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COMMENT
ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE

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 7 IIIIIIII JIIIIII

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LAC G . M. CHALLENGER
AN APPROACHING JET LAC G .M . Challenger was carrying out a
APPEARING THIS SIZE BFI on a Sabre aircraft . His inspection was
TRAVEIIING AT 600 MPH more extensive than required by EOs for a
BF'I and, as a result, he discovered extensive

f
WOUID BE HERE . . . .S
4 . . 3 . . .2 . . .I, . NOW damage to the compressor and the turbine
section of the engine .
By doing more than was required, LAC

1
Challenger undoubtedly averted a serious acci-
dent, This is a case of thorough ~~ork paying
big dividends r-many thousands of dollars . It is
an example of preventive maintenance at its
best . A very Good Show indeed .

AIRCRAFT DISTANCE-2 MILES : SPEED-600 MPH : TIME-12 SECONDS

PHYSICAL AND MECHANICAL LAG TIME-10 SECONDS
 THE HURRICANE
flattening influence of the violent winds, rises
and falls in mountainous waves, threatening at
each instant to capsize even the largest vessels
so unfortunate as to be ensnared bythe storm .
i
by E. w. Brandcx~ As a first approximation the hurricane vortex
RCAF Station Greenwood can be considered circular, with the winds in-
r creasing towards the eye of the storm . The
strongest winds occur on the right side of the
direction of motion of the storm where the
hurricane winds are superimposed upon the
steering current . The winds also have a com-
ponent blowing into the centre, so that an air
._....~v~ __ parcel actually follows a spiral trajectory, as
shown in Figure 1 . Radar photos reveal a hurri-
cane as an octopus-like structure with rainbands
i- ~UN 71Q ~__~ spiralling out from the usually circular eye
boundary as in Figure Z, The greatest cloud
i~ Fig l : Paths of motion of air particles about
build-up occurs along these spiral rainbands .
f~7 These bands are usually more concentrated in
a hurricane with centre at C.

the sector towards which the storm is moving ,

Hurricane Decay

In a tropical storm the process of decay,

Sources, Regions and Frequency The Formative Stage once begun, generally progresses much faster
than is the case with an extratropical low . AB
When asked to relate one's preconceptions Weak troughs characterized by extensive a hurricane travels over the sea towards higher
concerning the climate of the sub-tropical cloud bands and showery weather frequently latitudes cooler water surfaces are encountered
ocean areas, one naturally envisions palm- occur in the trade wind flow . Occasionally a which have a weakening effect upon the storm .
studded tropical islands basking in the bright closed cyclonic circulation with quite strong A hurricane rnoving inland usually fills very
sunlight, the white surf breaking gently on the winds will develop in one of these troughs . rapidly, although a few rernarkable instancee
shores, Occasionally a passing rainshower On rare occasions, and for reasons not clearly of the generation of intense extratropical storms
accompanied by gusty winds temporarily cools understood, a hurricane with its highly organ- associated with hurricanes moving inland have
the air a few degrees, llowever, while these ized cloud and weather structure, very 1ow taken place . Hurricane Hazel, October 15,
regions usually enjoy the most pleasant weather central pressure and extremely strong winds 1954, wasanoteworthyexample . Hazel, moving
to be found anywhere, they occasionally become (greater than 7Z mph) comes into being . The into the South Carolina coast, came into contact
Fig 2 : Spiral rainbands about the nearly
the birth- P laces of the mostviolent anddestruc- development of the majority of hurricanes is with the polar front lying along the Appalachians, circular eye of a hurricane.
tive storms that the earth's atmosphere can remarkably rapid, the centre of a weak 1ow A new and violent low centre formed on the
develop on an extensive scale , Entire fleets deepening into a small hurricane vortex of very
have been destroyed, thousands of lives have strong winds within a fewhours or a day . The
been lost, and vast property damage has been initialdiameter of this intense storm is usually
wrought by the furious winds and tumultuous in the order of 60 to 100 rniles . The strongest
seas accompanying the intense tropical low winds rnay exceed 1.00 mph, A slow increase
pressure areas which we call hurricanes . in diameter occurs as the storm matures .
These storms depend for their beginnings
upon the moist, unstable air masses, and high Structure Of Hurricanes
sea temperatures to be found only in lo~a lati-
tude s . It has been found that hurricanes do not Perhaps the most rernarkable characteristic
forrn where the water temperature is less than of a hurricane is the central region of lowest
about 80° F, nordo theyforrY~closer than about pressurc known as the "eye", In this region
5 ° to the equator . In the Atlantic, north of the (which as a rule has a diameter in the order of
equator, there are two ~nain source regions 8 to 40 miles, depending upon the age of the
for hurricanes, namely the Cape Verde region storm and other factors) the winds are very
and the Gulf of Mexico-{;aribbean region . lightand the skies cornparatively clear, although
The hurricane season is the period August P atches of middle and hi g h cloud and variable
through October, although hurricanes occa- amounts of stratocurnulus are frequently
,
sionallv occur in other months . Hurricanes of observed . Keports fronl weather observing 1
~'' ~ -'' . .i~ .
Ca p e Verde ori g in most fre q uentl 5 ~ occur in stations often mention a s}Iarp rise intempera- r
Septerr~ber while the Gulf of Mexico-Caribbean ture coincident with the arrival of the eye .
type favour October . A frequency tabulation Descending air currents, the cessation of the
made for the years 1887 to 1956 shows that cooling influcance of the heavy rain, and the
about eight tropical storms developE~d annually sudden break-through of sunshine, all of which
in the North Atlantic, but only about one-half are usually characteristic of hurricane eye
of these, or about four per year, were actually passages, combine to produce this effect . Cloud formation dose to the eye of a tropical cyclone.
of hurricane strength . Within the eyE:, the sea surface, relieved of the (Plate 186, International Cloud Atlas, Vol, IL~
 eye for a long period of time, so that the storm
could be tracked without risk except, of' course,
to the craft dropping the balloon,

Significance Of Hurricanes To AMC

The probability of an occurrence of a hurri-

CONTROLLERS ARE HUMAN TOO `~
cane in the Atlantic is greatest from late August
to late October . [iurricanes in the Atlantic,
other than those arising in the Gulf of Mexico
and extreme Western Caribbean, tend to move
aroundthewestern side of the semi-perrnanent by F 0 D . A. Griffith-Cochrane
high pressure area, the "Bermuda Height" . RCAF Station Rockdiffe
With such a track a hurricane becorY~es a th reat
to exercises carried out south of Nova Scotia
and, at times, to MAC bases themselves . While It i s occa~ic~nall y- for g otten that we P eo P le The other aircraft in the area know it too and
irr the tower, far from being annoyed at the have a good idea what you propasc: to do, Fail
there is a tendency for a hurricane to weaken
over the cooler wate.rs as it moves northwards, intrusion of occasionalflying typesbreaking up to acknowledge and everyone has to keep an
, .~,_ . acceleration under thc: influence of the stronger a good crib game or siesta and therefore wax eye on one more thing because they are not sure
upper vv~inds mav result in its arrival near nasty on the R ;'T or telephone, are really only you have received the message and consequently
Damage caused by hurricane Hazel in the Toronto area . Nova Scotia as a verti~ intense storm . worried over the possible consequences of may be going to do just about anything, and
As a hurricane a PP+roaches alon g the Atlantic rr~omentary rnernory lapses or "I can make it some pilots seem to have a weird sense of
VF'R" tactics on part of usually courteous and hurnor !
polar front near Buffalo to which the energy of coast the atmosphere at the !vIAC bases becomes
wcll trained aircrew . One evening during night flying DFCU cleared
Hazel, the hurricane, was transferred . This increasingly tense . Insufficient hangar space
For example, a pilot taxiing down the run- an aircraft for takeoff and glancing down the
new low moved into Untario causing extensive exists at Greenwood for the Neptune tind Argus
aircraft . No tiedown facilities are provided . way hears someone asking for landing clear- runway saw two sets of headlights progressing
damage .
Personnel frorn 404 and 405 squadrons are ance behind him andthinkin~~ to speedthings up m~rrily up thc middle . The controller yelled
alerted to fly those aircraft v<>hich cannot be he concentrates his attention on the transmis- "Abort takeoff" and the pilot, right. on the bit,
Flying The Hurricane
hangared to a base, preferably in Canada, which 5ions from this aircraft and expeditious taxiing said "Roger" and ground to a halt . The pilot
Hurricane reconnaissance: flights by military is forecast to be unaffected by the storrn, A of his own aircraft to t.he end of the runwav . could not see what. all the excit.ement was about
He concentrat.es to such a de Jree that he fails as the vehicles were beyond his line of sight at
aircraft and personnel, directed by the Miami forecast «~ind of 60 mph has been chos -r.n arbi-
to hear the towE:r advising "Expedit.e first. rikht" . the time he started his roll, due to the rise in
Weather Office, began on a routine basis in trarily as the critical wind speed for grounded
Result, a near miss, a thoroughly hostile fcllow tlre center of the field, The vehicles were a car
1944 . T :ach year since 1944 tropical storms Arguses and Neptunes .
Little damage to the sturdily built structures pilot doing the tour of the circuit once al;ain and and a truck, operated by a couple of friendly but
threatenin g the Caribbean area or the U ,S .
an irate controller ready to shootthe next pilot inebriated types who thought. to shortcut to a
coast have been tracked by aircraft, This is of the MAC bases is to be feare.d . With
reasonable precautions the chance of injury to on sigirt, With many airports handling l.raffir friend'~ horr~e on the othE:r sidc: of the field,
an extremely hazardous undertaking and much
at maxirT~um capacity for a large part of tlre They werc busy con~ratulating Ontario on the
credit is owing to the crews to whom this duty personnel at these bases or to their families
is not high, IIovvever, a partial or complete day, the pilot who ignores, forgets, or does nice road, well lighted on the side~, vvhen the
is allotted .
In the early days hurricane reconnaissance disruption of landline corT~rrrunications is not not acknowledge tower instructions creates far fireworks started . The car driver, still retain-
more lrazard and confn5ion than many of them ing a 5light degree of mental competence,
aircraft would engage the storms at low levels . uncommon during a hurricane, It is to be ex-
pected that by the time the wind strength has realizz, T're tow~er, to keep R~T patter to a st.reaked to the nearest cut-off and departed
When traversing the maximum wind zone just
reached these proportions all that can be done m ;nimum, will often clear a taxiing aircraft these hallowed grounds . The truck driver,
outside the eye of the storm it sometimes praved
acros5 tlre "live" witlrout request from the air- whose rnother was obviously badly frightened
a strenuous task for the captain and co-pilot, to mitigate the storrn damage has already been
craft, T :re pilot Iraving received thi~ red carpet by an ostrich at some timc, stopped in the
working together, to maintain control of the accornplished .
treatment a few times start.s to takc° it for middle of tl~e runway and turned uut all l-ris
craft andprevent itfrom beingbuffeted into the The aftermath of a hurricane may w~e11 be
granted and one day breezes out on the "live" lights! After it was all over we were able to
tumultuous sea, No life-saving equiprnent could a hectic experience for the Search and Rescue
without 5o rnuch as by-your-leave from the
possibly be of service in the turmoil created squadron based at Greenwood . Even in this
towcr, nevE:r realizing the tower i5 trying to
at the ocean surface by the winds of a mature modern age of storm warnings it occasionally
happens that ships at sea fall afoul of thc watch the AFPs round up a 17air of touring dal-
hurricane ,
mations, clear a Lancaster in emergency, con-
The majority of hurricane reconnaissance weather . Furthermorc the destructive forces
tact tlre hospital via phone because the intercom .
flights now take place at the 700 or 500 mb of a hurricane can completely block land routes, "r'r,-" ~ ~.
lias ~one for the chop, and direct an urgent red
levels . At thesc. higher levels much smoother making air evacuation of the critically ill or
light att.he snowplow driver who has decided to
flying conditions are encountered . Dropsondes, in'ured
J in some localities the onlti~
.P ossibilit y~ .
stop and check his equipment on the middle of
which are radio-equipped devices used to send
Conclusion the runway, After the sr~~oke has cleared away
back weather data, are released at intervals to
determine pressures, temperatures, etc ., be- the poor pilot is observed, w~ith an expre~tiion
. like a whihped bloodhaund, murmuring "Wot a
tween the flight level and the sea surface . The Our knowledge of precisely how hurricanes
snarely clot, the Y g ot in the tower toda Y " .
use of powerful airborne radar in recent y~ears arise and of their internal mechanisms is, at
allows the aircraft to remain outside the more present, incamplete, but research is broadening Let's not forget the majority of aircraft
accider~ts occur during landino, takeoff, and
violent storms and still obtain a position fix of t111S body of knowledge at an ever accelerating
the eye . Plans are now under way to drop rate . We are on the verge of greatdiscoveries taxiin ;?, Every field is a dan~er area unless
m this field . On the practical side we. know that ever ~one kee P s hiti l~ead u p , It is not sufficient
constant level balloons carr}~ing meteorological
to tl-iink, "I know wiratthe tower wants me to do",
instruments and radio equipment into the eye these storms are not to be taken lightly by those
on the ground, and are to be avoided by those Acknowledge all transmissions and then the
reKions of hurricane . It is believed that a
tower knows you have received instructions,
constant level balloon would remain within the in the air .
 MAINTENANCE ERRORS 1958
In this a g e of statistics indices and rates nose gear indicated unsafe after retraction ; it
it is easy to be trapped into a false sense of was fully up and locked but the micro-switch
security . For example, our accident rate for was not in the right place . An Expeditor pilot
the 1958 calendar year was down about 20% couldn't raise the wheelg at all - the mechanism
from the rate for 1957 . Should everybody be was jammed by a surplus stud which had been
happy? Let's take a look behind this rate and dropped during a feathering pump change,
see what we, Maintenance, had to contribute , Two T-33s finished the landing roll each
Turn out the E329s and review our errors , minus one wheel . One had a 1 /16" oversize
We are charged with 184 errors, an increase nut installed on the axle that didn't stay installed,
of 25% over the 1957 figure, The trades respon- The other had a nosewheel bearing installed in
sible~-1957 figure in brackets-were : airframe a mainwheel . Because the internal diameters
see the humorous side of the sit .uation but if grounds he decides the weather and fuel state 110(91), aero engine 3?(38), electrical 12(12), of the two bearings are considerably different
the DFCO or pilot involved lrad becn doping off are comfortable so why nut tack on a couple of instrument 4(4), and four trades not listed in the rollers all fell out and the wheel slid easily
the least bit no one would havc~ seen anything I~ours Iocal for Qood rr~easure . Excellent spirit 1957 are armament 3, safety equipment 2, over the nut, A Canao had a bearing spacer
funny in it, harticularly the widows who would brrt he forgets to tcll anyone ~~that Ire is up to . telecom l, and photo 1 , To complete the list left out when a mainwheel was replaced, This
have bc:en left, All is serene untilETA plus :30 when Montreal there is a miscellaneous item consisting of caused the wheel to seize during taxiing . Two
Something unforeseenoccurs andin seconds cent.re calls and says "Whe.rc~ is your wayward 14 errors that, due to lack of information, CF100s had tires blow out on landing ; during
pilot and tower are faced witli a ne~a~ aud danger- aviator?" Irnmediatel y calls are made to al1 tire assembly and inflation some air was trapped
could not be charged to a specific trade,
ous situaiion atrdthere is no time to sit down and statior~s in the area and all fields check their Is everybody hnppy?Following is a resume of between the tube and casing, resulting in hot
tall : it ovc:r, You have to do somethin~ fast and han~ar lines tc~ see if the ~~~ay~~~ard one is ona our errors by trade : spots, blisters, and blow-outs . A Mitchell also
if it is the wron~ thing-well the air force will coffec bre.al: ~ornewlrere . No joy, so-o-o-o had a tire blow-out ; an item from the tire-bay
pay for the funeral if that is any consolation, Search and Ilescuc is alerled . ~If you think Airframe tool inventory had been left inside, A Cl 19 lost
Donrt count on routine kee P alert and ex p ect controllers don't lilce bein~ disturbed, t.ry the emergency escape hatch as a result of severe
the unexpected because sooner or later you are shakin g a m~ss of SAR bods out of bed sorne Undercarriages had a rough time in 1958 - main-wheel shimmy caused by unbalanced
hoin~ to meet it onthe field where being awake night when you are tired of living), Line checks 28 misadventures . A CF100 nosewheel wouldn't tires, The unit had been operating C119s for
can well rnean being alive, Controllers are not start a11 over a k ain ~ aircraft are warmed u p~ lock up ; it was adjusted to stay up all the time
mind readers and can only know your intentions crews are callc:d in . All in all a ratlter large and did, An Expeditor lost connection with the
if you have told them, Also, beinK hurnart, (t.hey organization swinRs into pretty rapid artion, undercarriage chain drive when a nut and locknut
are so ! ~ a controller can rY~ake as rnany mistakes Just. as everyone is nicely under way--"Out fell off , This left the starboard wheel hanging
a5 a pilot, Check your clearances and instruc- tw ;~ 11~ou5and, landing instructions>" Needless free, and eventually the wing tip took over the
tions or you may find yourself cleared to the to say he is horribly shocked at the reply he job of supporting the aircraft . A Canso
pearly gate~ . received and goes aroundfor days murmuring, nose gear collapsed after some violent shimmy-
An occasional worry producer is the chap "Awfultouchy folks, these flying controt types" . ing ; the bolt at the apex of the scissors was
~s~l-ro has strapped an his t.rusty charlie forty- (This article is a reprint, with sorne editin~ twisted off through lack of grease . A Harvard
five and filed three hours VFR round robin . changes, from AFHQ Practice Flik_ht (1'iston) wing tip and wing were bent when the downlock
Arriving in thc: vicinity of the home nesting Nc~ws Lett.er,--ED~ pin didn't lock dow~n ; it was jammed solid by
dirt and sand deposited there by the w~ind, A
T-33 had a near tniss whenthe starboard uplock
wouldn't release ; the pilot managed to lower
the undercarriage by the emergency method,
Several airc raft had trouble hiding the wheels

~~ s~i~~i~~~ LF~sunT o~~ .~r~:~ after takeoff . Two Sabres had the nose gear
tangle with the door when adjustments were
a little out . Two CF10Us had the opposite
trouble - the nose gear went up but left the
Have you ever wondered how the injection and therefore more fuel can be fed into the doors behind, Two more CF100s had nose
of water into a jet engine produces abottt 30 per- combustiot~ cl-~amber wit ;tout exceedin>> the n~ax- gear trouble ; on one a flexible hydraulic line
centextra take-off power? 1-Iere is the answer, imum permissible temperatures at critiCal got into the uplock before the gear did, and on
Whe.n water is fed into the engine air intake points, 5econd, because tltrust is directly re- the other the w~heels were left flapping around
ahead of the combustion chamber, and into the lated to the weight of air passing through the after the oleo became disconnected . A T-33
combustors, there are two useful effects, enc~ine
> > the hiaher
~ densit y~ of the water-cooled had door trouble when the~ support bracket bolts
First, the water lowers the temperature of the air enables the en~ine to develop t,~ore power . lt~t go ; thc~ bolts had been tightened several turns
air (which has been raised by compression~, FSF : Mechanics Bt~lletin too much and the threads stripped, A Sabre Four dzuz fasteners were not properly secured .
several years without balancing equipment, and other assorted junk jamming things, extra Dakota noticed the CSU pulley was loose, He
A Dakota and a CF100 had brake failure due to tight or loose cables, levers and cables fouling tightened the nut on the CSU shaft, but didn't
incorrect adjustments, Two more CF100s on other parts, ice on the cockpit floor, etc, notice that he jammed the pulley in full fine
had the main-wheel doors come loose and jam Two T-33s had flap trouble when the flexible position . Naturally an overspeed occurred on
between the tire and wing . A Neptune also had shafts were fractured because of sharp bends , takeoff . A Harvard pilot found that Harvards
undercarriage door troubles - the operating Another T-33 had a plenumchamberdoor come do not climb well with the prop in full coarse .
chain was broken because it was adjusted too open in flight . Still another T-33 had an accident This always happens when the CSU linkage
tight , of a type that has never been reported before , comes loose, A Mitchell and a Neptune each
Two T-33s tried to bury their noses in the After landing and taxiing to'the hangar line, the had a throttle disconnect ; a C119 and a Chipmunk
tarmac a few seconds after the pilots puahed pilot unlatched the canopy and it whipped up so had throttles jam . The student pilot in the
their starter buttons . Since one was on air- fast that the operating chains snapped . Some- Chipmunk was right on the ball-he cut the
test after a periodic inspection and the other bodyhadleftthecabinpressure regulator in the ignition switches and pulled a forced landing on
had several retraction checks the night before, OFF position after a P200 check-the pressure the runway . ASabre and two CF100s had flame-
the AFTechs carry the can for leaving under- must have been terrific , A CF100 had the oppos- outs caused by incorrect throttle adjustments .
carriage levers in the UP position . ite trouble, no pressurization . The 8th stage air The reason given for the two CF100 flameouts
Airplane designers are a pessimistic bunch line came loose from the elbow because the is a new one on us, change in the weather caus-
and insist on putting in some kind of alternate clamps were not tight enough, and while the line ing low idle speed ,
system to take care of things if the standard was flapping around it bashed up some wiring Two CSU's and one propeller were installed
hydraulic system gets out of kilter . Eighteen in the gunbay, rather carelessly, A Lanc had an extra spacer
times during the year their pessimism was and gasket installed below the CSU . After a
justified . Nine CF100s lost all their hydraulic En~ine few hours running the drive gears were suf-
fluid from leaks, loose fittings, etc ., so did ficiently worn to disengage, the prop went to
two Sabres and a Dakota . Another Sabre lost A Comet had an overheat warning in one full fine pitch and overspeeded . One engine
the fluid whenthe reservoir cap fell off, another nacelle . Two combustion chambers on that on an Expeditor ran out of oil and seized, The
had a mixture of fluid, water, ice and dirt engine had been installed with the sealing ring CSU base plug had notbeen tightened . Another
sloshing around in the pipes, and two had ob- gapa in line, permitting leakage from the Expeditor had no unfeathering results on an
solete hydraulic pumps pack up . The pumps chamber into the nacelle , A CF100 had a leak afr-test after prop installation, A seal in
should have been replaced by an improved type . between the tailpipe and the exhaust cone , This the prop was leaking . If a ground feathering
Two T-33s had their header tanks fall apart also caueed an overheat warning, Another check had been done the leak would have been
when the clamps broke because the bolts were CF100 had the oil and fuel lines broken when
tightened too much . the auxiliary gear box drive shaft came loose,
A good s}iare of sloppy maintenance was and still another had severe vibration in one Foreign objects discovered
perpetrated on fuel eystems during 1958 . T-33s engine traced to a loose retaining strut . A inside a rocker box cover.
Two trades worked on this
in particular had their trouble s . ~'ifteen times T-33 had one burner nozzle installed outside the
accessory drrve disconnect.
one or both tiptanks wouldn't feed, usually be- flame tube, resulting in burnt nozzle guide
cause of loose caps, but a couple of times the vanes , Three Mitchells, an Expeditor, a C119,
air connection in thc wing tip leaked, and once a and a Lanc had valve troubles-adjusting screw
screwhadbeenleftoutofeachtank . Justalittle locknuts left loose, a rocker arrn not locked,
screw but enough to let all the pressure out . pushrod covers loose, andpieces of old gasket
Three Sabres also had droptanktrouble, on one left in the rocke r boxes to plug oil lines . An-
the cap was loose, on another the sway brace other Mitchell had a couple of induction pipe
came loose and caused a leak, and on the third inserts come loose . This is an old trouble on
the swaybrace fe11 off-so did the tank, Another these engines, and the -7 EO requires a visual .
Sabre had indigestion brought on by a mixture check for signs of gas leaks in the area . An
of fuel and water . The tank sumps had been H34A 1-Ielicopter was due for pre-oiling, so the
drained but the aircraft was parked on a slope, pre-oilplug wasleft loose and an appropriate
tail down, and the water wasn't in the surnps . entry was made in the L14-of another aircraft .
A CF100 and a Mitchell each losta wing tank cap . The Helicopter went flying, the plug came out
Two T-33s had fuel venting pastloosc fuselage and all the oil went ov erboard . The engine never
tank caps, and one was venting all over the did get pre-oilf~d, but it doesn't need it now .
place because a float valve was jammed open A CF100 also ran one engine out of oil, This
by a piece of stone . Another T-33 sprang a particular engine had a history of high oil con-
leak in the line between wing tanks and fuselage sumption, but the oil level was not checked on
tank because the clamps were not tight . Finally, several BFIs . A Harvard, a North Star, and
the fuel selector valve handle in an Expeditor two Lancs had oil tank caps fall off or come
was installed 180 ° out . When the pilot switched loose, A Bristol Freighter had a feathering
to starboard Main the selector was actually in line chafed through because a spacer was left
the OFF position ; the starboard engine quit and out, and a Chipmunk sprang a leak at a loose
could not be started again . connection behind the instrument p anel . A
Thirty-three aircraft had their controls act Dakota pilot found one engine running hot - the
up, The types involved may be of interest - oil ternperature just kept going up and up . Oil V

1 Sabre, 1 T-33, 1 Mitchell, and 30 Canucks . cooler connections had been reversed .
The difficulties had a variety of causes including Engine controls had their share of inat-
wrong diameter cables (Mitchell), water in the tention, as usual . Vine cases afflicted eight
hydraulic systern (Sabre), various nuts, bolts types of aircrait . ,An AETech doing a PI on a
discovered, in the terminal blocks , And finally an Expeditor Photo from the smoke room, The other ease concerns
There were four instances of extraordinary undercarriage had to be handcranked down a CF100 . The pilot was slightly bewildered by
maintenance that deserves special mention, because a wire was broken on the dynamic relay, A photographer came up with one of the an explosion which took place when he lowered
One engine in a Mitchell was overheating con- easiest and most effective ways of wrecking the seat, A couple of MRPs had been installing
tinually . After the normal trouble-shooting Instrument an airplane . 13e just left two Dzus fasteners a mod (Martin-Baker 337) and in the process the
failed, a check was made for air leaks in the undone on the camera panel in the air intake seatlatch hadbeen installed upsidedow~n . This
induction system, A leak was found ; there was The ITechs had most of their problems with of a Sabre , The panel came off, broke off the allowed the seat to drop past the latch, firing the
no gasket between the carburettor adapter and CF100s, especially the pitot-static system, pitot head, and both chunks went through the drogue gun through the canopy, An M&WTech
the superchargercasing . ADakota was having One had a looae connectionatthe rear altimeter, engine during takeoff run, Since the engine NCO carried out an independentcheck afterthe
a PI inflicted on it when the AETech found some one had the lines reversed in the port wing was running at full throttle it disintegrated, MRPs were finished, but did not check the latch
oil leaks on one engine . He fixed up the leaks leading edge, and in the third the lines were not Bits and pieces flew out in all directions, through as it is an airframe part, and no one told the
and called it a day, A pilot doing his preflight connected when the leading edge was buttoned the sides of the fuselage, through the wheel AFTechs thatthe latch hadbeen disturbed, The
check a short time later found, on the same up, Probably the ITechs didn't know about the wells , It is only by the grace of God and good MRPs are mainly at fault, with inadequate
engine, part of the engine cowling and the cowl last one, no L14 entry, but we'll give them living that the pilot is alive today, che ~ ;ks on their work contributing ,
gills burnt through, A section of the exhaust credit anyway, Their only other boner was on Our last item is a good example of lack of
collector ring has come loose, apparently during a Mitchell, The nosewheel indicator showed Miscellaneous common sense and the only known case of a
the previous flight . A Chipmunk pilot found that unsafe after the gear was lowered , It was OK, taxiing accident being blamed on the mainten-
his throttle lever had no effect on the engine . but the indicator was worn out - 50°fo past its There were many cases of careles~ mainten- ance organization, An aircraft towing vehicle
No, itwasn'tdisconnected . Asmallbug (insect, authorized life , ance during the year where the trade of the was parked 7 or 8 feet from the edge of a taxi
species unknown) was plugging the main jet in person responsible was not mentioned in the strip during night flying, with no lights on the
the carburettor . Presumably it dropped or Armament report . Eleven of these referred to various tractor and none in the area, A Sabre taxiing
crawled induring the previous inspection while hatches, panels, doors, etc ,, being left loose by clobbered it with a wing,
the jet was removed, That old standby, Harvard A Sabre was shooting up the area, literally and either coming off or belng damaged during Quite an indictment againstthe maintenance
engine cowling, is the last one , The AETech did and legally since it was on a gunnery range, flight . Maintenance people are responsible for people, isn't it? One sad part of the story is
not do up the Dzus fasteners at the top last or when a small explosion occurred, A ahe11 had fastening these panels ; the pilot's pre-flight that in almost every case the original cause of
first . The -2E0 specifies doing the Dzus fired before it got into the gun, wrecking the check is merely a little extra insurance, He the accident or incident was a relatively minor
fasteners first and latches later . This fellow gun and some amrnunition chutes, The firing cannot possibly check every detail, only the detail . Something was not tightened enough, or

Z -'
justhooked the studs atthe top intothe corres- pin retainer had fallen out unnoticed while the most obvious things , tightened too much, something was not quite
ponding holes, did up the latches and forgot the gun was being assembled, The EO specified In addition to the various panels and hatches properly adjusted, all the splitpins except one
fasteners , the retainer and pin are to be a tight fit, so it left unlocked, there were a couple of other installed, or something equally "unimportant" .
should be impossible for pieces to fall apart interesting cases , A BFI was carried out on There are many ways of describing this kind
Electrical if the gun was assembled properly, A CF100 a Harvard, or at least the book was signed, of maintenance ; some of them are-sloppy,
carne back deficient one rocket pod , The waisted A short time later someone passing by noticed careless, haphazard, inattentive, lackadaisical,
The undercarriage warninghorn is a device bolthadnotbeen installed inthe ejector piston . a side window missing from the canopy . The and thoughtless . Which word applied to YUU?
to remind pilots in case they forget to lower On another CF100 the pod came apart and the window had blown out during the previous flight
the undercarriage when landing . One student tailcone fell off because the butterfly nut was and left some unhealthy gashes in the fuselage
in a Harvard forgot, and the horn didn't remind not tight enough to hold the pod together . and rudder on the way by, We can credit the
1 Jan - 30 Jun 57
him, so he landed wheels up . The rollers on pilot with an assist on this one, as there was

3
t . . : :=,- 1 1ul - 31 Dec 57
9

the horn actuating switch had developed flat Safety Equipment no L14 entry about the missing windo«~, how-

w
spots which made the switch very erratic ; at ever, it looks suspiciously like a BFI done 1 Jan - 30 Jun 58
the time of this accident the horn would blow The SETechs supplied one accident and one . 1 Jul - 31 Dec SB
only if the throttle was fully back, instead of at incident to the records, both involvedCF100s,
the usual throttle positivn . Several other One pilot and one navigator returned from a trip
Harvards on the unit were found in the same looking and feeling a little blue . No oxygen . W ~ 1L W J

condition, A CF100 pilot shut down one engine It had all leaked out through a loos e connection . w w Q Q ~ y
w J~C _Z ~ ~ U w
when he had a fire warnmg . When he shut off the Another pilot heard a loud crunch when he clos ed
w ~ ~ ~ w

U
low pressure cock the other engine quit . The the canopy ;the drogue acissors shackle hadnot J } = f0 Z tn ~ f" ~ U ~ W

low pressure cocks were wired to the opposite been fastened down and it went through the a
p ~
w
-
N
_ ~
~
~
~ U w
switches . A 5abre generator failed, after canopy, w } va Q 0
causing some voltmeter and loadmeter antics , a = ~ m > > J a
m ~ ~. ~ Q
The brushes had been removed during a PI and Telecom
were installed backwards . Two CF104s lost
their canopies ; one was taxiing when a loose It is notveryoftenthe Telecom people inter- 25% 0a
v
wire from the jettison switch touched a live fere with flying activities, except for rninor
20a~o
terminal ; in the other the navigator inadvert- annoyances when the various radios and tEiings \' I J

ently operated the jettison switch while reaching quit . However, the VHF antenna on a Sabre, 15°jo _ ~ ------
for another switch because the jettison switch the tip of the vertical stabilizer, caused them . , I ` ~ y
' C.y

--- - " o
had no guard on it . Two CF100s had false fire some embarrassment . A technician removed l00~0 , f
ctn l

warnings ; one had a wire left off the detector and the tip in order to have new anchor nuts in- .~~V
~..; ;
~ ~~ ~~+~ I \~ '
(~ J ~\

z
. . ~ I 1 1 "'~\~

50~0 --

it shorted, and in the other the detector itself was stalled, The workshop boys did the work and \, , '~V ~ ~ Ifi

, L1Y-t~ . .~~~ »
not secured, One CF100 lost the use of a wing set the tip back in place to check for fit . It 0 ~ _Cs,l_~

fuel pump and another lost all its lights and fitted . The technician saw the tip back in place
some radio, both caused by loose terminal and signed the L14 . The aircraft went flying The apparent drop in incidents affecting "Basic Airframe", when compared to 1957, is due to the
screws , Two T-33s had their tiptanks jettison and the VHF wentdead , The antenna had fallen introduction of the °Others" clossification . This classification consists almost entirely of incidents
when terminals were shorted by metal objects off - no screws had been installed . involving lost panels, hatches, and doors, which were included in "Basic Airframe" in 1957 .

10 11
WHEELS UP oR DOWN
by S l G. L Sheahan

Si~ S P ades! Double! The words were loud

and clear throughout the crew room . Dummy
spread the cards on the table, and excitement ¢:r~
mo unted . Declar er, who is a sharp operator, ,r

looked at the lead, looked over the dummy and ~, ;,'7~

;, ;~'3~"i~: ~ ~°.t ,~ ,~r~
gave the matter a little thought, Said he, "I'll :`K ;,~Ft k~e
a~ ", ~',~,y~r,~r xr~, r°~~~,
try a squeeze play and if that doesn't work I'll
try an end play, What's the chances of them
working? 50-50 ." finish the hand, Mayday Mayday Mayday-- landings in the RCAF and could not substantiate only landed wheels down and in one of these the
Clang! Clang! Scramble! Engines on, taxi Flameout . Well thert~ is no squeeze play here this ruling and, as a result, RCAF EOs, except pilot suffered a severe back injury . His harness
out, airborne, on heading and climbing . I but let's get to it . Let's have the speed stabil- for the recommendation for landing the CF100, was unlocked , In one wheels up landing the
wonder if that end play would have been neces- ized to gliding speed, and try a relight, Well, leave the decision up to the pilot, It is not the pilot also suffered a back injury because his
sary? "Rat Trap Two your vector is 315, " well, nojoy . Let's tryitagain, watch the air- intention to arglie this point, but we feel that if harness was undone . In onP landing accident
"Roger 315 ." Yep, it's too bad we couldn't speed , It should work at the lower level so we'll the pilot has a little background it will assist the aircraft stalled in the turn, but the pilot
try it again, Still no joy, I guess we have had him in making a decision should the occasion managed to level the wings before the aircraft
the course ; nowdo we ejector do we force land, arise . struck the ground, with the wheels down, The
We're well within gliding distance to the field, so Of eight Sabre forced landings at aero- aircraft was a write-off ; the pilots suffered
give it a go , dromes, five were short landings on prepared minor and no injuries respectively .
"Gladstone Tower Rat Trap Two unable to or semi-prepared surfaces, four with wheels From the overall analysis, it is impossible
get a relight . I'm in position to make base, down and one with wheels up, and in each case to arrive at a definite conclusion as to whether
Request clearance to force land," Man, this the crew sustained minor or no injury, Two, jet aircraft should be forced landed wheels up
couldn'tbe better if Itried, Altitude just right, on take-off, landed wheels down inthe overrun or wheels down, Therefore it is left to the pilot
"Tower Rat Trap Two high downwind ." Base area and the pilots sustained no injuries . One to select the configuration that is appropriate
leg, unde rcarriage down and locked, watch this landed on the runway and was fatal as the pilot for his particular emergency, The most
turn, not too tight, that's better, lined up, ejected the canopy on touchdown and it was important factor is effecting the landing in a
Airspeed good, a little high, better get some assumed that he was knocked unconscious . controlled attitude and with proper airspeed .
flap down, that's better , I got her made, full Thirty-four cases of Sabre forced landings This point bears repetition-a controlled atti-
. , ..~[ , flaps, flare, Man it's nice to be home again, off the airfield were reviewed of which 281anded tude and with proper airspeed .
~;b' .ir ~is~, ~ "'vl~~:~ . Now in this case there was no doubt about wheels up and six landed wheels down . Wheels There are cases on record where the pilot
putting the wheels down, which brings us to the up landings caused two fatalities ; one landed too either tried to put the wheels down or retract
A successful wheels down forced landing. fast and the other struck a steel guy wire before them just before landing, with the result that the
point of this story .
The Board felt this terrain indicatedawheelsdownlanding. When you, the pilot of a jet, are faced with touchdown . One pilot sustained minor/major* last minute distraction caused a poor landing ,
an emergencyforced landing should you try the injury when he landed wheels up in an open This brings in the psychological aspect of
landing wheels up or wheels down? (EO 25D-1 rough field and in each of the 25 other wheels indecision, If you are tryingto decidewhether
recommends "a normal w~heels up landing" for up cases onlyminor or no injury was involved . to land wheels up or dow~n, you are apt to forget
the CF100 . ) Two pilots were fatally injured in wheels down your flying and lose control close to the ground ,
In the old days the order was clear, in the landings because they were ejected from the As the evidence we have does not indicate that
F
event of a forced landing, we were instructed aircraft after touchdown . One wheels down one configuration is safer, a good policy to

i
to land wheels up because this would minimize landing was in heavy bush (trees ten inches in follow would be to make up your mind early,
the damage to the aircraft . Today, unless you diameter) and the pilot suffered major injury, then under no circumstances change it at the
are landing on a prepared surface the odds are One landed wheels down, partially out of control, last minute, And again : Choose your configura-
the aircraft willbe a write-off, sothe problem
we are trying to answer with Wheels Up or Down
is how to minimize injury to the crew .
l but with wings level, in light bush and the pilot
sustained minor/major injury, Only minor or
no injury was reported for each of the other
tion then concentrate on controlling attitude and
speed .
There are other cases on record where the
This problem was broughtto the fore by the wheels down landings , specialists felt that because the wheels were
USAF in 1956 . Their EOs left no choice ; you A review of 15 T-33 cases of off the airfield down they absorbed the initial shock, with the
landed Gear Down, DFS investi g ated forced forced landings reveals no fatal injuries . Two result thatthe c_rew were unhurt . Let's take a

'~ Inquiries dassified "minor'major" may be either minor or 13

11
major depending on complications,
hypothetical case where a pilot for reasons cessful if the aircraft was under control to the
unknownhas to force land, The field is uneven point of touchdown . In the 42 cases concerning
and strewn with rocks , Nowfor mybooks, this the Sabre that were discussed, all the aircraft

,_'NEAR
would be an ideal case where the wheels should were written off except two that sustained C
be down . The initialcontact, be it a mound or and D categorydamage . This, therefore, is the
rock, will be taken by the wheels , No doubt the justification for the statement that the purpose
undercart will be torn from the aircraft, but
that is the whole idea . The initial shock will
of discussing this problem is to save lives,
not aircraft, and the reason for repeating, MISS
be absorbed by the wheels, the aircraft will choose your configuration then concentrate on
decelerate, and the contact of the fuselage will attitude and speed,
be less severe . Again, bear in mind, the speed I'll leave you one last thought, if you have
on touchdown is all important, the altitude and have control in a normal glide,
In summary, the forced landings that were you have the ideal conditions for a successful
carried out either wheels up or down were suc- ejection,
(The USN made a study of jetforced landings .
Forty out of forty-two Sabres were written off. This study only considered landings in which the
wheels were up or down--not in an intermediate
position-and "only those cases in which the air-
error? Because the automatic oil temperature
craft made initial contact with the ground in an
.°~ ~ attitude suitable for landing," Their conclu- 450 FEET control system kept the temperature within
limits, Whena small adjustment was required
, ~;;"~.,,.
, r,;~
.r ;.-- "` .w sions are quoted in toto :
, ' ~. .,~_~-1 , ~'1 , When all forced or crash landing Prior to letdown in a C F 100 at our de stination it ma gnified the problem, Then manual operation
~~C' -; " :- by the pilot only added more heat to the hot oil
the tower gave us an altimeter setting of 29 .94 .
.t j,

~~5~ accidents are considered without regard for any

and more cold to the cooler oil,
:>,- ~IIE: '~~ ~ factors other than position in gear, there is no A few minutes later another tower in the area
The pilot, however, took the proper action,
/
r~ f . ~_ ~r :74 t .1~ .~~ . . _ ~+C1
relationship between position of gear and was heardto give a setting of 29 .45 . Destination
A UCR has been raised to "colour code" these
' .i. . R

tower was asked againforthe altimeter setting

, ~ ~y,,,

injuries incurred . In other words, the serious-

~.
f,~ itr,,- "~~ /
" .7",Xu ~T,J
.r- .~~d' .~""
connections, And the contractor has been in-
' w'~r

_ ness of injuries received is no greater for and they again gave 29 .94 .
accidents when the aircraft is in a gear up On GCA while passing through 8000 GCA was formed of his error,
asked to confirm 29 .94, Their answer : 29 .49 . (Here is more proof that, all automatic
configuration than when in a gear down config-
'~~
, r -~j~ rZ'~

uration, and vice versa, Although the setting of Z9 .94 would have meant gadgets to the contrary, there is nothing to
~ .~ . .~ ~,~s.. _ ~ii
Li~~' '~ k~IG'"

'~`" _ a~~`~' ".I 2. When the accidents considered are a high roll out, i_t could have been critical had take the place of a consciencious maintenance
injuries were fuel been low, Onthe ot}ier hand, if it had been man and a good supervisor,-ED)
only thoae in which serious
incurred, there is a tendency for more com- IFR and the altimeter settings reversed it could
pression fractures to occur whenthe gear is in have been disastrous,
the up position than when it is down,
CORRECT EMERGENCY ACTION
3, When the factor of speed upon initial FSO's Comment :
A T-33 was on cross-country from Mac-
impact is considered, there is a definite
This strongly suggests the need for caution Donald to Saskatoon , Approximately one minute
relationship between speed on initial impact and
in accepting such a critical item as an altimeter from station passage on the Saskatoon range
seriousness of injuries received--the higher
setting without cross checking whenever pos- a complete generator failure was experienced ,
the speed the greater the injury, This relation-
sible, The finger may also be pointed at the At this time conditions at Saskatoon were 600
shipholds true regardless of the position of the
originator of this report for his false deduction, feet and 10 miles ; the tip tanks had ran dry
gear ; and there is no relationship between
Hadhe leftthe erroneous settingonhis altimeter about two minutes before the generator failed ;
position of gear and injuries incurred when
he would have rolled out lower, not higher than and the aircraft had been cleared to descend
speed is held constant,
4, When type of aircraft are grouped desired* on arrival at Saskatoon .
An emergency was declared and the letdown
together on the basis of their descent rates,
commenced with all excess electrical equipment
there is only a very slight tendency for the
higher rate grouptoincur more serious injuries CROSSED UP turned off (the defroster had to be turned on
thanthe lower rate group . However, when gear again) . The flag on the gyro horizon was flicking
position is also considered there is a definite A C119, which was 81 :15 hours past overhaul off and on so the letdown was done on limited
by a contractor, was climbing through 6000 when panel,
relationship between the higher rate group with
gear upand seriousness of injuries-higher rate the pilot noticed thatthe starboard oil temper- This is how the pilot told it ; "On reaching
of descent aircraft incur more serious injuries ature was increasing, It could not be kept within minimurn the ground could be seen through
when the gear is up . limits so the engine was shut down and the air- breaks in the cloud, The letdown was continued
5. When only accidents which are obstacle craft returned to base . D~iringthe eight minutes so that we could remain visual . At this time
free are considered, there is no relationship required to return to base the portoil temper- we tried to call approach to tell them we were
between position of gear and seriousness af ature decreased to a point just above the visual butcontact couldnotbe madc: . We could
injuries , minimum limit, barelyhear onthe RT, but were getting a bear-
6, In contrast, when obstacles are en- Afterthe previous flighttheportoil temper- ing on the ARC , We homed intothe range station
countered, more serious injuries occur than ature was reported low and adjustments were on ARC and on station passage the wheels and
whenno obstacles are encountered . Thisholds made to increase the temperature . Here is ZO° flap were lowered . The wheels indicated
true for both the gear up and gear do~~n config- where everyone was crossed up-the temper- down and locked . Flaps were then selected full
uration, although slightly more serious injuries ature gauges had been cross connected by thc down but only about 35 - -10 ° went down before
occur when the aircraft encounters obstacles in contractor, battery power failed . At this time total radio
Why did it take 81 ;15 hours to discover this contact was lost . A straight-in approach on
a gear up configuration . "-ED)

15
14
runway 32 was made and the c rash equipment yards in front of us and at the same altitude .
was noticed standing by at the side of the run- This was quite a surprise as we were not con-
way . Touchdown was made without incident cerned about other aircraft in our holding area
and the aircraft brought to a stop on the runway . and we knew the scramble would turn left after

WATCH THAT BIRD

The ambulance led us to the parking area and the takeoff and go to the inner beacon,
aircraft was shut down . There were still 70 Immediately a check to the tower confirmed
gallons indicated in the fus elage tank and lights that the leader of the scramble proceeded
were sti11 glowing faintly . The canopy could directly to the "cans" and had not adhered to his
be slowly raised electrically . During the let- clearance . The leader had read his departure
dow"n we were not able to transmitbut the VHF instructions back to the tower so this was not a
receiver was still functioning . We were not misunderstanding,
advised that crash equipment was standing by If anti-collision lights were fitted to the air- .;
nor cleared to land . It is suggested that in craft it is possible that th :~ Nc~dr ~ti~~ ~to~. .ld ri
similar emergencies the tower should consider not have been quite so clo~e .
blind transmission of any pertinent information . (DFS has recommended 13rioz~ity installation
If this accomplishes nothing else it would at of anti-collision lights on aircraft,-ED) by S L T. Wallnutt mended manner . He applied insufficient bank
least help to reassure the pilot ." and, of course, the noae came up high with the
Investigation showed that the field circuit airspeed dropping rapidly, The safety pilot
wiring was broken inside the insulation approxi- FIRE ONE Flashli g hts , ha ndbooks, canopy w'mding decided to take over at this point, but the nose
mately 3 1 /2 inches from the rear generator handle, and other sundry items were whirling was so high he elected to continue over the top
field switch . (The code number of this wire During a periodic inspection on a CF 100 the about the cockpit threatening collision with the and recover in that way . To assist the aircraft
drogue guns were removed and taken to the crew's heads . These objects were tearing loose overthe top, ashe explained, he applied flaps .
is PP4F-20 and it is located in the rear right
hand switch panel .) The cause was assessed armament repair shop for servicing, The Cpl from theirnormal etorageto become missiles, The re is room for argument in the value of this
"Materiel" and UCR action initiated, put the guns on the workbench and explained to their energy being derived from the violent technique among the hot-stove fraternity ; some
the M&WTech the procedure for carrying out manoeuvres of the vehicle in which they were might even say that the use of flap aggravated
an inspection on the drogue gun . The Cpl then suspended . In its descent the ship groaned, the situation and induced a more violent re-
FINAL CHECK PAYS OFF went to the tool crib . In his absence the shuddered, and heaved . The inatrument panel
was shaking so badly that the dials became
action than heretofore heard of in a T-33, In
M&WTech secured a drogue gun in the holding any case the aircraft yawed and, although the
bracket on the bench and hroceeded with the fuzzy and indistinct, and impossible to read, pilots' recollections were naturally a bit hazy,
On checking oat a CF 100 prior to a navigation
inspection . With the barrel, piston and cart- Although the harneas was tight and locked the it is assumed that a flick roll to the right
exercisc: I found that the radios were very weak,
ridge still installed the safety pin and sear seat packs shifted to an awkward position over followed . It is not surpriaing that the aircraft
While I was waiting for this snag to be fixed the
The gun fired . The piston the lip of the bucket and the crc~w's efforts to began to "tumble" .
groundcrew were instructe:d to see that all air- were removed .
struck an ejectiongunthatwason the bencl~ and replace them were ineffective . The relentless In an article in Jan-Feb 1956 issue of Flight
crafthad pitot covers on . When the radios were
gyrations of the ship and the resultant acceler- Comment on tumbling trials, you will recall
fixed I did not do another external as I was al- ricocheted against a concrete wall,
Instructions laid down in E05 55- ation forces, fluctuating from positive to reading that the prerequisite for tumbling is
rc~ady twenty minute~ behind my flight plan . Cause :
50-2B and 55-50-2C were not followed, negative "G", were causing extreme confusion maximum-rate side-slip, which necessitates
I noticed, on takeoff, t .hat no airspeed was
No one was in'ured and as accide7ts 1:10, to the occupants, disorientation, and rendering crossing the controls . This situation cancels
indicated, By this timc: I had accelerated to
approximately 90K but managed to stop without this was not an expensive one . How rnuch will them virtually incapable of any co-ordinated out the natural aerodynamic stability of the tail
A hand? A lifc'? Even reaponse with their hands, At best they might and the tumble may follow, Theae two pilots
burning out the brakes or going off the end of the next one cost?
though steps have beentakento prevent similar have been able to negotiate the canopy jettisoning donot recall crossing the controls, but no doubt
the runway,
I feel that this incident was caused by my accidents, we still must depend on the individual handle, but they had little hope of success in the effect was the same as it appears the air-
to do it the safe wa~. . The way prescribed in manipulating their seat ejection controls . craft stalled on its tail, side-slip, and yawed,
own negligence in not doing another external
The launching of a space ship? Sounds like However, the most startling aspert about
but I cannothe.lp thinking that part of the blame
it doean't it? Or two ordinary fly-boys giving the tumble, according to other pilots who in-
w~as ~s" ith the groundcrew since they knew I had
with an "'orrible line" to impress some doll advertently have induced one, is tlle com P lete
checked the aircraft,
early in the evening at the squadron thrash? absence of warning . In contrast to the "incip-
Wrong on all counts ! Not out of this world, ient" spin familiar to all pilots who have mis-
FSO's Commenl:
but very much an actual event . It happened in handled the controls, the transition from more
the RCAF. And if you have been conscientious or less controlled flight to the violence of the
The pilot avoided a serious accident indoing
in reading your flight safety literature, you tumble is instantaneous . Evenwhen deliberately
a cockpit check on takeoff roll . All too often
will be able to identify the event as a recent trying to induce the tumble its suddenness is un-
we pour on the coal and forget about a final check
T-33 accident published in the Flight Safety expected and disconcerting to the pilot, Thus,
after we've started to move, Perhaps this is the
Bulletin . Moreover, you will recall that the in an inadvertent tumble, the reaction is so
lesson we can learn from this incident,
two pilots who survived this "hair-raiser" were sudden and violent that, initially, the pilot
two experienced instructors . So bewarel And suffers complete spatial disorientation, This
LET THERE BE LIGHT read on with the hairy details so that you won't likely accounts for these two experienced pilots
get caught the next time you s trap on your trusty having difficulty recounting the position of the
While doing local night flying, the tower T-33 to do a spot of stickhandling in yon blue I controls when "all hell broke loose" . Pilots
a~ked me to hold north of the field at 2500 as he It could happen to you without any warning! w'ZO have experienced the tumble say that there
had a two P lane CF' l00 scramble . The tower then Two instructors were engaged in mutual is no attitude of flight that develops so suddenly
gave the CFl00s their departure instructions, instrument flying and one was giving the other and is so sur P risin g to the victim "
"Takeoff R24-2500 feet to the inner climb 015 some unusual positions under the hood, During This particular tumble was a bad enough
degrees", The clearance wa5 acknowledged by one recovery from a nose high attitude at 18, 000 experience, but the recovery became the hair-
the formation leader, While we were circling feet the instructor under the hood applied back raiser . Characteristically, the gyrations of the
t o the ri g ht a CF l00 p assed a Pp roximatel y" 200 Note dent in drogue gun and damoged wall . pressure and bank to recover in the recom- tumble were so confusing that neither pilot

17
16
 could identify the direction of rotation . As AOIs, but "side-slips using full rudder, m ust by their nature
recommended they raised the flaps, retarded vertical stalls , and any manuE:uvre in- aircraft is taxiingor a~
the throttle, and attemnted to centralize the volving large ya~~ angles" are listed . letins, cross-section),
controls but the rudder resisted bein g cen- Since these are the necessary prere- instruments, maintain
tralized and remained full left . T}ie controls quisites for tumbling, enough said! rying out student ins
were then released and they centralized them- ~ Experience alone is no guarantee against grant you delegation of
selves after a few more gY rations . The controls tumbling, therefore, comply with mini- but in the end the capta
were held neutral until the aircraft recovered mum altitudes . These experienced pilots the safety and efficie>"
into a vertical dive at eight to ten thousand feet . started at 18, 000 and nearly ran out of Surely in this age
The recovery from the dive was achieved at altitude . When you are the safety pilot ccessful attempts to re- denser traffic and mo
approximately 1500 feet above ground level! engaged in unusual positions do not be light engineer decided to' trend should be to _r
How close can you come! Not a fatal, but lulledinto a false sense of security be- rope was attached to thel
looking back, a few of our obscure T-33 fatals cause youhave an experienced Joe under he aircraft and thPn thd POT ROAST
are suspect . t11C 1100d, a successful cross feed
Fort~rnately, the aircraft suffered only minor ~ Do not depend on being able to read the uld be to transfer the fuel A T -33 was being flown on an IF exercise .
-
buckling of the wing root fillets and the boys dials in a tumble-it may not be possible, ~~~ `~ .~rd then cross feed it, This Start-up a~nd pre-taxi checks were completed,
returned safely, The accelerometer registered Thus, if you are o~~er a cloud deck, ensure ~~~1 ~ until the 140 g allon level The aircraft was taxied to the 'TO position . On
plus 7 1~2 to minus 4 1~4, which is considerably the tops provide you with enough recovery takeoff power was increased to 65%, TOE switch
more acceleration than has been recorded room especially doing unusual positions . " ° to make excuses for the on, normal surge and 100~o power was applied,
previously intumbling experiencey . Likelythe y
~ Er~sure that tl-~e harness is extrerY~e1 ti ht rew inthatthe Y lacked the As the aircraft broke ground the JPT started to
highest positive acceleration occurred during before commencing aerobatic y, spinning, to handle this particular climb and the tailpipe overtemp light came on,

:IRI~ll :ll~~
the dive recovery, and unusual positions--a tumble could f TYPE traininQ does a The pilot reduced power to 65% and the light
How can you intrepid T-33 jockies prevent catch you off guard ! went out, The tower was informed of the details .
this from happening to you? Here is some Kee p flashli g hts, handbooks, etc ., in It was found that the JPT remained within limits
sound flight safety advice for those who wish zippered or flapped pockets, and ensure with po«~er up to 85°~0 . The tower relayed the
tc~ dra~~ pensions ; stored items are secure intheirholders, information to the su P ervisor Y staff . Consid-
~ Avoid situations that are likely to produce ~ Know and follow prescribed recovery cring t.hat, t.he aircraft was behaving well at 85°~0

il III~
tumbles . Tumbling is an emergency procedures from a tumble . the supervisory staff instructed the pilot to burn
condition . Tumble5 are not listed as ~ Review the RCAF training film on T-33 off fuel locally and then land .
sucli under Prohibited Manoeuvres in the tcimbling periodically, From the scanty information that you havE:
read, doyouagree withthis decision? It is not

UEPaR~'I RES
our intention to comment either way onthe action
of the supervisory staff as we do not know what
information they received from the pilot, but
the pilot sure pulled a boner when he failed to

OXYGEN
understand his difficulties,
An article in the Jan-Feb 59 issue of Flight
Comment on Nene air casing failures outlined
the symptoms to watch for when a casing fails .
The first symptom was a JPT higher than
In the May-Jun issue of Flight Comment, use in most instances to denote a relative or normal, anditalso mentioned tlre amber over-
page 18, a short article was printed on Oxygen partial lack of oxygen .
in which we explained the term hyperventilatiori Is "hyperventilation" too rnuch oxygen? No!
as too much oxygen, We realized thatthis was Hyperventilation, or overbreathing, results in
not true, but we were not prepared for the a reduction of the carbon dioxide in the blood .
violent reaction we received from the users, Altlrough carbon dioxide is a waste product of
This is indeed gratifying, However, to get oc>r cellulor metabolism it is one of the
everyone back on an even keel,,we asked chemicals which plays a part in controllingthe
W C Coons DGM~(Air) Av Med to clarify the pH (acid-base balance) of the blood . By a
points of anoxia and hypoxia, simple chemical reaction it combines with
Twoquestions havebeen raisedwith respect water to form a weak acid, carbonic acid . For
to the first paragraph of that articlc : the body system to function normallythe acidity
Wiiat is the difference between "anoxia" and (pH) of the blood and tissue fluids must be
"hypoxia" ? When speaking in term s of the whole controlled within relatively narrow limits,
man, anoxia means a total lack of oxygen and is otherwise malfunctions occur, This is particu-
not commonly encountered except through larly true of the nervous and muscul.ar systems,
drowning, strangulation and like events, The When carbon dioxide is blown-off by hyper-
biological scientist may speak of anoxia of ventilation, carbonic acid cannot form and the
specific body tissues which can result from pH of the blood becomes alkaline because this
some eventpreventing the oxygen from reaching weak acid is not present to neutralize the
those tissues through a disturbance of, or dam- alkali (base) . The symptom :~ of this acid-base
age to the oxygen transport system, For disturbance are frequently similar to those of
practical purposes the two terms may be used tiypoxia and are just as incapacitating, This
synonymously in the flying environment, state is known as alkalosis, and ittakes longer
although hypoxia would be the correct term to to recover from it than from hypoxia . A burnt out air casing is hoNer than a blow torch.

19
18
 has, if it strikes the tail, the same effect as
heat or fire warning ~ection of rotation . As
mended getting the bir,ed the flaps, retarded being bit by cannon fire, JAMMED PARATROOP DOOR must by their nature be completed while the
aircraft is taxiingor airborne, (fuel logs, bul-
quickly as possible . pted to centralize the We could quote page and para for half an An RCAF C 119 was engaged in a paratroop' letins, cross-section), itseemsthatmonitoring
In this case the pilc>r resisted being cen- hour where you have been told that, if anything dropping exercise, When readying the aircraft' instruments, maintaining a look-out, and car-
minutes burning off fuel ffull left . The controls is wrong with the aircraft get on the ground for the drop the starboard paratroop door latcht rying out student instruction must suffer . I
ing, hey centralized them- and do not, under penalty of death, carry out was found jammed grant you delegation of duties can enter in here,
in the closed position,'
Investigation reveale" rations, The controls a high speed run . This pilot was lucky . Next The captain sentthe fli g ht en g ineer aft to deter-1 but in the end the captain is still responsible for
from the guide vanes, ~he aircraft recovered time will he know if his luck has run out before it mine the cause of the jamming and to assist in~ the safety and efficiency of the trip .
casing, and a hole burhttotenthousand feet . is too late? opening the door . Surely in this age of increasing air speeds,
No . 1 casing . There was dive was achieved at altitude, W hen you After several unsuccessful attempts to re- denser traffic and more complex equipment the
in the back end adjacent above ground level! engaged in unusual lease the latch, the flight engineer decided to' trend should be to reducing the pilot's fringe
cables . Fortunately the . .~ : ..s'LUl~lru ~r~rough lulled into a false pull the hinge pins, A rope was attached to the~~ dutie~ so he can return to flying the aircraft,
iV'o . 1 and 2 casings did not. occur in a position cause youhave an e: door to pull it into the aircraft and t.hPn tha?
where the heat could have burned through the the hood . hinge pins w only way a successful cross feed D . B. 0'Connor, F L
fuselage . ~ Do not depend on b of the door vecuted, would be to transfer the fuel d (T) OTU
There you have it, The pictures tell the dials in a tumble-i broke free,age tankandthencross feedit, This
story, and we have two wiser pilots who are Thus, if you are over air flo~~~ an~ot be done until the 140 gallon level Part Of The Blame
lucky to be with us today, Remember, if you the tops provide you the horizont
have an overheat condition suspect the worst room especially doi done to the ~ seemed to make excuses for the It seems a shamethatthe "accident concep-
and get down on the ground, ~ Ensure that the harni land the airr'rvicing crew in that they lacked the tion watchers" (Runaway Mule Kicks Birds,
before comrnencing ; To find a required to handle this particular May-Jun issue) did not see fit to try to warn the
UNDER PENALTY OF DEATH and unusual nositi~ of the USAFJhat sort of TYPE training does a airmen by shouting or whistling that the mule
A SUGGESTED PROCEDURE was made, r~eed so that he knows enough not to was still moving . Perhaps they should be as-
A pilot took off in a T-33 to test a smoke covered ; in ~ tip tank? sessed part of the blame for it?
he found that The startup, runup, and takeoff of a C 119
g enerator, Shortly after takeoff in the other c'~rlce uti~hi` }~u~tatgc~~'~~~hc~r~o at)3e r~~~t
were routine . Just after takeoff, however, the was maae at Uttawa . Ht the time ot this entry
he had to use left rudder to maintain his heading . horizontal stabilizer was damaged - a11 on
He suspected the undercarriage doors were tower reportedfuel venting fromthe port wing, the aircraft had flown 4 hours 45 minutes and
board were killed . The RCAF aircraft, it its oil state was recorded as 6 gallons each
causing drag so he recycled the undercarriage, When circuit height was reached the engineer
would seem, was about as close to disaster as tank . No oil was added . The pilot said he had
This did not clear trouble ; left rudder was still went aft to check and reported a considerable
it could come and still escape .
required . amountof fuelwas venting . With booster pumps asked for oil and fuel at each servicing stop
Investigation of the RCAF accident revealed but, according to the L 14T, the aircraft flew 13
He carried on with the exercise . On the third on emergency fuel pressure read 26 psi, switch-
that the flight engineer did not inform the pilot hours 35 minut.es without oil
run at 390Ks he felt a bump and found that left ing the pumps to off and normal did not clear the being added,
of his deciston to remove the door in an unor -
trouble so they were returned to emergency and Fortunately the engine was not darnaged .
rudder was no longer required to maintain his thodox mannc.r, Tlus was a serious mistake ; Disciplinary action has been taken against
heading . the aircraft was landed . The port engine was
the pilot must be kept informed of all things the pilot for not checking the L14'I' after each
On landing it was found that the lower fillet, shut down to taxi then, because of the quantity
that may ~eopardize the aircraft, servicing stop . But what about the servicing
win r, to fuselage, at the lower wing root port of fuel streamiug from the wing, the other engine
flights concerned? Surely they must realize
side was torn open leaving a hole one foot in was shutdownwiththe aircraft still on the run-
that fuel is useless if the crankshaft won't g o
diameter . One piece of metal was missing and wa Y , a fire truck was called and the crew stood
around, The pilot is finally responsible it is
the restwas torn back bythe slip stream . The by with fire extinguishers . ,
cause was assessed "Maintenance Error" . Investigation revealed that the port inboard
Someone had left six 10-32 screws out of the tank selector (27VA/2044) had failed inthe open
into the
leading edge of the fillet, p osition and allowed fue.l to be pumped
Not securing parts properly is inviting an tank, When the selector and motor were dis-
accident ; flying an aircraft at high speed after mantled they were found to be saturated wit .h
experiencing a control problem is flirting with water . It was assumed that the presence of
water was caused by a defective gasket
disaster . A piece of metal torn from the air-
( W-7950-2D-H) . UCR action has been taken .
craft and travelling towards the tail at 400Ks
Because the aircrew involved did not know
the source of the venting fue1, it is considered
that they took the proper action . In this case,
however, switching to the port inboard tank ~i
would have stopped the venting . 'rhis procedure
would reduce the fuel in the inboard tank to a
safe level, The only problem being that, if ~~~>
sufficient fuel has not been removed from the
outboard tank it will overflow due to the car-
burettor va P our vent return . This same proced-
ure ma Y be used if an outboard tank shows signs
of overflowin g , i .e ., switching to the outboard
tank,
Insimilar incidents itis suggested that air-
crew tr Y this P rocedure and then, if venting
interval, assume
P ersists after a reasonable
that the leaka $ e is from some other source, for i~~
example, a leaking fuel cell . A parotroop door ihaf was removed during flight.

20 21
 could identify the direction of rotation, As not been fully inserted . The unusual stress the starboard indicated that it was transferring", must by their nature be completed while the
recommended they raised the flaps, retarded caused by the landing seperated the line from Accordingtomy knowledge ofthe CF100 MK IV aircraft is taxiing or airborne, (fuel logs, bul-
the throttle, and attempted to centralize the the nipple . The fire started when the oxygen, fuel system itis impossible to transfer from the letins, cross -section~, it seem s that monitoring
controls, but the rudder resisted being cen- iunder pressure, came in contact with oil and tip tanks until the level of the fuselage tanks instruments, maintaining a look-out, and car-
tralized and remained full left, T}re controls :grease on varioc.rs fittings, Due to the fire, the drops to 140 gallons, (Auth EO OS-Z5E-2 Part rying out student instruction must srrffer, I
were then released and t}rey centralized them- ~aircraft was written off, 5, Section Z Para 53~, There would be a con- grant you delegation of duties can enter in here,
selves after afew more gyrations, The controls < The hazard associated with oxygen under siderable lapse of time until the 140 gallon level but in the end the captain is still responsible for
were held neutral until the aircraft recovered lpressure and grease is well known, and this is was reached after completion of the auxiliary the safety and efficiency of the trip,
into a verticaldive at eighttotenthousand feet . ione of the rare cases that proves the need for tank transfer, which leaves the fuselage tank Surely in this age of increasing air speeds,
The recovery from the dive was achieved at caution . So w}ren you are working on an oxygen full, denser traffic and more complex equipment the
approximately 1500 feet above ground level! system make sure you know what has to be done He also stated that "by cross feeding I was trend should be to reducing the pilot's fringe
How close can you come! Not a fatal, but and do it properly or you may be rigging your- able to finally balance the load", It is also an dutie~ so he can return to flying the aircraft,
looking back, a few of our obscure T-33 fatals self a blow torch, impossibility to cross feed from a CF100 tip
are suspect, ing, ` tank . The only way a 5uccessful cross feed D. B. 0'Connor, F l
Fortunately, the aircraft suffered only minor Investigation " vE could be executed, «~ould be to transfer the fuel 4 (T) OTU
buckling of the wing root fillets and the boys from the
g uide v~d ,~. tothe fuselage tankandthencross feedit, This
returned safely . The accelerometer re g istered casing, and a hole in turn cannot be done until the 140 gallon level Part Of The Blame
plus 7 1~2 to minus 4 1~4, which is considerably No, 1 casin , is reached,
g Ther e
more acceleration than has been recorded in the back end a ' You also seemed to make excuses for the
d~ac It seems a shamethatthe "accident concep-
previously intumbling experiences . Likelythe cables, Fortunatel Winnipeg servicing crew in that they lacked the tion watchers" (Runaway Mule Kicks Birds,
yt
highest positive acceleration occurred durin~ No . 1 and Z casin s knowledge required to handle this particular May-Jun issue~ did not see fitto try to warn the
g d.
the dive recovery, where the heat cn~,l~ aircraft, What sort of TYPE training does a airmen by shouting or whistling that the mule
How can you intrepid T-33 jockies preven A SUGGEST E D PR 0 CEDURE technician need so that he knows enough not to was sti11 moving, Perhaps they should be as-
this from happenin~ tn ~~~~,? JJ ~ ..~~ 0 . J111V1~C fill just one tip tank? sessed part of the blame for it?
cr, rt T af P ak~nff he found that The startup, runup, and takeo
THIS IS A ~A t The sentence which stated "although the port
J . W . Brown, FS
BRAKE ADJUSTMENT tip tank indicated t}~at it did not feed, there was
no fuel in it when inspected on the ground" has 1110 TSD
Onreturnfroma multi fighter exercise, the
CF100 was landed slightlyhotand long, Shortlv The crew of a North 5tar were practicing me completely baffled as well, (Agreed, Accident prevention is not a spec-
after touchdown a violent shimmy commenced touch and go landings off simulated instrument tator sport,-ED~
and the aircraft tended to pull to the right, The approaches . The technique used for a111andings J. A. McGovern, Cpl
4 (F) Wing
pilot applied continuous heavy braking but the was combination wingdownand crab with touch
CF100 continued to swing to the right,If left the downs being made onthe starboard main wheels .
runway and ended up in a snowbank, The fourth landing was a full stop and during (Considering the information given, Cpl Somewhat Unsafe Situations
When the navigator started to climb out of the the landing roll a loud "clunk" was heard on the MeGovern is correct, The pilot did not report
aireraft he noticed smoke coming from the rear port side, The "clunk" did not affect the opera- all his actions in detail so both he and Flight A recent extended trip to various RCAF
air conditioning trough cover and advised the tion of the aircraft so it was taxied to takeoff Comment have leftthe impression that the im- stations pointed out several situations, that are
pilot to get out quickly because the aircraft was position for more touch and go landings, possible was accornplished . Ifthere~sa lesson somewhat unsafe, at least for transient air-
on fire . As the pilot. was leaving the aircraft On the second landing there was con5ider- in this it must. be that Maintenance must have craft .
there was an audible bang and witnesses stated able vibration so the over shoot was aborted, complete rc:ports-ED} The use of non-5tandard R~T by RCAF ap-
that flames began coming from the mid-dorsal The aircraft was returned to the rart~p where proach controllers may be required for local
sectionandthat smoke appearedfrom the sabre investigation revealed that the port, inner main conditions, but any airc raft not using a tactical
drain below the empennage . wheel tire had blown and the undercarriage call sign should be controlled by standard R~T
The cause of the shimmy and swing to star- plate was darnaged, Lobbying For A Clerk STATS(Air) procedures, Also, if a GCA is to be assigned,
board was due to a nut missing from the torque The D14 listed "D" category darnage and some attempt should be made to ascertain GCA
link boltinthe scissors shackle, Damage from suggested that the cause may have been brake I think the timc has cor~~e to erase the false frequencies and then assign a frequency by
running off the runway was minor . The origin of adjustment, i .e,, "the inner wheel's brake tol- picture of the transport pilot sitting in his megacycles not by channel .
the fire was traced to a defective oxygen line, erances were closer than the outer wheel's but spacious cockpit thumbing through Playboy and Tower operators should also give extra
When the line was soldered to the nipple it had still within limits", occasionally checking up on "George" . attention to transients, The use of geographical
Leaving on a trip these days one generally fixes for reporting points should be avoided,
has a small bag of clothes and two large bags and, while NOTAMs may have been filed on
of papcr work . (At that something is probably runway obstructions, transient pilots should be
missing if the check list . is rnore than two weeks reminded of them,
old,) A quick glance at these papers show that While some units may be excused because of
30%o are authorizing the trip, 30°fo to be com - a change in servicing personnel, an attempt
pleted to prove you went on it, and the remainder should be made to have airmen qualified on type
to show Y ou 5hould be entitled to food and yhelter park and service,visiting aircraft to avoid such
while away . problems as, too tight turns for parking, non-
For the transport pilot roughly one third of setting of fuel counters and non-topping up of

/
the total trip time is spent flying and two thirds oxygen after sitting all night,
are used in compilation of form s, logs and the Also, an organization should be set up to
Checked Carefully like, provide distributionof NOVAs to servicin g , the
Wlule I re.alize thatmany of these are neces- messes, VMEO, etc,, as applicable, While
Firstof all, the gentlemanwho was the victim sary some are addc:d with no thought of the pilot's visiting personnel should not be pampered,
of the "Near Miss" reports ; "after emptyingthe work load or the time required to every effort should be made to eliminate fatigue,
cornplete
Shimmy marks . auxiliary tank I selected both tip tanks but only them, Since a large number of these forms especially when the visitor is just making a

22 23
 FLIGHT
short stop . Transport, such as a mule, should
meet the aircraft to help carry any baggage,
Then too, a room w~ith sufficient lockers and
suitable for student debriefings should be avail-
able . Also, AircrewBetweenMealSupplements
CODI~IENT
BIRD WATCNERS'CORNER
should be readily available to visitors if the ~i
ISSUED BY
stop is between meal hours .
All the situations mentioned above occurred nnt>F:rTOr~ ~T» or r~.icuT s:~c><";T~~~
to some extent at the various stations visited, R.C .A.F . HEADQUARTERS . OTTAWA . CANADA

However, it should also be mentioned that the

units oftenwent out of their way to provide good
service, but may not have been aware of some
of these problems .
The USAF has~ a g im_nick that should help September " October 1959
overcome some of these deficiencies, I refer
to their "Recommenced by Duncan and Heinz"
certificate presented to outstanding bases for
Good Show . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . 1
g ood transient servicin g and mainte.nance pub-
lished in "Aircraft Accident and Maintenance
Review" . Such a team could and should be The Hurricane . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .. . 2
organized to visit various RCAF bases, make
rec.ommendations to im ;.~rove the care of Controllers Are Human Too . . . . . . . . . ... . .. . 5
transient aircraft and aircrew and present a
certificate to outstanding bases . Maintenance Error-1958 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

l. B. Benson, F l. Wheels Up or Down . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12

RCAF Station Scskatoon
Near Miss . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15
(We asked DAirS and DMEng for their
Watch That Bird . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17
comments :
DAirS -Non-standard R~T is not condoned .
Arrivals And Departures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .i9
Standard R~T patter rY~ay be abbreviated but
abbreviated standard R~T patter should never
Thrust'n' Parri+ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23
be used on itinerant flights . CAP 342, Vo1I,
art111 .10,prohibits theuse of channel nurnbers
when directing a change of frequency and arts
104 .04 and 102,02 controlthe passing of inform-
ation ~n runway condition, taxiing, parking,
STAFF
c:tc ., to visiting aircraft, Approach control
operation will improve gradually as rz~ore Editor-in-Chief Squadron Leader George Sheahan
operators complete the 10-week advanc.ed
course given at the School of Flying Control . Editor Mr . Garth Harvey

DMEn g - As for the servicing_ of visiting

Circulation Flight Lieutenant Peter Bremner
aircraft, itis not feasiblc: to staff stations with
personnel frorzi which a servicing flight could Arfists Mr, lean A . Dubord
be drawn that would be qualified to service all Mr. Harry K . Hames

tyhes of RCAF aircraft . To compound this

Editorial Assistant - Mrs. Nancy L. Chenier
difficulty, maintaining a comalete library of
EOs at each station is not practical . The best
solution to servicing is, whenever possible, OFFICIAL INFORMATION The printing of this pub-
lication has been approved by the Minister, Department of
schedule servicing stops at stations that operate Natlonal Defence . Contnbutions are welcome, as ar~ comment
the sarne type of aircraft as you are flying, and criticism . Address all correspondence to the Editor, Flight
Comment, Directorate of Flight Safety, RCAF Headquarters,

FAIR WEATHER COCK

CAP 100, art 114 .20 and AF'AO 59 .00/03 Ottawa 9, ~ntario . The Editor reserves lhe right to make any
control the dispat.ch and content of NOVA mes- chanqes in the manuscript which he believes will improve the
material without altering the intended meaning . Service organi~
sage5, Tfle dist,ribution of a NOVA r-r~es5age zations may reprint articles Irom Flight Comment without further
within a station, according to the AFAO, is aufhorization . Non~Service oryanizations musl obtain official
permission- in writiny irom RCAF Headquarters 6efore re-
"COs shall ensure . ., . .prompt notificat.ion of all prinGng any of the contents of this publication . The opinions
cancerned . . . . ." . expressed in Fhqht Comment are ihe personal views of con- This bird is a first cousin to the Sunday driver . He enjoys a pleasant fliqht in
tributinq writers; they do not necessarily reflect the official ideal weather conditions and can not be bothered to carry out any practice letdowns .
We find this letter very interesting as it opinion of the Royal Canadian Air Force . Unless otherwise Is caught short when he runs into clag . To this bird, what should be a normal let-
focuses attention onone of our problem areas - stated, contents should not be construed as regulations, orders or
directives . down is a nightmare, which causes much consternation to others of the flock that
accidents that result from servicing crews not are waiting their turn to return to the roost . You know when this species is at large
Published every two months, Flrght Comment
being familiar with a particular type of aircraft . by ATC's insisted call, "What is your present position?"
may be purchased from The Queen's Printer,
Have you had any difficulties? If you have drop Department of Public Printinq and Stationery,
us a line ; with enough evidence perhaps the not Ottawa, Ont . Sinqle copy 50 cents; 1 year CALL : WHERE'MI WHERE'MI WHERE'MI
practical can be made practical . - ED~ subscription $2 .

24 rHE OCF.EN~S PRr4TFF d'iD COriTROLLLA OF $rATtoNEAS'

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