Knowledge

29/08/2023, 15:21 Knowledge - Wikipedia
Knowledge
Knowledge is a form of awareness or familiarity. It is

often understood as awareness of facts or as practical
skills, and may also mean familiarity with objects or
situations. Knowledge of facts, also called propositional
knowledge, is often defined as true belief that is distinct
from opinion or guesswork by virtue of justification.
While there is wide agreement among philosophers that
propositional knowledge is a form of true belief, many
controversies in philosophy focus on justification. This
includes questions like whether justification is needed at
all, how to understand it, and whether something else
besides it is needed. These controversies intensified due
to a series of thought experiments by Edmund Gettier
and have provoked various alternative definitions. Some The owl of Athena, a symbol of knowledge
of them deny that justification is necessary and suggest in the Western world
alternative criteria. Others accept that justification is an
essential aspect and formulate additional requirements.
Knowledge can be produced in many ways. The most important source of empirical knowledge is
perception, which is the usage of the senses. Many theorists also include introspection as a source
of knowledge, not of external physical objects, but of one's own mental states. Other sources often
discussed include memory, rational intuition, inference, and testimony. According to
foundationalism, some of these sources are basic in the sense that they can justify beliefs without
depending on other mental states. This claim is rejected by coherentists, who contend that a
sufficient degree of coherence among all the mental states of the believer is necessary for
knowledge. According to infinitism, an infinite chain of beliefs is needed.
Many aspects of knowledge are investigated, and it plays a role in various disciplines. It is the
primary subject of the field of epistemology, which studies what someone knows, how they come to
know it, and what it means to know something. The problem of the value of knowledge concerns
the question of why knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief. Philosophical skepticism is
the thesis that humans lack any form of knowledge or that knowledge is impossible. Formal
epistemology studies, among other things, the rules governing how knowledge and related states
behave and in what relations they stand to each other. Science tries to acquire knowledge using the
scientific method, which is based on repeatable experimentation, observation, and measurement.
Many religions hold that humans should seek knowledge and that God or the divine is the source
of knowledge.
Definitions
Numerous definitions of knowledge have been suggested.[1][2][3] Most definitions of knowledge in
analytic philosophy recognize three basic types. "Knowledge-that", also called propositional
knowledge, can be expressed using that-clauses as in "I know that Dave is at home".[4][5][6]
"Knowledge-how" (know-how) expresses practical competence, as in "she knows how to swim".
Finally, "knowledge by acquaintance" refers to a familiarity with the known object based on
previous direct experience.[5][7][8] Analytical philosophers usually aim to identify the essential
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Knowledge 1/33
features of propositional knowledge in their definitions.[9] There is wide, though not universal,
agreement among philosophers that knowledge involves a cognitive success or an epistemic
contact with reality, like making a discovery. It is also widely accepted that propositional
knowledge is a form of true belief.[10][11]
Despite the agreement about these general characteristics of knowledge, its exact definition is
disputed. The disagreements relate to the goals and methods within epistemology and other fields.
They also concern disputes about the standards of knowledge that people intend to uphold, for
example, what degree of certainty is needed. One approach is to focus on knowledge's most salient
features in order to give a practically useful definition.[12][5] Another is to try to provide a
theoretically precise definition by listing the conditions that are individually necessary and jointly
sufficient. The term "analysis of knowledge" (or equivalently, "conception of knowledge" or "theory
of knowledge") is often used for this approach.[1][13][14] It can be understood in analogy to how
chemists analyze a sample by seeking a list of all the chemical elements composing it.[1][15][16] An
example of this approach is characterizing knowledge as justified true belief (JTB), which is seen
by many as the standard definition.[4][17] Others seek a common core among diverse forms of
knowledge, for example, that they all involve some kind of awareness or that they all belong to a
special type of successful performance.[11][18][19][20]
Methodological differences concern whether scholars base their inquiry on abstract and general
intuitions or on concrete and specific cases. These two positions are known as methodism and
particularism.[21][22][23] Another source of disagreement is the role of ordinary language in one's
inquiry: the weight given to how the term "knowledge" is used in everyday discourse.[6][14]
According to Ludwig Wittgenstein, for example, there is no clear-cut definition of knowledge since
it is just a cluster of concepts related through family resemblance.[24][25] Different conceptions of
the standards of knowledge are also responsible for disagreements. Some epistemologists, like
René Descartes, hold that knowledge demands very high requirements, like certainty, and is
therefore quite rare. Others see knowledge as a rather common phenomenon, prevalent in many
everyday situations, without excessively high standards.[1][5][26]
In analytic philosophy, knowledge is usually seen as a mental state possessed by an individual

person. But the term is sometimes used to refer to a characteristic of a group of people as group
knowledge, social knowledge, or collective knowledge.[27][28] In a slightly different sense, it can
also mean knowledge stored in documents, as in "knowledge housed in the library"[29][30] or the
knowledge base of an expert system.[31][32] The English word knowledge is a broad term. It
includes various meanings that some other languages distinguish using several words. For
example, Latin uses the words cognitio and scientia for "knowledge" while Spanish uses the words
conocer and saber for "to know".[11] In ancient Greek, four important terms for knowledge were
used: epistēmē (unchanging theoretical knowledge), technē (expert technical knowledge), mētis
(strategic knowledge), and gnōsis (personal intellectual knowledge).[20] Knowledge is often
contrasted with ignorance, which is linked to a lack of understanding, education, and true
beliefs.[33][34][35]
Epistemology, also referred to as the theory of knowledge, is the philosophical discipline studying
knowledge. It studies topics like the nature of knowledge and justification, how knowledge arises,
and what value it has. Further issues include the different types of knowledge and the extent to
which the beliefs of most people amount to knowledge as well as the limits of what can be
known.[36][37][11]
Justified true belief
Many philosophers define knowledge as justified true belief

(JTB). This definition characterizes knowledge through three
essential features: as (1) a belief that is (2) true and (3)
justified.[4][17] In the dialogue Theaetetus by the ancient Greek
philosopher Plato, Socrates pondered the distinction between
knowledge and true belief but rejected the JTB definition of
knowledge.[38][39] The most widely accepted feature is truth:
one can believe something false but one cannot know
something false.[5][6] A few ordinary language philosophers
have raised doubts that knowledge is a form of belief based on
everyday expressions like "I do not believe that; I know
it".[4][5][40] Most theorists reject this distinction and explain Knowledge is often defined as
such expressions through ambiguities of natural language.[4][5] justified true belief.
The main controversy surrounding the JTB definition concerns

its third feature: justification.[1][4][41] This component is often included because of the impression
that some true beliefs are not forms of knowledge. Specifically, this covers cases of superstition,
lucky guesses, or erroneous reasoning. The corresponding beliefs may even be true but it seems
there is more to knowledge than just being right about something.[4][5][14]
The JTB definition solves this problem by identifying proper justification as the additional
component needed. This component is absent in the above-mentioned cases. Many philosophers
understand justification internalistically (internalism): a belief is justified if it is supported by
another mental state of the person, such as a sensory experience, a memory, or a second belief.
This mental state has to constitute a sufficiently strong evidence or reason for the believed claim.
Some modern versions modify the JTB definition by using an externalist conception of
justification instead. This means that justification depends not just on factors internal to the
subject but also on external factors. According to reliabilist theories of justification, justified beliefs
are produced by a reliable process. According to causal theories, justification requires that the
believed fact causes the belief. This is the case, for example, when a bird sits on a tree and a person
forms a belief about this fact because they see the bird.[1][4][5]
Gettier problem and alternatives
The JTB definition came under severe criticism in

the 20th century, when Edmund Gettier gave a
series of counterexamples.[42] They purport to
present concrete cases of justified true beliefs that
fail to constitute knowledge. The reason for their
failure is usually a form of epistemic luck: the
justification is not relevant to the truth.[4][5][41] In a
well-known example, there is a country road with
many barn facades and only one real barn. The
person driving is not aware of this, stops in front of
the real barn by a lucky coincidence, and forms the The Gettier problem is motivated by the idea that
belief that he is in front of a barn. It has been some justified true beliefs do not amount to
argued that this justified true belief does not knowledge.
constitute knowledge since the person would not
have been able to tell the difference without the
fortuitous accident.[43][44][45] So even though the belief is justified, it is a lucky coincidence that it
is also true.[1]
The responses to these counterexamples have been diverse. According to some, they show that the
JTB definition of knowledge is deeply flawed and that a radical reconceptualization of knowledge
is necessary, often by denying justification a role.[1] This can happen, for example, by replacing it
with reliability or by seeing knowledge as the manifestation of cognitive virtues. Another approach
is to define it in regard to the cognitive role it plays. For example, one role of knowledge is to
provide reasons for thinking something or for doing something.[11] Various theorists are
diametrically opposed to the radical reconceptualization. They either deny that Gettier cases pose
problems or try to solve them by making smaller modifications to how justification is defined.
Such approaches result in a minimal modification of the JTB definition.[1]
Between these two extremes, some philosophers have suggested moderate departures. They agree
that the JTB definition includes some correct claims: justified true belief is a necessary condition
of knowledge. However, they disagree that it is a sufficient condition. They hold instead that an
additional criterion, some feature X, is necessary for knowledge. For this reason, they are often
referred to as JTB+X definitions of knowledge.[1][46] A closely related approach speaks not of
justification but of warrant and defines warrant as justification together with whatever else is
necessary to arrive at knowledge.[4][47]
Many candidates for the fourth feature have been suggested. In this regard, knowledge may be
defined as justified true belief that does not depend on any false beliefs, that there are no
defeaters[a] present, or that the person would not have the belief if it was false.[14][45] Such and
similar definitions are successful at avoiding many of the original Gettier cases. However, they are
often undermined by newly conceived counterexamples.[49] To avoid all possible cases, it may be
necessary to find a criterion that excludes all forms of epistemic luck. It has been argued that such
a criterion would set the required standards of knowledge very high: the belief has to be infallible
to succeed in all cases.[5][50] This would mean that very few of our beliefs amount to knowledge, if
any.[5][51][52] For example, Richard Kirkham suggests that our definition of knowledge requires
that the evidence for the belief necessitates its truth.[53] There is still very little consensus in the
academic discourse as to which of the proposed modifications or reconceptualizations is
correct.[1][54][11]
Types
A common distinction among types of knowledge is between propositional knowledge, or
knowledge-that, and non-propositional knowledge in the form of practical skills or
acquaintance.[5][55][56] The distinctions between these major types are usually drawn based on the
linguistic formulations used to express them.[1]
Propositional knowledge
Propositional knowledge, also referred to as descriptive knowledge, is a form of theoretical

knowledge about facts, like knowing that "2 + 2 = 4". It is the paradigmatic type of knowledge in
analytic philosophy.[4][5][6] Propositional knowledge is propositional in the sense that it involves a
relation to a proposition. Since propositions are often expressed through that-clauses, it is also
referred to as knowledge-that, as in "Akari knows that kangaroos hop".[5][6][8] In this case, Akari
stands in the relation of knowing to the proposition "kangaroos hop". Closely related types of
knowledge are know-wh, for example, knowing who is coming to dinner and knowing why they
are coming.[5] These expressions are normally understood as types of propositional knowledge
since they usually can be paraphrased using a that-clause.[5][6] It is usually held that the capacity
for propositional knowledge is exclusive to relatively sophisticated creatures, such as humans. This
is based on the claim that advanced intellectual capacities are needed to believe a proposition that
expresses what the world is like.[57]
Propositional knowledge is either occurrent or dispositional. Occurrent knowledge is knowledge

that is active, for example, because a person is currently thinking about it. Dispositional
knowledge, on the other hand, is stored in the back of a person's mind without being involved in
cognitive processes at the moment. In this regard, it refers to the mere ability to access the relevant
information. For example, a person may know for most of their life that cats have whiskers. This
knowledge is dispositional most of the time. It becomes occurrent when the person actively thinks
about the whiskers of cats. A similar classification is often discussed in relation to beliefs as the
difference between occurrent and dispositional beliefs.[6][58][59]
Non-propositional knowledge
Non-propositional knowledge is knowledge in which no

essential relation to a proposition is involved. The two most
well-known forms are knowledge-how (know-how or
procedural knowledge) and knowledge by acquaintance.[5][6][7]
The term "know-how" refers to some form of practical ability or
skill. It can be defined as having the corresponding
competence.[5][57] Examples include knowing how to ride a
bicycle or knowing how to swim. Some of the abilities
responsible for know-how may also involve forms of
knowledge-that, as in knowing how to prove a mathematical
theorem, but this is not generally the case.[11] Some forms of
practical knowledge do not require a highly developed mind, in Knowing how to ride a bicycle is
contrast to propositional knowledge. In this regard, practical one form of non-propositional
knowledge is more common in the animal kingdom. For knowledge.
example, an ant knows how to walk even though it presumably
lacks a mind sufficiently developed enough to stand in a
relation to the corresponding proposition by representing it.[57] Knowledge-how is closely related
to tacit knowledge. Tacit knowledge is knowledge that cannot be fully articulated or explained, in
contrast to explicit knowledge.[60][61]
Knowledge by acquaintance is familiarity with an individual that results from direct experiential
contact with this individual.[5][6][8] This individual can be a person or a regular object. On the
linguistic level, it is usually expressed without a that-clause by using using a direct object. So when
someone claims that they know Wladimir Klitschko personally, they are expressing that they had a
certain kind of contact with him and not that they know a certain fact about him. In this regard, it
is a relation to a concrete individual and not a relation to a proposition. Knowledge by
acquaintance plays a central role in Bertrand Russell's epistemology. He contrasts it with
knowledge by description, which is a form of propositional knowledge not based on direct
perceptual experience.[62][63][5] However, there is some controversy about whether it is possible to
acquire knowledge by acquaintance in its pure non-propositional form. In this regard, some
theorists, like Peter D. Klein, have suggested that it can be understood as one type of propositional
knowledge that is only expressed in a grammatically different way.[4]
Other distinctions
A priori and a posteriori
The distinction between a priori and a posteriori knowledge came to prominence in Immanuel
Kant's philosophy and is often discussed in the academic literature. To which of these two
categories a knowledge attitude belongs depends on the role of experience in its formation and
justification.[6][64][65] To know something a posteriori means to know it on the basis of

experience.[66][67] For example, to know that it is currently raining or that the baby is crying
belongs to a posteriori knowledge since it is based on some form of experience, like visual or
auditory experience.[64] A priori knowledge, however, is possible without any experience to justify
or support the known proposition.[65][68] Mathematical knowledge, such as that 2 + 2 = 4, is a
paradigmatic case of a priori knowledge since no empirical investigation is necessary to confirm
this fact.[67][68] The contrast between a posteriori and a priori knowledge is usually equated with
the contrast between empirical and non-empirical knowledge.[67] This distinction pertains
primarily to knowledge but it can also be applied to propositions or arguments. For example, an a
priori proposition is a proposition that can be known independently of experience.[64]
The relevant experience in question is primarily identified with sensory experience. However,
some non-sensory experiences, like memory and introspection, are often included as well. But
some conscious phenomena are excluded in this context. For example, the conscious phenomenon
of a rational insight into the solution of a mathematical problem does not make the resulting
knowledge a posteriori.[64][65] It is sometimes argued that, in a trivial sense, some form of
experience is needed even for a priori knowledge: the experience to learn the language in which
the claim is expressed. For a priori knowledge, this is the only form of experience required. For
this reason, knowing that "all bachelors are unmarried" is considered a form of a priori
knowledge. The reason is that for a person who understands the terms "bachelor" and
"unmarried", no further experience is necessary to know that it is true.[64][65]
One difficulty for a priori knowledge is to explain how it is possible. It is usually seen as
unproblematic that one can come to know things through experience but it is not clear how
knowledge is possible without experience. One of the earliest solutions to this problem is due to
Plato. He argues that, in the context of geometry, the soul already possesses the knowledge and
just needs to recollect or remember it to access it again.[68][69] A similar explanation is given by
René Descartes, who holds that a priori knowledge exists as innate knowledge present in the mind
of each human.[68] A further approach is to posit a special mental faculty responsible for this type
of knowledge, often referred to as rational insight or rational intuition.[64]
Self-knowledge
In philosophy, "self-knowledge" usually refers to a person's knowledge of their own sensations,

thoughts, beliefs, and other mental states. Many hold that it is a special type of knowledge since it
is more direct than knowledge of the external world, which is mediated through the senses.
Traditionally, it was often claimed that self-knowledge is indubitable. For example, when someone
is in pain, they cannot be wrong about this fact. However, various contemporary theorists reject
this position. A closely related issue is to explain how self-knowledge works. Some philosophers,
like Russell, understand it as a form of knowledge by acquaintance while others, like John Locke,
claim that there is an inner sense that works in analogy to how the external five senses work.
According to a different view, self-knowledge is indirect. This means that a person has to interpret
their internal and external behavior in order to learn about their mental states. It is similar to how
one can learn about the mental states of other people by interpreting their external
behavior.[70][71][72]
In a slightly different sense, the term self-knowledge can also refer to the knowledge of the self as a
persisting entity. This entity has personality traits, preferences, physical attributes, relationships,
goals, and social identities. This sense of self-knowledge is of particular interest to psychology and
refers to a person's awareness of their own characteristics.[73][74][75] Self-knowledge is closely
related to self-concept, the difference being that the self-concept also includes unrealistic aspects
of how a person sees themselves. In this regard, self-knowledge is often measured by comparing a
person's self-assessment of their character traits with how other people assess this person's
traits.[74]
Situated knowledge
Situated knowledge is knowledge specific to a particular situation.[76][77] It is closely related to

practical or tacit knowledge, which is learned and applied in specific circumstances. This especially
concerns certain forms of acquiring knowledge, such as trial and error or learning from
experience.[78] In this regard, situated knowledge usually lacks a more explicit structure and is not
articulated in terms of universal ideas.[77] The term is often used in feminism and postmodernism
to argue that many forms of knowledge are not absolute but depend on the concrete historical,
cultural, and linguistic context.[76][77] Understood in this way, it is frequently used to argue against
absolute or universal knowledge claims stated in the scientific discourse. Donna Haraway is a
prominent defender of this position.[78][79] One of her arguments is based on the idea that
perception is embodied and is not a universal "gaze from nowhere".[78]
Higher and lower knowledge
Many forms of eastern spirituality and religion distinguish between higher and lower knowledge.
They are also referred to as para vidya and apara vidya in Hinduism or the two truths doctrine in
Buddhism. Lower knowledge is based on the senses and the intellect. In this regard, all forms of
empirical and objective knowledge belong to this category.[80][81] Most of the knowledge needed in
one's everyday functioning is lower knowledge. It is about mundane or conventional things that
are in tune with common sense. It includes the body of knowledge belonging to the empirical
sciences.[80][82][83]
Higher knowledge, on the other hand, is understood as knowledge of God, the absolute, the true
self, or the ultimate reality. It belongs neither to the external world of physical objects nor to the
internal world of the experience of emotions and concepts. Many spiritual teachings stress the
increased importance, or sometimes even exclusive importance, of higher knowledge in
comparison to lower knowledge. This is usually based on the idea that achieving higher knowledge
is one of the central steps on the spiritual path. In this regard, higher knowledge is seen as what
frees the individual from ignorance, helps them realize God, or liberates them from the cycle of
rebirth.[81][82] This is often combined with the view that lower knowledge is in some way based on
a delusion: it belongs to the realm of mere appearances or Maya, while higher knowledge manages
to view the reality underlying these appearances.[83] In the Buddhist tradition, the attainment of
higher knowledge or ultimate truth is often linked to seeing the world from the perspective of
sunyata, i.e. as a form of emptiness lacking inherent existence or intrinsic nature.[80][84][85]
Common knowledge
Common knowledge is knowledge that is publicly known by everyone or nearly everyone, usually
with reference to the community in which the knowledge is referenced.[86] Common knowledge
can be about a broad range of subjects, such as science, literature, history, or entertainment.[86]
Since individuals often have different knowledge bases, common knowledge can vary and may
sometimes take large-scale studies to know for certain what is common knowledge amongst large
groups of people.[87] Often, common knowledge does not need to be cited.[88] Common knowledge
is distinct from general knowledge.
In broader terms, common knowledge is used to refer to information that an agent would accept as
valid, such as information that multiple users may know.[87] Assigning something the label of
common knowledge requires certain considerations about the involved community, group, society
and/or individuals, the time period, and the location.[86]
Domain knowledge
Domain knowledge is knowledge of a specific, specialised discipline or field, in contrast to general
(or domain-independent) knowledge. The term is often used in reference to a more general
discipline—for example, in describing a software engineer who has general knowledge of computer
programming as well as domain knowledge about developing programs for a particular industry.
People with domain knowledge are often regarded as specialists or experts in their field.
Metaknowledge
Meta-knowledge or metaknowledge is knowledge about knowledge.[89]
Some authors divide meta-knowledge into orders:
zero order meta-knowledge is knowledge whose domain is not knowledge (and hence zero
order meta-knowledge is not meta-knowledge per se)
first order meta-knowledge is knowledge whose domain is zero order meta-knowledge
second order meta-knowledge is knowledge whose domain is first order meta-knowledge
most generally, order meta-knowledge is knowledge whose domain is order meta-
knowledge.[90]
Other authors call zero order meta-knowledge first order knowledge, and call first order meta-
knowledge second order knowledge; meta-knowledge is also known as higher order knowledge.[91]
Meta-knowledge is a fundamental conceptual instrument in such research and scientific domains

as, knowledge engineering, knowledge management, and others dealing with study and operations
on knowledge, seen as a unified object/entities, abstracted from local conceptualizations and
terminologies. Examples of the first-level individual meta-knowledge are methods of planning,
modeling, tagging, learning and every modification of a domain knowledge. Indeed, universal
meta-knowledge frameworks have to be valid for the organization of meta-levels of individual
meta-knowledge.
Meta-Knowledge may be automatically harvested from electronic publication archives, to reveal

patterns in research, relationships between researchers and institutions and to identify
contradictory results.[89]
Sources of knowledge
Sources of knowledge are ways how people come to know things. According to Andrea Kern, they
can be understood as rational capacities that are exercised when a person acquires new
knowledge.[92] Various sources of knowledge are discussed in the academic literature, often in
terms of the mental faculties responsible. They include perception, introspection, memory,
inference, and testimony. However, not everyone agrees that all of them actually lead to
knowledge. Usually, perception or observation, i.e. using one of the senses, is identified as the
most important source of empirical knowledge.[5][6][93] So knowing that the baby is sleeping is
observational knowledge if it was caused by a perception of the snoring baby. But this would not be
the case if one learned about this fact through a telephone conversation with one's spouse. Direct
realists explain observational knowledge by holding that perception is a direct contact with the
perceived object. Indirect realists, on the other hand, contend that this contact happens indirectly:
people can only directly perceive sense data, which are then interpreted as representing external
objects. This contrast affects whether the knowledge of external objects is direct or indirect and
may thus have an impact on how certain perceptual knowledge is.[11]
Introspection is often seen in analogy to perception as a source of knowledge, not of external

physical objects, but of internal mental states. Traditionally, various theorists have ascribed a
special epistemic status to introspection by claiming that it is infallible or that there is no
introspective difference between appearance and reality. However, this claim has been contested
in the contemporary discourse. Critics argue that it may be possible, for example, to mistake an
unpleasant itch for a pain or to confuse the experience of a slight ellipse for the experience of a
circle.[11] Perceptual and introspective knowledge often act as a form of fundamental or basic
knowledge. According to some empiricists, perceptual knowledge is the only source of basic
knowledge and provides the foundation for all other knowledge.[5][6]
Memory is usually identified as another source of knowledge. It differs from perception and
introspection in that it is not as independent or basic as they are since it depends on other previous
experiences.[11][94] The faculty of memory retains knowledge acquired in the past and makes it
accessible in the present, as when remembering a past event or a friend's phone number.[95][96] It
is generally seen a reliable source of knowledge. But it can be deceptive at times nonetheless,
either because the original experience was unreliable or because the memory degraded and does
not accurately represent the original experience anymore.[11]
Knowledge based on perception, introspection, or memory may also give rise to inferential
knowledge, which comes about when reasoning is applied to draw inferences from another known
fact.[5][6][11] In this regard, the perceptual knowledge of a Czech stamp on a postcard may give rise
to the inferential knowledge that one's friend is visiting the Czech Republic. According to
rationalists, some forms of knowledge are completely independent of observation and
introspection. They are needed to explain how certain a priori beliefs, like the mathematical belief
that 2 + 2 = 4, constitute knowledge. Some theorists, like Robert Audi, hold that the faculty of pure
reason or rational intuition is responsible in these cases. This faculty can be used to explain why
such general and abstract beliefs amount to knowledge even though there seem to be no sensory
perceptions that could justify.[94][97] However, difficulties in providing a clear account of pure
reason or rational intuition have led some empirically minded epistemologists to doubt that they
constitute independent sources of knowledge.[5][6][11] A closely related approach is to hold that
this type of knowledge is innate. According to Plato's theory of recollection, for example, it is
accessed through a special form of remembering.[5][6]
Testimony is often included as an additional

source of knowledge. Unlike the other sources,
it is not tied to one specific cognitive faculty.
Instead, it is based on the idea that one person
can come to know a fact because another
person talks about this fact. Testimony can
happen in numerous ways, like regular speech,
a letter, the newspaper, or an online blog. The
problem of testimony consists in clarifying
under what circumstances and why it is a
source of knowledge. A popular response is that
it depends on the reliability of the person
Testimony is an important source of knowledge for
many everyday purposes. The testimony given at a
trial is one special case.
pronouncing the testimony: only testimony from reliable sources can lead to knowledge.[11][98][99]
Structure of knowledge
The structure of knowledge is the way in which the mental states of a person need to be related to
each other for knowledge to arise.[100][101] Most theorists hold that, among other things, an agent
has to have good reasons for holding a belief if this belief is to amount to knowledge. So when
challenged, the agent may justify their belief by referring to their reason for holding it. In many
cases, this reason is itself a belief that may as well be challenged. So when the agent believes that
Ford cars are cheaper than BMWs because they believe to have heard this from a reliable source,
they may be challenged to justify why they believe that their source is reliable. Whatever support
they present may also be challenged.[4][11][14] This threatens to lead to an infinite regress since the
epistemic status at each step depends on the epistemic status of the previous step.[102][103]
Theories of the structure of knowledge offer responses for how to solve this problem.[4][11][14]
The three most common theories are

foundationalism, coherentism, and infinitism.
Foundationalists and coherentists deny the
existence of this infinite regress, in contrast to
infinitists.[4][11][14] According to
foundationalists, some basic reasons have their
epistemic status independent of other reasons
and thereby constitute the endpoint of the
regress. Against this view, it has been argued Foundationalism, coherentism, and infinitism are
that the concept of "basic reason" is theories of the structure of knowledge. The black
contradictory. This criticism is based on the arrows symbolize how one belief supports another
idea that there should be a reason for why some belief.
reasons are basic and others are non-basic. This
would imply that "basic" reasons themselves
depend on other reasons and are therefore not basic. An additional problem consists in finding
plausible candidates for basic reasons.[4][11][14]
Coherentists and infinitists avoid these problems by denying the contrast between basic and non-
basic reasons. Coherentists argue that there is only a finite number of reasons, which mutually
support each other and thereby ensure each other's epistemic status.[4][11] Their critics contend
that this is the fallacy of circular reasoning.[104][105] For example, if belief b1 supports belief b2 and
belief b2 supports belief b1, the agent has a reason for accepting one belief if they already have the
other. However, their mutual support alone is not a good reason for newly accepting both beliefs at
once. A closely related issue is that there can be distinct sets of coherent beliefs. Coherentists face
the problem of explaining why someone should accept one coherent set rather than another.[4][11]
For infinitists, in contrast to foundationalists and coherentists, there is an infinite number of
reasons. This position faces the problem of explaining how human knowledge is possible at all, as
it seems that the human mind is limited and cannot possess an infinite number of reasons.[4] In
their traditional forms, both foundationalists and coherentists face the Gettier problem, i.e. that
having a reason or justification for a true belief is not sufficient for knowledge in cases where
cognitive luck is responsible for the success.[4][106]
Value of knowledge
Knowledge may be valuable either because it is useful or because it is good in itself. Knowledge can
be useful by helping a person achieve their goals. An example of this form of instrumental value is
knowledge of a disease, which can be beneficial because it enables a person to identify and treat
the disease. Or to reach an important job interview, knowledge

of where and when it takes place helps the person arrive there
on time.[107][108][109] However, this does not imply that
knowledge is always useful. In this regard, many true beliefs
about trivial matters have neither positive nor negative value.
This concerns, for example, knowing how many grains of sand
are on a specific beach or memorizing phone numbers one
never intends to call. In a few cases, knowledge may even have
a negative value. For example, if a person's life depends on
gathering the courage to jump over a ravine, then having a true
belief about the involved dangers may hinder the person to do
so.[108]
Besides having instrumental value, knowledge may also have

intrinsic value. This means that some forms of knowledge are
good in themselves even if they do not provide any practical
benefits. According to Duncan Pritchard, this applies to forms Los portadores de la antorcha (The
of knowledge linked to wisdom.[108][107] The value of Torch-Bearers) – sculpture by Anna
knowledge is relevant to the field of education, specifically to Hyatt Huntington symbolizing the
the issue of choosing which knowledge should be passed on to transmission of knowledge from one
the student.[107] generation to the next (Ciudad
Universitaria, Madrid, Spain)
A more specific issue in epistemology concerns the question of
whether or why knowledge is more valuable than mere true
belief.[110][109] There is wide agreement that knowledge is good in some sense but the thesis that
knowledge is better than true belief is controversial. An early discussion of this problem is found in
Plato's Meno in relation to the claim that both knowledge and true belief can successfully guide
action and, therefore, have apparently the same value. For example, it seems that mere true belief
is as effective as knowledge when trying to find the way to Larissa.[109][110][111] According to Plato,
knowledge is better because it is more stable.[109] A further approach is to hold that knowledge
gets its additional value from justification. However, if the value in question is understood
primarily as an instrumental value, it is not clear in what sense knowledge is better than mere true
belief since they are usually equally useful.[110]
The problem of the value of knowledge is often discussed in relation to reliabilism and virtue
epistemology.[110][109][112] Reliabilism can be defined as the thesis that knowledge is reliably-
formed true belief. On this view, it is difficult to explain how a reliable belief-forming process adds
additional value.[110] According to an analogy by Linda Zagzebski, a cup of coffee made by a
reliable coffee machine has the same value as an equally good cup of coffee made by an unreliable
coffee machine.[113] This difficulty in solving the value problem is sometimes used as an argument
against reliabilism. Virtue epistemologists see knowledge as the manifestation of cognitive virtues
and can thus argue that knowledge has additional value due to its association with virtue.
However, not everyone agrees that knowledge actually has additional value over true belief. A
similar view is defended by Jonathan Kvanvig, who argues that the main epistemic value resides
not in knowledge but in understanding, which implies grasping how one's beliefs cohere with each
other.[110][109][114]
Philosophical skepticism
Philosophical skepticism in its strongest form, also referred to as global skepticism, is the thesis
that humans lack any form of knowledge or that knowledge is impossible. Very few philosophers
have explicitly defended this position. However, it has been influential nonetheless, usually in a
negative sense: many scholars see it as a serious challenge to any epistemological theory and often
try to show how their preferred theory overcomes it.[4][5][11]

For example, it is commonly accepted that perceptual
experience is a source of knowledge. However, according to the
dream argument, this is not the case since dreaming provides
unreliable information and since the agent could be dreaming
without knowing it. Because of this inability to discriminate
between dream and perception, it is argued that there is no
perceptual knowledge.[4][5][6] A similar often cited thought
experiment assumes that the agent is actually a brain in a vat
that is just fed electrical stimuli. Such a brain would have the
false impression of having a body and interacting with the
external world. The basic argument is the same: since the agent
is unable to tell the difference, they do not know that they have
a body responsible for reliable perceptions.[11]
One issue revealed through these thought experiments is the Pyrrho of Elis was one of the first
problem of underdetermination: that the evidence available is
philosophical skeptics.
not sufficient to make a rational decision between competing
theories. And if two contrary hypotheses explain the
appearances equally well, then the agent is not justified in believing one of those hypotheses rather
than the other. Based on this premise, the general skeptic has to argue that this is true for all our
knowledge, that there is always an alternative and very different explanation.[11] Another skeptic
argument is based on the idea that human cognition is fallible and therefore lacks absolute
certainty. More specific arguments target particular theories of knowledge, such as
foundationalism or coherentism, and try to show that their concept of knowledge is deeply
flawed.[4][11] An important argument against global skepticism is that it seems to contradict itself:
the claim that there is no knowledge appears to constitute a knowledge-claim itself.[6] Other
responses come from common sense philosophy and reject global skepticism based on the fact that
it contradicts many plausible ordinary beliefs. It is then argued against skepticism by seeing
common sense as more reliable than the abstract reasoning cited in favor of skepticism.[11][115]
Less radical forms of skepticism deny that knowledge exists within a specific area or discipline,
sometimes referred to as local or selective skepticism.[5][6][11] It is often motivated by the idea that
certain phenomena do not accurately represent their subject matter. They may thus lead to false
impressions concerning its nature. External world skeptics hold that one can only know about
one's own sensory impressions and experiences but not about the external world. This is based on
the idea that beliefs about the external world are mediated through the senses. The senses are
faulty at times and may thus show things that are not really there. This problem is avoided on the
level of sensory impressions, which are given to the experiencer directly without an intermediary.
In this sense, the person may be wrong about seeing a red Ferrari in the street since it might have
been a Maserati or a mere light reflection. But they cannot be wrong about having a sensory
impression of the color red.[5][6][11]
The inverse path is taken by some materialists, who accept the existence of the external physical
world but deny the existence of the internal realm of mind and consciousness. One reason for
taking this position is the difficulty of explaining how the two realms can exist together.[14] Other
forms of local skepticism accept scientific knowledge but deny the possibility of moral knowledge,
for example, because there is no reliable way to empirically measure whether a moral claim is true
or false.[5]
The issue of the definition and standards of knowledge is central to the question of whether
skepticism in its different forms is true. If very high standards are used, for example, that
knowledge implies infallibility, then skepticism becomes more plausible. In this case, the skeptic
only has to show that no belief is absolutely certain; that while the actual belief is true, it could
have been false. However, the more these standards are weakened to how the term is used in
everyday language, the less plausible skepticism becomes.[6][116][11] For example, such a position is
defended in the pragmatist epistemology, which sees all beliefs and theories as fallible hypotheses
and holds that they may need to be revised as new evidence is acquired.[117][118][119]
In various disciplines
Formal epistemology
Formal epistemology studies knowledge using formal tools, such as mathematics and logic.[120] An
important issue in this field concerns the epistemic principles of knowledge. These are rules
governing how knowledge and related states behave and in what relations they stand to each other.
The transparency principle, also referred to as the luminosity of knowledge, is an often discussed
principle. It states that knowing something implies the second-order knowledge that one knows it.
This principle implies that if Heike knows that today is Monday, then she also knows that she
knows that today is Monday.[11][121][122] Other commonly discussed principles are the conjunction
principle, the closure principle, and the evidence transfer principle. For example, the conjunction
principle states that having two justified beliefs in two separate propositions implies that the agent
is also justified in believing the conjunction of these two propositions. In this regard, if Bob knows
that dogs are animals and he also knows that cats are animals, then he knows the conjunction of
these two propositions, i.e. he knows that dogs and cats are animals.[4]
Science
The scientific approach is usually regarded as an exemplary process for how to gain knowledge
about empirical facts.[123][124] Scientific knowledge includes mundane knowledge about easily
observable facts, for example, chemical knowledge that certain reactants become hot when mixed
together. But it also encompasses knowledge of less tangible issues, like claims about the behavior
of genes, neutrinos, and black holes.[125]
A key aspect of most forms of science is that they seek natural laws that explain empirical
observations.[123][124] Scientific knowledge is discovered and tested using the scientific method.
This method aims to arrive at reliable knowledge by formulating the problem in a clear way and by
ensuring that the evidence used to support or refute a specific theory is public, reliable, and
replicable. This way, other researchers can repeat the experiments and observations in the initial
study to confirm or disconfirm it.[126] The scientific method is often analyzed as a series of steps.
According to some formulations, it begins with regular observation and data collection. Based on
these insights, the scientists then try to find a hypothesis that explains the observations. The
hypothesis is then tested using a controlled experiment to compare whether predictions based on
the hypothesis match the actual results. As a last step, the results are interpreted and a conclusion
is reached whether and to what degree the findings confirm or disconfirm the
hypothesis.[127][128][129]
The progress of scientific knowledge is traditionally seen as a gradual and continuous process in
which the existing body of knowledge is increased in each step. However, this view has been
challenged by some philosophers of science, such as Thomas Kuhn. He holds that between phases
of incremental progress, there are so-called scientific revolutions in which a paradigm shift occurs.
According to this view, some basic assumptions are changed due to the paradigm shift. This results
in a radically new perspective on the body of scientific knowledge that is incommensurable with
the previous outlook.[130][131]
Religion
Knowledge plays a central role in many religions. Knowledge claims about the existence of God or
religious doctrines about how each one should live their lives are found in almost every
culture.[132] However, such knowledge claims are often controversial and are commonly rejected
by religious skeptics and atheists.[133] The epistemology of religion is the field of inquiry studying
whether belief in God and in other religious doctrines is rational and amounts to
knowledge.[132][134] One important view in this field is evidentialism. It states that belief in
religious doctrines is justified if it is supported by sufficient evidence. Suggested examples of
evidence for religious doctrines include religious experiences such as direct contact with the divine
or inner testimony as when hearing God's voice.[132][134][135] However, evidentialists often reject
that belief in religious doctrines amount to knowledge based on the claim that there is not
sufficient evidence.[132][134] A famous saying in this regard is due to Bertrand Russell. When asked
how he would justify his lack of belief in God when facing his judgment after death, he replied "Not
enough evidence, God! Not enough evidence."[132]
However, religious teachings about the existence and nature of God are not always seen as
knowledge claims by their defenders. Some explicitly state that the proper attitude towards such
doctrines is not knowledge but faith. This is often combined with the assumption that these
doctrines are true but cannot be fully understood by reason or verified through rational inquiry.
For this reason, it is claimed that one should accept them even though they do not amount to
knowledge.[133] Such a view is reflected in a famous saying by Immanuel Kant where he claims
that he "had to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith."[136]
Distinct religions often differ from each other concerning the doctrines they proclaim as well as
their understanding of the role of knowledge in religious practice.[137][138] In both the Jewish and
the Christian tradition, knowledge plays a role in the fall of man in which Adam and Eve were
expelled from the Garden of Eden. Responsible for this fall was that they ignored God's command
and ate from the tree of knowledge, which gave them the knowledge of good and evil. This is seen
as a rebellion against God since this knowledge belongs to God and it is not for humans to decide
what is right or wrong.[139][140][141] In the Christian literature, knowledge is seen as one of the
seven gifts of the Holy Spirit.[142] In Islam, "the Knowing" (al-ʿAlīm) is one of the 99 names
reflecting distinct attributes of God. The Qur'an asserts that knowledge comes from God and the
acquisition of knowledge is encouraged in the teachings of Muhammad.[143][144]
In Buddhism, knowledge that leads to liberation is called vijjā. It contrasts with avijjā or
ignorance, which is understood as the root of all suffering. This is often explained in relation to the
claim that humans suffer because they crave things that are impermanent. The ignorance of the
impermanent nature of things is seen as the factor responsible for this craving.[145][146][147] The
central goal of Buddhist practice is to stop suffering. This aim is to be achieved by understanding
and practicing the teaching known as the Four Noble Truths and thereby overcoming
ignorance.[146][147] Knowledge plays a key role in the classical path of Hinduism known as jñāna
yoga or "path of knowledge". Its aim is to achieve oneness with the divine by fostering an
understanding of the self and its relation to Brahman or ultimate reality.[148][149]
Anthropology
The anthropology of knowledge is a multi-disciplinary field of

inquiry.[150][151] It studies how knowledge is acquired, stored,
retrieved, and communicated.[152] Special interest is given to
how knowledge is reproduced and undergoes changes in
relation to social and cultural circumstances.[150] In this
context, the term knowledge is used in a very broad sense,
roughly equivalent to terms like understanding and
culture.[150][153] This means that the forms and reproduction of
understanding are studied irrespective of their truth value. In
epistemology, on the other hand, knowledge is usually
restricted to forms of true belief. The main focus in
anthropology is on empirical observations of how people
ascribe truth values to meaning contents, like when affirming
an assertion, even if these contents are false.[150] But it also
includes practical components: knowledge is what is employed
when interpreting and acting on the world and involves diverse
phenomena, such as feelings, embodied skills, information, and Saraswati is the goddess of
concepts. It is used to understand and anticipate events in knowledge and the arts in
order to prepare and react accordingly.[153] Hinduism.
The reproduction of knowledge and its changes often happen

through some form of communication.[150][152] This includes face-to-face discussions and online
communications as well as seminars and rituals. An important role in this context falls to
institutions, like university departments or scientific journals in the academic context.[150] A
tradition or traditional knowledge may be defined as knowledge that has been reproduced within a
society or geographic region over several generations. However, societies also respond to external
influences, such as other societies. The knowledge claims found in them are interpreted and
incorporated in a modified form.[150][153][154]
People belonging to the same social group usually understand things and organize knowledge in
similar ways to one another. In this regard, social identities play a significant role: people who
associate themselves with similar identities, like age-influenced, professional, religious, and ethnic
identities, tend to embody similar forms of knowledge. Such identities concern both how a person
sees themselves, for example, in terms of the ideals they pursue, as well as how other people see
them, such as the expectations they have toward the person.[150][155]
Sociology
The sociology of knowledge is closely related to the anthropology of knowledge.[156][153][157] It is

the subfield of sociology that studies how thought and society are related to each other. In it, the
term "knowledge" is understood in a very wide sense that encompasses many types of mental
products. It includes philosophical and political ideas as well as religious and ideological doctrines
and can also be applied to folklore, law, and technology. In this regard, knowledge is sometimes
treated as a synonym for culture. The sociology of knowledge studies in what sociohistorical
circumstances knowledge arises and on what existential conditions it depends. The examined
conditions can include physical, demographic, economic, and sociocultural factors. The sociology
of knowledge differs from most forms of epistemology since its main focus is on the question of
how ideas originate and what consequences they have. In this regard, it does not ask whether the
ideas are coherent or correct. An example of a theory in this field is due to Karl Marx, who claims
that the dominant ideology in a society is a product of and changes with the underlying
socioeconomic conditions.[158][159][160] A related view is found in forms of decolonial scholarship

that claim that colonial powers are responsible for the hegemony of western knowledge systems.
They seek a decolonization of knowledge to undermine this hegemony.[161][162]
Artificial intelligence
Knowledge representation and reasoning (KRR, KR&R, KR²) is the field of artificial intelligence
(AI) dedicated to representing information about the world in a form that a computer system can
use to solve complex tasks such as diagnosing a medical condition or having a dialog in a natural
language. Knowledge representation incorporates findings from psychology[163] about how
humans solve problems and represent knowledge in order to design formalisms that will make
complex systems easier to design and build. Knowledge representation and reasoning also
incorporates findings from logic to automate various kinds of reasoning, such as the application of
rules or the relations of sets and subsets.
Examples of knowledge representation formalisms include semantic nets, systems architecture,

frames, rules, and ontologies. Examples of automated reasoning engines include inference
engines, theorem provers, and classifiers.
See also
Epistemic modal logic – subfield of modal logic that is concerned with reasoning about
knowledge
General knowledge – Type of information
Inductive inference – Method of logical reasoning
Inductive probability – Determining the probability of future events based on past events
Intelligence – Ability to perceive, infer, retain or apply information
Knowledge falsification – Deliberate misrepresentation of knowledge
Knowledge transfer – Sharing knowledge for problem solving
Omniscience – Capacity to know everything
Outline of human intelligence – Overview of and topical guide to human intelligence
Outline of knowledge – Overview of and topical guide to knowledge
References
Notes
a. A defeater of a belief is evidence that this belief is false.[48]
Citations
1. Ichikawa & Steup 2018.
2. Bolisani & Bratianu 2018, p. 1–22 (https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-60657-
6_1), The Elusive Definition of Knowledge.
3. OD staff 2010.
4. Klein 1998, Knowledge, concept of.
5. Hetherington 2022a.
6. Stroll 2023.
7. Stanley & Willlamson 2001, p. 411–444 (https://philpapers.org/rec/WILKHV).

8. Zagzebski 1999, p. 92.
9. Zagzebski 1999, p. 92, 96–7.
10. Zagzebski 1999, p. 109.
11. Steup & Neta 2020.
12. Zagzebski 1999, p. 99.
13. Hannon 2021, Knowledge, concept of.
14. Lehrer 2015, 1. The Analysis of Knowledge (https://books.google.com/books?id=yKG9CgAAQ
BAJ&pg=PA1).
15. Zagzebski 1999, p. 96.
16. Gupta 2021.
17. Zagzebski 1999, p. 99–100.
18. Silva 2019, p. 723–746.
19. Crumley 2016, p. 51–52, What do you know? Look at the artifacts.
20. Allen 2005, p. 1199–1204, Knowledge.
21. Pritchard 2013, 3 Defining knowledge (https://books.google.com/books?id=sfUhAQAAQBAJ).
22. McCain 2022.
23. Fumerton 2008, p. 34–52 (https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195
183214.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780195183214-e-3), The Problem of the Criterion.
24. García-Arnaldos 2020, p. 508 (https://brill.com/view/journals/hpla/23/2/article-p507_11.xml).
25. O'Brien 2016, Part I Chapter 7: Family resemblance (https://books.google.com/books?id=UVK
9DQAAQBAJ).
26. Black 2002, p. 23–32 (https://www.pdcnet.org/swphilreview/content/swphilreview_2002_0018_
0001_0023_0032).
27. Klausen 2015, p. 813–839 (https://portal.findresearcher.sdu.dk/da/publications/bbee5873-28f2-
46d5-94b6-49ef5b18a38b).
28. Lackey 2021.
29. AHD staff 2022a.
30. Magee & Popper 1971, p. 74–75 (https://archive.org/details/modernbritishphi0000mage/page/7
4), Conversation with Karl Popper.
31. AHD staff 2022b.
32. Walton 2005, p. 59–69 [59, 64].
33. Crotty 2022, p. 16 (https://books.google.com/books?id=LsSVEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA16).
34. Peels & Blaauw 2016, p. 25 (https://books.google.com/books?id=69t7DQAAQBAJ&pg=PA25).
35. AHD staff 2022.
36. Truncellito 2023.
37. Moser 2005, p. 3 (https://books.google.com/books?id=5NJjAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA3).
38. Parikh & Renero 2017, p. 93–102 (https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-53280-
6_4), Justified True Belief: Plato, Gettier, and Turing.
39. Chappell 2019.
40. Zagzebski 1999, p. 93.
41. Zagzebski 1999, p. 100.
42. Hetherington 2022.
43. Rodríguez 2018, p. 29–54.
44. Goldman 1976, p. 771–791.
45. Sudduth 2022.
46. Durán & Formanek 2018, p. 645–666.
47. Comesaña 2005, p. 367–383 (https://www.jstor.org/stable/40040862).

48. McCain, Stapleford & Steup 2021, p. 111 (https://books.google.com/books?id=IeNBEAAAQBA
J&pg=PT111).
49. Zagzebski 1999, p. 101.
50. Kraft 2012, p. 49–70 (https://philpapers.org/rec/KRASIF).
51. Zagzebski 1999, p. 103–4.
52. Sidelle 2001, p. 163–179 (https://philpapers.org/rec/SIDAAT).
53. Kirkham 1984, p. 501–513.
54. Zagzebski 1999, p. 93–4, 104–5.
55. Ronald 1990, p. 40 (https://books.google.com/books?id=eTjlAAAAQBAJ&pg=PA40).
56. Lilley, Lightfoot & Amaral 2004, p. 162–163 (https://books.google.com/books?id=HT8VDAAAQ
BAJ&pg=PA162).
57. Pritchard 2013, 1 Some preliminaries (https://books.google.com/books?id=sfUhAQAAQBAJ).
58. Bartlett 2018, p. 1–17 (https://philpapers.org/rec/BAROS-4).
59. Schwitzgebel 2021.
60. Gascoigne & Thornton 2014, p. 8, 37, 81, 108 (https://books.google.com/books?id=IVlsBAAA
QBAJ&pg=PA8).
61. Hill 2009, Knowledge–Based View Of The Firm (https://www.encyclopedia.com/management/e
ncyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/knowledge-based-view-firm).
62. Hasan & Fumerton 2020.
63. DePoe 2022.
64. Baehr 2022.
65. Russell 2020.
66. EB staff 2017.
67. Moser 2016.
68. EB staff 2020.
69. Woolf 2013, p. 171–216 (https://academic.oup.com/mind/article/122/485/171/961176).
70. Gertler 2021.
71. Gertler 2010, p. 1, 1. Introduction.
72. McGeer 2001, p. 13837–13841.
73. Gertler 2021a.
74. Morin & Racy 2021, p. 373–374, 15. Dynamic self-processes – Self-knowledge.
75. Kernis 2013, p. 209 (https://books.google.com/books?id=r0gahbOYsU4C&pg=PA209).
76. APA staff 2022.
77. Hunter 2009, p. 151–153 (https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9780230244481_23),
Situated Knowledge.
78. Haraway 1988, p. 575–599 (https://philpapers.org/rec/HARSKT).
79. Thompson 2001, p. 14129–14133, Situated Knowledge: Feminist and Science and Technology
Studies Perspectives.
80. Thakchoe 2022.
81. The Hindu staff 2018.
82. Mishra 2021, p. 52 (https://books.google.com/books?id=v8s7EAAAQBAJ&pg=PA52).
83. Ghose 1998, Political Writings and Speeches. 1890–1908: The Glory of God in Man (https://inc
arnateword.in/cwsa/7/the-glory-of-god-in-man).
84. Paul Williams 2008, p. 68–69 (https://books.google.com/books?id=GMN-AgAAQBAJ).
85. Christopher W. Gowans 2014, p. 69–70 (https://books.google.com/books?id=yW4KBAAAQBA
J&pg=PT69).
86. Halpern, Joseph Y.; Moses, Yoram (1 July 1990). "Knowledge and common knowledge in a
distributed environment" (https://doi.org/10.1145/79147.79161). Journal of the ACM. 37 (3):
549–587. arXiv:cs/0006009 (https://arxiv.org/abs/cs/0006009). doi:10.1145/79147.79161 (http
s://doi.org/10.1145%2F79147.79161). ISSN 0004-5411 (https://www.worldcat.org/issn/0004-54
11). S2CID 52151232 (https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:52151232).
87. Geanakoplos, John (1 November 1992). "Common Knowledge" (https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/1
0.1257/jep.6.4.53). Journal of Economic Perspectives. 6 (4): 53–82. doi:10.1257/jep.6.4.53 (htt
ps://doi.org/10.1257%2Fjep.6.4.53). ISSN 0895-3309 (https://www.worldcat.org/issn/0895-330
9).
88. Shi, Ling (2011). "Common Knowledge, Learning, and Citation Practices in University Writing"
(https://www.jstor.org/stable/40997768). Research in the Teaching of English. 45 (3): 308–334.
ISSN 0034-527X (https://www.worldcat.org/issn/0034-527X). JSTOR 40997768 (https://www.js
tor.org/stable/40997768).
89. Evans, J. A.; Foster, J. G. (11 February 2011). "Metaknowledge" (https://www.science.org/doi/1
0.1126/science.1201765). Science. 331 (6018): 721–725. doi:10.1126/science.1201765 (http
s://doi.org/10.1126%2Fscience.1201765). ISSN 0036-8075 (https://www.worldcat.org/issn/003
6-8075).
90. Mark Burgin (27 October 2016). Theory Of Knowledge: Structures And Processes (https://book
s.google.com/books?id=FmptDQAAQBAJ&pg=PA165). World Scientific. p. 165. ISBN 978-
981-4522-69-4.
91. Pedersen, Nikolaj Jl Linding, and Christoph Kelp. "Second-Order Knowledge." The Routledge
Companion to Epistemology. Routledge, 2010. 586-596.
92. Kern 2017, p. 8–10, 133 (https://books.google.com/books?id=eyh5DQAAQBAJ&pg=PA8).
93. O’Brien 2022.
94. Audi 2002, p. 71–94 (https://philpapers.org/rec/AUDTSO-3), The Sources of Knowledge.
95. Gardiner 2001, p. 1351–1361.
96. Michaelian & Sutton 2017.
97. Markie & Folescu 2021.
98. Leonard 2021.
99. Green 2022.
100. Hasan & Fumerton 2018.
101. Fumerton 2022.
102. Cameron 2018.
103. Clark 1988, p. 369–380 (https://philpapers.org/rec/CLAVIR).
104. Murphy 2022.
105. Lammenranta 2022.
106. Schafer 2014, p. 375.
107. Degenhardt 2019, p. 1–6 (https://books.google.com/books?id=FuCsDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA1).
108. Pritchard 2013, 2 The value of knowledge (https://books.google.com/books?id=sfUhAQAAQB
AJ).
109. Olsson 2011, p. 874–883.
110. Pritchard, Turri & Carter 2022.
111. Plato 2002, p. 89–90, 97b–98a (https://archive.org/details/fivedialogueseut00plat/page/89).
112. Pritchard 2007, p. 85–110.
113. Turri, Alfano & Greco 2021.
114. Kvanvig 2003, p. 200 (https://books.google.com/books?id=ILTIEjvbeLoC).
115. Lycan 2019, p. 21–36 (https://books.google.com/books?id=cfeEDwAAQBAJ), 2. Moore against
the New Skeptics.
116. Zagzebski 1999, p. 97–8.
117. McDermid 2023.

118. Misak 2002, p. 53 (https://books.google.com/books?id=S6WHAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA53).
119. Hamner 2003, p. 87 (https://books.google.com/books?id=Uno8DwAAQBAJ&pg=PA87).
120. Weisberg 2021.
121. Das & Salow 2018, p. 3–23 (https://philpapers.org/rec/DASTAT-2).
122. Dokic & Égré 2009, p. 1–20 (https://philpapers.org/rec/DOKMFE-2).
123. Pritchard 2013, p. 115–118 (https://books.google.com/books?id=sfUhAQAAQBAJ), 11
Scientific knowledge.
124. Moser 2005, p. 385, 13. Scientific Knowledge.
125. Moser 2005, p. 386, 13. Scientific Knowledge.
126. Moser 2005, p. 390, 13. Scientific Knowledge
Hatfield 1996, Scientific method (https://philpapers.org/rec/BEAREO)
EB staff 2023
Hepburn & Andersen 2021
127. EB staff 2023.
128. Hatfield 1996, Scientific method (https://philpapers.org/rec/BEAREO).
129. Hepburn & Andersen 2021.
130. Pritchard 2013, p. 123–125 (https://books.google.com/books?id=sfUhAQAAQBAJ), 11
Scientific knowledge.
131. Niiniluoto 2019.
132. Clark 2022.
133. Penelhum 1971, 1. Faith, Scepticism and Philosophy (https://books.google.com/books?id=QQ
U9AAAAIAAJ).
134. Forrest 2021.
135. Dougherty 2014, p. 97–123.
136. Stevenson 2003, p. 72–101 (https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/kantian-review/article/ab
s/opinion-belief-or-faith-and-knowledge/9519081ED9BAE7811D2B9670340AD7E1).
137. Paden 2009, p. 239–256 (https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9780203868768
-19/comparative-religion-william-paden), Comparative religion.
138. Bouquet 1962, p. 1 (https://books.google.com/books?id=zQ49AAAAIAAJ&pg=PA1).
139. Carson & Cerrito 2003, p. 164.
140. Delahunty & Dignen 2012, p. 365, Tree of knowledge.
141. Blayney 1769, Genesis (https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Bible_(King_James)/Genesis#3:22).
142. Vost 2016, p. 75–76 (https://books.google.com/books?id=pdaiDQAAQBAJ&pg=PA75).
143. Campo 2009, p. 515 (https://books.google.com/books?id=OZbyz_Hr-eIC&pg=PA515).
144. Swartley 2005, p. 63 (https://books.google.com/books?id=gLi2X1rzeZIC&pg=PA63).
145. Burton 2002, p. 326–345 (https://www.jstor.org/stable/1400322).
146. Chaudhary 2017, p. 202–203, Avijjā).
147. Chaudhary 2017, p. 1373–1374, Wisdom (Buddhism).
148. Jones & Ryan 2006, jnana (https://books.google.com/books?id=OgMmceadQ3gC).
149. Jones & Ryan 2006, Bhagavad Gita (https://books.google.com/books?id=OgMmceadQ3gC).
150. Allwood 2013, p. 69–72 (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/9781118339893.wbecc
p025), Anthropology of Knowledge.
151. Boyer 2007, 1. Of Dialectical Germans and Dialectical Ethnographers: Notes from an
Engagement with Philosophy.
152. Cohen 2010, p. S193–S202 (https://www.jstor.org/stable/40606072).

153. Barth 2002, p. 1–18.
154. Kuruk 2020, p. 25 (https://books.google.com/books?id=ia7ZDwAAQBAJ&pg=PT25).
155. Hansen 1982, p. 193.
156. Boyer 2005, p. 34 (https://books.google.com/books?id=j67InfxRfLsC&pg=PA34).
157. Aspen 2001, p. 5 (https://books.google.com/books?id=rTTglmNKY0UC&pg=PA5).
158. Coser 1968, Knowledge, Sociology of (https://www.encyclopedia.com/social-sciences-and-law/
sociology-and-social-reform/sociology-general-terms-and-concepts/sociology-knowledge).
159. Tufari 2003, Knowledge, Sociology of (https://books.google.com/books?id=4C0KAQAAMAAJ).
160. Scheler & Stikkers 2012, p. 23 (https://books.google.com/books?id=pFqrO7Lxiw4C&pg=PA2
3).
161. Lee 2017, p. 67 (https://books.google.com/books?id=ZtArDwAAQBAJ&pg=PT67).
162. Dreyer 2017, p. 1–7.
163. Schank, Roger; Abelson, Robert (1977). Scripts, Plans, Goals, and Understanding: An Inquiry
Into Human Knowledge Structures. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
Sources
AHD staff (2022). "The American Heritage Dictionary entry: ignorance" (https://www.ahdictiona
ry.com/word/search.html?q=ignorance&submit.x=58&submit.y=14). www.ahdictionary.com.
HarperCollins. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20230307140404/https://www.ahdictionar
y.com/word/search.html?q=ignorance&submit.x=58&submit.y=14) from the original on 7 March
2023. Retrieved 7 March 2023.
AHD staff (2022a). "The American Heritage Dictionary entry: knowledge" (https://www.ahdictio
nary.com/word/search.html?q=knowledge). www.ahdictionary.com. HarperCollins. Archived (htt
ps://web.archive.org/web/20221129072236/https://www.ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=
knowledge) from the original on 29 November 2022. Retrieved 25 October 2022.
AHD staff (2022b). "The American Heritage Dictionary entry: knowledge base" (https://www.ah
dictionary.com/word/search.html?q=knowledge+base). www.ahdictionary.com. HarperCollins.
Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20220319181514/https://ahdictionary.com/word/search.
html?q=knowledge+base) from the original on 19 March 2022. Retrieved 25 October 2022.
Allen, Barry (2005). "Knowledge" (https://web.archive.org/web/20170822095315/https://www.e
ncyclopedia.com/science-and-technology/computers-and-electrical-engineering/computers-an
d-computing/knowledge). In Horowitz, Maryanne Cline (ed.). New Dictionary of the History of
Ideas. Vol. 3. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. pp. 1199–1204. ISBN 978-0-684-31377-1.
OCLC 55800981 (https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/55800981). Archived from the original (https://
www.encyclopedia.com/science-and-technology/computers-and-electrical-engineering/comput
ers-and-computing/knowledge) on 22 August 2017.
Allwood, Carl Martin (2013). "Anthropology of Knowledge". The Encyclopedia of Cross-Cultural
Psychology (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/9781118339893.wbeccp025). John
Wiley & Sons, Inc. pp. 69–72. doi:10.1002/9781118339893.wbeccp025 (https://doi.org/10.100
2%2F9781118339893.wbeccp025). ISBN 978-1-118-33989-3. Archived (https://web.archive.or
g/web/20220926085332/https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/9781118339893.wbecc
p025) from the original on 26 September 2022. Retrieved 26 September 2022.
APA staff (2022). "APA Dictionary of Psychology: situated knowledge" (https://dictionary.apa.or
g/situated-knowledge). Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20220920171203/https://dictiona
ry.apa.org/situated-knowledge) from the original on 20 September 2022. Retrieved
18 September 2022.
Aspen, Harald (2001). Amhara Traditions of Knowledge: Spirit Mediums and Their Clients (http
s://books.google.com/books?id=rTTglmNKY0UC&pg=PA5). Otto Harrassowitz Verlag. p. 5.
ISBN 978-3-447-04410-3. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20230307092452/https://book
s.google.com/books?id=rTTglmNKY0UC&pg=PA5) from the original on 7 March 2023.

Retrieved 7 March 2023.
Audi, Robert (2002). "The Sources of Knowledge". The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology (htt
ps://philpapers.org/rec/AUDTSO-3). Oxford University Press. pp. 71–94. ISBN 978-0-19-
513005-8. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20220612112116/https://philpapers.org/rec/A
UDTSO-3) from the original on 12 June 2022. Retrieved 12 June 2022.
Baehr, Jason S. (2022). "A Priori and A Posteriori" (https://iep.utm.edu/apriori/). Internet
Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20191004061905/https://w
ww.iep.utm.edu/apriori/) from the original on 4 October 2019. Retrieved 17 September 2022.
Barth, Fredrik (February 2002). "An Anthropology of Knowledge". Current Anthropology. 43 (1):
1–18. doi:10.1086/324131 (https://doi.org/10.1086%2F324131). hdl:1956/4191 (https://hdl.han
dle.net/1956%2F4191). ISSN 0011-3204 (https://www.worldcat.org/issn/0011-3204).
Bartlett, Gary (2018). "Occurrent States" (https://philpapers.org/rec/BAROS-4). Canadian
Journal of Philosophy. 48 (1): 1–17. doi:10.1080/00455091.2017.1323531 (https://doi.org/10.1
080%2F00455091.2017.1323531). S2CID 220316213 (https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusI
D:220316213). Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20210504181849/https://philpapers.org/r
ec/BAROS-4) from the original on 4 May 2021. Retrieved 3 April 2021.
Black, Tim (1 April 2002). "Relevant alternatives and the shifting standards of knowledge" (http
s://www.pdcnet.org/swphilreview/content/swphilreview_2002_0018_0001_0023_0032).
Southwest Philosophy Review. 18 (1): 23–32. doi:10.5840/swphilreview20021813 (https://doi.o
rg/10.5840%2Fswphilreview20021813). Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/202206022151
08/https://www.pdcnet.org/swphilreview/content/swphilreview_2002_0018_0001_0023_0032)
from the original on 2 June 2022. Retrieved 12 June 2022.
Blayney, Benjamin, ed. (1769). "Genesis". The King James Bible (https://en.wikisource.org/wik
i/Bible_(King_James)/Genesis#3:22). Oxford University Press. Archived (https://web.archive.or
g/web/20230130092757/https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Bible_(King_James)/Genesis#3:22)
from the original on 30 January 2023. Retrieved 30 January 2023.
Bolisani, Ettore; Bratianu, Constantin (2018). "The Elusive Definition of Knowledge". Emergent
Knowledge Strategies: Strategic Thinking in Knowledge Management (https://link.springer.co
m/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-60657-6_1). Springer International Publishing. pp. 1–22.
doi:10.1007/978-3-319-60657-6_1 (https://doi.org/10.1007%2F978-3-319-60657-6_1).
ISBN 978-3-319-60657-6. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20220602105801/https://link.
springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-60657-6_1) from the original on 2 June 2022.
Retrieved 12 June 2022.
Bouquet, Alan Coates (1962). Comparative Religion: A Short Outline (https://books.google.co
m/books?id=zQ49AAAAIAAJ&pg=PA1). CUP Archive. p. 1.
Boyer, Dominic (2007). "1. Of Dialectical Germans and Dialectical Ethnographers: Notes from
an Engagement with Philosophy" (https://books.google.com/books?id=JF1X-WEtDFgC&pg=P
A27). In Harris, Mark (ed.). Ways of Knowing: Anthropological Approaches to Crafting
Experience and Knowledge. Berghahn Books. ISBN 978-1-84545-364-0.
Boyer, Dominic (2005). Spirit and System: Media, Intellectuals, and the Dialectic in Modern
German Culture (https://books.google.com/books?id=j67InfxRfLsC&pg=PA34). University of
Chicago Press. p. 34. ISBN 978-0-226-06891-6. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/202303
07092453/https://books.google.com/books?id=j67InfxRfLsC&pg=PA34) from the original on 7
March 2023. Retrieved 7 March 2023.
Burton, David (2002). "Knowledge and Liberation: Philosophical Ruminations on a Buddhist
Conundrum" (https://www.jstor.org/stable/1400322). Philosophy East and West. 52 (3): 326–
345. doi:10.1353/pew.2002.0011 (https://doi.org/10.1353%2Fpew.2002.0011). ISSN 0031-
8221 (https://www.worldcat.org/issn/0031-8221). JSTOR 1400322 (https://www.jstor.org/stable/
1400322). S2CID 145257341 (https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:145257341). Archived
(https://web.archive.org/web/20230217131701/https://www.jstor.org/stable/1400322) from the
original on 17 February 2023. Retrieved 17 February 2023.
Cameron, Ross (2018). "Infinite Regress Arguments" (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/infinite-

regress/). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford
University. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20200102233254/https://plato.stanford.edu/e
ntries/infinite-regress/) from the original on 2 January 2020. Retrieved 12 June 2022.
Campo, Juan Eduardo (2009). Encyclopedia of Islam (https://books.google.com/books?id=OZ
byz_Hr-eIC&pg=PA515). Infobase Publishing. p. 515. ISBN 978-1-4381-2696-8. Archived (http
s://web.archive.org/web/20230304103828/https://books.google.com/books?id=OZbyz_Hr-eIC&
pg=PA515) from the original on 4 March 2023. Retrieved 4 March 2023.
Carson, Thomas; Cerrito, Joann, eds. (2003). New Catholic encyclopedia Vol. 14: Thi–Zwi
(2nd ed.). Detroit: Thomson/Gale. p. 164. ISBN 978-0-7876-4018-7.
Chappell, Sophie-Grace (2019). "Plato on Knowledge in the Theaetetus" (https://plato.stanford.
edu/entries/plato-theaetetus/). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research
Lab, Stanford University. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20220710154406/https://plato.
stanford.edu/entries/plato-theaetetus/) from the original on 10 July 2022. Retrieved 12 June
2022.
Chaudhary, Angraj (2017). Sarao, K.T.S.; Long, Jeffery D. (eds.). Buddhism and Jainism.
Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Springer Nature. ISBN 978-94-024-0851-5.
Christopher W. Gowans (2014). Buddhist Moral Philosophy: An Introduction (https://books.goo
gle.com/books?id=yW4KBAAAQBAJ&pg=PT69). Routledge. pp. 69–70. ISBN 978-1-317-
65934-1. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20211112122117/https://books.google.com/boo
ks?id=yW4KBAAAQBAJ&pg=PT69) from the original on 12 November 2021. Retrieved
12 June 2022.
Clark, Kelly James (2022). "Religious Epistemology" (https://iep.utm.edu/relig-ep/). Internet
Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20220921184650/https://ie
p.utm.edu/relig-ep/) from the original on 21 September 2022. Retrieved 21 September 2022.
Clark, Romane (1988). "Vicious Infinite Regress Arguments" (https://philpapers.org/rec/CLAVI
R). Philosophical Perspectives. 2: 369–380. doi:10.2307/2214081 (https://doi.org/10.2307%2F
2214081). JSTOR 2214081 (https://www.jstor.org/stable/2214081). Archived (https://web.archi
ve.org/web/20220326133203/https://philpapers.org/rec/CLAVIR) from the original on 26 March
2022. Retrieved 12 June 2022.
Cohen, Emma (2010). "Anthropology of knowledge" (https://www.jstor.org/stable/40606072).
The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute. 16: S193–S202. doi:10.1111/j.1467-
9655.2010.01617.x (https://doi.org/10.1111%2Fj.1467-9655.2010.01617.x). hdl:11858/00-
001M-0000-0012-9B72-7 (https://hdl.handle.net/11858%2F00-001M-0000-0012-9B72-7).
JSTOR 40606072 (https://www.jstor.org/stable/40606072). Archived (https://web.archive.org/w
eb/20220926085332/https://www.jstor.org/stable/40606072) from the original on 26 September
2022. Retrieved 26 September 2022.
Comesaña, Juan (2005). "Justified vs. Warranted Perceptual Belief: Resisting Disjunctivism" (h
ttps://www.jstor.org/stable/40040862). Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 71 (2):
367–383. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2005.tb00453.x (https://doi.org/10.1111%2Fj.1933-1592.200
5.tb00453.x). ISSN 0031-8205 (https://www.worldcat.org/issn/0031-8205). JSTOR 40040862
(https://www.jstor.org/stable/40040862). Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/202206021057
50/https://www.jstor.org/stable/40040862) from the original on 2 June 2022. Retrieved 12 June
2022.
Coser, Lewis A. (1968). "Knowledge, Sociology of". International Encyclopedia of the Social
Sciences (https://www.encyclopedia.com/social-sciences-and-law/sociology-and-social-reform/
sociology-general-terms-and-concepts/sociology-knowledge). Gale. ISBN 978-0-02-928751-4.
Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20230307092450/https://www.encyclopedia.com/social-
sciences-and-law/sociology-and-social-reform/sociology-general-terms-and-concepts/sociolog
y-knowledge) from the original on 7 March 2023. Retrieved 7 March 2023.
Crotty, Kevin (2022). Ignorance, Irony, and Knowledge in Plato (https://books.google.com/book
s?id=LsSVEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA16). Rowman & Littlefield. p. 16. ISBN 978-1-6669-2712-2.
Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20230307140404/https://books.google.com/books?id=L
sSVEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA16) from the original on 7 March 2023. Retrieved 7 March 2023.
Crumley, Jack S. (2016). "What do you know? Look at the artifacts" (https://books.google.com/
books?id=RlCmDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA51). Introducing Philosophy: Knowledge and Reality.
Peterborough, Ontario, Canada: Broadview Press. pp. 51–52. ISBN 978-1-55481-129-8.
OCLC 950057343 (https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/950057343). Archived (https://web.archive.or
g/web/20220613024954/https://books.google.com/books?id=RlCmDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA51)
from the original on 13 June 2022. Retrieved 13 June 2022.
Das, Nilanjan; Salow, Bernhard (2018). "Transparency and the KK Principle" (https://philpaper
s.org/rec/DASTAT-2). Noûs. 52 (1): 3–23. doi:10.1111/nous.12158 (https://doi.org/10.1111%2F
nous.12158). Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20220612112741/https://philpapers.org/re
c/DASTAT-2) from the original on 12 June 2022. Retrieved 12 June 2022.
Degenhardt, M. A. B. (2019). Education and the Value of Knowledge (https://books.google.co
m/books?id=FuCsDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA1). Routledge. pp. 1–6. ISBN 978-1-000-62799-2.
Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20230405045326/https://books.google.com/books?id=F
uCsDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA1) from the original on 5 April 2023. Retrieved 9 March 2023.
Delahunty, Andrew; Dignen, Sheila (2012). "Tree of knowledge" (https://books.google.com/boo
ks?id=hX6rCuCLI2MC&pg=PA365). Oxford Dictionary of Reference and Allusion. OUP Oxford.
p. 365. ISBN 978-0-19-956746-1. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20230217161843/http
s://books.google.com/books?id=hX6rCuCLI2MC&pg=PA365) from the original on 17 February
2023. Retrieved 17 February 2023.
DePoe, John M. (2022). "Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description" (https://i
ep.utm.edu/knowacq/). Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Archived (https://web.archive.org/
web/20220602105753/https://iep.utm.edu/knowacq/) from the original on 2 June 2022.
Retrieved 28 May 2022.
Dokic, Jérôme; Égré, Paul (2009). "Margin for Error and the Transparency of Knowledge" (http
s://philpapers.org/rec/DOKMFE-2). Synthese. 166 (1): 1–20. doi:10.1007/s11229-007-9245-y
(https://doi.org/10.1007%2Fs11229-007-9245-y). S2CID 14221986 (https://api.semanticschola
r.org/CorpusID:14221986). Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20220612112738/https://phil
papers.org/rec/DOKMFE-2) from the original on 12 June 2022. Retrieved 12 June 2022.
Dougherty, Trent (12 June 2014). "Faith, Trust, and Testimony". Religious Faith and Intellectual
Virtue: 97–123. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672158.003.0005 (https://doi.org/10.1093%2F
acprof%3Aoso%2F9780199672158.003.0005). ISBN 978-0-19-967215-8.
Dreyer, Jaco S. (21 April 2017). "Practical theology and the call for the decolonisation of higher
education in South Africa: Reflections and proposals". HTS Teologiese Studies / Theological
Studies. 73 (4): 1–7. doi:10.4102/hts.v73i4.4805 (https://doi.org/10.4102%2Fhts.v73i4.4805).
Durán, Juan M.; Formanek, Nico (1 December 2018). "Grounds for Trust: Essential Epistemic
Opacity and Computational Reliabilism" (https://doi.org/10.1007%2Fs11023-018-9481-6).
Minds and Machines. 28 (4): 645–666. doi:10.1007/s11023-018-9481-6 (https://doi.org/10.100
7%2Fs11023-018-9481-6). ISSN 1572-8641 (https://www.worldcat.org/issn/1572-8641).
S2CID 53102940 (https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:53102940).
EB staff (2017). "a posteriori knowledge" (https://www.britannica.com/topic/a-posteriori-knowle
dge). www.britannica.com. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20220920173553/https://ww
w.britannica.com/topic/a-posteriori-knowledge) from the original on 20 September 2022.
Retrieved 17 September 2022.
EB staff (2020). "a priori knowledge" (https://www.britannica.com/topic/a-priori-knowledge).
www.britannica.com. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20220920171606/https://www.brita
nnica.com/topic/a-priori-knowledge) from the original on 20 September 2022. Retrieved
17 September 2022.
EB staff (2023). "scientific method" (https://www.britannica.com/science/scientific-method).
nnica.com/science/scientific-method) from the original on 12 July 2022. Retrieved 17 July
2022.
Forrest, Peter (2021). "The Epistemology of Religion" (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/religion

-epistemology/). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab,
Stanford University. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20220710182220/https://plato.stanf
ord.edu/entries/religion-epistemology/) from the original on 10 July 2022. Retrieved
21 September 2022.
Fumerton, Richard (2022). Foundationalism (https://www.cambridge.org/core/elements/abs/fou
ndationalism/1B82DBB2B5A167EBDD8170F0C5899D81). doi:10.1017/9781009028868 (http
s://doi.org/10.1017%2F9781009028868). ISBN 978-1-009-02886-8. Archived (https://web.archi
ve.org/web/20220612112214/https://www.cambridge.org/core/elements/abs/foundationalism/1
B82DBB2B5A167EBDD8170F0C5899D81) from the original on 12 June 2022. Retrieved
12 June 2022.
Fumerton, Richard (2008). "The Problem of the Criterion". The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism
(https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195183214.001.0001/oxfordh
b-9780195183214-e-3). pp. 34–52. doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195183214.003.0003 (https://do
i.org/10.1093%2Foxfordhb%2F9780195183214.003.0003). ISBN 978-0-19-518321-4.
Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20220602215110/https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/vie
w/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195183214.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780195183214-e-3) from the
original on 2 June 2022. Retrieved 12 June 2022.
García-Arnaldos, María Dolores (23 October 2020). "An Introduction to the Theory of
Knowledge, written by O'Brien, D." (https://brill.com/view/journals/hpla/23/2/article-p507_11.xm
l) History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis. 23 (2): 508. doi:10.30965/26664275-20210003 (htt
ps://doi.org/10.30965%2F26664275-20210003). ISSN 2666-4275 (https://www.worldcat.org/iss
n/2666-4275). S2CID 228985437 (https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:228985437).
Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20230304103826/https://brill.com/view/journals/hpla/23/
2/article-p507_11.xml) from the original on 4 March 2023. Retrieved 4 March 2023.
Gardiner, J. M. (29 September 2001). "Episodic memory and autonoetic consciousness: a first-
person approach" (https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1088519). Philosophical
Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological Sciences. 356 (1413): 1351–
1361. doi:10.1098/rstb.2001.0955 (https://doi.org/10.1098%2Frstb.2001.0955). ISSN 0962-
8436 (https://www.worldcat.org/issn/0962-8436). PMC 1088519 (https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
pmc/articles/PMC1088519). PMID 11571027 (https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/11571027).
Gascoigne, Neil; Thornton, Tim (2014). Tacit Knowledge (https://books.google.com/books?id=I
VlsBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA8). Routledge. pp. 8, 37, 81, 108. ISBN 978-1-317-54726-6. Archived (h
ttps://web.archive.org/web/20230306151834/https://books.google.com/books?id=IVlsBAAAQB
AJ&pg=PA8) from the original on 6 March 2023. Retrieved 6 March 2023.
Gertler, Brie (2010). "1. Introduction" (https://books.google.com/books?id=kfqsAgAAQBAJ&pg
=PT21). Self-Knowledge. Routledge. p. 1. ISBN 978-1-136-85811-6. Archived (https://web.arch
ive.org/web/20230408161413/https://books.google.com/books?id=kfqsAgAAQBAJ&pg=PT21)
from the original on 8 April 2023. Retrieved 24 October 2022.
Gertler, Brie (2021). "Self-Knowledge" (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/self-knowledge/). The
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.
Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20211111053236/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/self-k
nowledge/) from the original on 11 November 2021. Retrieved 22 October 2022.
Gertler, Brie (2021a). "Self-Knowledge > Knowledge of the Self" (https://plato.stanford.edu/entr
ies/self-knowledge/supplement.html). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Archived (https://w
eb.archive.org/web/20220703092637/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/self-knowledge/supple
ment.html) from the original on 3 July 2022. Retrieved 22 October 2022.
Ghose, Aurobindo (1998). "Political Writings and Speeches. 1890–1908: The Glory of God in
Man". Bande Mataram II (https://incarnateword.in/cwsa/7/the-glory-of-god-in-man). ISBN 978-
81-7058-416-2. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20230309124953/https://incarnateword.i
n/cwsa/7/the-glory-of-god-in-man) from the original on 9 March 2023. Retrieved 9 March 2023.
Goldman, Alvin I. (18 November 1976). "Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge". The
Journal of Philosophy. 73 (20): 771–791. doi:10.2307/2025679 (https://doi.org/10.2307%2F20
25679). JSTOR 2025679 (https://www.jstor.org/stable/2025679).

Green, Christopher R. (2022). "Epistemology of Testimony" (https://iep.utm.edu/ep-testi/).
Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20220307123956/
https://iep.utm.edu/ep-testi/) from the original on 7 March 2022. Retrieved 8 June 2022.
Gupta, Anil (2021). "Definitions: 1.1 Real and nominal definitions" (https://plato.stanford.edu/en
tries/definitions/#ReaNomDef). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research
Lab, Stanford University. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20220501014300/https://plato.
stanford.edu/entries/definitions/#ReaNomDef) from the original on 1 May 2022. Retrieved
28 May 2022.
Hamner, M. Gail (2003). American Pragmatism: A Religious Genealogy (https://books.google.c
om/books?id=Uno8DwAAQBAJ&pg=PA87). Oxford University Press. p. 87. ISBN 978-0-19-
515547-1. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20230307183338/https://books.google.com/b
ooks?id=Uno8DwAAQBAJ&pg=PA87) from the original on 7 March 2023. Retrieved 7 March
2023.
Hannon, Michael (2021). "Knowledge, concept of" (https://philpapers.org/rec/HANTCO-45).
Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. London; New York: Routledge.
doi:10.4324/9780415249126-P031-2 (https://doi.org/10.4324%2F9780415249126-P031-2).
ISBN 978-0-415-07310-3. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20220602215108/https://philp
apers.org/rec/HANTCO-45) from the original on 2 June 2022. Retrieved 12 June 2022.
Hansen, Judith Friedman (1982). "From Background to Foreground: Toward an Anthropology
of Learning" (https://doi.org/10.1525%2Faeq.1982.13.2.05x1833m). Anthropology & Education
Quarterly. 13 (2): 193. doi:10.1525/aeq.1982.13.2.05x1833m (https://doi.org/10.1525%2Faeq.
1982.13.2.05x1833m). ISSN 0161-7761 (https://www.worldcat.org/issn/0161-7761).
JSTOR 3216630 (https://www.jstor.org/stable/3216630).
Haraway, Donna (1988). "Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the
Privilege of Partial Perspective" (https://philpapers.org/rec/HARSKT). Feminist Studies. 14 (3):
575–599. doi:10.2307/3178066 (https://doi.org/10.2307%2F3178066). JSTOR 3178066 (http
s://www.jstor.org/stable/3178066). S2CID 39794636 (https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:
39794636). Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20220920172614/https://philpapers.org/rec/
HARSKT) from the original on 20 September 2022. Retrieved 19 September 2022.
Hasan, Ali; Fumerton, Richard (2018). "Foundationalist Theories of Epistemic Justification" (htt
ps://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justep-foundational/). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/201908
05002103/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justep-foundational/) from the original on 5 August
Hasan, Ali; Fumerton, Richard (2020). "Knowledge by Acquaintance vs. Description: 1. The
Distinction" (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-acquaindescrip/#Dis). Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Archived (https://
web.archive.org/web/20220531070118/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-acquainde
scrip/#Dis) from the original on 31 May 2022. Retrieved 28 May 2022.
Hatfield, Gary (1996). "Scientific method". In Craig, Edward (ed.). Routledge Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (https://philpapers.org/rec/BEAREO). Routledge. Archived (https://web.archive.org/
web/20210116111145/https://philpapers.org/rec/BEAREO) from the original on 16 January
Hepburn, Brian; Andersen, Hanne (2021). "Scientific Method" (https://plato.stanford.edu/entrie
s/scientific-method/). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab,
ord.edu/entries/scientific-method/) from the original on 26 February 2020. Retrieved 23 July
2022.
Hetherington, Stephen (2022). "Gettier Problems" (https://iep.utm.edu/gettier/). Internet
Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20090219085540/http://ww
w.iep.utm.edu/g/gettier.htm) from the original on 19 February 2009. Retrieved 28 May 2022.
Hetherington, Stephen (2022a). "Knowledge" (https://iep.utm.edu/knowledg/). Internet

p.utm.edu/knowledg/) from the original on 2 June 2022. Retrieved 18 May 2022.
Hill, Sonya D., ed. (2009). "Knowledge–Based View Of The Firm". Encyclopedia of
Management (https://www.encyclopedia.com/management/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcript
s-and-maps/knowledge-based-view-firm). Gale. ISBN 978-1-4144-0691-6. Archived (https://we
b.archive.org/web/20230306151834/https://www.encyclopedia.com/management/encyclopedia
s-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/knowledge-based-view-firm) from the original on 6 March
Hunter, Lynette (2009). "Situated Knowledge". Mapping Landscapes for Performance as
Research: Scholarly Acts and Creative Cartographies (https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.105
7/9780230244481_23). Palgrave Macmillan UK. pp. 151–153.
doi:10.1057/9780230244481_23 (https://doi.org/10.1057%2F9780230244481_23). ISBN 978-
0-230-24448-1. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20220920173930/https://link.springer.co
m/chapter/10.1057/9780230244481_23) from the original on 20 September 2022. Retrieved
19 September 2022.
Ichikawa, Jonathan Jenkins; Steup, Matthias (2018). "The Analysis of Knowledge" (https://plat
o.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-analysis/). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
02031402/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-analysis/) from the original on 2 May
2022. Retrieved 24 May 2022.
Jones, Constance; Ryan, James D. (2006). Encyclopedia of Hinduism (https://books.google.co
m/books?id=OgMmceadQ3gC). Infobase Publishing. ISBN 978-0-8160-7564-5. Archived (http
s://web.archive.org/web/20221020070415/https://books.google.com/books?id=OgMmceadQ3g
C) from the original on 20 October 2022. Retrieved 21 September 2022.
Kern, Andrea (2017). Sources of Knowledge: On the Concept of a Rational Capacity for
Knowledge (https://books.google.com/books?id=eyh5DQAAQBAJ&pg=PA8). Harvard
University Press. pp. 8–10, 133. ISBN 978-0-674-41611-6. Archived (https://web.archive.org/w
eb/20221028125631/https://books.google.com/books?id=eyh5DQAAQBAJ&pg=PA8) from the
original on 28 October 2022. Retrieved 28 October 2022.
Kernis, Michael H. (2013). Self-Esteem Issues and Answers: A Sourcebook of Current
Perspectives (https://books.google.com/books?id=r0gahbOYsU4C&pg=PA209). Psychology
Press. p. 209. ISBN 978-1-134-95270-0. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/202210221218
41/https://books.google.com/books?id=r0gahbOYsU4C&pg=PA209) from the original on 22
October 2022. Retrieved 22 October 2022.
Kirkham, Richard L. (October 1984). "Does the Gettier Problem Rest on a Mistake?". Mind.
New Series. 93 (372): 501–513. doi:10.1093/mind/XCIII.372.501 (https://doi.org/10.1093%2Fm
ind%2FXCIII.372.501). JSTOR 2254258 (https://www.jstor.org/stable/2254258).
Klausen, Søren Harnow (March 2015). "Group knowledge: a real-world approach" (https://port
al.findresearcher.sdu.dk/da/publications/bbee5873-28f2-46d5-94b6-49ef5b18a38b). Synthese.
192 (3): 813–839. doi:10.1007/s11229-014-0589-9 (https://doi.org/10.1007%2Fs11229-014-05
89-9). S2CID 207246817 (https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:207246817).
Klein, Peter D. (1998). "Knowledge, concept of" (https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/themat
ic/knowledge-concept-of/v-1). In Craig, Edward (ed.). Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
London; New York: Routledge. doi:10.4324/9780415249126-P031-1 (https://doi.org/10.4324%
2F9780415249126-P031-1). ISBN 978-0-415-25069-6. OCLC 38096851 (https://www.worldca
t.org/oclc/38096851). Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20220613025031/https://www.rep.
routledge.com/articles/thematic/knowledge-concept-of/v-1) from the original on 13 June 2022.
Kraft, Tim (2012). "Scepticism, Infallibilism, Fallibilism" (https://philpapers.org/rec/KRASIF).
Discipline Filosofiche. 22 (2): 49–70. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20220602215107/h
ttps://philpapers.org/rec/KRASIF) from the original on 2 June 2022. Retrieved 12 June 2022.
Kuruk, Paul (2020). Traditional Knowledge, Genetic Resources, Customary Law and
Intellectual Property: A Global Primer (https://books.google.com/books?id=ia7ZDwAAQBAJ&p
g=PT25). Edward Elgar Publishing. p. 25. ISBN 978-1-78536-848-6. Archived (https://web.arch
ive.org/web/20230307093541/https://books.google.com/books?id=ia7ZDwAAQBAJ&pg=PT25)
from the original on 7 March 2023. Retrieved 7 March 2023.
Kvanvig, Jonathan L. (2003). The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding (http
s://books.google.com/books?id=ILTIEjvbeLoC). Cambridge University Press. p. 200.
s.google.com/books?id=ILTIEjvbeLoC) from the original on 23 July 2020. Retrieved 16 July
2020.
Lackey, Jennifer (2021). The Epistemology of Groups (https://academic.oup.com/book/31841/c
hapter-abstract/267480629?redirectedFrom=fulltext). Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-
965660-8. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20221025083743/https://academic.oup.com/
book/31841/chapter-abstract/267480629?redirectedFrom=fulltext) from the original on 25
October 2022. Retrieved 25 October 2022.
Lammenranta, Markus (2022). "Epistemic Circularity" (https://iep.utm.edu/ep-circ/). Internet
p.utm.edu/ep-circ/) from the original on 27 January 2021. Retrieved 12 June 2022.
Lee, Jerry Won (2017). The Politics of Translingualism: After Englishes (https://books.google.c
om/books?id=ZtArDwAAQBAJ&pg=PT67). Routledge. p. 67. ISBN 978-1-315-31051-0.
Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20230308134204/https://books.google.com/books?id=Zt
ArDwAAQBAJ&pg=PT67) from the original on 8 March 2023. Retrieved 8 March 2023.
Lehrer, Keith (2015). "1. The Analysis of Knowledge". Theory of Knowledge (https://books.goo
gle.com/books?id=yKG9CgAAQBAJ&pg=PA1). Routledge. ISBN 978-1-135-19609-7. Archived
(https://web.archive.org/web/20220602105810/https://books.google.com/books?id=yKG9CgAA
QBAJ&pg=PA1) from the original on 2 June 2022. Retrieved 12 June 2022.
Leonard, Nick (2021). "Epistemological Problems of Testimony" (https://plato.stanford.edu/entri
es/testimony-episprob/). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab,
ord.edu/entries/testimony-episprob/) from the original on 10 July 2022. Retrieved 8 June 2022.
Lilley, Simon; Lightfoot, Geoffrey; Amaral, Paulo (2004). Representing Organization:
Knowledge, Management, and the Information Age (https://books.google.com/books?id=HT8V
DAAAQBAJ&pg=PA162). Oxford University Press. pp. 162–163. ISBN 978-0-19-877541-6.
Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20230310130538/https://books.google.com/books?id=H
T8VDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA162) from the original on 10 March 2023. Retrieved 10 March 2023.
Lycan, William G. (2019). "2. Moore against the New Skeptics". On Evidence in Philosophy (htt
ps://books.google.com/books?id=cfeEDwAAQBAJ). Oxford University Press. pp. 21–36.
s.google.com/books?id=cfeEDwAAQBAJ) from the original on 6 March 2023. Retrieved
7 March 2023.
Magee, Bryan; Popper, Karl R. (1971). "Conversation with Karl Popper" (https://archive.org/det
ails/modernbritishphi0000mage/page/66). In Magee, Bryan (ed.). Modern British philosophy.
New York: St. Martin's Press. pp. 74–75 (https://archive.org/details/modernbritishphi0000mag
e/page/74). ISBN 978-0-19-283047-0. OCLC 314039 (https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/314039).
"Popper: Putting our ideas into words, or better, writing them down, makes an important
difference. ... It is what I call 'knowledge in the objective sense'. Scientific knowledge belongs
to it. It is this knowledge which is stored in our libraries rather than our heads. Magee: And you
regard the knowledge stored in our libraries as more important than the knowledge stored in
our heads. Popper: Much more important, from every point of view"
Markie, Peter; Folescu, M. (2021). "Rationalism vs. Empiricism" (https://plato.stanford.edu/entri
es/rationalism-empiricism/). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab,
ord.edu/entries/rationalism-empiricism/) from the original on 9 August 2019. Retrieved 8 June

2022.
McCain, Kevin; Stapleford, Scott; Steup, Matthias (2021). Epistemic Dilemmas: New
Arguments, New Angles (https://books.google.com/books?id=IeNBEAAAQBAJ&pg=PT111).
Routledge. p. 111. ISBN 978-1-000-46851-9. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/202210211
63258/https://books.google.com/books?id=IeNBEAAAQBAJ&pg=PT111) from the original on
21 October 2022. Retrieved 21 October 2022.
McCain, Kevin (2022). "Problem of the Criterion" (https://iep.utm.edu/problem-of-the-criterion/).
https://iep.utm.edu/problem-of-the-criterion/) from the original on 2 June 2022. Retrieved
28 May 2022.
McDermid, Douglas (2023). "Pragmatism: 2b. Anti-Cartesianism" (https://iep.utm.edu/pragmati/
#SH2b). Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20190523
181337/https://www.iep.utm.edu/pragmati/#SH2b) from the original on 23 May 2019. Retrieved
7 March 2023.
McGeer, V. (2001). "Self-knowledge: Philosophical Aspects". International Encyclopedia of the
Social & Behavioral Sciences: 13837–13841. doi:10.1016/B0-08-043076-7/01073-1 (https://do
i.org/10.1016%2FB0-08-043076-7%2F01073-1). ISBN 978-0-08-043076-8.
Michaelian, Kourken; Sutton, John (2017). "Memory: 3. Episodicity" (https://plato.stanford.edu/
entries/memory/#Epis). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab,
ord.edu/entries/memory/#Epis) from the original on 5 October 2021. Retrieved 2 October
2021.
Misak, Cheryl (2002). Truth, Politics, Morality: Pragmatism and Deliberation (https://books.goo
gle.com/books?id=S6WHAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA53). Routledge. p. 53. ISBN 978-1-134-82618-6.
Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20230307183340/https://books.google.com/books?id=S
6WHAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA53) from the original on 7 March 2023. Retrieved 7 March 2023.
Mishra, T. K. (2021). The Power of Ethics: Some lessons from the Bhagavad-Gita (https://book
s.google.com/books?id=v8s7EAAAQBAJ&pg=PA52). K.K. Publications. p. 52. ISBN 978-81-
7844-127-6. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20220730070425/https://books.google.co
m/books?id=v8s7EAAAQBAJ&pg=PA52) from the original on 30 July 2022. Retrieved 21 June
2022.
Morin, Alain; Racy, Famira (2021). "15. Dynamic self-processes - Self-knowledge" (https://ww
w.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/B9780128139950000157). The Handbook of
Personality Dynamics and Processes. Academic Press. pp. 373–374. ISBN 978-0-12-813995-
0. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20221022121840/https://www.sciencedirect.com/scie
nce/article/pii/B9780128139950000157) from the original on 22 October 2022. Retrieved
22 October 2022.
Moser, Paul K. (2016). "A posteriori" (https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/a-posteri
ori/v-1). Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Routledge. Archived (https://web.archive.org/w
eb/20220920170718/https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/a-posteriori/v-1) from the
original on 20 September 2022. Retrieved 18 September 2022.
Moser, Paul K. (2005). The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology (https://books.google.com/book
s?id=5NJjAwAAQBAJ). Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-020818-9. Archived (https://w
eb.archive.org/web/20230519082259/https://books.google.com/books?id=5NJjAwAAQBAJ)
from the original on 19 May 2023. Retrieved 8 March 2023.
Murphy, Peter (2022). "Coherentism in Epistemology" (https://iep.utm.edu/coherentism-in-epist
emology/). Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/202206
12112215/https://iep.utm.edu/coherentism-in-epistemology/) from the original on 12 June
Niiniluoto, Ilkka (2019). "Scientific Progress" (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-progre
ss/). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford

ntries/scientific-progress/) from the original on 6 March 2023. Retrieved 8 March 2023.
O'Brien, Dan (2016). "Part I Chapter 7: Family resemblance". An Introduction to the Theory of
Knowledge (https://books.google.com/books?id=UVK9DQAAQBAJ). John Wiley & Sons.
s.google.com/books?id=UVK9DQAAQBAJ) from the original on 6 March 2023. Retrieved
6 March 2023.
O’Brien, Daniel (2022). "The Epistemology of Perception" (https://iep.utm.edu/epis-per/).
http://iep.utm.edu/e/epis-per.htm) from the original on 8 May 2009. Retrieved 25 October 2022.
OD staff (2010). "knowledge" (https://web.archive.org/web/20100714023323/http://www.oxford
dictionaries.com/view/entry/m_en_us1261368). Oxford dictionary (American English). Archived
from the original (http://oxforddictionaries.com/view/entry/m_en_us1261368#m_en_us126136
8) on 14 July 2010.
Olsson, Erik J (December 2011). "The Value of Knowledge: The Value of Knowledge".
Philosophy Compass. 6 (12): 874–883. doi:10.1111/j.1747-9991.2011.00425.x (https://doi.org/1
0.1111%2Fj.1747-9991.2011.00425.x). S2CID 143034920 (https://api.semanticscholar.org/Cor
pusID:143034920).
Paden, William E. (2009). "Comparative religion". The Routledge Companion to the Study of
Religion (https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9780203868768-19/comparative
-religion-william-paden). pp. 239–256. doi:10.4324/9780203868768-19 (https://doi.org/10.432
4%2F9780203868768-19). ISBN 978-0-203-86876-8. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20
220921184650/https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9780203868768-19/compa
rative-religion-william-paden) from the original on 21 September 2022. Retrieved
21 September 2022.
Parikh, Rohit; Renero, Adriana (2017). "Justified True Belief: Plato, Gettier, and Turing".
Philosophical Explorations of the Legacy of Alan Turing: Turing 100 (https://link.springer.com/c
hapter/10.1007/978-3-319-53280-6_4). Springer International Publishing. pp. 93–102.
doi:10.1007/978-3-319-53280-6_4 (https://doi.org/10.1007%2F978-3-319-53280-6_4).
ISBN 978-3-319-53280-6. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20220602105750/https://link.
springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-53280-6_4) from the original on 2 June 2022.
Paul Williams (2008). Mahayana Buddhism: The Doctrinal Foundations (https://books.google.c
om/books?id=GMN-AgAAQBAJ). Routledge. pp. 68–69. ISBN 978-1-134-25056-1. Archived (h
ttps://web.archive.org/web/20161121014437/https://books.google.com/books?id=GMN-AgAAQ
BAJ) from the original on 21 November 2016. Retrieved 12 June 2022.
Peels, Rik; Blaauw, Martijn (2016). The Epistemic Dimensions of Ignorance (https://books.goo
gle.com/books?id=69t7DQAAQBAJ&pg=PA25). Cambridge University Press. p. 25. ISBN 978-
1-107-17560-0. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20230307140406/https://books.google.c
om/books?id=69t7DQAAQBAJ&pg=PA25) from the original on 7 March 2023. Retrieved
7 March 2023.
Penelhum, Terence (1971). "1. Faith, Scepticism and Philosophy". Problems of Religious
Knowledge (https://books.google.com/books?id=QQU9AAAAIAAJ). Macmillan. ISBN 978-0-
333-10633-4.
Plato (2002). Five Dialogues (https://archive.org/details/fivedialogueseut00plat/page/89).
Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Pub. Co. pp. 89–90, 97b–98a (https://archive.org/details/fivedialogue
seut00plat/page/89). ISBN 978-0-87220-633-5.
Pritchard, Duncan; Turri, John; Carter, J. Adam (2022). "The Value of Knowledge" (https://plat
o.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-value/). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
10164703/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-value/) from the original on 10 July
Pritchard, Duncan (2013). What is this thing called Knowledge? (https://books.google.com/boo

ks?id=sfUhAQAAQBAJ). Routledge. ISBN 978-1-134-57367-7. Archived (https://web.archive.o
rg/web/20220602105758/https://books.google.com/books?id=sfUhAQAAQBAJ) from the
original on 2 June 2022. Retrieved 12 June 2022.
Pritchard, Duncan (April 2007). "Recent Work on Epistemic Value". American Philosophical
Quarterly. 44 (2): 85–110. JSTOR 20464361 (https://www.jstor.org/stable/20464361).
Rodríguez, Ángel García (2018). "Fake barns and our epistemological theorizing" (https://doi.o
rg/10.22201%2Fiifs.18704905e.2018.02). Crítica: Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía. 50
(148): 29–54. doi:10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2018.02 (https://doi.org/10.22201%2Fiifs.18704905
e.2018.02). ISSN 0011-1503 (https://www.worldcat.org/issn/0011-1503). JSTOR 26767766 (htt
ps://www.jstor.org/stable/26767766). S2CID 171635198 (https://api.semanticscholar.org/Corpu
sID:171635198).
Ronald, Barnett (1990). The Idea Of Higher Education (https://books.google.com/books?id=eTj
lAAAAQBAJ&pg=PA40). McGraw-Hill Education (UK). p. 40. ISBN 978-0-335-09420-2.
Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20230305174659/https://books.google.com/books?id=e
TjlAAAAQBAJ&pg=PA40) from the original on 5 March 2023. Retrieved 5 March 2023.
Russell, Bruce (2020). "A Priori Justification and Knowledge" (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/
apriori/). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford
ntries/apriori/) from the original on 12 August 2021. Retrieved 18 September 2022.
Schafer, Karl (September 2014). "Knowledge and Two Forms of Non-Accidental Truth".
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 89 (2): 375. doi:10.1111/phpr.12062 (https://doi.o
rg/10.1111%2Fphpr.12062). "What the Gettier cases show is that this condition is insufficient to
capture all the ways in which accidental truth is incompatible with knowledge."
Scheler, Max; Stikkers, Kenneth W. (2012). Problems of a Sociology of Knowledge (Routledge
Revivals) (https://books.google.com/books?id=pFqrO7Lxiw4C&pg=PA23). Routledge. p. 23.
s.google.com/books?id=pFqrO7Lxiw4C&pg=PA23) from the original on 7 March 2023.
Retrieved 7 March 2023.
Schwitzgebel, Eric (2021). "Belief: 2.1 Occurrent Versus Dispositional Belief" (https://plato.stan
ford.edu/entries/belief/#OccuVersDispBeli). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics
Research Lab, Stanford University. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20191115080001/htt
ps://plato.stanford.edu/entries/belief/#OccuVersDispBeli) from the original on 15 November
Sidelle, Alan (2001). "An Argument That Internalism Requires Infallibility" (https://philpapers.or
g/rec/SIDAAT). Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 63 (1): 163–179.
doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2001.tb00096.x (https://doi.org/10.1111%2Fj.1933-1592.2001.tb0009
6.x). Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20220602215105/https://philpapers.org/rec/SIDAA
T) from the original on 2 June 2022. Retrieved 12 June 2022.
Silva, Paul Jr. (September 2019). "Beliefless knowing". Pacific Philosophical Quarterly. 100 (3):
723–746. doi:10.1111/papq.12273 (https://doi.org/10.1111%2Fpapq.12273). S2CID 240808741
(https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:240808741).
Stanley, Jason; Willlamson, Timothy (2001). "Knowing How" (https://philpapers.org/rec/WILKH
V). Journal of Philosophy. 98 (8): 411–444. doi:10.2307/2678403 (https://doi.org/10.2307%2F2
678403). JSTOR 2678403 (https://www.jstor.org/stable/2678403). Archived (https://web.archiv
e.org/web/20220602215122/https://philpapers.org/rec/WILKHV) from the original on 2 June
Steup, Matthias; Neta, Ram (2020). "Epistemology" (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemo
logy/). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.
Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20200721023728/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epist
emology/) from the original on 21 July 2020. Retrieved 22 May 2022.
Stevenson, Leslie (March 2003). "Opinion, Belief or Faith, and Knowledge" (https://www.cambr
idge.org/core/journals/kantian-review/article/abs/opinion-belief-or-faith-and-knowledge/951908
1ED9BAE7811D2B9670340AD7E1). Kantian Review. 7: 72–101.

doi:10.1017/S1369415400001746 (https://doi.org/10.1017%2FS1369415400001746).
ISSN 2044-2394 (https://www.worldcat.org/issn/2044-2394). S2CID 143965507 (https://api.se
manticscholar.org/CorpusID:143965507). Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20220921213
211/https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/kantian-review/article/abs/opinion-belief-or-faith-a
nd-knowledge/9519081ED9BAE7811D2B9670340AD7E1) from the original on 21 September
Stroll, Avrum (2023). "epistemology" (https://www.britannica.com/topic/epistemology).
nnica.com/topic/epistemology) from the original on 10 July 2019. Retrieved 20 May 2022.
Sudduth, Michael (2022). "Defeaters in Epistemology: 2b Defeasibility Analyses and
Propositional Defeaters" (https://iep.utm.edu/defeaters-in-epistemology/#SH2b). Internet
p.utm.edu/defeaters-in-epistemology/#SH2b) from the original on 2 June 2022. Retrieved
17 May 2022.
Swartley, Keith E. (2005). Encountering the World of Islam (https://books.google.com/books?id
=gLi2X1rzeZIC&pg=PA63). InterVarsity Press. p. 63. ISBN 978-0-8308-5644-2. Archived (http
s://web.archive.org/web/20230304103829/https://books.google.com/books?id=gLi2X1rzeZIC&
pg=PA63) from the original on 4 March 2023. Retrieved 4 March 2023.
Thakchoe, Sonam (2022). "The Theory of Two Truths in India" (https://plato.stanford.edu/entrie
s/twotruths-india/). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford
ntries/twotruths-india/) from the original on 16 May 2022. Retrieved 6 June 2022.
The Hindu staff (18 September 2018). "Para and Apara Vidya" (https://www.thehindu.com/soci
ety/faith/para-and-apara-vidya/article24978890.ece). The Hindu. Archived (https://web.archive.
org/web/20220531105255/https://www.thehindu.com/society/faith/para-and-apara-vidya/article
24978890.ece) from the original on 31 May 2022. Retrieved 6 June 2022.
Thompson, C. M. (2001). "Situated Knowledge: Feminist and Science and Technology Studies
Perspectives" (https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/B0080430767031594).
International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences. Pergamon. pp. 14129–14133.
ISBN 978-0-08-043076-8. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20220920172607/https://ww
w.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/B0080430767031594) from the original on 20
September 2022. Retrieved 19 September 2022.
Truncellito, David A. (2023). "Epistemology" (https://iep.utm.edu/epistemo/). Internet
p.utm.edu/epistemo/) from the original on 13 January 2022. Retrieved 8 March 2023.
Tufari, P. (2003). "Knowledge, Sociology of". New Catholic Encyclopedia (https://books.google.
com/books?id=4C0KAQAAMAAJ). Thomson/Gale. ISBN 978-0-7876-4008-8.
Turri, John; Alfano, Mark; Greco, John (2021). "Virtue Epistemology: 6. Epistemic Value" (http
s://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology-virtue/#EpisValu). The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Archived (https://web.archive.org/
web/20230326030005/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology-virtue/#EpisValu) from
the original on 26 March 2023. Retrieved 20 September 2022.
Vost, Kevin (2016). Seven Gifts of the Holy Spirit (https://books.google.com/books?id=pdaiDQ
AAQBAJ&pg=PA75). Sophia Institute Press. pp. 75–76. ISBN 978-1-62282-412-0. Archived (ht
tps://web.archive.org/web/20230307134743/https://books.google.com/books?id=pdaiDQAAQB
AJ&pg=PA75) from the original on 7 March 2023. Retrieved 7 March 2023.
Walton, Douglas N. (January 2005). "Pragmatic and idealized models of knowledge and
ignorance". American Philosophical Quarterly. 42 (1): 59–69 [59, 64]. JSTOR 20010182 (http
s://www.jstor.org/stable/20010182). "It is a pervasive assumption in recent analytical
philosophy that knowledge can be defined as a modality representing a rational agent's true
and consistent beliefs. Such views are based on rationality assumptions. One is that
knowledge can only consist of true propositions. This way of speaking is sharply at odds with
the way we speak about knowledge, for example, in computing, where a so-called knowledge
base can be a database, that is, a set of data that has been collected and is thought to consist
of true propositions, even though, realistically speaking, many of them might later be shown to
be false or untenable. ... The pragmatic account of knowledge starts with a knowledge system,
meaning a working system with an agent having a database. ... The notion of a search can be
a social one, in many instances. A group of agents can be engaged in the search, and some of
them can know things that others do not know."
Weisberg, Jonathan (2021). "Formal Epistemology" (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/formal-e
pistemology/). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford
ntries/formal-epistemology/) from the original on 14 March 2015. Retrieved 5 June 2022.
Woolf, Raphael (1 January 2013). "Plato and the Norms of Thought" (https://academic.oup.co
m/mind/article/122/485/171/961176). Mind. 122 (485): 171–216. doi:10.1093/mind/fzt012 (http
s://doi.org/10.1093%2Fmind%2Ffzt012). ISSN 0026-4423 (https://www.worldcat.org/issn/0026-
4423). Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20220920172241/https://academic.oup.com/min
d/article/122/485/171/961176) from the original on 20 September 2022. Retrieved
18 September 2022.
Zagzebski, Linda (1999). "What Is Knowledge?" (https://philpapers.org/rec/ZAGWIK). In
Greco, John; Sosa, Ernest (eds.). The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology. Malden, MA:
Blackwell. pp. 92–116. doi:10.1002/9781405164863.ch3 (https://doi.org/10.1002%2F97814051
64863.ch3). ISBN 978-0-631-20290-5. OCLC 39269507 (https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/392695
07). S2CID 158886670 (https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:158886670). Archived (http
s://web.archive.org/web/20220602215147/https://philpapers.org/rec/ZAGWIK) from the original
on 2 June 2022. Retrieved 12 June 2022.
External links
Knowledge (https://philpapers.org/browse/knowledge) at PhilPapers
"Knowledge" (http://www.iep.utm.edu/knowledg). Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
"Epistemic Value" (http://www.iep.utm.edu/epistemic-value). Internet Encyclopedia of
Philosophy.
Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). "The Value of Knowledge" (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge
-value/). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). "The Analysis of Knowledge" (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowled
ge-analysis/). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). "Knowledge by Acquaintance vs. Description" (https://plato.stanford.ed
u/entries/knowledge-acquaindescrip/). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Knowledge (https://www.inphoproject.org/taxonomy/2390) at the Indiana Philosophy Ontology
Project
Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Knowledge&oldid=1172414133"

Knowledge

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Knowledge

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Knowledge

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

29/08/2023, 15:21 Knowledge - Wikipedia

Knowledge is a form of awareness or familiarity. It is

In analytic philosophy, knowledge is usually seen as a mental state possessed by an individual

Justified true belief

Many philosophers define knowledge as justified true belief

The main controversy surrounding the JTB definition concerns

Gettier problem and alternatives

The JTB definition came under severe criticism in

Propositional knowledge, also referred to as descriptive knowledge, is a form of theoretical

Propositional knowledge is either occurrent or dispositional. Occurrent knowledge is knowledge

Non-propositional knowledge is knowledge in which no

A priori and a posteriori

justification.[6][64][65] To know something a posteriori means to know it on the basis of

In philosophy, "self-knowledge" usually refers to a person's knowledge of their own sensations,

Situated knowledge is knowledge specific to a particular situation.[76][77] It is closely related to

Higher and lower knowledge

Meta-knowledge or metaknowledge is knowledge about knowledge.[89]

Some authors divide meta-knowledge into orders:

Meta-knowledge is a fundamental conceptual instrument in such research and scientific domains

Meta-Knowledge may be automatically harvested from electronic publication archives, to reveal

Introspection is often seen in analogy to perception as a source of knowledge, not of external

Testimony is often included as an additional

The three most common theories are

the disease. Or to reach an important job interview, knowledge

Besides having instrumental value, knowledge may also have

try to show how their preferred theory overcomes it.[4][5][11]

The anthropology of knowledge is a multi-disciplinary field of

The reproduction of knowledge and its changes often happen

The sociology of knowledge is closely related to the anthropology of knowledge.[156][153][157] It is

socioeconomic conditions.[158][159][160] A related view is found in forms of decolonial scholarship

Examples of knowledge representation formalisms include semantic nets, systems architecture,

7. Stanley & Willlamson 2001, p. 411–444 (https://philpapers.org/rec/WILKHV).

47. Comesaña 2005, p. 367–383 (https://www.jstor.org/stable/40040862).

117. McDermid 2023.

152. Cohen 2010, p. S193–S202 (https://www.jstor.org/stable/40606072).

s.google.com/books?id=rTTglmNKY0UC&pg=PA5) from the original on 7 March 2023.

Cameron, Ross (2018). "Infinite Regress Arguments" (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/infinite-

Forrest, Peter (2021). "The Epistemology of Religion" (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/religion

25679). JSTOR 2025679 (https://www.jstor.org/stable/2025679).

Hetherington, Stephen (2022a). "Knowledge" (https://iep.utm.edu/knowledg/). Internet

ord.edu/entries/rationalism-empiricism/) from the original on 9 August 2019. Retrieved 8 June

University. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20230306151757/https://plato.stanford.edu/e

Pritchard, Duncan (2013). What is this thing called Knowledge? (https://books.google.com/boo

1ED9BAE7811D2B9670340AD7E1). Kantian Review. 7: 72–101.

Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Knowledge&oldid=1172414133"

You might also like