Turkish
chroniclers describe him, he made an impression on the court
of Edrene. As the son of a vassal ruler, the Sultan had him
sent to the military school of “ich-ogllans”, which was near
the palace. According to custom, he was converted to
Mohammedanism, and was given the name of Skender. His
biographers affirm that he finished military school with
brilliant results. In 1426 we find Gjergj once again in Al­
bania, but after that, for many years consecutively, we lose
66
Gjergj Kastriot Scanderbcg, from a 16th century painting
sight of him in the documents. Undoubtedly, he was still
kept as pawn in the imperial court of the Sultan. As soldier
and as the son of a vassal, Gjergj, with the name of Skender,
was obliged to take part in the usual expeditions of the
Turks. During these campaigns he distinguished himself as
a soldier and won the title of “beg” which at that time was
a military grade. He was thus called Scanderbeg. By taking
part in those expeditions he at the same time won the con­
fidence of the Sultan. In 1438 Murat II appointed Scander­
beg subash of the vilayet of Kruja, one of the most impor­
tant vilayets of the sandjak of Albania.
Though he served for many years in the Turkish army,
Scanderbeg did not forget his motherland, which was suf­
fering under the Turkish yoke. He preserved his love for
the freedom of his country and of his compatriots. As soon
as he arrived at Kruja as subash, he began secretly to pre­
pare the organization of the revolt for liberation. But he
realized that in order not to meet with failure as in the pre­
vious revolts, the present insurrection should have a long
and careful preparation. After ascertaining the acquiescence
of the popular masses, Scanderbeg sought to insure also in­
ternational support. By means of his aged father, he en­
tered into a secret understanding with the Republic of
Venice as well as with that of Ragusa, and these two
pledged him their friendship.
In 1440 Scanderbeg left Kruja and it is presumed that he
went to the sandjakbey of the sandjak of Dibra. Here he
continued his preparations and, always with the same object
in view, he came in touch with other states, too, especially
with Naples and with Hungary. But despite the readiness
of the popular masses and of the instigations on the part of
the states with which he had come in touch, Scanderbeg de­
layed the revolt until the autumn of the year 1443, when
favourable conditions were created.
Since the year 1442 under the leadership of their talented
captain Janosh Hunyadi, the Hungarians had passed from
the defensive war they had waged up to then, to a stubborn
offensive war with the aim to drive the Ottoman invaders
68
as far away as they could, and also to chase them from the
Balkans if possible.
After initial successes, Hunyadi planned to organize in the
following year a still greater offensive. For this purpose
he tried to enter into alliance with the Balkan peoples,
which were to operate behind the lines of the Turks. Hun­
gary’s ally, the Pope, exercised continuous pressure on the
Balkan and Albanian nobles to induce them to seize arms
against the Turks as soon as the Hungarians would move
toward the south. Such a recommendation was given to
Scanderbeg also. In spite of that, Scanderbeg obeyed the
command of the Sultan, and together with the armies of
his sandjak marched in the direction of the Danube.
On November 3, 1443 the Hungarian armies most coura­
geously crossed the Danube and started their offensive in
the direction of the city of Nish, thus creating panic in the
rank and file of the Turkish armies. Scanderbeg thought
that the appropriate hour had struck. In the midst of the
turmoil and confusion of the retreat, together with his nep­
hew Hamza Kastrioti and with 300 Albanian horsemen, he
abandoned the front, and after some days arrived at Dibra,
where he was received with acclamation by the population
of the city.
At Dibra, Scanderbeg took urgent measures to clear the
land of the Turkish garrisons. In the whole system of these
garrisons, a key position was held by the Castle of Kruja,
with its strong strategic situation that rendered it extremely
difficult to be seized by fighting. By means of a false im­
perial writ of the Sultan, stating that he was re-appointed
as subash of Kruja, he took possession of the city and of the
castle. During the night he introduced into the city his
soldiers who lay hidden in a nearby forest and, together with'
numerous loyal citizens, assailed and annihilated the Turkish
garrison of the castle.
With this assault began, under the leadership of Gjergj
Kastriot Scanderbeg, the general revolt of the Albanians
against the Turkish conquerors. In the following days,
Scanderbeg himself spread the sparks of the revolt in the
69
remaining districts of the Kastriotis’ domain by chasing away
the spahis and the Turkish garrisons. On November 28,
1443, he proclaimed the restoration of the independent
Albanian principality by hoisting above the white castle of
Kruja the banner of Kastriotis — the black two-headed
eagle on red background.
The uprising of Scanderbeg offered the opportunity to
other Albanian nobles to liberate, too, their respective
feudal domains. During the month of December 1443, the
whole of central Albania was cleared of the Turkish forces.
After the victory of the uprisings in these districts, before
Scanderbeg and the other Albanian leaders lay the task of
unification of all the forces in manpower and in materials
of the country, not only for the defence of their freedom,
but also in order to offer resistance to the expeditions which
the Sultan would undoubtedly send as soon as he had nulli­
fied the pressure of the Hungarian offensive, but also with
the object of liberating the other districts of Albania. To
achieve this task, a general assembly met at Lezhe on March
2, 1444 on the initiative of Scanderbeg, which was attended
by practically all the Albanian nobles, among whom also
were those who had led the previous insurrections against
the Turks — Gjergj Arianit, Andrea Thopia, Nikolla Dukag-
jini, Theodor Muzaka and others. The chieftains of free
Albanians also took part in the assembly.
Incited by the interest to protect the feudal domains, the
Albanian nobles, notwithstanding the divergences they had
with each other, took the decision to unite in the common
war against the Turks. This decision led to the creation of
an alliance, which is known also as the “Albanian League”
with Scanderbeg as its president. For the same purpose the
assembly decided to create an Albanian army, which was
to be constituted by the troops that all the members of the
League were to send within the limits of their possibilities.
The commander-in-chief was Scanderbeg. In order to pro­
vide for the war expenses, the assembly decided to create a
common case. Its funds were to be delivered by the mem­
bers in the form of contributions. Each noble pledged be-
70
 fore the assembly the number of soldiers and the amount of
money that he would give to the “Albanian League”. The
greatest number of military troops were promised by
Scanderbeg.
The Albanian League of Lezha was a sort of political and
military alliance of the nobles, created for the sole purpose
of fighting against the Turks. Each noble guarded his do­
main, and at the same time his autonomous authority over
the domain. Scanderbeg too kept his domain. As president
of the League he was merely primus inter pares. He had no
right to interfere with the affairs of the domains of other
nobles. But in spite of these shortcomings, the creation of
the “Albanian League” marked one step ahead, because with
it a common front was created in the war against the Turkish
foes.
As soon as the Lezhe Assembly had terminated its work,
Scanderbeg, as supreme head of the League, undertook the
speedy organization of the Albanian army and the adoption
of other measures for defence purposes. Thorough connois­
seur of the merits and of the weak points of the Turkish
army, he had in view to create not an army as that of the
nobles, constituted by disorganized mercenary bands and
peasant troops, but in lieu of that a new, disciplined, well
drilled army interested in fighting without compromise
against the enemy.
Within a short period Scanderbeg created a new army of
about 8,000 soldiers. A portion of it, about 3,000 soldiers,
constituted the “pretorian guard”, which stood always near
Scanderbeg. This was made up of infantry and of light
cavalry, and not of heavily armoured mounted troops which
had proved inefficient to fight against the Turkish jenichers
and spahis. One other part, this too composed of about 3,000
soldiers, was allotted to Moisi Golemi’s command for the
protection of the eastern boundary, whence the Turkish
armies had easy access. These were permanent standing
armies, and were recruited within the Kastriotis domains.
The other part of the army was made up of troops sent by
the allied nobles. Besides them Scanderbeg created troops
71
of voluntary peasants, who were to help the standing army
only when the alarm was given. Through this organiza­
tion Scanderbeg could raise, in case of necessity, an army of
15,000-18,000 soldiers.

THE FIRST VICTORIES OF SCANDERBEG

The occasion for the clash with the Turks presented itself
soon enough. In spring, as soon as Hunyadi had withdrawn
into Hungary, the Sultan decided to crush the successful
uprising of the Albanians. In June of the year 1444, a
Turkish army composed of 25 thousand soldiers under the
command of Ali Pasha entered Albania from the Dibra dis­
trict. The Albanian army marched to meet it and took up
positions facing them in the plain of Domosdova. Ali Pa­
sha initiated the assault on June 29, 1444. Scanderbeg
manoeuvred with dexterity, feigning to accept the battle,
and retreated as if he were defeated until he enticed the
Turkish army into the narrow Torviolli plain, surrounded by
mountains and forests. While the Turks thought they had
caught the Albanians in a trap, they found that they were en­
circled by hidden forces of Scanderbeg, who assailed them
from all quarters until they annihilated them completely.
The Sultan sent against the Albanians two other expedi­
tions — one in 1445 and the other in 1446. But these expedi­
tions also were crushed by the Albanian army.
In 1447 the Turks did not molest Albania. But that year
the Albanians had troubles with the Republic of Venice.
The victories won against the Turks strengthened the inde­
pendence of the Albanian feudal domains, and in a special
manner that of the principality of Scanderbeg. There was
no doubt that the Albanian nobles, getting all the while
stronger, would attempt to recapture the prosperous cities
on the coast which were now under the authority of Venice.
For this reason the Republic of St. Mark, alarmed by the
72
strengthening of their positions, began to interfere by means
of provocations with the object of splitting the Albanian
League, and particularly of undermining the independent
government of Scanderbeg, which was, as K. Marx puts it,
“a thorn in its side”.
This hostile attitude brought about in its train the decla­
ration of war between the Albanian League and the Republic
of Venice in the autumn of the year 1447. The problem of
the city of Dania served as a pretext for the outbreak of
hostilities. Lek Zakaria, lord of Dania and member of the
League, had died without leaving heirs. According to the
convention, the city as well as the important castle of Dania
were to pass under the authority of the League. However,
Venice through artifice got hold of the castle before the
arrival of the Albanian forces. Then on behalf of the
League, Scanderbeg attacked Dania and the other castles
of the coast, which were still under Venice’s sway, but, as
he had no artillery, he did not succeed in his attempt. The
fighting continued throughout the following year, too. Ven­
ice’s endeavours to cause discord among the allies of Scan­
derbeg met with little success. The Republic announced
that it would give a princely reward to whoever would kill
the Albanian leader. But this step, too, met with failure.
In the spring of the year 1448, while the wars with Venice
still continued, the conditions of the Albanians suddenly de­
teriorated. From the east a huge Turkish army with Sultan
Murat II in person at its head, arrived in June at the gates
of the neighbouring castle of Sfetigrad, which they besieged,
and then passed by, continuing their march on Kruja.
The arrival of the Turks placed the Albanians between
two fires. In order to put out the fire on one side, Scan­
derbeg undertook a series of speedy actions against the Ve­
netians in the region of Shkoder. With the aid of native
farmers, who revolted, he beat the Venetian army in the
battle of Drin, on July 23, 1448, and won a brilliant victory.
After leaving there under the command of his nephew
Hamza Kastrioti only an outpost to keep guard, with
73
the rest of his troops he left for Sfetigrad, which was be­
sieged by the Turks.
In Sfetigrad the Sultan had to face incredible resistance.
The besieged Albanian garrison defended the castle heroi­
cally. In order to assuage the condition of the besieged,
Scanderbeg as soon as he had arrived at Sfetigrad, began to
storm the Turks from the rear. The resistance of Sfetigrad
lasted until the autumn. At the end, the Turks discovered the
conduit that furnished the castle with water, and obliged the
garrison constrained by thirst, to surrender. Though Sfe­
tigrad had capitulated, the Sultan did not continue his march
on Kruja. The news that Hunyadi was getting ready for
a new campaign obliged Murat II to return to Edrene to
make his preparations against the Hungarians.
This news convinced Scanderbeg also of the necessity to
bring speedily to an end the war with the Venetians, and to
have, in this manner, his hands free in order to take part in
the Hungarian campaign, as it had been agreed between him
and Hunyadi. But the preliminary parleys dragged on, and
the peace treaty was signed on October 4, 1448, only after
Scanderbeg had agreed to abandon Dania. In compensation,
the Republic promised to pay to Scanderbeg 1,400 golden
ducats each year. However Scanderbeg was still en route
when the Hungarians came to a clash with the Turks on
October 18, 1448 and were badly beaten.
In the year 1450 Sultan Murat II resolved to give a deci­
sive blow to the resistance of the Albanians. After gather­
ing all the Turkish armies, about 100 thousand strong, at
the beginning of May 1450 he set out at their head, once
more toward Albania, this time with the aim of capturing
Kruja.
In order to face that formidable army, Scanderbeg gave
the alarm for general mobilization. To his call responded
all the men of the principality fit for fighting. Within a
couple of days an army of nearly 18,000 men was raised.
Scanderbeg divided this army into three parts. He quarter­
ed about 1,500 men in the castle under the command of
Count Uran, a valiant warrior of long-standing repute. He
74
personally, with 8,000 soldiers, withdrew outside the castle,
with his quarters in the Gumenishti mountains to the north
of Kruja. The rest of the forces was organized in small and
mobile bands.
As soon as they penetrated into Albania, the Turkish
armies all along the Shkumbin valley met with the am­
bushes of Albanian peasants, and were obliged to fight with
heavy losses and to pursue the mobile bands into the depth
of the country, and often they succumbed at their ambus­
cades. After heavy losses, the Sultan with the bulk of his
army, appeared on May 14, 1450, before Kruja.
After the endeavours of the Sultan to get hold of the
citadel without fighting, through threats and bribes, had
failed, the Turks began to bombard with heavy artillery
which threw shells of about 400 pounds, and which were
being used for the first time in Albania. The bombardment
was followed by a general assault of the Turks. But all the
endeavours were frustrated. The garrison defended the
citadel heroically. Scanderbeg from outside attacked the
Turkish army once from one flank, then from the other,
causing them great anxiety and damage. On the other hand,
the peasant bands assailed the caravans that furnished the
Turkish army with provisions from Macedonia and Venice.
During the summer, the Turks tried several other times
to capture Kruya by assault, but the war waged by the Al­
banians on all the fronts frustrated their efforts completely.
After an unsuccessful siege of four and a half months, with
the approach of winter. Sultan Murat II withdrew his camp
on October 26, 1450, and returned to Edrene together with
his defeated army, which had left in Albania about 20,000
killed.
The defence of Kruya was a great victory for the Albanians
in general, and for Scanderbeg in particular. The victory
had a resounding echo within as well as outside the bounda­
ries of the country. European courts, through the delega­
tions and messages they sent to Kruya, congratulated Scan­
derbeg for this brilliant achievement.
73
 THE CREATION OF THE INDEPENDENT
ALBANIAN STATE;
THE WARS AGAINST THE TREASON OF
THE FEUDAL LORDS

The victories of the Albanians drew since the first years

the attention of European states, which were interested in
the war against Turkey. They began to see in the Albanians
an important force for the expulsion of the Turks from the
Balkans. It was clear for Scanderbeg too that the war
against the mighty Sultans, with so untrustworthy neigh­
bours as the Venetians, could not be carried on with any
success for a long time without the material and political
support of other powers. This common interest brought
the establishment of diplomatic relations between Scander­
beg and a number of foreign states with Hungary, Ragusa,
Rome, Naples and others.
Scanderbeg’s need for allies in the forthcoming encounters
with the Ottomans became still greater after the siege of
Kruya. Six years of war had ruined the country. Especial­
ly during the campaign of the year 1450, the Turks had
burned down great numbers of homes and the crops in the
fields of the peasantry. In the winter 1450-1451 the country
was threatened by famine. There was great need for food
for the population and for the army, weapons and means and
material for the reparation of the damaged fortresses. In
order to satisfy these needs Scanderbeg addressed himself
to those foreign states which followed an anti-Turkish policy
But it was only the Kingdom of Naples which manifested its
readiness to give the required help. Between Alphonse IV
of Naples, who dreamt of founding a vast empire in the Med­
iterranean Sea, and Scanderbeg, lord of Albania, as he
began to be called at that juncture, a treaty was signed at
Gaeta, Italy, on March 26, 1451. Alphonse undertook
to help the lord of Albania with military and financial
means for the continuation of the war against the Turks.
Whereas Scanderbeg, in need of assistance and with the
76
hope of enticing the Kingdom of Naples into the war against
the Ottomans, pledged to commend himself as vassal of Al­
phonse for all the lands that would be liberated with the
participation of Neapolitan forces.
The support given him by Alphonse was, however,
meagre. There came to Albania only 100 Catalan soldiers
who did not take part in the fighting at all. Consequently
Scanderbeg did not proffer the oath of fidelity. In like
manner, in the following years too, the Albanians had to
fight once again all alone, against numerous ferocious
Turkish expeditions. At their head now stood Mehmed II,
the Fatih (the Conqueror), who after capturing Constan­
tinople in the year 1453, carried on with more impetus his
military campaigns with the aim of stretching the bound­
aries of Turkey still farther into Europe.
The Albanian League founded at Lezhe in 1444, in which
the nobles preserved the autonomy of their domains, for
some time had begun not to respond to the conditions
created by the extension and the intensification of the war
of liberation. With their selfish attitude, the nobles hin­
dered the mobilization of the resources in manpower and in
materials of the land, which was required by the uneven
war with the Ottomans. Furthermore, their vacillating at­
titude, especially at critical moments of the war, constituted
a danger behind the back of Scanderbeg — the more so as
this attitude was exploited, and even instigated, by hostile
powers — the Turks and the Venetians.
The necessities of the war for self-protection induced
Scanderbeg to do away with the particularism of the nobles.
Relying on the masses of the population and, in a higher
degree, on the army, which by now were attached to him
politically, Scanderbeg began, whenever the interests of the
war demanded it, to ignore the social standing of the nobles
as autonomous rulers. During the war operations, he violated
the boundaries of the domains of allied nobles, quartered
in their castles loyal military garrisons and took other steps
of security, which constituted an infringement of their rights.
Later on, when he felt himself still stronger, Scanderbeg
77
even took coercive measures against unreliable, shaky
feudal lords, dismissed from their offices inefficient or sus­
pected aristocratic officers, took away from them the pron-
ies or feudal estates, and gave them to military nobles or
to peasants who had distinguished themselves at war. Thus
with the constant growth of the authority of Scanderbeg,
the former boundaries of feudal domains began to disappear
and the domains in their turn to fuse in a united single state.
This process led to the creation of one united Albanian state
under the rule of Gjergj Kastriot Scanderbeg. The crea­
tion of this independent state marked one step forward in
comparison with the previous conditions of feudal chaos.
But this process caused the discontent of the nobles, who
sought to safeguard their individual authority. Powerless
to check this process which was directed by the strong hand
of Scanderbeg, the major nobles began to break away from
the Albanian League. In 1450 two powerful aristocratic
families, Arianits and Dukagjins, left the League. Their
exit caused great damage to the country, because it weakened
the war front at a time when the Turks were in a rage
against Albania. Scanderbeg tried to keep them near him.
But his efforts failed. The Dukagjins not only did not
accede, but on the contrary concluded peace with the Sultan
and began to plot against Scanderbeg. With Gjergj Arianit
it seemed that Scanderbeg had some success. In order to
strengthen their friendship, in the month of April of the
year 1451 he married Donika, the daughter of Arianit.
However after some time Arianit again broke off.
Later on when the authority of Scanderbeg grew still
more, various nobles, among whom were even some of his
intimate collaborators, committed open treason and entered
into the service of the Turks against their own country.
The feudal treachery reached its culmination in the years
1456-1457.
With the aim to open a way to the liberation of south Al­
bania, Scanderbeg decided in 1455 to storm the citadel of
Berat which had fallen anew into the hands of the Turks
during the siege of Kruja. This time, together with the
78
Albanian ariny, two thousand Neapolitan infantrymen too,
who were ultimately sent to Albania by Alphonse, took part
in the action. At the start, the war operations were success­
ful. The citadel was besieged and the Turkish garrison,
finding itself in difficulty, asked for a respite of 15
days to surrender. But before the delay had terminated,
a large Turkish army of 40,000 men, in secret understanding
with Moisi Golemi, the commander of the frontier forces,
came without being detected and attacked unexpectedly the
Albanians and the Neapolitans at Berat, inflicting on them
a great defeat. After his treachery, Moisi Golemi bound
himself to the Turks.
In 1456, 15,000 Turkish cavalrymen, and with them the
traitor Moisi Golemi, assailed Albania. But at the bloody
encounter that took place in the district of Dibra, the Turks
were annihilated completely, and Moisi repented and rend­
ered himself to Scanderbeg, who pardoned him and admitted
him back into the Albanian army. Before long, another
commander, Gjergj Stres Balsha, treacherously yielded to
the Turks the frontier fortress of Modritza. After a couple
of weeks, the nephew and the most closely related collab­
orator of Scanderbeg, Hamza Kastrioti, who as a descend­
ant of the Kastriotis had the pretension to inherit a part
of the domains of his grandfather, betrayed likewise and
went over to the Turks.
Towards the end of spring of the year 1457, in almost
hopeless circumstances for the Albanians, a large Turkish
army of nearly 80 thousand men, under the command of the
well experienced general Isak bey Evrenos was despatched
against Albania. The Turkish army was accompanied by
Hamza Kastrioti, appointed by the Sultan as governor of
Kruya.
The Albanians, this time too, were not downcast. They
remained loyal to Scanderbeg. With the unlimited support
of the popular masses, which he enjoyed, Scanderbeg con­
trived to tire out the hostile army from the end of May up
to the beginning of September, without giving battle. On
the contrary he effaced his traces in such a manner that he
79
misled the Turkish commandant and his own nephew to
believe that he was “routed”, that his soldiers and his
officers had “abandoned” him and that he himself had
“taken refuge” in high mountains to save his head. How­
ever, when on September 7, 1457 the Turks, sure of the
victory, were celebrating the end of the Albanian resistance
light-heartedly in the plain of Albulene near Kruja, Scan­
derbeg with his army attacked the enemy unexpectedly and
annihilated them completely, capturing, among thousands of
war prisoners, the traitor Hamza Kastrioti.
At Albulene the Albanians with Scanderbeg won not only
a brilliant military victory over the manifold superior Turks,
but at the same time they achieved also an important polit­
ical victory over the vacillating and treacherous nobles, and
dissipated as well the doubts that had risen as to the forth­
coming fate of Scanderbeg’s authority. With this victory
Scanderbeg triumphed over the separatist tendencies of the
allied nobles, by centralizing further in his own hands the
authority of the Albanian principality.
The victory of Albulene brought Albania and its chief
more than ever into the international arena. To congrat­
ulate Scanderbeg for the victory he had achieved, the Eu­
ropean courts sent him messages full of praise. Pope Calist
III together with praises and titles of glorification invited
Scanderbeg to take part in the great Crusade he was trying
to organize against the Turks.
Pope Pius II, who succeeded Calist, proved more active in
the preparation of the Crusade, and the hopes for its success
he made to depend on the participation of Scanderbeg, who
after the death of Hunyadi in 1456 had become the most
popular personality in Europe in the anti-Turkish war of
liberation. At the congress of Mantova, which was convened
in 1459 to take a decision on the European Crusade, the name
of the illustrious chief of the Albanians was extolled by
a great number of participants. In the plans of war drawn
on this occasion, to Scanderbeg was allotted the important
task of attacking the Turks on the central front.
80
 But the preparations for the Crusade dragged on account
of the feudal contradictions that existed between the partic­
ipants. In the meanwhile the Turks sent other expedi­
tions to Albania. In expectation of the preparations for the
Crusade, which were likely to take time, and with the aim to
give the country a certain respite to rest and to restore as
much as possible the economic prosperity which was ruined
on account of the continual wars, Scanderbeg in 1460 ac­
cepted the offer of the Sultan and signed with him an armi­
stice for three years.
Scanderbeg took advantage of the armistice with the
Turks for hastening to go to the succour of his ally the King
of Naples. Alphonse V, who had died in 1458, had been
succeeded by his son Ferdinand. Against the young sov­
ereign had revolted the native inhabitants, who wanted to
bring to the throne of Naples an Anjouine king. Scanderbeg
was concerned that in this civil war should win the son of
his former ally, hoping that he, in return, would give him
an aid in his war against the Ottomans. It is for this reason
that he acceded to the request of Ferdinand to go to his
assistance. One of the rebellious nobles, the Prince of Ta­
ranto, Johannes Antonius de Ursinis, in a letter he sent to
Scanderbeg on October 10, 1460, tried to persuade him to
give up the expedition to Italy, warning him that the lightly
armoured Albanian army could not rescue Ferdinand from
the certain overthrow and that it would suffer an igno­
minious defeat at the hands of the heavy Italian cavalry. In
the answer he dispatched on October 31, 1460, Scanderbeg
wrote to the Prince of Taranto that he was “a friend of
virtue and not of fate”, and that he could not abandon his
ally. Scanderbeg reminded the rebellious prince that after
the successful war which had been waged by the Albanians,
it was in the interest not only of Albania but also of Italy
that the House of Aragon, which had assisted in the war
against the Sultan, should be supported, and not the House
of Anjou, which had made no contribution whatsoever
against the Turkish foes.
81
 In 1461 Scanderbeg left for Italy with a part of his light
cavalry, and arrived there at the most critical moment for
Ferdinand. In Italy Scanderbeg reaped two military vic­
tories, one at Barletta and the other at Trani. With his
victories he helped Ferdinand to suppress the insurrection
and to consolidate his tottering authority.

THE BRILLIANT VICTORIES OF

THE ALBANIANS AGAINST
SULTAN FATIH

In 1462 the situation in Albania had again deteriorated.

On one side the Republic of Venice, uneasy on account of
the reinforcement of the alliance of Albania with Naples,
its rival, began again with the provocations by instigating
the separatist nobles against Scanderbeg. On the other side,
Sultan Mehmed II, believing that Scanderbeg’s situation was
impaired and in order not to allow the Albanians to take
part in the Crusade, broke the armistice and dispatched, one
after the other, three expeditions against Albania.
Scanderbeg, informed in time, quickly returned from
Naples to Kruya and again faced the aggravated situation.
Within a month he made an end of the three Turkish expedi­
tions.
After these expeditions had failed, in the spring of the
year 1463 Sultan Fatih proposed to Scanderbeg to sign this
time no more an armistice, but a treaty of ten years’ peace.
Scanderbeg accepted the proposal and the peace was signed
at Shkup, in April of the year 1463.
The organizers of the Crusade, with Pope Pius II at its
head, were distressed by the peace accord, and applied their
pressure on Scanderbeg in order to oblige him to begin once
more the wars with the Turks. At the start Scanderbeg
refused to comply. But in the following months it appeared
that the Crusade was ready to commence. In the summer
82
Venice started a war against Turkey. The Republic, which
was anxious to have the Albanians fight, renounced its
previous hostile attitude and even banded itself with Scan­
derbeg in a treaty of alliance against the Turks. The sep­
aratist nobles, among them Lek Dukagjini, approached
Scanderbeg and put themselves under his command. In
November, Pius II proclaimed the commencement of the
Crusade. These events persuaded Scanderbeg, and there­
fore at the end of November 1463 he restarted the war
against the Turks.
But the Crusaders, on account of their conflicts with each
other, did not move against the Turks. With the death of
Pius II in August 1464, the Crusade ended definitely. With
its elimination the Albanians found themselves once more
face to face with the enraged Sultan.
The Albanians were obliged to face the fury of Fatih in
extremely difficult circumstances. From the 20 years’ war,
the country was dilapidated, the national economy was de­
stroyed, the land was denuded of its population, partly
through slaughters, partly on account of emigration. The
fields were desolate, men fit to bear arms had diminished.
The hopes to receive succour from abroad were scarce. The
European states in general did not manifest any concern for
the Balkans, although their fate was being played there.
Ferdinand of Naples was not in a condition to help his ally.
The new Pope, Paul II, a great miser, complained that the
Vatican coffers were empty, and gave no hope of giving
any help to Scanderbeg. The new allies, the Venetians,
were not entirely reliable because from one moment to the
other they might come to peace terms with the Sultan,
besides they too had proved very parsimonious in their
military and financial grants.
In this state of affairs, in 1465 the Sultan sent against
the Albanians five expeditions, one after the other, under
the command of Ballaban Pasha, with the task to demolish
the country entirely, to tire out Scanderbeg’s army and to
demoralize the Albanian population, in order to give at
last the finishing stroke to the persistent resistance of Al­
83
bania. However, as each time before, this year too the
five expeditions were crushed.
The Turkish expeditions were launched at harvest time.
The damages were so immense that the Albanians entered
into the winter under the threat of famine, and with the
greatest difficulty survived until the spring of the year 1466.
Yet in June, at the threshold of the new harvesting, at
a time when the grain stores were entirely empty, Sultan
Fatih together with Ballaban Pasha, at the head of the
entire imperial army of 150,060 men, started their march on
Albania.
All this immense mass of soldiers pushed onwards burning
everything and killing everyone they found on their way.
This time too the events of the year 1450 repeated them­
selves. The peasants withdrew their families from unpro­
tected places and laid ambush all along the road against
Fatih’s soldiers. As the chroniclers themselves admit, the
Ottoman armies had to fight tooth and nail all along the
road and to pursue the Albanian bands far into the high­
lands in front of unimaginable acts of heroism. At last
Fatih with the major part of his army arrived before Kruya
and laid siege to the citadel.
Scanderbeg this time also had left in the fortress a small
garrison under the command of Tanush Thopia, while he
himself with the other part of the army remained outside
the ramparts. As 15 years before, the besieged Kruya
heroically stood fast against the Turkish assaults. After two
months’ struggle without success, the Sultan with a portion
of his army departed from Kruia and left there Ballaban
Pasha to continue the siege with the hope that the garrison
wTould surrender because of hunger.
In order to assure the rear of the Turkish army, Fatih built
in the valley of Shkumbin near the ruins of the ancient city
of Skampa, a strong fortress, to which he gave the name
“Ilbasan” (Elbasan), an Arabic word which means “domi­
nating place”. Then in the autumn of 1466 the Sultan left
Albania.
84
 Ballaban Pasha held Kruja besieged, thus aggravating to
the extreme point the conditions of the Albanian garrison.
Scanderbeg undertook from the outside a series of assaults
against the Turkish army, but did not succeed in hewing
a breach in the lines of the besiegers. The lack of arms
and of provisions became alarming. Venice promised aid
all the while but put unacceptable conditions. The need
for weapons and for provisions constrained Scanderbeg in
December of 1466 to go to Rome and in January 1467, to
Naples, to persuade the Pope and Ferdinand to give Albania
immediate help. In Rome, the masses of the population
gave Scanderbeg, dressed as a modest knight, a reception
Worthy of a glorious captain. The speech he delivered in
the Roman Consistory left a deep impression. However
the help Paul as well as Ferdinand gave Scanderbeg was
altogether insignificant.
In spite of all, the Albanians with Scanderbeg did not lose
heart. After Scanderbeg had returned to Albania, the Al­
banians won a brilliant victory. In April they routed the
Turkish army which had encircled Kruya, liberating their
capital from the prolonged siege. In this encounter was
slain Ballaban Pasha also.
Yet in July 1467 the whole Turkish army with Sultan
Mehmet at its head again assaulted Albania. At Buzurshek
near Elbasan a bloody battle was fought out. Through the
victory he had achieved, Fatih thought he had brought to
an end the Albanian resistance. But at Kruya he met anew
with unbelievable resistance. The besieged Kruya for a.
second time heaped shame on the Conqueror of Constanti­
nople. After three weeks the Sultan departed and Scan­
derbeg once again liberated the glorious capital.
In order to gather force and new equipment, Scanderbeg
decided to appeal once more to the country, particularly to
the nobles who had kept themselves aloof. With this aim
in view he proposed to restore, as in 1444, the Albanian
League, and invited the nobles to assemble in January of
the year 1468 in a pan-Albanian Convention at Lezhe. At
the convention Scanderbeg urged the nobles to give military
85
and financial aid to carry on the war against the common
enemy.
In the meanwhile another Turkish army was directed in
the midst of winter against Albania from the north of
Shkoder. As always Scanderbeg prepared to march at the
head of his army against the foe. But seized by fever,
his exhausted body could not resist the illness. After a
few days, while the Albanian armies were gaining another
brilliant victory in the neighbourhood of Shkoder, Gjergj
Kastriot Scanderbeg, covered in everlasting glory, died at
Lezhe on January 17, 1468.
The unexpected death of Scanderbeg caused a general
affliction throughout the country. In him the Albanians
lost their immortal hero, the gifted organizer of the revolt
which brought freedom to the land, the ingenious strategist
who for a quarter of a century scored inconceivable victories
over enemies many times superior; they lost their brilliant
political leader who created the independent Albanian state.

THE CONTINUATION OF THE

ALBANIAN RESISTANCE

After the death of Scanderbeg, it became apparent that

in Albania there remained no leader capable to lead the
resistance of the Albanians against the Turks. The son of
Scanderbeg, Gjon Kastriot, was too young, only about 14
years old, to take the place of his father. Together with his
mother he even left the country and settled down at Naples.
Numerous feudal chiefs lost every hope of victory and one
by one they either forsook the land or else went over to
the enemy. In order to escape from the Turkish yoke,
whole masses of peasants and citizens likewise migrated
from the homeland.
Yet the part of the population that remained carried on
the war against the Turks who had in mind, after doing
86
away with the resistance of the Albanians, to capture from
the Venetians the cities of the coast of Albania, in order to
make a reality of their dream of long standing — to cross
over to Italy. For this purpose, in the year 1474 a large
Turkish army laid siege to Shkoder and bombarded it
throughout a whole month with artillery, but the citadel
resisted. In 1476 another large Turkish army laid siege for
the fourth time to Kruya with the aim to keep the siege
until the citadel would surrender out of hunger. The siege
lasted until the year 1478. In the spring of the year 1478
Sultan Mehmet the Conqueror came in person to Albania
with the entire imperial army. The defenders of Kruia,
constrained by hunger and by the lack of arms, at last on
June 1478 surrendered the citadel. After that, the Turkish
armies with the Sultan at their head, laid siege to Shkoder,
bombarded it for several weeks with heavy guns and as­
sailed it furiously several times but they did not succeed
in capturing the citadel of Rozafat which protected the
city. In September the Sultan departed, but the siege con­
tinued. Shkoder held out until January 25, 1479, when at
last a Turco-Venetian peace treaty was signed, according to
which Shkoder, Lezhe and Drishti were assigned to Turkey,
whereas Venice retained Durres, Ulqin and Tivar.
Now in Albania outside of the Turkish control remained
only the mountainous regions.
After they had crushed the organized Albanian resistance
and after they had concluded the peace treaty with the
Venetians, about 10 thousand Turkish soldiers started from
Vlora and landed in Italy, where they captured the citadel
of Otranto, within the lands of the Kingdom of Naples.
The entry of Naples into a war against Turkey resusci­
tated the hopes of the Albanians for the liberation of the
country. In Albania armed revolts began against the
Turks, and in the year 1481, at the call of the chieftains of
the revolt, the son of Scanderbeg, Gjon Kastriot, returned
to Albania. With his arrival, the revolt took such big pro­
portions that the Turks were obliged to keep in Albania a
part of the forces which were destined for Italy. The ac­
87
tions of the Albanians rendered less onerous the task of the
Christian armies in Italy, which in September of the year
1481 chased the Turks from Otranto. ,
After they had withdrawn from Italy, the Turks under­
took vast operations against the Albanians, which lasted
over several years till the revolt was subdued, and Gjon
Kastriot was constrained to flee the country.
However, the resistance against the feudal military Tur­
kish regime was not interrupted. One of the districts which
continued to be in revolt was Himara. The Himariots h'ad
not accepted any spahi or governor from Istanbul. They
had to withstand armed assaults, especially in the summer
of the year 1492, when Sultan Bayazid II with his armies
came into Albania with the object of landing in Italy. The
disembarkation in Italy did not take place, but Bayazid,
before returning to Istanbul, took the decision to crush the
Himariots. In July the Turks penetrated deep into the
mountains, through treason captured a part of the Hima­
riots, whom they either killed or kept as captives. But they
could not overcome their resistance. As the autumn ap­
proached the Sultan decided to depart, and for that reason
he came to an agreement with the Himariots. According to
the terms of the agreement, the Sultan agreed that the
Himara district be governed as before on the basis of tradi­
tional “canons” (venoms). The Himariots were to retain
their arms without restriction. In compensation, they
agreed not to rebel and to pay a royal tribute for each house
in sign of obedience. The Himariots preserved these venoms
during the whole period of the Turkish domination.
In the following years also the Albanians continued their
struggle to expel the Turks from their homeland. For this
purpose, they seized all the favourable circumstances. Each
time any European power declared war on Turkey, the Al­
banians nourished the hope that the day of their liberation
had approached; and for this reason they took up arms
against the Turks.
This happened in the year 1494 when the monarch of
France, Charles VIII, with his armies proceeded to Italy in
88
order to continue his march against Istanbul through Al­
banian territory. This happened in the year 1499 also,
when Venice was waging war against Turkey. This time
too the Albanians took up arms. However, these revolts
brought no result. In August 1501 Turkey captured Durres
from the Venetians. In order to save Ulqin and Tivar, the
Republic of Venice concluded peace with Turkey in 1502.
The Albanians were once again alone. The uprising, which
continued for some years, was crushed in 1506. With its
liquidation the great Albano-Turkish War also, that had
lasted over 60 years, came to an end.

THE STRENGTHENING OF THE TURKISH

REGIME OF TIMARS IN ALBANIA

The prolonged war that had been waged between the Al­
banians and the Turks had ruinous effects on Albania. The
country lost its freedom and was brought under the yoke
of the Ottoman feudal empire, which lasted several cen­
turies. Its economic life was strangled.
The cities in general were demolished, and were almost
deserted by their previous inhabitants. A number of the
ancient cities, such as Drishti, Danja, Shirgji, did not re­
cover. The large and prosperous cities such as Durres,
Shkoder, Berat, Kruja, etc. were reduced to mere villages.
In the cities there were very few artisans and trade was
almost completely paralyzed. On account of the Turkish
domination, the former contacts of the Albanian coast with
the Adriatic cities were interrupted. The important artery,
Via Egnatia, was no longer used by foreign tradesmen as a
means of communication. The rural economy also was in
utter decay. In the low coastal districts of Albania hun­
dreds of villages were abandoned or nearly so by the vil­
lagers, who had migrated outside the country or had taken
refuge in the mountainous regions. Large expanses of land
89
 lay fallow. The population diminished considerably not
only because of the extermination at the hands of the Turks,
but also on account of the immigration en masse outside the
country. Hundreds of thousands of men, women and chil­
dren left the homeland. The major part of them settled in
southern Italy, in the domains of the Kingdom of Naples,
especially in Calabria and Sicily, where they founded nearly
a hundred villages with Arbresh population, whose
descendants, at least those of them who had escaped being
assimilated, even today speak the Albanian language. Hav­
ing no towns with an artisan economy and isolated from the
outside world, the villages of the lowlands and of the moun­
tainous regions, were plunged into the natural economy.
The consolidation of this system brought Albania, in com­
parison with its previous conditions, into a much more back­
ward state.
Albania remained for a long period of time a backward
country. The reason for that was the strengthening and
the expansion throughout the land of the regime of timars,
which offered no stimulus to the development of the eco­
nomic life of the land; on the contrary it spoliated the sub­
jugated land in a most unproductive manner, because the
greater part of their revenues the spahis extorted by taking
part in the military campaigns of Turkey, and because
through these campaigns they could amass great wealth and
at the same time advance in their military career.
After they had subdued Albania, in the year 1506 the
Turkish governors once again undertook the registration of
the lands, which they repeated doing several times later on.
The registered lands were considered, as had been done
previously, as miri lands, and were divided, according to
their revenues, into timars, zeamets, and hases. According
to the registration of the year 1520, in the territory of Al­
bania there were approximately three times more timars,
zeamets and hases than at the registration of the year 1432.
Along with the increase in the number of timars, dur­
ing the 16th century we meet also the strengthening of the
90
Onur ri Neokastra, “David the Prophet”, from a fresco in the\
Church of St. Nicholas in Shekan near Shpat (16th century) |
position of the spahi in his relations with the raya
peasant (the serf). While in the 15th century the spahi
was the lord of the land only, in the 16th century he began
to become lord of the raya (serf) also. Now the peasant
could not leave the timar or the zeamet where he was reg­
istered without the consent of the spahi. In the 16th and
17th centuries, the duties also, which the spahi exacted from
the raya, grew in amount.
With the administrative reorganization, which was carried
through in the Ottoman empire in the 16th century, the
territories of Albania were divided into seven sandjaks:
Delvina, Vlora, Elbasan, Ohri, Shkoder, Prizren and Du-
kagjin (with its chief town Peja). Within one sandjak were
comprised not only Albanian populations, but also popula­
tions of other nationalities — Montenegrins in the sandjak
of Shkoder, Serbians in that of Prizren, Macedonians in
that of Ohri, and Greeks in that of Delvina. All these
sandjaks constituted the vilayet (province) of Rumelia.
In spite of their efforts, the Turks did not succeed in
establishing in all the districts of the country their feudal
military regime. In a vast number of mountainous dis­
tricts the regime of timars was not enforced at all, or else
was introduced merely in a formal manner. This occurred,
for example, in the highlands of Himara, of Dukagjini, of
Upper-Shkoder, of Dibra, etc. In these districts the high­
landers never became rayas. They remained peasant
freeholders.
As they could not subdue them, the Turkish governors
felt constrained, as had been the case with the Himariots in
1492, to recognize these highlanders’ venoms, that is to
say, their right to self-administration according to the an­
cient local “canons” (laws). Through this privilege they
were exempt from the timar regime and from the duties
which the peasant rayas gave. They had to pay only the
yearly tribute.
In these districts lived highlander families principally on
the basis of a cattle raising economy. With them the rela­
tions of tribal community had not died out completely. By
92
remaining outside the frame of the state administration,
they stood aloof and separated from the rest of the country
and kept to themselves. The necessity to protect them­
selves against the Turkish expeditions determined the
highlander families to band closer together. In these
circumstances, the tribal communities, or tribes, as they
are called by the highlanders, were conserved.
Though they had recognized the traditional venoms, the
Turks strove, from time to time, to subjugate these districts.
However, each time they undertook military expeditions
against them, the sandjakbeys and the spahis met with
the resistance of the highlanders.
On the other hand, whenever Turkey was engaged in war
with European states, to the highlanders beamed the hope
for their liberation from the foreign yoke. Thus they took
up arms and assailed the Turkish cohorts most violently
and half-free mountainous districts became the principal
bases of Albanian resistance against the Turkish rulers dur­
ing the 16th and 17th century.
This took place especially in the year 1537, when Sultan
Sulejman Kanuni, together with huge land and sea forces,
came to Albania and took quarters on the Vlora and Himara
coastland, with the intention of disembarking in Italy. As
soon as the Sultan had arrived, the Himariots again took
up their arms. This time also the Turkish expedition did
not take place, and the whole weight of the Turkish armies
was thrown on the Himariots. But the Himariots coura­
geously withstood the assaults of the foe. The fighting
lasted over the summer without any success for the Turks.
In the year 1571, when the Ottoman empire was waging
war against a coalition of European states, among which
was Venice, the Albanians rose again in revolt and liberated
a considerable part of the country. However, in August,
the condition of the insurgents grew worse. By sea and by
land the Turkish fleet and army encircled Ulqin, which was
in the Venetians’ possession, and compelled the garrison to
surrender. After a couple of days the Turks captured Tivar
also. After she had lost these cities, Venice showed no
93
further concern for the Albanian movement. In October
the fleet of the coalition destroyed the Turkish fleet at
Lepant. But the European states missed out on the fruits
of the Lepanto victory, and the rivalry and the conflict of
interests existing between them brought about the dissolu­
tion of the coalition. Thus, this time too the Albanians re­
mained alone to face Turkey.
The hopes of the Albanians were revived in 1593 when
an anti-Turkish European coalition was created once more,
and when in 1594 one of the promoters of this coalition, the
Roman Pope, came into touch with the chieftains of the
highlanders. The Albanians hastened to draw up plans for
an armed uprising. For this purpose in June of the year
1594 a general convention met in the Monastery of St. Maria
at Mat, in which the chiefs of a vast number of districts
and of tribes of Albania assisted. The convention took the
decision to appeal to the Pope for aid in arms. But the
Republic of Venice, which at this juncture feared more the
European Coalition than Turkey, did not desire any insur­
rection in Albania, and put various obstacles in the way of
all the Albanians’ preparations.
Relying on the promises of the Papacy and of Spain, the
Albanians began the insurrection. Approximately 10,000
men, armed with arrows and yatagans, attacked the Tur­
kish army. Only Spain sent hardly any aid, but this too was
confiscated on its way by the Venetians. However, in 1596,
the Turks, who by now were equipped with firearms,
crushed the revolt.
In 1601 another general convention met at the village of
Dukagjin of Mat. Its agenda was prolonged into the year
1602. Delegates of 14 districts of Albania took part in it.
The convention decided to send once again a delegation to
the Great Powers to ask for arms. However, this time also,
there was no response to their demand.
The Albanians carried on, without any result, their strug­
gle in the following years also. Annoyed by these en­
deavours, the Turks organized a series of expeditions against
the Albanian highlanders, of which that of the year 1610
94
met with certain success, while those of the years 1612-1613
failed completely.
The defeats of the Turks encouraged not only the Alba­
nians, but also the Balkan peoples. In order to organize
a revolt on a grand scale, an extraordinary convention was
held in 1614 at Kuq of theTVIalesiae Madhe, in which Alba­
nian, Montenegrin, Serbian and Macedonian populations
took part. Inter-Balkanic conventions were held in the
following years also. But the plans drawn at these con­
ventions for a general insurrection were not put into execu­
tion on account of the lack of arms.
With the aspiration to frustrate the impetus of the con­
tinual revolts of the Albanians, who retaining their faith as
Christians, came continually in touch with European states,
the rulers of Istanbul undertook, towards the end of the
16th century, the systematic campaign of islamizing en
masse the Albanian population. At the same time they had
in view to create in Albania a considerable mass of Moslem
inhabitants ideologically bound to the fates of the Ottoman
Empire.
In order to oblige them to accept the religion of Moham­
med, the Turks applied to the Albanians the most accen­
tuated policy of religious discrimination, in their social life,
and especially in the domain of fiscal revenues. The
Djizia, which was the poll tax on the Christians, was
raised to the extent of being impossible to pay — from the
45 akche annually, that it had been in the 16th century, to
305 akche at the beginning of the 17th century; while in
the middle of the 17th century, for a certain category of
inhabitants, it reached 780 akche a year. In order to avert
this discrimination, with no other way of saving themselves,
from year to year a part of the native population was con­
verted to the Islamic religion.
But the conversion of the major part of the Albanians to
Mohammedanism did not decrease the force of the uprisings
in Albania. In a report that the Albanian Bishop and writ­
er Peter Budi sent in 1621 to Cardinal Gocadino, he in­
formed this latter that in Albania tens of thousands not only
95
of Christians, but also of Mohammedans, were ready to take
up arms as soon as the required aid would be given. Yet
in the 17th century, just as in the 16th, the principal pro­
moters of the numerous uprisings were the Albanian high­
landers who retained their Christian religion and, through
their inflexible resistance, had guarded their traditional
rights. These uprisings took vast proportions, especially in
the years when European powers were at war with the
Ottoman Empire.

ALBANIA, 17TH CENTURY

In the 17th century the growth and expansion of the Otto­

man Empire came to an end. The defeat that the Turks
had suffered in 1683 at the gates of Vienna was the prelude
to the downfall of their empire. As it is clear, this decline
was the outcome of the changes that took place in the in­
ternational arena (the creation of great centralized states at
its northern frontier), as well as in its interior condition
(the decay of the primitive economy on which depended
the regime of the timars, and consequently the decay of this
regime itself). The spahis began to pay much more atten­
tion to their income, which they extorted from the timars
and from commercial transactions, than to their wars,
which at this juncture were not only being fought at very
distant frontier points, but also did not always terminate to
the advantage of Turkey. The spahis began to disobey the
commands of the Sultan, weakening still more the military
force of the empire and decreasing its victories. The de­
crease of victorious wars brought in its train a continuous
financial crisis in Turkey. As the state itself, so the spahis
together with the big feudal lords began to satisfy their
needs by exploiting ruthlessly the peasant raya. As a re­
sult, entire masses of peasants were ruined and had to sell
their lands, becoming landless farm labourers.
96
 These lands fell in the most part into the hands of the
feudal lords. From the rank of the feudal military aristoc­
racy, a landowning aristocracy began to rise and to get
stronger. The strengthening of this landowning aristocracy
was favoured by the fact that the dispossessed peasant
masses had settled partially in the estates of the big land­
lords. The income from the products of the farm labourers
established in the estate after the reduction of the ushur
that appertained to the spahi was divided, according to the
case, in half when the seed and oxen belonged to the land­
lord, or else by one-third, when the seed and the plough
oxen belonged to the farm labourer (one-third to the land­
owner and two-thirds to the labourer).
The decomposition of the primitive rural economy was
manifested by the restoration of the cities, which had fallen
into ruins in the 15th century and afterwards. by their
speedy development and by their change into important
economic, artisan and commercial centres, which process
was achieved especially through the 17th century. Of these
cities, the largest one was Berat, the centre of the sandjak
of Vlora. Immediately behind it stood Elbasan, Shkoder
and Gjirokastra, with approximately 2,000 houses each.
Through the 18th century, new cities also grew, among them
Voskopoja.
At the beginning, most artisans plied their trade in manu­
facturing weapons and military equipment. But starting
with the 17th century a vast number of crafts thrived, the
products of which were closely connected with the neces­
sities of the peasants and of the citizens. Gaining fame at
this time were the silversmiths of Shkoder, Prizren and
Elbasan, who produced golden and silver trinkets for wom­
en. They adorned the weapons of the men and decorated
with various ornaments the household wares and furniture
and vessels used in churches.
Through the development of the barter system, a special
class of inhabitants was created in cities, who were given
exclusively to trading within and outside the country. In
the 18th century great merchants established their agencies
97
in various cities of the country, even outside Albania, es­
pecially at Venice and at Trieste. The merchants sold in
foreign lands agricultural, handicraft and dairy products,
and brought thence the products of European industry.
The development of commerce brought in its train the
growth of the Albanian mercantile fleet. The city with
the greatest fleet was Ulqin (Dulcigno) whose inhabitants
distinguished themselves as bold sailors.
The economic importance which some of the cities such
as Shkoder, Berat, Elbasan, Prizren, Peja and others ac­
quired in the 18th century made of them market places not
only for the adjacent rural country, but also for a vast
number of neighbouring districts.
With the growth and development of artisan vocation the
mediaeval organization of craft guilds also was revived, now
to be called esnafs or rufets. At the head of esnaf stood
the qahya and at his side, the muteveil (the administrator),
who was elected by the members of the esnaf for a certain
fixed period.
On account of the great number of artisan members and
of their thorough organization, the esnafs began to play
an important political role also. Within these guilds,
groups or tarafs with opposing economic and political in­
terests were created. In some of the cities, as in Shkoder,
a group of esnafs banded together with the tabaks (leather
workers), the other part with the terzis (tailors), thus creat­
ing two big tarafs — the “taraf of tabaks” (the group of
leather workers) and the “taraf of terzis” (the group of
tailors).
The principal cities became at the same time centres of
a cultural movement. But this movement did not have the
same development throughout the country. On it not only
the feudal partition of Albania left its traces, but also the
division of the population into three distinct religions. The
Albanian Mohammedan, Orthodox and Catholic school chil­
dren were allowed to frequent, according to their re­
spective faiths, only Turkish, Greek or Italian schools.
Consequently the Christian school children received Greek
98
Orthodox or else Catholic culture. And even in the cases
where authors wrote texts in Albanian, for writing in their
mother tongue they made use of Turkish, Greek or Latin
alphabet.
In the 17th-18th century, a number of secondary schools,
medreses, also were founded in Albania for the preparation
of functionaries of Moslem faith. But of great importance
was the secondary school, the New Academy which was
founded at Voskopoya in the environment of Orthodox
population.
With the profits they gained from artisan production and
from commercial activity, Voskopoya achieved in the 18th
century a cultural prosperity. The city was endowed with
a great number of churches which were adorned by frescos
and icons of a high artistic level. In 1740 Voskopoya had
also a printing press, in which a considerable number of
books were printed, some written by Voskopoyan authors.
In 1744 a group of Voskopoyan intellectuals founded in
their city the “New Academy” under the direction of a
dean. The dean of the Academy was Theodor Kavalioti, a
distinguished scholar of the 18th century. Most of the ped­
agogues were laureates of different European universities.
A great number of students of the Academy received higher
education outside of Albania, and were distinguished as
scholars in the domains of education, culture and the
sciences.

THE FORMATION OF ALBANIAN

PASHALLEKS

Through the exploitation of governmental offices, the feu­

dal lords began to acquire a great number of big estates
(chtfliks), which they retained under their possession also
after they were dismissed from office. Personally they
themselves, or else through intermediaries, leased the col­
99
lection of a number of state taxes, and strove to extort
through oppression and violence as much revenue as they
could, of which only a mere part they sent to Istanbul.
At the same time they interfered in the affairs of the
merchants, and under threats of reprisals, obliged them to
surrender a substantial part of their gains. Through these
means quite a number of Albanian feudal lords became eco­
nomically and politically powerful in a short space of time.
Feeling themselves stronger, the great feudal lords began
not to take into account the central authority, which was
getting weaker and weaker. Often enough they did not obey
the fermans (edicts) of the Sultan and appropriated all the
revenues that were due the imperial treasury. Whenever
they had the chance, the Sultans took repressive measures
against them by dismissing them or by transferring them,
but when they were engaged in war with other powers, they
tried not to aggravate their relations with these powerful
feudal lords in order to avert their sedition. In this manner
the contradictions between the great Albanian feudal lords
and the central Ottoman government arose and intensified
during the 18th century.
Through their further acquisition of power, the great feu­
dal rulers began to govern as mutesarrifs (prefects) in
sandjaks (provinces) or as muteselims in kazas (sub­
prefectures), relying more on their economic, political and
military power than on the Ottoman central authority.
Gradually they ceased to be functionaries of Istanbul and be­
came semi-autonomous rulers within the sandjaks or
kazas, or within territories that did not correspond at all
to the Turkish administrative division. These domains were
called pashalleks.
The rulers of these pashalleks continued to govern
formally in the name of the Sultan and to carry the title of
mutesarrtf or multesim. They regularly enacted the
orders of the central government, when they did not feel
strong to disobey, or when these orders did not touch their
proper personal interests. Whenever their interests were
damaged, the rulers of the pashalleks, under various pre­
100
texts, did not enforce them. Powerful feudal rulers suc­
ceeded in making their offices hereditary.
For the purpose of increasing their incomes and of
strengthening their authority, the feudal rulers did their
best to expand the boundaries of their pashallek, by sub­
duing adjacent districts, which were under the rule of other
feudal rulers. They were mostly concerned to get hold of
the thriving cities of the land, which were a great source
for amassing wealth.
These inclinations caused the feudal rulers to wage war
against each other. The esnafs took part in these wars,
as well as the peasant masses also, who usually stood by the
side of the rulers, who had been more clement than the
others. The circumstances created by these wars were
exploited by quite a number of minor feudal rulers, more
especially by the spahis who had lost their timars or
zeamets. For the purpose to regain the lost fiefs, to
create great estates of chifliks, and afterwards to establish
an independent pashallek, a part of them organized armed
bands and started ravaging attacks against the villages and
cities, thus sowing everywhere panic and insecurity.
The governors of Istanbul were not in condition to check
these attacks. On the contrary, because they were weak,
they tried to break the power of a strong feudal ruler by
instigating against him those who were less dangerous for
Istanbul.
These wars and conflicts plunged Albania into a deep
feudal chaos. The anarchy was spread all over the land.
Prolonged and violent fighting took place particularly at
Shkoder between the aristocratic families of Begollays,
Chaoushollays and Bushatlys. In central Albania no less
violent fighting took place between the feudal rulers of
Tirana, Kavaja, Kruya and Elbasan. In the south the fight­
ing, or the wars for supremacy, continued for many years
between the feudal rulers of Vlora, Berat, Delvina, Cha-
mouria and so on.
From these feudal wars for supremacy the country suf­
fered great damage. Through menace and reprisals many
101
villagers were deprived of their lands and fields and be­
came tenant-farmers. The feudal rulers caused damage to
the cities too. Through three blundering attacks on Vosko-
poya in the years 1769, 1772 and 1789, the city was demol­
ished and never recovered. Together with the city the
“New Academy” also was destroyed. On account of attacks
and pillages of the bands of feudal rulers on the caravans
of merchants and on the pazars (market places) of the cities,
the economic life of the country also began to be paralyzed.
However, by subduing the weaker feudal lords, the power­
ful ones created vast pashalleks and became semi-autono­
mous rulers. From a vast number of small pashalleks
that existed up to the middle of the 18th century, within a
couple of decades they were fused into two large pashal­
leks that were created, the one in north Albania with its
chief town at Shkoder under the rule of Bushatlys, the
other in south Albania with its chief town at Janina under
the rule of Ali Pasha Tepelena. With the creation of these
two vast pashalleks, the Albanian feudal class created an
independent power, separate from that of the Turkish feudal
class. The creation of this separate authority, of this state
within a state, brought the conflict between the Albanian
feudal class and the Ottoman central power. The further
intensification of this conflict, which paved the way for the
creation of an independent Albanian feudal state, was the
most important outcome of the feudal anarchy into which
Albania was plunged in the 18th century.

THE GREAT PASHALLEK OF SHKODER

— THE BUSHATLIES

Through the first half of the 18th century, the sandjak

of Shkoder, one of the most important sandjaks of the
Ottoman Empire in the Balkans, from the administrative
point of view, fell into complete decay. From the authority
102
of the mutesarrif broke loose one by one the rulers of Lezhe,
Podgoritza and Ulqin, each creating an independent pa-
shallek depending on Shkoder merely in form.
The weakening of the authority of Istanbul furnished the
opportunity for feudal fighting to break out even within the
city of Shkoder. The two great aristocratic families, the
Chaoushlies and the Begollies, with the assistance of the
“tailors’ guild” and of the “tanners’ guild” (the “taraf of
terzis” and that of tabaks) and of highlander forces, fought
against one another for more than 20 years, each family
overthrowing the other from time to time. The Sultan at
Istanbul did nothing but acknowledge as mutesarrif of
Shkoder, either the Chaoushly or Begolly family as it came
to power.
These struggles tired out Shkoder. Of this state of af­
fairs another aristocratic family, the Bushatlies, took advan­
tage. Mehmet bey Bushatly, after he had insured the help
of a vast number of Shkodran feudal rulers, and after he
had put himself at the head of'the powerful taraf of the
tabaks (leather workers’ guild), annihilated and banished
from Shkoder the Begollies as well as the Chaoushlies, and
in 1757 became ruler of Shkoder. The Sultan, together with
the ferman (edict) of his nomination as mutesarrif, sent
to Mehmet Bushatly the title of Pasha.
Mehmet Pasha Bushatly or, as he is otherwise known,
Mehmet Pasha the Ancient, ruled for 16 years. Through
the steps he took, he established peace and order within the
city, which won him the sympathy of the citizens. After
he had insured the aid also of the highlanders, he undertook
a number of campaigns, extending his authority over all
the districts of the sandjak of Shkoder.
These operations were in line with the duties of his of­
fice as mutesarrif; therefore they were not opposed by
Istanbul. But when Mehmet Pasha the Ancient through
war-making began to expand his authority outside the
boundaries of his proper sandjak and then stopped sending
the state revenues to Istanbul, the relations with the Sultan
deteriorated. Bushatly was not intimidated by the threats
103
of the Sultan, but reigned as a semi-independent ruler in
his pashallek. In order to get rid of this powerful ruler,
the Sublime Porte in 1775 succeeded to poison secretly the
old Bushatly, and in his stead appointed Mehmet Pasha
Kustendil as mutesarrif at Shkoder.
The new mutesarrif did not contrive to remain in Shkoder
for a long time. With the assistance of the Shkodrans and
of the highlanders, Mustafa Bushatly, the eldest son of
Mehmet Pasha the Ancient, got hold of the power by force.
The powerless Sultan then appointed as mutesarrif in
Shkoder the brother of Mustafa, Mahmud Pasha Bushatly,
known by the name of Kara Mahmut Pasha, in the hope
that this would instigate a war between the sons of Bushatly
the Ancient. But between them there arose no conflict.
Mustafa Pasha, that same year, passed on his office to Kara
Mahmud Pasha.
The Sultan tried to overthrow the Bushatlies in the year
1779. That year, while the agents of Istanbul poisoned
Mustafa Pasha when he was in Morea, once again at the
incitement of Istanbul, the feudal rivals of the Bushatlies
in Shkoder started sedition. However Kara Mahmut
crushed the revolt and remained in power.
After this victory, without taking any account of the
Sublime Porte, Kara Mahmut undertook a series of cam­
paigns, expanding his pashallek in the direction of cen­
tral Albania. But in 1785, as he was advancing in south
Albania, the Sultan, alarmed by the growing power of Bu­
shatly and on account of his seditious activities, dismissed
him from office as mutesarrif and gave the order to the
armies of the two Balkan vilayets (provinces) of Rumelia
and of Bosnia, to march on Shkoder. However, Kara
Mahmud through his rapid movements, encountered the
Rumelian army before it had time to join with that of
Bosnia, and in the clash he had with it at the Kossovo plain,
routed it entirely. The defeat of the Rumelian armies
persuaded the vali (governor general) of Bosnia to retreat
without coming to any clash whatsoever with Bushatly.
104
 The victory of Kossovo raised the prestige of Kara Mah­
mud in the international arena also. Austria and Russia,
which were getting ready to enter into war against Turkey,
came in touch with him and gave him heart to carry on
his wars against Istanbul. Vienna promised to recognize
him as autonomous ruler. Of this concern on the part of
European powers Kara Mahmut drew advantage for his own
purpose: in the summer of the year 1787, as soon as the
Russo-Turkish War had started, he marched into Kossovo
and brought it under his control.
The Sultan was so annoyed by Bushatly’s actions that he
withdrew from the front a good part of the Turkish armies,
approximately 30,000 soldiers, and, under the command of
Mahmud Pasha Aydos, sent it to Shkoder. Kara Mahmut
again advanced to encounter them in Kossovo, but this time
the onrush of the commander-in-chief was so impetuous
that Kara Mahmud was forced to turn back at once to
Shkoder without his army, and here he found himself en­
circled by inimical armies. This obliged him to shut him­
self up with 200 men in the fortress of Rozafat.
The Albanian troops undertook a number of assaults from
outside the fortress, but met with no success. Rozafat,
though surrounded on all sides, held out under the shells
of the Turkish artillery for 80 days. However, on Novem­
ber 25, 1787, at the instigation of Kara Mahmud, an as­
sault of his armies from outside and a general revolt of the
citizens from within started simultaneously. Between two
fires, the Turkish armies were badly routed and departed
from Shkoder.
After the victory of Shkoder and later in the year 1788,
after Austria had entered into war against Turkey, the as­
pirations of Bushatly to become independent ruler were
revived. In order to achieve his aim he further strength­
ened his ties with Austria. But the fact that he broke
loose from the Sultan-Caliph and entered into closer rela­
tions with Vienna alarmed the fanatical Mohammedan cir­
cles and the feudal rulers of Shkoder. As it appears, this
reactionary opposition constrained Kara Mahmud to put
105
an end to his relations with Austria and to seek amical
terms with the Sultan.
The good relations with the Sultan lasted only three years,
till the Austro-Turkish hostilities were brought to an end.
As soon as a peace treaty was signed between them at
Sistovo (August 14, 1791) Kara Mahmut turned back to
his previous independent policy, further extending the
boundaries of his pashallek. These actions obliged the
Sublime Porte to send for the third time a great punitive
expedition against him.
This time also the reactionary circles that dreaded the
breaking off from Turkey rebelled against Bushatly. At its
head stood the younger brother of Kara Mahmut — Ibrahim
Pasha Bushatly, who on the eve of the Turkish expedition
ran away and went to Istanbul.
In the summer of the year 1793 a huge Turkish army
under the command of Ebubekir Pasha, having at his side
Ibrahim Pasha Bushatly, who was appointed mutesarrij
of Shkoder, started on its way to Albania. Kara Mahmud
was not able to impede its onrush. As six years before, he
shut himself in the fortress of Rozafat. The siege of Shko­
der by the hostile armies lasted from August 20 until
November 28, 1793. This time, too, the events of the year
1787 repeated themselves. After a general attack, Kara
Mahmud routed the Turkish army and liberated Shkoder
from the siege.
After this third defeat, the Sultan endeavoured to draw
Bushatly closer to him in order to make use of him against
the other feudal lords. Kara Mahmud accepted this policy
of “rapprochement”, reconciled himself with his brother,
who returned to Shkoder, but he did not interrupt his strug­
gles to strengthen and expand his pashallek. In 1795 he
captured Prizren and Dibra, and in 1796 set out for Mon­
tenegro. But in Montenegro he met, as in the past, with
the heroic resistance of the Montenegrins, who were fight­
ing in defence of the freedom they had won long since.
After approximately 100 days of fighting without any
result, he himself was killed on September 22, 1796.
106
 With his death came an end also to the autonomy of the
pashallek of Shkoder. In his stead the Sultan at once ap­
pointed as mutesarrif in Shkoder, Ibrahim Pasha Bushat-
ly, who had shown himself for a long time an opponent of
the policy of Kara Mahmud. The new ruler pursued the
policy of complete submission to Istanbul. He took part
with his armies in all the expeditions ordered by the Sultan
within the boundaries of Albania, as well as in other parts
of the Balkans. Until his death in 1810, he ruled not as a
lord of a pashallek, but as a mutesarrif of the Sultan. Dur­
ing his rule, Shkoder lost the political victories won by
Kara Mahmud.

THE GREAT PASHALLEK OF JANINA

—ALI PASHA TEPELENA

Almost at the same time, in south Albania there came to

be created one other great pashallek with Janina as its chief
town, the history of which is closely connected with the
name of Ali Pasha Tepelena.
Son of Veli Bey, the ruler of Janina, Ali was orphaned at
the age of nine, when in 1753 his father was killed by his
rival, usurper of the power in Tepelena. Educated by his
mother Hanko, an ambitious, courageous and severe woman,
Ali, when he had grown up, put himself at the head of
a band of robbers which for almost 20 years attacked and
plundered his rivals and the peasants, both in Albania and
in Thessaly. He astutely interfered in the conflicts of the
feudal lords with each other, and in these conflicts backed
the cause of the Sultan, until he attracted the attention of
Istanbul, and in the year 1785, when he was 41 years old,
he was bestowed the title of Pasha and at the same time
the office of mutesarrif of Delvina. A year later, in 1786,
the Sultan appointed him mutesarrif of the important
sandjak of Terhalla to establish order and peace in the re­
107
gion of Thessaly. With full knowledge of their dens and
hiding places, Ali endeavoured to carry out this task, and
with notable success. In reward the Sultan designated him
the following year, 1787, to the office of dervenpasha of
Toskeria and of Thessaly.
After he had attained these offices, Ali Pasha Tepelena
directed his eye on Janina, which at that time was one of
the biggest and wealthiest Turkish cities in the Balkans.
With its numerous artisans and merchants, Janina had be­
come at the same time also the principal economic centre,
with which were bound not only the districts of Epirus,
but also those of Toskeria. At Janina were gathered many
Albanian feudal rulers, who were split in tarafs or groups
and were fighting with each other in order to insure their
domination over the. city.
Ali skilfully drew profit out of these conflicts, and in the
year 1788 captured the city without any difficulty. Through
gifts and presents he sent to Istanbul, he insured also the
ferman (decree) of the Sultan. Again through presents he
insured the other imperial ferman, appointing his second
son Veli Pasha mutesarrif of Terhalla.
In Janina also Ali established order within a short period.
But at the same time, he took urgent measures for creating
a large army with the aim to extend his authority in neigh­
bouring districts. Profiting from the fact that Turkey was
engaged with Russia and Austria, and by taking advantage
of his office as dervenpasha, under the pretext he would
re-establish the order that was upset, he undertook in the
years 1789-1791 a series of campaigns in Toskeria and in
Epirus. Through these campaigns Ali brought under his
sway a great number of districts of Toskeria, such as
Konitza. Permeti, Klissura, Libohova and Tepelena, whereas
in Epirus he captured Arta, thus reaching the Ionian
seashore.
In 1792, after he had freed himself from the war with
Austria and Russia, Sultan Selim III began to take steps in
order to strengthen the interior condition of the empire.
In order to avert the counteraction of Istanbul, in contra­
108
diction with how Kara Mahmud Bushatly had acted, Ali
Pasha Tepelena suspended his campaigns and endeavoured
to observe the relations of submission to the Sultan. For
this reason he took part, even though merely in a formal
manner, in the Turkish expedition against Shkoder in the
year 1793.
However, at the end of the 18th century, when Turkey
had fallen into utter decay on account of the campaigns of
Napoleon Bonaparte, Ali Pasha restarted his operations for
the expansion of the boundaries of the pashallek of
Janina. In 1797 France seized the Ionian Islands, Corfu, etc.,
and thus became neighbour of the pashallek of Janina.
Napoleon, who was preparing to conquer Egypt from the
Turks and had interest to create trouble for Istanbul in the
Balkans, instigated Ali too, to start a revolt against the
Sultan. Ali Pasha took advantage of the opportunity thus
offered, and obtained from France arms, munitions and
military instructors. But he did not break off relations with
the Sultan. On the contrary, when in the year 1798 Turkey
conjointly with England and Russia declared war on France,
Ali began his military operations against the French, and
captured some of the cities on the Ionian seashore, such as
Preveza, Gumenitza, etc.
At the beginning of the year 1799, the Ionian Islands
passed into the hands of Russia. In spite of all his en­
deavours, Ali did not succeed to enter on friendly terms
with the Russians. In its policy towards the Ottoman Em­
pire, Russia relied only on the Christian populations of the
Balkans, and did not trust the Mohammedan pashas. On
account of the unfriendly relations with the new neigh­
bours, Ali had considerable trouble, as the Russians incited
against the ruler of Janina all his antagonists — the ruling
beys of Berat, Delvina and Chamouria and, in a special
manner, the Christian Suliots, a warrior highlander free
Albanian tribe, which had taken refuge here from the high­
lands of Himara since long ago, and had settled in the rugged
mountainous regions of Suli, in southern Epirus.
109
 However, Ali Pasha Tepelena overcame all these dif­
ficulties, displayed not only military dexterity, but also
diplomatic ability. In order to have his hands free to
eliminate his antagonists who were instigated by the
Russians at Corfu, Ali did not break his relations with Istan­
bul. After he had wrought a breach in the bloc of his
feudal opponents, in the year 1799 he undertook a military
expedition against the Suliots.
Ali had tried once before to subdue Suli, but had had
no success. Therefore, this time he took the decision to lay
siege to Suli and to keep the Suliots blocked till they had
to surrender out of hunger. But to this blockade the
Suliots, led by the Captain Foto Djavella, offered resistance
for four years. Only at the end of the year 1803, when the
siege was intensified and their condition had got worse
than ever before, for lack of provisions, the Suliots were
obliged to capitulate with the condition that they would be
allowed to leave the country. However, after they had ca­
pitulated, Ali did not permit the Suliots to go to Corfu to
the Russians. Then, the wars between them broke out again.
A part of the Suliots with Foto Djavella did succeed to
cross to Corfu. The rest of them were captured on their
way to the sea. A group of Suliot women, lest they should
fall into the hands of Ali, threw themselves, together with
their children, from the rocks of Zallong into the chasm.
After he had subjugated the Suliots, in the following years
Ali sought support in the international arena, for the pur­
pose of fulfilling his ambition to become an independent
ruler. For this reason, in the year 1803 he made an agree­
ment with England, and in the year 1806 once again with
France. But these gave him no support. Accordingly, in
order not to aggravate his relations with the Sultan, Ali
suspended his campaigns. Still Ali drew profits from the
agreements with France and England, by taking from them
modern armaments through which he further strengthened
his army.
In the years 1808-1812, when Turkey was at war with
Russia, Ali restarted his campaigns for the extension of
no
the pashallek, and achieved, one after the other, a series
of successes. In 1809 he subjugated Berat, where he set
up as governor his eldest son Miftar Pasha, and Chamouria,
the rulers of which he took captive and imprisoned. In
1810, in spite of the threats of Napoleon, Ali assailed and
captured Vlora, caught and interned its ruler, who was on
friendly terms with the French. In 1811 he stormed Delvina
and Gjirokastra, which he conquered after an intense
artillery bombardment. In 1812 he attacked resolutely the
citadel of Kardhiqi, where his feudal rivals were assembled,
and forced them to yield. Through these conquests the
whole of Toskeria, Thessaly and Epirus, with the exception
of Parga on the Epirean coast, fell into the hands of Ali
and were included in his vast pashallek. The Pashallek
of Janina attained thus the culmination of its power.
Like all the other pashalleks that were created in
Albania and in other territories of the Ottoman Empire,
the Pashallek of Janina, too, had a feudal character. But
here the process of the growth of the big feudal landed
estates at the expense of the feudal military property, took
greater proportions than another places. The timars and
the zeamets here disappeared entirely. Ali Pasha Tepe-
lena himself, from the proprietor of only two estates that
he had inherited from his father, towards the end of his life
had become the proprietor of estates comprising 934 villages,
scattered in Toskeria, Epirus, Thessaly and elsewhere.
Ali Pasha had for a long time nourished the ambition to
become an independent ruler and therefore felt constrained
to achieve as wide an autonomy as possible, without break­
ing ioose from the Ottoman Empire, and furthermore to
keep formally the relations of submission to the Sultan.
Especially during the periods in which Turkey was engaged
in war, in the home policy as well as in that of foreign
relations, the Pashallek of Janina tended to assume the
characteristics of an autonomous state.
The Pashallek of Janina comprised within its boundaries
Albanian and Greek populations. Still for his rule Ali
11
Pasha depended on the Albanian population. The ruling
class and the armed forces were constituted entirely of the
Albanians.
The growth of the power of Ali Pasha caused an uneasi­
ness in Istanbul. Therefore in 1812, as soon as he had con­
cluded a peace treaty with Russia, Sultan Mahmud II took
measures against Ali and discharged him from office and
ordered him to withdraw to Tepelena. Ali complied with
the order only in form, but a couple of months later he
came back to Janina, and after he had strengthened his ties
with the British, he took no account of the authority of
Istanbul.
The Sultan was not in a condition to take military steps,
because shortly after, an uprising in Serbia broke out. In
order not to deteriorate still more his relations with Janina,
the Sultan gave in and sent to Ali the necessary fermans
appointing him again to his previous offices. Thus since
1812 Ali governed over the Pashallek of Janina, almost as
an independent ruler.
After the death of Ibrahim Pasha Bushatly (1810), in
Shkoder the feudal conflicts broke out again. In these con­
flicts Ali Pasha Tepelena too intervened, but had no success.
In 1811, the wars were brought to an end by the victory of
Mustafa Pasha Bushatly, who in a short period of time
restored the former Pashallek of Shkoder. In 1812 the
whole territory of Albania was under the rule of two great
feudal lords.
However, of these two the more powerful ruler was the
Pasha of Janina, who began to extend his authority north­
ward. In this direction he met with considerable success.
The rulers of central Albania who formerly depended on
Shkoder, now bound themselves to Janina. In the year
1812 Ali organized a plot also against Mustafa Pasha, but
this attempt failed. These machinations determined Mustafa
Pasha to enter into much closer relations with Istanbul.
On his part, the Sultan gave the ruler of Shkoder all his
support, in order to incite him to fight, in case of need,
112
against Ali Pasha Tepelena. However, the two Albanian
rulers avoided, for a certain time, an open conflict be­
tween them.

THE DEFEAT OF THE GREAT PASHALLEKS

AND THE END OF THE REGIME
OF TIMARS IN ALBANIA

In the years 1814^1815 important international events

took place, which upset the balance of forces in Europe.
After the fall of Napoleon Bonaparte, the Congress of
Vienna dictated to France the conditions of peace and drew
the new map of Europe. The Holy Alliance which was
created in October of the year 1815 put to itself the task
not to support any revolutionary movement and not to allow
any modification of the political map of Europe. This
assured Turkey certain security from the danger from out­
side the frontiers. Therefore Sultan Mahmud II had the
way open to crush internal revolutionary and separatist
movements. In these circumstances Ali Pasha Tepelena was
obliged either to surrender unconditionally to the Sultan
or else to break away from him completely, which would
lead inevitably to an open war with Istanbul.
Ali chose the second alternative. He believed that Russia,
though it was one of the partners of the Holy Alliance, had
not renounced its traditional policy to destroy Turkey. In
this occurrence he saw the support the Russian Czar gave
the Greek revolutionary patriots, who under the guidance
of their organization Filiqi Eteria (Society of Friends)
were active in preparing the Greek uprising for liberation.
For this reason Ali attempted to approach Russia and by
pledging its friendship tried to secure its support. At the same
time he came in touch with the Greek eterists and with the
aim of making of them his allies in his war against Istanbul,
he gave them substantial political and material help.
113
 However Ali Pasha’s estimation of the international situa­
tion was erroneous. This became apparent at the beginning
of the year 1820 when Sultan Mahmud II took the decision
to crush the Pashallek of Janina; Ali Pasha found himself
altogether alone. Russia was not prepared to trample the
principles of the Holy Alliance and therefore advised Ali
to wait until the Russo-Turkish war should be declared, of
which there were no signs as yet. England too, to which
Ali likewise addressed himself, advised him to make peace
with the Sultan. Only the Greek eterists promised him
that as soon as he would start the war with Istanbul they
would start their revolt for liberation. However, through
these promises the Greeks had in mind to pin down in
Albania the forces of Ali with those of the Sultan, with the
aim to facilitate the success of the revolt in Greece. Still
Ali Pasha had great hope that, as soon as the Greek in­
surrection should break out, the Sultan would leave alone
the ruler of Janina, and would direct his armies against
Greece.
At the beginning of the year 1820, the Sultan Mahmud
II issued the decree discharging Ali Pasha Tepelena from
his official functions, and the Sheikh-ul-Islam invited him
to present himself at Istanbul in order to render account of
his deeds. Ali did not obey, and in May the Sultan issued
the second ferman by which Ali was sentenced to death.
After one month, in June, a large Turkish army with its
commander-in-chief Ismail Pasho Bey, who was to succeed
Ali in office, started on its way to the Pashallek of Janina.
At the same time started the Turkish fleet also. Mustafa
Pasha Bushatly, too, received the order to take part in this
expedition.
At the beginning the Turkish army reaped speedy success.
The Albanian forces, which were put in charge of the pro­
tection of the boundaries and of the cities of the pashallek,
retreated without offering any serious resistance, and then
they yielded together with their commanders, some of
whom were the sons and grandsons of Ali, and who con­
sidered, as it appears, the result of the resistance as of no
114
consequence. In August 1820, the Turkish armies arrived
at Janina and laid siege to the city, where Ali with a small
part of his armies had taken shelter.
Ali Pasha did not yield but tried through parlies to pro­
long the resistance as much as possible until the Greek
insurrection should start. But, when in the year 1821 the
Greek revolt for liberation did burst out, the Turks did not
withdraw any of their forces from Janina, on the contrary
they sent in new reinforcements. Under the command of
Hurshid Pasha, who had succeeded the inefficient Ismail
Pasho Bey, the Turkish armies increased the pressure on
Janina. But Ali Pasha resisted till the end. At night on
January 25, 1822, after a siege of 17 months, after Ali had
been assassinated treacherously by Hurshid Pasha, the
resistance of Janina came to an end. The head of Ali Pasha
was sent to Istanbul as a precious trophy.
Although the pashallek of Ali Pasha Tepelena ceased
to exist, it left its traces in Albania as well as in the inter­
national arena. Not only did it sweep away the vestiges of
the military feudalism in south Albania, but Ali Pasha’s
aspiration to create an independent Albanian principality
and furthermore his resolute war against Istanbul in­
fluenced later events. On the other hand, with the aid he
had given to the eretists and with the prolonged resistance
of Janina, Ali made a substantial contribution to the
triumph of the uprising for liberation and of the Greek na­
tional independence.
After destroying the Pashallek of Janina, the Sublime
Porte sent to Greece all its armies, including those of the
Albanian feudal rulers. Among those who went to Greece
with the aim to crush the insurrection was Mustafa Pasha
Bushatly.
Up to that time Bushatly and the Sultan had guarded
friendly relations with each other. But these relations did
not continue for long. After the defeat of the Pashallek of
Janina, there was no reason for the Sultan to support
Bushatly to get stronger. Mustafa Pasha on his part was
alarmed by the objectives that became apparent on the part
115
of the Turkish governors to centralize the imperial authority
at the expense of the separatist power of the feudal rulers.
The relations between them started to deteriorate in 1824
when Bushatly returned from Greece to Shkoder without
the permission of the Sultan. But the Sublime Porte, fully
occupied with the Greek question, the problem of the
janissarys, the situation of Bosnia and afterwards with
the Russo-Turkish war, which began in the year 1828, post­
poned its intervention in the Shkodran problems. These
circumstances induced Mustafa Pasha to enter into a secret
agreement with the Russians. These promised him that
they would recognize him as independent ruler in Albania
in case he did not take part in the war against them. And
indeed, when the Sultan bade him to come to the front with
his numerous armies, Bushatly delayed his start and then
marched so slowly that when he arrived at the appointed
place the Turkish armies were dispersed. But the Russians
did not keep their promise. Mustafa Pasha returned to
Shkoder with broken relations with the Sultan and with
the Russians, and with no friends and supporters in the
international arena.
After the Russo-Turkish war had come to an end, the
Sultan decided to subjugate Albania for good. This task
was undertaken personally by the Turkish prime minister,
Mehmet Reshid Pasha. In 1838, at the head of a modern
army, he marched into Toskeria, where the feudal lords
had become once again independent rulers. When Mehmet
Reshid Pasha arrived at Manastir, he invited all the feudal
lords of Toskeria to award them pardon and rewards, and
on August 26, 1830 massacred treacherously more than
500 of them. Afterwards, through fire and sword, he
scourged south Albania.
In 1831 Mehmet Reshid Pasha marched on Gegeria.
Mustafa Pasha with his armies started off to encounter him,
but at Babune of Macedonia he was routed. The disaster
obliged Bushatly to retreat to Shkoder and to shut himself
up in the Rozafat fortress, where the Turkish armies be­
sieged him. After six months’ siege and after he was
116
assured that the Sultan would spare his life, Mustafa Pasha
surrendered. With his surrender the Pashallek of Shkoder
also came to an end.
The Sublime Porte, after it had broken the power of
the separatist feudal lords, did not re-establish the previous
system of timars which was in total decay throughout the
Ottoman Empire. Even so, a year later, in 1832, it abolished
this system through an act of law. Thus came to an end
also officially the regime of military feudalism, introduced
into Albania four centuries ago.
"Instead of the military feudal administration, Istanbul
began to establish in Albania the regular state administra­
tion. However, the new administration roused the opposi­
tion of the Albanian feudal rulers who had escaped from
the exterminating campaigns of Mehmed Reshid Pasha and
who saw in it the end of their independent rule. On the
other hand, the new functionaries who filled the important
offices in the administration, began to abuse their offices
and to carry on unlimited speculation, which caused the
discontent of the masses of the population. Thus shortly
after the Turkish state administration had been introduced,
a series of armed revolts of the peasant masses burst in
Albania, which were led by feudal chieftains such as
Zylyftar Poda, Tafil Buzi, Zenel Gjoleka, or else of the
masses of citizens, at whose head stood feudalized leaders
of the esnafs, such as Hamza Kazazi, Haxhi Idrizi, etc.
But all of these revolts were crushed.

THE FIRST STEPS OF THE NATIONAL

MOVEMENT;
THE REVOLTS AGAINST THE TANZIMAT

The Turkish governors, in sequence to the steps they had

taken in the 20’s and 30’s of the 19th century, prepared
the way for the application of the reforms of Tanzimat,
117
which aimed at strengthening the central authority, weak­
ened by the separatist tendency of the provincial feudal
rulers, by the peasant revolts, and by the revolts of the
oppressed nationalities which erupted from time to time
in various parts of the Empire.
The basic principles of these reforms, which were made
public by Sultan Abdul Medjid in November of the year
1839 through his decree “Hat-Sherif of Gulhane” in essence
provided the establishment of a centralized state adminis­
tration after the model of European states, which was
going to replace the separatist authority of regional feudal
rulers, the establishment of a financial state apparatus that
was to replace the corrupted system of Iltizam, the dis­
persion of former troops of the feudal rulers, and the organ­
ization of a regular army of the state on the basis of the
obligatory, unpaid, universal military service. However,
neither the principles of Gulhane nor the supplementary by­
laws infringe the decayed social-economic basis of the
feudal Ottoman Empire. In the hands of the depraved
Turkish governmental officials, these reforms paved the
way for speculations on a greater scale at the expense of
the population.
In Albania the reforms of the Tanzimat were welcomed
only by the landlords, because with the elimination of the
feudal military landholding system, the latter had the pos­
sibility to extend unhindered and even under the guarantee
of the state, their large estates. For this reason they
supported the Sublime Porte in the enforcement of these
reforms.
Whereas the feudal lords of long standing, who realized
that Istanbul was constantly pursuing its plan of centraliz­
ing power, received the Gulhane decree with protests. The
same attitude was adopted by the highland bayraktars
(chieftains) and by the discontented leaders of the esnajs.
Although they were prepared to oppose by means of arms
the enforcement of these reforms, still they did not demand
any new systemization of the manner of governing the
118
country. They merely demanded the re-establishment of
the previous system — the ancient feudal rulers to regain
the lost pashalleks and their revenues (timars), the bayrak-
tars (mountain chieftains) to guard the traditional auton­
omy, and the leaders of the esnafs to continue enjoying
their former privileges, which were, being eliminated by the
establishment of state administration.
A hostile attitude towards the reforms of Tanzimat was
taken by the masses of the peasantry. The establishment
of the state administration with depraved officials did not
ameliorate their deplorable conditions. More especially be­
came heinous for the masses of the peasantry the new
system of the collection of taxes, particularly the djelep
(tax on cattle), and the regular military service (nizam)
which was to be rendered without any pay and was to
last 7-10 years. Relentless opponents of the reforms were,
in a particular manner, the highlanders, because in the cen­
tralizing measures of Istanbul they saw the end of their
traditional privileges.
By foreseeing that the enforcement of the new reforms
would arouse the armed opposition of the Albanians, and
in order to avoid the general insurrection, the Sublime
Porte began to adopt them in Albania not simultaneously
in all the regions of the country, but at various periods —
in 1843, in the regions of Kossovo, in 1844 in the regions of
Gegeria, and in 1845 in those of Toskeria.
Everywhere the peasants and the highlanders opposed
these reforms by armed revolts. The Sublime Porte sent
against them numerous armies, and at some localities
arrived to exact by force the taxes and the nizam. In the
mountainous regions it did not meet with any success and
was obliged to renounce for the time being, the enforce­
ment of the reforms.
But the revolts of the peasantry and of the highlanders
also were animated by restrained demands: they were
aimed against the new reforms, and more concretely against
the taxes and the nizam (the military service), without
119
assuring any advanced order of government. These
demands served to back the feudal lords and the bayraktars.
At the same time that a series of armed revolts burst out
against the Tanzimat, various personalities emerged who
started to believe that the Albanians could not be saved by
re-establishing in Albania the former backward condition,
but by entering on a new road, the road of civilization,
after the example of the advanced European states. They
considered the extension of education and of culture among
the vast masses of the population as the means to achieve
this aim. At the beginning, only a very restrained circle
of Albanians realized this historic necessity. Better and
clearer than by anyone else, this imperative need was ex­
pressed by Naum Veqilharxhi.
Naum Veqilharxhi, born in 1797 at Vithkuq, had migrated
when he was still a young man to Roumania and there, in

Naum Veqilharxhi, pio­

neer of the 19th century
Albanian National Liber­
ation Movement
120
the year 1821, together with hundreds of other Albanians,
had taken part in the Roumanian revolt of liberation against
the Turkish oppressors. Although in exile, Naum directed
his attention to his distressed homeland, which was suffer­
ing from ignorance and a state of backwardness from the
Turkish yoke. He soon arrived to the conclusion that Al­
bania could save itself from this backwardness and slavery
only if the masses of the population shook off the ignorance
and that this could be easily achieved not by spreading
education in foreign languages (Turkish and Greek), as it
was done in Albania, but by education in the Albanian
language. Naum thought that education in a foreign
language not only was difficult, but destroyed the love of
the Albanians for their own country, whereas education in
the mother tongue could be mastered easier even by the
poorest, and besides it imbued his countrymen with love
of their country.
Starting from the axiom that “a nation without culture
and education resembles a throng of slaves” and that “cul­
ture and education can be acquired only through the
mother tongue”, Naum Veqilharxhi began the writing of
school books in Albanian, making use of an absolutely par­
ticular alphabet which he had created himself. After the
edict on the reforms of the Tanzimat had been published,
he addressed to his Christian countrymen a circular letter
in which he wrote: “The time has arrived that we should
rouse ourselves and think with more maturity, and coura­
geously change our route and hence take as example the
advanced peoples of the world”. In 1844 he published in
Roumania a small Albanian primer entitled Evetor, which
was distributed in south Albania. The publication of
Evetor caused among progressive Albanians a wide
movement for the support and the diffusion of education
in Albanian. In Korea the higher class of the citizens started
a campaign of aid for the education in Albanian. A year
later Naum published a new Evetor, more complete than
the one before.
121
 The movement in favour of the Albanian alphabet and
the Albanian school, which had as its aim the liberation
and the progress of the country, was proof of the revival
and development of the national consciousness of the Al­
banians. This marked, on its part, the beginning of a new
period in the history of Albania, which has been called
since long ago the period of the Albanian national revival,
or shortly, the “Albanian Revival”.
The peasants’ and the highlanders’ revolts continued in
the following years, too. Of these the greatest was the
revolt of the year 1847.
The revolt started in Laberia, and in July of the year
1847 in Kurvelesh the collectors of taxes on cattle made
their appearance. Some 500 labs, with Zenel Gjoleka, a
former spahi, at their head, took up arms, chased away the
officials in charge of tax-collection, descended from the
highlands of Laberia, stormed and liberated Delvina, and
afterwards marched on the chief city of the sandjak, Gjiro­
kastra, to which they laid siege.
From Laberia the insurrection spread over the other dis­
tricts of south Albania. But it took major proportions in
the district of Mallakastra, which was included in the
sandjak of Berat. The mutesarrif of this sandjak was
the great landlord Hussein Pasha Vrioni, who had terrorized
the peasants through ruthless oppression. For this reason
the rancour of the insurgents was directed chiefly against
Vrioni feudal rulers, who had the support of the Sublime
Porte. Under the leadership of the audacious peasant Rapo
Hekali, the insurgents, after liberating the whole of Malla­
kastra and of Muzekeya, in the village of Greshitza defeated
the Turkish forces who had marched against them, took
captive and executed two brothers of Hussein Vrioni, who
commanded the government forces, and then marched
against the central city of the sandjak, Berat, to which they
laid siege.
After these successes, the insurgents banded themselves
together and created a common committee, composed
mainly of the beys who were opposed to the reforms.
122
 The insurgents achieved still other successes. They
liberated the city of Berat and compelled the Turkish garri­
son to shut itself up in the citadel. Almost simultaneously,
the Lab insurgents defeated a Turkish army, which was
moving to the succour of the besieged Gjirokastra. Without
giving up the siege of Gjirokastra, a part of the insurgents
from Laberia and from Chamouria started an attack on
Janina, which was the chief city of the vilayet, and on
August 28, 1847, in the village of Dholane, not far from
Janina, they smashed a Turkish army of 5,000 regular
soldiers, which was advancing towards Gjirokastra.
But the insurrection did not last long. The Sublime Porte
sent to Albania a strong army, which stormed Berat and
after having defeated the forces of Rapo Hekali, terrorized
the native population and marched on Gjirokastra. In the
encounter which took place in the village of Palavlia
(Delvina), the forces of Gjoleka too, which had interrupted
their march on Janina, were routed. After other punitive
operations, at last the insurrection was crushed.
Although it was crushed, the revolt of the year 1847 was
of great importance. As far as the demands are concerned,
it surpassed by far the previous revolts. The peasant masses
fought not only against the nizam and the taxes levied
by the state, but also against the big feudal landholders,
which was manifested more clearly by the villages of
Mallakastra and of Muzekeya. Furthermore, in this revolt,
though dimly, the preliminary claims of the Albanian na­
tional movement can be detected. For this reason the revolt
of the year 1847 had vast reverberation throughout Albania.
Its repercussion continued throughout the following decades.
The violence used by Istanbul in crushing the Albanian
pashalleks and the insurrections against the nizam did
not achieve anything but the accentuation of the discontent
of the popular masses of Albania.
The Albanians all the while were beginning to see in
Turkey their hateful enemy. They paid the taxes only at
the threat of the gendarmes. The few nizams (soldiers)
that were recruited, in the majority of cases, deserted. The
123
authority of the Sultan was practically ignored. In the
years 1853-1856, when Turkey was again at war with
Russia (the Crimean War), the Sultan succeeded in recruit­
ing in Albania only a limited number of soldiers. After the
Crimean War, the Sublime Porte tried again to re-establish
its authority in the mountainous regions. But this time also
it had to face the armed opposition of the Moslem and
Christian Albanians.
All these factors placed the Albanians in the international
arena as an important force which had to be taken into
consideration whenever the question was raised of the fate
of Turkey and the events in the Balkans. The Great Powers
as well as the Balkan states began to pay attention to the
further development of the incidents in Albania.
But the concern of the foreign states brought great harm
to the Albanians. Before, as well as after the Crimean War,
the Great Powers had no interest to destroy the Ottoman
Empire: England and France did not desire the fall of
this Empire because they wanted to use it as an obstacle
to hinder Russia from reaching the Straits of the Darda­
nelles; Austria, because it did not want to have trouble at
its rear, while its attention was concentrated on the happen­
ings in Germany; and Russia itself, because it was weakened
by the defeat it had suffered in Crimea. For the fall of
the Ottoman Empire were interested and actively busy,
only the three new Balkan states — Greece, Serbia and
Montenegro, which would be able to achieve their national
union only through this means. It would have seemed that
the Balkan states would have been the natural allies of
the Albanians, who were likewise interested in the expul­
sion of the enemy who had swayed and oppressed them
throughout centuries. But the governments of Athens,
Belgrade and Cetinje were in the hands of bourgeois circles,
which began to manifest tendencies of chauvinism. They
aspired to include within the boundaries of their respective
states the Albanian territories also. For this reason they
did not welcome the idea of the creation of an independent
Albanian state. On the contrary, in the course of secret
124
 discussions that took place in 1861 between Serbia and
Greece, the governments of these two countries adopted the
plan of dividing Albania between them after the expulsion
of the Turks. This is why the Albanians began to regard
their neighbours too with suspicion. The anti-Islamic and
pan-Slavic or pan-Hellenic clamours of chauvinist Serbian
and Greek propagandists went so far as to awaken anxiety
in the hearts of the Albanians, and in the first line among
the Mohammedan Albanians, who constituted approximately
three-fourths of the population of the country. Thus, on
account of the chauvinistic attitude of the bourgeois govern­
ments of Belgrade and of Athens, the cooperation between
the Albanians and the neighbouring populations in the
struggle against Turkey was rendered extremely difficult.
Uneasy circumstances were created in Albania also by
the policy that Istanbul followed in the cultural domain.
Although with the Tanzimat reforms the Turkish gov­
ernors had proclaimed that they would concede to the
various populations of the Empire the right to freely carry
on the education according to the nationalities, they further
continued to identify the nationality with the religion. Con­
sequently they went on to consider the Mohammedan
Albanians as belonging to the Ottoman nationality, the
Greek Orthodox Albanians as belonging to the Greek na­
tionality, and the Roman Catholic Albanians as belonging
to the Latin nationality, and on the basis of this discrimi­
nation, the Albanians, split into three different religions,
were not recognized as belonging to one and the same na­
tionality, and accordingly were deprived of the right to
follow their education in their mother tongue. This had
harmful effects, and with time became a handicap in the
struggle for the unity of the Albanians, because in the
Turkish schools, conducted by the Sublime Porte, en­
deavours were made to inculcate in the Albanian scholars
the feeling of the Islamic Ottoman nationality; in the Greek
.schools, which were put under the supervision and the
spiritual guidance of the Patriarchate of Istanbul, it was
aimed to cultivate in the hearts of the Orthodox the pan­
125
Hellenic sentiment which served the chauvinistic aspira­
tions of Athens; whereas the supervision for the education
of the Catholic population, which was carried on in the
Italian language, was in the hands of the Papacy and of
Austria.
The increase in the number of foreign schools after the
reforms of the Tanzimat and the political objectives
hidden behind their educational activities, engendered the
danger of the breach and the assimilation of the Albanians
according to the religions which they belonged to. To
forestall this danger, the Albanian patriots adopted and
divulged the platform of the priority of nationality before
religion, and in this direction, by leaving in the second line
the religious factor, they concentrated their efforts in
diffusing among the Albanians national consciousness by
means of education in Albanian and the teaching of Al­
banian literature.
In 1864 endeavours were made to found an Albanian cul­
tural society in Istanbul, and with the permission of the
Sublime Porte the initiative was taken by a young patriot,
Konstandin Kristoforidhi, who had completed his higher
studies some years before in England. The aim of this cul­
tural society was to open Albanian schools and to publish
the necessary school texts in an alphabet more practicable
and easier to be used than the difficult alphabet of Veqil-
hardji. But their endeavours brought no result on account
of the hostile attitude of the Sublime Porte, which refused
to recognize the Albanians as a nation in itself.
In 1867, 1870 and 1871 in Istanbul once again attempts
were made for the foundation of an Albanian cultural
society. But these attempts, too, were fruitless. This time
the Sublime Porte as well as the Patriarchate of Istanbul
interfered by means of threats in order to compel the mem­
bers of the committee to give up all efforts.
On account of these obstacles the national movement had
very slow growth. The ranks of the Albanian patriots had
few adherents. They had no organization, neither political,
nor cultural. The masses of the Albanian population were
126
Konstantin Kristoforidhi
(1830-1895), gifted linguist
and pioneer in the Alba­
nian National Liberation
Movement

still under the influence of the feudal chieftains, who were

hostile to the Sublime Porte. It is in these circumstances
that Albania had to face the years of the Balkan crisis.

THE LEAGUE OF PRIZREN (1878)

The Balkan crisis had its starting point, as is well known,

in the revolts for liberation that broke out in 1875 in Bosnia
and Herzegovina, and in 1876 in Bulgaria. Russia gave its
support to the claims of the insurgents for autonomy. In
1876, on Russia’s incitement, Serbia and Montenegro, too,
declared war on Turkey. Istanbul crushed mercilessly the
revolts, compelled Serbia to sue for an armistice and refused
Russia’s demand to grant autonomy to the Slav populations
of the Balkans. After that, Russia precipitated its prepara­
127
tions for declaring war on Turkey. With the initiative of
England, which wanted to save the Ottoman Empire from
the calamity of a war with Russia, an international con­
ference was held in Istanbul and, at the proposal of the con­
ference, the Great Powers signed a protocol in London in
March of the year 1877, compelling Turkey to create one
autonomous province in Bosnia, Herzegovina and two au­
tonomous vilayets in Bulgaria. Within the boundaries of the
western Bulgarian vilayet were to be included districts in­
habited by the Albanian population, such as that of Dibra,
of Gostivar, of Tetova, of Kachanik and others.
The conference of Istanbul as well as the Protocol of
London did not take into account the existence of the Al­
banian nationality, and refused to acknowledge to the
Albanians the right of autonomous administration; and
along with these various districts inhabited by them were
comprised within the Bulgarian vilayet. For this reason a
great number of renowned leaders of south Albania, among
them Abdul Frasheri, held a meeting in Janina, and there
composed a memorandum addressed to the Turkish Govern­
ment demanding that the various Albanian districts,
allotted to different vilayets, be united in a single Albanian
vilayet. In this vilayet the administration was to be com­
posed exclusively of Albanian officials, in the schools and
courts of justice the Albania language was to be used, the
recruits were to do their military service within the bound­
aries of the vilayet. In the memorandum were presented
for the first time the demands for the administrative
autonomy for the whole of Albania.
However, neither the Protocol of London was put into
execution, nor was the memorandum of Janina taken into
consideration for the reason that Russia, after it had signed
a secret treaty with Austria-Hungary in January of the year
1877 in Budapest, on April 24, 1877 declared war on the
Ottoman Empire. Together with Russia, Serbia and Mon­
tenegro began once again war operations against Turkey.
Decayed from within, Turkey was defeated and, on
March 3, 1877, was compelled to sign a treaty of peace at
128
St. Stephanon with the onerous conditions dictated by
Russia. The Treaty of St. Stephanon made no mention of
the Albanian problem at all. Albania was not only to re­
main, as up to then, under Turkish rule, without any rights
whatsoever, but considerable parts of its territories were
to be detached from it and annexed by foreign states. Mon­
tenegro was to receive, among others, Ulqin (Dulcigno), Hot,
Plava, Gucina, etc. Serbia was going to annex above all
the sandjak of Prishtina. Bulgaria was going to include
within its boundaries the districts of Korea, Pogradec,
Dibra, Gostivar, Tetova and others.
The publication of the Treaty of St. Stephanon utterly
exasperated the Albanians. Throughout the country a wide
movement broke out against the chauvinistic aims of Al­
bania’s neighbours. In a vast number of districts local
committees were created spontaneously for their self-
defence, against the new danger. A further incitement to
this Albanian movement was given by the decision of the
Great Powers to have the terms of the Treaty of St.
Stephanon revised by a Congress of the Great Powers,
which Russia was compelled to accept, and which was to
meet in Berlin in June of the year 1878.
The Sublime Porte welcomed the indignation of the
Albanians and tried to exploit the protest movement in
Albania with the aim of modifying in its favour the terms
of the Treaty of St. Stephanon. For this reason Istanbul
gave permission for the creation of the self-defence com­
mittees, but at the same time tried to persuade the Moham­
medan Albanians to declare themselves, in their protests,
as Turks who had no desire to separate themselves from
Turkey and from the Sultan.
For the Albanian patriots it was clear that in these dif­
ficult circumstances the Albanians ought to take their fate
into their own hands. The task to create an Albanian
united and general movement was assumed by the secret
committee founded in Istanbul in the spring of the year
1878, which had as president Abdul Frasheri, and as mem­
bers Pashko Vasa, Sami Frasheri, Jani Vreto and others.
129
 The Istanbul Committee tried by every possible means
to bring the Albanian question before the Chancelleries of
the Great Powers prior to the meeting at the Berlin Con­
gress. The members of the Committee came in touch with
the leaders of the self-defence committees. At the con­
clusion of these contacts, towards the end of May 1878, it
was decided to call an extraordinary convention at Prizren
to which delegates from all the districts of Albania were
invited. The assembly was to meet on June 10, 1878, three
days before the date fixed for the Berlin Congress.
The extraordinary convention held its inaugural meeting
on June 10, 1878. Delegates from a vast number of districts
took part in it. On account of the very short notice and of
the difficulties of travel, not all the delegates from districts
of south Albania were able to attend it.
The convention began its work with a fiery speech by
Abdul Frasheri. He appealed to the delegates to unite them­
selves into a single body in order to forestall the danger of
the partition of the country. The Assembly at once decided
to create a general organization with its central executive
committee which the branches that were to be created in
all the districts of the country had to obey. With its
creation, all the self-defence committees were to change into
its branches. The organization thus created was called “the
League” and is known under the name of “The League of
Prizren”. The Convention decided likewise to create with­
out any loss of time an efficient army in order to protect
the districts that were in danger of being annexed by foreign
states. The Convention addressed a note of protest to the
Congress of Berlin with which it formulated its opposition
against the partition of the Albanian territories. After
that, the Convention occupied itself for several days in suc­
cession with the drafting of the statute of the League.
While the statute was being discussed, two trends dia­
metrically opposed to each other made their appearance in
the League. A great number of reactionary pashas, of beys
and of clergymen, actively behind whom was the Sublime
130
Porte, attempted to give the League the character of a
Mohammedan organization, which was to include also the
non-Albanian Mohammedan populations of the Balkan
Peninsula (Bosnians, Bulgarians, Turks, etc.). For this rea­
son they had called to attend the Convention non-Albanian
Mohammedan delegates from Bosnia, Herzegovina, Bulgaria,
etc. The objective of the Sublime Porte was, on the one
hand, to eclipse the national movement, and on the other,
to induce the Albanians to fight in defence of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, which Austria-Hungary was preparing to
seize. The other current was represented by Albanian
patriots with Abdul Frasheri at their head, who demanded
that the League should assume the character of an Albanian
organization and that all the Albanians, irrespective of their
religion, should take part in it. They had in view that the
League should fight not only to save the country from parti­
tion, but also in order to attain the autonomy of Albania.
At the Convention the elements attached to the Sublime
Porte had the supremacy. Under their sway, on July 18,
1878, the statute, called the Karamame (the register of
resolutions) was adopted in which the fidelity to Turkey was
asserted, and to the League was attributed the character of
an Organization of the Mohammedans of the Balkans. How­
ever, the reactionary pashas succeeded in securing the ma­
jority only in the Convention. In a great number of the
branches the platform of the patriots had the upper hand.
For this reason, the Albanian patriots, though they did not
approve the principles of the kararname, did not forsake
the League, but endeavoured to bring it onto the right road.
After the work of the Convention was completed, Abdul
Frasheri left for south Albania in order to extend the
League also over the districts that had not had the possibility
to be represented at the meetings of Prizren. With the del­
egates of these districts, a special meeting was held in
Frasheri. In south Albania the influence of the reactionary
pashas was a mere trifle. That is why at the meeting at
Frasheri the platform of the patriots triumphed. Here the
131
principle was adopted that the branches of the League
should assume an open Albanian character.
At the Congress of Berlin, which met for the first time
on June 13, 1878, the thesis triumphed to decrease the in­
fluence of Russia in the Balkans. At the expense of Tur­
key, a new partition of the territories took place. However
at this partition too no mention was made of the principle
of nationality. The area of Bulgaria fixed at St. Stephanon
was reduced considerably. Serbia did not receive the
sandjak of Prishtina but obtained the districts of Pirot,
Treni and Vrania. To Montenegro were allotted, among
others, Tivari, Podgorica, Plava and Gucia; whereas Ulqin
was retained by Turkey. To Greece, although it had not
taken part in the war against Turkey, the Congress granted
Thessaly and Epirus, but under the condition that the
boundary was to be drawn by a common Greco-Turkish
Commission.
The Congress took no notice of the protests of the
Albanians. None of the Great Powers raised its voice in
favour of their demands. The Congress treated the
Albanians according to their respective religions: the
Mohammedans were considered as Turks and the Greek
Orthodox as Greeks. The chancellor of Germany, Prince
Bismarck, who was the chairman of the Congress, went so
far as to declare that there existed no Albanian nation. Thus
Albania was doomed to remain without any rights what­
soever under Turkish rule, and on the other hand a num­
ber of its territories were torn away and partitioned out
among foreign states.
The decisions of the Congress of Berlin inflamed still more
the indignation of the Albanians. The fury of the Albanians
was directed against the Great Powers, which had paid no
attention to their demands, as well as against the Sublime
Porte, that had proved itself incompetent to defend
their territories. In all the regions of the country, and
in the first place in the territories along the boundaries,
hasty preparations were made in order to oppose with arms
132
in hand the annexation of Albanian territories. In the cities
and villages began the registration of volunteers. The
masses of the population gave considerable help in money,
grain and cattle. Thus, within a couple of weeks the
League of Prizren created an Albanian army of several tens
of thousands of soldiers.
The Sublime Porte officially announced that it was going
to put into execution the decisions of the Congress of Berlin.
But on the other hand it tried to frustrate the occupation by
Austria-Hungary of Bosnia and Herzegovina by means of
irregular forces. Of these irregular forces the most impor­
tant were those of the League of Prizren. However, the
Albanian patriots, as in August the Austrian armies seized
Bosnia and Herzegovina, by means of strenuous agitation, in
spite of all the strong pressure exercised by the Sublime
Porte, convinced the League of Prizren to stand aloof and
not to get involved in the adventure of a war with Austria,
but first to take care of the Albanian interests. On account
of this attitude of the Albanians, the principal plan of Is­
tanbul met with failure. The Sublime Porte began to look
upon the League with suspicion.
A few days later the Sublime Porte was compelled by the
Great Powers to surrender to Montenegro the regions which,
according to the decisions of the Berlin Congress, apper­
tained to Cetinie. In order to hand over these districts and
to persuade the Albanians to renounce their armed opposi­
tion, the Sultan sent to Albania the Turkish marshal
Mehmed Ali Pasha, its former delegate at the Congress of
Berlin. In Prizren the Turkish marshal won to his side
only the reactionary pashas. But the authority of these
pashas over the League had considerably decreased by that
time. Most of the leaders of the League did not comply
with the orders of the Sultan.
On his way to the Montenegrin frontier, Mehmed Ali
Pasha arrived at Jakova on September 1, 1878. In Jakova
the committee set up by the League was in the hands of
patriotic elements such as Sulejman Vokshi and Ahmed
133
Koronitza, who, with the exception of the chairman of the
committee Abdullah Pasha Dreni, were among the most
progressive active members of the entire League of Prizren.
The committee intimated the Turkish marshal to turn back
to Istanbul. Mehmed Ali Pasha, protected by six Turkish
battalions, did not yield. Then the committee assembled the
volunteer forces and laid siege to the palace of Abdullah
Pasha Dreni, where the Turkish marshal had chosen his
quarters. On September 4, 1878 fierce fighting began
around the walls of the palace which lasted until September
6, 1878, and came to an end with the surrender of the
Turkish battalions and the massacre of Mehmed Ali Pasha
and Abdullah Pasha Dreni.
After the death of the Turkish marshal, the League of
Prizren made great strides ahead. The relations with Istan­
bul were broken. Now the League even expected punitive
expeditions on the part of the Turkish Government.
Through these actions the authority and the influence of the
reactionary pashas was declining, whereas that of the patriot
elements was growing from day to day. Thus were created
for the patriotic leaders the conditions for replacing the
programme evolved in the karamame with a new prog­
ramme which was to embody the principal demands of the
Albanian national movement: the autonomy for Albania.
The initiative was again taken by the Istanbul Committee.
The Committee drafted a projected programme, which was
published on September 27, 1878 in Turkish in the news­
paper Terdjuman-i Shark (The Interpreter of the East)
which was published in Istanbul with Sami Frasheri as its
editor. After animated discussions that took place through­
out the country on the draft statute, the assembly of the
League of Prizren in November sanctioned the new prog­
ramme. In the programme was demanded: the unification
of all the Albanian districts in a single vilayet, the creation
of a general assembly as the highest organ of the vilayet;
the cognizance of the Albanian language by the officials of
the vilayet; the introduction of the tuition in Albanian lan­
134
 guage in the schools of the country; and the allotment of a
part of the budget of the vilayet for the diffusion of educa­
tion and for public construction. The assembly elected a
delegation of seven members to deliver to the Istanbul gov­
ernment the demands incorporated in the programme.
With this platform, the League of Prizren thus became a
patriotic organization — the first organization of its kind in
the history of Albania.
The memorandum was delivered to the Sublime Porte at
the end of January 1879. The Turkish government neither
rejected nor accepted it. In order to gain time until it had
settled the boundary problems with Greece and Montenegro,
it promised to appoint a commission to investigate the
matter.
A couple of months later, as it became apparent that the
Sublime Porte was dragging with the response, in Albania
started a popular movement against the Turkish administra­
tion. The movement took vast proportions in Kossovo. In
various meetings, the citizens and the peasants demanded
initially the suppression of the state courts of justice and
their replacement by Albanian courts. Afterwards the
popular masses began to oppose the conscription of soldiers
and levy of taxes. This movement gave to the highlanders
the opportunity to restart their earlier revolts against the
reforms of the tanzimat and for the safeguarding of their
traditional privileges. The movements took such vast pro­
portions that the Sultan was compelled to delay the col­
lection of taxes and the recruiting of soldiers, and to allow,
especially in the Kossovo regions, the creation of Albanian
courts of justice.
However, in spite of its growth, the popular movement
for an autonomous administration did not make great
advance, because the League had to face the imminent
danger of annexation of Albanian districts by Greece and
Montenegro. This danger temporarily distracted the atten­
tion of the Albanians from the problem of autonomy.
135
 THE STRUGGLE OF THE LEAGUE OF
PRIZREN AGAINST THE PARTITION
OF ALBANIA

In February of the year 1879, the Turco-Greek Commis­

sion of boundaries started its work in Preveza. Greece
claimed to include within its boundaries, besides Greek
territories, the southern Albanian territories also. The
Albanians now had no faith that Turkey would be able to
save these territories from annexation by Greece. Conse­
quently, as soon as the Turco-Greek discussions had been
started, hundreds of influential personalities of south
Albania who had adhered to the League of Prizren, assem­
bled in Preveza, and at a meeting they held, announced that
they were going to oppose by means of arms the transition
of Albanian districts into the hands of Greece, and that they
would seize arms against Turkey, too, in case it would sanc­
tion the annexation of these districts by Greece.
Turkey dreaded the troubles that would be created by the
Albanians. Therefore, with various pretexts it prolonged
and then interrupted the discussions. The Greek press then
began a violent campaign against the Mohammedan Alba­
nians. In order to clarify international public opinion and
to expose to the Great Powers the character of the move­
ment in Albania and the just claims of the Albanians, Abdul
Frasheri accompanied by Mehmed Ali Pasha Vrioni visited
several states of western Europe and handed to the cabinets
of the Great Powers a memorandum in which they urged
that the latter should renounce the policy of the partitioning
of their country and that Albania should receive the benefit
of autonomous administration. ‘
In February of the year 1879, Turkey was compelled
through the pressure exerted by the Great Powers to sur­
render to Montenegro the districts allotted to it by the Con­
gress of Berlin, and therefore it withdrew its armies from
these districts. The Montenegrin armies occupied Podgori-
tza, Shpuza and Jabiak, but when they entered the districts
136
of Plava and of Gucia, they found there the armies of the
League of Prizren which had preceded them.
Montenegro applied to the Great Powers urging them to
compel Turkey to eject the Albanian armies from Plava and
Gucia, and then to hand them over to Cetinie. In spite of
the pressure of the Great Powers, Turkey was reluctant to
exert any coercion against the enraged Albanians. It is
then that Knias (Prince) Nicola of Montenegro decided to
seize by the force of arms these two districts, where the
armies of volunteers of the League under the command of
Ali Pasha Gucia were massed. On account of the valiant
defence of the Albanians, the Montenegrin armies suffered
two ignominious defeats, one at Velike and the other at
Pepich.
As it did not succeed in conquering Plava and Gucia, Mon­
tenegro once again pleaded for the intervention of the Great
Powers to have the Treaty of Berlin put into execution.
However the Great Powers now regarded as cumbersome
the surrendering of these two districts without war, which
would have rendered still worse the condition of Turkey.
That is why, after long debating, on April 2, 1880, they de­
cided to give to Montenegro two other Albanian districts in­
stead of Plava and Gucia. This solution was accepted also
by the Sultan. The new territories were to be yielded
within twenty days.
This decision too caused a new wave of indignation in
Albania. In all the regions of the country a great number
of telegrams were addressed to the Great Powers, protesting
against this unjust decision also. At the same time speedy
steps were taken for defence. Groups of Albanian volun­
teers were concentrated in Hot and in Gruda.
The indignation of the Albanians, however, was directed
against the Sublime Porte too, which had given its acquies­
cence. This indignation passed into armed actions against
the Turkish military garrisons, which in order to protect
themselves from these assaults, had taken refuge in the cit­
adels of the cities. In these circumstances the movement
137
 for achieving Albania’s autonomy made a great step ahead.
In Shkoder, in an extraordinary assembly of the mountain­
ous regions, a memorandum addressed to the Sultan was
adopted, in which it was demanded in categoric terms the
unification of all the Albanian districts into an autonomous
principality under the suzerainty of the Sultan, with a
prince at its head, to be elected by the Albanians them­
selves. The text of the memorandum was announced public­
ly on April 17, 1880 at a popular meeting, by the chairman
of the assemblage Hodo Sokoli, a colonel of the Turkish
army who, together with 150 other Albanian officers, in
order to demonstrate that they had broken their relations
with the Sultan, removed before the assembly their insignia
and their decorations.
In order not to arouse further the anger of the Albanians,
the Sublime Porte withheld all repressive measures against
them. But, on the other hand, complying with the decisions
of the Great Powers, on April 22, it withdrew the Turkish
armies from Hot and Gruda, and the armies of the League
at once occupied these regions. The Montenegrin armies
attempted once more to conquer them by force. However,
in the bloody encounter that took place between them at
Ura e Rzhanices, the Montenegrin armies were routed
and obliged to retreat, and forced to rely again on the Great
Powers for the realization of their hopes.
As it became evident that the Albanians would not relin­
quish Hot and Gruda without fighting, after long negotia­
tions that were carried on between them, the Great Powers
took the decision to urge Turkey to deliver to Montenegro,
instead of Hot and Gruda, the city of Ulqin (Dulcigno)
together with its hinterland, which too had a population
composed exclusively of Albanians.
A couple of days later, the committee of the League of
Prizren, at its meeting held on June 30, 1880, resolved to
resist by force of arms the surrender of Ulqin also. At the
war-call of the League, within a few days the army of
Albanian volunteers once more was mobilized.
138
 This time the Great Powers threatened Turkey with the
occupation of the port of Smyrna in Asia Minor, in case it
would not hand over Ulqin to Montenegro. Caught in a
difficult position, the Sublime Porte tried its best to per­
suade the Albanians to give up the resistance, but its ef­
forts met with failure. On September 27, as soon as the
Turkish army evacuated Ulqin, the Albanian volunteer
forces took possession of the city and announced that they
were going to defend it by every means.
On September 20, 1880 an international fleet composed of
17 men-of-war made its appearance before Ulqin. The
commander of the fleet sent an ultimatum to the Albanian
volunteers to deliver up the city within three days, but the
defenders did not waver. After that the Great Powers de­
cided to keep the city under blockade by the sea, and at the
same time kept on exerting pressure on Turkey in order to
constrain it to crush the Albanian resistance.
On September 25, 1880 the Sublime Porte started drastic
measures to break the resistance of Ulqin and to dissolve
the League of Prizren. For two consecutive months in
Shkoder and the surrounding regions arrests and persecu­
tions were enacted and at the same time strong pressure was
exerted by means of distribution of rewards, ranks and dec­
orations, in face of which a number of the League leaders
began to vacillate. After the arrival of reinforcements, the
Turkish marshal Dervish Pasha at the head of 20 battalions
on November 20, 1880 began his march from Shkoder on
Ulqin which was being defended by 3,000 Albanian volun­
teers, and blockaded it by sea and land. Thanks to
his military superiority, Dervish Pasha at last, on November
23, 1880, broke the resistance of the Albanians and three
days later, on November 26, 1880, in the presence of the
international fleet, handed over Ulqin to the Montenegrins.
The defence of Ulqin left a deep impression not only in
Albania, but also in the international arena. It discredited
loudly the diplomacy of the Great Powers, which sacrificed
without any hesitation the vital rights of small nations for
their interests of world capitalistic hegemony.
139
 THE STRUGGLE OF THE LEAGUE OF
PRIZREN AGAINST THE SUBLIME PORTE
FOR THE AUTONOMY OF ALBANIA

After it had dragged for a year and a half the response to

the demands of the League of Prizren, the Sublime Porte
in June of the year 1880 began to interfere openly with the
purpose of crushing the autonomist trends which were con­
tinuously growing. The Albanian patriots, however, took
the resolution to bring forward once again, with still greater
vigour, the problem of the autonomy of Albania. With this
purpose in view, through their initiative on July 23, 1880
a special assemblage met in Gjirokastra, which was attended
by the progressive elements of the various branches of the
League of Prizren.
At the assemblage Abdul Frasheri gave a detailed report
in which he argued the absolute necessity of the creation of
an autonomous Albania as the only means to save the Al­
banian nation from the danger of annihilation which men­
aced it from all sides. He presented at the same time a
projected statute on the internal organization that the au­
tonomous Albanian state should adopt.
The necessity of the creation of the autonomous Albanian
state was recognized by all the participants of the Assembly.
But as to the time and the manner of achieving this auton­
omy, various points of view were expressed. In those days
the problem of Ulqin was clarified. For this reason, the
assembly decided that the action to secure autonomy should
be postponed for a later period.
In October 1880, as the anger of the Albanians against the
Sublime Porte that had resolved to break the resistance of
Ulqin by every possible means had reached its climax, the
Albanian patriots deemed that the time had come to put
into execution the resolutions of Gjirokastra. With the
hope to persuade also a part of the feudal lords of the
country into the movement for autonomy, they demanded
140
that the general assembly of the League of Prizren be con­
voked.
The assembly met in Dibra on October 20, 1880 with
Iliaz Pasha Dibra, president of the League of Prizren, as
chairman. It was attended by three hundred delegates in­
cluding a great number of pashas, beys and bayraktars,
accompanied by their personal bodyguards. At the assem­
bly the Albanian patriots presented the programme adopted
in Gjirokastra and demanded that Ulqin be defended by
every means, even by fighting against the Turkish armies.
The programme of the progressive wing, however, at the
assembly, was met by the opposition of the reactionary and
philo-Turkish feudal lords and clergymen who, now that the
Sublime Porte was resolved to hand over Ulqin and to crush
the League of Prizren without granting to the Albanians the
required autonomy, did not desire to get embroiled with the
Sultan. At the assembly, the discord between the two par­
ties was so deep and the discussions so heated that they
came to armed clashes. As a result of these divergences,
there were two resolutions passed by the assembly, which
were dispatched to Istanbul with special delegations.
This time, too, the Sublime Porte did not take into con­
sideration the demand for the autonomy of Albania. It did
not even pay any attention to the resolution of the feudal
lords petitioning the Sultan for some minor superficial
administrative reforms. On the contrary, the Turkish
government took measures to crush the Albanian resistance
and to disperse by force the League of Prizren.
But the steps Istanbul had started to take increased even
more the anger of the Albanians. The general discontent
with Turkey which had prevailed in Albania created for the
Albanian patriots favourable conditions to achieve by them­
selves the autonomy of Albania without further having to
wait for the goodwill of the Sultan. By assuming the lead­
ership of the popular movements which spontaneously had
sprung against the Turkish administration, the patriotic
elements got hold of a number of the districts in Kossovo
and brought improvements in the organization of the League
141
of Prizren. Through a resolute struggle they expelled from
its directing organs all the reactionary pashas and clergy­
men. As president of the League was elected Sheh Umer
Prizreni and, by his side, into the central committee entered
the most decided elements of the autonomist movement,
Abdul Frasheri, Sulejman Vokshi, Shuaip Spahiu and
others.
The new League of Prizren declared itself the provisional
government of Albania. In Prizren and in Jakova it re­
placed without any difficulty the Turkish administration by
an Albanian administration. Within a short time it organ­
ized a new army under the command of Sulejman Vokshi,
which during January 1881 stretched the authority of the
provisional government through strenuous fighting against
the feudal chieftains over entire Kossovo, and even further,
over Shkup (Skoplje), Tetova, Gostivar, Dibra etc. Thus
the League of Prizren, by revolutionary methods, was
achieving the autonomy, and perhaps, as Sami Frasheri
wrote in those days, the full independence of Albania.
The Turkish government delayed its military operations
against the League on account of the fact that the conflict
with Greece on the boundary question in those months was
getting continually more serious, and the Sublime Porte did
not desire to wage war at a time when Greece could strike it
at its rear. In the course of three months, it tried to
weaken the authority of the League by means of the Alba­
nian feudal chieftains. During February and March 1881,
at the instigation of Istanbul, the reaction within the country
was revived. The feudal chieftains began to assail the
League openly. In Dibra they organized an attempt against
the life of Abdul Frasheri. Abdul escaped murder but two
of his attendants were wounded. The League, however,
stood its ground against the reaction. A great number of
feudal chieftains were arrested and others either hid them­
selves or fled to Istanbul. In March, the League of Prizren
began to get ready for the extension of its authority in
Gegeria and Toskeria. However, the preparations were in­
terrupted because in the meantime the Turco-Greek accord
142
concerning the question of the boundaries was signed, and
the Sublime Porte dispatched to Albania a strong military
expedition, composed of 24 battalions under the command
of Dervish Pasha.
On March 24, 1881 the first contingents of the Turkish
army arrived at the gates of Shkup, and through the treach­
ery of the pashas captured the city without a fight, seizing
by surprise the members of the committee of the League,
too, who bound by chains were thrust into jail. In order to
terrorize the masses of the population, the Turkish army
made in Shkup mass arrests and plundered rapaciously.
After the entire Turkish forces of 12,000 men had arrived,
Dervish Pasha started operations in the direction of Prizren.
As soon as the Turkish expedition had started, the Central
Committee of the League of Prizren let the war-call resound,
and at the same time sent to the Great Powers a memoran­
dum soliciting their intervention in order to bring to a
standstill the Turkish expedition and to compel Turkey to
grant to the Albanians the autonomy they longed for. How­
ever, at this critical moment for the fate of Albania, those
feudal lords, too, who had remained in the League up to
that date, deserted it. Their desertion and the general at­
tack started by the feudal reaction against the League from
all sides, considerably weakened the military power of the
latter. The central committee succeeded in raising only a
small army. The major part of it, comprising about 6,000
men, was sent to defend Prizren. Of these, 2,000 men under
the command of Suleyman Vokshi, took up positions at
Slivove, whereas the remainder, consisting of 4,000 men
under the command of Mic Sokolli, was sent to Shtimeke.
These were the two passages that could be used by the
Turkish army to march on Prizren.
The first encounter of the Turkish armies with the Al­
banian armies took place on April 16, 1881. For four days
consecutively the Albanians repelled the Turkish attacks.
But on April 20, the main Turkish forces made a violent
attack on Slivova, accompanied by a dense artillery fire.
The Albanian army resisted heroically for several hours;
143
the vehement artillery fire, however, constrained them to
retreat to Shtimeke, where the second and decisive clash
took place. The fighting lasted five hours, with heavy loss­
es on both sides, — the Albanians had 800 men killed and
the Turks 1,800 men. Here too the Albanians were obliged
to retreat. After they had frustrated also two other Alba­
nian ambushes, the Turkish armies with Dervish Pasha ac­
companied by seven generals at their head, entered
Prizren, where they proclaimed martial law and made in­
numerable arrests.
After the capture of Prizren, the leaders of the League
took refuge in Gjakova. Here they raised fresh Albanian
forces, which offered resistance for many days to the
Turkish armies. However, at last in May, Dervish Pasha
captured Gjakova; afterwards he continued his march until
he had conquered the whole of Kossovo and re-established
the former Turkish administration. At the same time the
Turks succeeded in putting down the autonomist movement
in south Albania, too.
Even after they had broken the armed resistance, the
Turkish armies continued to spread their terror in every
part of the country. Everywhere military courts were set
up which condemned mercilessly the partisans of the au­
tonomist movement. Some 7,000 persons were judged by
them, of whom 4,000 were sentenced to varying penal servi­
tude: imprisonment, or banishment to Asia Minor or the
Aegean Islands.
Dervish Pasha tried hard to seize the principal leaders of
the resistance. Of these, Sheh Umer Prizreni fled Turkey
and, in spite of the pardon, rewards and high offices that
the Sultan offered him, did not agree to return. Suleyman
Vokshi remained a fugitive in the mountainous regions of
Jakova for a long period. Shuaip Spahia, who was captured
and sentenced by the military tribunal, died after some
time in prison. Abdul Frasheri for a certain period was a
fugitive. Dervish Pasha publicly announced a large sum as
reward for his capture. After having successfully eluded
his pursuers for several weeks, he at last was arrested while
144
crossing the river Shkumbini on his way to south Albania,
and was escorted to Prizren. The military tribunal passed
the sentence of death against Abdul Frasheri, the principal
leader of the autonomist movement and of the armed
resistance. The verdict of death was mitigated by the
Sublime Porte into life penal servitude. In 1885, with the
general amnesty, he was released from prison. But utterly
shattered through sufferings, Abdul lived a sick and isolated
man until his death in 1892.
After the armed resistance was crushed, the League of
Prizren declined and fell into decay on account of the per­
secutions, confinements and imprisonments. But though it
was crushed and destroyed, it had left a deep impression
within and outside the country.

THE STRUGGLE FOR A NATIONAL SCHOOL

AND ALBANIAN LITERATURE

Relying on the international temporary stability, which

came as a result of the mitigation of the Eastern crisis and
on the military success it had achieved against the Albanian
armed movement, the Sublime Porte established in Albania,
after the collapse of the League of Prizren, a regime of po­
lice terror, by means of which it aimed at exterminating
the autonomist aspiration that henceforth was spread over
all Albania. This regime, connected with the name of Sul­
tan Abdul Hamid II, lasted for several decades and marks
for Albania one of the periods of the fiercest Turkish reac­
tion.
In these years the internal and external conditions for
the Albanian armed movement of liberation became not
only difficult, but also unfavourable. They were difficult,
because, after the military operations of Dervish Pasha,
after the mass arrest of the active patriots and under the
systematic persecution of Ottoman police, there had
145
survived in Albania not even one of the numerous regional
organizations of the League of Prizren. They were un­
favourable, because the Great Powers, in spite of their con­
flicts of interest, adopted at this period the policy of keep­
ing intact the status quo in southeastern Europe, and
therefore were not disposed to foster the idea of the auton­
omy of Albania. On the contrary, they were prepared to
help Turkey to put down any armed movement that should
upset the political map of the Balkan Peninsula.
As a result of these circumstances, the armed movements
that broke out in Albania after the suppression of the
League of Prizren were spontaneous and unorganized and
had a limited character both regarding the political claims
and territorial expansion. In the course of these years of
Turkish reaction and in the expectation of more favourable
international circumstances for armed revolt for liberation,
the Albanian patriots devoted their main concern to the
political education of vast strata of the population by
instilling in them national consciousness. As the best means
of realizing this aim, the Renaissance adepts continued to
regard, as in the past, the national Albanian school and
literature. As the Sublime Porte as well as its ally, the
Patriarchate of Phanar, kept on fighting with still greater
fierceness all Albanian cultural manifestation, including the
Albanian script, the former among the Albanian Mohammed­
an population, and the latter among the Albanian Orthodox
population. The struggle for the national school, severed
from religion, for the common school for all Albanians of
any faith and along with it, the struggle for Albanian publi­
cations on political theory and enlightening subjects, re­
mained in this period also as the main content of the
Albanian national movement.
The only patriotic organization of those founded during
the years of the existence of the League of Prizren that
escaped being hit by the Turkish reaction only for the
reason that it had assumed a secret character, was the
“Society for Printing in Albanian Language”, founded in
Istanbul in October of the year 1879. On account of the
146
Sami Frasheri (1850-1904),
eminent ideologist and
leader in the movement
for Albanian national
liberation from the Otto­
man yoke

wise and untiring activity of its leaders, the Istanbul society

became in these years of political reaction the main direct­
ing centre of the Albanian national movement, which issued
its instructions to various patriots inside and outside Al­
bania. Its president, Sami Frasheri (1850-1903), after the
imprisonment of his brother Abdul, became one of the most
illustrious personages of the Albanian patriotic movement.1
In 1882, besides Sami Frasheri, Jani Vreto and Pandeli Soti-

1 Through the literary and other works he had published and was
still publishing signed with the double name of Shemsedin Sami,
he had started to acquire renown at the same time as a pioneer of
the Turkish progressive culture. He became particularly renowned
within and outside the boundaries of the Ottoman Empire above
all through his monumental works in Turkish as “Kamusu-alam”
(Encyclopedia of history and geography) in 6 volumes, “Kamusu-
turki” (Turkish dictionary), a etymological dictionary, and through
numerous other Eastern scientific works.
147
 Naim Frasheri (1846-1900),
an Albanian national poet
of the period of the na­
tional liberation struggle
against Turkish invasion

ri, there came into office as a member of the committee of

the “Society for Printing in Albanian Language” in Istan­
bul, Naim Frasheri (1846-1900) who, through his great
literary and political activity became, like his two brothers
Abdul and Sami, in those turbulent years of reaction, one
of the most honoured leaders of the Albanian national
movement.
After hard endeavours, the leaders of the cultural society
of Istanbul succeeded to snatch from the Sublime Porte
the permission to edit an Albanian periodical with an ex­
clusively cultural programme. In August of the year 1884
appeared in Istanbul the first number of this monthly organ
under the name of Drita (Light) which, beginning with
the third number, was given the title Dituria (Knowl­
148
edge). The pages of this periodical were filled with
material prepared by the leaders of the Society themselves.
The publication of this first review entirely in Albanian
was a great success for the Albanian national movement.
Its contents, although mainly of educational-didactic charac­
ter, served in a conscious manner the political aims of the
adepts of the Renaissance, because it kindled in the hearts
of its readers the consciousness for struggle for the libera­
tion of the homeland. This review, however, was short­
lived.
In 1885, while in Bucharest (Roumania), where there was
a strong colony of Albanians, through the aid of the Society
of Istanbul, a cultural-patriotic organization was founded
under the name “Society of Drita” (Light), in Albania,
particularly in Kossovo, armed revolts broke out against the
police regime and the burden of heavy taxes. The Albanian
patriots succeeded in taking the lead in these spontaneous
revolts. Through their incitement, the insurgents demanded
not only the reduction of taxes, but also the release of their
compatriots that in very great number's were kept impris­
oned or else confined since the time of the suppression of
the League of Prizren. Annoyed by the speedy extension
of the fire of revolt, in autumn of the year 1885 the Sublime
Porte was constrained to make some concessions: it released
from prison and internment the Albanians that had been
arrested, it once more postponed the enforcement of the
centralizing reforms in the mountainous regions and pledged
that it would allow the use of the Albanian language in the
schools of Albania.
The announcement of Istanbul made it clear that the
Sublime Porte would allow the introduction of tuition in
Albanian language in the school programmes only in case
it would be demanded by the local population. For this
purpose, some weeks later, towards the end of the year 1885,
while in Kon;a a secret national committee under the
leadership of Jovan Cico Kosturi, Orhan Qerciz Pojani and
Thimi Marko was founded to take up the direction of the
movement in favour of the Albanian instruction, the leaders
149
Anton Zako Chajupi
(1866-1930), poet, patriot
and democrat of the
period of the National
Liberation Movement
against Turkish aggres­
sion

of the two patriotic societies in exile — that of the Society

of Istanbul and that of Bucharest — undertook, the former
to prepare Albanian school texts, and the latter to print
them in the printing house that was bought with the con­
tributions of patriots and was established in the capital of
Roumania. Within a couple of months, the inhabitants of
Korea handed to the local authorities a petition bearing
hundreds of signatures, with which they demanded the use
of Albanian in the schools of their province. At the same
time, in the printing-shop of the society Drita in Bucha­
rest, were issued the first Albanian school texts that were
prepared by the leaders of the Society of Istanbul, Sami
Frasheri, Naim Frasheri and Jani Vreto. The Turkish gov­
ernment, however, gave no answer to the demands of the
Albanians. At the end of the year 1886, it made clear that
it did not allow the Mohammedans to enjoy the right to
receive instruction in the Albanian language, but that this
150
right was granted only to the Christian Albanians. The
endeavours of the patriots to introduce the Albanian
language into the Greek schools met with the violent oppo­
sition of the Phanariot Church, which had under its pat­
ronage the Orthodox population. After these attempts
had failed, the leaders of the Society of Istanbul, at last,
in the first month of the year 1887 succeeded in obtaining
from the Turkish government the permission, issued to
Pandeli Sotiri, to open a private Albanian school in Korea.
In spite of all the threats and maledictions of the Metro­
politan of Eparchia, of the calumnies and blackmail of the
philo-Greek inhabitants of that city, on March 7, 1887, the
first national Albanian school was opened in Korea, and
was attended by both Christian and Mohammedan students.
The opening of the Albanian school was a victory for the
nationalist movement. Under its impulse, the patriots of
the other regions began to open Albanian schools in various
cities and villages of the country, by further extending this
movement, which seemed merely educational, but in es­
sence had a political character. The patriots of the country,
in order to win rights in the cultural domain, had to resort
to fighting. To take the leadership of this movement, the
secret national committee, with Jovan Cico Kosturi at its
head, made a number of attempts to create a National
Society inside Albania with its centre in Korea. But on
account of the interference and persecutions of the Turkish
administration and of the Phanariotic Church, the National
Society could not be founded and the Albanian schools,
with the exception of that of Korea, were shut one after the
other. Consequently, for still several other years, as direct­
ing centres of the nationalistic movement remained the pa­
triotic societies that were organized outside of Albania, in
those places where there were more or less strong colonies
of Albanians and where the Albanian patriots enjoyed a
certain degree of freedom of action in regard to the Albanian
cultural movement. In Roumania, the society Drita was
reorganized in 1887 as a new society with the name
Dituria, which embraced hundreds of workers, peasants
151
and intellectual patriots. In 1892 the Albanians in exile in
Bulgaria founded a patriotic society by the name of
Deshira (Desire), whereas in 1894 the Albanians in Egypt
likewise created their society under the name of Vellazeria
e Shqiptareve (Brotherhood of Albanians). Only the
Society of Istanbul, changed towards the end of the cen­
tury into an “Albanian Committee”, still under the leader­
ship of Sami Frasheri, continued to carry on its activity
clandestinely. These societies of exiles kept close connec­
tions with each other. Their more or less similar statutes
were permeated by democratic principles. Through the
Albanian exiles who returned from time to time to the
homeland, they strove for the diffusion of Albanian culture,
of patriotic feelings and of struggle for the liberation of their
enslaved country, among the popular masses of Albania.
Their leaders, incited by the teachings of the enlightened
Sami and Naim Frasheri, tried to make the Albanian na­
tionalist movement depend only on the interior forces of
the country and that no foreign state should be allowed to
interfere.
In the course of these years, in spite of the unfavourable
conditions, the Albanian cultural movement took an un­
precedented upward leap. With the contributions of the
patriots, a great number of school books and literary works,
written by renowned men of the Renaissance, were printed.
Among them, the principal place was occupied by the works
of Naim Frasheri, the most talented champion of the
Albanian cultural movement. Besides school texts, he gave
to the Albanian literature works of artistic value, with a
new spirit in their contents and a new ring to the language,
such as the romantic poem Bageti e Bujqesia, or else as the
collection of lyric poems Lulet e veres (Summer Flowers)
or as the epic poem Historia e Skenderbeut (History of
Scanderbeg), which became very popular in Albania. In his
magnificent works, Naim sang with ardour to his country,
to its natural beauties, to the life and labour of farmers and
of shepherds, and at the same time to its glorious past, to the
splendour of the struggles of the Albanians against the Otto­
152
man oppression, to the immortal valour of Scanderbeg, and
further he underlined more than once his great faith in
the imminent liberation of Albania and his belief in the
brilliant future that was reserved to his motherland. Naim
praised the mother tongue and the Albanian school, knowl­
edge and progress, and left no occasion pass without
appealing to his compatriots for unity and fraternity. With
great care he cleared the Albanian literary language of
unnecessary foreign words, and enriched it with words and
phraseology which he took from the treasure of the popular
language. Naim has ranked since his own time as the na­
tional poet of the Albanian Renaissance.

RESUMPTION OF THE ALBANIAN

ARMED MOVEMENTS

The period of ebb in the Albanian armed movement did

not last long. The so-called “Macedonian question” — the
problem of the adoption of autonomist reforms in neigh­
bouring Macedonia, in which for their imperialistic and
chauvinistic interests the Great Powers as well as the Balkan
states began to interfere — put into motion the entire
Albanian population. At the beginning in Albania the
movement was launched with the aim to oppose the inclu­
sion of Albanian districts within the zones where the
reforms for Bulgarian Macedonia were going to be enforced,
because the inclusion of those districts within the bound­
aries of Macedonia meant their separation from the trunk
of the motherland. There was, however, no delay, and in
the whole country a parallel movement started demanding
from the Sublime Porte the execution of special reforms
for Albania as formulated from the time of the League of
Prizren, in other words, the union of all Albanian districts
into one autonomous vilayet. The movement for the auton-
153
omous administration of Albania was thus put once again
on the agenda.
The various political circles of the country did not have
the same point of view in regard to the type of the auton­
omy. The ultra-reactionary circles, politically and ideo­
logically bound with Turkey, sought to direct the movement
only to oppose the inclusion of Albanian districts within
the boundaries of autonomous Macedonia and did not desire
to have the question of the reforms for Albania to be raised
at all. On the contrary, some powerful feudal circles, who
regarded the introduction of administrative reforms as con­
venient to their proper interests, drew up in Monastir, in
October of the year 1896, a petition for the union of five
vilayets (the vilayets of Shkoder, Kossovo, Monastir, Janina
and Salonica) into a single vilayet and the teaching of the
Albanian language in the schools of the vilayet alongside
the Turkish, which was to remain as the official language.
The Albanian democratic patriotic circles did not agree to
these superficial demands, which were moreover permeated,
as it became evident especially by the claim on the vilayet
of Salonica, by a chauvinistic trend, and they expressed their
demands officially in a separate petition drawn up in
Bucharest in February of the year 1897. This petition
demanded the union not of five but of four vilayets into
a single vilayet, the recognition not of Turkish but of
Albanian as the official language.
The silence of the Sublime Porte in regard to the peti­
tions on one hand, and the further aggravation of the
Macedonian problem on the other, gave an impetus to the
revolutionary movement in Albania. In a vast number of
districts of the country the Albanians undertook armed
operations against the Turkish military garrisons, which in
a considerable number of cases were obliged to remain on
the defensive. The endeavours of Istanbul during the
year 1897 to crush the armed movement and, in general,
the whole of the Albanian movement, met with no success.
In the heat of the spontaneous autonomist movement, the
Albanian patriots tried their best to create an organization
154
similar to that of the League of Prizren, which was to unify
all the strata of the country in war to wrest from the
Sublime Porte the Albanian autonomy. A preliminary
meeting was held for this purpose in Peja in November of
the year 1897, which was attended by nearly 500 delegates.
As for the programme of the Albanian movement, at the
meeting, two political lines at once came to the fore — that
of the patriots, which comprised as principal personality
Haxhi Mulla Zeka from Peja, and that of the feudal rulers,
who asked for a number of superficial reforms and were
opposed to armed action against Istanbul, at the head of
which stood the powerful feudal chieftain of Gjakova, Riza
bej Kryeziu. On account of the vacillating attitude of the
feudal forces and of the interference of the Sublime Porte,
the meetings of Peja gave no result. However, in January
of the year 1899, as the tension in the Balkans regarding
the “Macedonian question” was aggravated still more,
another Albanian assembly was held in Peja. It was
attended by about 450 delegates from all the districts of
the vilayet of Kossovo. After several days of discussion
and with violent discord between the two principal plat­
forms, a covenant, or as it was called at that time, a Besa-
Bese (Word of honour) was drawn up. Haxhi Mulla Zeka,
one of the renowned leaders of the League of Prizren, was
elected its president. As far as its programme was con­
cerned, the platform of the patriots received minority
support.
The Albanian patriots tried their best to divert Besa-
Bese to the struggle for the autonomy of Albania. For this
purpose Sami Frasheri wrote and published during that
period the political treatise “The Past, Present and Future of
Albania”, in which, after analysing the contemporary polit­
ical situation, he laid down and argued, in connection with
the nationalist movement, the following basic theses: that
the Albanians could save their country from the danger of
partition, not by fighting against the chauvinistic neigh­
bours under Istanbul, but by demanding above everything
else from the Sublime Porte the autonomy of Albania; that
155
Turkey would not concede this autonomy voluntarily; that
for this reason the Albanians ought to wrest autonomy from
Turkey by force of arms; that in the international arena the
conditions were favourable for obtaining a still greater
degree of autonomy, as the Great Powers, in order to avoid
any disturbance of the status quo that might arise on ac­
count of the Albanian insurrection, would intervene with
the aim to compel Istanbul to palliate the Albanians by
granting special reforms for Albania, too; that after acquir­
ing autonomy the regime best suited to Albania would be
a democratic-republican regime, etc.
The Albanian patriots, however, did not succeed in
upsetting the balance of internal forces; the influence
exerted within the country by the powerful feudal lords
was still considerable. Their endeavours were not favoured
either by the international situation. The Great Powers
not only failed to compel Turkey to introduce the reforms
it had promised, but they instigated and helped it to smash
the movement for liberation. With the support of reac­
tionary feudalists, in spring of the year 1900, the Sublime
Porte dissolved the League of Peja. Consequently the auton­
omist movement in Albania temporarily came to an end.
Under these circumstances, the patriotic leaders regarded,
for the time being, the armed revolts as of no avail, because
they would induce the Great Powers to intervene not in
favour but to the detriment of Albania.
Some weeks later, after the League of Peja had been
dissolved, in the last days of April 1900, one of the Albanian
patriots, Ismail Qemal who had held up to that day impor­
tant functions in the Ottoman administration and had ac­
quired great repute throughout the empire as an enemy of
absolutism and a supporter of the constitution, fled Turkey
openly. In exile, he published in the foreign press a
declaration for the international foreign opinion and in
the Albanian press a summons addressed to his compatriots,
in which he expressed his point of view concerning the
programme of the nationalist movement. These opinions of
156
his were appropriated by the major part of the Albanian
patriotic organizations.
Close observer of the international situation, Ismail Qemal
was convinced that the Great Powers which had followed
the policy of keeping the status quo, for the time being
would not allow the partition or the diminution of Turkey,
and on that account would intervene against the Albanian
insurgents. Besides, these uprisings would offer the Balkan
powers the opportunity to enter into war against the
Ottoman Empire in order to annex its territories in the
Balkans, including Albania. On the other hand, he was
convinced that the Great Powers were getting ready to
upset in the near future the status quo, and to parcel Turkey
out among themselves. Austria-Hungary and czarist Russia
particularly had cast greedy eyes on Albania, the former to
bring Albania under its claws, and the latter to divide it
between its Balkan allies, Serbia and Montenegro. It was
therefore in the interest of the Albanians, few in number,
who were deprived of a central national organization,
deprived of special state institutions, deprived of an army
of their own, and without any strong ally in the interna­
tional arena, that the policy of safeguarding the status quo
should be carried on at least for some time to come, until
they could organize themselves to forestall the danger from
foreign countries. This policy should be maintained, but
on the condition that in the meantime the Albanians should
acquire territorial autonomy within the framework of the
Ottoman Empire — an autonomy that would undoubtedly
be provisional, but that would bring with it the right to self-
determination sufficient to allow Albania to better its de­
plorable economic, political and cultural conditions and to
enable it to defend itself in case its hostile neighbours raised
their hand against it. Besides, he thought that the Al­
banians could not free themselves from the Turkish despotic
servitude if at the same time other nationalities oppressed
by that same empire could not be liberated also, and
furthermore if at the same time the Turkish nation itself
was not liberated. According to him, what would unite
157
 these active forces in this battle without having to enlist
the doubtful support of the foreign powers and without
giving ground for their ominous intervention, was the
constitution — the movement for the overthrow of the
feudal anachronistic absolutism and the establishment of a
constitutional bourgeois regime founded on the principle of
the decentralization of the imperial authority, for the
benefit of the provincial autonomy on the basis of na­
tionality.
Since the end of the 19th century, Albania’s place in
world affairs had become involved, ever more, in the inter­
national diplomatic sphere. The Ottoman Empire continued
to refuse to the Albanians the most elementary nationality
rights, even the right to write in the mother tongue, and
in 1902 the Turkish authorities took the extreme measure
of closing the school of Kor<?a, the only national school in
Albania, arrested a great number of patriots, among them
the Albanian teachers, and executed without trial Haxhi
Mulla Zeka in the streets of Peja. The adjoining Balkan
governments persevered in their feverish activity for the
realization of their old chauvinistic plans, aimed among
other things at the division of Albania between them, as
soon as this country would be liberated from the Ottoman
Empire. In those days, when the general imperialistic
trends were fast developing, the Great Powers made use of
the Albanian problem as a pawn on the chess board, being
ready to sacrifice Albania in order to secure advantages in
other sectors. Austria-Hungary and czarist Russia, two of
the Great Powers directly interested in the fate of the
Balkans, had agreed in the accord they had reached in 1897
that the eastern part of the peninsula would be considered
as a Russian sphere of influence, whereas the western part,
which included Albania, as an Austrian sphere of influence.
Almost at the same time, Russia and its ally France agreed
in principle that, in order to prevent Austria-Hungary from
reaching Salonica, they should, in case the status quo was
upset, yield to Serbia all the Albanian territories north of
the river Shkumbini or at least up to Durres, which was to
158
become a Serbian port, whereas Shkoder, the largest
Albanian city of that time, was to become the capital of
Montenegro. The third Great Power interested in the fate
of the Balkans, Italy, after suffering defeat of its African
colonial expansionist policy at Adua, had started an un­
restrained competition with its ally Austria-Hungary in
order to secure and to strengthen an economic and political
position in Albania.
In spite of the stubborn hostile attitude of the Sublime
Porte, of the disorientating activity of the Balkan neighbours
and of the daily intrusions of the Great Powers, which
largely exploited any capitulation, the Albanian nationalist
movement continued to grow and deepen. The Albanian
patriots acquired new revolutionary methods and their
activity assumed a frankly anti-feudal and anti-imperialistic
character.
After the insurrection of Ilinden which broke out in
Macedonia in August of the year 1903, Russia and Austria,
through the agreement they had signed in October 1903,
and which Italy later also signed, with a two-fold purpose
in view — on the one hand to extinguish the flame of revolt,
and on the other, to seek for the opportunity to interfere
more concretely in the internal affairs of declining Turkey
— proposed to Istanbul a programme of reforms which
should be put into execution in Macedonia under their su­
pervision, and demanded that it should carry out an admin­
istrative division, according to which in each commune
(nahiye) the population of only one nationality should be in­
cluded. Such interference incited to the breaking point the
Balkan chauvinistic passions. Bulgarian, Serbian and Greek
nationalist bands began to terrorize the population of the
country in order to compel them to disavow their national­
ity and to accept the chauvinistic claims of the bands. This
terror spread also to the Albanian population. In February
1905 a band of Greek andarts massacred the patriotic writer
“Papa” Kristo Negovani together with a number of his
countrymen.
159
 The Albanians were roused again to action. This time
the influence of the patriots on the political life of the
Albanians had grown, whereas that of reactionary beys, in
the greater part of the country, had decreased. In the
course of these years, a great number of new patriotic so­
cieties had been founded in exile and numerous periodicals
in Albanian had started to be published. In spite of the
conditions of the police regime of Sultan Abdul Hamid, in
Albania a new generation had risen, imbued with revolu­
tionary patriotic feelings. Through their bitter experience
gained in previous movements, these Albanian patriots put
to themselves the task to unite the country around the plat­
form of a national-liberation struggle, avoiding alliance with
reactionary beys. For this purpose a group of young
patriots with bourgeois-revolutionary tendencies, in No­
vember 1905, founded in Monastir under Professor Bajo
Topulli a secret committee by the name of “Committee for
the Freedom of Albania” after the model of Balkan rev­
olutionary committees. Within a short period, the Com­
mittee of Monastir created secret local committees in nu­
merous cities of Albania.
In close connection with the more advanced patriotic
societies in exile, such as those of Bucharest and of Sofia,
the committee of Monastir together with the committees
dependant on it, by means of clandestine agitation carried
on intense activity for the popularization, in every corner
of the country, of the banner of the revolutionary struggle
for the liberation of the motherland. With the purpose to
carry on an open patriotic activity, in January 1906, Bajo
Topulli took refuge in the mountains in the district of Kor­
ea, thus creating the first armed band of the committee. Some
months later, in south Albania other armed bands too were
created. While they were thus engaged in their activity
in the field of agitation, they had several encounters with
Turkish detachments of soldiers. In order to curb the
Greek andarts acts of terror, the Albanian bands killed in
September 1906 the Greek metropolitan of Kor?a, Foti, one
of the heads of the pro-Greek reaction in Albania and one
160
of the persons responsible for the massacre of “Papa”
Negovani.
In $pite of the persecutions of the Ottoman Gendarmery,
the warriors of the patriotic bands, with the revolutionary
slogan “Liberty or death!” on their caps, during the year
1907 carried on their revolutionary activity with still greater
intensity. As reprisal for the arrest by the Turkish authori­
ties of a great number of patriots, the band commanded by

Left, Cer$iz Topulli (1880-1915), commander of a

detachment of patriots that distinguished them­
selves in armed struggle against Turkish invasion,
1906-1908
161
Captain Qerciz Topulli and by the writer Mihai Grameno,
at the beginning of March 1908, killed the commandant of
the gendarmery of Gjirokastra inside the city. A few days
later, on March 18, 1908. Turkish detachments besieged the
band of £erciz and of Mihai at the Plane-tree of Mashkullore
in the vicinity of Gjirokastra. The band defended itself
heroically and after many hours of hard fighting against
large Turkish forces, succeeded in breaking through the
siege. The battle of Mashkullore resounded throughout
Albania, as a war-call for a general strike for freedom.
The further development of the Albanian revolt, how­
ever, was interwoven with the bourgeois revolutionary
movement of the Young Turks (Jeunes-Turcs), which was
conducted by the committee of Ittihad ve Terekii (Union
and Progress). The war-call of the Young Turks to over­
throw the feudal despotic regime of Sultan Abdul Hamid
II and to establish a constitutional bourgeois regime, their
pledges that they would grant democratic liberties and that
they would yield to the oppressed nationalities provincial
autonomy, had for a long time attracted the attention of the
Albanians. Though at the end of the 19th century Sami
Frasheri, and later Ismail Qemal in the early years of the
20th century had warned that with their constitution the
Young Turks would do nothing more than substitute the
feudal despotism with an Ottoman dictatorship, and that
their promises for liberty and autonomy were a sheer fraud,
the Committee “Union and Progress” through its organized
activity secured the sympathy of a great number of Al­
banians, especially of officers who loathed the feudal and
absolutist regime. In the face of the same enemy — des­
potic oppression by the Sultan — the Albanian national­
liberation movement and the bourgeois-revolutionary
movement of the Young Turks proceeded along two similar
lines. In July 1908 both of these movements assumed ex­
tremely vast proportions. But the Young Turk agitators,
more efficient and better organized and relying on the
sympathy with which the Albanians had welcomed their
constitutional programme, succeeded in gaining positions at
162
the head of 20,000 armed Albanians assembled at Feri-
zoviq, and in their name demanded from the Sultan by
ultimatum, agreement to grant the constitution. As is
known, the danger lest the insurrection that had started
in the vilayet of Monastir under the leadership of the Al­
banian officer Niazi Resna should become a general insur­
rection compelled Sultan Abdul Hamid II to publish the
constitution on July 23, 1908. Thus with the active partic­
ipation of the Albanians, the bourgeois revolution triumph­
ed in Turkey.

THE GREAT REVOLTS OF 1910 AND 1911

The Albanians greeted the announcement of the constitu­

tion as a historic victory that marked the end of the cen­
tury long autocracy of the Sultans and the beginning of an
epoch of liberty, equality and of civilization. In every city
of the country occurred spontaneous manifestations in fa­
vour of the revolution. The warriors of the patriotic bands
came down from the mountains and within a few weeks in
all of the cities of Albania, Albanian patriotic clubs were
created. On their own initiative, Albanian newspapers
began for the first time to publish freely in' Albania, and
the teaching of the Albanian mother tongue proceeded
without fear. While acclaiming the revolution, the entire
country expected that the Young Turks would grant to the
Albanians the nationality rights that they had promised —
first and foremost that the courses in the Albanian schools
should be taught in the Albanian language, and after that
territorial autonomy for the whole of a united Albania.
However, nationalist, chauvinistic and bourgeois as they
were, the Young Turks had no sooner consolidated their
authority than they began to take steps to limit and then to
crush the movement for Albanian autonomy, claiming that
the Albanians were Ottoman subjects, and as such were
obliged to observe the laws of the Empire.
163
 Thus before the elapse of a couple of weeks, a breach was
wrought between the Albanian nationalist movement and
the Young Turks’ central authority. What Ismail Qemal
had foreseen turned out to be true. His return to Vlora
after an absence of eight years was marked by extraor­
dinary grandeur. His words at a meeting of his fellow­
citizens that the Albanian people had to fight a still greater
battle in order to attain their rights, resounded as a clear
call for mobilization.
The majority of the patriotic clubs passed at once into
opposition against the central authority of the Young Turks.
The club of Bashkimi (Union) of Monastir, which took the
place of the clandestine committee of Per lirine e Shqi-
perise (For the Freedom of Albania) under the leadership of
Halid Berzeshta, became their directing headquarters. The
rest of the clubs, less in number, were in the hands of several
personalities who had entirely succumbed to the influence
of the dogmatic programme of the committee of “Union and
Progress”. Their apprehension lest the strengthening of the
opposition should awaken the reaction and bring about the
overthrow of the constitution induced them to content them­
selves with the limited rights granted and join the central
authority of the Young Turks.
Taking advantage of their limited rights, the patriotic
clubs, which were constrained to declare that they would
dedicate themselves exclusively to cultural and not political
activity, hastily convoked a congress to decide on a standard
Albanian alphabet, for the reason that various alphabets
were still being used for writing Albanian. The congress
met in Monastir from the 14th to the 21st of November
1908, and was attended by delegates of Albanian clubs and
societies within and outside Albania. The Congress ap­
proved the alphabet which is in use by the Albanians at
present. The meeting of Monastir gave the Albanian pa­
triots the opportunity to examine in several secret gather­
ings, the task that lay before the Albanian national move­
ment. At the termination of these meetings a programme
was drawn up, which in substance contained the demand
164
for the administrative and cultural autonomy of Albania.
How it was deemed for outworn reasons that the demand
for full independence was still unseasonable.
While the congress of Monastir was still in progress, in
Albania as well as throughout the entire Ottoman Empire,
the campaign for the election of deputies to the Turkish par­
liament was going on. Many Albanian patriots announced
their candidature for deputy. Though through terror, cor­
ruption, fraud and propaganda, the Young Turks’ adminis­
tration continued that its candidates should be solely elected
as deputies, actually the Young Turks, who succeeded in
securing the majority of deputies’ seats for the empire,
gained a minority in Albania, where 26 deputies were
elected. In the ranks of the Albanian deputies opposed to
the Young Turks, only a part including Ismail Qemal, Hasan
Prishtina, Shahin Kolonja, Nexhip Draga etc. constituted in
the parliament the Albanian nationalist group. In the Ot­
toman parliament many Albanian deputies waged open war
against the policy of the Young Turks on diverse points.
One of these deputies, Ismail Qemal of Berat, with the aim
of gathering the adversaries of the Young Turks in one com­
mon front, founded the Ahrar party with liberal tenden­
cies and contradictory programmatic points of view, which
demanded, among other things, the decentralization of the
administration and the autonomy of the provinces of the
empire on the basis of nationality. On account of these
items in the programme, deputies of various nationalities:
Turkish, Arabic, Albanian, Armenian, Greek and others,
joined Ismail Qemal’s party.
But the voice of the opposition, and still less that of the
Albanian deputies, was not raised. As soon as they had
secured the majority in parliament the Young Turks took a
series of steps in order to strengthen, especially in Albania,
the centralized authority and began to stamp out, by means
of police force, the demands for the nationality rights. At
the same time, without considering the poverty of the coun­
try, they increased taxes, trod on nationality rights, began
to establish their centralized administration and to conscript
165
 recruits in the mountainous regions. These steps gave rise
to armed insurrections breaking out once again in those re­
gions in the spring of the year 1909.
At that time, the Albanian patriotic leaders were opposed
to armed movements for the reason that the Young Turks
were still strong, whereas the Albanians were disorganized;
furthermore, for the reason that such revolts might bring
about the intervention of Austria-Hungary, which a couple
of months before had annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina
without any serious opposition on the part of the Great
Powers. Neither did they join in the coup of the reaction­
ary heads of the Empire, who in April 1909 overthrew the
Young Turks from power and re-established the old regime.
On the contrary, interested in guarding the constitution,
they gave their support to the Young Turks, who after two
weeks returned to power.
The Young Turks carried on their policy of negation of
the nationality rights to the Albanians even after the shock
they had experienced in April. With the pretext of disarm­
ing the counter-revolutionary forces, the Turkish armies
under the command of General Djavid Pasha undertook a
series of operations against the Albanian highlanders. These
operations infused new ardour into the insurgents; who were
crushed, however, after violent fighting. Alongside these
military operations, in July 1909 the Young Turks organized
a congress in Dibra, in which their emissaries demanded
that the Mohammedan Albanians should declare themselves
as Ottomans, accept the Arabic alphabet and pledge that
they would fight against the foes of the Empire and Cali­
phate. The few patriots who were able to attend the con­
gress openly protested against these provocations. As a
matter of fact, the decisions of the congress of Dibra came
to nothing. Two months later, in September 1909, at the
call of a number of patriots, the congress of Elbasan met
to discuss the question of education and culture — the only
question the Ottoman government allowed to be discussed.
The congress confirmed the decision for the adoption of the
Latin alphabet for Albanian script, which decision meant
166
the breaking away of the Albanians from the Ottomans in
this respect also. The congress likewise took the decision
to found within the year and with the funds of the patriotic
clubs a school to train teachers in Elbasan. This school,
with Luigj Gurakuqi as principal, the first Albanian school
of its kind, was inaugurated on December 1, 1909.
The discontent of the Albanians had grown to the extent
that in the spring of 1910, as the Young Turks’ government
levied new taxes from the population of the vilayet of Kos­
sovo, an armed revolt broke out in Prishtina, spread over
Peja and then over the entire vilayet. After the first efforts
had failed, Istanbul charged the general of the Prussian
school Shefqet Turgut Pasha with the special army corps of
Rumelia to carry out large-scale operations, smash the
liberation revolts, disarm the population and recruit new
soldiers by force. At the end of April 1910, at Ka<?anik
pass, a bloody battle was fought out between several thou­
sands of Albanian insurgents led by Idriz Seferi and the
Turkish divisions, which terminated in the retreat of the
Albanians, fewer in number and very poorly armed. The
revolt, however, had taken such vast proportions that the
Turkish Minister of War, Marshal Mahmud Shefqet Pasha

Highlanders of Kossovo with their leader Idriz Seferi (centre),

participants in the anti-Turkish liberation revolt of 1910
167
had to come personally with fresh forces to the aid of the
army corps of Shefqet Turgut Pasha. Only after fierce
fighting that lasted over three months were the Albanian
warriors, without a leader among them, without sufficient
arms and ammunition, at last routed.
In July 1910 the army corps of Rumelia went to the
vilayet of Shkoder in order to carry out, there too, the
disarmament of the population and the recruitment of sol­
diers. Some of the highlanders prepared to resist, whereas
a part of them fled and crossed the frontier into Montenegro,
which left a deep impression on the European public. The
apprehension lest in the highlands of the vilayet of Shkoder
the events of Kossovo might repeat themselves, compelled
the Turkish government to temporarily suspend military
operations in those regions that were difficult to subjugate,
and to direct its attention to central Albania, especially to
the unarmed cities. Wherever the army corps trod, mar­
tial law was enforced and military tribunals were created.
The nationalist clubs, private schools and Albanian news­
papers were suspended. Hundreds of patriots were arrested
and humiliatingly beaten in the streets and squares of the
cities. Military tribunals sentenced them to harsh penal
servitude or internment. After this campaign of terror,
the special army corps left Albania.
The patriotic leaders, taking into account the stubborn­
ness of the Young Turk governors to crush the Albanian
movement at any cost, decided to seize the initiative before
it was too late, to pass from defensive to offensive in order
to give to the revolts the right direction towards the princi­
pal claim of the nationalist movement — the autonomy of
Albania. The date for the start of the armed liberation
movement was fixed for the spring of 1911.
During the winter the preliminary preparations were
completed — arms and ammunition were bought with the
funds provided by patriotic clubs and societies, posts of
liaison were created within and outside the country. How­
ever, in an unexpected manner, King Nicola of Cetinie,
168
who desired to have the revolt begin at once, compelled the
unfortunate highlanders who had sought refuge in Mon­
tenegro to return to their country. The highlanders did not
surrender to Turkey but returned to Albania, and at the call
of Ded Gjo Luli, who on April 6, 1911 had hoisted the Al­
banian flag on the summit of Mt. Dechich, the armed revolt
started. Within a few days the revolt had engulfed the
whole of Malesia e Madhe, and the number of insurgents
had reached nearly 8,000 men. However, the premature
outburst of the revolt upset the plans of the revolt com­
mittees. The patriotic leaders tried their best to hasten the
preparations for the revolt in the other regions of Albania.
But these preparations had not been completed as yet (the
problem of arms, the question of the certainty that Serbia,
and especially Greece, would not interfere by assailing them
from the rear), when in the middle of April the special army
corps with its commander, Shefqet Durgut Pasha, arrived in
Shkoder and immediately started operations against the
highlanders. Between the Turkish armies and the Albanian
highlanders long and bloody wars took place throughout
Malesia e Madhe. Through their heroism, the highlanders
aroused a wave of enthusiasm throughout Albania and drew
the attention of the entire European public. In various re­
gions of the country a great number of bands were created,
which began to fight with arms in hand; from the colonies
in exile volunteers left for Malesia e Madhe.
After the failure of their military operations and under
the pressure of the Great Powers, especially of Austria-
Hungary and of Russia, which desired that trouble in the
Balkans should be avoided for the reason that they were
not as yet prepared to have the status quo upset, the Young
Turk government endeavoured to put a stop to the armed
revolt of the Albanians by peaceful means. For this pur­
pose in June 1911 Mehmet Reshad V went personally to
Kossovo, and with the hope of appeasing the Kcssovo people
and thus avoiding their participation in the revolt, he an­
nounced on June 16 an amnesty for all the insurgents of
169
the past year. On June 17 Shefqet Durgut Pasha likewise
announced in Shkoder an amnesty for all the insurgents
that would give themselves up within 10 days and promised
them to reconstruct the houses burnt down in the course of
military operations at the expenses of the state.
The Albanian patriots responded to the Turkish govern­
ment with a memorandum approved on June 23, 1911 by
an assemblage of the Albanian leaders that met in Ger?e of
Montenegro on the initiative of Ismail Qemal and Luigj
Gurakuqi. In the memorandum addressed to Istanbul and
to the Great Powers, the territorial-administrative autonomy
was demanded for all the regions inhabited by Albanian
populations, as condition to end the revolt. In the mem­
orandum it was added that in case Istanbul accepted these
demands, they had to be enacted under the guarantee of the
Great Powers.
The Ottoman government declared that it was prepared
to accept only some of the conditions contained in the
memorandum, and that only for the vilayet of Shkoder. To
this manoeuvre of the Sublime Porte the bands of warriors
of south Albania answered with an armed gathering held
on July 21, 1911 in the Monastery of Cepo (Gjirokastra), at
which it was decided to demand categorically that all con­
cessions granted by Istanbul to north Albania should be ex­
tended compulsorily over south Albania, as well.
However, the rebellious highlanders, economically ruined
by the destruction and the prolongation of the revolt on
the one hand, and by the hard pressure Montenegro had
placed on them to expel their families from Montenegrin
territory on the other, accepted the proposals of Istanbul to
return to their homes on condition that the Sublime Porte
should decree a general amnesty, reduce taxes, appoint a
number of native officials to the administration of the
vilayet, allow arms to be carried etc. The agreement was
signed in Podgorica at the beginning of August 1911. The
Sublime Porte granted more or less similar concessions to
the other regions of Albania.
170
 THE GENERAL UPRISING OF 1912;
THE DECLARATION OF ALBANIAN
NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE

The concessions granted by the Sublime Porte were of

no great issue, but the fact that Istanbul had been obliged
to enter into negotiations with the Albanians and had had
to yield to the detriment of the imperial prestige and of the
centralized authority, had very great importance. The age-
old stubbornness of Turkey had been cracked. The far­
sighted leaders were optimistic. One of these leaders, Hil
Mosi, who, together with the insurgent highlanders, had
fought with arms in hand, wrote a few weeks after the
agreement of Podgorica:
And though this year was not propitious for us,
Let rib one believe Albania has died,
Spring will come again, and again to the mountains
we’ll hie!
The main problem of the liberation war tactics was to
keep the initiative permanently in the hands of the Alba­
nians under the control of one single centre. To this prob­
lem the most enlightened leaders of the Albanian nation­
alist movement of these crucial years turned their main
attention.
In autumn 1911, the political situation in the Balkans
became extremely complex. At the end of September,
Italy had declared war on the Ottoman Empire for the con­
quest of Tripoli. Turkey had proved to be militarily weak.
The Balkan monarchies planned to realize their territorial
objectives at the expense also of the Albanians in case the
Ottoman Empire was defeated. In December, the group of
Albanian deputies under Ismail Qemal started a violent
argument in the Turkish parliament to compel Istanbul to
acknowledge the Albanian nationality rights, and in the
first place those in the domain of culture and administra­
tion. Their aim was to have the political boundaries of
171
Albania sanctioned through obtaining administrative au­
tonomy. Together with this petition, a memorandum too
was delivered to the Sublime Porte. At the meeting of the
parliament on January 11, 1912, during the discussions on
a governmental project for the amendment of Article 35 of
the Ottoman Constitution, the Albanian deputy Hasan
Prishtina warned that through their reactionary policy the
Young Turks were creating the conditions for a revolution
in Albania.
In face of strong opposition, the Young Turks dissolved
the parliament on January 18, 1912 with the intention
of excluding from the parliament the deputies adverse to
them, at the next elections, which were to be held in April
of that year, and then openly establishing their Ottoman dic­
tatorship. The Albanian patriots, with Ismail Qemal and
Hasan Prishtina at their head, in consideration of the crit­
icalness of the historic moment, decided to organize and
start the general liberation revolt the following spring.
The electoral campaign offered to the Albanian agitators
the opportunity, along with the propaganda in favour of
the patriotic candidates, of great activity for the armed
revolt. The best propaganda material was furnished by
the Young Turks themselves through the brutality of the
police forces and the anti-Albanian fanaticism which they
manifested during the electoral campaign, and further
through open interference by the gendarmery on the day
of elections against the voters who supported the patriotic
candidates, especially Ismail Qemal and Hasan Prishtina,
who enjoyed great popularity in Albania. The falsified
results of the elections hastened the break out of the armed
uprising in the Jakova highlands at the end of April 1912.
In May the uprising had spread all over Kossovo; in June it
had extended over south, central and north Albania; offi­
cers and soldiers began to desert from the Turkish
regiments.
In June the armed revolt in Albania received a still
greater impetus because other forces hostile to the Young
Turks rose against Istanbul — the adherents of the Itilaf
172
 party and military officers of opposition, who endeavoured
to exploit the Albanian movement in order to overthrow the
Young Turks’ party from power. The Albanian patriots,
in the interest of the extension of the revolt, collaborated
with their new companions-in-arms, and in July the upris­
ing assumed a general character. The Albanians took the
offensive and liberated a number of regions. Isa Buletini
in VuQitern and Bajram Curri at Qafa e Prushit scored
remarkable successes against the Turkish armies. By inflict­
ing on the Ottoman armies defeat after defeat, the insur­
gents began to liberate the cities. The bands of Themis-
tokli Germenji in Korea, of Salih Butka in Kolonje, of
Elmas Xhaferi in Vlora, of Aqif Bi^aku in Elbasan, of Abdi
Toptani in Tirana, of Ded Gjo’Luli in Shkoder, won the
admiration of the masses of people. By the middle of
July the whole of Albania had risen to its feet with arms in
hand. The state administration was entirely paralysed.
In face of the unexpected spread of the uprising, on July
17, 1912, while the Albanian forces were beginning their
assault on Prishtina, the Young Turk government in Istan­
bul was compelled to resign. On July 22, 1912, as the Al­
banian insurgents were marching victoriously into Prish­
tina, in Istanbul the opponents of the Young Turks, among
them the partisans of Itilaf, formed a new government
presided over by Ahmed Miftar pasha.
One of the most pressing jobs of the new government was
to extinguish the fire of revolt in Albania, and for this rea­
son it requested the leaders of the revolt to stop fighting
and start negotiating at once with the government delega­
tion, which it sent to Prishtinai a few days later. The demand
to start negotiations only with the heads of the uprising
in Kossovo had a diabolical intention — it aimed at split­
ting the Albanian forces by means of separate negotiations
for each vilayet, also to make use of the participation of
Itilaf party supporters of Kossovo in the revolt against the
Young Turks to soften the demands of the leaders of the
Kossovo patriots.
173
 Since the creation of the new situation, the Albanian pa­
triots, in the north as well as in the south, had agreed on a
common attitude: to demand from the government of Istan­
bul the approval of the conditions contained in the mem­
orandum of Ger^a drawn up in June 1911 —in other words,
the administrative autonomy of Albania. This included in
substance the demands that Hasan Prishtina delivered on
behalf of the Albanian party to the Turkish government del­
egation as soon as the negotiations had started in Prishtina
on August 3, 1912. But to this demand the reactionary
heads did not adhere, as they considered the objective of the
revolt, the fall of the Young Turks from power, already at­
tained. They only formulated the demand for the dissolu­
tion of the parliament and holding of new elections. With
the aim of widening the breach still further, the government
of Istanbul decreed on August 5, 1912 the dissolution of the
Turkish parliament. The leaders of the Itilaf Party were
satisfied and deemed the revolt terminated.
However in those critical days for the Albanian nationalist
movement, most of the Kossovo insurgents united themselves
with the patriotic leaders, with Hasan Prishtina, Bajram
Curri, Bajram Deklani and others, who interrupted the nego­
tiations that were taking place in Prishtina, re-started the
armed operations and marched on Shkup (Skoplije). On
August 12, 1912, Shkup, one of the largest cities of Rumelia,
fell into the hands of the Albanian insurgents. Some days
later, the insurgents of other regions freed Peshkopia, Fier,
Permeti, etc.
The fall of Shkup was a hard blow to the Ottoman Em­
pire. It marked the acme o’f the Albanian uprising for the
year 1912. It demonstrated the inaptitude of Turkey to put
down this movement of liberation, which on account of the
extraordinary proportions it was assuming, was leading to
the recognition of the autonomy of Albania. The successes
of the Albanians on their side disquieted the Balkan bour­
geois chauvinistic governments. The recognition of the
autonomy of Albania to a certain degree put in danger
the possibility of the realization of the aspirations which
174
these countries had fostered for a long time for the
division of this land between them. On this account
the Balkan states hastened their political and military prep­
arations in order to declare war on Turkey, weak and still
further enfeebled by its conflict with Italy which dragged on
for nearly a year, and by the Albanian uprisings. The
Great Powers, on their part, deemed that a Balkan war
might give rise to the outbreak of a world war, and declared
that they would not acknowledge any change in the politi­
cal map of the Balkans. This was to say that they would
refuse to recognize not only the partition of Turkey by the
Balkan states, but also the detachment of Albania from the
Ottoman Empire, though under the form of autonomy. In
order to avoid still more serious complications, as early as
August 18, 1912 Istanbul had announced that it would ac­
cept with some modifications the Albanian demands. The
leaders of the revolt, seeing the approach of the danger
from the Balkan neighbouring states, agreed on their part
to the accord of Shkup with Istanbul, according to which
the Albanians were to receive a series of economic, political,
administrative and cultural rights, though their formulation
officially as rights appertaining to the autonomy of Albania
was avoided.
In spite of the opposition of the Great Powers, in October
1912 the Balkan states declared war on Turkey in order to
divide between them the territories which Turkey still re­
tained in the Balkans. Albania was one of the important
countries here. According to the agreement reached be­
tween the Balkan allies, after the expulsion of Turkey, the
Albanian territories were to be parcelled out among Greece,
Serbia and Montenegro. In their plans the creation of an
Albania was not provided for.
The beginning of the Balkan war in October 1912 and the
speedy breakdown of the Turkish armies created a critical
situation for the Albanians, because the place of the long
time foreign ruler was going to be taken by new invaders,
who were full of ambitious plans of aggrandizement; and
because Albania, up to then enslaved but territorially undi­
175
vided, was going to remain enslaved, but was faced with
partitioning without any hope of redress. In connection
with the line that ought to be followed in these new cir­
cumstances, it soon became clear that the alignment of the
Albanians on the side of the Balkan states was as suicidal
as their fusion with the Ottoman army, because in the first
case, the Albanians would facilitate the advance of the
Balkan allies without any guarantee that these would
acknowledge their nationality rights; in the second case,
they would identify themselves with the foreign ruler, and
consequently they would bind the fate of Albania with that
of the Ottoman Empire.
Far-sighted patriots, inside and outside the country,
decided to consider the Balkan war as of no concern to
Albania, and to call for a national convention, comprising
delegates elected by all the Albanian territories; and this
convention was to decide on the attitude the Albanian peo­
ple should maintain in the interest of their motherland in
this new complex situation.
Towards the end of October, while the Balkan armies in
the pursuit of routed Turkish armies were marching into
the Albanian territories, the aged patriot Ismail Qemal left
Istanbul for neutral Roumania, and after he had obtained
on November 5, 1912 the approval of the most ancient and
the greatest patriotic society in exile to convoke a national
convention, he started for Vienna, accompanied by Luigj
Gurakuqi, Pandeli Cale and by other personalities, in order
to sound out in the Austrian capital the attitude of the Great
Powers on the Albanian problem. From the encounter in
Vienna with the Austro-Hungarian foreign minister and
with the ambassadors of some of the Great Powers, Ismail
Qemal, a wise diplomat with an acute sense of orientation
in politics, realized that after the elapse of a month from
the beginning of the war the international political condi­
tions had changed, that the former political map of the
Balkans could not be kept, that among the Great Powers
contradictions existed as to how the new political map of
the peninsula should be drawn, and that these conditions
176
Ismail Qemaj (1S44-191.9), chairman of the Vlora National Congress which
proclaimed the national independence of Albania, and head of the first
government of independent Albania
 Proclaiming the national independence of Albania in Vlora
on Nov. 28, 1912. Ismail Qemal with delegates of the
National Congress on the balcony

offered the Albanians the possibility to realize their age-

long aspiration — not merely the autonomy, but the in­
dependence of Albania.
While the Serbian, Montenegrin and Greek armies were
marching in the Albanian territory without encountering
any resistance on the part of the defeated Turkish armies,
the Albanian cities, before falling into the hands of the
Balkan armies, proclaimed the national independence of
Albania, and with great haste elected their delegates who.
without losing a single moment, left in order to attend the
national convention that should assemble as soon as possible
in a free town near the seashore for easier communication
with the outer world — in Durres or in Vlora. When Ismail
Qemal and his companions arrived, Durres was still in the
hands of the Turkish administration, which tried, though
178
 in vain, to capture the great leader. It was then that it
was decided to convoke the convention in Vlora, which had
been liberated by the Albanian patriots. With the Balkan
armies almost on their heels, the majority of the delegates
arrived in Vlora on November 26 and November 27, 1912.
On the following day, November 28, 1912, in exceptional
circumstances, the national assembly was convened, with
Ismail Qemal as chairman. While the Serbian armies cap­
tured Tirana and were preparing to enter Elbasan and
Durres, while the Montenegrin armies were pressing hard
in their siege of Shkoder and the Greek armies were mov­
ing from Himara in the direction of Vlora, the national con­
vention, after hearing the masterly and noble speech of the
great leader, unanimously proclaimed Albania a free, sover­
eign and independent state. At the same time the national
convention entrusted Ismail Qemal with the formation of
the first Albanian government. After the great, historic
decision, the noble old man, from the balcony of the palace
of the convention, before an enthusiastic popular meeting,
hoisted with his own hands onto a mast the Albanian
national flag — the flag of Gjergj Kastriot Scanderbeg.

THE FIRST YEARS OF INDEPENDENT

ALBANIA

The proclamation of national independence marked a

great turning point in the history of Albania. With this
came to an end the five-centuries-long period of foreign rule,
which had brought great damage to Albania; came to an
end the Ottoman feudal servitude, which had kept the land
in an utterly backward state. The lost freedom was re­
stored to the motherland, and the foundations of the in­
dependent Albanian state were laid. For the first time
Albania now had a national government. The gates to
progress and civilization were opened to the country.
179
 However the enthusiasm that seized the Albanian patriots
as they saw the flag of Scanderbeg unfurl freely, did not
last long. After the acclamations and enthusiastic ovations
came prosaic reality. The Albanian patriots, and particu­
larly the national government, had to face a number of
tasks, on the accomplishment of which depended the very
existence of the young state. In the first place stood the
political problems, as: the acknowledgment of Albania’s
independence in the international arena. This had been re­
fused up to then by all the Great Powers; setting the bound­
aries of the Albanian state, which task met with insistent
territorial claims by the neighbouring Balkan states which
did not lack in powerful supporters in the international
arena; to bring to a halt the Balkan armies which had been
advancing in the territory of Albania, and afterwards to
drive out of the country these foreign armies, which hinder­
ed the new government from extending its own authority
over the entire land. After that came the problem of the
building up of the state — the creation of the Albanian
administration, formation of the national army, securing
financial means — in a word, the management of state
affairs in a manner that was to demonstrate the earnestness
of the resolutions of the convention of Vlora and contribute
to the raising of prestige of the new-born state. Finally,
there were the economic and social problems, which im­
posed themselves on account of the backward condition of
the country. Albania had been almost entirely rural: the
peasant still tilled the soil with a primitive plough drawn
by oxen; the produce of agriculture was extremely meagre;
the fertile plains of low-lying Albania were marshy; in the
uplands, where arable land was scanty, the highlanders were
in utter and continual misery; about one-half of the arable
land was the property of landlord families, some of whom,
e.g. the Vrionis, Toptanis, Verlacis and Vloras, each owned
more than ten thousand hectares. The cities had no modern
industry; the masses of the population in the cities were
composed of small artisans, whose produce had at its basis
principally hand tools; only here and there in the cities were
180
a few private enterprises with machinery which processed
agricultural raw materials, but the amount of their produc­
tion was insignificant in comparison with the produce of
the craftsmen. The condition of the network of roads was
likewise execrable; the transportation of persons and of
goods was generally done by horses and carts. Still more
lamentable was the cultural level of the country; more than
90 per cent of the population was illiterate; the schools in­
herited from the Ottoman administration were almost en­
tirely foreign schools. The sanitary condition of the popu­
lation was wretched, hygienic and sanitary facilities being
virtually non-existent.
The new Albanian government had to face these hard and
complex tasks under most difficult internal and external
political conditions.
On November 28, 1912, a few hours after the proclama­
tion of independence, the president of the government.
Ismail Qemal, informed by wire the chancelleries of the six
Great Powers, as well as the ministries for foreign affairs
of the Balkan states of the historic event. He requested
their acknowledgment of the independence of Albania and
that they consider the creation of the Albanian state as a
factor for peace and equilibrium in the Balkans. At the
same time he announced the neutrality of independent
Albania regarding the Balkan conflict. But while the
Great Powers kept silence for a number of weeks about
these requests, the armies of the Balkan allies continued to
advance into the Albanian territories. As they met with
no resistance, the Serbian armies continued to advance
towards southern Albania and to conquer the territories to
the north of the river Shkumbin, which lands Belgrade
aspired to annex. The Greek armies, after laying siege to
Janina, began to infiltrate into Albania, menacing the city
of Vlora itself, in order to link up with the Serbian armies
along the river Shkumbini, which, according to the agree­
ment between them, was to serve as the new Greco-Serbian
boundary. Likewise, Montenegro was pressing hard on
Shkoder through the siege it had laid to the city, in order
181
to capture and annex it with its hinterland. The situation
did not become better even after the armistice that was
signed between the Ottoman Empire and the Balkan pow­
ers. Besides, the routed Turkish armies that were retreat­
ing and gathering in Berat and in Fier, were ready
momentarily to march in the direction of Vlora as soon as
they received orders from Istanbul, in order to dissolve the
national convention and to upset the government of Ismail
Qemal, that had dared to sever Albania from the Ottoman
Empire.
In those crucial days, the only weapon with which the
Albanian patriots were equipped was their enthusiasm. The
far-sighted leaders likewise took into account the contradic­
tions that existed among the Great Powers regarding their
respective interests in the Balkan sector.
As they had decided, the six Great Powers took into their
hands the re-drawing of the map of the Balkans. On June
17, 1912 the “Conference of Ambassadors” presided over
by British Foreign Minister Sir Edward Grey, met in
London for this purpose. As the most important item of
the adjustment in the Balkans was the Albanian question,
the Conference deliberated on this matter at its first sitting.
Here, on the basis of preliminary negotiations conducted
through the regular diplomatic channels, the Conference of
Ambassadors decided that Albania should become not an
independent state, as it had been proclaimed by the Assem­
bly of Vlora, but an autonomous state under the sovereignty
or suzerainty of the Sultan and under the guarantee and
control of the six Great Powers. The Conference likewise
decided, in principle, that Albania should have as neigh­
bouring states Montenegro, Serbia and Greece, and that the
boundaries were to be set later, after negotiations that would
be conducted within the Conference by the representatives
of the Great Powers.
The decision to keep in Albania the sovereignty of the
Sultan, and to put it under the control of the Great Powers
was a flagrant violation of the aspirations of the Albanian
patriots, who longed to see their motherland altogether in­
182
dependent as it had been decided by the Assembly of Vlora.
Besides, the national rights of the Albanians were infringed
by the Great Powers still more outrageously when the polit­
ical boundaries of the Albanian state were set.
While deciding on the boundary question, the Great
Powers did not take into consideration the ethnical princi­
ple and the will of the population. They had in view only
their own imperialist interests. A special interest for these
boundaries showed Russia, Austria-Hungary and Italy.
Russia supported the claims of Serbia, Montenegro and
Greece, which after they had failed to thwart the creation
of the Albanian state, now demanded that the boundaries
of Albania be as restrained as possible. Austria-Hungary,
on the contrary, did not desire the growth of Serbia, which
was a satellite of Russia and which obstructed the penetra­
tion of Vienna into the Balkans — and for this reason it sup­
ported the claims of the Albanians. Italy sided with Vienna,
particularly in regard to the southern boundaries of Alba­
nia, because it wanted to remove Greece as far as possible
from Vlora and from the Corfu Channel.
After long discussions and negotiations, during the year
1913 the imperialist Great Powers set the boundaries of the
Albanian state. Within these boundaries were included one
half of the Albanian territories — approximately 28,000
square kilometres with a population of nearly 800,000. More
than half of the Albanian population remained outside the
boundaries of Albania, mostly under Serbian yoke. There
had remained outside Albania, Kossovo, with its fertile ter­
ritories, that had fought so much for the freedom of the
motherland, there had remained important Albanian cities
as Prizren, Jakova, Peja, Prishtina, Dibra, Tetova, Gostivar
etc.
In spite of the armistice that was concluded in the first
days of December 1912, the Montenegrin armies continued
their assaults against the besieged city of Shkoder, in order
to compel the garrison to surrender. They hoped that in
case they could get hold of the city they would secure its
annexation. The garrison under the command of the
183
Turkish general Hasan Riza Pasha did not yield but con­
tinued to resist for many months consecutively, to which
action the government of Vlora gave its encouragement.
In the defence of Shkoder an important role was played
by the division composed of Albanian reservists levied by
Istanbul in central Albania at the beginning of the Balkan
war and by the population of the city itself, which preferred
to suffer starvation and the discomforts of the siege rather
than to surrender to the Montenegrin armies. The re­
sistance of Shkoder drew the attention of world public
opinion. While the garrison continued resisting, at the end
of January 1913, General Esad pasha Toptani, commander
of the Albanian reserve forces, killed Hasan Riza Pasha,
and with th,e help of Young Turk officers took the command
of the garrison himself and carried the resistance further,
though still under the Turkish banner.
On March 20, 1913, when the Great Powers decided that
Shkoder was to remain to Albania, King Nicola of Mon­
tenegro increased his efforts to capture the city at any cost.
He attained his aim not by fighting, but through Esad Pasha
Toptani, who convinced by them, as it appears, that the
fate of Shkoder no longer depended on the resistance but on
the decision of the Great Powers, preferred to surrender
the city after be was assured by Montenegro of the right to
withdraw the whole of the garrison army together with its
armaments, and after he had received the promise that
Cetinie and its allies Serbia and particularly Russia would
support him to take power in Albania. Thus after seven
months of siege and of heroic resistance, Shkoder fell on
April 22, 1913, into the hands of the Montenegrin armies.
Montenegro held Shkoder for only three weeks.
Constrained by the Great Powers and especially by
Austria-Hungary, on May 14, 1913, it withdrew its armies
from the city. However Shkoder, instead of being handed
over to the Albanian government, was put under interna­
tional military control. The armies of the Great Powers, un­
der the command of the British Admiral Cecil Burney,
established international administration in the city.
184
 After he had signed the act of surrender of Shkoder,
Esad Pasha Toptani, at the head of two divisions (one com­
posed of Turkish soldiers, the other of Albanian reserve
forces), arrived in central Albania, at Durres and Tirana,
which were under Serbian occupation, and without taking
any notice of the government of Vlora, he established there
a separate administration. Besides, there arose the danger
that the ambitious Pasha might make use of the Turkish
army on behalf of the Sultan, who, with the resolution of
December 17, 1912, was considered by the Great Powers
sovereign of the Ottoman state, and in secret understand­
ing with Serbia and Montenegro, try to overthrow the gov­
ernment of Vlora.- Annoyed by these actions, the govern­
ment of Ismail Qemal brought before the Conference of
Ambassadors the claim for the acknowledgment of the full
independence of Albania and the withdrawal from the
country as soon as possible of the foreign armies, including
the Turkish armies. Similar demands were made by the
states of the central block—Austria-Hungary and Italy—
which now desired to cancel the sovereignty of the Sultan
in order to have the way paved for the economic and polit­
ical subjugation of Albania. The Central bloc powers ex­
erted pressure and compelled the Sultan on May 30, 1913,
to leave to the Great Powers the question of the settlement
of Albania. In June 1913, the Turkish and Serbian armies
withdrew from Albania; only the Greek government, under
diverse pretexts, put off to a later time the withdrawal of
its armies from the districts of south Albania.
After many heated debates between Austria-Hungary
demanding the annulment of the sovereignty of the Sultan,
and Russia, demanding that the decision of December 17,
1912 should remain in force, the Conference of Ambassadors
at last, on July 29, 1913, approved the project on the or­
ganization of the Albanian state. According to this deci­
sion, Albania was recognized as an independent state, but
under the control and guarantee of the six Great Powers.
Albania was to be neutral. At the head of the state was
to be a prince, who was to be elected by the Great Pow­
185
ers. The control by the Great Powers was to last 10 years
and was to be exerted by an international commission com­
posed of 7 delegates (6 delegates of the 6 Great Powers and
one delegate of Albania). The international Control Com­
mission was to manage the entire civil administration and
the entire state budget. The Great Powers likewise decided
that the Albanian gendarmery was to be organized by
Swedish officers. As Sweden did not accede, Dutch offi­
cers were called on.
The decision of July 29, 1913 also recognized Albania as
independent. The relations with the Sultan ceased alto­
gether. Still, the control of the Great Powers put a limit to
its independence. Through the International Control Com­
mission, the Great Powers were enabled to interfere and to
instigate trouble for Albania.

THE PLOTS OF FOREIGN POWERS TO HARM

ALBANIA —PRINCE WIED’S REGIME

After the questions of the independence and of the bound­

aries of Albania were solved, the national government
of Ismail Qemal turned its attention to internal problems.
It made great efforts to extend the state administration over
all the districts of the country, to increase the number of
Albanian national schools and to enact new laws to replace
the Turkish laws still in force.
The steps undertaken by Ismail Qemal’s government
were to change the feudal landowner regime inherited from
Turkey into a capitalist bourgeois regime, after the pattern
of the states of Western Europe. These steps aroused the
discontent of landowning beys. During September 1913,
the reactionary beys deserted one after the other the gov­
ernment of Ismail Qemal and united themselves with Esad
Toptani. With the support of these reactionary circles,
Esad Pasha Toptani in October set up an independent gov-
186
ernment in Durazzo whose main objective was to over­
throw the government of Vlora, which all the democratic
patriots supported.
The difficulties created for the government of Ismail Qe­
mal by the reaction of the feudal forces were further ag­
gravated by the intervention of the Great Powers and by
the plots of the neighbouring chauvinist states.
Austria-Hungary and Italy exerted continual pressure in
their attempts to bind the government of Ismail Qemal to
their own policy and to snatch from it important economic
concessions and certain political privileges.
Russia and France took a still more hostile attitude to­
wards the government of Ismail Qemal, which did not give
up protesting against the injustice that was committed on
Albania in connection with the drawing up of the bound­
aries. That is why they secretly helped Esad Toptani, who
displayed his readiness to side without reserve with the
Entente powers.
From among the Balkan states only Bulgaria and Rou-
mania respected the independence of Albania and took
steps to enter into friendly relations with it, whereas Serbia,
Montenegro and Greece, though they formally recognized
the creation of the Albanian state, organized plots against
its independence and territorial integrity. Serbia gave full
support to Esad Toptani in order to overthrow the govern­
ment of Vlora, in the hope of realizing through him its
aspiration to reach the seaport of Shengjin. At the same
time, the Greek government began to organize in the dis­
tricts occupied by it in southern Albania or “Northern
Epirus” (Vorio-Epir), as it called them, armed so-called
“volunteer” bands, composed mostly of Greek andarts
brought over from Greece, which were to fight against the
Albanian administration of the government of Vlora when
the regular Greek armies retreated from southern Albania.
The government of Istanbul did not at first acknowledge
the separation of Albania from the Ottoman Empire, but
later on, as it did not succeed in reversing the situation
created on the Adriatic coast, started to conduct a policy
187
of rapprochement with the Albanians. In the relation of
forces recently created in the Balkans after two Balkan
wars, Turkey was interested to have a strong Albania as an
ally in order to forestall the expansion of Serbia and of
Greece. For this reason, the rulers of Istanbul and partic­
ularly the committee of the Young Turk party Ittihad ve
Terekii circulated the idea of installing a Turkish Moham­
medan prince at the head of the Albanian state, by indicat­
ing for this post the former Turkish minister of war Izet
Pasha, of Albanian origin. In order to popularize his can­
didature as against the German Prince Wilhelm of Wied,
elected by the Great Powers in line with the decision of
July 29, 1913, a squad of Turkish emissaries of Albanian
origin and members of the Ittihad ve Tereki party went
from Turkey to Albania.
Istanbul manifested special solicitude for the Albanians
in the autumn of 1913, when Turkey together with Bul­
garia began to get ready for a war of revenge against Greece
and Serbia. The solicitude of Istanbul found a warm re­
ception on the part of the masses of the Albanian popula­
tion. The hope that from this alliance Albania might attain
its territorial unification or at least acquire the means to
withstand the annoying pressure of Serbia and Greece,
drew the attention also of the head of the Albanian govern­
ment, Ismail Qemal, and of the Kossovo immigrants in Al­
bania. For this reason Ismail Qemal agreed to enter into
secret negotiations with Turkey and Bulgaria. As Albania
had been compelled by the Great Powers under all cir­
cumstances to maintain neutrality, the Turks and the Bul­
garians asked the Vlora government at least to allow the
secret passage through the Albanian territory, of bands
organized in Turkey and Bulgaria, in order to assail the
Serbians and the Greeks from behind and to use their
prestige to influence the Albanians of Kossovo to seize arms
against the Serbian state. In return they promised the head
of the Albanian government that at the end of the war they
would help Albania to recover Kossovo. Ismail Qemal ac­
cepted this secret agreement.
188
 The agreement did not remain secret for long. It was
made public as soon as the steamship arrived at the coast of
Vlora, bringing over, under the command of Major Beqir
Grebene, Turkish soldiers dressed as Albanians, ready to
land and march into Macedonia. Beqir Grebene was ar­
rested by the International Control Commission, and from
a document that was found, the ties that he had with
Ismail Qemal were disclosed. Neither Beqir Grebene nor
Ismail Qemal admitted befoire the examining judge the ex­
istence of the secret agreement. This furnished the adver­
saries of Ismail Qemal with the opportunity to start a cam­
paign of calumnies against him, pretending that the aged
patriot had called in Turkish forces for a coup d'etat in or­
der to bring Albania back into the framework of the Ot­
toman Empire. By taking as argument “the question of
Beqir Grebene” and by using as pretext the arrival of
Prince Wied in Albania, the International Control Commis­
sion on January 22, 1914 compelled Ismail Qemal to resign.
The government of Vlora and the National Council were
entirely eliminated. The administration of the country
passed into the hands of the International Control Commis­
sion. Esad Pasha Toptani, who likewise was asked by the
I.C.C. to hand in his resignation, on February 12, 1914 com­
plied with this demand and was granted the privilege of
heading the Albanian delegation that was going to offer
Wied the crown of Albania.
Greece also was constrained to obey the order of the
Great Powers to evacuate the southern districts of Albania
before the arrival of Prince Wied. However, according to
plans prepared a long time ahead, as soon as the Greek
armies were withdrawn at the end of February, the so-called
Epirotic bands, by committing acts of terror on the patri­
otic native population, took power into their hands. On
March 2, 1914, Greek agents assembled in a “congress” in
Gjirokastra, proclaimed the “autonomy of Vorio-Epirus”
and formed a “provisional government” under the presi­
dency of Jorgji K. Zografo. The government of “Vorio-
Epirus” took possession of the entire province of Gjiro-
189
kastra. The efforts exerted by the Greek agents to seize
Korea were unsuccessful. Korea together with its districts
passed without any difficulty into the hands of the Al­
banian patriots.
On March 7, 1914 Prince Wilhelm of Wied arrived in
Durres, designated as capital of Albania. The Albanian pa­
triots welcomed the arrival of the prince, for they hoped
that under his guidance the liberation and unification of the
Albanian territories would be achieved, that the long suf­
fering of the unfortunate people would come to an end, that
peace and order, which had been disrupted by foreign prov­
ocations, would be established — that Albania would start
an existence of civilization and of prosperity.
Wied, however, dashed the hopes of the democratic pa­
triots. He felt obliged to the Great Powers for electing him
sovereign of Albania. After due consideration of their
suggestions he constituted a government composed of feudal
elements, with Turhan Pasha Permeti, former minister of
the Ottoman Empire, as prime minister. The most im­
portant posts in the government — the ministry of the in­
terior and of war1 — were taken by Esad Pasha Toptani, the
greatest feudalist of Tirana. Wied likewise placed his hopes
on the International Control Commission, which was a
declared agency of the imperialist powers, the members of
which acted on behalf of the states they represented to the
disadvantage of the independence of Albania and of the
prince’s authority itself. By relying on the internal reac­
tionary forces and on the great imperialist powers, Prince
Wied, personally an incompetent head of state, became a
tool in their hands.
One of the most urgent tasks for the government of Wied
was to organize the Albanian army and to liberate the dis­
tricts of south Albania from the Greek bands. But even in
this vital matter for the country that he was going to rule
and for his throne itself, the prince proved to be absolute­
ly incapable. Under his very eyes, the organization of the
army was undermined in person by the minister of war,
Esad Pasha Toptani, who had entered into secret under­
190
standing with Serbia and with Greece. He hesitated to take
energetic measures that were proposed by the democratic
patriots against the “government of Vorio-Epirus”, which
legally was considered a rebellious government. On the
contrary, under the pressure of the Great Powers, Wied was
obliged to start negotiations with J. Zografos in order to
settle through “peaceful” means the question of the
“autonomy of Vorio-Epirus”. These negotiations, which
took place on the Greek island of Corfu, were an affront to
Albania.
By agreeing to begin negotiations, the Albanian party be­
trayed its weak position. This encouraged the Greek agents
to whip up provocations and menaces in order to constrain
the Dutch Colonel Thomson, representative of Wied, to ad­
mit the autonomy of “Vorio-Epirus” Wied was undecided,
and it is only under the pressure of the protestations of the
Albanian patriots that he rejected the proposals of the
“Vorio-Epirots”. But later, urged by the Great Powers,
Wied authorized the International Control Commission to
represent the Albanian party.
After a week’s deliberation, a protocol was signed in
Corfu on May 17, 1914 with the delegates of the “Vorio-
Epirotic government”. On the basis of the Corfu Protocol,
the districts of southern Albania were to enjoy semi-auton­
omous administration, with local government and gendar-
mery, using Greek and Albanian as official languages —
Albanian, however, to be taught only in the first three class­
es of elementary schools- The higher officials, who were
to be native Albanians, as well as all the other officials,
were to be appointed by the Albanian government only
after approval by the International Control Commission.
The protocol of Corfu seriously violated the Albanian sov­
ereignty that had been acknowledged by the Great Pow­
ers with the decision of July 29, 1913. Another odious as­
pect of this protocol was its stipulation that the population
that lived in the southern districts and that could speak
only Albanian, although it was to live within the bound­
aries of the independent Albania, would be compelled to
191
attend the primary schools beyond the first three classes
and then the secondary schools where the teaching was only
in the Greek language. Besides, with the protocol of Corfu,
an argument was furnished to Greece to demand later on
the annexation of all the districts of southern Albania. For
this reason, the government of Durres, under the very
strong pressure of the Albanian patriots of these districts,
refused to ratify the protocol of Corfu, hoping that a more
favourable situation might arise later on.
The political situation of the Wied government, however,
steadily worsened on account of the further extension of
the rebellion that had broken out in central Albania. To­
gether with the supporters of Esad Toptani, Young Turk
agents, too, took part in the uprising and were active in Al­
bania from the autumn of 1912. The Young Turks proved
to be diligent propagandists.
By criticizing Prince Wied as a supporter of landowning
beys and as an instrument in the hands of the Christian
Great Powers, which aimed at suppressing the Moham­
medan populations, the Young Turks succeeded in getting
a considerable number of peasants of central Albania to
seize arms in order to overturn the authority of Durres
and to install on the throne an Ottoman prince bound to
the Turkish Sultan, who at the same time was also the
Caliph, the Chief and Protector of all Mohammedans over
the entire world. Esad Pasha Toptani on his part, while
he pretended that he was prepared to accept an Ottoman
prince as head of Albania, soon came to an agreement with
the Young Turk adherents — with Musa Qazim, the Mufti
of Tirana, and Qamil Haxhi Feza from Elbasan. Thus in.
the middle of May 1914, in the districts around Shijak and
Tirana, the armed uprising started against Prince Wied and
his reactionary government in which whole masses of peas­
ants took part, incited by social and religious motives, but
led by chiefs who aimed at replacing Wied by a prince
bound to Turkey. In this movement fanatical pro-Turkish
elements did not fail to participate, the most conspicuous
192
representative of whom was the Mufti of Tirana, Musa
Qazim.
In the capital, the Albanian patriots were anxious especial­
ly on account of the religious aspect of the uprising, as they
were unable to realize its real character. Their anxiety
grew still more as on May 18 the insurgents appeared in
the vicinity of Durres. Hoping that with the elimination
of Esad Toptani the uprising would lose force, a group of
patriots, with the support of the gendarmery of the capital,
by night on the eve of May 19, 1914 surrounded Esad Pa­
sha inside his home in Durres and arrested him; however,
in face of the pressure, Wied handed over Esad Pasha to the
Italian Minister, Baron Aliotti, and granted him freedom to
travel to Italy.
Although Esad Pasha had been banished, the uprising
spread still further. Within a few weeks, while Durres
remained besieged, the insurgents extended their authority
over practically every district of central Albania. In the
occupied districts a new administration was established
under the General Council, which was elected in Shijak in
June 1914 by an assembly attended by the insurgents.
Mustafa Ndroqi was elected president of the General
Council, and Qamil Haxhi Feza, commander-in-chief of the
armed forces.
The great danger that was created for Durres by the
armed uprising was exploited by the Great Powers in order
to oblige the government of Wied to ratify the protocol of
Corfu. Finding itself in a difficult position, the Albanian
government at last accepted, and on June 23, 1914 ratified
this protocol, with the hope the “Vorio-Epirots” would
cease their attacks in the south.
The “Vorio-Epirots”, however, instead of interrupting
the fighting, as it had been stipulated in the protocol, dur­
ing the month of July, as the insurgents were pressing their
siege of Durres and were pushing toward Berat and Pogra-
dec, started a general assault in the districts of Kolonje,
Korga and Berat, still under the control of the government
of Durres. The Albanian forces, caught between two fires,
193
were obliged to retreat. This offered to the Greek bands
the possibility of conquering the southern districts without
any difficulty and to create common boundaries with the
rebels from Pogradec up to Berat.
During the conquest of the southern districts, the Greek
bands furious with the native population for not agreeing
to follow the Vorio-Epirotic movement, treated them with
the greatest cruelty. As in the past spring during the retreat,
now too during the recapture of these districts, the Greek
bands set fire to more than 160 villages, arrested hundreds
of patriots and massacred hundreds of peasants, guilty only
of the “crime” of considering themselves Albanian. In
order to escape being massacred, tens of thousands of per­
sons abandoned their hearths and gathered as refugees in
the olive groves near Vlora, the only city besides Durres that
remained under the administration of the government of
Wied. With no means and no succour, this mass of more
than 60,000 men, women and children had sunk into utter
misery due to famine and epidemics.
By this offensive, the Vorio-Epirotic leaders violated the
Protocol of Corfu, which forbade armed action against the
Albanian state. Consequently the Protocol of Corfu was
null and void.

ALBANIA DURING THE FIRST

WORLD WAR

The outbreak of the World War in early August 1914

created an extremely critical situation for Albania and the
Albanians. Now that arms had been resorted to, the im­
perialist Great Powers and chauvinistic neighbouring states
seized the opportunity to realize their objectives at the ex­
pense of Albania — mainly because the World War had
found Albania in a lamentable condition.
194
 The authority of the government of Wied was confined
only to Durres and to Vlora. Central Albania was under
the control of the insurgents hostile to Wied. South Albania
lived under the terror of Greek bands. In the east, the
Dibra region was under Serbian occupation and the moun­
tainous regions were under the rule of local chieftains.
By taking advantage of the circumstances that were cre­
ated by. the war, the forces hostile to Wied continued more
tenaciously their assaults against the government of Durres.
After the fall of Vlora into their hands, on September 1, 1914
the situation of Wied was extremely aggravated. Deprived
of all support, as Austria-Hungary too, who had backed it,
had now abandoned it, the prince was compelled to leave
Albania on September 3, 1914, together with his govern­
ment. Thus, after six months, the regime of Wied came to
an end. On September 5, the insurgent forces entered
Durres.
Austria-Hungary cast aside Wied as of no further use and
tried to win to her side the leaders of the anti-Wied move­
ment, for the purpose of making use of their armed forces
against her foe, Serbia. With the Young Turk emissaries,
who had infiltrated deep into the ranks of the insurgents
and who received their instructions from Turkey, ally of
Austria-Hungary, Vienna reached agreement without any
difficulty. But with the native chieftains and still less with
the peasant masses, who had fought against Wied, it had
no success. In October 1914 the situation in Albania be­
came very complicated. After the departure of Wied, with
the help of the armed forces subsidized by the government
of Belgrade, Esad Toptani came from his exile back to Dur­
res, and here on October 2, 1914 proclaimed himself head
of the provisional government and commander-in-chief of
the army. His return produced no other result than to in­
flame once again the former fury of the anti-feudal up­
rising. Alongside the peasants, who this time, too, became
the main striking force of the uprising, Young Turk emis­
saries also took part, and, especially in November, as
Turkey entered the war on the side of the Central Powers,
195
tried their best to direct the armed movement not only
against Esad Toptani, who backed the Entente, but also
against Serbia. However, the peasant masses again paid no
attention to the appeal of the Young Turk leaders.
From the anarchy that developed once again in Albania,
profited two other powers which at that time maintained
neutrality in the War — Italy, which at the end of October
1914, with the approval of the Great Powers occupied Vlora
and the island of Sazan, and Greece, which at that time
occupied with regular armies the districts of southern Al­
bania that were under the control of the “Vorio-Epirotic”
bands. By these military occupations, Rome as well as
Athens hoped to assure the annexation of these regions.
In the fighting against Esad Toptani the peasant insur­
gent forces of central Albania speedily achieved success.
Within a few weeks all the regions of central Albania fell
into their hands, and the authority of Esad Toptani was
confined only to Durres.
The pressure of Young Turk emissaries to direct the in­
surgent forces against Serbia continued, but without any
success. In January 1915, in a note addressed to the Great
Powers, which was repeated in February and in March, the
native leaders of the revolutionary peasants announced their
neutral attitude in the world conflict and emphasized their
objective as merely anti-Esadist. In this month the uprising,
directed against Esad Toptani and his landowning support­
ers, took an open anti-feudal character. Under the lead
of Haxhi Kamil of the Sharri district of Tirana, who had
been elected by the insurgents as commander-in-chief, the
armed peasants set fire to the homes of beys, confiscated
the estates of land-holders, gave aid and support to the poor,
the orphans, the infirm, and at the same time multiplied
their attacks against Esad Pasha Toptani, who was besieged
in Durres. Some of the peasant insurgents, who were not
entirely relieved as yet of the old ideological domination and
prompted also by the wrong idea that the Albanian flag
was the banner of beys and atheists, kept on making use of
the Turkish flag in their rank and file. The fact that Haxhi
196
Kamil and his collaborators did not comply with the instruc­
tions of Turkey and of Austria-Hungary to assail Serbia from
the rear, demonstrates that irrespective of the Ottoman
flag they made use of, politically they were independent of
the Turkish government.
In the meanwhile Italy took the decision to bring to an
end its neutrality that it had announced at the beginning
of the World War by entering into war against its former
allies, the Central Powers, on the side of the Triple Entente
powers, which it deemed had more chance of victory at the
end of the war, and which gave assurances for more terri­
torial gains than those promised by its former allies. For
this purpose on April 26, 1915 Italy signed with the three
Great Powers of the Entente — England, France and Rus­
sia— the secret Treaty of London.
This treaty of London marked the culmination of the
shameful policy the Great Powers had adopted towards
small Albania. England, France, Russia and Italy, that is
to say four of the Great Powers which two years ago, on
July 29, 1913, had acknowledged the independence of Al­
bania under their control and guarantee, with this treaty
were treading upon the commitment they had previously
made, and were preparing the extinction of the independ­
ence and, further, the partition of this unfortunate land. By
Article 6, Italy was acknowledged to have the right to annex
the city of Vlora with a considerable hinterland together
with the island of Sazan. In Article 5, it was stipulated
that the port of Sheng jin was to be annexed by Montenegro,
whereas in Article 7 the possibility was foreseen for Serbia
and Greece to annex respectively the northern and the
southern regions of Albania. What was to remain, in other
words, central Albania, was to constitute, according to
Article 7, a small, autonomous, neutral state, with its capital
in Durres, which was to be represented by Italy in its re­
lations with foreign countries.
The Treaty of London was kept secret even after Italy
entered the war in May 1915. However, Serbia, which
learned the contents of the Treaty, was dissatisfied that its
197
great allies had not granted to it Durres. Under the pre­
text that it desired to secure its rear from the peasant in­
surgents, who were unjustly accused of having been
incited and organized by Austria-Hungary, the Serbian gov­
ernment swiftly amassed its army on the Albanian bor­
der in order to march across central Albania and capture
Durres, where its ally, Esad Toptani, was besieged. On
this occasion, Belgrade wanted to make of the annexation
of Durres an accomplished fact. The leaders of the peasant
insurgents protested by means of notes to persuade the Ser­
bian commander to renounce the military march across
the country. However, on June 2, 1915, as the Serbian
armies crossed the boundaries, the armed peasants went to
meet them and at Qukes, under Haxhi Kamil, put up furious
resistance. Without arms, without organization and in face
of the numerical superiority of the Serbians, the peasants
turned back and the uprising was crushed. In face of the
pressure exerted by the great Allies, which did not want
to cause any annoyance to Italy, the Serbian armies did not
enter Durres at all. But in the meantime, the Serbian
forces banded themselves with Esadist detachments, which
were relieved from the blockade of Durres, and wreaked
terror on the peasants. Haxhi Kamil was hanged together
with 40 peasants. Only after the position of Esad Pasha
Toptani was stabilized, within a few weeks, did the Serbian
armies withdraw from Albania.
In June 1913 Montenegro, too, with the aim of assuring
the annexation of Shkoder, captured this city. Like the
Serbians and the Greeks, so the Montenegrins arrested and
interned great numbers of Albanian patriots. The Mon­
tenegrins killed in Shkoder, without trial, two renowned
patriots, Cercjiz Topulli and Mustafa Qulli.
A few months later, the Serbian armies of approximately
200,000 men, routed and pursued by the Austro-Hungarian
armies, retreated across the territories of Albania. In Jan­
uary 1916, together with the Serbian armies, also their
ally Esad Pasha Toptani, left Albania by sea, together with
his “government”, who at first settled in France, then
198
later1 went with the headquarters of the Anglo-French Army
corps of the Orient, which landed at Salonica.
In January 1916 Austro-Hungarian armies marched into
Albania from the north. Within a few weeks they captured
the whole of north and central Albania. In the autumn
of that same year, the Italian armies spread out from Vlora
over the whole of south Albania, while the French armies
coming from Salonica, occupied the Korea region and cre­
ated a common border with the Italian armies at Kolonje.
In Korga, the French military authorities handed over the
administration of the city to their allies, the Greek partisans
of Venizelcs, who had formed a separate government in Sa­
lonica and had declared war against the Central Powers.
The Albanian patriots of these regions protested against
this act that displayed that France was acknowledging the
right of Greece to occupy Korea. Armed bands led by The-
mistokli Germenji and Salih Butka started action against
Greek agents, and then let it be understood that they would
strike against the French armies also, in case the Greeks
199
would not be expelled and the administration of Kor<;a
would not be handed over to the Albanian patriots.
The French military authorities, realizing that the Greeks
had no support whatsoever in the Korea region, and that
they were not in any condition to assure the peace and or­
der they so badly needed, chased away the Venizelists and
came to an understanding with Themistokli Germenji and
other patriots, signing together with them, on December
10, 1916, a protocol according to which the regions of Kor<?a,
Bilisht, Kolonje and Pogradec were to enjoy an administra­
tive “autonomy” under the rule of Albanian authorities.
According to the protocol of December 10, 1916, an ad­
ministrative council was placed at the head of the “autono­
mous district of Korga”, composed of 14 persons; the gen-
darmery was organized and put under its orders; in the
administration Albanian officials were appointed; Albanian
was adopted as the official language; Greek schools were
replaced with Albanian schools; the flag of the “autono­
mous district” was the national flag of Albania with the
French tri-colour attached at the top. The administration
of the “Autonomous District of Korea” was placed, in con­
formity with the protocol, under the protection of the French
military authorities. Themistokli Germenji became the most
renowned personality of the autonomous district or of the
“Republic of Korea” as it was called by the Albanians.
The concession of this “autonomy” was an important vic­
tory achieved by the Albanian patriots in the circumstances
created by the First World War, because it obliged France
itself to reject the claims of their allies the Greeks, on
Korea. Besides, it replaced the foreign military administra­
tion by a local civil administration which to a certain degree
was an alleviation for the population of the district. It
was a stimulus for the patriots of other regions to fight, in
order to secure an identical autonomy. Under the pressure
of these demands, in order to appease the Albanians, in
January 1917 the Austro-Hungarian military authorities,
and in June 1917 the Italian military authorities were
obliged likewise to make concessions in the domain of the
200
administration of the land and to promise that they would
acknowledge to Albania the “autonomy” and the territorial
integrity, as soon as the War was terminated.
The proclamation of the “Autonomous District of Kor?a”
and its transfer into the hands of Albanian authorities was
received by Greek chauvinistic circles with violent protests.
Under the continual pressure of these circles and of the
Greek Prime Minister Venizelos himself, and in conformity
with the instructions of the government of Paris, since June
1917, when Greece entered the war on the side of the En­
tente, the French military authorities began to violate the
Protocol of December 10, 1916. After six months’ existence,
the district of Korea began to lose the Albanian administra­
tive autonomy. In Korea Greek schools were opened again.
The French authorities arrested the leader of the Albanian
patriots of Korea, Themistokli Germenji, who, on the basis
of false evidence, was sentenced to death by the French
military tribunal of Salonica and executed there on No­
vember 9, 1917. Some months later, the French abrogated
the Protocol of December 10, 1916. However, for fear of
the extension of the armed resistance of the Albanians,
they did not dare to deliver to the Greek authorities the
administration of Korea. The whole district passed under
the direct administration of the French military authori­
ties.
The occupation of Albania by Austro-Hungarian, Italian
and French armies lasted till the end of the war. With
these occupations, Albania became a battlefield of the
armies of the belligerent powers. For a long period in the
Fier district fierce fighting took place between the Austro-
Hungarian and the Italian armies, and in the Pogradec dis­
trict, between the Austro-Hungarian and the French ar­
mies. These occupations and wars brought great human
and material loss to the country. Nearly 70,000 persons
died in Albania during the First World War due to fight­
ing, epidemics and famine. The economy, which had been
poor in the past, declined still further.
201
 THE CONGRESS OF LUSHNJE AND
THE WAR OF VLORA

The termination of the First World War in November

1918, instead of marking the end of the sufferings of the
Albanian people and of the anxiety of the democratic
patriots for the fate of their homeland, brought, on the con­
trary, a still greater deterioration in the Albanian political
situation.
The war was won by western powers — England, France,
Italy and the United States of America, of which the first
three had affixed their signatures to the Treaty of London
of April 1915 and in principle were always agreed to enact,
particularly, the articles envisaging the partition of Al­
bania. Among the smaller allies were two neighbour states
of Albania, Serbia and Greece, that demanded the more
energetic exploitation of the right of the conqueror in order
to secure the annexation of Albanian territories, which they
had been able to do in 1913.
Of the signatories of the Treaty of London, only one state,
Russia, opposed the execution of that ill-famed document
The reason was that in Russia, before the year was out,
the October Socialist Revolution had broken out and tri­
umphed, and had overthrown the oppressive regime of the
Russian capitalists and land-holders and instituted the rule
of the labouring class and of the oppressed masses of the
village. On the very next day of the triumph of the Revolu­
tion, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin had put an end to the participa­
tion of Russia in the First World War and had proposed to
the belligerent powers the conclusion between them of a
just, democratic peace renouncing annexations. These acts
left a deep impression on Albania. Some weeks after the
triumph of the Revolution, the Russian Bolsheviks made
public the contents of the secret treaties concluded between
the Great Powers up to then, including the Treaty of Lon­
don.
202
 After learning the contents of this treaty, the Albanian
political leaders became fully aware of the seriousness of
the situation created after the general war for the fate of
Albania. That is why, as soon as the war was brought to an
end, the Albanian leaders, who for many years in succes­
sion had remained in exile or in concentration camps, or
else had lain hidden inside Albania, were active forming a
national government, elected by a congress, which was to
take into its hands the fate of the motherland and to defend
the independence and the territorial integrity of Albania
before the peace conference that was to convene in Paris
in January 1919, and where the Great Powers would
demand the enforcement of the Treaty of London. But it
was difficult to have a national congress meet freely, be­
cause Albania was entirely occupied by alien troops — by
Italian armies which had captured the regions occupied by
Austro-Hungarian armies with the exception of Korea and
of Shkoder, which remained under French military occu­
pation.
The Italian government gave permission to call the
congress in Durres on condition that it should not appoint
a national government but only a “national council” to
represent Albania, with the exception of the district of
Vlora; that it should have the prerogatives of govern­
mental authority, and that it should have the right only
to express the “desires” of the Albanians before the peace
conference, naturally in conformity with the Italian in­
terests. By means of pressure, that the military authorities
in Albania were going to exercise, the government of
Rome intended that its adherents and agents should be
sent to the congress and to the council.
The Congress of Durres opened on December 28, 1918.
It was attended by more than 50 delegates. In order to
avoid giving any ground to the Italian troops that were
within the city, to disperse the congress, the patriotic-
delegates in their discussions did not openly criticize the
policy of Rome towards Albania. However, through their
votes, the Congress of Durres passed resolutions that were
203
in opposition to the policy of the Italian government. The
Congress elected not a “council”, but a “national govern­
ment” with President Turhan Pasha, ex-prime minister
of the Wied regime, who was empowered to exercise the
executive power alongside a national senate that was
elected to wield the legislative power. Besides that, the
Congress entrusted an Albanian government delegation,
under the prime minister, to defend before the peace con­
ference the national independence and the territorial in­
tegrity of the country, by which resolution not only the
claims of Greece, Serbia and Montenegro, but also those
of Italy set forth in the Treaty of London, were rejected.
Although discontented with the Congress of Durres, the
Italian military authorities did not interfere with the na­
tional government, in order to avoid arousing, in those
unseasonable moments, the anger of the Albanians. But
on the other hand, for a long period of time, they did not
allow the government of Durres to exercise the executive
power or the national senate to assemble in order to exer­
cise the legislative power. Italian emissaries tried to per­
suade the government of Durres that, for the support
Rome would give to spare Albania from the territorial
claims of Serbia and of Greece, Albania should demand
from the peace conference the inclusion of Albania under
the mandate or protection of Italy.
On January 18, 1919 as the peace conference opened at
Versailles, the neighbor states of Albania — Italy, Serbia,
Greece and Montenegro — as had been expected, presented
their territorial claims at the expense of Albania, although
this was not a defeated country. Italy demanded the an­
nexation of the district of Vlora together with the island
of Sazan which had been promised to it by the Treaty
of London, and apart from that, it aspired to have the rest
of Albania brought under its protectorate without sharing it
with Greece and Serbia. Greece put forth once again its
chauvinistic claims and demanded the annexation of the dis­
tricts of Gjirokastra and Kor^a. Serbia, which did not ap­
prove Italy’s settling in Vlora, demanded the “independ­
204
ence*’ and the “territorial integrity” of Albania, but in
case the independence and the integrity should not be ac­
cepted, it demanded that Albania should be partitioned,
whereby Serbia should receive the northern districts. Mon­
tenegro demanded, again, Shkoder.
Besides the delegation of the government of Durres, dele­
gations of all the Albanian colonies in exile — the colonies
in Roumania, Bulgaria, Egypt, Turkey and in the United
States — went to Paris in order to forestall the bargaining
at the expense of Albania. The Great Powers, however, did
not allow Albania to be represented at the Peace Con­
ference, and treated it as a land without master. In spite
of that, the Albanian government delegation, supported by
the delegations of the Albanians in exile, opposed all the
claims of the neighbouring states, protested against the
Treaty of London, demanded recognition of the independ­
ence and of the territorial integrity of the motherland,
and even demanded that the Albanian regions of Kossovo
and of Gameria also, which had been unjustly left outside
its boundaries, should be ceded to Albania.
In face of the difficulties with which the Albanian prob­
lem was beset, a part of the Albanian government delega­
tion of Durres, together with its head Turhan Pasha, under
the pressure of the emissaries of Rome, began to oscillate
and to demand the mandate of Italy over the whole oi
Albania, on condition that the boundaries set in 1913 should
be maintained. Against these machinations, the Albanian
patriots rose to their feet. With their intervention, in June
1919, Turhan Pasha resigned from the presidency of the
government delegation, and in his stead Bishop Luigj
Bum$i was appointed.
In the summer months the Italian question was aggra­
vated still more. Italy, realizing that the Great Powers were
adverse to its efforts for the inclusion under its mandate
of the whole of Albania, came to an understanding with
Greece to support each other in connection with their
respective claims in Albania. In July 20, 1919 Rome and
Athens signed a secret accord “The Tittoni-Venizelos Ac­
205
cord”, in accordance with which Italy recognized Greece’s
right to annex Korea and Gjirokastra, whereas Greece rec­
ognized Italy’s right to annex Vlora and the mandate over
the remaining districts of Albania. After it had signed the
secret accord for the partitioning of Albania, on August 20,
1919 Rome granted to the government of Durres the right
of administration under the supervision of Italian civil
authorities rather than under Italian military control.
As some months later, in October 1919, the contents of
the Tittoni-Venizelos accord were divulged, a series of
vehement protests broke out in Albania. Yet, not all of the
Albanian personalities made the same estimation of the
political situation. The major part of the ministers of the
government of Durres overestimated in an alarming man­
ner the danger of the partitioning of the motherland. Hop­
ing that they would be able to preserve intact the terri­
torial integrity of Albania, they capitulated before the pres­
sure of Rome and began to ask that Albania be placed
under Italian protection, or else that a prince of the royal
house of Italy be brought to the throne of Albania. These
demands compromised the Albanian question and the
government of Durres itself, which by this time had fallen
entirely into the hands of such agents of Italy as Mufid
Libohova, Mustafa Kruja and Fejzi Alizoti. Under their
guidance the government of Durres entered onto the road
of treason.
After more than ten months’ bargaining, three major
imperialist powers, which directed in fact the work of the
peace conference — England, France and the United States
of America — reached a mutual understanding, and on De­
cember 9, 1919 drafted a memorandum for the settlement
of the claims of Italy, Serbia and Greece in the Adriatic
and in Albania.
According to the memorandum of December 9, 1919, Italy
was to annex the district of Vlora together with the island
of Sazan and was to have under its mandate Albania, split
and partitioned. The district of Gjirokastra was to be ceded
to Greece, whereas the fate of Korga was to be decided
206
later on. The northern boundaries of Albania were to re­
main intact; but on the other hand, to the Serbo-Croato-
Slovene Kingdom, which was now called Yugoslavia, the
right was conceded to construct a railway line across Al­
bania in order to communicate with the Adriatic sea.
The memorandum of December 9, 1919, by which Albania
was being partitioned and put under the colonial regime of
Italy, aroused the whole country to action. The Albanian
patriots had entirely lost faith in the government of Durres
taking steps to save the motherland from the twofold
danger. Although the country found itself occupied by
Italian armies, the Albanian patriots, with Aqif Bi^aku at
their head, in early 1920, courageously appealed to the
Albanian people to elect their delegates for a new national
congress, which was to decide on the measures that should
be taken to save the motherland. It was decided to hold
the congress in Lushnje on January 21, 1920.
As most of the delegates could not arrive in Lushnje by
January 21, the congress opened a week later, on January
28, and terminated after four days of deliberations, on
January 31, 1920. In it fifty delegates took part.
The Congress of Lushnje passed resolutions of unusually
great importance for the fate of the country. Although
under the menace of the Italian bayonets, the delegates
resolved to oppose all the plans and the bargainings of the
Great Powers at the expense of Albania. The congress in­
formed the peace conference that the Albanians were de­
termined to fight against all alien powers in order to
defend without any concession the national independence
and the territorial integrity of the country.
The congress then looked into the activities of the
government of Durres. After pointing out that it had taken
the way of treason, it announced its dismissal and in its
stead appointed a new national government with Sulejman
Delvina as prime minister. The congress likewise appointed
a new Albanian delegation to the peace conference, com­
posed of Dr. Mihai Turtulli, Bishop Luigj Bumgi and
Mehmed Konitza.
207
 The third problem that lay before the congress for deliber­
ation was the drafting and the approval of a provisional
statute, on the basis of which the Albanian state was to be
administered until a regular constituent assembly should
meet without alien armies in Albania. In connection with
this item, the assembly took the decision that, until the
Assembly met, Albania should not be proclaimed a
monarchy, as it had been decided at the conference of peace
in 1913, neither a republic, as was desired by the majority
of the delegates. For the time being, at the head of the
Albanian state was to stand a Supreme Council, composed
of four members. The congress elected as members of the
Supreme Council Aqif Biqakqiu, Mihai Turtulli, Luigj
Bumqi and Abdi Toptani. In the statute approved by the
congress it was defined that alongside the national govern­
ment, which was to exercise the executive power, a national
council (parliament) of 37 deputies was to be created, which
was to exercise the legislative power. The statute con­
tained other dispositions relating to various administrative
institutions of the new Albanian state, their prerogatives
and their duties.
The Congress of Lushnje, by opposing resolutely the
bargaining of the imperialist Great Powers and by deposing
the government of Durres that was ready to capitulate,
changed to a course of events no longer detrimental, but
on the contrary, favourable to Albania. By sanctioning a
new statute, it rejected the statute dictated by the con­
ference of peace in 1913, which placed Albania under the
humiliating control of the imperialist Great Powers. The
Congress of Lushnje resolved that the Albanian people
themselves should decide the fate of Albania by means of
the constituent assembly.
The government of Durres attempted to disperse the
Congress of Lushnje without success but, left without any
support, it ceased to exist only a few days later.
On the contrary, the government of Sulejman Delvina,
with the support of vast masses of the population, since
the first weeks scored successes of considerable importance.
208
On February 11, 1920, the high state organs—the Supreme
Council, the council of ministers and the National Council —
left the small town of Lushnje and established themselves
in Tirana, which at that time was a town of 15 thousand
inhabitants, and which was chosen as the provisional cap­
ital of Albania. From here the new government demanded
that the Italian and French military authorities should
withdraw together with their armies from the districts of
the country. In consideration of the great support that
was given to the new government and in order to avoid
conflicts with the masses, the Italian and French armies
began to evacuate Albania little by little. In the liberated
districts the Albanian administration was installed, to
which the local population gave an enthusiastic reception.
The government of Rome, however, instead of withdraw­
ing to Italy its armies scattered throughout Albania, massed
them in the district of Vlora, manifesting in this manner
not only that it did not intend to evacuate this district, but
that on the contrary it was going to defend it by military
force. At the same time, with the aim of paralysing the
government of Tirana, it instigated against it the Esadist
rebel movement in the neighbourhood of Tirana. On March
27, 1920, as the National Council, the first Albanian parlia­
ment, opened its sessions, within the framework of the
defence of the national cause at the peace conference in
Paris, before the government of Tirana two problems of
vital importance for the fate of the country awaited solu­
tion: the liberation of the district of Vlora and the breaking
down of the Esadist rebellion. Hoping to solve these two
problems by peaceful means, and at the same time in order
to gain time to accomplish its military and political prep­
arations, the government of Sulejman Delvina, with the
approval of the National Council, entered into negotiations
with the government of Rome and with the chiefs of the
Esadist rebellion.
The Albanian patriot leaders had it clearly in mind that
the link that would bring about the solution of the critical
situation in which the Albanian problem found itself was
209
the armed struggle for the expulsion of the Italian armies
from Vlora. They were confident that under the pressure
of Albanian arms and the protests that would be raised
over the whole world in favour of the struggle for libera­
tion of this small nation, Italy would find itself at last
constrained to withdraw its troops from the district of Vlora
also. The patriot leaders were likewise confident that
neither Greece nor Yugoslavia desired to see Italy remain
in Vlora, and moreover, if Italy were chased from Vlora,
neither Athens nor Belgrade would have the possibility of
annexing at the expense of Albania the districts they had
aspired to bring under their rule. That is why, while the
peace conference continued its deliberations on the
memorandum of December 9, 1919 and consequently no
definite decision had been taken as yet to the detriment of
Albania, the patriot leaders took the decision to organize
the uprising for liberation against the Italian armies of
occupation.
The task of leading to an end the uprising for liberation
was taken over by the “Committee of National Defence”
that was formed secretly inside Vlora by the patriots of
the districts occupied by Italian troops. In secret under­
standing with the government of Tirana, the “Committee of
National Defence” on May 20, 1920 issued the war-call for
the armed uprising, to which thousands of peasants re­
sponded. On June 3, 1920, from Mt. Beun near Smokthina
in the occupied zone, the Committee addressed to the com­
mander of the Italian armies of occupation an ultimatum,
demanding a reply within 24 hours whether it would con­
sent to handing over the administration of Vlora, of Tepe-
lena and of Himara to the national government of Tirana.
As the Italian command gave no response, on June 5, 1920
an uprising for liberation broke out in the entire occupied
districts.
Thousands of peasants in the occupied districts, organized
in armed bands, assailed simultaneously, about midnight,
all the Italian garrisons and post commands outside the
city of Vlora and won great success. The peasants heroi-
210
Bajram Curri (1862-1925),
one of the leaders of Al­
bania’s liberation revolts
against Turkish invasion
in 1911-12 and of the
Democratic Bourgeois
Revolution of June 1924

cally assailed and demolished within a couple of hours the

fortified garrisons of Kote, Gjorme, Llogora and Drashovica,
taking hundreds of prisoners-of-war and liberating the
entire occupied territory. About 3,000 brave peasants, on
the eve of June 11, 1920, undertook an intrepid attack on
the city of Vlora, which was defended by two army divi­
sions, by fortifications erected beforehand and by a great
number of warships. Towards dawn, the peasants pene­
trated the outer quarters of the city, but did not carry
further their attack and at the order of the commander of
the uprising, they withdrew to the hills of Vlora in order
to avoid damaging the population of the city.
In the meantime the military forces of the government
of Tirana, under the command of Bajram Curri, had under­
taken a vast operation against the Esadist rebel movement.
211
 Avni Rustem
(1897-1924)

These operations were terminated successfully within a

few days. On June 13, 1920, the revolutionary Albanian
student Avni Rustem made an attempt on the life of the
traitor Esad Pasha Toptani, killing him in Paris. With his
murder the Esadist rebel movement came to an end.
With the speedy aid that arrived from Italy, the com­
mand of the occupation forces later on undertook two ex­
peditions to crush the uprising for liberation, but in both
cases its efforts met with failure. For weeks in succession
the Albanian warriors kept Vlora besieged.
The war for the liberation of Vlora aroused great enthu­
siasm throughout Albania. From all the districts of the
country hundreds of volunteers left for Vlora, and supplies
of money and food were collected for the valorous warriors.
At the same time it drew the sympathy of all the world.
In those critical days for Albania, the Italian working class
rose to help the Albanian people, launching numerous pro­
212
tests, demonstrations and strikes against the brutal war
of the Roman imperialists in Albania.
Exactly as had been foreseen by the patriots, the unre­
lenting resistance of the Albanian people, the pressure of
international public opinion and the actions of the Italian
working class compelled the government of Rome to start
negotiations with the government of Tirana to bring the
fighting to an end. After long discussions that took place
in the capital of Albania and after other defeats the Italian
troops suffered in Vlora, the government of Rome was
obliged at last to accept the conditions set by the Albanians.
On August 2, 1920, the preliminary protocol of Tirana was
signed, according to which Italy was constrained to with­
draw its troops from Albania by September 2, 1920, with the
exception of Sazan, and to renounce all its claims to annex
Vlora, and undertook to respect the independence and the
territorial integrity of Albania. On September 3, 1920, the
heroic Albanian fighters triumphantly marched into Vlora,
liberated it and united it with the independent motherland.

THE POLITICAL LIFE IN ALBANIA

IN 1920-1923

The victory which the Albanians achieved in Vlora was

of great importance for Albania. It solved, so to say,
automatically the “Albanian question”, the question of the
partitioning of Albania that for more than a year had been
the target of imperialist and chauvinist passions at the peace
conference. Italy, by signing the preliminary protocol
of Tirana and by withdrawing its troops from Albania,
acknowledged — as was stated in the second paragraph of
the protocol — “Albanian sovereignty” and the “territorial
integrity of Albania”. Thus it gave up the right to demand
before the tribunal of Paris the annexation of Vlora and
the Italian mandate over the crippled Albanian state. And
213
in fact Rome, discredited by the Albanian uprising and by
the defeats it had suffered in Vlora, was no longer in con­
dition to demand its “rights” in Albania as promised in
the Treaty of London. Consequently the peace conference,
too, which in March had shelved sine die discussion of
the “Albanian question”, postponing its re-examination till
after the Italo-Yugoslav bipartite negotiations on their
divergences in the Adriatic had been terminated, did not
take up for a second time the discussion of this question,
even after the negotiations between Rome and Belgrade
had come to an end. As the promises that had been given
to Greece, Serbia and Montenegro on the Treaty of London
were conditioned by the benefit that was to go to Italy,
their claims could neither find fulfilment. Thus the govern­
ment of Tirana was no longer constrained to address itself
to the peace conference in order to defend the sovereign
rights of Albania, denied up to then by the Great Powers.
On the contrary, a few weeks later it applied to the League
of Nations and to its general assembly for the admission
of independent, sovereign Albania, with its boundaries as
fixed in 1913, as a member state. The general assembly on
December 17, 1920 took the resolution to admit Albania
as a member of the League of Nations. This resolution
marked the international recognition of Albania as an in­
dependent state, thereby marking the triumph of the policy
adopted by the Congress of Lushnje and officially, though
not openly, burying the odious Treaty of London, which had
worried the Albanians so.
Now that the danger of enslavement and of partition of
the country appeared to have passed, the main attention of
the Albanian political leaders was riveted upon the internal
problems of the country. Of these, the most concrete prob­
lem was the construction of the state apparatus, the
problem of the political regime. Albania needed above all
else a complete fundamental statute to replace the provi­
sory and rudimentary regulations that had been approved
by the Congress of Lushnje. She was in need of new laws
appropriate to a sovereign and independent state and to
214
supersede the Ottoman laws which continued in force. Of
equal seriousness were the economic problems. Albania,
a rural country with almost no industry whatsoever, was
in urgent need of radical measures to improve its backward
agriculture. It was evident that the import of grain and
other articles of consumption, amounting to six or seven
times the total of Albania’s exports, would dry up within
a few years the monetary fund that she had inherited.
Albania had for the first time to make a regular state budget
and to start investing in the domains of economy and of
culture.
In the face of these complex problems which emerged
with the times, the Albanian political forces, which had
been united at the time of the Congress of Lushnje in order
to forestall the danger from abroad, were now split up into
factions. The Cabinet of Sulejman Delvina, deeming that
the mandate it had received from the Congress of Lushnje
had come to an end, and in view of the breach in the ranks
of the political forces that had been up to then its main
support, resigned from office on November 14, 1920. The
National Council (the parliament) created in Lushnje, also
handed in its resignation. Thus started for Albania a new
period of internal political strife, which was characterized
on the one hand by the efforts of conservative and land­
owning classes to preserve their estates and their former
privileges, and on the other hand, by the struggle of new
progressive forces aiming at the democratization of the
Albanian state.
This internal political strife was accompanied by serious
external troubles. The two neighbouring states of Albania,
Yugoslavia and Greece, the former especially, did not give
up their old cupidity. At this conjuncture of “stability”
created by the League of Nations they of course changed
their tactics. Yugoslavia, heir to the Serbian and Mon­
tenegrin chauvinistic greed of old times, and alongside it
Greece with its megalomaniacal rulers, began to demand,
no mere annexation of Albanian soil, but the definite settl­
ing of the boundaries of Albania, insinuating by these claims
215
the “rectification” of the boundaries of Albania to their
advantage. At the same time, Belgrade, by means of armed
bands, attempted to undermine the Albanian state appara­
tus, in order to set up in Tirana a government friendly to
Yugoslavia. Athens, on the other side, in order to achieve
its aims, began again to activate, though in a moderate
form, the discredited Vorio-Epirotic movement. The Great
Powers, on their part, including Italy, started to exer­
cise pressure on the Albanian government and to menace
it, in order to snatch economic concessions and privileges,
particularly in the domain of the exploitation of mines and
trade with foreign countries. The new cabinet that was
formed under the presidency of Ilias Vrioni on November
19, 1920 tried in a formal manner to guard the unity of
Albanian political forces. The new prime minister was a
partisan of the political platform of the Congress of Lush-
nje, but at the same time he was a son of a great landowner
of Albania, and this fact was not without telling influence
on his governing activity. The main task of the new cabinet
was to give to the country its parliament. On December 5,
1920 the law on elections was published, drafted in such
a manner as to facilitate the election of the landlords’ can­
didates and their supporters.
During the election campaign two main political currents
polarized themselves, and after the elections on April 5,
1921, crystallized into two parties, in reality, into two par­
liamentary political groups — the progressive party which
represented the interests of the landlords, the conservative
bourgeoisie, the high clergy and the supporters of “social
traditions”; and the popular party, constituted of democratic
elements together with some liberal beys, who demanded
that a democratic constitution, based on bourgeois prin­
ciples of Western Europe, be introduced in Albania.
The political life of the Albanian state, however, was
again disturbed by the Yugoslav and Greek provocations.
In May 1921, the government of Ilias Vrioni, which received
a vote of confidence in the new parliament, insistently
demanded from the League of Nations that Yugoslavia and
216
Greece should be compelled to withdraw their troops from
the Albanian districts and thus to respect, according to the
resolution of the League of Nations itself, the boundaries
of Albania set in 1913. The League of Nations, on the
other hand, at the proposal of France in support of the
Yugoslav policy, referred for examination the question of
the boundaries of Albania to the Conference of Ambassa­
dors in Paris, composed of representatives from Great
Britain, France, Italy and Japan. This resolution whetted
the appetite of Albania’s two neighbours. While in the
south the government of Athens endeavoured, without
success, to revive the abortive Vorio-Epirotic movement,
in the north the ultra-reactionary arch-bayraktar Gjon
Marka Gjoni, through the political, financial and military
aid of Belgrade, passed into open rebellion, and in June
proclaimed the so-called “Republic of Mirdita”.
The turmoil continued throughout the summer. Through
the steps it took, the government of Ilias Vrioni, at the
start, achieved various successes: in the south it re-estab­
lished its prestige without any difficulty; in the north, by
means of military operations, it put down the rebellion of
Gjon Marka Gjon. At the beginning of autumn, however,
the situation deteriorated in an alarming manner, because
Belgrade sent into Albania new bands of mercenaries ac­
companied by detachments of the regular Yugoslav army,
thus committing open intrusion. In face of these serious
difficulties, the government of Ilias Vrioni began to vacillate
and to hesitate in taking energetic steps. In order to fore­
stall the danger, the members of the Popular Party,
together with a number of the Progressive Party mem­
bers, partisans of strong action, formed a temporary
alliance called “Sacred Union”, which succeeded in bringing
about on October 11, 1921 in the parliament the fall of the
cabinet of Ilias Vrioni and the formation on October 16, 1921
of a new cabinet headed by Pandeli Evangjeli.
A few weeks later, on November 9, 1921, the Conference
of Ambassadors in Paris passed the resolution that had been
demanded by the League of Nations. Not one of Greece’s
217
claims was acknowledged, and in south Albania the bound­
aries set in 1913 were reconfirmed. Consequently Athens
was compelled to withdraw its armies from the Albanian
villages in the district of Bilisht, which it had occupied
since May 1920. In the north, however, the Conference of
Ambassadors made changes in the boundaries to the disad­
vantage of Albania, by ceding to Yugoslavia the district of
Gora, part of the district of Luma and several villages of
Golloborda with a population of tens of thousands of souls.
By another decision that the Conference of Ambassadors
took on that same day, a special position in Albania was
granted to Italy, to whom a number of rights were also
conceded, violating the sovereignty of the Albanian state.
According to this resolution, any violation of the bound­
aries of Albania, of its political and economic independ­
ence by any other power would be considered as a threat
to the strategic security of Italy; and therefore, similarly,
the three Great Powers, Great Britain, France and Japan,
should recommend to the League of Nations that it entrust
Italy with the task of restoring the territorial integrity and
the political and economic independence of Albania.
The resolutions of the Conference of Ambassadors were
approved by the League of Nations. The Albanian govern­
ment was recognized by the Great Powers. Tirana issued
the order to the military commanders of the frontiers to
suspend military operations. Belgrade, however, not only
did not stop its provocations, but it increased them still
more. That is why, on November 20, 1921, the Cabinet of
Pandeli Evangjeli signed the order to start the general
operations under the command of Colonel Bajram Curri
against the Yugoslav bands concentrated in the Puka re­
gion, and under the command of Colonel Achmed Zogu
against the rebellion of Mirdita, which had not been entirely
crushed as yet. Through the aid of the local population,
the operations were successful. The international commis­
sion that arrived a few weeks later to define the Albanian-
Yugoslav boundaries, ascertained the authority and the
prestige the government of Tirana enjoyed even among
218
the unfortunate Albanian population of these frontier
zones.
The relative stability that was achieved by these deci­
sions and the operations at the frontiers of Albania
furnished the opportunity for internal political struggles
to erupt with unprecedented impetus within as well as out­
side the parliament. The “Sacred Union” created to re­
sist the danger from abroad, was dissolved. With its dis­
solution the cabinet of Pandeli Evangjeli lost its support
in the parliament. In order to avoid a government crisis,
the Supreme Council of the Albanian State, at the proposal
of the prime minister, decreed the suspension of the parlia­
ment until January 1922, thus affording to the government
the privilege of carrying on without having to give account
to anyone during that period of time. These acts gave
great anxiety to the democratic forces of the country, be­
cause behind the prime minister Pandeli Evangjeli, they
perceived the hand of a Buonapartist, as was said at this
juncture, whose personal ambition for despotic domination
began to be detected in every political circle of the country.
This was Ahmed bey Zogolli, or, as he had started to call
himself, Achmed Zogu, native of Mat, the grandson of the
powerful tribal chieftain Xhelal pasha Zogolli, who had
aspired in his time, in the I860’s, with the help of the
Serhians and the Russians, to become prince of an Albania,
one-fourth the size of the Albania of today. Clever, but
inordinately ambitious and an unscrupulous intriguer,
Achmed Zogu had entered the political life of Albania
when he was still very young, attracting the attention of
the personalities of the time by his “devotion” towards the
country, by the “inclination” he manifested for the
advanced political ideas, and still more, by the considerable
mercenary forces he had secured by the inherited right of
chieftainship in Mat. He was about 24 years old when,
accompanied by hundreds of mercenaries he went with
great pomp to the Congress of Lushnje as delegate of Mat.
By taking advantage of the crucial moment in which the
historic Congress met, the cunning and astute chieftain of
219
Mat secured for himself the post of Minister of Home Af­
fairs in the cabinet of Sulejman Delvina. Afterwards, by
insinuating his mercenary forces in the ranks of the state
gendarmery, Achmed Zogu secured a privileged position in
the Council of Ministers and easily succeeded in imposing
his will on his colleagues. In the grouping of the political
forces that took place after the fall of the Delvina cabinet,
Zogu, who had failed to be re-elected as minister, adhered
to the Popular Party, keeping at the same time clandestine
relations with the leaders of the opposition landlords’ party.
Acknowledging his rank of colonel, which the Austro-
Hungarians had given him during the First World War as
honoris causa, the prime minister appointed Achmed
Zogu, who at the same time was deputy of Mat, commander
of military operations against the Mirdita rebellion. Zogu
utilized these operations to strengthen his personal military
power.
The close collaboration of the prime minister with the
powerful and ambitious Zogu, their pulling for a change
in the policy of Albania in the direction of “rapproche­
ment” with Yugoslavia and, along with this, their attempts
to reform the cabinet by bringing in partisans of Zogu
while the parliament was not in session, alarmed the dem­
ocratic elements. On the strong urging of these elements,
the Supreme Council, on December 6, 1921, decreed the
dismissal of the Evangjeli cabinet and approved the for­
mation of an anti-Zogist cabinet with Qazim Koculi as
prime minister. From its first hours, however, it was evi­
dent that Zogu had secured in his hands the most important
posts of the state administration; therefore the new cabinet,
unable to withstand the actions of the adherents of Zogu,
resigned after holding office only 20 hours. The new anti-
Zogist cabinet under the presidency of Hasan Prishtina,
formed on December 7, 1920, was likewise compelled to
hand in its resignation after four days in order to avoid the
break out of civil war, with which Zogu threatened the
country. On December 10, 1921 the management of state
affairs until the parliament assembled was taken over by
220
a cabinet of “technicians” headed by I. Kosturi. This polit­
ical crisis was exploited with dexterity by Achmed Zogu.
After he had suspended the military operations, he entered
Tirana on December 14, 1921 at the head of his troops, pro­
claimed martial law, convoked immediately the parliament,
and forced the Supreme Council and the Kosturi cabinet to
resign. The new Supreme Council that was elected through
his interference on December 24, 1921, entrusted Xhafer
Ypi, an obedient instrument of Zogu, with the formation
of the government. Zogu personally kept the portfolio of
the ministry of interior. The Zogist clique thus came into
power.
As minister of interior Zogu afterwards took a series of
measures in order to strengthen his personal power. On
the pretext of establishing order and internal tranquillity,
he began to disarm the population, directing his zeal against
the population hostile to him, without hesitating to per­
secute personalities of the opposition, including anti-Zogist
ministers and deputies. Against the Zogist clique a strong
opposition was formed inside and outside the parliament,
which, with the aim of curtailing the Buonapartist as­
pirations of Achmed Zogu, demanded the convocation of the
constituent assembly without delay. Deeming that the
parliamentary battle, although directed with remarkable
eloquence by Fan Noli, Stavro Vinjau and Luigj Gurakuqi,
would not bring the desired results, a number of opponents
of Zogu such as Bajram Curri, Elez Isufi, Aqif Bi^ak^iu,
Zia Dibra and others decided to overthrow by force the
Zogist clique. In March 1922, these forces of the opposi­
tion, joined by some adventurous elements that had entered
into secret relations with certain foreign powers, passed to
armed uprising with the slogan “For the convocation of the
Constituent Assembly”. On March 22, a part of these forces
succeeded in entering the capital. But the movement,
ill-organized, met with failure. Unreliable insurgent forces
were swayed by the pressure of the British minister Ayres
and departed from the capital. The uprising of March failed
and then was crushed.
221
 The repression of the uprising was followed by a ruthless
terror on the part of the government against the forces of
the opposition. The administration and the army were
purged of anti-Zogist elements. Hundreds of persons were
imprisoned. Zogu went so far as to subject to hard labour
the peasant population of the district of Shijak that had
supported the movement of March. Then he suspended the
sessions of the parliament until the autumn of 1922. In
order to deceive the public, in May the government promised
that it would soon call a meeting of the constituent as­
sembly, which continued to be the current main demand.
In September the government placed before the parliament
for its approval a provisional statute more complete than
the one approved by the Congress of Lushnje, in which
democratic liberties were formally confirmed. After this
measure, on December 24, 1922 a new cabinet was formed
with Achmed Zogu himself holding the posts of prime min­
ister and minister of interior.
In spite of the police measures he took, Zogu did not suc­
ceed in breaking the opposition. The number of his adver­
saries increased steadily outside the parliament, and for the
further reason that by abandoning the principles of the
Popular Party, he divulged his underhanded connections
with landlords and the assistance he gave to the feudal
beys. More and more the political strife against the dicta­
torial aims of Zogu was fusing with the social strife against
the stubborn reactionary sway of the feudalists. In this
direction there was a reorganization of the forces of the op­
position. The more advanced members of the Popular Party,
under the head of Fan Noli, Stavro Vinjau, Luigj Gura-
kuqi and Sulejman Delvina, formed in the parliament a new
opposition front, which was directed not only against the
person of Zogu, but also at the overthrow of the authority
of beys in general; in other words for the overthrow of the
remnants of feudalism in Albania and for the establishment
of a democratic power. Outside the parliament, too, after
October 1922, a political organization was formed by the
name of Bashkimi under the presidency of Avni Rustem,
222
a young teacher with democratic revolutionary tendencies.
This organization was scoring speedy successes in the rank
and file of the progressive youth of the country. The
growth of the opposition was apparent in the great number
of newspapers and periodicals, defending democratic prin­
ciples, in the increase in social, cultural, anti-feudal socie­
ties and clubs, and most conspicuously, in the popular prot­
estations, meetings and strikes directed against the policy
of the Zogu government.

THE DEMOCRATIC BOURGEOIS REVOLUTION

OF JUNE 1924

Under the pressure of the democratic movement, the cab­

inet of Zogu was compelled to lay before the parliament
in August 1923 the bill on the elections to the Constituent
Assembly. The bill that provided indirect elections in two
grades with schedules and lists, met with the vigorous re­
sistance of the opposition and of democratic circles through­
out the country. The opposition fought in the parliament
in order to bring about important modifications of the bill,
so that the voting should be direct and not in two steps,
that in consideration of the high percentage of illiteracy,
the votes should be cast by ballets and not by schedules,
that the elections should develop according to the one-name
principle and not by means of lists, that women should be
given the right to vote, that on the day of elections both
the army and the police force should be confined to their
garrisons, and that political amnesty should be decreed for
the participants of the March 1922 movement, in the first
place for Bajram Curri, who had remained a fugitive in the
mountains of north Albania. After prolonged and animated
debates, the governmental majority in the parliament
on September 28, 1923, passed the bill without taking into
consideration the proposed amendments of the opposition.
223
After that, the parliament was dissolved, and in the whole
country the electoral campaign began in an atmosphere of
aggravated political strife.
In the course of the electoral campaign, the country was
split into two great political camps: on one side rallied all
the organizations friendly to the government, in fact organ­
izations that were financed by land-holders of the country
and by Zogu himself, who on this occasion was subsidized
from abroad, by Italy and Yugoslavia; on the other side
stood the numerous organizations of the opposition, which
were, however, rent into factions and badly organized, and
which came forward with an open, anti-feudal, anti-im­
perialist and anti-dictatorial programme, for a democratic
regime, for a republican Albania. Never before had the Al­
banians taken part so enthusiastically and so totally in the
political life of the country. The popular upsurge soon
posed a threat to the landlord Zogist clique. In order to
bring it to a halt, the government organs resorted to in­
timidation and terror. They did not hesitate to murder
through ambush the courageous delegate electors who were
resolved to cast their votes for the opposition. An impor­
tant role in the campaign of threat on the part of the gov­
ernment was played especially by the police force through
its open interference.
In an inflamed political atmosphere the elections were
terminated on December 27, 1923. In spite of the falsifi­
cations, threats and direct interferences, the government
bloc secured in the parliament only 40 of the 95 deputies
that were elected to the Constituent Assembly. The oppo­
sition led by Fan Noli secured 35 seats. In the ranks of the
opposition in the Assembly stood Avni Rustem, the presi­
dent of the society Bashkimi (Union) elected by the votes
of sympathizers of Bajram Curri. The remaining 20 seats
represented the so-called “independents”, who, after the
elections, were united with the government bloc.
The results of the elections aroused indignation through­
out the country. Consequently, the democratic, anti-feu­
dal and anti-Zogist movement was not only not cowed by
224
the terror, but on the contrary it grew still stronger. From
all quarters of the country, energetic protests were sent to
the government against its falsifications and repressions
during the elections. Political tension over the country
rose to a still higher pitch after the opening of the Con­
stituent Assembly (February 2, 1924), as the Prime Minister
A. Zogu, in violation of the democratic rules, failed to hand
in his resignation.
He was compelled to resign only after an abortive at­
tempt on his life by a student on February 23, at the entrance
of the parliament building, incitement to his act being at­
tributed by the government to the opposition. After violent
debates in the parliament, the government crisis was solved
in favour of the land-holder clique. The new cabinet that
was formed on March 3, 1924, had as Prime Minister Shef­
qet Verlaci, father-in-law of A. Zogu and at the same time
one of the greatest feudal landowners of Albania. Zogu,
who, in order to appease the opposition and to give satisfac­
tion to the “independents” did not place himself in the
cabinet, began behind the scenes to prepare to seize power
by force. At the beginning of April, his agents laid ambush
and murdered at Mamuras two American tourists who were
travelling from Tirana to Shkoder. Exploiting this hideous
assassination, which had deep repercussions within the
country and abroad, he proclaimed martial law with the
authorization of the government, and thus blockaded the
capital with troops.
Under these circumstances the opposition was convinced
that by constitutional means it was impossible to hinder the
further strengthening of the Zogist and landlord dictator­
ship and to give to Albania a democratic regime. The ar­
gument gained increasing strength that the iron hand of
the intriguer Zogu and of the landlord clique could be
broken only by energetic action. The attack by the agents
of Zogu in Tirana on April 20, 1924, on Avni Rustem, who
died on the 22nd of the wounds he had received, filled the
cup to the brim.
225
 The assassination of Avni Rustem, renowned for the role
he had played in the patriotic movement, for his demo­
cratic revolutionary ideas and for the signal service he had
rendered to the country through the attempt on the life of
the traitor Esad Pasha Toptani which he had made in Paris
on June 13, 1920, aroused a wave of anger throughout Al­
bania. In various parts of the country meetings of indigna­
tion and of protest were held. His assassination was con­
sidered by advanced circles as prelude to a terrorist
offensive by the Zogist landholder clique against the demo­
cratic, anti-feudal movement. The opposition resolved to
go into action.
The body of Avni Rustem was buried in Vlora on May
1, 1924, with the assistance of almost 10,000 peasants and
citizens who had rallied from different regions of the coun­
try. After the funeral, the opposition members of the As­
sembly directed from Vlora an ultimatum to the Supreme
Council in Tirana, in which they demanded punishment of
the muiderers of citizens and of foreign visitors, thus allud­
ing openly to A. Zogu. As the government gave no reply,
the 43 members of the Assembly gathered in Vlora, after
having secured the vote of all the democratic circles and
the support of the military commands of the country, de­
cided to start the armed uprising. To direct it, a revolu­
tionary administrative commission was formed with Fan
Noli at its head.
The first signal of the armed uprising was given by Baj-
ram Curri on May 25, 1924, who within a few days scored
great successes in the districts of Kukes and Dibra. The
resignation of the Verlaci cabinet on May 27, 1924, and the
formation on that same day, of a new cabinet with Ilias
Vrioni as prime minister, had no influence on the develop­
ment of events. On May 31, the important garrisons of
Shkoder and of Per met joined the uprising, accompanied by
whole peasant masses. On June 2, most of the districts and
cities of northern and southern Albania fell into the hands
of the insurgents. The government and Zogist mercenary
forces that were sent against the insurgents were shattered.
226
On June 10, the revolutionary forces entered the capital
while the leaders of the Zogist landholding reaction fled
abroad: Achmed Zogu and Ceno Kryeziu to Yugoslavia,
Mufit Liboho-va and Ko^o Kota to Greece, and Shefqet Ver-
laci and Ilias Vrioni to Italy.
A democratic authority was established in Albania for
the first time, bourgeois in nature but with revolutionary
impulse, a shift of authority that triumphed with relative
facility, thanks to the sympathy its democratic, anti-feudal
and anti-imperialist programme had aroused among the
popular masses.
On June 16, 1924, the democratic government was formed
with Fan Noli as prime minister, and Sulejman Delvina,
Luigj Gurakuqi, Stavro Vinjau, Kasem Qafzezi, Kasem Sha-
la, Qazim Koculi etc. as members of the cabinet. After
three days the prime minister announced the programme of
the government, in which the highest aspirations of the
bourgeois-democratic revolution were formulated in a con­
densed manner: eradication of feudal system, definite
establishment of democracy in Albania, liberation of the
population, economic emancipation of the peasants, establish­
ment of the enforcement of the law, real independence
of the courts of justice, radical reform of obsolete legisla­
tion, change in the system of taxation, simplification of the
state bureaucracy, re-organization of the budget, of admin­
istration, of education and so on. The government pro­
claimed the elections of December 27, 1923 null and void,
and promised that new elections for the Constituent As­
sembly should be held, based on secret and direct voting,
as soon as order and tranquillity should be established.
The Noli government started its activity with a series
of encouraging measures. It decreed at once democratic
liberties, warranting to the citizens and peasants freedom
of speech, of the press, of assembly and of organization;
at its prosecution, the tribunal passed in absentia the sen­
tence of death and the confiscation of their property on
the most notorious leaders of the reaction who had fled the
country; the Ministry of Agriculture started studying the
227
enactment of agrarian reforms in favour of the peasants.
The government took steps for the normalization of rela­
tions with the neighbour states of Albania; it began to re­
examine the commercial treaties unfavourable to Albania,
signed by the government of Zogu, etc. etc.
However, in this revolutionary activity, the cabinet of
Noli since its first days was encumbered by serious internal
and external difficulties. After the triumph of the 10th of
June, the forces that took part in the revolution ran into
divergences and split into forces for and against social and
political reforms. This was due to the fact that in the June
movement, bourgeois and landlord forces had also taken
part, which were concerned only in the overthrow of the
personal, dictatorial power of Achmed Zogu. More specifi­
cally, military high officers, supported by conservative ele­
ments and with the approval, in part reticent and in part
openly declared, of some of the members of the govern­
ment, began to exert pressure on the government as a whole
and on the prime minister, to postpone or cancel the execu­
tion of radical social, economic and political reforms. On
the international scene, in 1925, there did not exist favour­
able conditions for a revolutionary movement, there did
not exist any inducement for the Great Powers to give their
support to this government that refused to grant conces­
sions and privileges to foreign capitals, and that caused
damage more especially to the interests of the Italian fascist
government and of its rival, the Yugoslav reactionary gov­
ernment. For propaganda purposes nothing was speculated
upon by these powers more than the initiative taken by
the government of Noli to establish normal diplomatic re­
lations between Albania and the Soviet Union. None of
the Great Powers recognized de jure the government of
Noli. Indisputably this was a great drawback for the Noli
cabinet, and an encouraging factor for the malcontents
within the country and the fugitives abroad.
Under the pressure of these factors, the leaders of the
revolution began to temporize with the enforcement of the
programme proclaimed in June, in order to avoid arousing
228
armed counteraction to the internal reaction, and in order to
avoid the aggravation of the unfriendly relations with the
Great Powers. The provocative accusation of “Bolshevik”
tendencies influenced the members of the government to
lag with the solution of one of the main problems of the
revolution, agrarian reform, and to ask the Soviet minister
plenipotentiary, who had arrived in Tirana to present his
credentials, to leave Albania within 24 hours. The political
opportunism which had seized the majority of the members
of the government weakened to a considerable degree its
revolutionary impetus.
This weakness was exploited by Zogist landlord reac­
tion. Still, this reaction would have been unable to upset
the situation without the help of foreign reactionary forces.
Achmed Zogu carried on negotiations with the Yugoslav
government for the organization of military intervention in­
to Albania. Belgrade gave him effective political, military
and financial aid. Within the territory of Yugoslavia he
raised an army composed of mercenaries, which he strength­
ened by Russian whiteguard troops put at his disposal by
Belgrade — a force of approximately 10,000 men armed
and equipped. Similar activity was carried on by his collab­
orators in Greece, where Mufit Libohova and Koqo Kota
recruited other military forces.
In face of the rapid counter-revolutionary preparation,
the government of Noli did not take any military steps.
While its attention was concentrated on the electoral cam­
paign for the Constituent Assembly, on December 10, 1924
the internationalist forces commanded by Achmed Zogu
crossed the Yugoslav-Albanian frontier in order to break
the revolutionary authority of June before the elections
had been terminated. On December 14 the mercenary
forces of Mufid Libohova and Ko<?o Kota; too, crossed the
Greco-Albanian frontier.
Not meeting with any serious resistance, the interven­
tionist forces of A. Zogu penetrated with facility into the
depth of the Albanian territory. After two weeks of fight­
ing, on account of the superiority in numbers, and taking­
229
advantage of the lethargy that had enveloped the govern­
mental apparatus of Noli, the counter-revolutionary forces
entered Tirana on December 24. Fan Noli, together with
the other members of the government and accompanied by
hundreds of democratic and revolutionary elements, left
Albania for foreign lands.
Some days after the fall of the capital, the Zogist land­
lord reaction, with the aid of imperialist powers, re-estab­
lished its anti-popular authority throughout Albania.

THE YEARS OF THE ZOGIST REPUBLIC

On December 24, 1924, with the entrance of interven­

tionist forces into Tirana, the government of the great land­
holder Iljas Vrioni, which had been overthrown by the
bourgeois-democratic revolution, formally came back to
power. In reality full power was held by Achmed Zogu.
the principal organizer of the counter-revolution, who of­
ficially held the office of commander of the armed forces.
By means of the gesture, the dictator endeavoured to dem­
onstrate that he respected the constitutional rules. A
few days later, the cabinet of Vrioni resigned. On January
6, 1925 the new cabinet was formed under the presidency
of Achmed Zogu, who continued to hold at the same time
the office of commander of the armed forces. In his govern­
ment, besides Zogu who held also the post of minister for
home affairs, were only two other ministers, the other two
leaders of the counter-revolution, Mufid Libohova, who
held three ministries, and Kogo Kota, an emissary of the
dictator, a persori without personality.
By concentrating almost the entire power in his own
hands, Zogu continued the military operations in order to
extirpate everywhere the democratic spirit and to show
the teeth of his dictatorial authority. He divided Albania
into several military zones, putting at the head of each, as
230
 omnipotent commanders, tribal chieftains (bayraktars) de­
void of all principles of civilized life. Their mercenary­
bands proclaimed martial law. Under the pretext of
disarming the population that had helped the revolution,
the martial law continued for a long time. The punitive
operations lasted several months consecutively. Hundreds
of persons were imprisoned or interned. Court-martials
sentenced to death a considerable number of peasants who
had taken part in the June revolution. In villages and cities
bands of mercenaries ransacked and looted the homes of
those who had nothing to do with the events. One of the
particular concerns of the mercenary commandants was
the depredation of the population by means of fines and
bribes.
Zogu not only annulled the democratic liberties that had
been won by the revolution of June, but he suppressed the
former limited liberties, too. Political organizations and
cultural and art clubs that had existed formerly, were closed
down. It was likewise forbidden to create new political
organizations. Police censorship was placed not only on
the Albanian press and foreign publications that entered
into Albania but also on private correspondence.
After he had grasped firmly in his own hands the politi­
cal power, Zogu turned his attention to the form of the
regime, and, in connection with this, to the drafting of the
constitution that had remained unsettled. At this occur­
rence, he preferred, for convenience, the republican regime.
At his dictate, the remnants of the Constituent Assembly
elected at the end of 1923, were called to meet in Tirana.
This crippled Assembly, on January 21, 1925, proclaimed
the Albanian Republic, and ten days later, on January 31,
1925, Achmed Zogu as its president. The constitution was
approved definitively on March 2, 1925.
Full of democratic phraseology, the constitution pro­
claimed Albania a parliamentary republic, responsible to the
will of the people. But behind the democratic phraseology
the dictatorial rule of Zogu and the power of the land­
holding beys, of the reactionary tribal chieftains and of con­
231
servative bourgeoisie lay hidden. According to the constitu­
tion, the president of the Republic, that is to say Zogu, was
to be at the same time president of the Council of Ministers
and commander-in-chief of the army. The legislative power
was to be exercised by the parliament composed of two
chambers, the senate and the chamber of deputies. The
constitution conferred on the president of the Republic
unlimited power, among them the right to appoint and to
dismiss arbitrarily ministers, higher functionaries, officers,
etc. In case the parliament modified the bills presented by
Zogu as president of the Council of Ministers, Zogu as Pres­
ident of the Republic had the right to veto the acts passed
by the parliament.
Even after he had been proclaimed President of the Re­
public, Zogu concentrated in the hands of the leaders of
the reaction, such as Mufid bey Libohova, Ceno bek Krye-
ziu, Koqo Kota, the government which he reformed on
February 1, 1925. He continued to strengthen the gendarm-
ery, the organizing of which he entrusted in September
to a group of British instructing officers, led by General
Sir Jocelyn Percy. At the same time he endeavoured more
and more to draw around him the reactionary chieftains of
the highlands, to whom, at a “congress” convoked by him in
June, he promised special political privileges, and through
military grades he conferred on them, he assured monthly
subsidies in the form of wages. In the framework of the
policy of terror against democratic elements, his agents as­
sassinated on March 2, 1925 in the streets of Bari in Italy
Luigj Gurakuqi, one of the most illustrious leaders of the
Albanian nationalist-democratic movement. Four weeks
later, on March 29, 1925 the gendarmery forces of Zogu
killed in an encounter in Dragobi one of the most popular
leaders of the progressive movement of liberation, Bajram
Curri, who fought heroically till the end of his life. Of the
multifarious acts of terror which Zogu committed, the as­
sassination of these two highly honoured personalities in
Albanian political life left the ugliest impression. Zogu’s
anti-democratic policy in home affairs was matched by his
232
capitulating attitude towards the Great Powers. This was
undoubtedly the consequence of the obligations he had as­
sumed to the imperialist powers for their help during the
counter-revolution in December 1924. The policy he adopt­
ed in his dealings with them was that of the “open door”
in economic as well as political spheres. As a result of this
policy, it can be asserted that the years 1925-1928 represent
in the history of Albania the years of assault and of capture,
on the part of international imperialist capital, of the most
important levers of the economy of this backward country.
The preferred domain of concessions demanded by foreign
capitalist companies was the exploitation of mines. Two
powerful British companies took in concession 220,000 hec­
tares of land for prospecting purposes; one of the biggest
capitalist companies of the U.S.A., the Standard Oil Com­
pany of New York, took in concession 80,000 hectares of
land for prospecting for petroleum and various minerals
such as iron, mercury, copper and sulfur. The Italian cap­
italist corporations AIPA, SIMSA, SIEMA received like­
wise the right to prospect and to exploit the underground
riches of Albania, her petroleum, asphalt, coal, etc. One
Yugoslav company received in concession the exploitation
of copper in the zone of Puka. Through agreements reached
between these foreign capitalist companies and the Zogist
Albanian government, foreign capitalists took in concession
23 per cent of the territory of Albania. The extent of the
land that Albanian capitalists took over for prospecting and
exploitation during that same period was equal to 0.03 per
cent of the territory of Albania, one-745th the land area
taken in concession by foreign companies.
Along with the concessions for the exploitation of mines,
the foreign capitalists likewise grabbed concessions in agri­
culture and industry. All these concessions, with special
privileges, were granted to foreign corporations. In general
the Albanian state did not exercise any control over the
economic and administrative management of these corpora­
tions. For the military and financial aid he had received
from Belgrade, Zogu handed to Yugoslavia a slice of Al­
233
banian territory, which injured the political boundaries of
Albania won through the Albanian patriots’ numerous and
strenuous struggles. The Conference of Ambassadors in
Paris on the League of Nations’ instruction in 1921, as it
has been stated, had set, though to the disfavour' of Albania,
the final Albano-Yugoslav boundary. At that time, Bel­
grade had protested against this solution, demanding the in­
clusion, within the confines of Yugoslavia, of Vermosh and
of St. Naum, which had been allotted to Albania. In spite
of the reiterated Yugoslav demands, the Conference of Am­
bassadors, relying on the report of the special commission
entrusted by it for investigations on the spot, by the deci­
sion it took in September 1923, confirmed its former deci­
sion. After further persistent demands by Belgrade, in
May 1924, the Conference of Ambassadors passed the res­
olution to reject the Yugoslav claims on Vermosh, which
it re-allotted to Albania, whereas the question of St. Naum
was shelved by it for later reconsideration. This question
was brought before the League of Nations for discussion
in September of that year. Considering the defence of the
inviolability of the frontiers as the supreme duty of each
citizen, the prime minister Fan Noli, accompanied by Baj-
ram Curri and Luigj Gurakuqi, in spite of the not altogether
propitious internal conditions of the revolutionary govern­
ment of June, went to Geneva, and there by a brilliant
speech in defence of the Albanian question, contributed in
the positive resolution which the League of Nations took
leaving St. Naum within the boundaries of Albania.
Immediately after he had retaken power, A. Zogu granted
St. Naum to Yugoslavia. This cession of territory aroused
a general indignation in Albania. Achmed Zogu was guilty
in the eyes of the Albanian people of high treason against
Albania.
The strong connections of Zogu with Belgrade which led
to the submission of Albania to Yugoslavia did not leave
indifferent fascist Italy, which had started to develop an
active policy in the Mediterranean. Behind Yugoslavia
stood France, which Mussolini at that time considered the
234
 greatest rival of imperialist Italy. The fascist dictator could
not tolerate France’s stretching its tentacles into Albania
under the very nose of Rome. For Great Britain this was
an excellent chance to exercise its policy of balance of pow­
ers in the zone of southeast Europe by encouraging Italy
to extend its influence in Albania at the expense of Yu­
goslav interest, and indirectly at the expense of the French.
Great Britain had vast opportunities in this direction, be­
cause Zogu preferred the advice of London to that of all
other Great Powers. From January 30, 1923, Zogu tried to
appease Mussolini, informing him that he deemed it con­
venient to strengthen the friendly relations between Al­
bania and Italy. In circumstances Zogu was discouraged
from cultivating further close relations with Belgrade, for
the reason, too, that these relations had discredited him as
a tool of Yugoslavia, odious in the Albanian mind, because
this tool oppressed the million Albanians of Kossovo with
ruthless tyranny, and also because it continued to foster,
as always, chauvinist aspirations at the expense of Alba­
nia. Italy promised the dictator of Tirana more substantial
financial and political aid than Yugoslavia. Mussolini prom­
ised, among other things, that he would suspend the sup­
port Rome gave to Albanian political exiles, unreconcilable
rivals of Zogu, on condition that he would detach himself
from Belgrade.
The separation took place without fanfare in the spring
of 1925. The intermediary for the approach was Great
Britain. The first act of the rapprochement was the con­
cession for the creation of the National Bank of Albania
(Banca Nazionale d’Albania).
Albania did not possess as yet a national coinage, unified
monetary system and no regular system of credit. From
1912, and particularly from 1920, numerous demands had
been presented to the Albanian government by groups of
wealthy Albanians and by foreign financial groups for the
creation of a bank of emission and of credit in Albania.
These demands had not been taken into consideration, al­
though they had contained favourable conditions. Zogu,
235
 on the contrary, authorized the minister of finance Mufid
bey Libohova to sign on March 25, 1925 with a group of
Italian financiers representing the biggest Italian banks,
a convention by which the financiers’ group received a
concession to found the National Bank of Albania as a
bank of emission and credit with much more onerous con­
ditions than the former offers. According to the agreement,
the Albanian citizens could subscribe not more than 49
per cent of the shares, while foreign citizens must subscribe
not less than 51 per cent. Besides, by a secret agreement
concluded between the minister of finance Mufid bey Libo­
hova and the representative of the Italian group of finan­
ciers, Mario Alberti, for the subscription of the Albanian
shares a very short term was fixed, which was never pub­
lished anyway. After this term had elapsed, the shares that
pertained to Albania were to be subscribed by Italian
citizens. At the expiration of the term, it turned out that
three landowner beys had alone subscribed 25 per cent of
the shares, which after a few years likewise were acquired
by the great banks of Italy. A limited part of the shares
were bought by Swiss, Belgian, and Yugoslav capitalist cor­
porations.
The incorporation of the bank and the manner in which
it was executed caused a political scandal in Albania. The
government was blamed of corruption and of new treason.
In order to evade being compromised by this scandal, A.
Zogu could find no other way than to lay the whole burden
of the responsibility on the minister of finance, Mufid bey
Libohova. The special commission that was entrusted by the
parliament to investigate and conduct a hearing against the
minister of finance suspended activity as soon as it became
apparent that the threads of corruption led into the presi­
dential palace. Mufid bey Libohova? thoroughly discredited,
was obliged to retire from the government and from polit­
ical life. In this connection it is true that Zogu did not
succeed in appeasing the agitated public opinion, but he
achieved another success: he eliminated one of his closest
but most pretentious collaborators, with whom he was no
236
longer obliged to share the power that had been won by
them conjointly. As for the convention, this remained un­
impaired. After it had been ratified by the parliament, the
so-called National Bank of Albania was constituted in
Rome on September 2, 1925.
At the same time the Zogist government signed a con­
tract with another group of financiers for a loan of 70.5
million gold francs payable in yearly instalments with
reimbursement term of forty years at a yearly interest of
7V2 per cent. The loan, destined for the economic devel­
opment of Albania, was given in concession, by a con­
vention, to an Italian concern, especially created for this
purpose by the Italian group of financiers, under the name
of SVEA “Societa per lo Sviluppo Economico dell’Albania”
(The Company for Economic Development of Albania). As
was stated in the contract, as security for this loan the
government of Tirana pawned to this company (SVEA) the
revenues from customs duties and the Albanian state
monopolies up to the sum of 8.5 million gold francs a year,
and promised not to introduce for forty years any changes
in the customs tariffs without previous understanding with
the alien company.
These two conventions marked the beginning of the
unrestrained penetration of Italian capital into Albania and
led to the speedy economic and political submission of the
Albanian state to the Italian fascist state. The loan ear­
marked for the economic development of Albania was in­
vested in unproductive projects — for the construction of
prisons and government palaces, including Zogu’s palace,
for the construction of strategic roads that were to serve
later on for the military needs of Italy. For the improve­
ments in the backward agriculture, instead of 31.2 million
gold francs provided for in the convention, only 2.5 million
gold francs were spent. Apart from that, scarcely before two
years had elapsed, playing on the financial difficulties in
which the Albanian state found itself at the time of the
payment of the first instalment, Mussolini interfered finan­
cially and succeeded in exchanging the loan contracted by
237
Albania with the Italian group of financiers into a loan
from the fascist imperial state.
The policy of submission to fascist Italy aroused among
the Albanian people as much resentment as submission to
chauvinist Yugoslavia. But the blow given by Zogu during
the counter-revolution had so utterly paralysed all the
democratic organizations, and his police regime was so much
tightened, that it had become difficult, if not impossible,
to raise any open protest. Only the patriotic and democratic
Albanians who were in exile raised their voice of protest,
voice that at that period of political stability and of revolu­
tionary ebb throughout Europe, was lost in the wilderness.
Still, within Albania as well as abroad, attempts were made
to organize an active resistance. Inside Albania these ef­
forts met with no success. In exile, however, certain rela­
tive results were obtained. After Mussolini had rendered
the residence in Italy difficult and even impossible, the
Albanian refugees who had left Albania in December 1924
crossed over to Austria. The conference held by them in
Vienna on March 25, 1925 founded the National Revolu­
tionary Committee, shortened KONARE, under the head of
Fan Noli, which was to conduct the popular resistance
against the domination of Zogu for the liberation of Al­
bania from the yoke of feudal beys and of imperialist states,
for the establishment of a truly republican regime and for
the introduction of agrarian reforms. The KONARE pub­
licly condemned the cession of St. Naum to Yugoslavia,
as well as the enslaving conventions of March in favour of
Italy. But before long, right-wing elements, Q. Koculi,
A. Kelcyra, R. Mitrovica, etc., who did not agree with the ac­
centuated democratic revolutionary character of KONARE
but wanted the resistance limited to the overthrow of Zogu,
forsook it and formed a separate organization with the name
of “Bashkimi Kombetar” (National Union). Differently
from KONARE which continued to guard its political in­
dependence and its revolutionary spirit, the “Bashkimi
Kombetar” began to incline towards Yugoslavia, whose re­
238
lations with Zogu deteriorated apace, and towards France
whose relations with Italy became steadily worse.
In 1926 Zogu undertook further steps of rapprochement
with Italy. In June of that year, as the parliament of
Belgrade refused to ratify the Nettune Convention con­
cluded between Italy and Yugoslavia, which guaranteed the
cultural rights of Slavs in Italy and those of Italians in
Yugoslavia, Mussolini reacted by demanding that Zogu
should sign a political and military pact between Italy and
Albania. While the negotiations between Rome and Tirana
were being carried on, Belgrade attempted to overthrow
the Albanian president by means of an internal insurrec­
tion. Due to the activity undertaken by the political
emigrants, who, as Zogu in 1924, had found asylum in
Yugoslavia and exploited the discontent of the popular
masses, on November 20, 1926, an armed insurrection
erupted in the district of Dukagjini, northern Albania. Zogu
suppressed the insurrection. The anxiety caused to Zogu by
the insurrection was so great that he renounced the reserva­
tions he had maintained towards Mussolini up to then and,
on November 27, 1926, signed for a period of five years
“The Italo-Albanian Pact of Friendship and Security”, or,
as it is otherwise called, “The First Pact of Tirana”, ac­
cording to which Italy undertook to protect the political,
juridical, and territorial status quo of Albania.
It was evident that the Pact of Tirana was directed
against Belgrade, as it made clear to Yugoslavia that any
attempt to cause a change in the political condition inside
Albania would bring it face to face with Italy. This pact
was a victory for Mussolini, because it shut the door to
Yugoslavia for any interference in Albania, and attached
Zogu to Rome as a hanged man is attached to the noose.
“Independent” Albania in this manner entered under the
protectorate of Italy. “The Albanian national question”
was brought once again onto the agenda. The Albanian
democratic revolutionaries undertook the task of fighting
hence not only for the popular revolution, but also for the
national liberation of the country from the foreign protec­
239
torate sanctioned by Zogu. This programme was adopted
by KONARE in the spring of 1927, which on this occasion
was reorganized under the name of “The Committee of Na­
tional Liberation” with its seat in Geneva.
The Pact of Tirana, which marked the failure of the
Yugoslav policy towards Albania, on December 8, 1926
caused a government crisis in Belgrade. The new Yugoslav
government that came to power adopted a strong policy
against Albania and Italy, getting closer, all the while, to
France. In June 1927 the further aggravation of the rela­
tions led to the rupture for one month of diplomatic rela­
tions between Albania and Yugoslavia.
The reason for the rupture was the arrest by the police
authorities of Tirana of an employee of Albanian citizenship
in the service of the Yugoslav Legation, accused of
espionage activity. In response to the efforts of Yugoslavia
to organize acts of subversion in Albania, Zogu counter­
acted by assassinating, in Prague, in October, his brother-
in-law Ceno bek Kryeziu, Minister of Albania to Czecho­
slovakia, and one of the leaders of the counter-revolution
who was in clandestine contact with the Yugoslav govern­
ment. In the meanwhile the Italo-Yugoslav and Italo-
French relations deteriorated to the extent that France and
Yugoslavia, in order to forestall the menace of Mussolini’s
policy, on November 11, 1927, signed a treaty of friendship
which in other words was a pact of alliance directed against
Rome. Mussolini responded by signing with Zogu on
November 22, 1927 the Second Pact of Tirana, called the
Pact of Defensive Alliance, for a period of twenty years.
According to the clauses of the pact the two parties under­
took to protect each other from any threat or assault from
abroad, putting at each other’s disposal their resources.
In the circumstances when the most important levers of
the economy of Albania had fallen into the hands of Italian
capitalist concerns, when the expenses for the armaments
and military equipment of Albania were defrayed by the
government of Rome, when at the head of the Albanian
army Italian fascist instructor-officers were placed, when
240
the important naval base of Vlora was open to the Italian
navy — the two pacts of Tirana did nothing other than com­
plete the political submission of Zogist Albania to fascist
Italy.

ALBANIA —ZOGIST MONARCHY

These extremely close relations with Italy and the im­

portant economic and political concessions that had been
accorded to Mussolini gave Achmed Zogu the opportunity
to realize one of the most audacious ambitions that could
be fostered in the 20th century, the ambition to become
king.
By becoming monarch Zogu aimed at securing his abso­
lute power for an indefinite time, at removing from the
minds of his partners and of the masses of the population
all illusions that with the termination of the presidential
term, he would be replaced by another president of the
republic, and at feeling himself under no obligation to give
account to anyone on his political activity. Mussolini gave
his support without any hesitation for the realization of
this aspiration, because he was interested in consolidating
the power of Zogu, in whom he perceived the warrant for
the exploitation without any hindrance the concessions and
the privileges that he had secured and that he hoped to
secure in the future in accordance with his Caesar-like
ambition. Great Britain, to which Zogu addressed himself,
as always, for consultations, fostered the aspiration of this
ambitious tribal chieftain, who dreamed of becoming cousin
of the “pure blood” monarchs of Europe and the world.
Zogu paved in time and with great care the way that
was to lead him to his coronation as king, in order to
eliminate the obstructions that were to be expected not
only from the masses of the population imbued with re­
publican ideas, but also from his closest collaborators with
241
whom he had divided up to then in a certain measure the
political power, and who, as he believed, would not stand
aloof without counteracting in face of the realization of his
unrestrained absolutism. After he had banished from polit­
ical life by parliamentary impeachment the powerful
feudal Mufid bey Libohova, whom through his private
physician he later succeeded in secretly poisoning; and
after he had assassinated his brother-in-law, the equally
powerful feudalist Ceno bek Kryeziu, Zogu organized in
Tirana itself an attempt to assassinate his ex-father-in-law.
the still more powerful Shefqet bey Verlaci (which attempt
however failed) and forced him to depart from Albania
temporarily and to withdraw from political life. Whereas
he obliged Eshref Frasheri, the president of the parliament,
through probe into his presumed abuses, to abandon polit­
ical life.
In June 1928 Zogu, as President of the Republic, sanc­
tioned the resolution of the parliament for a general revi­
sion of the constitution and proclaimed the dissolution ol
the two legislative chambers and the convocation of a
Constituent Assembly. The elections of the members of
the Assembly took place on August 17, 1928 under the open
control of the police force. Only after the elections had
terminated was the public informed indirectly of the
change in the form of the regime. Thus several days after
the Constituent Assembly had been declared open, on
September 1, 1928, was Albania proclaimed a monarchy
and Achmed Zogu King of the Albanians, and not of Al­
bania, under the name of Zogu I. On September 5, 1928,
the first cabinet of monarchical Albania was formed with
Koqo Kota as prime minister.
After he had achieved his highest ambition, Zogu could
not escape taking into consideration the increasing resent­
ment of the masses of the population for all the anti-na­
tional and anti-popular policy pursued by him up to then
to the exclusive benefit of his personal autocratic authority,
the resentment of the remnants of feudal landowners and
of the fascist Italian imperialists. He could not escape
242
taking into consideration the fact that the extensive landed
estates, which he had protected, were one of the sources of
the misfortune of the masses of the peasantry, that the class
of landlords, entirely parasitic beys, on which he had relied,
had discredited his regime, that his economic policy in
favour of foreign capital had engendered a suffocating at­
mosphere for the new Albanian bourgeoisie, the discontent
of which fused with that of the popular masses, and espe­
cially with that of the peasantry, might put in danger his
royal crown. At the advice of his friends within and out­
side the country, in the message he addressed on December
5, 1928 to the first parliament of the monarchy, Zogu
inaugurated a new course in his home policy, the policy of
the so-called “modern and occidental reforms”. He pledged
to give to the land a new system of laws after the model of
the civilized states of Europe, and that he would enforce
for the benefit of the peasantry the agrarian reform.
It was a demagogical game, sufficiently attractive, that
aimed at creating an illusion among the dissatisfied strata
of the population of the country. His courtiers proclaimed
Zogu the “reformer king”. Before long competent com­
mittees, too, were created for the elaboration of the projects
of the reforms. On April 1, 1929 the new civil code came
in force, based on the principle of the bourgeois laws, that
supplanted the Ottoman mexhele. In the year 1930 a new
penal law was introduced and in 1931 the commercial law
drafted after the codes of laws of capitalist states of Europe.
Meanwhile changes were introduced in the financial legis­
lation and in the customs duties, which had the welfare of
the bourgeoisie of the country in view. Thus the regime
of Zogu was proceeding on the way of making of Albania
a fully bourgeois state. The reforms, however, did not go
any further. The committee of agrarian reforms began its
work; from Italy a specialist on the matter was called in
for investigations in the country; the bill elaborated by the
government received the approval of the parliament, and
on May 3, 1930 the law on agrarian reform was decreed by
Zogu. But the law, trumpeted with as much clamour by
243
the official press as one of the most radical reforms of the
Zogist regime, that was to inter once and for all the rem­
nants of feudalism in Albania, besides being superficial
and defective, found no application whatsoever as far as
the great landholders were concerned. Postponed from year
to year, at last the law on agrarian reforms fell into oblivion.
The agrarian reform was applied only on a limited area —
altogether 4,698 hectares or about 11,600 acres of the lands
belonging to the state, and 3,411 hectares or about 8,500
acres of the estates of private landholders, which were in­
significant compared to the 60,640 hectares or about 130,000
acres which were state property, and to over 103,000 or
about 255,000 acres which were private property. Soon it
was realized that in this great demagogic manoeuvre, too,
Zogu aimed at using the agrarian reform as a means of
pressure on various landowner beys, who were his oppo­
nents.
As far as the policy of the “open door” to foreign capital
was concerned, Zogu did not introduce any substantial
change in this field. The only change that can be pointed
out is the fact that after the proclamation of the monarchy
the concessions decreed by Zogu’s government were al­
lotted exclusively to the Italian imperialist capital.
All the clamour about the so-called reforms did not create
illusions of long duration in Albania. As long as powerful
landlords continued to exert their domination unhampered
and with traditional harshness, the masses of the peasantry
could not help raising their voice of protest against the
regime that continued to protect the feudal oppression.
Particularly resounding was the notorious conflict of the
peasants of Goritza with the rapacious bey Maliq Frasheri,
who through the help of the local government authorities
and exactly a few months after the law on agrarian reform
had been promulgated, arbitrarily appropriated their lands
and goods. Nor could the masses of workmen help charging
the Zogu regime with the responsibility for the colonial
exploitation at the hands of Italian capitalist companies, for
the low wages they were receiving, for the intolerable dis­
244
crimination which they suffered in their home, in Albania,
from alien patrons. The submission of “independent” Al­
bania to Mussolini’s Italy was so apparent that patriotic and
democratic elements clearly foresaw the catastrophe to
which the dictatorial sovereign was driving their country.
As a consequence of social and political aversion, the
first attempts were undertaken during these years for an
active resistance against the Zogu regime. It is exactly at
this period that in Albania the first Communist-organized
nuclei were created. In Korea, in 1930, the first Communist
group was formed, which adopted, though in a not alto­
gether crystallized form, the programme of the Third Com­
munist International, and which endeavoured to penetrate,
not without success, into the workers’ professional organiza­
tions. Before a year had elapsed, nuclei of communist
revolutionary organizations were created in other cities, too,
in Tirana, Vlora, Elbasan and elsewhere. In 1931 the com­
munist group in Korea made publicly known its under­
ground existence, by affixing on the walls of the city plac­
ards with the slogans “Down with capitalism!”, “Long live
communism!”
The bourgeois anti-Zogist elements, too, endeavoured to
reorganize themselves for the overthrow of the Zogist re­
gime. Their organization created in the year 1930 had,
however, more or less a plotters’ character. Its leaders, in
conjunction with the Bashkimi Kombetar (National
Union) which in exile did not have confidence in the in­
ternal revolutionary forces, but relied for any hope of suc­
cess on foreign support, particularly on Yugoslavia. After
the failure of the attempt on Zogu’s life, that had been
organized by the Bashkimi Kombetar in 1931 during
his stay in Vienna where he had gone for medical treat­
ment, the leaders of the organization of Vlora solicited the
effective aid of Yugoslavia in order to start an armed sur­
prise action. The plan of the revolt, however, was frus­
trated, because in the summer of 1932, Zogu tracked down
the organization of Vlora and by means of a great number
of arrests, smothered it completely.
245
 In the years that followed, the social and economic con­
dition of Albania continually deteriorated. The general
economic crisis, which had laid hold of the whole world
since 1929, did not leave unharassed this small, backward,
agrarian country. Moreover, here the crisis had even more
devastating effects than in other small countries. The
crisis reached its culmination in Albania not in 1932, as in
other countries, but in 1934. As everywhere else, here too
the economic crisis manifested itself in the catastrophic
fall in purchasing power, which in turn was expressed
in the extraordinary fall in prices. In comparison to 1928
(=100 per cent), the prices of articles of consumption in
1930 were approximately 80 per cent; in 1932 they sank to
69 per cent; whereas in 1934 they went down to 38 per cent.
The slump in prices led to still greater depression in the
worth of exported goods. As against 1928, their worth sank
in 1930 to 83 per cent, in 1932 to 30 per cent, whereas in
1934 to even less than 29 per cent. As had been the case in
the past, the value of export goods was always several times
below that of imported merchandise. In 1928 exports repre­
sented 46.4 per cent of the value of imports; in 1930 — 37.2
per cent, in 1932— 19.7 per cent, in 1934 — 35 per cent of
the import value. This chronic unfavourable trade balance
was naturally also reflected in the balance of payments.
From 1920 to 1934, the total value of imported goods reached
255.9 million gold francs, whereas that of exports was 104.3
millions, consequently there was a trade deficit of 151.6
million gold francs. The sums of money sent by the Alba­
nian exiles reduced only in limited measure the outgo of
foreign currencies in gold and silver, with which Albania
was obliged to cover its trade deficit. This deficit helped
to no other end but to drain off wholesale the monetary
wealth of Albania, and to exhaust the purchasing power
of the population. In the first years of the world economic
crisis the credits the Albanian state obtained from Italy
covered to a certain degree the deficit of the balance of
payments. After the SVEA loan, which created for a num­
ber of years in the field of constructions the prospect of
246
labour for several thousands of manual labourers, and be­
fore this loan had been entirely spent, Zogu signed in Rome
in 1931 an agreement for a loan of 100 million gold francs,
which was to be paid in instalments of 10 million gold
francs each year. However, while the monarchy hoped that
this considerable loan would deliver it for at least 10 years
from the anxieties caused by the chronic deficit of the state
budget and of the balance of payments, fascist Mussolini
used this agreement as a means of pressure and of black­
mail on the Albanian state in general and on Zogu in par­
ticular. A year later, in 1932, exploiting the fact that Zogu
was again unable to repay the first instalment of the SVEA
loan, Mussolini imposed as a condition for a new delay of
the term of payment that a customs union between Alba­
nia and Italy should be established.
Zogu found himself thus unexpectedly between the devil
and the deep sea. The customs union would mean the un­
hampered penetration into Albania of Italian industrial
goods, consequently the certain ruin of the Albanian small
producers, harassed by the economic crisis, the incurable
impoverishment of the popular economy of the country
and the ultimate conjunction of this backward economy
with the Italian economy. It would mean, on the other
hand, the disappearance from the Albanian state budget of
the important revenues from the Italo-Albanian customs,
consequently the further deterioration of the financial sit­
uation of the Zogu government, and therefore its full de­
pendence on the financial help in the form of credits from
the Italian fascist government. The refusal of the demands
of Mussolini would bring likewise a situation devoid of any
positive perspectives. It would bring about the counter­
action of the fascist dictator, who had hitched by this time
the Albanian monarch to his economic and political chariot,
and consequently great difficulties would be created for
Albania, and might even cause troubles to the royal regime.
Zogu tried to resist by hinting to Mussolini that in case
Rome sought to drive its dagger deeper into the flesh of
Albania, he would be obliged to reconsider his foreign pol­
247
icy. As a warning of this radical step, in autumn, four
Italian vocational schools opened by Rome in Albania were
nationalized. Mussolini responded by suspending on April
1, 1933, at the beginning of the Albanian financial year, the
credit of 100 million which he had granted to Albania.
Zogu attempted to resist further. He suspended the private
schools, which step was a blow at the schools that were
administered by Albanian Catholic clergy with subsidies
from Rome, and refused to modify the agreement with Italy
for the Italian military instructors, not few in number,
headed by the fascist general Alberto Pariani, to remain any
longer in Albania for the instruction of the Albanian army.
The measures undertaken by Zogu — the nationalization
of foreign schools and the expulsion of the Italian military
mission, which hinted at a return of his capitulating policy
up to then, were received favourably by the Albanian
public. But soon it became evident that by his policy of sub­
mission to Mussolini, which he had practised since the year
1925, Zogu had surrendered all arms of resistance. The
suspension of the loan created for the Albanian government
an extremely difficult financial situation. All the invest­
ments were interrupted. Its immediate effect was the
threatening increase in the number of unemployed labour­
ers. The state treasury was depleted to such an extent that
the government was unable to defray even the payment of
the wages of the administrative personnel. State officials
and teachers in the provinces did not receive their wages
for from 7 to 10 months, those in the capital up to 4 months.
For the purpose of aggravating still more the economic and
financial uneasiness that had befallen Albania, the National
Bank, in the hands of Italian managers, kept on restrict]
the paper currency, thus creating for the country an artifi­
cial monetary deflation at a time when there were reserves
in gold, and when other countries, in order to alleviate the
effects of the economic crisis, had even passed to inflation.
Consequently, Albania was stricken by a poverty unseen
up to that time. The lack of money in circulation led to a
248
 catastrophic fall in the prices of agricultural products, and
to the economic ruin of the peasantry.
The masses of the population faced with self-sacrifice
this situation of extreme privation. However, Zogu, who
did not consider or desire to aggravate and still less to
break off the relations with Italy, undertook steps over and
over again to re-establish the former relations with Rome.
Mussolini, in an undoubtedly stronger position, increased
his claims. Through a note couched in categoric terms he
delivered to Zogu a series of new and onerous demands,
such as denunciation by Albania of all the trade treaties
concluded with other states, the preliminary approval by
Rome for all the trade treaties that Tirana signed in the
future with other states, departure from Albania of all
British officers that served in the Albanian gendarmery as
inspectors and their substitution by Italian officers, in­
troduction of Italian as required language in all the schools
of the country, appointment to the state administration only
of officials who had been graduated in Italy, and so on.
Zogu, who rejected these demands, in the hope that he
could exert pressure on Mussolini, undertook steps in order
to get closer to France, Italy’s rival, demanding the conclu­
sion of a friendly alliance and above all the granting of
a state loan in order to forestall the difficult financial
situation. In May 1934, Paris responded by presenting, as
condition for an eventual rapprochement, a series of de­
mands as enslaving as those of Rome. To these steps,
however, Mussolini retorted by setting his navy in action.
On June 22, 1934, twenty-two Italian warships approached
the port of Durres without any previous notice, and without
asking for permission dropped anchor in the port. In
face of this open threat, Zogu, at the advice of the British
government, capitulated, demanding as a satisfaction that
the negotiations for a reapproach should begin only after
the departure of the Italian war fleet from the Albanian
shores. Realizing the delicate situation in which Zogu
found himself faced with the home public opinion, Mussolini
renounced some of his exaggerated demands such as the
249
customs union and the denunciation of trade treaties con­
cluded between Albania and other countries. The other
conditions were accepted by Zogu, and thus the two states
came once again closer to each other without great diffi­
culty. This rapprochement marked the complete submis­
sion of Albania to fascist Italy.
The rapprochement brought no amelioration in the deplor­
able economic condition of the country. The labourer and
peasant masses could not avoid falling into poverty and
misery. The state continued to remain short of money. As
the Italian “aid” now came in a dribble, the budgetary situa­
tion remained in accentuated deficit. In 1935 the general
economic situation was as lamentable as in 1934. In face of
the general misery which was aggravated by the calamity of
famine caused by an extraordinary drought, the Zogu gov­
ernment took no serious measures. In the financial year
1934-1935, too, the state budget continued to maintain its
previous anti-popular character. No change was introduced
in the fiscal system for the alleviation of the burden of the
peasantry. As far as the expenditure is concerned, 41.37 per
cent of it was allotted to the armed forces, and 18.7 per cent
to the Ministry of Finance, which included the expenses
of the royal court. While the royal court that year spent
3.7 per cent of the budget, the expenditure of the Ministry
of National Economy, which was responsible for the man­
agement of the agricultural as well as the industrial
economy, hardly attained 2.4 per cent of the budget.
The general misery and above all the capitulation of the
Zogu government to Italy, gave still greater impetus to the
popular opposition, which seemed to have attended with
vigilance during the years of tension in the Italo-Albanian
relations. The year 1935 marked a rapid growth in the
labour and communist movement. However this move­
ment continued to develop secretly and under the persecu­
tion of political police. In anti-Zogist circles the problem
of an armed revolt was once again placed on the agenda for
the overthrow of the autocratic monarch, who through his
policy of capitulation achieved nothing other than to pave
250
 Ali Kelmendi (1897-1939),
an early Albanian revolu­
tionary Communist

the way for the not distant conquest of Albania by fascist

Italy. The “secret organization” created by military men
and civilians with bourgeois-democratic tendencies who had
participated in the June insurrection, undertook the task of
organizing the armed revolt without recourse to foreigners
and on a more extensive basis than the movement of 1932.
The Albanian Communists came to be informed of these
preparations; without engaging themselves as an organiza­
tion, they decided to support individually the anti-Zogist
movement, although they hold considerable reservations as
to the plotting character of the “secret organization” and
to its inadequate preparations in connection with the
launching of the armed revolt. The ideologically better
prepared Albanian Communists Ali Kelmendi, Riza Cerova
and some others considered as difficult the success of the
armed revolt if the masses of the peasantry were not at­
251
tracted into its orbit, and if these masses were not politi­
cally enlightened, which considerations were incompatible
with the plotting character of the “secret organization”
Still, the Communists did a great deal of work in support
of the insurrection and proved themselves to be its most
untiring and most intrepid militants. On the other hand,
the leaders of the “secret organization”, in the interest of
the expansion of the insurrectional front, accepted easily
the collaboration of anti-Zogist landholding beys, whose
participation weakened, not strengthened, the democratic
character of the movement.
It was decided that the armed revolt should break out
in various points of the country simultaneously on August
15, 1935, in order to bewilder the Zogist gendarmery and
to facilitate the rapid expansion of the revolt. However,
one day prior to the fixed date, on August 14, 1935, the
leaders of the local “secret organization” of Fier, doubting
that they had been detected by the police, started the armed
revolt as soon as they had seen the Zogist general of
Austrian origin, De Gilard, arrive in their city. As a matter
of fact he was travelling on some other mission. The
general was killed and the insurgents, after seizing without
difficulty the administration of the city, started on their
way to assail Lushnje and to proceed on Tirana. The Zogist
forces in Lushnje, however, offered resistance long enough
to enable Tirana to send considerable government forces,
which smashed the insurrectional forces. On the following
day, the “secret organizations” of other centres, discouraged
by the extinction of the movement of Fier, did not dare
to revolt. Only the Communists of Berat, led by Riza
Cerova, stood fast by the word of honour they had given,
and entered the armed insurrection. But, as they remained
isolated, they became object of relentless pursuits at the
hands of the gendarmery till they were broken and till
their leader Riza Cerova was killed during an encounter
on August 22.
The movement of August, the so-called “movement of
Fieri” was crushed, but not without leaving its echo in
252
Albania. The arrest of more than 2,000 persons could not
appease the Zogist clique, which, within ten years, found
itself for the third time face to face with armed revolt.
Unable to attribute the fault of the opposition movement
on this occasion to alien instigations, Zogu began to make
some concessions to Albanian public opinion. On October
15, 1935, he compelled the cabinet headed by Pandeli
Evangjeli to resign, and on October 21, 1935 he installed
into office a new cabinet with Mehdi Frasheri, known as a
liberal-democrat, as prime minister, and with bourgeois
young intellectuals as ministers. There were two cardinal
points on the programme of the so-called liberal govern­
ment: to carry on the enforcement of progressive reforms
announced in its time by the king, but hampered by conserv­
ative, reactionary governments, and to guarantee the free­
dom of thought, of speech and of the press, proclaimed in
the constitution of the monarchy, excluding criticisms of
the person of the king, of the monarchic regime and of the
foreign policy.
Although limited, the promised freedoms gave a fillip
to the development of the political and social life of the
country. A new press, fostered by new literary and prop­
agandist pens, appeared not only in the capital, but also
in the provinces. With the greatest harshness they
criticized the social plagues of the time: capitalist and
landlord exploitation at the expense of labourers and peas­
ants, the alarming unemployment, the exorbitant usury,
the lack of legislation for the protection of labour and of
the life of the labourer, for the protection of the Albanian
capital from the preponderance of foreign capital, the
financial bankruptcy of the state, the passiveness of the
government in respect to the enforcement of agrarian re­
form, in respect to the general impoverishment of the
population, and so on and so forth. Using Aesopian lan­
guage, they criticized even the foreign policy and the para­
sitic character of the Zogu regime. This animation of the
political life gave ground to the growth and organization
of the labour movement. After the creation in Kor?a, in
253
1934, of the professional association of workmen under the
name of Puna (Labour), the workers of Kumova, great min­
ing centre, also created their professional association under
the same name Puna, for the protection of their economic
interests and of their national dignity in face of the
ruthless exploitation and colonial discrimination practised
on them by the Italian capitalist concern AIPA, which had
a concession to the petroleum basin of Kugova. After thei
example, labourers of various mining centres of the country,
too, demanded from the government permission to form
professional associations.
The demagogy of the government was soon evident. While
the promised reforms remained on paper, the so-called
‘'liberal” government of Mehdi Frasheri with the greatest
ease passed to repressive measures. It backed AIPA against
two thousand Albanian labourers in their demand for bet­
ter living conditions. And when on February 11, 1936, the
petroleum workers, as a protest for the dismissal by the
AIPA concern of various leaders of their professional asso­
ciation Puna, announced a general strike, the government
crushed the strike by employing the gendarmery to arrest
a great number of militant labourers.
Some days later, on February 19, 1936, the shoemakers
of Korea closed their shops in protest against the authori­
zation granted by the government for the opening of a
modern shoe factory in their city. Their demand, animated
by the danger of economic ruin and, on the other hand, in­
fluenced by the petty-bourgeois illusions that the process
of industrialization could be hindered in the interest of
small artisan production, was not supported by the other
masses of the population. Through the intervention of the
communist vanguard, amendments were introduced in the
formulation of the demand of the shoemakers. On February
21, 1936, together with the shoemakers, all the workers of
Korea organized a peaceful demonstration, protesting
against unemployment, against the distress. To the cries
of the workers for “bread!” and for “work!” the govern­
ment authorities responded by calling out the gendarm-
254
 Gendarmes of Achmed Zogu (King Zog) breaking up a
workers’ demonstration against unemployment and
hunger in Korc;a, Feb. 2*1, 1936

ery, which came to a clash with the labourers and made

arrests in their ranks. A few hours later, together with the
labourers, students of the city, too, burst in a second dem­
onstration against the violence of the government and
against the arrest of innocent labourers. By the force of
the gendarmery, the “liberal” government crushed also the
strikes and the meetings that were held during the weeks
that followed in other cities of the country.
In the foreign policy likewise the cabinet of Mehdi
Frasheri followed the Zogist way of complete capitulation
to fascist Italy. In March 1936, Tirana and Rome signed a
series of economic agreements for new credits from Italy
and for further concessions from Albania. At the same
time, secret agreements of political and military character
255
tuals of the country. In 1938 the two principal communist
groups issued their secret periodicals too, of which that of
Korea under the name of Perpara (Forward), theoretically
more advanced, presented the platform for the constitution
of a united National-Liberation Front including all the
patriotic and democratic forces of the country. Through
this publicly announced programme, the Albanian Com­
munists became inheritors of the Albanian national “renais­
sance”, and carriers, under new conditions, of the ideals of
renowned adepts of that renaissance.

THE CONQUEST OF ALBANIA

BY FASCIST ITALY

The economic and political agreements concluded be­

tween Rome and Tirana in March 1936 cannot be divorced
from the general political situation of that time, created
by the expansionist tendencies of the three great aggres­
sive fascist countries, Germany, Italy and Japan. Italy at
that period was waging aggressive war against Ethiopia
without encountering any serious resistance on the part of
other Great Powers, excepting the farce of the sanctions by
the League of Nations. Exactly at that time, on March 7,
1936, nazi Germany reconquered, likewise without meet­
ing with any resistance, the Rhineland, thus definitely
stamping on the treaty of Versailles. Still later on, in July
1936 in republican Spain, the fascist insurrection broke out,
aided openly by Hitler and Mussolini. Encouraged all the
while by the inertia of the western powers, Germany and
Italy constituted the fascist-military bloc, or as it was called
at that time, the “Rome-Berlin Axis” for the establishment
of the “new order” in Europe, whereas a month later Ger­
many and Japan signed the “Anti-Comintern Pact”, which
Italy joined later on.
258
 When things seemed to be looking up for the fascist im­
perialist states there was no reason why Albania should
feel herself immune to aggression by Mussolini’s Italy. In
the chancelleries of the western powers, the possibility of
Albania’s one day coming under the military power of Rome
had become altogether plausible. Zogu did not have any
alliance of friendship with other states that would have
engaged themselves to protect Albania from an eventual
invasion by Italy. The League of Nations, which was obli­
gated by its covenant to protect small countries from foreign
aggression, did not possess, as it had never possessed, power
to stop the hand of any aggressor whatsoever, and still less
that of powerful and self-sufficient aggressors such as Ger­
many and Italy. The appointment of Galeazzo Ciano on
June 9, 1936, to the post of minister for foreign affairs of
Italy pointed out to a more dynamic course in the foreign
policy of Rome. Little more than a month later, on July
11, 1936, the ambassador of Great Britain Drummond in­
formed Ciano that with the withdrawal of the sanctions
decided by the League of Nations against Italy at the
beginning of the Italian aggression against Ethiopia, his
government was withdrawing the home fleet from the Medi­
terranean; he added, however, that the unilateral engage­
ments of Great Britain for the protection of Greece, Yu­
goslavia and Turkey from aggression were to remain all
the while in force. The fact that Albania was not mentioned
was an open, encouraging allusion. On the other hand,
Hitler assured Mussolini through the German minister of
justice, Hans Frank, during a meeting in Rome on September
23, 1936 with the chief of Italian fascism, that Germany
considered the Mediterranean as an “Italian sea”, and con­
sequently acknowledged the right of Italy to control the
Mediterranean countries. The appointment in October of
that year of Francesco Jacomoni, cunning fox who directed
Albanian affairs in Palazzo Chigi, as minister plenipoten­
tiary to Tirana, was very significant in the course of the
Italian policy towards Albania.
259
 However, Italy had still one other obstacle in its way
to the military occupation of Albania, and of which Zogu
and his advisors were well aware. It was its rival in the
Balkans — Yugoslavia. Mussolini did not desire under any
condition that Albania, which he had under his control also
as it was, should serve as a pretext for the aggravation of
Italo-Yugoslav relations at a time when it was becoming ap­
parent that Yugoslavia was breaking off from France and
getting closer to the German-Italian fascist bloc. The at­
traction of Belgrade to the influence of the “Rome-Berlin
Axis” was a much more precious pearl than the military
conquest of Albania. This pearl did not in the final analysis
exclude the conquest of Albania, by now subjugated, but
only postponed it. If there was anything new in the line of
policy of Italy towards Albania after the installation of
Mussolini’s son-in-law in the ministry of foreign affairs in
Rome, this nuance should be sought in the endeavours of
Mussolini to accomplish the military conquest of Albania
with the acquiescence of Yugoslavia — even if mere part­
nership with it.
Zogu realized that his royal crown depended on the de­
velopment of Italo-Yugoslav relations, and to a certain ex­
tent on the Italo-Greek relations. But the prognosis was
not soothing for him even on this side. The accession to
power of Stoyadinovich in Yugoslavia and of Metaxas in
Greece, completed, after Bulgaria and Roumania, the almost
full political and governmental fascistization of the Balkans.
Zogu made some childish endeavours in Belgrade and in
Athens, for the conclusion of Albano-Yugoslav and Albanc-
Greek alliances of friendship but no attention was paid to
them. At the encounter they had in Belgrade on March 26.
1937, Stoyadinovich told Ciano among other things that
Albania had great importance for Yugoslavia at the time
when European diplomacy, by which he hinted at the Brit­
ish and French diplomacy, had succeeded in inciting an­
imosity between Italy and Yugoslavia. Whereas today,
claimed the Serbian minister, in the new climate of the
260
 Italo-Yugoslav relations, the Albanian problem represent­
ed merely a local problem of no consequence.
The concrete plan for the conquest of Albania by Italy
was elaborated by Count Ciano in May 1938 after his return
from the visit he made to Tirana on the occasion of the mar­
riage of King Zogu. The exclusion of Albania from the
League of Nations with the aim of depriving other powers
of the possibility of interfering in the question of Albania
at the moment of the outbreak of the crisis provoked by
Rome; the continual enfeeblement of the Albanian army
due to undermining by Italian officers in Albania in order
to render ineffective any armed resistance; the strengthen­
ing and extension of the economic concessions in Albania
in favour of Italian capitalist companies; the development,
by means of subsidies, of what had begun to be called “the
fifth column”; the enticement by means of promises and
bribes to the upper strata in the political network of
Rome; the introduction and spread in Albania of fascist and
pro-fascist institutions, not so much of political character
as with social and cultural functions in order to enlist the
sympathy of the masses of the population; and finally, the
approbation of Yugoslavia, obtained beforehand. These were
the principal points of the programme of Ciano, approved
by Mussolini also, in order to prepare the ground for the
military occupation of Albania and the proclamation of
“personal union” as a means of concealing the annexation.
The programme of Ciano did not in fact contain anything
new; it was the continuation at a faster rate of the previous
programme. This stepping up did not remain undetected by
the erstwhile diffident Albanian public, and did not remain
without causing great anxiety to the people of this country,
who had got too near the fangs of the wolf. Zogu, however,
left a free hand for the realization of the feverish plans of
Rome. In the very spring of 1938, the government of
Tirana granted to various Italian concerns a series of
further important concessions for the exploitation of cop­
per, of chromium, fishing rights, etc. Through a special
convention, Italy secured a monopoly of the entire foreign
261
trade. In May that year the parliament approved the new
educational system elaborated by the Italian adviser S.
Montanelli. ’Italian fascist, clever and capable agitators
and organizers came to Albania to uphold the work of pre­
vious propagandists in the field of the creation of fascist and
pro-fascist organizations. The fact that they did not suc­
ceed in creating such organizations is due not to the resist­
ance on the part of the government, but to the popular
opposition and to the danger that this opposition might erupt
into open conflict.
On June 18, 1938, Count Ciano had a second meeting with
Stoyadinovich in Venice and received the assurance that
Yugoslavia would hold a disinterested attitude in the ques­
tion of peaceful penetration of Italy in Albania, but not
as yet in the military occupation of this country. However,
six months later, during the meeting that took place be­
tween them in Belgrade from January 18 to 23, 1939, the
minister Ciano at last succeeded in securing the acquies­
cence of the Yugoslav government to the military conquest
of Albania by Italy, by proposing to Stoyadinovich the rec­
tification of the boundaries of Albania in favour of Yugo­
slavia, the conclusion of an Italo-Yugoslav military alliance,
the support of Rome for the eventual conquest of Salonika
by Yugoslavia, etc. But to the astonishment of the Italian
foreign minister, the prince regent of Yugoslavia, Paul,
manifested much less interest than Stoyadinovich for the
territorial gains that would accrue to Yugoslavia at the ex­
pense of Albania. According to the report that the Italian
foreign minister drew up for Mussolini on this encounter.
Prince Paul told Ciano: “We already have so many Alba­
nians within our boundaries, and these are giving us so much
trouble, that I have no desire to increase their number.”
The dee was thus broken. The Italian fascist government
took the decision to make the necessary preparations for
the military conquest of Albania.
The fascist agents in Albania precipitated their prepa­
rations to deprive the Albanians of all possibility of armed
resistance and particularly to attract to the preparations
262
 of Rome the so-called “upper crust” of the country; that is
to say the ministers, the deputies, the prefects, the staff of­
ficers, with the twofold aim of isolating Zogu and achieving
through them, by “constitutional” means, the union of Italy
to Albania under the crown of Victor Emmanuel III. The
royal palace in Tirana was seized by panic. However, Zogu
with prime minister Koqo Kota and minister of the interior
Musa Juka, instead of taking measures against the Italian
fascist agents that acted unhindered against them, continued
the police harassment of the Albanian Communists, who in
those days of tension more than ever before sought the crea­
tion of a common liberation front with all the patriotic
forces of the country, if it were possible with even Zogu
himself, in case the latter with his government would be
willing to oppose the Italian fascist aggression. During that
January, the police of Musa Juka, following the track of
underground Marxist organizations, arrested a great num­
ber of Communists. On February 4, 1939, 73 of them ap­
peared before the political tribunal of Tirana. On 56 of
them exemplary punishments were inflicted for the only
reason that they were sympathizers of Marxist-Leninist
ideas.
In March 1939 the international situation more than
ever was favourable for fascist Italy. In Spain, the civil
war was ending in favour of the fascist forces of Franco,
which saved Mussolini from a preoccupation that lasted
since three years. On March 15 Hitlerite Germany con­
quered Czechoslovakia without meeting with any resistance
on the part of western powers. In Yugoslavia, with the
resignation from office of Stoyadinovich at the beginning
of February, an entirely capitulating government had come
to power, which upheld the point of view of Prince Paul in
respect to Albania. Under these circumstances, Mussolini
massed his war forces in the ports of southern Italy facing
Albania and on March 25, 1939, delivered to the govern­
ment of Tirana in the form of an ultimatum a projected
treaty including these demands: that Italian troops should
land in the principal ports of Albania, that these troops
263
 should control strategic roads, aerodromes and strategic
points along the boundary; that Italian farmers should be
settled in Albania, to enjoy the rights of Albanian citizens;
that the customs union was to be carried on; that Italian
citizens residing in Albania should be entitled to the most
important state offices; that the general secretaries of the
ministries should be Italian citizens; that the Italian minis­
ter in Tirana and reciprocally the Albanian minister in
Rome should be members of the council of ministers of
the country where they were accredited. After a couple of
days, Rome dispatched to Zogu an ultimatum demanding
an answer to the terms of March 25, before midnight of
April 6, 1939.
Zogu and his government kept secret the projected treaty
as well as the ultimatum of Mussolini. The public, however,
soon got to know of the intentions of Rome. The great
number of troops gathered at the ports of southern Italy
caused anxiety throughout the country. In Tirana, on the
eve of April 3, 1939, the youth of the capital led by the
Communists demonstrated, expressing their readiness to
protect their country from the Italian aggression. On April
4, the masses of people started a forceful demonstration in
the streets of the capital, demanding to know the truth of
the Italian intentions, and arms in order to fight against the'
fascist foe. Similar demonstrations burst forth in other
cities of the country too — in Shkoder, Elbasan, Durres,
Korea, Vlora. Zogu tried to appease the public by issuing
an official communication denying the news that had beer,
spread about the aggravation of the Italo-Albanian rela­
tions. At the same time, on April 5, the prime minister
Koeo Kota answered the Italian ultimatum, presenting the
counter-proposals of the Albanian government and de­
manding the prolongation of the term set in the ultimatum.
The counter-proposals provided: the definition by means
of a military convention of the cases in which Italian troops
should be sent to Albania; the enjoyment of the right of
Albanian citizenship should be reserved only to those Ital­
ians who had lived in Albania for more than five years;
264
 Patriotic demonstrations in early April, 1939,
against the menace of fascist aggression

not customs union, but the reduction of customs tariffs up

to two per cent on Italo-Albanian trade; the admission in­
to the Albanian state administration of Italian organizers
only, not of regular officials.
The government communication did not appease the coun­
try. On April 5 and 6, mass demonstrations broke out in
entire Albania. As in the past the Zogist government kept
absolute silence in face of the popular demands to enlist
as volunteers for the defence of the motherland.
The Italian government paid no attention whatsoever to
the counter-proposals of the government of Tirana. Only
a delay of 12 hours was granted in reference to the ulti­
matum. With no answer at hand, in face of the critical
situation he himself had created with his policy of capitula­
tion, Zogu decided to abandon the country without resist­
265
ing. On the following day, in the early hours of April 7,
1939, Good Friday, approximately 40,000 Italian troops, on
a fleet of troop transports, escorted by hundreds of fighter­
planes, under the supreme command of Guzzoni, approached
the four principal ports of Albania — Durres, Vlora, Saranda
and Shengjin. In order to gain time until he could prepare
his escape and that of the Queen, who had recently given
birth to a child, Zogu attempted to enter into negotiations
with General Guzzoni without however achieving any suc­
cess. During the morning of April 7, Italian troops began
to land on the coasts of Albania, convinced that on account
of the undermining activity of Italian agents and of the pas­
sive attitude of Zogu, they would meet with no resistance.
As a matter of fact, the undermining work done by the
fascist agents and by the Zogist officials had been quite
extensive. The ammunition for the guns had vanished, the
few artillery pieces had been rendered ineffective and the
army was confused and disorganized. In spite of that, quite
a number of volunteers and of soldiers succeeded in secur­
ing some ammunition, and with that in hand, offered resist­
ance to the Italian army of occupation, which, especially
in Durres, they obliged to board their ships. Then, the
fire of artillery from the enemy warships was poured on
Durres, but this did not give the expected result. Three
times did the Italian troops attempt to seize Durres by as­
sault, three times they were compelled to withdraw to their
warships. These successes were achieved at a time when
the royal family, together with Zcgu, the man responsible
for this tragedy, started on its exile from Albania.
The speedy breakdown of the Albanian resistance was
determined not so much by the superiority of the enemy
as by the lack of arms and of ammunition. The symbol of
this spontaneous and unorganized resistance became the
sailor Mujo Ulqinaku, who fell heroically in the streets of
Durres on April 7, 1939. That same day Durres fell, as did
the other ports, into the hands of the Italian troops. The
fascist armies were able to enter Tirana on April 8, Shkoder
and Gjirokastra on April 9. The next day, on April 10,
266
Almost the entire country was conquered by fascist Italy
without evoking any protest on the part of the western
powers or of the Balkan states. Only the Soviet Union did
not recognize this disgraceful occupation. Of course all
the Albanian patriots who happened to be in exile, with
the exception of the adherents of the “Bashkimi Kombetar”
group, protested by means of meetings against this con­
quest that buried the independence of the motherland, won
through so much fighting and sacrifices. In their protests,
the Albanians in exile had the support of all democratic,
progressive forces of the whole world and, in the first place,
of the internationalist Communists.

THE BEGINNING OF THE ANTI-FASCIST

NATIONAL-LIBERATION MOVEMENT

Mussolini, in the official documents, did not treat the

military occupation of April 7, 1939 as an annexation of
Albania by Italy, but as an act accomplished with the aim
of bringing to an end the anti-Italian “manoeuvre” of Zogu
and insuring the “independence” of Albania, menaced by
other powers, through “personal union” — the union of the
kingdom of Albania with the kingdom of Italy under the
crown of the king-emperor Victor Emmanuel III.
In this demagogic endeavour Mussolini had the aid of
the collaborators of Zogu, who, with the exception of some
of the ministers — Kogo Kota, Musa Juka, etc. — remained
in Albania and were the first to congratulate the chief of
fascism for the event of April 7. On April 12, 1939, a so-
called “constituent assembly” composed of personalities
who prior to the occupation had entered into secret rela­
tions with the Italian Legation in Tirana, proclaimed the
“union” of Albania with Italy under the crown of king-
emperor Victor Emmanuel III. On that same day the
Albanian renegade government was constituted under the
267
 presidency of the great landlord Shefqet bey Verlaci, and
signed on April 20, 1939 with Francesco Jacomoni, who had
been elevated to the rank of ambassador extraordinary and
plenipotentiary, a series of political and economic conven­
tions. According to these conventions, Albania would con­
stitute with Italy one single land, the customs union was to
be enforced, the Albanian franc was to be tied to the Italian
“lira”; in the relations of Albania with foreign countries
the general tariffs of the Italian kingdom were to be ap­
plied, Italian citizens in Albania were to enjoy all the rights
that Albanian citizens enjoyed, and vice versa. On June 3
further steps were undertaken towards the virtual enslave­
ment of the country. The “Statute of the Albanian King­
dom”, which was proclaimed at that same day, reserved
the executive as well as the legislative power to the “King
of Italy and of Albania and Emperor of Ethiopia”, who
on his part appointed as his “lieutenant” (luogotenente),
in Albania, Francesco Jacomoni. Albania was no longer to
have any parliament. Italy and Albania were no longer to
have mutual diplomatic representations. On the basis of an
agreement concluded on that same day, the unification of
international relations of Italy and Albania was accomplish­
ed, and these were concentrated in the ministry of foreign
affairs of Rome. Albania was no longer to have diplomatic
representatives in foreign countries, and foreign powers
would not have diplomatic representatives accredited in
Tirana. The Albanian army was suppressed as an indepen­
dent armed force, to be considered part and parcel of the
Italian army.
All these documents legalized by the force of arms the
Italian military occupation of Albania, and together with
it all the consequences that sprang from this occupa­
tion. With great speed emissaries who had come from
Rome formed the Albanian Fascist Party and all the or­
ganizations depending on it — the organization of “fascist”
youth, of “fascist” children, of “fascist” women, and one
called “After-work” (Dopolavoro), none of which found
support in Albania. By means of political pressure em­
268
ployees and labourers were coerced into enrolling them­
selves together with their wives and children in the re­
spective “fascist” organizations and to submit themselves to
indoctrination with fascist political and cultural ideology.
Swarms of new Italian capitalist companies invaded Albania
and took it upon themselves to exploit at a greater speed
the economic riches of the country, first of all the mineral
riches in order to provide the needs of the war economy of
Italy. Alongside them, Italian construction enterprises ar­
rived in droves to carry on the work of arranging and add­
ing military strategic roads to connect the coast with the
regions on the Albano-Greek and Albano-Serbian bounda­
ries. Two powerful Italian banks “Banco di Napoli” and
“Banca del Lavoro”, together with the “National Bank of
Albania”, which now relied almost entirely on Italian capi­
tal, covered the country with an extensive financial net
which exerted great activity. The “National Bank of Al­
bania”, which up to the eve of the occupation on April 7,
had followed the unjustifiable policy of deflating the paper
currency, immediately after the event of April, though it
had retained the same general manager and the same board
of directors, changed over to the policy of monetary “abun­
dance”, not stopping even when faced with “inflation”. From
the 10,653,000 francs that were in circulation at the end of
1936, the 11,131,000 francs at the end of 1937, the 10,526,000
francs at the end of 1938 and the 11,939,000 francs on
March 31, 1939, that is to say on the eve of the occupation,
within a month — in other words on April 30, 1939, it had
swelled to 17,262,000 francs, at the end of 1939 to 26,316,000
francs, at the end of 1940 to 80,178,000 francs, at the end
of 1941 to 108,417,000 francs, and at the end of 1942 to
141,897,000 francs. In agriculture the projects for “Mus­
solini’s reforms” were initiated, which provided the drainage
of the lands of lower Albania on the coast, the settlement
of Italian “farmers” in these lands, and the transfer of the
Albanian peasantry from these lands to the inner highlands.
The “farmers” who were to settle around the cities, the
overwhelming number of labourers who emigrated from
269
 Italy, more in 1940 than Albanian labourers, the imposing
of the Italian language and culture in the school programmes
of Albania and in the administration of the country, were
to serve as catalysts for the policy of Italianization of Al­
bania, which the bigger fascist leaders, especially Mussolini,
so much desired.
Consequently, the general resentment aroused by the
aggression of April 7 continued to develop and to expand
during the months that followed, not only against the Italian
fascist aggressors, but also against the Albanian collabora­
tors who acquiesced in the policy of making Albania a
dismembered colony and of her ethnical assimilation. This
resentment found expression in the continuation of the anti­
fascist resistance — an altogether spontaneous resistance.
At workshops and work centres, small employees and la­
bourers, in spite of the pressure of the management, re­
fused to accept membership in fascist parties; at schools,
the students stood aloof from fascist youth organizations;
at Italian capitalist enterprises, a series of workers’ strikes
broke out against extortions by the bosses and against co­
lonial discrimination. The peasantry of Muzeqe protested
against the measurement of their lands. Their resistance
was of local character, however, and too often gave no re­
sult. More than ever the need was felt in Albania for a
revolutionary patriotic organization to take up the direc­
tion of this resistance, which was in continual ferment. As
the former collaborators of Zogu who had remained in Al­
bania, as well as erstwhile opposition leaders to Zogu,
exiles in the Bashkimi Kombetar organization who re­
turned to their country after the 7th of April, preferred to
remain in the ranks of the collaborators, therefore the task
of organizing the patriotic resistance fell on the Albanian
Communists, who prior to, as well as after the fascist oc­
cupation had proved themselves men of principle in the
question of the independence of the country were just as
revolutionary in the methods of the war of liberation. As
such, in the spontaneous resistance of labourers, of peas­
ants, of employees and of students, they had invariably
270
given proof of their solidarity with them, and in most cases
they had even been their organizers and their leaders.
However, the Albanian Communists, too, had their weak
points. In Albania there did not as yet exist a single rev­
olutionary Marxist party. The Communists continued to be
split into two separate groups in conflict with each other
as to the ideology and the manner of organization.
This movement did not weaken, not even during the
period of the great victories of Hitlerite Germany after the
outbreak of the Second World War on September 3, 1939,
which victories created a desperate situation in Europe.
On November 28, 1939, on the anniversary of the proclama­
tion of the national independence of Albania, in Tirana a
popular patriotic demonstration broke out against the alien
fascist occupation. During the first half of the year 1940,
the anti-fascist resistance led as always by the Albanian
Communists, took more militant and more active forms,
passing over to actions of sabotage of Italy’s military in­
stallations. After the entry of Italy, in June 1940, into the
World War on the side of nazi Germany, this resistance
came to know difficult moments of political and police reac­
tion. While the continental prisons and insular camps of
Italy were filled with Albanian patriots, Italian fascists to­
gether with Albanian collaborators undertook a widespread
propaganda campaign to palm off the war that Rome was
waging in the Balkans as an opportunity for Albania as an
independent state to realize its ethnical unification, to in­
clude within its boundaries the Albanian territories of
Kossovo and Qameria, unjustly annexed by Yugoslavia and
Greece through the decisions of the Congress of Berlin in
1878 and of the Conference of Ambassadors in 1913. This
was too slim a pretence since the Albanians could never
forget the injustice done them by the imperialist diplomacy,
which had left outside the boundaries of their country
almost half of their compatriots. The collaborators ex­
ploited to the extreme this political factor in order to in­
duce the Albanians to fight against the neighbour countries.
What’s wrong — asked the collaborators, specially their prin­
271
cipal spokesman Mustafa Kruja — if Italy rectifies the er­
rors committed by the plutocratic diplomacy and crippled
Albania achieves national unification through this action?
A number of personalities who had protested against the
aggression of April 7th chimed in this chorus. One of them;
Faik Konitza, former minister plenipotentiary of Zogist Al­
bania in the U.S.A., who had remained in exile, in a dec­
laration he handed to the American press on August 22,
1940, said: “Now that Italy is prepared to intervene in or­
der to rectify the injustices that have been inflicted on the
Albanian nation and to re-establish the natural and his­
toric boundaries of Albania is it reasonable for a
genuine Albanian to be dissatisfied with the intervention?”
And further: “In case Qameria is Albanian can it be con­
ceivable that this reality should automatically cease to be
such because it is defended by the Italians?”
The Albanian people, however, had their own logic. They
did not desire to become cannon fodder for the imperialist
aims of Rome. This became clear after October 28 when
Italy, by making use of the territory of Albania conquered
by force, assailed Greece, and when with this typically fas­
cist aggression the quisling government of Shefqet Verlaci,
too, expressed its solidarity. It was very soon found out
that the fascist and the pro-fascist propaganda had taken
no root whatsoever. Two battalions of Albanian recruits
sent by force to the front refused to fight; after desertions
from the very first, the two battalions were withdrawn from
the front and confined in the Shijak concentration camp in
central Albania. On the front and in the rear, sappers were
active. It was exactly at this time that in the mountainous
regions of Albania the first armed bands of the Albanian
National-Liberation Movement were formed by soldiers who
had deserted the army.
As is known, in this theatre of war, the Italian Army of
Mussolini suffered ignominious defeat, which Mussolini per­
sonally, in a letter to Hitler on November 22, 1940, attrib­
uted to insufficient military preparations and to unfore­
seen “treason” of the Albanians. In pursuit of the foe, the
272
Greek armies penetrated into the territory of Albania, and
on November 22, captured Korga and, at the beginning of
December, Gjirokastra. The Albanians considered the Greek
victory as a victory over fascism and the Greek army
as their ally in the war against the common enemy.
Thousands of volunteers from the occupied regions asked
for permission from the Hellenic commander to fight under
the Albanian banner side by side with the Greek army
against the Italian fascist army. The Hellenic commander,
however, rejected this demand and announced that he
would admit only such volunteers as would fight under
the Greek banner. Further, he took measures, such as the
prohibition of the Albanian flag, the establishment of Greek
civil administration, the arrest and interment of Albanian
patriots though hostile to Italian fascists, demonstrating
that Athens had not renounced its old chauvinist claims on
Albania. Consequently Albano-Greek relations remained
strained and unfriendly even at this historic moment when
the two countries were at war against a common enemy.
In the spring of 1941 the situation in the Balkans was
abruptly upset. On April 6 German armies attacked Yugo­
slavia and Greece by surprise simultaneously, and within a
few days had shattered their resistance, thus enabling the
Italian armies, which had remained on the defensive
throughout the winter, to expel the Greek armies from Al­
bania. With the capitulation of the Yugoslav armies on
April 17 and of the Greek armies on April 21, 1940, Ger­
many and Italy, represented by the ministers of foreign
affairs Ribbentrop and Ciano, delineated in Vienna the new
political map of the Balkans. The map drawn in Vienna
was based on the principal division of the zones of in­
fluence in the Balkans between Germany and Italy. Dis­
credited by the defeat it had suffered at the hands of Greece,
a fraction the size of Italy, Rome sought to extend its
zone of influence in the Balkans by hiding behind the ter­
ritorial ethnical demands of the quisling government of
Tirana. With some modifications, the Albanian demands
were accepted by the two “arbitrator” powers, and thus
273
the Albanian regions of Kossovo annexed in 1913 together
with several like Albanian districts at one time annexed by
Montenegro, were returned to Albania. In the south, Al­
bania got back the Albanian region of Qameria, which
Greece had annexed in 1913.
Through these annexations the territory and the popula­
tion of Albania almost doubled. As the annexed regions
of Kossovo were more productive, the chronic deficit in
agricultural produce was solved at once; Albania changed
from a grain importing country into a grain exporting coun­
try. Italian fascists and Albanian collaborators widely ex­
ploited these facts in their propaganda campaigns in order
to persuade Albanian public opinion that the existence of
“greater” Albania as they called it, depended on the victory
of the Rome-Berlin Axis, and that with the victory of the
western powers, whose allies were Yugoslavia and Greece,
the very existence of “lesser” Albania would be put in
question. This campaign was fervently supported by anti-
Zogist personalities who had returned from exile: Mustafa
Kruja, Rexhep Mitrovica, Ali Kelcyra, Koi Tromara, etc.
Public opinion, however, in general remained prudent
towards this propaganda barrage. As an unexpected answer
to Rome resounded the attempt on the life of King-Emperor
Victor Emmanuel III during his visit in Albania by the
Albanian worker Vasil Lagi in Tirana in May.
The Albanian Communists opposed the fascists’ political
stratagem of pressing the Albanians into their gendarmery
in the Balkans or employing them at their various war
fronts. The resistance of the Communists, however, was
weak, because they were still divided, even more so than
before, because two other communist groups that were
created alongside the former two groups — the group of
Korga and that of Shkoder — of less importance than these
last named in number of members as well as the influence
they exerted on public opinion in the country. One of them
was the so-called “Youth” group with pro-Trotsky leader­
ship, and the other was called “Fire” with anarchist tend­
encies. Between these two groups there existed a series of
274
 divergencies in connection with ideological and tactical ques­
tions and problems regarding the organization of the com­
munist movement, and although all of them worked under­
ground, they were in conflict with each other. Object of the
most violent attacks was the group of Korea, the largest,
most revolutionary and most closely adherent to principles.
There were also in the ranks of these groups revolutionary
communist elements who regretted the unjustifiable split
and demanded fusion without delay to form a single
Marxist-Leninist party. However, the attempts under­
taken in this direction up to the summer of 1940 had yielded
no result.
During the summer of 1941, after the aggression launched
by the German Nazis against the Soviet Union on June 22,
the national-liberation movement in Albania had a new
impulse. With the entrance of the Soviet Union into the
war, the anti-fascist war front was widened, and this in­
creased the prospect of the annihilation of the German-
Italian bloc and raised Albania’s hopes for early liberation.
Through the entry of the Soviet Union in the ranks of the
anti-fascist coalition, the Albanians were convinced that at
the end of the war the chauvinist tendencies of the Yugoslav
and particularly of the Greek anti-fascist governments in
exile in London and considered as allied anti-fascist govern­
ments enjoying the support of Great Britain, would be
curtailed. The Albanian Communists and anti-fascist
patriots deemed that the further strengthening of the
alliance of Albania with the Soviet Union was the only way
of securing the independence of the country.
The speedy advance of German fascist armies deep in
Soviet territory during the first month of the war did not
diminish at all these hopes. During the summer and au­
tumn months, the Albanian Communists were active for
the expansion of the armed struggle. In cities, secret tracts
drawn up by the Communists of the Kor^a group were
distributed, in which appeals were made for the initiation,
on a large scale, of the armed war of liberation. In moun­
tainous regions, the Communists made attempts, with good
275
results, to organize, into regular warrior bands, fugitive
anti-fascist patriots who found themselves isolated. Wide­
spread measures were taken to secure the necessary arms
and ammunition for guerrilla units of cities, which had just
started to organize. At the same time, endeavours were
continually made to eliminate the differences of the com­
munist groups and to fuse all these groups in a single rev­
olutionary Marxist-Leninist party.
These endeavours brought substantial results. In spite
of the resistance on the part of the leaders of some of the
groups, especially of those of the groups of “Youth” and
“Fire”, internationalist revolutionary Communists succeeded
in subduing the intolerable tendency to split into groups,
and secretly and under police persecution, paved the way
for the convocation in Tirana of an extraordinary conven­
tion of the Albanian communist groups. In the ranks of
the internationalist Communists who strove to lay the foun­
dations for an Albanian Communist Party, the figure of
Enver Hoxha, then only 31 years old but with rich revolu­
tionary Marxist experience, began to come forward in a
most noteworthy manner. He was born in Gjirokastra on
October 16, 1908. After he had finished secondary school
in Korea, where he came to know the Communists of that
city, Enver Hoxha resided for some years as student and
as employee (1930-1936) in France and Belgium, where he
had worked together with French and Belgian Communists.
In 1936 he returned to Albania and, after being unemployed
for some time, at last was appointed as a teacher at the
state lyceum in Tirana, and in the years 1937-1939 at the
state lyceum of Korea. As one of the oldest members of
the communist group of Korea and, at the same time, one
of its most active leaders, Enver Hoxha, dismissed from of­
fice after April 7, 1939 by the fascist collaborationist ad­
ministration, settled in Tirana, where he dedicated himself
exclusively to Marxist revolutionary activity and at the same
time to the creation of a common anti-fascist war front of
all the patriotic forces of the country. By standing above
the split and the struggle of the communist groups, Enver
276
Comrade Enver Hoxha, leader of the national-liberation struggle of the
Albanian people against Italian fascist and German Nazi occupation
Hoxha gradually became the central figure of the revolu­
tionary forces of the country which demanded that the de­
plorable breach in the Albanian communist movement
should speedily be brought to an end. He demanded, not
the union of the groups as was demanded by the fractionisL
leaders, but their fusion into one party, with the traces of
their previous features by no means remaining apparent.
His basic point of view that the union of Albanian Com­
munists into a single revolutionary party would be achieved
not only by the renunciation of the distorted points of view
of the groups, not only by the acceptance by the members
of groups of a sound Marxist-Leninist programme, but also
by common revolutionary action against the fascist enemy,
which would do much more towards leading to the fraterni­
zation of the Communists than discussions on theories, met
with the support of the more revolutionary members of
the groups. For this reason Enver Hoxha himself headed
the great patriotic demonstration, which on the initiative
of the revolutionary Communists took place in Tirana be­
fore the quisling prime minister’s office on October 28.
1941, the anniversary of the fascist march on Rome, a few
days prior to the convoked assemblage of the groups.
The demonstration, during which the Communists were
constrained to fight without paying any attention to group
divergences in order to defend each other against the in­
terference of Italian police forces, proved, though rudimen-
tarily, the indisputable value of the revolutionary actions
not only in the fusion of Communists into a single party,
but also in the attraction of the popular masses into the
great patriotic war against the fascist invaders and native
collaborators.
An extraordinary convention of communist groups met
in Tirana in the first week of November 1941, with the
participation of the delegates of the three communist groups
— “Fire” refused to assist and stood aloof for a year, when
it disappeared altogether. After some days’ discussions, and
after fractionist-liquidator tendencies of some pretentious
leaders had been overcome, on November 8, 1941 the de-
278
 The house in Tirana where the Albanian Communist
Party was founded secretly on Nov. 8, 1941

cision was taken to disperse the groups and to form the

Albanian Communist Party as a Marxist-Leninist party,
with a new programme approved in the form of a resolution.
The convention likewise elected the provisional Central
Committee of the new Party, at the head of which Enver
Hoxha was chosen.
Briefly the resolution set out as the political programme
of the Albanian Communist Party the mobilization of the
popular masses of Albania in the armed struggle against the
fascist invaders and native collaborators for the national
independence of Albania, in cooperation with all the na­
tionalist, patriotic forces of the country, in militant friend­
ship with the peoples of the Balkans, particularly with the
peoples of Yugoslavia and of Greece, and in alliance with
the great anti-fascist coalition, in the first place with the
279
Soviet Union, which was to be popularized in Albania also
as a socialist country; alongside the national-liberation
movement, the resolution set out the mobilization of the
masses, foremost of labourers and peasants, with the aim
that after the liberation of the country the bourgeois-land­
lord rule should be uprooted, and a popular democratic rule
should be established in Albania.

THE PATRIOTIC ARMED STRUGGLE AND

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE POPULAR
REVOLUTION IN ALBANIA

A few days later, still in November 1941, a manifesto

bearing the signature of the Central Committee and distrib­
uted secretly was addressed to the country, which after
analysing the internal and external political situation, de­
manded from the masses of the population that the general
war against the fascist invader for the definite liberation
of the country should start. The people should not pay
taxes, not deliver corn, not give even a glass of water to
the enemy; further, they should take part, with arms in
hand, in the ranks of the fighters for freedom. Addressing
the Albanian Communists, the first manifesto of the Al­
banian Communist Party asked them to display in all cir­
cumstances an example of revolutionary resoluteness, of
sacrifice, of initiative, or organization; to stand always in
the forefront of the national-liberation struggle, to occupy
always the advanced posts in fighting, where the danger
was the greatest, and to give without hesitation even their
life for the national liberation of the country. During that
same month the leaders of the Albanian Communist Party
entered into relations with the armed bands, which obeyed
their order to abandon secret activity and to operate more
freely in the villages by doing political propaganda work
among the peasants and by taking armed actions against
the fascist invaders. In the principal cities of the country
280
Comrade Myslim Peza with his detachment of Albanian partisans

likewise, guerrilla detachments were organized on new

bases, ready to carry out undermining actions and attempts
against the enemy. On November 23, 1941. under the
direction of the Albanian Communist Party, the under­
ground organization of Albanian Communist Youth was
created in Tirana, with Qemal Stafa as the political secre­
tary of its Central Committee. Likewise within the month
of November the first shot of the armed anti-fascist war
had resounded. While a partisan detachment had under­
taken an assault on a fascist command post inside Tirana on
the eve of November 28, 1941, the anniversary of the na­
tional independence, the chief of a squad of collabora­
tionist political police was killed by a guerrilla unit.
This change within the Albanian resistance naturally
drew the attention of the fascist, authorities. The distribu­
tion of the first tract in every city, and even in a great
281
 Qemal Stafa, hero of the Misto Marne, martyred in
war for national liberation, the fighting against the
who gave his life in battle enemy in Tirana on Aug.
on May 5, 1942 16, 1942

number of villages, while the police were powerless to lav

hands on even one single anti-fascist militant, the demon­
strations that took place in Tirana on October 28, and in
Korea on November 8, 1941, followed by a hand-to-hand
encounter with the police, the presence of the first armed
bands even in the vicinity of the capital and other similar
actions, evidenced the resoluteness of the communist or­
ganization and the gravity of the internal political situa­
tion. To this new situation, the highest fascist officials
responded by, as they called it, a “change of the guard"
The quisling government of Shefqet Verlaci was dismissed
under the censure that it had proved itself unable to put
down the anti-fascist resistance since its inception. At the
beginning of December 1941 a “mailed fist” government
came to power, headed by Mustafa Merlika Kruja.
The Italian fascist leaders could not find a man more to
their liking to face the situation than Mustafa Kruja, an
experienced fox in Albanian political life who, as an agent
of Rome since 1914, enjoyed their trust. Mustafa Kruja
focused the fire of his political artillery not against the
entire anti-fascist resistance, but narrowed it down against
the Albanian communist movement, with the aim of bring-
282
 Patriotic anti-fascist demonstration against Italian invaders,
led by Comrade Enver Hoxha on Oct. 28, 1941, in Tirana

ing about a breach in the resistance front, detaching the

patriotic non-communist forces from the common national­
liberation front, which was on the way of being created
in conjunction with the Albanian Communists. In the ex­
ecution of this tactics, Mustafa Kruja started even to in­
troduce various concessions: he slowed down the pressure
exerted till then for obligatory enrolment in the Albanian
fascist party and in other fascist organizations; he under­
took to receive in his offices any anti-fascist citizen and to
discuss with him any political question without resorting
to reprisals; he promised that he would not persist in the
mistakes of the previous government and in conclusion let
it be understood that the Italian military occupation was a
provisional occupation imposed by the circumstances of the
World War and that with the termination of the war Al­
283
bania would gain true independence without the need for
bloodshed.
The demagogic character of the promises of Mustafa
Kruja soon became evident. His policy of “no peace with
Communists” and the repressive police measures he took
proved futile. Although it was engaged at that time in
internal conflict with the old fractionists, who refused to
accept Party discipline, the Albanian Communist Party con­
tinued to step up the anti-fascist war. Through the selfless
work and unparalleled heroism of its members, unbelievable
successes were achieved during 1942. Partisan bands
covered almost the whole of Albania. The attacks of
these bands against the Italian fascist motor-lorry col­
umns and troops were carried out in coordination with
guerrilla operations inside the cities and attempts to wipe
out fascist criminals. During the night of July 24, 1942
guerrilla units in all Albania cut down telephone posts and
wires, interrupting inter-urban communications throughout
the country. On the following days guerrilla units in Ti­
rana set fire and burned down the telephone office, seized
the archives of the ministry of the interior, blew up the
warehouse of the military engineering department and with
amazing intrepidity assailed the airfield, destroying military
installations. In Korga fire was set to the headquarters of
the fascist party, in Shkoder the political prison was stormed
and opened, in Vlora the Italian military stores were blown
up, at a time that partisan bands were clearing the inland
regions of the country of fascist authorities and the govern­
ment gendarmery. The Communists who, in the spirit of
fulfilling their Party task, preferred to die rather than to fall
into the hands of Italian fascist police or of the militia of
Mustafa Kruja, won the admiration of the whole country
with their heroic, unyielding resistance. The fighting of
several hours that took place from one quarter to the other
within the capital between a whole company of enemy mili­
tia and a single man, Qemal Stafa, who fell heroically, the
prolonged clash that took place in July in a house in Shkoder
between three students, Perlat Rexhepi, Branko Kadia and
284
 Perlat Rexhepi, who fell in Vojo Kushi, who died heroi­
the struggle for the libera­ cally on Oct. 10, 1942
tion of the motherland on
July 22, 1942

Jordan Misja (who in the end fell as heroes), and government

police detachments, as well as the valorous stand of Midhi
Kostani and Kigo Grego in Korga, in August, in face of in­
human tortures and the gallows, the unprecedented heroism
of the commander of guerrilla units Vojo Kushi who was
killed in Tirana by hurling himself on an enemy tank after
five hours’ resistance, and hundreds of similar cases, raised
the prestige of the Communists among the masses and dis­
paraged all the hideous campaigns of Italian fascists and
their Albanian collaborators.
The Albanian Communist Party kept the public informed
of all the successes achieved by partisan bands or by guer­
rilla units by means of regular secret tracts and bulletins,
in which at the same time it clearly explained its political
line of action which was the formation of a national-libera­
tion front. Together with these the first issue of the mim­
eographed organ of the Albanian Communist Party, Zeri
i Popullit (The Voice of the People) was put in secret cir­
culation, and this became the most authoritative organ on
theory and on the conduct of war of the Albanian political
national-liberation movement. Somewhat later the first
number of the organ of the Union of Communist Youth
285
under the title Kushtrimi i Lirise (The War Call of Frc
dom) was issued.
The successes won by Albanian Communists during the
few months of the existence of the Albanian Communist
Party against a very strong and very astute enemy as
fascist Italy, on the one hand, and Mustafa Kruja, on the
other, were greater than had been anticipated. The anti­
communist demagogy of collaboration with the enemy and
of extra-governmental pseudo-nationalists was seriously
shaken. The platform of the formation of a common
national-liberation front had won considerable prestige
among the masses and among the intellectual nationalist
circles that had been standing aloof. Judging that the con­
ditions were by now mature to carry out further the pro­
gramme of the National-Liberation Movement, through the
initiative of the Albanian Communist Party, a national­
liberation conference was convened at Peza, liberated by
partisan forces, 18 kilometres from the capital. A large
number of personalities renowned as anti-fascist patriots,
together with Communists, were asked to attend this
conference. Attending were also several irresolute “nation­
alists” and well-known anti-communists.
The Conference of Peza, which met on September 16.
1942, held discussions for several days, then on the basis
of the proposals of Enver Hoxha made on behalf of the
Albanian Communist Party, took a series of decisions,
three of which had particular importance: a) the creation
of a common National-Lib eration Front, in which all the
patriotic forces of the country, regardless of differences of
ideas, of regions and of religions, should join in a war
against the fascist invaders and Albanian collaborators,
under the head of a General National-Liberation Council,
to which communist leaders, nationalist-democrats, Zogist
adherents, representatives of anti-fascist youth, of anti­
fascist women, etc. should be elected; b) the extension and
intensification on all the fronts of the armed liberation war
against the foreign invaders and Albanian collaborators,
with no compromise with the enemy; c) the creation
286
throughout the country, legally in the liberated zones or
else underground in districts still under enemy occupation,
in villages, regions, districts and cities, of local and regional
national-liberation councils elected by the local populations;
these councils should possess a double function — to act as
mobilizing organs of the armed revolution and, at the same
time, as organs of local authority, because they were to
replace the fascist authority when it was overthrown in
order to eliminate in this manner the re-establishment of
the former bourgeois-landlords’ authority; the national­
liberation councils consequently would be the basic organs
of the new democratic popular authority until, after the
liberation of the whole country, conditions would be created
for the convocation and the holding of a constituent
assembly.
These decisions marked the incontestable victory of the
political line that had been elaborated by the Albanian
Communist Party. The creation of the National-Liberation
Front sanctioned the failure of the attempts of the Mustafa
Kruja government to detach the nationalists from the
Communists. The decision for the intensification of the
anti-fascist national-liberation war, on the other hand,
marked the triumph over the view of the nationalist­
bourgeoisie who, with their slogan “It’s too early to start
fighting the invader”, sought to dampen public opinion
until certain western powers landed, as they hoped, in the
Balkans and without any difficulty seized power after the
war. The third decision, that on the creation of national­
liberation councils, marked the triumph of the democratic-
revolutionary method on the question of taking possession
of the political authority over the traditional practice
employed up to that time by the “higher” social, conser­
vative and reactionary classes.
The Conference of Peza thus decided to merge, in time
and in space, the two historic processes in a common
revolution: the national-liberation struggle to secure the
independence of the country, and the popular revolution
for the establishment of true democracy in Albania.
287
 Disturbed by these “monstrous decisions”, as Mustafa
Kruja called them, the Italian fascist authorities with the
Luogotenente F. Jacomoni at their head, as well as native
collaborators, took a series of new military and police
measures. A military punitive expedition was speedily
sent against Peza, and this was followed by still greater
expeditions that were sent against other partisan bands.
At the same time, in the cities a campaign of unrestrained
terror broke out against the Communists and their
sympathizers. The fascists, after finding out that they
were unable to exterminate the partisan bands, massacred
innocent peasants and travellers, began to set fire at
random to houses and to entire villages; in the cities
martial law was proclaimed for an unlimited period;
thousands of citizens were arrested, thus increasing the
number of prisoners and concentration camps in Italy. But
not one of these measures gave any result. From week
to week the partisan bands increased in number and size;
through their increase and through the war they waged,
liberated zones were created in the inner regions of the
country. In Peza, Skrapar, Kurvelesh, Qermenika, Mar-
tanesh, Opar, Mallakastra and elsewhere, the authority of
National-Liberation Councils began to operate normally
and freely. All these raised the prestige of the National-
Liberation Front within the country. Encouraging news
soon arrived from abroad, too. On December 17, 1942, the
British foreign minister A. Eden read in the House of
Commons a British government declaration acknowledging
the freedom and the independence of Albania and leaving
it up to the Albanian people to decide at the end of the
war what regime and form of government they would
have in this country, adding at the conclusion that the
question of Albania’s post-war boundaries would be dis­
cussed at the Peace Conference. On the following day,
December 18, the Soviet government, through its Minister
of Foreign Affairs, V. Molotov, after expressing the very
lively sympathy with which it envisaged the liberation war
of the Albanian patriots, and after declaring that it would
288
 Albanian partisans on the march

not acknowledge any claims of fascist Italy on Albania,

announced its desire to see Albania free and independent,
and recognized the right of the Albanian people to choose
the form of government it desired. Further on, the Soviet
government made it understood that on account of their
struggle,* the Albanian patriots would be considered as
allies in the great anti-fascist coalition. The Secretary of
the State Department of the United States of America,
289
 Mallakastra detachment of partisans and its commander,
Comrade Mehmet Shehu

C. Hull, too, expressing his admiration for the war of the

Albanian partisan units and reconfirming the right of
Albania to be a free and independent state, declared like­
wise that the question of the form of government after the
war depended on the people of the country themselves.
These successes of the National-Liberation Front in
general, and in particular those of the Albanian Communist
Party, which was its backbone, did not leave undisturbed
the bourgeois “nationalist” circles that had remained in
suspense. Various persons in these circles — mainly intel­
lectuals and anti-Zogist bourgeoisie — towards the end of
1942 formed an underground organization under the name
of Balli Kombetar (National Front). At the head of this
organization which had declared itself nationalist and anti-
Zogist, stood as a precious capital Midhat Frasheri, alias
290
 Lumo Skendo as he was known, a man of culture, renowned
as anti-Zogist and anti-fascist. Along with him, however,
the Central Committee of the Balli Kombetar included
also personalities with no political prestige such as the
former collaborationist minister of justice in the Mustafa
Kruja Cabinet, Hasan Dosti, or else high officials of the
collaborationist administration, such as Ali Kelcyra, Koi
Tromara, Koqo Muka, or else ambitious landlords such
as Nuredin bey Vlora, etc.
The programme of the Balli Kombetar, published in terse
phrases in the form of a decalogue, did not make a secret
of the anti-communist sentiments which pre-occupied its
nationalist-bourgeois leaders. The anti-fascist struggle for
the independence of Albania was not expressed in the
programme of the first plan. This had its proper reasons,
which soon became clearly apparent. The leaders of the
Balli Kombetar had no mind to aggravate their relations
with the fascist invader, and still less with the collabo­
rationist government; on the contrary they wanted to take
advantage of the unfavourable situation of the discredited
government authorities in order to consolidate their organi­
zation freely. And truly, in simulated secret positions in
front of the collaborationist administration, the Balli
Kombetar rapidly extended its network of organizations
in a multitude of districts of the country, and without
meeting with any obstacle created a number of armed
detachments that remained in the wait. Subsequently,
after only a short time, using as a pretext the interna­
tionalist cooperation that existed between the Albanian
partisans and the Yugoslav and Greek partisans in the war
against the common enemy, the Balli Kombetar launched
an all-out propaganda campaign slandering the Albanian
Communist Party as an agent of the Yugoslav and Greek
Communist Parties driving Albania into submission to
Yugoslavia and Greece. Therefore, the nationalist­
bourgeois leaders concluded, the Albanian forces should
be spared from the exterminating war with fascist Italy
291
in order to employ them against the foes of tomorrow —
Yugoslavia and Greece.
At the beginning, as the “National Front*’ (Balli
Kombetar) found quite a number of supporters, the
country was threatened by a new split which was bound
to bring in its train the danger of the outbreak of a civil
war to the benefit of the fascist invaders. The fascist
invaders, too, in the early months of 1943, took a series
of political measures, through which they aimed at leading
astray Albanian public opinion and at isolating the
National-Liberation Front. On January 10, 1943 they over­
threw the discredited and politically cabinet of Mustafa
Kruja. After the short duration of the , government of
Eqrem Libohova, on February 22, 1943 they brought to
power a government of compromise headed by Maliq bey
Bushati, which in secret relations with the “National Front”
became the executor of the new policy of Rome — of the
so-called “concessions” to the Albanians. While it was
being promised that the Italo-Albanian customs and mone­
tary conventions of April 20, 1939 as well as the convention
of June 3, 1939 on the unification of international relations
of Italy and of Albania would be taken in reconsideration,
after a few days had elapsed, the decision was taken for
the substitution of the Albanian Fascist Party by a new
organization under the name of the “Guard of Great
Albania”, and still another decision on the creation of the
Albanian army and gendarmery, as independent self-relying
forces, which according to the statute of June 3, 1939.
were treated as attached parts of the Italian armed and
police forces. In March 1943, Mussolini decreed the dis­
charge from his office as Luogotenente of the king-
emperor, Francesco Jacomoni, detested by the Albanians
and of no further use to Rome, who was replaced by
General Alberto Pariani, former chief of the Italian military
mission in Albania and former Italian under-secretary of
state for war.
It was not the demagogic steps of Rome so much, as the
propaganda campaign of the “National Front” combined
292
with them, that placed the Albanian Communist Party,
for the second time after the demagogic and police offensive
that had been undertaken a year ago by Mustafa Kruja,
to a hard test. Yet the partisan bands continued unin­
terruptedly the attacks and acts of sabotage against the
military forces of the enemy, and won encouraging
successes, such as the liberation by assault of Voskopoja on
January 14, 1943, the engagement in the proximity of
Gramshi, where the partisans captured 200 fascist soldiers
and officers on January 31, 1943, the attack on the asphalt
mines of Salonica on February 23, 1943. Meanwhile the
communist leaders called the first meeting of the national
conference of their Party, in order to analyse, along with
the internal problems of the Party in respect to organiza­
tion, its activity up to that date, and, what was of par­
ticular importance, in order to delineate the political line
that was to be followed in the future in the new situation
created within the country by the combined political
offensive of the invaders, of the collaborators and of the
bourgeois nationalists of the “National Front”, and on the
other hand by the turn that had begun on the Soviet-
German war front following the historic victories won at
Stalingrad on February 2, 1943.
The conference which assembled in Labinot in the neigh­
bourhood of Elbasan from March 17-22, 1943, had no
reservations whatsoever in formulating its approval of the
political line followed by the Albanian Communist Party up
to that date, and found absolutely no reason to modify this
line in the future. The analysis made at the Conference
of Labinot and the arguments brought forth there by the
delegates of all the regions confirmed indisputably the
report of the Provisional Central Committee which was
delivered by Enver Hoxha. During the 16 months of its
existence, the Albanian Communist Party had grown and
gained strength, its political line had triumphed with the
rapidity of a thunderbolt in all directions, the partisan war
had been intensified, inflicting serious damage on the
enemy, the National-Liberation Front had been created and
293
was extended throughout the country, whole zones had
been liberated, where organs of the new power were func­
tioning, the echo of the national-liberation war had crossed
the boundaries of the country, inciting the encouraging
statements of December by the three principal powers of
the great anti-fascist coalition. The ranks of the foreign
enemy and of native collaborators were seized by bewilder­
ment and uncertainty, prompting their policy of concessions,
etc., etc. After pointing out the origin of these successes,
the conference deemed them of great value for the future
also, in other words the National-Liberation War should
be continued without any compromise with the enemy; the
alliance of the Albanians with the great anti-fascist coalition,
and particularly with the Soviet Union, should be strength­
ened; the National-Liberation Front should continuously
be extended, by addressing itself directly to the workers
and peasants, and not through the intermediary of influen­
tial and unreliable “chiefs”; into the National-Liberation
Front honest patriotic intellectuals should be attracted; from
minor partisan bands and units, bigger military formations
should be created, in the first place, partisan battalions,
with the object of laying the foundation for the formation of
a regular National-Liberation Army, etc. The conference
likewise took the decision that the Albanian Communist
Party should maintain a prudent and patient attitude to­
wards nationalist organizations that had been created or
that were to be created, and although they were convinced
that Albanian bourgeois nationalists had the tendency to
betray by uniting themselves with the enemy, continuous
attempts should be made in order to draw them into the
orbit of the anti-fascist patriotic war, to enlist them in the
National-Liberation Front; by all possible means it should
be tried to avoid the outbreak of the civil war. which
would be to the advantage of the enemy, and only in case
all these efforts failed, should it proceed to the unmasking
of bourgeois-nationalist organizations as collaborationist
and treacherous organizations. Against military formations
of these organizations .arms should be used only in self­
294
defence from provocatory attacks that they would under­
take.
After the Conference of Labinot, the Albanian Com­
munist Party reiterated to the “National Front” the
previous proposals for its entry in the National-Liberation
Front, or at least for the execution in common of war
actions against the fascist invaders and Albanian collabora­
tors. The leaders of the “National Front” rejected these
proposals on the excuse that the time had not come as yet
for an open uprising, and that it was necessary to wait
still further, by which they let it be understood that they
were awaiting “the second front” which England and the
United States of America had engaged themselves to open,
and which they hoped was going to be opened in Albania.
However, soon enough the leaders of the Albanian Com­
munist Party became aware of certain secret documents
which indicated that behind these excuses, the leaders of
the “National Front” were organizing a conspiracy on a
grand scale against the National-Liberation Movement in
general, in order to eliminate its moving force, the Albanian
Communist Party, in particular. Two members of the
Central Committee of the “National Front”, Ali Kelcyra
and Nuredin Vlora, had signed on March 15, 1943 with the
commander-in-chief of the Italian armies of occupation in
Albania, General Renzo Dalmazzo, a secret agreement
which has come to be known as the “Dalmazzo-Kelcyra
Protocol”, according to which the “National Front” agreed
not to start any armed revolt in south Albania, while the
Italian command of occupation on its part promised that
it would not undertake any operation of pursuit against
Albanian armed bands that would respect this protocol.
The significance of the protocol was evident: the “National
Front” was to be free to organize armed detachments in
order to direct them at the opportune moment not against
the foreign invader, but against the partisans. On the other
hand, the Central Committee of the Albanian Communist
Party became aware of sufficient indications which
demonstrated that officers of the British military mission
295
sent over by the Inter-Allied Mediterranean Command to
Albanian National-Liberation partisan forces, were in
secret contact with the leaders of the “National Front”,
who continued to remain in feigned secrecy, that they were
likewise in secret contact with the most prominent chief
of the Zogists, Abaz Kupi, who through their instigation
was forsaking the National-Liberation Front, to which he
had adhered since its creation in Peza in September 1942.
as well as with other reactionary leaders and chieftains
with pronounced collaborationist tendencies who still
enjoyed a certain influence in the mountainous backwoods
of the country — with the aim of forming a common
nationalist anti-communist front.
But the weakest side of all these efforts was the dread
of the armed anti-fascist war, the tendency to create with
the disguised aid of fascist invaders and of collaborators,
the nationalist anti-communist front, and their readiness
to sacrifice even the anti-fascist National-Liberation War
for the sake of seeing the Albanian Communist Party
extirpated.
The Albanian Communist Party responded to this con­
spiracy by continuous proposals for cooperation in the
patriotic war, and by an unprecedented increase in the
armed actions of the partisan bands against the armies of
the Italian invaders and local collaborators. To the call of
the Albanian Communist Party for the intensification of the
war of liberation, thousands of young men and young
women responded enthusiastically. In May 1943 volunteer
partisan battalions with military commanders and political
commissars were formed. By the end of May 1943 the
number of partisans had doubled what it was four months
before, whereas by the end of June 1943 there were four
times as many partisans. During the month of June, fierce
fighting took place throughout the country. In some cases
it was the partisan troops that assailed the Italian army in
cities and in lorry-columns, in other cases it was the Italian
army that undertook frontal operations against partisan
troops, in the attempt to break the national-liberation resist-
296
Asim Zeneli, heroic commander Zoja Curre, one of the many
who fell gloriously at the head Albanian heroines who died
of his forces on July 2, 1943 fighting for the liberation of
her country

ance and re-subjugate the liberated zones. In either case

the partisan battalions and bands scored remarkable suc­
cesses. After the ignominious defeats that the Italian troops
had suffered in the course of a three-day battle that they
had undertaken against the partisans and peasants in the
area of Peza, from June 14 to June 17, where they left
more than 300 of their men and officers killed, and after
the equally ignominious defeat of the Italian troops and
mercenaries during the four-day operation that took place
in the Mallakastra region, where they left hundreds of
bodies, the partisan battalions assaulted on July 1, 1943 the
garrison of thousands of Italian soldiers of Permeti, inflict­
ing on them severe losses and liberating the city after
strenuous fighting on the 5th of July. On the following
day, July 6, 1943, in the proximity of Barmash of Kolonja,
the Albanian partisans clashed for the first time with troops
of the German Hitlerite army, which had penetrated into
Albania from Macedonia, in the belief that here they would
find a safe way to reach the Greek city of Janina. For the
serious losses they had sustained in their first encounter
with Albanian partisans, the Hitlerite Germans knew no
other way of revenge than by devastating by fire the vil­
297
lage of Borova and exterminating every man, woman and
child, who had not been able to escape. A hundred and
seven souls perished.
While in every nook and cranny of the country uninter­
rupted fighting was raging, the General Council of the Na­
tional-Liberation Front assembled in Labinot and, judging
that by now a regular volunteer army had already been
created (in those days approximately 10 thousand men
strong), on July 10, 1943 decided on the formation of the
General-Staff of the National-Lib eration Army, under the
command of Spiro Moissiu, then a major, and as political
commissar, Enver Hoxha. The formation of the General-
Staff foretold a further intensification of the armed Na­
tional-Liberation Movement in Albania.
On the day that the General-Staff was formed, Anglo-
American allied armies landed in Sicily. These two events
alarmed the fascist government circles. With the aim of
securing the rear in face of an eventual disembarkment of
the allied powers on the eastern coast of the Adriatic, the
Italian army of occupation in Albania undertook a series of
large-scale military operations with the aim of destroying
the National-Liberation Army. Four Italian divisions
equipped with artillery, tanks and aircraft, started a new
operation in the Mallakastra zone on the 14th of July, setting
fire to 80 nearby villages and killing hundreds of peasants,
without succeeding in annihilating the partisan battalions
of not more than 2,000 fighters. On the contrary, by their
resistance and counter-attacks, in which they were sup­
ported by the masses of the peasantry, the partisan battal­
ions during four days of fighting inflicted hundreds of
casualties on the enemy. Nor did the other Italian expedi­
tions fare any better. Complying with the order of the
General-Staff not to give the enemy a moment’s peace, all
the partisan detachments at every point throughout the
country launched assaults against the Italian garrisons and
columns of military vehicles.
The “National Front” too, deeming the landing of the
allied powers in the Balkans as possible and as quite at.
208
 hand, started, though still not altogether openly, to strike
at the partisan formations by means of its bands. The
logic of the events inevitably brought about the coopera­
tion of nationalist forces of the “National Front” with the
forces of the Italian invaders, which the leaders of the
“National Front” endeavoured to dissemble and then to
deny. Various facts, however, were sufficiently clear to
the public. The case of Kolonja, when with the support
of the Italians a band of the “National Front” attacked
partisan forces, and still more the case of Mallakastra, when
Frontist forces assailed in the rear partisan battalions en­
gaged in the unequal war against Italian divisions —
were clamorous indices, forewarnings that the bourgeois­
nationalist leaders together with Midhat Frasheri, too, who.
blinded by his fanatical anti-communist hatred sanctioned
these actions, were gradually drifting to open treason.
After the overthrow of Mussolini on July 27, 1943 and
after Marshal Badoglio’s government had come to power,
the National-Liberation War in Albania did not slacken.
On the contrary, the General-Staff of the National-Libera­
tion Army issued the order that the fighting should be
carried on with still greater intensity, until the uncondi­
tional surrender of Italy and Germany, as had been an­
nounced by the big Allied Powers. At the same time the
National-Liberation General Council for the last time ad­
dressed an invitation to the “National Front” to renounce
the disguised cooperation with the occupation forces and
to unite with the National-Liberation Front in the war
against them. The “National Front” leaders agreed in the
end to enter into negotiations. In the village of Mukje of
the district of Kruja on August 1, and 2, 1943, a meeting of
the delegates of both parties took place.
In order to reach the cooperation, the leaders of the “Na­
tional Front” placed onerous conditions: they demanded
the formation of a “Committee for the Rescue of Albania”
that should replace the National-Liberation General Council
which had up to then directed the patriotic, anti-fascist war;
they demanded that the “Committee for the Rescue of Al­
299
bania” should be composed of 12 members, half to be chosen
by the “National Front” and the other half by the ‘ Na­
tional-Liberation Front”; they demanded the dissolution of
the National-Liberation Councils set up in the villages,
cities and districts and the formation of new organs, where
the proportional participation of the members of the “Na­
tional Front” should be respected.
It was evident that by the partition into halves of the
seats in the central as well as in the local organs, the “Na­
tional Front” would in effect secure a majority, because it
took into account the seats in these organs, too, that would
go to non-Communist members of the National-Liberation
General Council, some of whom, as for example Abaz Kupi,
had started to adopt an openly adverse attitude towards
the Albanian Communist Party. Consequently, the Cen­
tral Committee of the Albanian Communist Party, as well
as the National-Liberation General Council, rejected these
conditions that would render easier the seizure of the au­
thority after the war by the bourgeois-nationalists who
were ready to pass over, with the aid of their friends abroad,
to anti-Communist terror.
After the interruption of the fruitless negotiations of Mu-
kje, the divergences between the two political alignments
became aggravated to the extreme. The “National Front”
continued to follow its former line of action, increasing its
endeavours, always in conformity with the Dalmazzo-
Kelcyra Protocol, to augment its armed forces, which from
time to time, whenever they felt themselves fit, provoked
and hit the partisan forces. On the contrary, the National-
Liberation General Council and the partisan detachments
continued to win all the while more successes in their almost
daily assaults against the Italian forces of occupation. The
month of August marked a further growth of the partisan
forces, which from battalions grew into partisan brigades.
By a decision of the General-Staff of the National-Libera­
tion Army, the First Shock Brigade was formed, and on
August 15, 1943 it was inaugurated in Vithkuq of Kor$a,
under the command of Mehmet Shehu, former volunteer
300
 Members of the First Shock Brigade of the Albanian
National-Liberation Army on the day of its founding in
Vithkuq (Kor$a) on Aug. 15, 1943

in the Civil War of Spain and commander of the valorous

partisan forces in Mallakastra. In the days that followed,
the First Brigade and 30 different partisan battalions un­
dertook armed struggle in every quarter of the country,
proceeding to the liberation of cities.
On September 4. 1943, once again in Labinot, the sec­
ond National-Liberation Conference was convened in or­
der to review the political situation. This Conference took
a series of decisions on the new problems that had emerged
after the first conference which had been held in Peza
nearly a year before. After it had reconfirmed the political
line followed up to then and the attitude adopted by the
General Council in the negotiations of Mukje, taking into
consideration the provocative and collaborationist attitude
of the leaders of the “National Front”, and at the very end.
301
after conviction was expressed that it was not possible to
attract these leaders by mere discussions into the anti­
fascist patriotic war line, the Conference of Labinot de­
cided to answer the “National Front” by completely un­
masking it before the public, and by destroying it as an
organization, thus creating the opportunity for its ordinary
members to adhere without any obstacle to the National-
Liberation Front. The Conference reconfirmed the func­
tions of the local National-Liberation Councils, provided for
the formation of such councils in all districts, cities and
villages of the country, sanctioned their statutes and rules.
In anticipation of the imminent capitulation of Italy and the
occupation of Albania by German armies, the Conference
decided on the continuation of the National-Liberation War
with still greater vigour against the Hitlerite aggressors as
well.
The capitulation of Italy on September 8, 1943, while the
work of the Conference of Labinot was being completed,
created a new, original situation for the Albanian partisans.
On the instruction of the Central Committee of the Albanian
Communist Party and of the General-Staff, the partisan
troops interrupted the armed struggle wherever they were
and proposed to the Italian troops, their enemies until that
day, to bring to an end their hostilities and to unite with
them in order to carry on the war against the common
enemies of Albania and of Italy, the German-Hitlerite ar­
mies, which, coming from Macedonia and Greece, were in­
vading the territory of Albania. The commander of the
Italian forces of occupation, General R. Dalmazzo, refused;
the major part of the Italian troops obeyed his orders and
surrendered themselves to the Germans; others, which did
not accept either cooperation with the allies of Mussolini
or to fight against them on the side of the partisans, were
disbanded; thousands of soldiers deserted their barracks and
sought refuge and friendly reception by Albanian peasants.
Only some hundred Italian soldiers accepted enlistment as
volunteers in the ranks of the partisans, forming at first
one battalion and later a separate brigade under the name
302
of “Antonio Gramsci”. During these days, the overwhelm­
ing part of the country, with the exception of the prin­
cipal cities, passed into the hands of the National-Liberation
Army.

THE CONTINUATION OF THE NATIONAL­

LIBERATION WAR AGAINST THE
HITLERITE INVADERS;
THE LIBERATION OF ALBANIA AND THE
TRIUMPH OF THE POPULAR REVOLUTION

The partisan troops offered stiff resistance to the German

armies, which invaded Albania immediately after the capi­
tulation of Italy. In some cases armed clashes continued
for several days. Of all these, the most violent encounter
took place near Vlora — in Drashovica and Mavrova — at
the termination of which the partisans freed nearly 7,000
Italian soldiers and officers, and prisoners-of-war, from
the camp of Drashovica, and obliged the Hitlerites to re­
treat after sustaining heavy losses. In the weeks that fol­
lowed, however, thanks to reinforcements that had arrived
from different parts of the Balkans, the German armies,
vastly superior, after hard fighting captured the cities of
the country and the key points of the communications
system. For the martyred Albania, a new chapter of the
National-Liberation War was beginning.
The Hitlerite occupational command soon found a com­
mon language with the forces of internal reaction, with the
collaborators of yesterday and particularly with bourgeois­
nationalist forces, which, at the capitulation of Italy, had
been terrified by the impressive political and military force
of the National-Liberation General Council. The bourgeois­
nationalists were unable to perceive that the source of their
weakness lay in their opportunist and capitulating attitude
303
before the invader and at the reactionary position they had
adopted in face of social-political problems, which were of
great concern to the masses of the country. They found no
better way of saving themselves from ruin than coopera­
tion with the new German-Hitlerite invader.
This cooperation was founded on absurd, contradictory
principles. For the Hitlerite Germans, Albania was an oc­
cupied territory to be used as a military base for defending
the Balkan Peninsula against any allied disembarkation
and at the same time to fight from here against the allies
of the great anti-Hitlerite coalition, the National-Liberation
Movements of the Balkan peoples. By the bourgeois­
nationalists on the contrary, Albania was considered as an
‘‘independent” state which had the duty of strengthening
itself by waging war against the Albanian National-Libera­
tion Movement, and later, against Yugoslavia and Greece.
The absurdity reached its climax when it was imagined
that “independent” Albania would be “neutral”, while it
was permitted that its territory could be used as a military
base for Nazi Germany in its war against the Allied Powers
and while Albanian forces would be used in fighting
against the Balkan allies of the anti-Hitlerite coalition. It
was clear that on these premises this sort of cooperation
was an unparalleled political success for the Hitlerites, as
they were thus assured that by means of Albanian collab­
orationists’ forces they would fight the Albanian National-
Liberation Movement and afterwards the National-Libera­
tion Movement of Yugoslavia and of Greece, which were
proclaimed and acknowledged as allies of the great anti­
fascist coalition.
The German Nazis openly, as well as secretly, gave all
possible aid to Albanian “nationalists” in order to assure
their security and to reorganize themselves round a
game of political intrigue unprecedented in Europe. On
September 11, 1943, the “independence of the motherland”
was proclaimed in Tirana, and a “Provisory Executive Com­
mittee” was created under the presidency of Ibrahim
Bicakgiu until the “constituent assembly” should be called.
304
 Feverish efforts were made for the restoration of the Al­
banian army under the command of General Aqif Permeti,
and of the Albanian gendarmery under the command of
Colonel Hysni Dema, both of whom were former Zogists
and collaborators of the Italian occupation. Within and
outside the capital city, guarding closely its disguised clan­
destine existance, the “National Front” carried on its at­
tempts to strengthen its armed forces and improve its or­
ganization. Along with it, with the support of a dozen
chieftains who had been in the pay of Zogu and later of
Jacomoni, in the neighbourhood of Tirana the formation
of a Zogist party under the name “Legality” was announced,
to be headed by Abaz Kupi who continued as member of
the Presidency of the National-Liberation General Council.
In Shkoder, efforts were undertaken for the formation of
an ultra-reactionary Catholic fascist organization under the
head of the chief-bayraktar Gjon Markagjoni, a former
member of the Italian fascist senate, behind whom Catholic
prelates, former collaborators of Mussolini, stood concealed.
A speedy and ferocious reaction was thus being organized
against the National-Liberation Movement, which would
turn out, as in the past, to the benefit of the foreign in­
vader.
The Albanian Communist Party and the National-Libera­
tion General Council did not retreat from the attitude
adopted by them but, on the contrary, continued their ef­
forts in order to face the unequal war with the experienced
Hitlerite army of occupation and, at the same time, the
civil war that was being forced upon the country. During
the autumn of 1943, the situation was very favourable for
them. To the provocations and to the assaults on the part
of the government military forces and of the “National
Front”, the partisans stood firm, scoring victories that
brought the enemy chaos. Outside of the cities, the Na­
tional-Liberation Councils freely exercised authority. Even
the cities were kept under the close watch of partisan forces.
The capital city, too, was virtually besieged. The partisan
forces were so close to the capital that on October 18, 1943,
305
as the so-called ‘'constituent assembly” was opened, the
artillery of the Third Brigade made a direct hit with gun­
fire on the palace, causing panic in the ranks of the mem­
bers of the assembly, immediate suspension of the sessions
going on in that majestic building and their continuation
in another, inconspicuous, hall. More than 50 appeals and
tracts, besides the bulletin of news, were issued by the
higher organs of the Albanian Communist Party during
autumn, in the usual underground way, in order to enlight­
en the public on the machinations devised in Tirana and
in the districts by the most reactionary circles of the country
against the patriotic, anti-fascist movement.
These machinations took concrete form on October 20,
1943 with the creation, by the “Constituent Assembly”, of
the Council of Regents, composed of four members, and, on
November 4, 1943, with the formation of the Albanian
quisling government. Just as the Council of Regents, so
the council of ministers represented a coalition of multi­
ple colours on the basis of the anti-Communist war — of the
“National Front”, the “Legality” party, of the Catholic
Concentration, of the “independent nationalists” together
with the agents of the Hitlerite Gestapo. Mehdi Frasheii,
former prime minister of Zogu who had not been compro­
mised during the fascist occupation, was brought over by the
Germans by special plane from Italy, where he had been in
luxurious confinement, and had a seat allotted to him in
the Council of Regents together with Fuad Dibra, member
of the National Front, Anton Arapi, a Franciscan friar be­
longing to the Catholic Concentration, and Lef Nosi, an “in­
dependent nationalist”. The same compromise was re­
flected also in the composition of the government headed
by Rexhep Mitrovica, a collaborator of the Italian fascists,
with the difference that here the strong hand was the min­
ister of the interior, Xhafer Deva, an agent of Hitler’s
Gestapo. The daily political enlightenment, based on numer­
ous secret documents, which openly demonstrated the co­
operation of the heads of the “National Front” and of the
“Legality” party with the German forces against the parti­
306
sans, had their effect. Politically, the National-Liberation
General Council emerged triumphant.
The “National Front” and “Legality”, which continued
as wolves in sheep’s clothing, were denounced by the
National-Liberation General Council as treacherous collab­
orationist parties. On December 7, 1943, Abas Kupi was
expelled from the Presidency of the National-Liberation
General Council.
The military defeats that the armed forces of the quisling
government and of the pseudo-clandestine underground
organizations had suffered in their encounters with partisan
brigades and battalions, and furthermore, the continuous
losses these brigades and battalions on the German troops
inflicted by their assaults urged the Hitlerite occupational
command to undertake a large-scale operation to destroy
the Albanian armed resistance. This operation was pro­
longed during the whole winter of 1943-1944 and constituted
one of the culminating events of the armed Albanian
National-Liberation War.
The “winter operation”, as it is called now in Albania,
started in November with a series of preliminary blows
dealt by the German army, aided by quisling and National
Front troops, from November 5-10 against the partisan
Third Brigade that operated in the Peza zone near the
capital; from November 16-21 against the partisan forces
of the Dibra zone, capturing the city together with the
district; on November 19 against Berat, liberated by the
partisans, which they occupied; a few days later against
the First Brigade, which defended liberated Mallakastra;
on December 10 against the partisans of the Vlora district.
On December 19, 1943 a German division trained in
operations in mountainous terrain, accompanied by quisling
forces, undertook a lightning operation in the hilly regions
of Tirana, of Martanesh and of Qermenika, then covered
by snowj where the General-Staff of the National-Liberation
Army was located and where the Second and Third
Brigades had been concentrated. The partisan forces, who
were unable to halt the German offensive, with great
307
 difficulty, and after heroic resistance, succeeded in escaping
from the trap and retreating into other districts.
After these preliminary actions, during which both sides
suffered serious losses, the combined offensive of the
German armies began against south Albania, where the
greater part of partisan troops had been gathered, in the
bitter weather of January 1944. The National-Liberation
Army was put before an extraordinarily hard test. The
ground was snow covered, the winter severe, while the
partisans had poor clothing and footwear, or often enough
none. On account of the previous operations of Italian
armies and of the collaborators, hundreds of villages had
been ravaged and great masses of peasant families had
no shelter and were menaced by starvation. Not only pro­
visions and clothing were scarce, but ammunition, too.
The German army, on the contrary, outfitted with all it
needed, was composed mainly of divisions that had taken
part in the fighting on the Soviet front, trained in winter
operations and experienced in partisan warfare.
On January 7, 1944, three German divisions escorted
as always by armed quisling and National Front bands —
as there was no Zogist organization or band in south Al­
bania— starting from Kor$a, Elbasan and Berat, grouped
in semi-circular form, began the operations in the
southern fastnesses of the country, with the aim of de­
stroying the partisan troops and their bases, the villages.
The interior regions were trampled, whole districts were
turned to ashes, hundreds of peasants were killed accord­
ing to the Hitlerite method. A number of armed encoun­
ters took place between the German troops and the Al­
banian forces of the First and Fourth Brigades and other
partisan battalions, which operated in these zones and,
unable to withstand the iron blows of the Wehrmacht;
either retreated farther south in order to take up new
positions, or else pierced the front line and attacked the
enemy from the rear. On January 21, 1944, at Tenda-e-
Qypit, the bloodiest battle of this operation was fought.
On January 26, 1944, yet another German division started
308
marching from the territory of Greece, which assailed the
partisan forces from the rear, with the aim of completing
the encirclement. Through heaps of snow and swollen
rivers, with extreme privations and insufficient ammunition,
the First Brigade and the recently formed Fourth Brigade
and other partisan troops, sustained by masses of peas­
ants, resisted valiantly and self-sacrificingly, the fierce,
dexterous, and numerically superior and better equipped
Hitlerites, that continued on the offensive. In the belief
that they had annihilated the partisan forces, the German
armies directed their steps to the districts of Vlora and
Kurveleshi, where they encountered the local partisan
forces and the Fifth Brigade, which was likewise formed
only recently, and which likewise succeeded in manoeuvr­
ing in order to escape annihilation. After nearly three
months the German winter operation came to an end.
During the period that the operations of the Wehrmacht
troops and of the quisling and National Front bands con­
tinued, the cities too came to know the unprecedented
terror of Hitler. Thousands of honourable communist and
non-communist patriots, sick partisans who had come to
the cities for medical treatment, but ordinary persons,
too, who were suspected of sympathy towards the Na­
tional-Liberation Movement or else mistrusted for the only
reason that they had not agreed to join collaborators’
organizations, were apprehended, some to be imprisoned
and others to be thrown into the camps of extermination
at Prishtina, Belgrade, Buchenwald, Matthauesen and
elsewhere. The “National Front” organizations, in which
by now many criminals had been gathered, became the
most active spies of Hitler’s Gestapo and the quisling
police. The terror reached its climax in February 1944.
On February 4, under the direction of the German Hit­
lerite captain Langer, the German-quisling police, with
the participation of “National Front” members, who had
joined the ranks of the collaborative police, carried out
a still more heinous crime — the butchering of 84 peace­
ful citizens of Tirana in front of their very homes without
309
 the least formality. Similar massacres, which were car­
ried on later, too, took place in other districts of the country.
During those weeks in Tirana, the collaborative circles
and those friendly to them, held the opinion that the
German winter operation and the Nazi “National Front”
terror had, if not completely destroyed the National -
Liberation military forces, at least seriously injured and
crippled them and had incapacitated them beyond re­
covery. Nevertheless only a few weeks had elapsed since
the termination of the German offensive when alarming
news began to reach Tirana. As the legendary Phoenix
that rose out of its cwn ashes, so the National-Liberation
Army recovered with amazing rapidity through the hero­
ism of its martyrs. While the partisan brigades were re­
establishing the authority of National-Liberation Councils
throughout all south Albania, the First Brigade under the
command of Mehmet Shehu, through a historic anarch
that it undertook in the last days of February across
snow-clad mountainous regions in the direction of central
Albania, in order to deliver the General-Staff from the
German-quisling blockade, towards the middle of March
appeared in the neighbourhood of Tirana, causing a
serious dilemma in the ranks of its enemies. After that,
during April 1944, encouraged by the momentous vic­
tories of the Soviet army which had already penetrated
into the territories of Czechoslovakia and of Roumania
occupied by the Nazis and, reinforced by thousands of
young volunteers who had seized arms that early spring,
the National-Liberation Army took the offensive, winning
resounding victories throughout the land — not only in the
southern and central regions, but also in the north of
Albania, where the reaction headed by the clergymen and
chieftains was stronger than anywhere else.
These successes enabled the National-Liberation General
Council to call a meeting of the Anti-Fascist National-
Liberation Congress, which delegates were to attend as far
as circumstances allowed, both from the liberated zones,
310
 which had been expanded, and also from the districts that
were still under the German-quisling yoke.
The Anti-Fascist National-Liberation Congress met in the
liberated city of Permeti on May 24, 1944, with the par­
ticipation of nearly 200 delegates who represented the mass
of the Albanian population that had adhered to the Na­
tional-Liberation Movement — revolutionary Communists
and honest nationalists, labourers, peasants and intellectuals,
men, women, youth, partisan fighters, political agitators
behind the lines. After listening to the main report de­
livered on behalf of the National-Liberation General Coun­
cil and the General-Staff of the National-Liberation Army
by Enver Hoxha, on the internal and external situation,
on the National-Liberation War and on the popular dem­
ocratic revolution, on the victories achieved against
fascist-nazi enemies and on the immense sacrifice made by
the whole population, on the treacherous conduct of out-
and-out collaborationist organizations such as the National
Guard, the Guard of Justice, the Catholic Concentration, as
well as masked collaborationist organizations such as the
National Front, the “Legality” party, the so-called Social-
Democratic Party, which shared responsibility with the
Hitlerites for nationalist oppression, for Nazi terror, for
the vast number of arbitrary crimes, for the burning of
hundreds of villages, the Congress took a series of impor­
tant resolutions in connection with the further develop­
ment of the National-Liberation War and of the popular
democratic revolution in Albania. The Congress of Permeti
chose the Anti-Fascist National-Liberation Council, com­
posed of 78 members with the old democratic patriot Dr.
Omer Nishani as president, as the highest legislative and
executive organ of people’s sovereignty. The Anti-
Fascist National-Liberation Council, on its part, appointed
the Anti-Fascist National-Liberation Committee, with the
attributes of a provisional democratic government, compris­
ing ten ministries, headed by Enver Hoxha, who was
elected at the same time Commander-in-Chief of the Al­
banian National-Liberation Army. The Congress likewise
311
decided that the question of the regime of Albania should
be solved immediately after the victory of the anti-fascist
war, by the Albanian people itself — precisely as had been
announced by the great Allied Powers in December 1942.
In connection with this, it was decided to bar Achmet
Zogu from returning to Albania in order to avoid a rep­
etition of the events of 1924, and so that no other Albanian
government that might be formed within or outside the
country should gain recognition so long as there existed the
Anti-Fascist National-Liberation Council elected in the heat
of the patriotic war by the popular forces participating in
the National-Liberation War, which had already been
carried on for a number of years. The Congress likewise
decided that all political and economic agreements con­
cluded by former Albanian governments should be revised,
especially those by Zogist governments, and that at the
termination of this revision, all anti-national agreements
that violated people’s sovereignty or the economic interests
of the country should be repealed. The Congress of Per-
meti decided finally that the patriotic war against the
foreign aggressor should be intensified, that hostilities
should be carried on until the complete destruction of
both overt and covert collaborationist organizations, that
Local National-Liberation Councils should be reinforced and
expanded throughout the whole country as the basic-
organs of the new democratic popular authority. In order
to strengthen still further the alliance with the Great Anti-
Fascist Coalition, the Congress decided to request the
governments of the USSR and the USA to send military
missions to the General-Staff, which missions did in fact
arrive in the ensuing months. The Congress adjourned
after addressing a fervent greeting to each of the heads
of government of the three Great Powers of the anti­
fascist coalition — J. Stalin, W. Churchill and F. Roosevelt
The message addressed to J. Stalin, drawn up with particu­
lar warmth, expressed the boundless sympathy of the Al­
banian fighters for the land of the Soviets, not only for
their monumental victories in the war against Hitlerite
312
 Officers of the Soviet Military Mission to Albania
in 1944 attached to the Albanian partisan forces

Germany, not only for the historic successes won in the

gigantic battle of the construction of socialism in the USSR,
but more particularly for the faith the Albanians had in
the Soviet policy based on principle, in which they saw the
guarantee for the victory of the national independence of
Albania and of democratic popular authority, the defender
of these victories against international intrigues.
On May 28, 1944, the day on which the Congress of
Permeti terminated its work, the German occupation com­
mand undertook a second operation against the National-
Liberation Army in June in south Albania. More than
four Hitlerite divisions comprising altogether about 33,000
men with nearly 15,000 armed men placed at their disposal
by the quisling government, by the “National Front” and
by “Legality” attacked from all quarters (massacring,
setting fire and plundering the people as always), the
313
National-Liberation Army, which by then numbered almost
35,000 men and women partisans incorporated into one
assault division, nine assault brigades and into tens of
regional battalions. Albania became once again a battle
field. The German armies everywhere met with stubborn
resistance by the partisan military units, which valiantly
and ingeniously succeeded in combining counter-attack
with ambush and retreat, inflicting greater losses on the
enemy and sustaining less themselves. This time, too, the
National-Liberation Army escaped annihilation, the main
objective of its external and internal enemies. During this
operation of about two weeks, the partisan forces suffered
about 500 casualties, besides almost 1,000 peasant men
and women massacred, whereas nearly 3,000 German and
collaborationist men and officers were killed. The National-
Liberation Army, however, replaced its losses within a few
days by thousands of new volunteers who swelled its
ranks, and this at a time when its enemies were seized by
fright due to defeat after defeat. In order to remain on
the defensive and put into execution the decision of the
Congress of Permeti, on order of the commander-in-chief
of the First Assault Division, on June 26. 1944, started
its march northward, in order to liberate the regions
still under occupation and to destroy the bases of internal
reaction. The advance of the partisan First Assault Divi­
sion and the enthusiasm with which it was welcomed
by the people of the country caused real panic in the
ranks of the collaborators. While in Tirana the solution
of the crisis that had burst within the quisling govern­
ment since June 16 was still pending, the partisans of the
First Assault Division together with local battalions were
liberating one after another the regions of central Albania,
and then entered, without meeting any resistance, the so-
called ‘‘Zogist” and “National Front” districts of Mat and
of Dibra. Faced with death, the “Zogist” and “National
Front” leaders renounced feigned secrecy and gathered
around the new government that was formed in the middle
of July under1 the presidency of the chieftain Fiqri Dine,
314
 member of the ‘‘Legality” party. A desperate attempt was
made by the united government and government-friendly
forces in the district of Dibra. Nevertheless the strenuous
and bloody fighting that lasted for nearly two weeks came
to an end with their disastrous defeat. The new as well as
the former attempt undertaken by the combined German
and mercenary forces during the second half of August 1944.
terminated in their total destruction. In the city and in the
district of Dibra the authority of National-Liberation Coun­
cils was definitely established.
While the battles were being waged in Dibra. a new di­
vision of the National-Liberation Army, the Second
Assault Division, which had just been formed at the
beginning of August, likewise undertook a march
northward. In mid-August, the Second Assault Division
appeared in the suburbs of the capital, paralysing the
communications between Tirana and the provinces. In the
days that followed, the two divisions, incorporated in one
still greater military unit, the First Army Corps of the
National-Liberation Army, undertook the triumphal march
in the direction of the last den of internal reaction, the
patriarchal regions of northern Albania. The entry of the
partisans into mountainous Mirdita, which had been left
for centuries in darkness and ignorance by past regimes,
gave a tremendous shock to the collaborationist circles.
Orosh, the centre of Mirdita, which had resisted Turkish
occupation for hundreds of years on end, fell easily into
the hands of the brave partisans, who succeeded in win­
ning at once the hearts of the proud mountaineers. The
only edifice the partisans set fire to was the palace of
Gjon Marka Gjoni, the die-hard ultra-reactionary chieftain
of Mirdita in Orosh, and this was done to indicate the end
of the epoch of semi-feudal patriarchy and the overthrow
of familial rule, which assumed the proportions almost of
dynastic rule, and which ever since the proclamation of
the independence of Albania had opposed pugnaciously all
progressive steps and had entered into the service of
foreign imperialist and chauvinist powers.
315
 By the end of August 1944 the partisan forces had liber­
ated most of the country. In the hands of German armies
and of the entirely discredited and dispersed collaborators,
only the main cities and a few isolated region remained.
In September 1944, the National-Liberation Army enter­
ed the last stage of the patriotic war, the assault for the
final liberation of the cities and of the whole country. This
task expressed in a special order which bore the signature
of Enver Hoxha, was favoured by the enthusiastic atmos­
phere created by the very rapid advance of Soviet armies
in Eastern Europe, by the second front that was at last
opened by Anglo-American armies in Western Europe, by
the unarrestable growth in manpower of the National-
Liberation Army, which by now was an army of nearly
50,000 men and women fighters, and at the very end by
the precipitated dissolution of the collaborationist govern­
ment forces and treacherous organizations. Their dissolu­
tion manifested itself in the desertion en masse of gen­
darmes, of mercenaries, and of “National Front” and
Zogist “volunteers” — particularly after the final admoni­
tion of the Anti-Fascist National-Liberation Council and
Committee on September 22, 1944. Even the Hitlerite army
itself, which apparently had now ceased activity inside the
country, had narrowed down its operations to holding the
principal cities and the most important lines of communi­
cation for the withdrawal of its divisions from Greece in
the event of an allied landing — which did take place in
October 1944.
The partisans pounded continuously the enemy lines of
communication, inflicting great damage on German motor­
ized columns; their brigades assailed the cities, too, and
began to liberate them one after another. On September 12
Berat was liberated, on September 18 Gjirokastra, while the
German garrison at Tirana was being worn down by the
almost nightly attacks of partisan detachments of the
First Division, who had taken up positions all around the
capital. On October 10, 1944, the partisans pierced to the
heart of the Hitlerite garrison of Tirana, reaching the centre
316
of the city. Six days later, on November 16, the seacoast
city of Vlora was liberated, while Korea, the last occupied
city of southern Albania, was liberated, likewise by assault,
on October 24, 1944.
In the circumstances created by these great military and
political successes, on October 20, 1944 the second meeting
of the Anti-Fascist National-Liberation Council appointed
at the Congress of Permeti took place in liberated Berat.
As asserted in its documents, considering that the war
against Nazi Germany had entered the final phase and that
Albania was on the eve of complete liberation, that in more
than three-fourths of the country the authority of National-
Liberation Councils was being exercised, that before the
country lay not only political and military tasks for carry­
ing on till the end of the National-Liberation War, but also
political, economic, social and cultural tasks of a free and
independent state, on October 22, 1944, the Anti-Fascist
National-Liberation Council decided to transform the Anti-
Fascist National-Lib eration Committee, chosen in Permeti,
into a Democratic Government of Albania with Lieutenant-
General Enver Hoxha as Prime Minister and Minister of
National Defence. There were to be eleven government
departments, among which the economic and cultural de­
partments were of particular importance, especially the
Ministry of Reconstruction, which was in charge of the
direction of the colossal work of reconstructing and re­
storing the country, gutted during the war. The Anti-Fascist
National-Liberation Council then sanctioned, on the 23rd
of October, laws governing elections of National-Liberation
Councils, that were to take place after the country was
liberated, the law on the rights and duties of National-
Liberation Councils, which were henceforth to exercise only
the functions of state authority organs, whereas the political
functions, which they had exercised up to then on the basis
of the decisions of the Peza Conference were to pass to the
National-Liberation Front, which became an independent
mass organization. On that same day the conference ap­
proved unanimously the “Declaration on the Rights of
317
Citizens1’. Again on October 23, 1944, in the name of the
Democratic Government of Albania, the prime minister.
Lieutenant-General Enver Hoxha declared in clear terms be­
fore the Anti-Fascist National-Liberation Council that his
government would respect scrupulously the decisions of the
Congress of Permeti, that it would carry on the war for the
speedy liberation of Albania and the defence of its national
independence, that it would further strengthen the au­
thority of the National-Liberation Councils, that after the
liberation of the entire country, it would proceed to hold
elections to the Constituent Assembly, which was to sanc­
tion the Fundamental Statute of the Albanian State, that
it would revise all political, military and economic agree­
ments concluded with foreign states by Zogist governments,
annulling anti-national agreements, that it would assure and
protect the citizens’ civil rights, that it would endeavour
to strengthen still more the cooperation of Albania with
the great Allied Powers — Great Britain, the Soviet Union
and the United States of America — as well as with the
other members of the Anti-fascist Coalition, and that, last
of all, it would demand from the great Allied Powers and
the other members of the Anti-fascist Coalition, its recogni­
tion as the only Government of Albania.
Immediately after the meeting of Berat, the National-
Liberation Army, which now numbered approximately
70,000 armed fighters of whom nearly 6,000 were women,
intensified its assaults and inflicted heavy losses on Ger­
man divisions retreating from Greece across the territory
of Albania. The Army caused panic in the Hitlerite gar­
risons shut up in one or two cities still in enemy hands. On
October 25, 1944, the German High Command shifted its
headquarters from Tirana to Shkoder, leaving in the capital
a whittled down division with the order to hold the city until
the last military units were withdrawn from Greece. Hop­
ing to slow down the partisan assaults, which had sealed
up the capital and the path of retreat northwards, the
German Command forced the highest quisling organs (the
Council of Regents and the Council of Ministers) to an­
318
nounce publicly their resignation and the interruption of
all state activities on their part. However neither this
step, nor the habitual terror of the Hitlerites (who on Octo­
ber 23 massacred in the camp of Prishtina 103 interned
Albanians, and a few days later butchered on their own
door-steps hundreds of citizens and set fire to an entire
suburb of Tirana) dampen the vigour of the War of Libera­
tion. On October 29, 1944, on the order of the General-
Staff, the partisan First Assault Division, commanded by
Major-General Mehmet Shehu, began to storm Tirana for
its complete liberation.
The battle of Tirana marked the culminating point of
the National-Liberation War. That night almost half of the
city fell into the hands of the partisan battalions which,
aided by the population of the city, fought heroically
against the tanks, armoured cars and bunkers of the enemy.
On October 30, 1944 the fighting reached the centre of the
city. The Staff of the partisan First Division established
itself inside the city that day. The battle for the liberation
of Tirana proceeded from street to street, from barricade
to barricade and often enough from house to house. Heavy
fighting took place in the vicinity of the Mosque of Sulej-
man Bargjini, where today a monument has been erected
to the heroic partisans. Fierce fighting took place at vari­
ous spots of the city, in government palaces and military
barracks. On November 5, bloody attacks and counter­
attacks occurred. Heavy fighting was carried on also out­
side the city, between partisan forces and German military
units which tried to relieve their besieged garrison. Espe­
cially bloody for the Hitlerites was the clash that occurred
close to the village of Mushqeta of Krraba on November 13,
and 14. On November 15, detachments of partisan brigades
launched the decisive assault, at the termination of which,
after 19 days of fighting, on the morning of November 17.
1944, Tirana, heroic city, which had never flagged in the
patriotic resistance during the 2,150 days under the Fascist-
Nazi yoke, was liberated.
319
Scenes from the
battle for the
liberation of Tirana
 In the 19 days of fighting for Tirana, the German gar­
rison had more than 2,000 men and officers killed, three
identified as colonels, not to count the wounded; more
than 300 were taken prisoner. Booty included 25 cannons
in good condition, more than 1,000 machine-guns, 200
vehicles, etc. The partisans suffered 417 casualties in killed
and wounded, while hundreds of civilians were barbarously
massacred by the Hitlerites.
The liberation of Tirana indicated the imminent libera­
tion of the Motherland. The brave partisans continued to
assail and pursue the enemy, which retreated north, de­
stroying bridges and slaughtering as they fled. While on
November 28, 1944 the 32nd anniversary of the proclama­
tion of national independence of the year 1912, the presid­
ium of the Anti-Fascist National-Liberation Council and the
Democratic Government of Albania entered the liberated
capital, greeted by the stormy acclamation of the enthusias­
tic people, the untiring partisans were preparing to assail
Shkoder, the last pocket of resistance of the Hitlerite
hordes and native collaborator remnants. The enemy, how­
ever, seemingly desired to spare themselves further, use­
less losses and, after blasting the bigger bridges of the city,
decamped during the night, crossing the Albanian border,
with packs of collaborators who sought to escape having
to account for their treason at their heels. At dawn of
November 29, 1944, the partisan brigades entered Shkoder
without fighting.
With Shkoder, the whole of Albania was liberated, but
the war had not come to an end as yet. The Albanian
Democratic Government, considering itself allied to the
Great Anti-Fascist Coalition, took it on itself to continue
the anti-fascist war till the total defeat of Hitlerite Ger­
many. Two divisions of the National-Liberation Army, the
Fifth and the Sixth Divisions, received the order to pursue
the German army and to fight against it beyond the borders
of Albania — in the territory of allied Yugoslavia. The
Albanian partisans in cooperation with Yugoslav National-
Liberation Army units were engaged in relentless fighting
321
Comrade Enver Hoxha addressing the peo­
ple of liberated Tirana on Nov. 28, 1941
The first days of liberation. A bridge has been left destroyed by the
German Nazis, who fled before the victorious Albanian partisans

against the German enemy and pursued it up to Bosnia, in

central Yugoslavia. Of these encounters, the bloodiest took
place near the city of Vishegrad, which was liberated by
Albanian partisans on February 14, 1945. The surrender
of Nazi Germany and the victory of the anti-fascist war
on May 9, 1945, marked the triumph of the National-
Liberation War also for Albania, ally of the Great Anti-
Fascist Coalition.
In this historic victory of the people over, Nazi-fascist
aggressors, small Albania made her modest contribution,
beyond what was in her manpower and material potential.
Through their patriotic war, the Albanians kept pinned
down in Albania nearly 70,000 Italian, and quite as many
German, soldiers. The Albanian National-Liberation Army
inflicted on these two occupying powers 26,594 killed and
21,245 wounded; it took captive nearly 20,000 men and
officers, putting out of action more than 68,600 Italian and
323
Partisans pursuing Hitler’s troops through Yugoslav territory
Great Industrial eenire of Albania -fa the oi, region of Kucoye (now
the city of Stalin), destroyed by Hitler’s army fa its retreat from Albania

German troops. The Albanian National-Liberation Army

captured from the enemy or destroyed, more than 2,100
motor vehicles, tanks and armoured cars, more than 4,000
mortars, cannons and machine-guns, and set fire to 216
depots with military materiel.
On the other hand, the war caused great loss in human
life and property. With a population of about 1,125,000
inhabitants, the country suffered 28,800 persons killed, or
2.48 per cent of the population. On a percentage basis, of
persons killed, Albania comes fifth of the countries in
the anti-fascist bloc. Albania sustained 11,600 wounded,
eleven per 1,000 inhabitants, which is 4 to 5 times the aver­
age for the anti-fascist bloc. The invaders imprisoned and
confined 44,500 Albanians, 3.96 per cent of the population.
Thus 86,000 persons, or 7.3 per cent of the population,
325
were killed, crippled or disabled. The material damages
sustained by the country through arson and pillage on the
part of the invaders and mercenaries amounted to more
than 1,603 million dollars. More than a third of the habita­
tions of the country were burned or otherwise demolished
— about 61,000 buildings, equal to 36.66 per cent. More
than a third of the livestock were exterminated or stolen;
more than a third, or 34.2 per cent, of the fruit trees and
33.65 per cent of vineyards were destroyed. Almost all of
the mines, ports, roads and especially bridges were ruined.
Industrial plants were likewise heavily damaged.

ALBANIA, A PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC

With the victory of the National-Liberation War, before

the Albanian people in general and before its revolutionary
leaders in particular, great historic tasks were laid that
demanded speedy solution. The independence of the coun­
try, won through so many sacrifices, should be strengthened
and protected from foreign imperialist and chauvinist
claims, which even the Second World War had been unable
to put an end to. The country thoroughly devastated by
the war had to be reconstructed within the shortest time
possible in order to restore the entirely paralysed national
economy, to overcome the danger of famine which threat­
ened particularly the war-ravaged regions, and to secure
shelter for tens of thousands of peasant and urban families
whom the approaching winter found homeless. The demo­
cratic-popular revolution already started in the course of
the war, should be carried further, with the aim of striking
at the social-economic basis, on which the old reactionary
regimes had relied, and to build a new social-economic
basis for a new, democratic, anti-imperialist authority, capa­
ble of changing Albania from a backward, oppressed and
famished country into a free, advanced and prosperous one.
326
 Comrade Enver Hoxha addressing the Peace Conference in Paris

To the solution of these great and complex problems, the

Albanian Democratic Government led by Enver Hoxha con­
secrated all its efforts from the first weeks of existence of
free and independent Albania. Obliterating every trace of
the old state administration, which had been overthrown by
the war, a new state apparatus was erected, beginning with
the ministries and central directorates, down to the courts
of justice and people’s police. Elections were held through­
out the country in January 1945 for popular councils ol'
villages, of cities and of districts, and these became the
political organs of the new rule, in cities and towns and
in the provinces. Relying on the material gathered by the
commission for the detection of criminals of war, the Gov­
ernment brought to trial in the first months of 1945, col­
laborationist high officials and punished them according to
327
their anti-national activities and their responsibility in the
massacres, imprisonments, arson and pillage committed
jointly with the invaders.
While the Albanian divisions continued to fight against
the German enemy in the territory of Yugoslavia, in Al­
bania, at the call of the democratic government, the people
mobilized themselves to heal the wounds left by the war.
They undertook the heroic task of reconstructing their coun­
try. With great speed, the demolished bridges and impaired
roads were rebuilt; the devastated mining and industrial
plants were brought to life; in villages and in cities the
buildings that had been destroyed and burnt down were
erected again, large-scale social assistance was given to the
families that had been impoverished by the war, etc.
At the same time the democratic government took im­
portant anti-imperialist measures. All economic and polit­
ical agreements concluded by former Albanian govern­
ments with foreign powers were annulled. The property of
Italian and German nationals in Albania was confiscated;
all property of foreign capitalists was also confiscated, and a
special law nationalized the three banks that had been
founded in Albania with foreign capital, including the Na­
tional Bank of Albania, which was superseded by the Bank
of the Albanian State. Foreign trade was placed under
state control.
Likewise, measures of a democratic character were taken
Industrial enterprises and commercial companies of Alba­
nian citizens were placed under state control to facilitate
planned production and distribution; articles needed for the
reconstruction of the country and for the building up of the
army were requisitioned; in order to halt speculation, the
state took into its own hands the buying and selling of grain,
setting wholesale and retail market prices; the means of
transport together with terminals were taken over and paid
for; in order to fight the black market, the first consumers’
cooperatives were founded with the aid of the state; on the
enormous profits made in the course of the war by Albanian
and foreign capitalists and merchants, extraordinary pro­
328
gressive taxation was levied, which assured substantial rev­
enues to the Albanian state for the years 1945 and 1946,
making it possible for the government to meet the extra­
ordinary expenditure for the reconstruction of the country
without appealing to foreign powers for aid. Along with
these, important steps were taken also for the villages and
the peasantry. All peasants’ debts to the landlords were
cancelled; all the debts incurred prior to the liberation of
the country were written off the books, private waterways
used for irrigation were confiscated without compensation
and allotted to the peasants as collective property. In
August 1945 began the agrarian reform, which affected
deeply, though not completely, large estates in Albania. Im­
portant steps were taken in the social field, too. In the first
place, legislation on labour for the benefit of the workers
was passed. For the first time in Albania the 8-hour work
day was introduced, with 7-hour shifts at night. The
weekly day of rest and the yearly leave of 15 days were
guaranteed. Successful attempts were made to secure work
for those who were in need, and within a short period unem­
ployment was reduced to nil. At the beginning of 1945
workers’ trade unions were created, and in October1 of that
year their first congress was held.
In autumn of 1945 the electoral campaign for the Con­
stituent Assembly began, which was to solve the most impor­
tant question of the popular revolution — the form of gov­
ernment new Albania was to have. The electoral campaign
was characterized by a strenuous political fight between the
Democratic Front, which represented the new, revolution­
ary authority, and its internal adversaries, representing the
upper classes — bourgeoisie, landlords, clan chieftains and
clergymen, who sought to prolong the old economic and
social order. During the electoral campaign, difficulties
were created for the Democratic Front in the international
arena, too. While the government of the U.S.S.R., after
Yugoslavia and Poland, followed by Bulgaria, Czechoslo­
vakia and France, recognized the government led by Enver
Hoxha, the United States of America and Great Britain,
329
exasperated that the Albanian revolutionary reforms had
finally affected their interests in Albania, put as a condition
for their recognition that the elections should take place
under the supervision of foreign observers — an outrage
against Tirana. Washington added as a condition the
acknowledgement also, of the agreements concluded be­
tween Tirana and foreign powers prior to April 7. 1939,
which had recently been abrogated by the Albanian gov­
ernment. Further, members of American and British
missions in Tirana had not scrupled against inciting 1he
opponents of the Democratic Front to attempt the upsetting
of the political situation in Albania.
In the elections that took place on December 2, 1945. 90
per cent of the citizens having the right to vote, took part,
of whom 93 per cent voted for the candidates of the Demo­
cratic Front. The Constituent Assembly that met in Tirana
on January 11, 1946 proclaimed Albania a People’s Republic.
After a widespread popular discussion, on March 14.

Tirana, Jan. 11, 1916. People awaiting the proclamation

of Albania as a People’s Republic before the meeting place
of the Constituent Assembly
330
 1946, the Constitution of the People’s Republic of Albania
was promulgated, which defended the victories of the Na­
tional-Liberation War and sanctioned the reliance of the
new authority on the people’s councils of villages, cities and
districts, elected periodically by free, direct, general, equal
and secret ballot by all citizens, men and women, who had
attained the age of eighteen.
All measures taken in the course of the first 15 months
after liberation were for bringing the anti-imperialist and
anti-feudal revolution to completion. All these measures
and reforms enter not into the framework of a socialist pro­
letarian revolution, but into that of a democratic-bourgeois
revolution, based, not on the bourgeoisie, but on the work­
ing class and on the peasantry, and led, not by bourgeois
parties, but by the Communist Party.
After the achievement of these great, historic tasks, which
were sanctioned by the Constitution of the People’s Re­
public of Albania, before the leaders of new Albania lay
the problem of the further development of the revolution,
the question of the historic highway that the country ought
331
to follow in the future. The Albanian Communist Party,
after duly considering the internal and external favourable
circumstances, decided, in conformity with its ultimate pro­
gramme, to direct Albania onto the path of the socialist
revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat, in order to
build on the coasts of the Adriatic Sea the socialist society
as the transitional stage on the way to Communism. This
new, historic orientation was given by the Albanian Com­
munist Party as early as February 1946, at its fifth plenary
meeting.
On the basis of the decisions taken at this plenary meet­
ing and after the ratification of the Constitution, a series of
measures were taken by the state for the socialist transfor­
mation of the country, and these were carried on during
the whole of the year 1946 and during the first half of 1947.
By special laws all industries and mines of the country, all
factories and building enterprises, agricultural machines and
various implements of production, were nationalized; pro­
duction by private industrial concerns had ceased altogether
by the end of 1947. At the same time, foreign trade as
well as domestic wholesale trade passed into the hands of
the state. In April 1946, merchants were asked to renounce
claim to their merchandise. All principal construction ma­
terials and most important articles of consumption were
frozen and requisitioned against compensation. The com­
mercial companies created in 1945 were suppressed; the
stocking of grain and transport services passed into the
hands of the state. State and cooperative commercial en­
terprises began to be created for the retail trade, which
through the support of the state began to replace the re­
duced private trade. In that same year, pharmacies, chem­
ical laboratories, hotels, hot springs and bathing establish­
ments were nationalized. At the same time, from the
agrarian reform applied in the year 1945, which had not sup­
pressed private ownership of village land, radical agrarian
reform of socialist character was begun. In April 1946 a
law was passed forbidding the alienation of land under any
title, while by an additional law promulgated in May that
332
Comrade Enver Hoxha congratulating peasants who are receiving
grants of land at the agrarian reform (Nov. 17, 1947)

same year, big estates were broken up and the economic

position of the bourgeoisie of the village, of the kulaks, was
seriously affected. In the village, the socialist principle of
the land to the tiller was applied. On the basis of an amend­
ment, arable land, vineyards and orchards, together with the
buildings and equipment of proprietors who did not work on
their land were expropriated without compensation. Ex­
ception was made in the case of labourers, artisans and
employees, but these too should not possess more than 0.5
hectare of orchard or 0.2 hectare of vineyard or 30 olive
trees, while the religious institutions were allowed to have
not more than 10 hectares of land. By the agrarian reform
of the years 1945-1946, 172,000 hectares out of 221,500 hec­
tares of arable land, 474,000 olive trees and 6,000 oxen
became people’s property. Of the land fund accumulated
333
 by the expropriations, 155,159 hectares were distributed
among 70,221 peasant families, who had little or no land;
likewise 238,700 olive trees and all of the expropriated oxen
were distributed among the peasants. Through the agrarian
reform the large landed property was taken over; the big
landlord class disappeared; the poor peasant class too almost
disappeared, having become, thanks to the reform, landed
peasants; all chances for the rural bourgeoisie to thrive
were gone, and the middle class peasant became the central
figure in the village. The agrarian reform was completed
on November 17, 1947.
Nevertheless, even the agrarian reform was not the ideal
solution for a prosperous existence of the peasantry. Start­
ing from the premise that within the framework of small
property the possibilities for the development of agriculture
and of the welfare of the peasants are limited, the Albanian
Communist Party at that time promoted the idea of the co­
operative system in agriculture. The first agricultural co­
operative, and which was to serve as a model for the build­
ing of socialism in the villages, was set up in the autumn of
1946 at Krutje, formerly a large estate in Muzekeja.
These revolutionary changes were carried out not with­
out the vehement opposition of the overthrown classes, of
big landholders, of capitalists and of great merchants, who
could not reconcile themselves to the dictatorship of the
proletariat. Nor could the Western powers, particularly the
U.S.A, and Great Britain reconcile themselves either to the
socialist reforms or to the political, economic and ideological
orientation of Albania towards the U.S.S.R. The hostile
forces made several attempts to organize counter-revolu­
tionary movements. Such attempts were made in 1946 in
Tirana by the subversive “monarchist”, “social-democratic”,
“democratic” organizations, and in Shkoder by the former
“Catholic Concentration” organization of the German oc­
cupation period, instigated as in the past by the clergy, all
of whom were hand in glove with the Western powers. All
these attempts had no success whatsoever. After they had
been detected by the police organs and after the ring­
334
leaders had been referred to people’s courts of justice, these
clandestine organizations, which had few hangers-on in any
case, were wiped out from the political and organizational
scene. It was only in September 1946 that the reactionary
circles of the country, incited by the functionaries of
American and British missions, which had promised their
military intervention from abroad, undertook an armed
attack on the city of Shkoder, their attempt collapsing after
a couple of hours’ combat. This was the last armed attempt
against Albania by counter-revolutionary forces. Further
attacks became impossible on account of the thorough sym­
pathy the new rule enjoyed on the part of the popular
masses. Consequently, the reactionary circles passed over
to the well-known methods of political and economic under­
mining activities, which should create difficulties for the
new state, discredit her and her programme in the eyes of
the masses and thus create the condition for an anti-com­
munist counter-revolution. Vital undermining, subversive
activities were undertaken in the principal economic centres
of the country, as in the great project of draining Maliqi
Lake in 1946, in the oil fields of Kumova, in the copper
mines of Rubik, etc. But neither did these methods get
them anywhere. Nor did the plot of the “group of depu­
ties” have any success — the “group” so called for the reason
that alongside reactionary elements of the old, liquidated
parties, a number of deputies of the people’s assembly, too,
took part, these elements being either unable to detach
themselves from the old political bourgeois thought or else
had capitulated before the pressures of American and
British emissaries.
Along with the internal difficulties, serious difficulties
were created for the People’s Republic of Albania on the
international arena also by external hostile forces. The
United States and Great Britain not only refused to recog­
nize the government of the People’s Republic of Albania, but
they tried to obstruct it from representing Albania at the
Peace Conference which had begun its deliberations in
Paris in July 1946. Through the insistence of the Soviet
335
 Union, the Albanian delegation headed by Enver Hoxha
was admitted to the Conference of Peace as the representa­
tive of an allied country. Still the Albanian delegation in
Paris was forced to respond to the attacks directed against
Albania by the Greek government delegation, which raised
territorial claims on Albania, at the back of which was
obviously the inciting hand of the foreign ministers of
the U.S.A, and Britain. Relations with the Western powers
became momentarily aggravated in November 1946 when
two British warships, navigating the Corfu Channel, sank
after hitting mines left from the war. London charged
Tirana with having placed these mines. Since these disputes
the relations between Albania on the one side and the
United States of America and Great Britain on the other
have remained at odds up to the present day.
In its great efforts for the creation and development of
the socialist economy, the Albanian government had to face
other serious difficulties caused by the interference of the
Communist Party and its Federative government in Yugo­
slavia. Proceeding from the principle of fraternal interna­
tionalist relations that should characterize two countries led
by their Communist Parties, the Albanian revolutionary
leaders placed too much faith in the internationalist as­
sertions of the Yugoslav leaders. This confidence was ex­
ploited by Marshal Tito and his following by interfering,
by means of “advice” in the economic and political life of
Albania. These interferences had begun during the war,
and more precisely in November 1944, while in liberated
Berat the Second Plenary Meeting of the Central Commit­
tee of the Albanian Communist Party was meeting, the
Titoite agents, who had succeeded in winning to their side
the second secretary of the Albanian Communist Patry,
Ko$i Xoxe, endeavoured by means of this latter to direct
Albania towards economic and political capitulation to Yugo­
slavia. During the years 1945-1947, the Yugoslav pres­
sure, exerted under the slogan of “strengthening friendly
relations”, all the while increased to intolerable propor­
tions. The economic and political conventions concluded
336
 during the years 1945-1947 by Albania and Yugoslavia were
exploited by the Yugoslav government with the view to
reducing Albania to the status of dependency on Belgrade.
In the summer of 1948, when Belgrade’s pressure was
stronger than ever before, the decision of the Information
Bureau of the Communist Parties, taken in Bucharest, con­
demning the Yugoslav leaders for gross mistakes in political
and ideological fields, made it possible for Albania to find
its way out of the intricate situation. The Albanian Com­
munist Party immediately broke with the Yugoslav Com­
munist Party, and resolutely and quickly corrected all the
mistakes which had been committed in Albania as a result
of Titoite emissaries’ interference. The Albanian Com­
munist Party, which up to then had remained in semi­
secrecy, came out into the open. In November of that year
the First Congress of the Party assembled and reviewed its
entire activity since its founding. The Congress censured
the mistakes that had been committed, as well as the per­
sons principally responsible for these mistakes; examined
and sanctioned he statute of the Party; gave a new orien­
tation to the country in political and economic fields with
the aim of strengthening the independence and the eco­
nomic and cultural development of the country so as to build
a socialist base in Albania, in alliance with all the countries
of the socialist camp and particularly with the Soviet
Union.
After the turning point of the year 1948, the popular
masses under the leadership of the Party of Labour of Al­
bania, the new name of the Albanian Communist Party
taken at the First Congress, went all out with renewed
vigour in all fields of economic, social and cultural activi­
ty. This activity was exercised according to periodic plans
directed by the Party of Labour, drawn up by the Council
of Ministers and sanctioned by the People’s Assembly. For
the years 1949 and 1950 a biennial plan was drawn up, the
directives of which were approved by the First Congress of
the Party. For the years 1951-1955 the First Five-Year
Plan was drawn up. the tasks of which were approved in
337
outline by the Second Congress of the Party of Labour of
Albania in March-April of 1952; for the years 1956-1960
the Second Five-Year Plan was drawn up and approved by
the Third Congress of the Party of Labour of Albania which
met in May-June of 1956; whereas for the years 1961-1965
the Third Five-Year Plan was drawn up, .which was ap­
proved by the Fourth Congress of the Party of Labour of
Albania, convened in February of 1961.
The principles on which the five-year plans were drawn
up can be summarized in this manner: the elevation of Al­
bania from the backward technical, economic, cultural situa­
tion by means of socialist industrialization, agricultural col­
lectivization, electrification of the country; the cultural and
ideological revolution within the shortest time possible, by
attracting into this battle all the people and by employ­
ing all available material and financial resources of the
country, without neglecting the role of the credits and the
assistance afforded by socialist countries. Considerable aid
and credits were received by Albania particularly from the
U.S.S.R., other socialist countries also helped.
The First Five-Year Plan set as the principal economic
task the continuation at accelerated speed of the effort for
the construction of the economic basis of socialism, in order
to transform Albania at the end of the five-year period
from a backward agricultural country into an agricultural-
industrial country. During these years, combines and fac­
tories such as the Stalin Textile Complex in Tirana, the
November 8th Sugar Complex in Maliq, the “Nako Spiro”
Complex in Elbasan, the cotton ginning mill in Fier, the to­
bacco processing factory in Shkoder, the cement factory in
Vlora, the Lenin hydro-electric station in Tirana and many
other factories, which by the end of 1955 raised the industrial
production to 10.5 times that of 1938. Successes were
achieved in agriculture also. Compared with 1938, the area
of arable land approximately doubled; the grain producing
area expanded from 55,100 hectares in 1938 to 114,845 hec­
tares in 1955, while productivity increased from 7 quintals
338
 One of Albania’s many new industrial projects, the Stalin
Textile Complex in the suburbs of Tirana

per' hectare to 10.3 quintals per hectare; the number of trac­

tors calculated at 15 HP each increased from 30 in 1938 to
344 in 1950, 1,259 in 1955; combines increased from none to
114 and threshing machines from none to 335, while reapers
increased from none to 283. As a result agricultural pro­
duction increased, the value in terms of money rising from
12,826,000 leks in 1938 to 20,950,000 leks in 1955.
For the Second Five-Year Plan (1956-1960) the main tasks
set were the further development of industry, especially
mining industry with raw materials extracted in the coun­
try, the r apid development of agriculture, principally on the
basis of the reorganization of agricultural production
through collectivization and the extension of arable lands
by means of draining swamps. During this period, too, the
successes were remarkable. In 1960, about 90 per cent of
the national revenue was realized from the socialist sector
of the economy. The labouring population grew from a few
tens of thousands in 1938 to 22.5 per cent, numbering about
339
Application of machinery in Albanian agriculture
336,000 persons at present. The volume of industrial pro­
duction during the Second Five-Year Plan period increased
approximately 16.9 per cent annually, and in 1960 was
double that of 1955. while comparing with 1938, it in­
creased 21 times. Mineral production occupies a conspicuous
place in the growth of production in Albania. Alongside the
production of naphtha, chiomium, and coal, the exploitation
of new mines of nickel and iron, of copper, and of chro­
mium was started; oil wells were sunk. The place of small
electricity plants was taken by hydro-electric and thermo­
electric stations fitted out with new machinery. Of these,
the Karl Marx Hydro-Electric Station on the Mat river
stands out. During the Second Five-Year Plan period the
construction of 250 important economic and social-cultural
projects was completed and these put into immediate use
— oil refineries in Qyteti Stalin and in Cerrik, a coal mine
in Allarup, a copper mine in Kurbnesh, the nickel and iron
mines in Pishkash and in Cervenak, the chromium mines in
Tropoje and in Martanesh, the foodstuff combine in Tirana,
the fish combine in Vlora, the brick-kilns, velvet, glass, and
canned food factories, wineries, tobacco factories and so on.
The machine industry in 1960 provided 40 per cent of the
spare parts needed in the economy — eight times more than
in 1955. In the field of agriculture likewise great suc­
cesses were achieved. During the past years the collectivi­
zation of the countryside was completed. In 1960 the so­
cialist sector in agriculture — agricultural cooperatives and
state farms — embraced 86.3 per cent of the arable land,
while the rest remained in the hands of peasants living in
hilly regions where the conditions for the collectivization of
agriculture did not exist. In agriculture, great sums were
invested for the extension of arable land; a number of
marshes were drained, such as Terbufi, Thumana, Vurgu,
Roskoveci, etc., at the completion of which agriculture gain­
ed 17,000 hectares of new land and 43,000 hectares of im­
proved land. In 1960 the number of tractors increased so
341
that for every 1,000 hectares of land under cultivation there
were 10 tractors of 15 HP each.
The Third Five-Year Plan (1961-1965) is still in operation.
It aims at bringing Albania to a new stage, to the stage of
full construction of the socialist society, to the stage of tran­
sition of Albania from an agricultural-industrial country to
an industrial-agricultural country. Great industrial projects
and great agricultural achievements are planned and being
realized, and these will change the face of Albania from
day to day.
Great, incomparable successes have been achieved during
these five-year periods also in the field of education and
culture. While in 1938 almost 80 per cent of the popula­
tion was illiterate, in 1956, at the close of a great literacy
campaign, everyone in the country under the age of 40 could
read and write. In Albania in 1947, the Two-Year Ped­
agogical Institute, and in 1951 four institutes of higher edu­
cation were founded. In 1957 the State University of
Tirana was founded with six faculties and attended by
4,000 men and women students. In 1960 the Institute of
Arts was founded. In Albania in 1960 there were more
than 3,000 educational institutes with 33,000 students and
11,000 teachers and professors. One in five inhabitants
attends a primary or middle school, or takes university
courses. In 1960 within the country and abroad 48 stu­
dents in each 10,000 inhabitants studied at a university
(in France this figure was 37 and in West Germany it was
27).
During the recent years a number of scientific institutes
were likewise established, which carry on studies in the
various domains of science. Today almost all of the main
cities have their museums and theatres. In Tirana, cultural
institutions have long since been founded, such as the mov­
ing-picture studio ‘‘New Albania”, the Opera and Ballet
Theatre, the State Philharmonic Orchestra, and a great
number of theatres of the drama in the cities of the coun­
try. Albania within these recent years has experienced an
342
 Performance at the Albanian Opera and Ballet Theatre

unprecedented impulse in the field of book publishing.

Within the years 1945-1960 more than 3.000 titles have been
published in 29 million copies.
These successes were achieved not without struggle
against the internal and external enemies. The striking force
of internal reactionary circles, however, has diminished
apace in face of the uninterrupted strengthening of the
people’s rule. The hostile attitude which the U.S.A, and
Great Britain have fostered has not prevented Albania from
following in its chosen path. Their attempts, too, to ob­
struct the entry of Albania into the United Nations Orga­
nization in the end met with failure. In 1956 Albania took
its legitimate seat in the UNO. Albania was given some
trouble by the provocations of the Greek and Yugoslav gov­
ernments, but these provocations too fizzled out. The posi­
tion of the People’s Republic of Albania became increasingly
stronger. It has commercial relations with more than 30
343
countries. Precisely as the leaders of the People’s Re­
public of Albania have continually expressed, this small
country on the shores of the Adriatic Sea has oriented its
foreign policy towards the defence of peace and of indepen­
dence, and the liberation of oppressed colonial and semi­
colonial countries.