Social system and its foundational impacts on politics and the

economy
Pakistan is on course to becoming the world’s third most populous country by
2050. Its estimated population of 165 million people27 is unevenly distributed in
its territory. According to the 1998 population census, 28 the politically and
economically dominant province of Punjab was also the one with the biggest
share of the national population, 56 percent. It was followed respectively by
Sindh (23 percent), NWFP and FATA (16 percent), and Baluchistan (5 percent).
The overall population density was estimated at 166 people per km 2, though
huge differences existed among the four provinces. Punjab emerged again on
top of the list, with a density of 358 people. It was followed respectively by the
NWFP (238), Sindh (216), FATA (117) and Baluchistan, with an
extremely low density of 19 people per km2.
The ethnic composition of the population reflects broadly the above-mentioned
population distribution across
the four provinces. The Punjabis are estimated to amount to about 45 percent of
the population; the Pashtuns are
the next ethnic group with about 15 percent, followed by the Sindhis (14
percent) and Baluchis (4 percent).29
The religious composition of the country’s population is rather uniform, with a
96 percent majority Muslim
population; the remaining 4 percent are equally divided among Hindus and
Christians. However, interesting differences among the provinces emerge.
While the NWFP (including FATA) and Baluchistan show percentages of
Muslim population close to 100, Punjab has a relevantly high percentage of
Christians (2.3) and Sindh an even greater percentage of Hindus (6.5). 30 Up to
three-quarters of the Muslim population is probably Sunni, while according to
unofficial estimates, the share of the Shia minority is around one-fifth.
In Punjab, biradri (clan or caste) networks provide a ready source of social and
political affinity, which can also be exploited for political purposes. In other
parts of the country (Baluchistan and NWFP), tribal structures with hereditary
leaders (e.g. maliks and sardars) prevail, and structure social and political
interactions. More in general,
ethnic background, tribal affiliations and religious denominations or sects have
been used to achieve a sort of
traditional caste system. Caste and social stratification can greatly differ among
the various ethnic and religious
groups in Pakistan. The caste system in Pakistan creates a social divide whereby
lower castes (or classes) are
often severely persecuted by the upper castes. Within this system, a particularly
disadvantaged position is held
by women from the lower castes, who are frequently persecuted for attempting
to break the shackles of the
local, restrictive system.
The large dependency of the country’s economy at the time of partition on
agriculture, contributed to the rise of
the landowning class as an elite group within society. Pakistan’s politics to date
continues to be dominated by
rural-based elites, who have been able to parlay control over land, tenants and
customary loyalties (e.g. biradri)
into political power. These “feudal” elites are central to the patron-clientelist
character of politics described
below. The post-independence period, however, also witnessed the rise of
another elite group – that of the
industrialists, many of whom were originally Indian Muslims who had migrated
to Pakistan and who quickly
controlled most of the country’s industry and commerce.
Islam is a fundamental feature of Pakistan’s socio-cultural landscape. Around
96 percent of Pakistanis are
professed Muslims. In many contexts, Islam cuts across other divisions in
Pakistani society. But in recent years,
sectarian tensions (Shia versus Sunni) have divided communities and in many
cases led to violence. Moreover,
extremism has gained converts and influence in Pakistan, and increasingly
provides a platform for socio-political
mobilisation and violence.
Significant segments of Pakistani society are socially (and hence politically)
excluded. Landless labourers,
tenants, certain biradri and religious minorities are widely discriminated against
by both state institutions and local
elites. Gender relations in Pakistan are highly inequitable and women are often
systematically disadvantaged.

Hudood Ordinance have recently been repealed, women remain at a systematic

disadvantage in some legal
proceedings.
The Rules of the Game
This section investigates the formal and informal factors that shape state and
society and the interaction between
them. These factors are relatively fluid in the medium term. In Pakistan it is
often the informal “rules of the game”
that trump the formal. Behind the façade of the state and its laws and
procedures, it is socio-economic
structures and networks, cultural norms and expectations, and the exercise of
personal power that
shape governance and inhibits transparency. This section shows that substantive
power in Pakistan tends
to lie with a small elite and its military allies. This patrimonial elite has been
able to use its control over economic
and social resources to maintain their position of authority in successive
Pakistani governments. Once in power,
elected and military officials have been able to use their formal positions of
authority to advance their personal
fortunes and those of their clients and patrons.
The formal framework
Pakistan has a relatively comprehensive legal framework for governance, based
on British civil law.
The constitution enshrines checks and balances between the executive,
legislative and judicial branches of
government. The written rules and procedures for civil service performance,
transfers and promotions are clear
44 Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan (2007-2008). Op. cit.
45 K.A. Kronstadt (2008). Pakistan-US relations. CRS Report for Congress (RL33498).
Washington DC, US: Congress Research Service.
Available at www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33498.pdf.
46 A.H. Khan and Y. Kim (1999). Foreign direct investment in Pakistan: Policy issues and
operational implications. EDRC Report Series, No.
66. Manila, Philippines: Asia Development Bank. Available at
http://www.adb.org/documents/edrc/reports/er066.pdf.
47 Ibid.
48 Data from the State Bank of Pakistan, 'Workers’ remittances'. Available at
http://www.sbp.org.pk/Ecodata/homeremmit/remittance.pdf.
Pakistan State–Society Analysis • 23
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and streamlined. Pakistan has signed up to a range of international conventions
(including some, but not all,
related to human rights). Some national legislation has been amended to reflect
these international legal norms.
As already pointed out in the previous section, since 2001 the Local
Government Ordinance has provided a
legal framework for substantive decentralisation through elected representation
and service delivery at the union
council, tehsil49 and district levels.
In practice, however, aspects of the formal framework of government are
contradictory, selectively
enforced and lack legitimacy. Provisions within the legal system contradict each
other and provide openings
for abuse. For instance:
• There are inherent contradictions between Sharia and civil law, both of which
are enshrined in the constitution.
This is particularly true when it comes to family law.
• Freedom of speech and the right to information are legally protected, but other
laws have been used to curb
these rights in order to restrict criticism of specific state policies and the armed
forces.
• Article 17 in the constitution protects the right of association and assembly,
but it is alleged that the government
has used an 1886 law, Article 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to pre-
empt perceived threats to public
order.
Pakistan’s legal framework has never been stable. The constitution has been
abrogated and fundamental
legislation has been moulded by successive Pakistani leaders to suit their needs.
The country’s first constitution
was only enacted in 1956, after nearly a decade of deliberation, only to be
suspended two years later by Ayub
Khan’s coup. Since then, two entirely new constitutions have been written, in
1962 and 1973. In addition, despite
the fact that the constitution can only be amended with a two-thirds majority of
parliament, elected and military
leaders have found it relatively easy to amend it to suit their purposes. The 1973
constitution, for instance, has
been amended 17 times. The judiciary has given approval to each of these
changes. It has also legitimised each
of Pakistan’s military coups through application of its “doctrine of necessity”
(see Box 5).
Nevertheless, the 1973 constitution, through Chapter 1 (Articles 8-28), still
upholds fundamental rights, such
as those concerning the basic security of a person, including safeguards against
arbitrary arrest, detention, forced
labour and slavery. Furthermore, essential freedoms, such as the freedom of
movement, assembly, association,
trade, speech, and religious expression, are embedded in the constitution, as
well as the right to private property
and the principle of equal access to public places and services. Gender equality
is in principle safeguarded by
the constitution, although there are discriminatory laws within the Pakistani
legal framework, such as the Law of
Evidence and the Hudood Ordinance.
Pakistan is also a signatory to a number of international human rights
conventions, such as the conventions
on the Rights of the Child, on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, and the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights. At the same time, however, it has not yet signed
key conventions such as the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women,
and the Intentional Convention
relating to the Status of Refugees.
Apart from decreeing Islam as the state religion, the constitution does not
provide any specific status for religious
representatives or institutions, and similarly traditional institutions are not
covered by the constitution.
Constitutional amendments have not been the only means of Pakistan’s elected
and military leaders to make
policies and to govern. They have also relied on decrees rather than
parliamentary law-making. According
to the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP), 70 ordinances were
issued in 2007 alone, ‘a number of
them only a day before the National Assembly was due to meet’. 50 Some of
these were ordinances that had to
be reissued, as they had lapsed, and the National Assembly had not yet debated
them.
49 Administrative division and entity of local government subdivided into a number of union
councils.
50 Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (2008). State of human rights in 2007. Lahore,
Pakistan: HRC of Pakistan. Available at http://www.
hrcp-web.org/hrcpDetail_pub3.cfm?proId=528.
24 • Initiative for peacebuilding
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This use of ordinances and other directive forms of government has
systematically weakened parliament.
It has also weakened the legitimacy of many policies and directives. Formal
rules made by directive are not
the product of any negotiated settlement or substantive consultation with
citizens and their representatives
(parliament). As such, there is a danger that these policy changes may lack
legitimacy in the eyes of citizens and
parliament. In this context, even the most well intentioned reforms may have
little broad support and are subject
to reversal by subsequent regimes (as was the case with earlier military-led
decentralisation efforts in the 1960s
and 70s). There is a real risk that reforms created by processes that are broadly
seen as illegitimate may
be seen as illegitimate themselves.
As to the existing legal provisions regulating the right to own and trade land,
and in particular land inheritance
procedures, it is interesting to point out the blatant discrimination against
women. While they enjoy the right to inherit
the family’s land according to Islamic law, their permitted share is just half that
of their male siblings. In practice, even
this inheritance may not accrue to them, as feudal families in Sindh and south
Punjab in particular often require
women of marriageable age to forfeit their right of inheritance in favour of
brothers or other male relatives.
On paper, there are a number of rules governing public sector employment, and
entry to and promotion within the
civil service is relatively routinised. The political independence of civil servants
at all levels, however, has
been eroded over the past several decades. Most senior civil servants enter the
system through a comprehensive
exam process. But, in the 1970s, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto created a system of lateral
entry into the civil service,
through which he could directly appoint supporters to the bureaucracy. Loyalty
to the political leader, rather than
efficiency considerations, was considered as crucial for an appointment in the
civil service.51 Subsequent elected
and military regimes have used lateral entry as a way to populate the civil
service with supporters. Following his
ascendance to power in 1999, it is estimated that Musharraf used this system of
lateral entry to appoint around
1,200 acting and retired military officers to senior positions within government.
In terms of the institutional political framework, the constitution that was
prepared and approved in 1973
under the civilian government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, envisaged a prime
ministerial system with the president as a
ceremonial head of state. In 1985, the then President General Zia ul-Haq
introduced the Eighth Amendment to
the Constitution, which, under Article 58 2(b), gave the president the power to
dismiss the National Assembly if
he feels that the prime minister no longer holds the confidence of the House, or
if ‘a situation has arisen in which
the Government of the Federation cannot be carried on in accordance with the
provisions of the Constitution and
an appeal to the electorate is necessary’.52 The amendment
essentially tilted the balance of power in favour of the
president. The Thirteenth Amendment passed in 1997 by
Nawaz Sharif’s second government stripped the president
of these powers, and once again turned the president into a
figurehead. However, the Seventeenth Amendment of 2003
promulgated by President Musharraf brought back Article
58 2(b), which remained in the Constitution as of the end of
November 2008, in spite of increasing pressure for its removal
by mainstream political parties. President Zardari was accused
by the Pakistan Muslim League-Q and Jamaat-i-Islami of yet
another volte-face, following the previous failure to honour
the commitment to reinstate deposed Chief Justice Iftikhar
Mohammad Chaudhry. Those parties ‘doubted Mr Zardari’s
sincerity to go ahead with what his Pakistan People’s Party
and its allies had pledged to do in their election manifestos
and the famous Charter of Democracy signed by assassinated
PPP leader Benazir Bhutto and [the Pakistan Muslim League
(Nawaz), or] PML (N) chief Nawaz Sharif in 2006’.53
51 Interview with Dr. Humayun Khan, Former Ambassador and Foreign Secretary, Peshawar,
12th September 2008.
52 Constitution (Eighth Amendment) Act, 1985, validates amendments made by Gen. Zia-ul-
Haq. Available at http://www.pakistani.org/
pakistan/constitution/amendments/8amendment.html.
53 R. Asghar, 'PML-Q offers support for scrapping 58(2)b', Dawn, 29th October 2008. Available
at http://www.dawn.com/2008/10/29/top6.
htm.
Box 5: The Doctrine of Necessity
This principle became an accepted legal
norm after a ruling of the Supreme Court of
Pakistan confirmed the validity of the use
of non-constitutional emergency powers by
the then governor general in 1954. Ghulam
Mohammad had dissolved Pakistan's first
constituent assembly, apparently in an attempt
to counter a bill passed in the Assembly
curtailing his powers as governor general.
This move was subsequently challenged in
court by Maulvi Tamizuddin, the speaker of
the Assembly. The Supreme Court relied on
Bracton's maxim, 'that which is otherwise not
lawful is made lawful by necessity', to support
its ruling in the governor general's favour.
Pakistan State–Society Analysis • 25
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The budgetary process is initiated by individual departments, which make
demands for grants and appropriations
and send these to the Finance Ministry. The Ministry then holds discussions on
Statements of New Expenditures
(SNEs) – new categories of expenditure proposed by departments. The
discussions start by March/April. The
budget is finalised by May, printed and presented to Parliament generally in the
first week of June. Its approval
normally takes place before the fiscal year ends on 30th June. Budgets are
subsequently allocated across
localities by the various departments (e.g. Education, Health, etc.). Funds are
supposed to be transferred in three
or four tranches, starting from the second week of July (which is the start of the
fiscal year). In practice, however,
the transfer of funds is random and unpredictable, leading to serious budgeting
difficulties at the local level.
Macro-economic management in Pakistan has recently shown some signs of
weakening, after clear
improvement had been achieved during the last few years. The World Bank’s
International Development
Association (IDA) Resource Allocation Index, for instance, awarded Pakistan
for the year 2007 a score of 3.5 for
macro-economic management, lower than the average value of 3.7 calculated
for all the other 74 IDA borrowers.54
Financial management systems are, however, largely in place at the federal and
provincial levels, but have not yet
been implemented at the local level. Budgets are well publicised in the press and
civil society, but parliamentary
debate on the budget is limited. Debate begins only two days after the budget is
presented, limiting the ability of
parliamentarians to analyse it. The overall period for debate is short and the
opposition tends to use the budget
sessions to raise unrelated but long-standing grievances with the government.
Due to persistent privatisation and liberalisation policies, there are no state-
owned enterprises in Pakistan that
can that show large revenues. Most of them have been already privatised, while
the remaining ones are either in
the process of being privatised, or are being restructured. The private sector is
therefore penetrating all sectors
of the country’s economy, with the only exception of the defence and security
industry, which is still kept under
government control.
The media has also undergone a deep privatisation drive. Out of about 50 TV
channels and networks in
Pakistan, only one is state-owned (i.e. the Pakistan Television Network, or
PTV). While liberal policies have
promoted impressive growth in this sector, former president Musharraf tried to
place some restrictions on the
way the newly born media outlets operated, by promulgating the notorious
Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory
Authority (PEMRA) Ordinance in 2007, which has since expired.
Finally, given the already mentioned problematic relationships between the
Punjabi-dominated centre of the
state and its more peripheral levels of governance, it is essential to shed some
extra light on the institutional
framework that has emerged throughout the years, and that has officially aimed
at creating a more accountable
and effective local governance system.
The allocation of responsibilities between the federal and provincial
governments is specified in the 1973
Constitution. In the event of any conflict between the legislation of the two tiers
of government, that of the federal
government prevails. The service functions to be performed by the federal
government include: defence; external
affairs; currency, coinage, and legal tender; foreign exchange; foreign loans and
foreign aid; nuclear energy; stock
exchanges; national planning and economic coordination; national highways
and strategic roads; geological
and meteorological surveys; censuses; railways; exploitation of minerals and
natural gas; and development of
industries.
The weak financial position of provincial governments and their overwhelming
dependence on federal grants
and transfers greatly dilutes their ability to perform several of their functions.
Provinces have sole responsibility
for: law and order; justice; provincial highways; urban transport; secondary and
university education; agriculture
extension and provision of inputs; irrigation and land reclamation; industries;
and mineral resources.
In August 2001, following a year of local elections, the government
implemented the Local Government
Plan (announced a year earlier) and created three levels of local government,
entailing political, financial and
administrative devolution. Each province was divided into district governments,
tehsil municipal administrations
54 International Development Association (IDA), 'IDA Resource Allocation Index (IRAI) -
2007: Pakistan'. Available at http://www1.worldbank.
org/operations/IRAI/2007/PAK.pdf.
26 • Initiative for peacebuilding
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(TMAs) and union administrations, with the last representing the smallest local
government unit with its councillors
directly elected by the people at the village and town level. The three layers
were expected to function as
autonomous local bodies with their own responsibilities, financial shares and
revenue sources.
These new responsibilities entailed a process of transfer of human and financial
resources from the province
to local governments, as well as a series of amendments for relevant laws, rules,
systems, procedures and
processes. Given the complexity of the task, the transfer of powers is still
evolving. The new mandates clearly
posed many challenges for the newly created local governments, which were
faced with heightened public
expectations on the one hand, and large capacity gaps to handle these
responsibilities on the other. The new
structure has shaken up administrative relationships, including placement of the
local administration under an
elected council headed by a nazim (mayor or head of the local government), and
relative autonomy of local
governments vis-à-vis the provincial government.
The local government system was based on the premise that locally-managed
basic services will improve
responsiveness to local needs and facilitate improved service delivery, as it
provided a range of opportunities
for enhancing political commitment and greater accountability to the public.
Some (expected) problems did
emerge, however, such as politically-based transfer and non-merit-based
recruitment of staff. In addition, the
district government budget often barely covers the expenses for the fixed
obligations to operate the existing
services transferred to them. And eventually few allocations were made to the
new local governments from the
development budget.
public-sector companies and in cooperatives. For instance,
it has created the largest goods transportation company in
the country, and is the largest contractor for the construction
of roads and for the collection of tolls. Cooperative ventures
are normally small- and medium-sized, and are carried out by
the various military commands. The most visible level of the
military’s economic structure, however, is represented by four
welfare foundations,59 which engage in business ventures
as diverse as bakeries, farms, schools, private security firms,
commercial banks, insurance companies, radio and television
channels, and fertiliser, cement and cereal manufacturing
plants. Although military personnel tend to downplay the
military's influence over them, they are all controlled at the
top by senior generals or members of the Ministry of Defence
(MoD). Finally, there is also a substantial portion of the
military’s economic activities that is fundamentally hidden
from the public eye and that conveys benefits to its active or
retired individual members. The distribution of such benefits
does not necessarily happen on an institutional basis, but it is
rather dependent on each individual’s capacity to establish and exploit
connections with the military organisation
in order to create personal wealth. The benefits accruing to these individuals
include: the provision of land and
housing; the provision of jobs, especially after retirement (as further explained
in the following paragraph); and
the concession of exclusive business opportunities. In theory,
the MoD is positioned at the apex of the military economic
system and should act as the main controlling authority
for the defence establishment. In practice, it is used by the
three military services60 ‘as a forum to negotiate economic
opportunities and the monopolization of resources’. 61
The Pakistani military’s economic interests were further
promoted by a complex process of integration and exchange
of reciprocal favours between President Musharraf and the
military, which was set in motion after the 1999 coup. Retired
generals, for instance, were regularly placed in key positions of
authority within the government and national companies. ‘The
army’s business interests now span banking and insurance,
cement and fertilizer, electricity and sugar’. 62 This system of
rewards in exchange for loyalty was apparently extended to
include the lower-ranking officers and soldiers. Jobs, other
opportunities and rewards such as land, were regularly
promised after five years of service.
Besides its symbiotic relationship with those civilian elites
representing the country’s political power, the army, in a
classic case of collective and state-led over-plundering, has
also been cultivating a union of interests and intents with
religious actors, which dates back to the partition of 1947.
Religion was then used to justify the separation from Hindudominated
India, and soon after Islam became a useful tool in
the hands of Pakistan’s ruling civil and military elite. At home,
Islam was used ‘to co-opt and reward the clergy of all Muslim sects to keep the
secular, democratic political
parties at bay. Internationally, the Pakistani government showcased its Islamic
credentials to prove its allegiance
to the anti-communism cause’. 63 ‘A convergence of conservative interests had
taken place according to a pattern
that is still clearly recognizable in current day Pakistan’, argues Marco Mezzera
of the Clingendael Institute.
‘Musharraf’s political party, the Pakistan Muslim League (Q), and the military
establishment at large, both kept
looking for political alliances with Islamic parties (some of them openly pro-
Taliban) in order to resist challenges
to their power by more secular parties such as the PPP’. 64 As a result of this
regressive alliance, religious parties
managed to win the 2002 general elections and become major coalition partners,
respectively, in NWFP and
Baluchistan, two provinces where “Talibanisation” has been rampant.
In terms of civilian oversight of the military’s budget, it is relevant to note that
military expenditure is not
subject to parliamentary scrutiny, and as a matter of fact no government has
ever tried to reduce the military
budget. However, according to retired General and former Chief of Army Staff
Jehangir Karamat, a parliamentary
defence committee was involved in the discussion of the 2008 federal budget. In
addition, he referred to other
civilian oversight mechanisms in place, such as the Defence Council, under the
MoD; the Defence Committee
of the Cabinet, which could be convened by the prime minister at any time; and
the Public Account Committee,
charged with overviewing general expenditures and financial matters.
Nevertheless, he eventually conceded
that although the oversight mechanisms were formally in place, their
implementation had been particularly
lacking. For instance, the Defence Committee of the Cabinet had never been
convened during the Musharraf
government.65
The judiciary does not have a strong history of independence. Since 1958, the
year Ayub Khan, the first
military ruler of Pakistan took power, the judiciary has been effectively
integrated into the country’s notorious
“establishment”, playing a subservient role to the demands and wishes of the
military and political class.66 The
Supreme Court has done little to challenge the authority of the executive or
military, and (as highlighted above)
has given sanction to military rule in the past through the doctrine of necessity.
As the 2007 events testify,
however, the judiciary and the bar associations do have scope to assert
themselves against the executive. Chief
Justice Chaudhry showed parts of the judiciary class, and especially young
lawyers from district courts, that
it was still possible to take a stand against the establishment, and in particular
against the military regime. As
soon as his responsibilities as head of the Supreme Court led him to deal with
public litigation cases, such as
human rights violations, environmental cases, and cases concerning missing
persons, his zealous work started
affecting the (feudal) interests of the most powerful segments of Pakistani
society. On the other hand, he also
sent a strong message to those other segments of society that had been facing
regular abuses of power. And
as a result, during his tenure as chief justice between June 2005 and March
2007, 30,000 additional cases
were filed at the Supreme Court. This was as many as the number lying idle at
the Court at the beginning of
his mandate. This unprecedented collision between the judiciary and the
executive came to a head on 3rd
November 2007, when President Musharraf declared emergency rule and
dismissed Chief Justice Chaudhry
for a second time (the first time was on 1st March 2007). Eventually the two
principal causes of confrontation,
says the HRCP, ‘were the Supreme Court’s zeal to pursue the cases of
disappearance and its resolve to test
General Pervez Musharraf’s bid for re-election as President on the touchstone of
the constitution’.67 In spite of
Chaudhry's removal from office, reconfirmed even under the new civilian
government, the lawyers’ movement
that sprang from this case, and the spontaneous support that it received from
other sectors of society across
the country, indicated a society in transition, where potentially a new sense of
awareness of the need to guard
against abuses of political power and to protect the principle of “due process”
was being forged.68
With regard to the broader issue of access to justice, most Pakistanis face
significant barriers. Some of these
barriers are related to the limited capacity and reach of the formal justice
system. But others relate to the ways
in which informal institutions impinge on the legal system. Access to justice is
largely determined by one’s social-

State-society relations
As this analysis has shown, the governance challenges facing Pakistan have
deep social roots. The state’s
formal institutions are embedded in society, and the boundaries between public
and private spheres in Pakistan
are porous. Pakistan’s leaders at all levels are more likely to secure their
position of formal authority through
social networks and patronage, than through free and fair processes. Similarly,
Pakistani citizens are more likely
to access basic goods and services through personal networks of kin and biradri,
informal intermediaries and
facilitation payments, than through formalised procedures and processes.
At a local level, formal procedures and regulations are often poorly understood
by administrators and even
when they are, administrators use their position as gatekeepers to guard access
to information, public
services or documentation. This tends to reinforce the informality of the system
as people (particularly the
poorer and less powerful) must rely on intermediaries, personal connections or
facilitation payments to navigate
the system or to secure services, as the following examples illustrate:
• Land records in rural areas are maintained and tightly controlled by local
revenue officers, or patwaris. Control
over these records has created opportunities for graft in land titling and
registration, particularly in rural areas.
Land records are unavailable unless relationships with the local patwaris are
maintained.
• In some cities, access to water is also alleged to be managed by profiteering
intermediaries. In Karachi, most
residents rely on the “tanker mafia” to secure water. The speculation is that this
mafia colludes with local
administrators to access the municipal water supply, effectively capturing most
of the city’s public water
supply.
Nazims have also begun to use their influence over transferring civil servants to
shore up their political position
and as a tool of patronage. By threatening to or actually transferring non-
compliant civil servants, local officials
are able to strengthen their authority over the bureaucracy and to gain their
compliance. An indicator of the
degree to which transfers have been misused in recent years is the length of
tenure of civil servants in particular
postings. For instance, while police officers should expect to be in a particular
post for an average of three years,
the average time in posts is now closer to six months.
The government at all levels has difficulty spending the budget allocated to
basic services (i.e. health and
education), even though these sectors are relatively under-resourced in the first
place. In 2005–06, for instance,
it is estimated that the Sindh provincial government was only able to spend 37
percent of its education budget.
This inability to spend appears to be both because of the late arrival of transfers
from the federal level and
inadequate capacity to manage resources at the provincial level and below.
Public attitudes toward political processes and service delivery reveal deep
distrust and low
expectations. Voter turnout in Pakistan, for instance, is among the lowest in the
world. Since independence,
turnout for parliamentary elections has been 45.3 percent, by far the lowest rate
in Asia. Citizens have little faith
in public services. In these circumstances, people are more likely to turn to
informal systems of adjudication and
service delivery, even if they are administered by and favour local elites.
The presence of the state is even more contested in those areas bordering
Afghanistan, where service delivery
has been almost completely replaced either by total neglect or by military
presence and repression. For example,
in Baluchistan, where on paper the entire service and administrative structure
exists, in reality there are two
problems: 1) given the scarcity of trained manpower in Baluchistan, many
administrative posts are vacant; and
2) even when posts are not vacant, the officials who have been posted in
Baluchistan often do not go to their
place of service. This is because many people posted in remote areas of the
province do not belong to that area
and have to live there without their families. This problem is not unique to
Baluchistan and it happens in remote
areas of other provinces as well.
In the case of FATA, there is an obvious distinction between the situation prior
to and after the beginning of
military operations in 2003. Before 2003, there was a government presence in
the areas in the form of very
powerful Political Agents, as well as social service staff from the departments of
Health and Education. One
agency in FATA even had a teachers’ training college. After 2003, the situation
changed, and most educational
institutions and health centres are now closed because of the unrest, as well as
the fact that government staff
are at risk of being kidnapped.
Here and Now
This section briefly analyses the current events and processes and actors that are
shaping immediate prospects
for governance and state-society relations in Pakistan. The current situation in
Pakistan is rapidly evolving, so this
analysis should simply be seen as a “snapshot” to be corroborated and updated
by regular assessment processes.
Context
Internal conflict: 2008 has witnessed a significant escalation of the internal
conflict between the Pakistani state
and the Taliban in Pakistan. In the immediate aftermath of the election of
February 2008, both the federal government
(which at that time comprised a coalition of the PPP and the PML (N) group
amongst other parties) and the provincial
government of NWFP (led by the ANP) announced their intention to start a
process of negotiation with militants
in the FATA region (led by the so-called Tehrik e Taliban Pakistan, or TTP)
and Swat (led by Maulvi Fazlullah).84
Negotiations continued through April 2008, and resulted in the signing of an
agreement with Taliban commanders
in FATA and Swat in May 2008, in which the government agreed to the gradual
withdrawal of troops from the two
restive regions in return for a halt in suicide bombings, and an assurance that
parallel systems of government set up
by militants in the aforesaid regions would be dismantled.
The accord was greeted with trepidation by the international community, and
was followed by increased Taliban
activity in Afghanistan, which lent credence to the view that the government’s
“soft” approach to the militants
would encourage the use of the borderlands of Pakistan as a launching pad for
attacks against NATO forces in
Afghanistan.
The accord was short-lived, and by June 2008 the Army was called out to the
provincial capital of Peshawar to
break a siege of the city by multiple militant groups, some of whom were in
conflict with each other, but who were in
danger of over-running the city. The events in Peshawar pointed to the
infiltration of criminal elements in the militant
movement, and also to the possibility that the government was covertly
engaging in a policy of using officially backed
militant groups to counter others. At least one warlord active in the Khyber
Agency bordering Peshawar district was
known to have risen from the ranks of criminal gangs, and to have the support
of official counter-terrorist agencies.
The Army launched an operation to clear the Khyber Agency of militants at the
end of June 2008, and had barely
completed the operation when the southeastern NWFP district of Hangu, a
settled area known for sectarian
conflict, erupted in clashes between Shias and Sunnis, and more confusingly,
between two Sunni groups following
different interpretations of Sharia.
The Hangu conflict was followed by the outbreak of further trouble in the
Bajaur Agency, where the Taliban
appeared to be in danger of taking over the agency headquarters and expelling
the civil administration from the
agency, which borders Afghanistan. The Bajaur operation has proved to be
perhaps the most drawn-out single
operation in the ongoing Army engagement in the tribal areas, with the area not
being declared trouble-free
even four months after the operation began. Although the Army seems to have
regained control over much
of the agency, clashes continue from time to time. The Bajaur operation has also
led to the largest internal
displacement of population in Pakistan’s history, with 300,000 people
reportedly leaving the agency for the
districts of Charsadda, Mardan and Peshawar.
The ongoing operations in the tribal areas, and particularly in Bajaur, have had
ramifications beyond the tribal
areas. The intensity of suicide bombings has registered an increase across
Pakistan, with ever more daring
attacks taking place in key cities. Of the more deadly attacks, the June 2008 car
bomb outside the Danish
embassy in Islamabad, suicide bombings on successive days in the southern
NWFP district of Dera Ismail Khan,
and the August 2008 bombing outside the Pakistan Ordinance Factories in Wah
(western Punjab), increased
the sense of insecurity in the country. In September 2008, one of the deadliest
suicide bombings in Pakistan’s
history took place at the Marriott Hotel in Islamabad, when a truck full of
explosives crashed into the entry barrier
of the hotel, killing at least 53 people and injuring more than 260. 85
• Civil society: Civil society played a vibrant role in the last days of the
Musharraf government, particularly with
regard to participation in the lawyers’ movement. However, civil society
activists seem to have adopted a waitand-
see approach to the current government, which has taken some positive action
on rights issues.
• Media: Media controls, which had increased substantially after the
proclamation of emergency in late 2007,
have eased after the elections of 2008. Nevertheless, the media has been accused
of being sensationalist,
and espousing a conservative, militaristic point of view. The media’s tendency
to sensationalise reached its
zenith in the aftermath of the Mumbai attacks, with sections of both the Indian
and Pakistani media exhorting
their respective governments to take strong action against the other country.