Maritime Safety Awareness

Bulletin
Issue

14
September 2021 Shaping shipping for people

Navigation officer performing position verification

Navigation Safety: Using Electronic Chart

Display and Information Systems
An Electronic Chart Display and with groundings and collisions
Information System (ECDIS) is a have been related to inadequate
computer-based navigation system passage planning, position finding In this issue, we focus
that complies with IMO regulations. and communications. Some of these on navigation safety, in
It is an IMO carriage requirement for are linked to inadequate training in
particular issues
most ships on international voyages navigation practices and supporting
and is widely used as an alternative safety systems1. Companies have a associated with the use
to paper navigation charts. All ECDIS primary role to play in ensuring crew of Electronic Chart Display
units on board must be approved by are appropriately trained, familiar and Information Systems
the ship’s Flag administration. ECDIS and have supporting and adequate (ECDIS).
is intended to support safe navigation, systems in place in the use of ECDIS
however grounding incidents have for safe navigation.
occurred in which the poor use
A recent review of the usability and
of ECDIS has been identified as
applicability of ECDIS by the UK’s
contributory factors.
Marine Accident Investigation Branch
In addition to the risk to the safety & the Danish Maritime Accident
of crew and ship, navigation-related Investigation Board concluded that,
incidents such as groundings pose from a user perspective, ECDIS
the risk of harm to sensitive marine does contribute to safe navigation.
environments1. Environmental However, the challenges that have
damage is likely to result in significant accompanied its introduction remain
clean-up costs and penalties, as well problematic2. This bulletin explores
as irretrievable reputational loss. practical ways to address these
Some of the safety issues associated issues to improve navigation safety.
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Maritime Safety Awareness Bulletin  Issue 14 — September 2021

C
 ase study 1 — MV Kaami for voyage planning and ECDIS
– Little Minch, Scotland. use, and the ship operator’s internal
auditing program did not identify
At 0141 local time on 23 March shortfalls in practice.
2020, the general cargo ship Kaami
ran aground on to rocks in the Little While there were no injuries and
Minch on the west coast of Scotland, environmental impact was minimised,
causing significant hull damage3. the damage to Kaami’s hull was
extensive and the ship was declared
a constructive total loss. MV Kea Trader, aground with fractured hull
(Maritime Cyprus)
C
 ase study 2— Kea Trader
– New Caledonia. • No warnings or reference to the
isolated danger were documented or
At 0055 local time on 12 July 2017, discussed in bridge team briefings.
the Maltese registered container ship
Kea Trader ran aground off the coast • The ECDIS route check function had
of New Caledonia4. not been enabled.
The MV Kaami aground (MAIB) Prior to the grounding, a minor change • The audible alarm was muted during
to the voyage plan was authorised, the ship’s voyage.
The investigation report identified that: resulting in the track passing over an
isolated danger. The danger symbol None of the watchkeepers were
• the mandatory generic and type appeared outside of the charted track aware of the actual safety settings on
specific training for the ECDIS were due to zooming-in and possibly over- the ECDIS, despite the completion
found to be inadequate for crew to scaling the ECDIS display. This led of bridge equipment familiarisation
perform their functions safely. the crew to incorrectly assume the forms. The ‘caution area’ messages
track was safe. repeatedly displayed in the
• the on-board operation did not allow subsequent navigational watches were
adequate opportunity for the voyage The incident investigation largely overlooked by the bridge team.
plan to be checked and verified by a determined that:
second member of the bridge team. During the salvage attempt, a
• No independent route check was structural fault resulted in the hull
• the safety management system did conducted, nor was the plan signed fracturing in heavy seas. The ship
not provide adequate safeguards off by the master. was declared a constructive total loss.

AMSA incident and inspection data

AMSA recorded 11 reported grounding AMSA inspection data from 2018
incidents involving regulated Australian 6% through to 2020 shows that 13 percent
vessels between 2016 and 2020, (746 out of 5663) of all deficiencies
that were due to navigational issues. were related to navigation shortfalls.
Some of the issues identified within Additionally, 5 percent (23 out of
these incidents are shown in the chart. 502) of all ship detentions for this
31% 44% period were due to ECDIS related
deficiencies. These detentions were
all related to safety management
6% - operating on non-approved software system shortfalls associated with
(ECDIS),1 19% officers’ being unfamiliar with ECDIS
44% - Inadequate passage planning, 7 operations, which also suggests issues
in terms of effective training. The
19% - Poor watchkeeping, 3 likelihood of navigation-related issues
31% - Poor navigational practices, 5 leading to potentially catastrophic
Grounding incidents related consequences means that improving
to navigational issues navigation safety is a key priority.
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Maritime Safety Awareness Bulletin  Issue 14 — September 2021

Strategies for safe navigation

The following are practical strategies • electronic navigational charts Look ahead function
for improving navigation safety, with (ENCs) must not be over-scaled.
a focus on the appropriate use of Over-scaled ENCs will show a When set properly, the look ahead
ECDIS. ‘jail bar’ pattern across them function will scan the chart ahead
and/or display an over-scaled of the ship and provide warning of
warning notice. hazards to navigation. Appropriate
Familiarisation of ECDIS procedures should ensure the look
• appropriate procedures should be in
ahead function is set up to achieve
place for alarms settings. Although
The company should ensure a balance of avoiding too many
it is important to set alarms to avoid
appropriate re-familiarisation training alarms while allowing enough time
information overload, it is even
is provided to the bridge team on the for the navigator to manoeuvre the
more important to understand these
operation and functions of the ECDIS ship to safety.
alarms before being disabled.
and other navigational equipment
when joining the ship - even if they The voyage plan must be available for Position verification
are returning to the same ship. immediate use on primary and back-
up navigation systems. MSC.1/Circ. 1503 ECDIS – Guidance
The Nautical Institute has developed
for Good Practice highlights
a useful checklist on ECDIS
that knowing the limitations of
familiarisation -
Use of Cross Track Limits and the equipment and identifying
https://www.nautinst.org/uploads/ look-ahead functions misrepresentation of information is
assets/uploaded/d644ad96-c4ac- essential for the safe use of ECDIS.
4ecc-8fda9f15fef17a7f.pdf Cross Track Limits - is a vital tool The circular recommends verification
which must be used correctly when through:
planning and executing any voyage
• Comparison of chart data and radar
Voyage planning plan. Appropriate procedures should
picture
be in place to ensure crew are familiar
Appropriate procedures should be in with the cross track limits function. • Checking the own ship’s position by
place for the bridge team to ensure The cross track limits function using other independent position-
safe navigation. provides an extra layer of defence for fixing systems
Where ECDIS is used to plan a safe navigation and should vary for
• The safety management system
voyage: each leg of the voyage, depending on
(SMS) should include procedures
the proximity of navigational hazards.
for the bridge team to verify the
• the voyage plan should be validated Cross track limits should be wide
ship’s position using alternate
by the route-checking function, using enough to provide flexibility for the
means.
applicable safety parameters, as well OOW to conduct collision avoidance
as a visual check of the intended manoeuvres in all conditions.
tracks using the most appropriate AMSA staff member on the bridge with
scale for viewing. navigation officer (AMSA).
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Maritime Safety Awareness Bulletin  Issue 14 — September 2021

Conclusion References
Navigation safety depends upon an ensure adequate opportunity for
Sánchez-Beaskoetxea, J., Basterretxea-
1 
effective SMS. A well implemented navigation officers to plan the voyage
Iribar, I., Sotés, I. (2021) “Human error in
SMS is critical for managing training and for this plan to be checked and marine accidents: Is the crew normally to
and familiarisation with the ship’s verified by a second member of the blame?” Maritime Transport Research, Vol.
navigation equipment such as bridge team. It also should ensure 2, 100016.
ECDIS. This will address issues of navigation officers and watchkeepers UK MAIB/DMAIB (in press) Application and
2 

misjudgement and overconfidence are sufficiently free from fatigue usability of ECDIS: A MAIB and DMAIB
with using ECDIS, as well as to attend to the critical role of collaborative study on ECDIS use from the
technical training, inexperience navigation safety. perspective of practitioners.
and misuse1. Lack of knowledge MAIB (2021) Report on the investigation of
3 
The transition to ECDIS has come
regarding the implications of ship the grounding of the general cargo vessel
with challenges in maritime. ECDIS Kaami on 23 March 2020. 7/2021, June.
specific ECDIS functionality can result
continues to be viewed in the
in loss of situational awareness5. Transport Malta (2018) Safety investigation
4 
same way as a standardised and
The consequences of this lack of into the grounding of the Maltese registered
automated paper chart, rather than as container ship Kea Trader on 12 July 2017.
understanding of what’s going on,
a technology that can contextualise No. 14/2018.
why and what’s going to happen
information from various sources
impedes decision making during Grech, M.R., Lutzhoft, M. (2016)
5 

and in support of safe navigation. “Challenges and opportunities in user

navigation and can be catastrophic.
Therefore, going forward, different centric shipping: developing a human
The SMS will also identify and types of training (rather than generic centred design approach for navigation
address shortfalls in procedures such type training and familiarisation), systems” OzCHI ‘16: Proceedings of the
28th Australian Conference on Computer-
as voyage planning and position procedures and future human centred Human Interaction.
verification. An effective SMS should design work is required 2.

Companies must ensure adequate familiarisation and training continue to be provided for their
crew to know their ECDIS, understand how the safety functions work, and always know what
safety settings have been used to ensure the safe navigation of their ship.

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