In: Bulletin d’Analyses Phénoménologiques 19 (2023)

« My life and that of Plato are the same » (Hua XIV, 198).
Husserl and the philosophical question

Hernán Inverso and Claudia Marsico

Abstract: The philosophical question has an existentially touching dimension but, at the same time,
entails an experience that goes beyond the self. It involves the contemporary others that ask the
same questions and those who lived before beset by similar doubts. This work explores this second
aspect. It reflects on some methodological issues related to the kind of question we address when
we look at the past. We will characterise some views on the ancient philosophical question often
associated with first philosophy. Then, we will consider some contemporary views, and in this
framework, we will dwell on Husserl's contributions related to the retrospective question, the
institution of meaning, and the notion of Denkergemeinschaft.

Keywords: Question, phenomenology, Husserl, Plato, Urstiftung, Intersubjectivity

The two main branches of philosophy, theoretical and practical, are the offspring of two primary
questions: what is and what is to be done. They contain all the other questions. In both cases, their
object and format are significant since addressing the details of a common phenomenon differs
from exploring the principles of a complex realm of things, and an anxious glance is not
comparable with an outlook sub specie aeternitatis. Hence, since these aspects can condition the
answer, we should explore them carefully. This is especially relevant when we go beyond common
phenomena, and the questions begin to deal with the so-called first philosophy.
We may start from an idea stated by Fausto Fraisopi in his Philosophie et demande. Sur la
métaphilosophie regarding the complexity of phenomena. He says that it would be an illusion to
think of freeing oneself from the speculative task by saying that the idea of first philosophy is
devoid of meaning.1 So, what questions and what meaning are at stake in these kinds of
investigations become crucial issues. Following these footsteps, we will characterise some
approaches to the ancient philosophical question often associated with first philosophy as the most
fundamental level of theoretical reflection. Then, we will consider some contemporary views
concerning historiography, and on this basis, we will dwell on Husserl's contributions related to
the retrospective question, the institution of meaning, and the notion of Denkergemeinschaft.

1. Ancient questions

Let us begin by noting that the obsession with Greek origins is a typical feature of Western thought
in so far as they represent the tradition’s birth. Contemporary approaches have reinforced this
attitude based on the strong similarities between both periods. Indeed, the rise of argumentative
explanatory systems as an alternative to mythical accounts implied a radically new way of looking
1
Fraisopi 2021, 223.

1
at phenomena.2 This change has significant links with the contemporary attempt to think « outside
or beyond metaphysics » by distrusting general theories. In this sense, even if Antiquity may be
the origin of ontotheology, it also came up with alternative ways, which can be understood as new
types of questions.
Three related cases are relevant to us. The main question often associated with Presocratic
philosophy tends to seek a univocal answer oriented to reduce multiplicity (Everything can be
reduced to water, air or the apeiron). Still, in the very origin there was a different kind of question
which, with the opposite spirit, was open to exceedance. Indeed, Parmenides was traditionally
linked to the birth of ontology in the manner of a « super-answer » that marked the way to come.
However, a less biased look may find a very different attitude, closer to a new kind of question,
aimed not so much at establishing an adequate discourse but at producing an experience of
certainty that could counterbalance the chaotic contact with the phenomena.
Hence, against these traditional views, we can think that Parmenides' goddess leads his
visitor to an exercise that provides him with certitude. If he takes a particular perspective, he could
grasp attributes of the notion of being without risk or error, contrasting with the rest of our beliefs,
which are dubious and lack trustworthiness. Hence, Parmenides' poem demonstrates that the notion
of being is special as its features can be grasped with total reliability. This exercise implies giving
up the common-sense idea of being and thinking of its absolute meaning to make its traits evident.
Hence, truth is possible, its structure corresponds to conformity between thought and reality, and
we can access the latter and gain knowledge. Parmenides offered a clear scheme of this view about
truth and its elements, i.e., reality, thought and language, and proved with an example that it can
be achieved.
Is this enough and something that prompts us to do pure ontological research? No. In fact,
Parmenides was a multifaceted thinker. According to Rossetti's recent studies, the poem, partially
preserved, reveals many argumentative abilities that should not be reduced to ontology.3
Parmenides can be considered a scientist. He explored geographical issues, including the spherical
form of the Earth, its climate regions, the location of the Mediterranean Sea, and astronomical,
biological and gender topics. This diversity invites us not to overestimate the doctrine of being,
not because it is unimportant, but because its relevance is better understood in the overall context.
Hence, Parmenides is not fixed in a single question.
A similar approach is present in Plato. In general, the method inspired by Socrates
considers the question as a fundamental element in philosophical investigation. The success of
dialectics rests on the relevance of this element and its correspondent skill. The respondent controls
the argumentation offering an inter-subjective guarantee, but the leading voice depends on the one
who makes the question and his ability to produce valuable theoretical outcomes. This is the
fundamental difference with eristics, which focuses on refuting the interlocutor. Instead, Plato's
questions guide the ascent in the simile of the line in Republic VI, and, as in Parmenides, they
conduct beyond common phenomena and try to reach the Idea of the Good. Indeed, the crowning
of the process is not a theory but a vanishing point of pure insight and secure knowledge.
Moreover, the non-hypothetical principle proves to be behind the questions that guided the ascent,
as the meaning that frames the philosopher's wandering.
The structure of Plato's question is critical. The question « what is x » (ti esti x) has been
traditionally associated with Socrates, although other members of this group adhered to different
variants. The case of Antisthenes is enlightening. He chose the question « how is x » (poion esti

2
On this turn, see Marsico 2011.
3
See the comprehensive presentation of this view in Rossetti 2020.

2
x), which by adding features in comparison with other entities ends up revealing diverse regions
of reality. A well-known example provided by Aristotle offers the case of tin, claiming that we
should search how it is until describing the semantic field of the metals, which according to
Antisthenes' peculiar metaphysical view, coincides with the structure of reality.4
We could say that Antisthenes' question follows the scheme of Parmenides' question
according to the model « how is x », i.e., how is being. For this reason, it produces the attributes
of being through the steps in Frag. 8. Indeed, Antisthenes' approach was in some sense similar
since it broadens this procedure to any notion in language.5 Following Parmenides and his
description of being, we can explore any notion and obtain knowledge when we grasp the network
in which this notion is contained. Yet he did not look for attributes but substances and their links
in the framework of the whole reality conceived as a set of material entities. For Plato, this way of
questioning was confusing and must be exchanged for the « what is x » model, which is also
capable of functioning in a two-level ontology.
This kind of question leads to the method of hypothesis, as seen, for instance, in the Phaedo
99-100, which closes the description with a warning about the admissible questions and those that
must be rejected. Going beyond appearances depends on asking the right questions. However, later
dialogues discussed the so-called « method of division », which seems to be an alternative way in
which questioning seems to be in the background. The philosopher takes a dichotomy separating
the genre into two parts through the criterion of distinction. This procedure can be applied several
times until the intended species is reached or indivisible species appears, as seen in the Sophist.
However, this passage aims at proving that mere semantic analysis, in line with
Antisthenes' proposal, is meaningless. The investigation does not produce the definition of the
sophist but seven dubious statements.6 After the sixth, it is necessary to step back and abandon
some of the findings. Hence, the moral is that semantic analysis only produces superficial features
that create confusion. Theaetetus is clueless and repeats that he ignores where they have arrived.
If the method of semantic analysis were so efficacious, the intended definition would have come
much earlier. Then, the research focuses on the skill to question everything (232e), which leads to
the relation between things and images. This step indicates that far from solving the initial
question, the speculative dimension, in the line of our opening reference, is inevitable. Its success
depends on the ability to raise the right questions.
Let us mention a third influential model related to Aristotle's diaporematic method. It puts
in the forefront a thread already addressed in Plato's Sophist, in the passage of the gigantomachia,
which was already present in Parmenides' allusion to mythology, and Homer's poetry concerning
history. In Met. III, Aristotle establishes three dialectic moments, which consist of establishing the
aporia, the problem to be dealt with, and then the diaporia, which involves going through them in
detail, to arrive, if possible, at the euporia, the finding of an acceptable answer. The beginning
implies analysing the question on which the success of the whole attempt depends. But
immediately, a dialogical dimension in a broad sense gains strength, given that diaporia implies
the discussion of endoxa, that is, the previous reputable opinions that have dealt with the subject

4
Met. 8.3. On this passage, see Brancacci 1990.
5
On this point, see Marsico 2022.
6
He appears first as a hunter of rich young people for a payment, then as a merchant of knowledge about the soul, in
the third place as a producer, then as vendor of knowledge, in the fifth place as a verbal athlete, and in the sixth
place as a purifier of the opinions that prevent the soul of getting knowledge. In this point, the sink of the
exploration occurs, and in the midst of the confusion the sophist seems not to be different from the philosopher, i.e.
there is a mix “of the wolf with the dog” (231a). On this point, see Marsico 2023a.

3
and constitute the research's ground. This move is the birth of the history of philosophy and
foregrounds the historical dimension of the overall method but especially the philosophical
question. Indeed, it is inseparable from the context in which it arises and defines the field in which
we think. The endoxa are the horizon of the question and the tool with which we advance towards
the desired euporia.
The very possibility of reaching first philosophy depends, again, on the questions to be
made. It is no coincidence that the categories in Aristotle's work of the same name are presented
through interrogative pronouns. Hence, they are diverse types of questions oriented to different
regions of reality. Only the first one, focusing on substances and their causes, can produce first
philosophy in its senses of study of the causes, ontology, « ousiology », and theology.7
In short, ancient philosophy offers a horizon that, far from obstructing the question, confers
on it a fundamental role in which openness to exceedance and the historical dimension of all
questioning are combined.

2. The philosophical question today

These views bring us back to the present. What is to be done with this hindsight or, in other words,
with history in the context of philosophical research? In the field of the philosophy of history, there
is no lack of attempts to clarify this point. Reflection in this area has made dizzying progress in
recent decades, especially concerning how we know the past. This is the case of intellectual history,
in its English, German and French strands, characterised by a marked discursivism, as can be seen
in the work of Koselleck, Foucault and Skinner.8 Something similar occurs with the lines of
hermeneutics and, to a lesser extent, with the developments associated with the notion of « field »
coined by Bourdieu9 and the notion of « imaginary » proposed by Castoriadis.10 Rescher's proposal
for the analysis of the production of philosophical ideas in terms of « aporetic clusters »,11 as well
as Hayden White's developments associated with metahistory can be added,12 as well as post-
analytical Bayesian historiography.13 Hence, state of the art in this field seems like an « archipelago
» in the common sea of dissatisfaction with inherited parameters.
Within this framework, Konstellationsforschung accounts for the interaction of thinkers in
a Denkraum (a space of thought) by alluding to philosophical problems, life situations and the
debates that shape it.14 With Foucauldian airs, this strand focuses on the detailed study of particular
cases, which are blurred when structures are prioritised. However, it is theoretically grounded in
sociological concepts, as the notion of « constellation » and its Weberian echoes suggest.
Therefore, it has limitations for its transposition into historical-philosophical contexts. On the other
hand, it is not a general method. Due to the small number of testimonies, it excludes Antiquity and
a large part of the Middle Ages, which are nevertheless of vital prominence and provide vital
examples of theoretical exchanges.

7
On the senses of first philosophy, see Reale 1980.
8
See Koselleck 2000 and 2006, Foucault (1969) and Skinner (2007).
9
Bourdieu 1989, 1991, 2002.
10
Castoriadis 1998.
11
Rescher 1977.
12
White 1973.
13
E.g., Tucker 2004.
14
See Mulsow 2005.

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 On the contrary, the Zones of Dialogical Tension approach also appeals to a « spatial »
notion to comprehend historical interaction through the notion of « zone » but offers instruments
for global historiography in both the synchronic and diachronic dimensions. It is rooted in the
philosophy of history and accounts for the « behaviour » of theoretical concepts without thematic
restrictions. This approach studies the dynamics between ideas within the same period and the
trans-historical dialogue that moves philosophy.15
Now, in line with Fraisopi's text, which appeals to Phenomenology, we want to consider
some contributions from this strand concerning the philosophical question and its bonds with
history. In fact, Husserl paid attention to this realm and identified a group of philosophers that
foreshadowed some of his views, which could be seen as part of the general strategy to explain his
position. However, this step is even more relevant since it entails essential aspects of his views
about spiritual heritage. The philosopher's responsibility is inherent to this task and involves a
historical sense that should be made explicit.16 That is the same as saying that he must be conscious
of their generativity, understood as the historical horizon of any philosophical research. Every
investigation is rooted in a tradition, understood as a process of constitution of meaning through
intersubjective and intergenerational relationships. In this sense, pointing toward generativity
implies questioning the philosopher's place within a tradition and, by extension, the position within
the tradition of a given community. Through this exercise, the philosopher embodies community
awareness and asks questions that reveal the generativity of the whole.
On these questions lies its character of critical understanding of history.17 Hence, the
philosophical character of the history of philosophy should never be blurred or biased toward mere
historiographic views, as we will see later. The philosophical question focuses on the origin and
its transformation, and in this sense, it is a retrospective question, a Rückfrage,18 focused on the
community background.
This scheme is strongly linked with Husserl's views about the Western tradition. He does
not embrace a model of fall, in the line of Nietzsche's description of how the real world became a
fable in Twilight of the idols. In that case, the luminous origin and the celebration of life associated
with the Dionysian impulse weaken because of the growth of the Apollonian synthesised in
Socratism and its main spokesman, Plato. All that follows is the fall, and only at its endpoint looms
the possibility of a new beginning. Instead, in the case of Husserl, the movement fluctuates and
tends to rise rather than decline.
The question about the origin is at the forefront, and the strategy for dealing with it appeals
to the notion of Urstiftung. It is the primal institution that reveals the authenticity of the
community.19 It is linked to the Greek past and the search for certain knowledge. However, the
achievements of this stage were not stable and became weak, ruined by disruptive elements. What
could seem a decline is so only at first glance when we focus on the continuous essence of tradition.
This process leads to a further institution, a Nachstiftung, that brings the primal impulse back into
a new environment. Descartes is the exemplary case of a new attempt at a radical reflection.
Phenomenology appears as the final institution, the Endstiftung, as the achievement of the original
goals and signs of long-term stability.

15
Marsico, 2010.
16
See, for instance, Crisis #15 and Supplement XXIV.
17
Hua VI,72.
18
Hua VI, 364. Hua XXIX, 399 and 424-426 seem to imply the priority of this way, although we must understand
that this is the more adequate to account for the kind of intersubjective and historical phenomena. See H. Inverso,
2015 and 2018.
19
Hua XXXIX, 527.

5
 This topic is addressed, among other passages, in a short text included in the volume about
the Lebenswelt (Hua XXXIX) focused on the universe of pre-givenness and world and the role of
habituality. In this framework, Husserl refers to the diversity of original institutions, which act as
a basis for later reactivations in the life of consciousness.20 This mechanism peculiar to the personal
life is like that which occurs in cultural traditions regarding the past. It varies and allows updating,
modification, correction and abandonment of the Urstiftungen that guided the personal or
communal realm at a particular moment.21
These acts involve restatements of the same opinion, which remains valid from its origin.22
Thus, they imply an after-foundation, a Nachstiftung, with diverse levels of coincidence and
confirmation or validation (Bekräftigung) of the original instance. If this confirmation becomes
weak, the Urstiftung loses its power progressively together with its motivational power in the
broader context of consciousness.23 Husserl stresses that the opinions rooted in these confirmations
can decay if left aside in the face of new views. If they conflict with each other, the Nachstiftungen
atrophy and wither until it disappears.24 But at the same time, an opinion can be renewed by
restoring the Urstiftung.
Hence, the horizon of our lives and beliefs involves the historical dimension. For Husserl,
natural life has a present changeable universe, the whole past, and the entire open future.25 Material
things, organic bodies, souls, psychophysical units, personal subjects and subjective communities,
and culture are intertwined.26 Hence, the diagnosis of the European crisis is not a prophecy of
doomsday but a warning about the decline of the ancient Urstiftung and at the same time, an
invitation to restore it. The loss is never complete and could even produce growing familiarity. In
the repeated Nachstiftung of the original Urstiftung, « the knowledge “deepens” in the form of the
increase of familiarity (Steigerung der Vertrautheit), albeit up to a limit of perfect familiarity ».27
Therefore, the past is always at hand and ready for a novel institution.
However, in this framework, Husserl foresees a peculiar re-institution characterised as
Endstiftung, not so much because it implies an end but because it is the goal of a process already
present in origin, as we will see in the next section. It is worth noting that this long-term perspective
is not focused on a fixed development model in the manner of « great stories » or Hegelian arrays
but on the comprehension of the evolution of communities. They are supposed to have an identity
that can be grasped through philosophical exploration.28
Therefore, the set Urstiftung, Nachstiftung, and Endstiftung guide the philosophical
question about the history of ideas and the destiny of communities, i.e., the Rückfrage. This kind
of question seeks to grasp the past significant milestones, their reinstitutions and the quality of
these reinstitutions, ranging from a partial view to a deep comprehension of historicity. As we have
said, for Husserl, the better instance of this three-steps process is represented by Plato, Descartes,
and himself. The Greek original institution was recovered by Descartes' attempts in a powerful
Nachstiftung, reinforced by Husserl's developments on phenomenology. The mention of isolated
figures could lead to thinking of the philosophical question as a solitary task. On the contrary, it

20
Hua XXXIX, 1-2.
21
Hua XXXIX, 46-49. On Husserl’s notion of tradition, see Moran 2013.
22
Hua XXXIX, 46.
23
Hua XXXIX, 47.
24
Hua XXXIX, 48.
25
Hua XXXIX, 49.
26
Hua XXXIX, 50.
27
Hua XXXIX, 463.
28
Hua VI, 72.

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always involves a joint undertaking, which even manages to cross time. Hence, we must explore
the nature of our dialogue with the past.

3. The retrospective question

A giant figure looms on the horizon when we look at the philosophical past. It is Plato, surrounded
by a colourful and noisy group. He appears as Socrates' disciple, Aristotle's master, Dyonisius'
host, friend and enemy of the many members of the complex Socratic circle, and illustrious part
of a prominent family. Above all, he was not alone. Neither was he nonchalant about the
community. His Republic stresses the philosopher's role in the framework of a community of
philosophers that lead society as a whole. Husserl is far from thinking of these philosophers as a
ruling group, but he confers them an equally important task. It consists of the institution of meaning
that clarifies the shared goals of its members. In this sense, they are « functionaries of modern
philosophical mankind ».29 This is far from the philosopher king, but not too far. They must
accomplish that work since communities, as we saw, tend to forget the original institution and
become blind concerning their objectives. Hence, the past needs to be reactivated to avoid
inauthentic paths that result in crises, understood precisely as the anxiety produced by forgetting
one's origin and ignoring how to face the future.30 How could the philosopher bring back to the
present that origin? This point puts the structure of the philosophical question at the forefront, and
its most prominent feature is that it addresses a non-living other.
Indeed, history entails a community with the dead. Only through their voices can we know
what happened before, and this hint is still stronger in the case of philosophy. We ask dead
philosophers what they have to tell us. The philosophers of the past asked philosophical questions
and unveiled the first institutions of meaning. Therefore, they are highly significant interlocutors
for those who seek to recover them and investigate their role in the present. Hence, «the
philosophical past is for the philosopher an actually motivating present». Still, diverse
philosophers have different horizons, which implies that the philosophical question oriented to
grasp the Urstiftung must go beyond this limit to reach a sphere where all the philosophers from
all times can cohabit.
The philosophical question will not find in this framework definitive answer. On the
contrary, the horizon of each question conditions what is found. If the question lacks or weakens
its force and direction, the dialogue disappears, and the past shows nothing relevant. In these cases,
philosophical generativity loses its power. However, all is never lost. A new philosophical question
can change the picture. If so, «a new spiritual and philosophical generativity begins, overcoming
the gap of the non-philosophical time».31 In some sense, the philosopher lives in a trans-historical
community and travels through it by asking philosophical questions.
Husserl coined a specific name for this strange community: Denkergemeinschaft, the «
community of thinkers ». Within the Denkergemeinschaft, time is not an obstacle but the
background of a long-standing dialogue. In Husserl's view, the philosopher puts time into brackets,
and « this mundanity which goes back to the original creation of Philosophy and philosophical
generativity is his living present. In this realm, he has his colleagues, his companions; he deals

29
Hua VI, 72.
30
On Husserl’s notion of crisis and its link with history, see Carr 2014.
31
Hua VI, Supp. XXIV, 488.

7
with Aristotle, Plato, Descartes, Kant, etc. ».32 Philosophical questions and answers feed life in
this peculiar realm. Plato comes back to life through his concepts and, above all, through his
responses to a present-day philosopher.
On this basis, Husserl goes one step further and says, « my life and that of Plato are the
same ».33 What does it mean and in what same they are the same? To answer this question, we can
turn to Husserl's comment on the nature of communication, which appears to be one-way or two-
way. In the first case, we can say that the one-way dialogue with a dead philosopher can be
considered a phenomenon of real communication, so strong that it allows thinking of it as a deep,
vital connection. If so, my life and that of Plato are the same since we share interests, objectives,
and philosophical questions. Again, this kind of question is the tool to bridge the gap and build a
common life beyond the limits of time. What is even more interesting, this common life within the
Denkergemeinschaft is not a bubble closed in on itself. Its contents impact the present community
and give it a channel to coexist with the past communities that guide its development. The sense
of continuity leads to a sustainable evolution based on shared meanings and goals. These goals
become manifest through the permanence of the philosophical questions and the peculiar answers
within a given tradition.
Let us analyse a bit more the case of Plato. It is clear that in Husserl's view, Plato represents
more than Plato himself. He is the voice of the Greek past and its challenges that are very similar
to the present ones. The whole tradition is a struggle between those who try to find solid grounds
to get knowledge and those who deny this possibility and choose to be sceptics. In this battle,
Husserl takes sides and feels himself as Plato's continuator, struggling against the same forces.
This is relevant since it entails that the original institution does not lack conflicts. On the contrary,
the conflict is at its very root and coping with this situation is part of the reactivation of the
Urstiftung.
Indeed, when one of the sides prevails to the point of stifling the other, it is a sign of crisis.
Both parts of the Greek legacy, i.e., the search for truth and the doubts about the possibility of such
an endeavour, are equally important. A sceptical position that abandons any serious investigation
is dangerous, but a naïve belief in any truth without solid grounds is also negative. The Greek
Urstiftung tells the story of a struggle in which the doubts prompted the best efforts to build reliable
approaches, i.e., they lead to Plato's philosophy. This perspective is evident in Husserl's First
Philosophy, of 1924, where he reviews the points of contact between his approach and that of
Plato. Plato's Ideas foreshadow the eidetic reduction and the method of variations, providing
important keys for thinking about subjectivity and its relation to the intelligible level.34
The very Urstiftung warns against leaving behind the philosophical question of living at
the bottom of the cave. Thus, Plato acts as a responsible functionary who remembers the
importance of thinking about personal enhancement and the community's destiny. This conviction
is reflected in the idea of the ruling philosopher, who takes it upon himself to guide the city not
because he pursues political power but because he understands his role as an official of humanity.
Through this combination of features, his philosophy synthesises the antecedent of Husserl's
views. However, also according to Husserl, this original establishment has flaws that produce a
subsequent weakening. In Husserl's view, Plato was dazzled by the Ideas, in a sort of metaphysical
bias, and fell short of the transcendental reduction. It could be said that Plato missed the

32
Hua VI, Supp. XIII, 444.
33
Hua XIV, 198.
34
Hua VII, 322. This view is already present in the introductory course of 1922-23 and the lectures Einleitung in die
Philosophie (1919/1920). See Miettinen 2013, 244ff.

8
philosophical question and rushed into paths that were not sufficiently solid. This failure destroys
the original establishment and reveals limits that make it unstable.
Each of these re-institutions is a Nachstiftung, characterised by the return of a similar
programme of a search for solid grounds. As we saw, the Neoplatonic versions, the medieval
persistences35 and above all, the return of a resolute search for truth in Descartes are re-institutions
of the original impulse, which appears each time as a reactivation of the Urstiftung. Husserl sees
phenomenology as one of these re-institutions on the two levels we mentioned, both theoretical,
related to the foundations, and practical, concerning the philosopher's role and the community's
relevance. Thus, phenomenology is a re-institution but also something more. To such an extent
Husserl conceives himself as a continuator of Plato that he considers phenomenology as an
Endstiftung, i.e., as a final establishment, insofar as it can fulfil the aims of justification and method
he sought in Plato.
This statement can lead to misunderstandings if the Endstiftung is understood as a closure
of possibilities or a definitive answer to philosophical questions. From what we have already said,
this is not a risk. The very structure of the retrospective question and its link to the philosophical
question implies that philosophy is dynamic and in permanent re-creation. Where, then, does the
«Ende» in Endstiftung lie? At this point, it is worth recalling the polysemy of the term telos in
Greek, which implies « end » but also « perfection » and « goal ». In this case, Endstiftung refers
to an institution that completes and perfects the original institution fulfilling its objectives.
Thus, the final institution never implies that philosophy is finished or that the philosophical
question has finally been answered. On the contrary, it entails a reinforcement of this kind of
question because it guarantees a certain direction. Instead of the hesitant questioning that fails to
establish a genuine link with the past and ends up fossilised as a mere record, the final
establishment implies that the original demand is fulfilled. Therefore, the dialogue with the past is
fully open and functions as a basis for a solid programme oriented to the future. Phenomenology
is experienced as the device that offers a firm ground for philosophical research and allows it to
flourish and advance. Would this not imply changes that paradoxically leave Endstiftung behind?
Not really, since sustained work in a philosophical direction, embodied in the work of a
philosophical community, confirms the central role of the Endstiftung concerning the destiny of
tradition.
When Husserl lamented the abandonment of his disciples and philosophical loneliness
towards the end of his career, he was suffering for his personal condition but also for having found
a channel that could enliven philosophy and was not valued by his contemporaries. A century later,
the scene was not as dark as it seemed to Husserl at the time. However, the subsequent history of
the approach was more oriented towards criticism attempting to overcome the initial stage or take
it from a mere historical study as if it were an obsolete vision. At the same time, more recently,
more than a few lines of thought consider Husserl's ideas a rich philosophical framework.
Let us assess the nature of this particular kind of question, which is not just a question but
a « retrospective question », a Rückfrage. As we saw, it tries to grasp the original institution, the
Urstiftung, which entails a set of meanings and corresponding goals. This question is rooted in the
present circumstances of the one who asks this question. For this reason, as in any conversation,
the result depends on many aspects. The past is rich and complex enough to give rise to many
answers. If the philosopher's life and that of Plato are the same, it does not imply that a present
philosopher will repeat Plato's findings. On the contrary, that philosopher will continue his task in

35
On the re-institutions of Platonism, see Marsico 2023b.

9
a new environment. He will be in contact with Plato and other philosophers to keep the dialogue
with the past open to better understand the present and its challenges.
As it happens in a real dialogue, Plato sometimes gives different answers because the
philosophical questions are similar but never the same since they arise from diverse contexts. This
diversity allows multiple exchanges that fit other times and traditions because, in the end, there is
just one humanity. Therefore, each philosophical question unlocks new possibilities for novel
responses. In this way, it keeps the dialogue with the past alive and active and turns this back-and-
forth into a valuable tool to produce new meaningful answers.36
If the Rückfrage had a single structure, the answers would become stagnant and no longer
meaningful. This happens when the community forgets the original institution and wanders
aimlessly into the future. The questions it can ask are no longer philosophical, so the dialogue
breaks down. Plato does not respond anymore because the philosopher's life has nothing to do with
the life of previous philosophers. The Denkergemeinschaft disappears and leaves room only for a
weakened history of thought, which in this sense, is the flip side of philosophy. The history of
philosophy not only can be philosophical, but it is philosophy itself when it involves the
retrospective question, i.e., philosophical questions within a Denkergemeinschaft. Still, it ceases
to be so when it becomes a mere data recording turned out of the trans-historical dialogue.
In this framework, the mere history of philosophy is a sign of the crisis. Philosophy faints
when the trans-historical dimension dries out and only offers meaningless data. Some strands that
try to convert philosophy into science kill the philosophical question and pose only common
questions that lack the power to activate the dialogue with the past. My life is no longer that of
Plato, and Plato does not answer. Hence, the philosopher becomes a historian of philosophy
reduced to organising and resuming Plato's work. No matter how hard he tries to make sense of it,
he only gets dead words, unable to unveil the Urstiftung. This is a waste of opportunities and a
lack of responsibility because the philosopher is a functionary of humankind. Hence, the whole
community loses its way if the philosophers fail their task. It is left to his own devices. The
philosopher must manifest the historical background that reveals the community's origin and its
purposes.
Hence, the philosophical weakening can be described as the vanishing of the
Denkergemeinschaft due to the lack of retrospective questions understood as the root of the
philosophical questions. When it happens, the bridge that unites the present and the past crumbles
and the present is left alone and helpless, without clues to advance. Conversely, the philosophical
strength lies in the activity within the Denkergemeinschaft that extends the dialogue with
contemporary philosophers and those who preceded us.
In sum, philosophy, meaning and history are part of the same unit and rest on the nature of
the questions that guide the theoretical research. In the framework of a growing interest in our link
with the past and the ways to explain it, phenomenology offers powerful tools to account for these
issues, putting the nature of the philosophical question at the forefront. From this perspective, it is
the key to comprehending the philosopher's role as a functionary of humanity and the notion of
Denkergemeinschaft as a trans-historical community. In this framework, the phenomenological
approach and its attention to the philosophical question help to understand the institution of
meaning and the relationship between the past, the present, and the future when we try to unravel
the destiny of our communities.

36
Hua Mat VIII, 222.

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