Road Safety Impact Assessment: RIA: F.C.M. Wegman, R. Roszbach, J.A.G. Mulder, C.C. Schoon & F. Poppe

Download as pdf or txt
Download as pdf or txt
You are on page 1of 40

Road Safety Impact Assessment: RIA

F.C.M. Wegman, R. Roszbach, J.A.G. Mulder, C.C. Schoon & F. Poppe

R-94-20
Road Safety Impact Assessment: RIA

A proposal for tools and procedures for a RIA

A study commissioned by the European Commission DG VII

R-94-20
F.C.M. Wegman; R. Roszbach; J.A.G. Mulder; C.C. Schoon & F. Poppe
Leidschendam, 1994
SWOV Institute for Road Safety Research, The Netherlands
Summary

Road safety is a quality aspect of road traffic and this aspect has to be
balanced with aspects like: level of service, access for destinations, envi-
ronmental impact, costs etc., when it comes to decisions in what infra-
structural projects to invest. In decision making on infrastructural projects
road safety arguments have to be considered as explicit as possible in the
planning phase already. An instrument has been developed in this study
with this aim: Road Safety Impact Assessment RIA. RIAs could be made
on a more strategic level and on an individual project or scheme level. For
both levels different tools are developed.

On a strategic level, we suggest to assess safety consequences of changes


(redistributions) of traffic over a road network due to infrastructural pro-
jects (new roads, new lay out of roads) by using a scenario technique.
This technique uses the fact that different categories of roads (with differ-
ent road and traffic chracteristics) turn out to have different road safety
records dependent on traffic volumes. By modelling road type, values of
relevant safety indicators and traffic volumes road safety impacts can be
calculated of different alternatives. A proposal has been developed for the
content of (the first phase of) a RIA.

Secondly, on a project level, we suggest to use an audit technique to make


as explicit as possible the safety consequences of certain choices in the
detailed planning and the design process and to optimize a road design.
The primary objective of using an audit technique is to ensure that road
safety is optimally incorporated during the design and realisation phase
of infrastructure projects. Independency of auditors is considered of great
importance. Different checklists have to be developed in a follow up
study.

We recommend to use the results of this study as a first draft for a RIA
and to gain experiences with this tool for EU projects on a voluntary
basis, before making a RIA compulsory. An EU-cooperative effort may be
considered to reach some sort of agreement on the specifications of RIAs
and to create a database with (EU)RIA-methodology and -results. When
these results are satisfying, we recommend to integrate the procedure for a
RIA in existing procedures for Environmental Impact Assessment (ETA),
as indicated in EC Directive 85/337, and not to initiate new procedures for
a RIA. This recommendation is based on the positive experiences with
ETAs. By integration of the ETA and RIA procedures, we expect an im-
proved quality of the decision process, without the drawback of more time
consuming of distinct procedures. Of course, individual Member States
could decide to use more stricter regulations.
Content

Preface

1. Introduction

2. General considerations

3. Tool to optimize network design: risk scenario's


3.1. Description of a tool
3.2. Example of risk scenario's in the Netherlands

4. Tool to optimize road design: safety audit


4.1. Introduction
4.2. The safety audit as applied in the United Kingdom
4.3. An example of a safety audit
4.4. Review of the safety audits
4.5. Conclusions and recommendations

5. Experiences with Environmental Impact Assessment EIA


5.1. Introduction
5.2. Advantages of an ETA
5.3. ETA characteristics
5.4. Procedures with the drafting of an ETA
5.5. Conclusions and recommendations

6. Procedures for integrating RIAs in decision making

7. Proposal for the content of a RIA


7.1. Introduction
7.2. Proposal

Literature

5
1. Introduction

Two primary objectives often predominate in (large) infrastructural pro-


jects: realising a high level of service and increased access for important
destinations, economically or socially. An additional factor in many
industrialised countries in recent years has been that plans should not
place an excessive burden on the environment. The environmental effects
of infrastructural projects must therefore be estimated in advance, through
Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs). These assessments are com-
pulsory in the European Union for certain decisions, as can be understood
from the EC Community Directive 85/337 (EU, 1985). If the political
assessment of a particular project is negative, mitigation of environmental
pollution could be agreed upon on the basis of the ETA-results. It has to
be stated that there is no legal obligation with respect to the ETA-results.
Recently, the OECD Road Transport Research Programme issued a report
providing a review of traditional environmental impact assessment
methods and procedures currently used in the road and transport sector
(OECD, 1994). In this OECD-report a distinction has been made between
impact assessments at a more strategic decision level (SEIA) and that of
an individual project or scheme (EIA).

Road safety is another quality aspect of road traffic which represents an


equally important consideration in decision-making on infrastructure. At
best, traffic risks are only considered implicitly and qualitatively in current
decision making on infrastmctural projects, which means that the conse-
quences for road safety are not visible. This can mean that - unintention-
ally, but also unwittingly - road safety is not given sufficient consideration
in decision-making process. It also hampers rational consideration of alter-
native solutions.

Projects or programmes often fit within a transport and infrastructure


policy or plan. As a rule, general goals and objectives are formulated, so
that the extent to which these are realized can be assessed. We suggest
the appropriate instrument for this might be called a Road Safety Impact
Assessment (RIA).

The aim of this study is to provide an insight into the possible content and
procedures of a Road Safety Impact Assessment, to be used in planning
of infrastructural projects in a local or regional context (i.e. to compare
different alternative road routes and to compare different design character-
istics) This possibility lies on a strategic level. Secondly, on a detailed
design level of new roads and of improvements of existing roads to make
as explicit as possible the safety consequences of certain choices in the
planning and the design process. The aim is to minimize the risk of cre-
ating safety problems or ending up with sub-optimal solutions with regard
to road safety.

In short, we propose to assess safety impacts of changes in road infra-


structure on two levels:
- the changes of the distribution of traffic over a certain road network
due to changes of that network;
- the changes of design characteristics of roads.

6
This report starts with some general considerations dealing with infra-
structure design and road safety. Chapters 3 and 4 contain the tools on
both levels, indicated above: scenario methods, specifically developed to
assess the safety consequences of redistributions of traffic over a road
network (Chapter 3) and road safety audits as a means of examining the
local design specifications (Chapter 4). The experiences with Environ-
mental Impact Assessments are described in Chapter 5 to find out whether
these experiences could be used in Road Safety Impact Assessments RIA.
Some ideas why RIAs should be integrated in existing procedures and
how this integration can be done are to be found in Chapter 6. Finally,
Chapter 7 contains a proposal for the content of a Road Safety Impact
Assessment.

7
2. General considerations

As in any system, design characteristics determine to a large extent the


safety characteristics of the road traffic system. Accidents, as they happen,
are to a large extent built-in. If, for instance, two lane rural roads allow
and are designed for overtaking at speeds of around 90 km/h, the over-
taking accident with differential speeds of around 150-200 km/h is bound
to happen. Additionally, some secondary variants may be expected as a
result of attempts to avoid the accident at the last moment, e.g. the run off
the road accident at around 90 km/h. By means of ergonomic road design,
improved vehicle performance and driver training one may, to a certain
extent, reduce the relative frequency of such accidents. But, since this
is an especially difficult task placing high demands on the driver, it
would be next to impossible to reduce such relative frequency to values
approaching zero.

Effective safety control, therefore, should be exercised in stages of


planning and design rather than after the fact on the basis of implemented
designs that have already been demonstrated to be unsafe.

This is, of course, a rather obvious notion, commonplace in other safety


area's. One would not even think, for instance, of designing a nuclear
power plant for energy production and subsequently improve on safety on
the basis of the implemented design, or even on the basis of actual system
failures. Regrettably, such an approach does characterize past and present
states of affairs in road transport.

To change this situation one needs a procedure, method and content:


- procedure: - either legal or administrative - to be able to effectively
introduce safety considerations into the transport decision process;
- method: to be able to asses the safety consequences of transport-
decisional alternatives;
- content and strategy: to be able to devise preferable or optimal safety
alternatives.

Within this threesome, the unspecified concept of road safety impact


assessments is mainly procedure, comparable to and derived from the
environmental impact assessment. As infrastructural planning and design
are prominent in road transport decision making, the concept has been
focussed on decisions regarding infrastructure. For actual application in
this area this leaves questions of method and content to be answered,
as well as questions about the specifics of entering the results of safety
impact assessments into the decision process.

Many infrastructural plans and projects are characterized by a basic


tension between mobility purposes and safety requirements. This tension
centres most of the time around driving speeds. Apart from requirements
concerning traffic flow and volumes, mobility purposes demand relatively
high speeds in order to realize acceptable travel times. At the same time,
any increase in speed constitutes a progressive increase in energy built-up,
of which the uncontrolled release progressively increases the probability
of injury. Where ever traffic participants interact, either with each other or
with obstacles in the immediate environment, safety purposes essentially
require low (differential) speeds. The basic task is therefore, to design in
such a way that on the one hand high speeds may be realized for at least
part of the road network, on the other hand interactions, encounters, con-
flicts etc. are then controlled in such a way that, if negotiated unsuccess-
fully, the corresponding accident does not result in major injury or death.

Present traffic environments, by and large, do not qualify in this respect.


The overtaking situation, as mentioned above, is a somewhat extreme
example. But it is not all that difficult to enumerate a substantial number
of situations and conflict-types which, leading to accidents in an unmiti-
gated form, offer little opportunity to survive to at least some of the par-
ticipants involved. It is a known fact that no attempt to reduce speed was
made in many accidents, either because the other vehicle or pedestrian
was not perceived, or because an attempt was made to avoid the accident
by accelerating or change of direction, rather than by braking. The speeds
of collision, then, are comparable to the original travelling speeds.

This holds true for e.g. the pedestrian crossing on 50 km/h-roads, cross-
traffic on uncontrolled intersections of rural roads but also the emergency
lane accident on motorways as a result of the presence of stationary
vehicles or pedestrians in combination with unintentional line-crossing by
passing (especially heavy) vehicles.

A basic rule of thumb might be that - in general - the uncontrolled en-


counter or conflict between unprotected slow moving traffic and motor-
ized traffic with differential speeds over 30 km/h should be avoided, as
well as uncontrolled conflicts among motorized traffic with differential
speeds over 50 km/h. Heavy vehicles pose a special problem that is, how-
ever, not only to be solved by speed regulation but also - to a substantial
degree - dependent on vehicle design.

The conflicting requirements from the points of view of mobility and


safety, then, have to be combined in a road design that is understood by
all drivers and other traffic participants, accepted and observed, and at the
same time constitutes an acceptable task load. Design is here interpreted
as a combination of physical road environment (geometry of carriageway,
surface, road side, etc.), visual aids (signing and marking, etc.) and rules
and regulations as applied and signalled.

Basically, three sets of criteria could be defined, in combination, to be


incorporated into the design:
- criteria derived from a road's designated mobility function;
- criteria derived from human tolerances (taking vehicle characteristics and
protective devices into account);
- criteria derived from behavioural principles.

9
This can be pictured as follows:

mobility function ,/ human tolerance


speed, flow, volume) -- (vehicles, protective
devices) -

/
' /
/

design
2' I
It)

I
behaviour
(attitudes, knowledge,
skills)

In this diagram, relation line (1) mainly relates to the combination of high
speeds with the management and control of conflicts at moderate speeds
by means of level crossings, roundabouts, controlled intersections, separ-
ation of slow moving and motorized traffic, etc. Line (2) relates mainly to
public acceptance of designated mobility functions, consequences for the
network structure, the distribution of trips over various road categories,
acceptance of corresponding speed limits and regimes, etc. Line (3) more
specifically relates specific local design and conflict-control to task
demands and necessary skills on the part of the traffic participant.

In a recent Dutch document on the development of 'sustainable system


safety' in road traffic this has been translated into three basic design prin-
ciples. An elaboration on the contents of sustainable safety is given in
different documents (SWOV, 1992 and SWOV, 1993).

• Prevent unintended use of road infrastructure, i.e. use that is inappro-


priate to the function of that road.
• Prevent encounters with the implicit risk of high differential speeds, i.e.
large discrepancies in speed, direction and mass at moderate and high
speeds.
• Prevent insecure or erratic behaviour of road users by enhancing the
predictability of the road's course and road users' behaviour on the road.

These principles, in turn, have been translated in terms of the development


of distinct, easily recognizable road categories derived from three main
functions: flow, distributor and access function, with special attention for
the conflict structure on flow and distributor roads (in terms of road user
categories involved, differential speeds and directions).

10
This again, leads to two levels of implementation:
- defining the network structure and defining the category (and/or sub-
category) specifications;
- defining the local design specifications.

Inversely, these two levels are also the levels on which the safety effects
of decisions on road infrastructure may be evaluated, and around which
reports on Road Safety Impact Assessment can be hierarchically orga-
nized.

It should be noted that these evaluation levels do not necessarily have to


correspond directly to the type or level of decision making. Which is to
say that, even where e.g. relatively simple decisions regarding a specific
stretch of road are concerned, it would be preferable or advisable to look
into the consequences for the distribution of traffic over that part of
the network in which it is embedded, or even take up the opportunity to
do some redistributing and redesign for that network-part as a corollary to
the main project.

Generally, the basic strategy should be that for a fairly limited length of
roads - given a flow or distributor function - much more severe con-
straints should be put on the design specifications in order to combine
mobility, speed and safety requirements. At the same time, major parts of
the network should be redesigned or 'downgraded' for the relative safety
of low driving speeds. The combined process of upgrading and down-
grading should thereby, apart from being a design for safety, also uphold
the mobility function of the network as a whole.

Before turning to practical questions of how to implement road safety


impact assessments, we will first have a more detailed look at:
- scenario methods, specifically developed to asses the safety conse-
quences of redistributions of traffic over a road network (Chapter 3);
- road safety audits as a means of examining the local design specifi-
cations (Chapter 4).

11
3. Tool to optimize network design: risk scenario's

3.1. Description of a method

In general, road accidents are caused by a combination of factors although


relationships between accidents and those factors causing them, or contrib-
uting to the causes, are not well understood. The interaction between road,
vehicle and the road user obscures the determination of accident causes.
In qualitative terms, it is a well known fact that physical features of a
road network, together with the traffic volumes on that network are the
main explanatory factors of the mean number of accidents happening on
that network.

This enables us to develop a strategy to assess road safety impacts of


changes of the road network itself and of its usage on a macro- and meso-
scopic level, i.e. on a national or a regional scale. The strategy finds its
origin in the different relationships between traffic volumes and the num-
ber of road accidents for different types of roads.

This method can be described in the following three steps:

1. The first step is to prepare the reference material. Establish a system


of categories of road types for a certain jurisdiction (country, county or
province). Do measure the road length per road type and try to measure
(or make an estimation of) the relevant road safety indicators per road
type. Two safety indicators are of relevance: the number of injury (includ-
ing fatal) accidents per kilometre of road length, the number of injury
accidents per million motor vehicle kilometres and the number of injuries
per injury accident. Try to estimate the development in time of road safety
indicators. Design a procedure to compare regional and national road
safety indicators (taking in mind the distributions of variables in the indi-
cators).

2. In step two the functional boundaries of a region are established. Per


road type an inventory of all roads needs to be prepared. When possible,
digitalize the road network, using a Geographic Information System. Try
to make an estimation of traffic volumes based on traffic counts (and, if
necessary, on traffic model results). Based on accident registration by the
police, locate registered accidents per road type (per link and junction).

Compute the regional safety indicators and validate these regional indi-
cators with national indicators. If necessary, try to establish 'regional
validated indicators'.

3. For the same region used under 2. make an estimation of the road net-
work and its traffic volumes for the prognosis year. This is the start of the
third step. Make an estimation of the road safety indicators for the same
year. Try to establish the road safety effects of changes of the road net-
work and the traffic volumes.

Summarize all the results in the first phase of a 'Road safety impact
analysis' (as indicated in Chapter 7) and make an interpretation (impact

12
assessment) of the RIA-results. These results can be used in public dis-
cussions and in the political decision process.

The following steps have to be taken to estimate road safety impacts of


changes of a road network and usage of that network.

STEP 1: Basic data


1.1. Categorising a road network
1.2. Road safety indicators per type of road
1.3. Relationship between road safety indicators and traffic volumes
1.4. Distribution of road safety indicators
1.5. Development of road safety indicators

STEP 2: Research area in reference year


2.1. Roads per road type
2.2. Traffic volumes per road type
2.3. Accidents per road type
2.4. Road safety indicator per road type
2.5. Comparing national and regional road safety indicators

STEP 3: Research area in future year


3.1. Road network per road type and estimations of traffic volumes
3.2. Estimations of road safety indicators
3.3. Estimations of road safety effects
3.4. Assessment of road safety impact

3.2. Example of risk scenario in the Netherlands

STEP 1.1. Categorising a road network

The following road characteristics are recommended to use:


- number of carriageways
- number of lanes per carriageway
- number of directions per carriageway
- existence of parallel facilities.

Furthermore, roads could be discriminated according the type of road


users using the same physical space: fast motorized traffic, non motorized
vehicles, agricultural vehicles.

Using these criteria the following eight road types outside urban areas are
used:
- motorways with three lanes or more per carriageway
- motorways with two lanes per carriageway
- motor roads with dual carriageway
- motor roads with one carriageway
- all purpose road with dual carriageway (no slow traffic)
- all purpose road with one carriageway (no slow traffic)
- all purpose road, one carriageway, two lanes
- all purpose road, one carriageway, one lane

Inside urban areas the following categorization of roads has been intro-
duced:
- dual carriageway, two directions, two parallel facilities

13
- dual carriageway, two directions, one parallel facility
- dual carriageway, two directions, no parallel facility
- one carriageway, two directions, two parallel facilities
- one carriageway, two directions, one parallel facility
- one carriageway, two directions, no parallel facility
- one carriageway, one direction, two parallel facilities
- one carriageway, one direction, one parallel facility
- one carriageway, one direction, no parallel facility

Of course, it might be possible that some of these road types do not exist.

STEP 1.2. Road safety indicators per type of road

Per type of road the following variables have to be measured to estimate


road safety indicators on a national level:
- kilometre of road lengths
- number of motorized kilometres travelled
- number of injury accidents
- number of casualties
- number of deaths.

As road safety indicator we recommend to use:


- number of injury accidents per kilometre per year per road type
- number of casualties per injury accident
- number of deaths per 100 casualties.
Dutch road safety indicators per road type, for roads inside and outside
urban areas are given in Table 1 (Dijkstra & Wegman, 1992).

STEP 1.3. Relationship between road safety indicators and traffic volumes

In Figure 1 we assume a linear relationship between the number of


(motorized) kilometres travelled and the number of injury accidents per
kilometre of road length, per road type (Janssen, 1991).

STEP 1.4. Distribution of road safety indicators

It is assumed that the number of injury accidents (nominator) follow a so-


called Poisson-distribution. This means that the number of observed injury
accidents are within a confidence interval of two times the square root of
the observed number.
The distribution in the denominator (the number of kilometres travelled) is
seldomly known per road type. Most of the times these observations are
based on measurements of a few hours per year.

STEP 1.5. Development of road safety indicators

The reduction of the number of casualties could be explained partly by the


fact that road traffic had become safer over the years (better trained and
more experienced road users, better cars and better design of roads), but
also by the increasing proportion of kilometres travelled on road with low
accident rates (motorways).
Unfortunately, we do not know the contribution of both of these factors.
For this reason we propose, in the mean time, not to assume the road
safety indicators will remain constant over the years, but to assume that

14
the reduction in fatality and injury rates in a country (to be estimated with
so-called macroscopic accident models) is the same for all road types.

STEP 2.1. Roads per road type

An inventory has to be made of all roads in a certain region as a start of


this second step, according the road types defined in STEP 1.1. It would
be well advised to use a Geographical Information System in order to
make it easy and cheap to estimate the impact of different scenario's and
to visualize these impacts.

STEP 2.2. Traffic volumes per road type

An inventory has to be made of the traffic volumes per road type in a


self-chosen reference year.

STEP 2.3. Accidents per road type

Based on information from a national accident database all accidents have


to be allocated to the road network. A procedure has to be developed how
to decide on accidents on junctions of two roads in two different road
categories.

STEP 2.4. Road safety indicator per road type

Road safety indicators per road type can be estimated in the area under
consideration, using the data collected in STEP 2.2 and 2.3.

STEP 2.5. Comparing national and regional road safety indicators

One can compare road safety indicators for a certain area based on region-
al data with 'mean' national data, a procedure of validation. Of course, the
results of this comparison will be different. A procedure has to be devel-
oped how to act by then, depending on the size of the differences found.
Generally, it is recommended to use national road safety indicators and
not regional ones. But, when differences occur, one should try to find
explanations that account for the differences found.

STEP 3.1. Road network per road type and estimations of traffic volumes

The third step deals with a year in the future: e.g. 2000, 2010, 2025. For
this year all the relevant changes of the road network have to be added to
the reference-network: road length and road type are of importance. Using
traffic forecasting techniques an estimation has to be developed for traffic
volumes per road type.

STEP 3.2. Estimations of road safety indicators

Road safety indicators per road type are not remaining constant over the
years, but are expected to improve. Estimations has to be made on the
values of the different indicators for the prognosis year. Estimations of
indicators per road type have to correspond with road accidents develop-
ments on a macroscopic level. Or, the other way around, from macro-
scopic developments road safety indicators per road type could be derived.

15
STEP 3.3. Estimations of road safety effects

When assuming values of road safety indicators per road type, and using
the outcome of STEP 1.5, including the results of STEP 3.1, it is possible
to estimate the effects on road safety.

STEP 3.4. Assessment of road safety impact

The results of different scenario's could be compared to each other and


these results could be compared with the road safety objectives as well.
Policy conclusions could be drawn and the results could contribute to
public debate and to political decisions.

16
4. Tool to optimize road design: safety audit

4.1. Introduction

"The main objective of safety audits is to ensure that all highway schemes
operate as safely as possible: this means safety should be given thorough
consideration throughout the whole preparation of the project". This
quotation is to be found in the 'Guidelines for: The safety audit of high-
ways', issued by the British Institute of Highways and Transportation
(IHT, 1990). A road safety audit could be considered as an important tool
in accident prevention by paying attention to all phases of a road design
process.

The background of safety audits is to carry out formal checks to ensure


that designers of infrastructural projects explicitly have covered road
safety aspects. It is to be advised to carry out safety audits by specialists
independent from the design team. Audit teams should be multi-disci-
plined, well-trained and experienced. The independency of audit teams
could be organised in different ways. It could be decided whether auditors
are reporting directly to the initiating authority of a road project, or form
a separate entity from the initiating party. The reports of auditors have to
be available publicly. A road authority, as initiator of an infrastructure
project, got to have a freedom of choice to follow an audit report or to
neglect the results. It is to be advised that the road authority remains
responsible for the decisions taken in the projects initiated.

Only a small number of countries are active in the field of road safety
audits: the United Kingdom, the United States, Australia, New Zealand
and a number of developing countries. The most extensive and more or
less standardized form of safety audit can be found in the United King-
dom, where it is compulsory for all trunk roads and could also be applied
for all other major and minor road schemes on a voluntary basis.

In the United States, guidelines have been drawn up concerning the design
and operational practices on road safety since the late 1960s. Currently,
the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) is recommending 'safety
reviews' for motorways at a local level. Such reviews are far from uni-
form and are widely divergent with respect to the level of detail. The
interest in audits is increasing in the US and it is likely that they may
become compulsory on a State level. They will call these activities 'Road
safety management schemes' instead of road safety audits, although the
aim of these schemes and the content are quite comparable to safety
audits. The so-called tort liability of road authorities for accidents caused
by improper road design and lay out is an important cause to tackle the
same problem with a different tool.

In Australia, some States have already introduced guidelines and check-


lists, while others are in the process of doing so. A project has been set
up designed for nationwide introduction.
New Zealand is currently in the process of developing guidelines for
safety audits. A number of pilot projects have already been performed and
training courses are in progress.

17
A cooperation agreement has been drawn up with Australia (Jadaan,
1993).

The safety audits performed to date in France only related to existing


roads (Machu, 1994). This concerned a feasibility study with a view to
determining hazardous situations on the basis of a reference manual. In
connection with the study of existing roads, Machu has defined two prob-
lems: if a road authority does not act in response to the hazardous situ-
ations found, then he is in principle liable with respect to accidents occur-
ring at that location. It is also anticipated that the road authority will only
make efforts to improve road safety if an audit team has paid a visit.

Denmark is not included in the above overview. Proctor & Beicher (1993)
indicate that a discussion on the introduction of safety audits is in prog-
ress in Denmark. In the Netherlands a discussion has been started as well,
but little progress can be reported so far.

For reasons of the leading role the United Kingdom plays in the field
of safety audits, an example of an English safety audit will be described
below. In addition, an example of an audit as performed in Northampton-
shire County will be given.

4.2. The safety audit as applied in the United Kingdom

In 1990, several reports concerning safety audits were issued in the United
Kingdom, including backgrounds and guidelines (Department of Trans-
port, 1990a; IHT, 1990). Subsequently, some opinions about the audit
were published (Bulpitt, 1991; Drummond, 1991; Proctor & Belcher,
1993).

Purpose of the audits


The primary purpose of the audits is to ensure that:
- road safety is optimally incorporated during the design and realisation
phase;
- the risk of accidents on connecting roads is minimized.

Application
The safety audit relates to:
- new (trunk) roads
- improvements to existing roads
- important maintenance work

Phases of an audit
1. Planning (route selection, relationship with existing networks, design
requirements, junctions).
2. Concept stage.
3. Assessment of detailed subjects.
4. Check prior to opening the road.
However, the Department of Transport (199Db) in the United Kingdom
dictated that the first point should not form part of an audit for strategic
roads, since the road safety of all schemes should also be considered at
the pre-public consultation stage as part of the strategic or conceptual
evaluation of alternatives. This is not a Road Safety Audit within the

18
terms of the Standard and Advice Note, at issue, but is an examination
of many factors including road safety.

Performance of an audit
A safety audit is performed by specialized safety experts functioning inde-
pendently from the (technical) design team. In the course of the work, the
expert or the team employs very detailed checklists. These checklists are
in fact used more or less as a guide; it is not the intention that they will
be fully filled out. Upon completion of each phase, the expert or the audit
team must draw up a report offering comments on the safety aspects and
with proposals for improvement. It is formally arranged that if the propo-
sals are not complied with, the reasons should be accounted for in writing.

The checklists consist of the following main subjects:


- geometric design
junctions
-

access control
-

horizontal and vertical alignment


-

cross section
-

- facilities for slow traffic


- road surfaces
skid resistance
-

day and night visibility


-

evenness and profile


-

- road signs and lighting


- road markings and delineators
- road side (safety) features
- traffic management
- speed limits, junction control
- road works and maintenance
- deviations from the guidelines.

Jadaan (1993) mentions that upon commencement of an audit, sufficient


information must be available. In addition to design drawings and the like,
the following are cited: accident history of the location, data of volumes
of motor vehicles, cyclists and pedestrians, background information about
the effectiveness of measures and an overview of deviations from the
guidelines.

4.3. Example of a safety audit

The Northamptonshire County Council (1992) performed a safety audit


during 1991 and 1992 concerning a new, single lane connecting road
outside the centre of Brackley. The road measures 1.9 km in length. The
connections to existing roads are formed by a level junction and a round-
about. Between the farthest points is a junction carrying little traffic on
the approach roads. The connecting road was opened to traffic in April,
1992.

Since many of the interim plans were already discussed before the start of
the audit, the audit commenced with the second phase and was completed
according to plan up to and including the fourth phase.

19
The audit document contains a description and drawings of the road in
question. In addition, phases 2 to 4 were reported by the auditor (only 1
to 2 pages) entitled: 'safety audit certificate'.
At the time the audit was carried out, it was not common practice to make
checklists, but these were nevertheless used by the auditor as a guideline.
It is noted that not one single audit report contains the thought processes
of the auditor in such a way that the report can serve as blueprint for
other audits. The essence of the matter is that the auditor is able to arrive
at a road design which is simple and recognizable for future road users,
thereby minimizing potential for error.

The audit described here was not carried out by teams, but rather accident
investigators. It is stated that the up to date experience of assessing real
world highway use problems and identifying remedial measures can be
applied to schemes on the drawing board.
The report does not indicate the hierarchical organization of the audit. In
sofar this can be determined, the auditor (a highway safety manager for
the Highway Safety Group within the Northamptonshire County Council)
reports to the head of project management, also part of the Northampton-
shire County Council.

With the findings described below, which were drawn up during a phase
of the audit, sketches with indicated improvements were often added, with
the exception of the first phase.

First phase: Feasibility/initial design


In the study report, the first phase of the audit is completed with the com-
ment that the following aspects were already considered: route selection,
number and type of junctions and integration into the existing road net-
work. Upon commencement of the second phase, a report on the prelimi-
nary phase of the design was not available. In the introduction to the
report, the hope is expressed that the discussions held during the prelimi-
nary phase could contribute towards solving the problems which were
encountered at a later stage.

Second phase: Preliminary design


The auditor considered the following aspects:
- horizontal and vertical alignments
- junction provision and layout
- termination points of scheme
In some cases, changes are proposed such as the construction of lanes to
offer motorists clear entry and exit points and measures to reduce speed at
roundabouts. In other cases, it is noted that the design of the elements
investigated was found to be satisfactory.

Third phase: Traffic signs


Comments were given concerning the size of the signs, the information
noted thereof and the location distance from the side of the road.
N.B.: The date on which the certificate for this third phase was issued is
the same as that on the certificate for the second phase. The report does
not note this fact, however.

Fourth phase: Inspection of the road


In this phase, the comments remained confined to two road signs and the

20
width and marking of an access road to a roundabout. One junction was
not yet completed and would be subjected to a 'stage 4 safety audit' at a
later stage. However, this fact was not mentioned in the report.

4.4. Review of the safety audits

The example given above does not relate to an audit performed in accord-
ance with the UK-guidelines: there was no initial phase and the second
and third phase were combined. Apart from this, two worthwhile elements
can be distinguished for the audit performed.
The first is that 'independent' safety experts should assess the plans and
realization of the work on the basis of safety aspects. The second is that
a report must be issued at fixed times upon completion of a project stage,
with an associated certification.

In his assessment of safety audits, Bulpitt (1991) concludes that the audit
expert should not become involved in technical specifications and calcu-
lations. Neither should an audit become a mechanical process of filling
in lists. Common sense should prevail, where the assessment is based on
the perspective of how the future road user will experience the design.
Checklists do serve a purpose in ensuring that no essential material is
forgotten. A supplementary assessment of the design function during
night-time conditions was considered particularly useful by the author.

Proctor & Belcher (1993) note a problem with which safety experts are
confronted. Due to the limited quantity of information, the expert is
unable to assess the effect the completed measure will have. In a general
sense, something may be said about future safety problems, but quantifi-
cation in terms of various accident types and their severity is not feasible.

For the safety audit, he proposes the setting up of a database similar to the
one used by the American Federal Highway Administration (FHWA).
These data are public information, because they are periodically published
by the FHWA in the 'Annual Report on Highway Safety Improvement
Programs'.

4.5. Conclusions and recommendations

A safety audit is a useful instrument for assessing those aspects relevant to


road safety at an early stage and during all subsequent phases of the road
design. We recommend not to start road safety audits before the results
are available of the first phase of a RIA: network scenario's. As essential
characteristics of safety audits could be considered:
- independency of auditors;
- reports of auditors have to be available publicly;
- a safety audit must start with the results of the scenarios as indicated in
Chapter 3;
- audit reports has to be published after completion of the preliminary
design, after completion of the detailed design and just before the opening
of the road;
- audit reports are to be considered as an advice to the initiators of a road
project; the initiator remains fully responsible.

21
A safety audit gains in impact if each subsequent phase may only com-
mence when the previous one is formally completed.

When road safety audits are going to be introduced we recommend to


develop different checklists, preferably by an international committee of
experts. We recommend to use all expertise and existing knowledge avail-
able in the literature, also in the field of so-called black spot manuals,
when preparing these checklists, and not 'to reinvent this wheel'.

We suggest to develop different checklists for every phase (preliminary


design, detailed design and checklist to be used before opening). Further-
more, it could be useful to distinguish different types of infrastructural
schemes, because the checklist per scheme could be completely different.
One may consider to develop these schemes for the construction of new
major roads and the improvement of existing major roads (assuming no
EU-interest in minor schemes).

22
5. Experiences with Environmental Impact Assessment:
ETA

5.1. Introduction

It might be of interest to learn from the activities, approaches, procedures


etc. in the field of Environment Impact Assessments (ETAs) when design-
ing Road Safety Impact Assessments (RIAs). For this reason this chapter
deals with experiences with ETA in the Netherlands.

Over the past decades, both the public and the country's administrations
have come to realize that the increasing affluence of society also has
negative consequences for the world we live in. This realization has led to
regulations in which measures that bring about radical change, have to be
reviewed in advance to determine their consequences for the environment.

The United States pioneered the initiation of such regulatory control. At


the end of the 1 960s, this led to the introduction of an Environmental
Impact Assessment (EIA), which enabled the systematic weighing up of
pros and cons (from an environmental perspective) in relation to certain
decisions. After Canada had followed the American example in the mid-
1970s, a similar process was also put in motion in other countries. This
process led to a bill for the implementation of the ETA in the Netherlands
in 1981. Prior to its introduction, this was subject to a provision that
allowed an ETA to be carried out on government projects on a voluntary
basis in order to gain experience. As a result of these trials, the perform-
ance of an ETA in the Netherlands was made compulsory in 1987, and the
act incorporated a list of those activities and decisions to which the obli-
gation applied. The EC Directive on the ETA which came into force in
1993 - in some aspects more stringent than the Dutch legislation, while in
others it was not as far-reaching - was fully integrated into the Dutch
legislation in 1993.

5.2. Advantages of an EIA

One of the advantages of an ETA is based on the fact that it exerts a


preventative influence. Project initiators and governments involved in the
decision making process surrounding these projects are forced to consider
all the possible consequences in advance, not only with respect to the
project itself, but also with respect to the alternatives.
In addition, an ETA ensures that sufficient account is taken of the inter-
ests of other parties aside from the actual initiator or the decision making
bodies. Also, the resultant streamlining of decision making procedures
and a means of coordinating decisions relating to the project should be
regarded as concomitant advantages.

The advantages of an ETA become quite evident when one realizes that
a decision about a project (which can have consequences for the environ-
ment) cannot be taken until an ETA procedure has been carried out which
not only describes the project, listing the alternatives and their relative
consequences, but also indicates that all procedural requirements have
been met.

23
5.3. ETA characteristics

Projects or activities which have significant deleterious consequences for


the environment have already been determined in advance by the legislator
and been made subject to an ETA obligation. This relates to the following
categories:
- roads, railways and waterways
- harbours, artificial islands and airfields
- military terrain
- pipelines
- recreational and tourist facilities
- housing construction
- hydraulic works
- changes in the water level
- water catchment and water supply
- mineral extraction
- removal/discharge of waste materials
- industrial activities
- energy supply
- storage and transfer of fuels
- key planning decisions

All decisions which relate to activities concerning the above mentioned


subjects are obliged to draft a preliminary ETA. This does not mean that
an ETA cannot also be performed on a voluntary basis. In that case, all
legal rules are applicable. This option is also applied in the Netherlands
to a limited extent. In addition to the national regulation, individual prov-
inces in the Netherlands can also determine which projects or activities
should be subjected to the compulsory drafting of an ETA. Generally, this
concerns areas located within these provinces which have a special signi-
ficance, or areas which were already heavily burdened from an environ-
mental perspective.

In some cases, the project initiator can be exempted from the obligation to
draft an EIA. This is the case, for example, if the initiator has already had
an ETA drawn up for that project, continues the same project or when it is
evident that a follow-up ETA will not offer any new data. An exemption
can also be granted from the point of view of the public good. The EU
Directive concerning the application of the ETA no longer permits exemp-
tions which until recently were granted in the Netherlands, i.e. if it could
be demonstrated that no major deleterious consequences were anticipated.

A number of parties play a role in the drafting of an EIA; each according


to his own area of participation:
- the initiator
- the competent authority
- the advisors
- the ETA commission
- public participants

The initiator can be a private or government organization wishing to


undertake an activity on which the competent authority must take a deci-
sion. Advisors can offer the competent authority advice about the ETA
under consideration. To this end, certain organisations may be appointed

24
in the course of the decision making procedure concerning the project or
the activity. Where it concerns matters in which the competent authorities
do not represent the state government, certain government bodies must in
any event be consulted.
If the national government does in fact represent the competent authority,
the Ministry of Housing, Physical Planning and the Environment (VROM)
and Agriculture and Fisheries (L&V) appoint the appropriate officials
to perform this consulting task. The results of the recommendation are
forwarded to the ETA commission. In return, the ETA commission issues
recommendations specific to each ETA to the competent authority. The
working group members are selected from the independent experts from
the ETA conmiission. The commission in its turn consists of a large num-
ber of experts in the field of the environment and in the field of activities
subject to an ETA obligation, who are appointed by the Crown. For each
ETA, the chairman of the Commission for the EIA determines, in consul-
tation with his deputies, the composition of the ETA commission, where
guarantees are incorporated in order to prevent a conflict of interests
occurring through direct or indirect involvement. Finally, the participants
represent those persons or organisations who are not included amongst the
above named parties. They are interested in an ETA for other reasons and
indicate that they wish to be heard in the decision making process.

5.4. Procedure with the drafting of an EIA

The ETA procedure consists of seven phases.


In the first phase, the initiator investigates whether the proposed project is
subject to an ETA obligation. Tf so, this is specified in an initial note and
submitted to the competent authority.
In the second phase, the competent authority publicises this fact and
appoints a committee and advisors to draw up a recommendation. Public
notice is also given, to offer other interested parties an opportunity to
comment on the directives which the ETA must satisfy. This second phase
is subject to a legally established maximum period.
In the third phase, which is not subject to a fixed term, the initiator draws
up the EIA. Here, he can make full or partial use of externally procured
know-how (important if there is a lack of know-how or manpower in
house) while continuing to bear ultimate responsibility for the content of
the ETA.
In the fourth phase, the competent authority checks the completeness and
accuracy of the ETA and its acceptability is then pronounced within pre-
determined periods. Tf accepted, the ETA is published. This simultaneously
enables assessment and participation in the fifth phase.
During this fifth phase, the legal advisors and the Commission for the ETA
are offered the opportunity to issue their recommendation. In addition,
a hearing is set in which others can also offer an opinion about the ETA.
The Commission incorporates the results of this hearing in its ultimate
recommendation. This fifth phase is also subject to legally fixed terms.
The sixth phase represents the decision process of the competent authority.
This decision process describes how the information collected during
the entire preceding procedure is utilised. In some cases (about 30%), no
decision is taken because it is noted that further information is needed.
Tt has become common practice that at the time of the assessment of the
ETA by the Commission, it is empowered to indicate which information is
still required to enable a decision to be made.

25
The final, seventh phase in the procedure concerns the evaluation. The
decision issued by the competent authority should indicate what needs to
be evaluated and by which means, and also within which time period this
should occur. The evaluation study is performed by the competent author-
ity who will receive the cooperation of the initiator.
Based on the results of such a study, the competent authority can take
measures if the consequences of the decision prove to be significantly
more serious than was apparent from the results of the ETA.

5.5. Conclusions and recommendations

From the points described above, it can be seen that the decision making
process concerning major projects or activities can be significantly inten-
sified or delayed by a procedure associated with so many requirements.
Nevertheless, a positive effect seems to have resulted from the regulation.
Not only are decision making procedures streamlined, as it is clear which
decisions are subject to an EIA and as information collection, consultation,
participation and decision making are specified; there is also question of a
preventative effect which is mainly determined by the increased environ-
mental awareness of the initiators and governments involved. Finally, the
need to draw up an ETA seems to contribute to the development of less
detrimental alternatives.

Keeping in mind the experiences with ETA and the usage of the EU Direc-
tive we conclude that a similar procedure could be used for a RIA as
well. Two exeptions have to be made. First of all we recommend to estab-
lish an independent commission (audit team) to prepare a RIA. Further-
more we recommend to start the procedure with an initial note as a start-
ing point of the procedure in order to prevent fundamental discussions in
follow-up phases, where these discussions are not appropriate, anymore.

26
6. Procedures for integrating RIAs in decision making

Basic to the implementation of road safety impact assessments are the


questions of whether these should be voluntary or mandatory, and,
whether these should have an independent basis or be integrated in exist-
ing law and procedures.

Existing procedures are already often felt to be too complicated and time-
consuming, sometimes hampering effective decision making rather than
contributing to it. In fact, in many respects efforts are being made to sim-
plify and shorten procedures. Therefore, in principle, not much support is
to be expected for adding issues to such procedures unless not only the
necessity is absolutely clear, but also content and method can be adequate-
ly specified in order to be able to assess the consequences for the process
of decision making.

If one takes a closer look at existing procedures, in particular at environ-


mental impact assessments as they are performed in the Netherlands, it
must be recognized that as such safety considerations (and, where appli-
cable, road safety considerations) are allowed for in the process. As a
matter of fact, where major new roads or the upgrading of existing roads
is concerned, road safety is often one of the main arguments used for the
proposed decision. From this point of view the question would rather be
why the safety parts of such reports usually are so flimsy. One may spec-
ulate as to the reasons for this phenomenon and look at these from the
point of view of e.g. public interest, priorities, acceptance etc. One may,
however, also relate these more specifically to properties of road safety as
such, and look at it from the point of view of predictability, assumed level
of control, locus of control, strategic consensus etc.

One of the basic problems in controlling safety effects is that one is deal-
ing with probabilistic rather than deterministic events. This makes predic-
tion and control harder, and in this respect sets it apart from environ-
mental variables that may be more deterministically assessed. Of course,
in this respect road safety is not different from other safety area's. What
may be different in the case of road safety is that much more responsibil-
ity and control is assumed to lay with the public (the road user) than in
the case of e.g. industrial safety with the workforce. This again, may bear
on the level of control that is assumed from a governmental or institu-
tional point of view. Finally, it may then be harder to reach an agreed
upon strategy to bring about safety effects.

Apart from such considerations, some degree of consensus with respect to


strategy, concepts and methods would seem to be a prerequisite to any
formal solution (or any informal solution, for that matter). Some of such
consensus is developing in the Netherlands around the concept of a
'sustainably safe traffic system', particularly as applied to design and
reconstruction of road infrastructure. It is especially within this framework
that the concept of road safety impact assessments has evolved and is
being developed, as one of it's basic tenets is that road safety should be
incorporated explicitly in the traffic planning and decision process, rather
than be something to be dealt with 'after the fact'.

27
It would seem natural, therefore, to incorporate road safety impact assess-
ment in current procedures, rather than set it apart in it's own decisional
surrounding. Environmental impact assessment would thereby seem to be
the most likely - and universally present - candidate, but there may also
be more specific legislation, varying from country to country, lending
itself for the inclusion of safety assessments.

In the Dutch situation, there are already two provisions within environ-
mental law that would allow for road safety impact assessments to be
incorporated. As a rule, the committee on environmental im-pact assess-
ments brings out an advice on the contents of any specific assessment,
which may then be taken up by the authorities and given the status of
directive. Road safety impact assessment may be part of such a directive,
and sometimes it is. In a more general way, rules on the contents of envi-
ronmental impact assessments are - under the law - laid down by execu-
tive order. It would be relatively easy - in terms of procedure - to specify
in such an executive order that projects relating to road infrastructure
should be subject to a road safety assessment as well.

For the European situation one might think of a recommendation of simi-


lar content on the basis of Directive 85/337. Additionally, one might
explore specific national legislations within the working area of Directive
85/337, in order to identify specific procedures where road safety impact
assessments might be incorporated.

As some practical experience with such methods would have to be gained,


however, the initial emphasis should lay on the development of instrumen-
tal support rather than mandatory procedure, instrumental support such as
this report is trying to bring one step further.

In a broad sense this instrumental support should be directed at questions


of concepts and strategies, as well as developing specific method and
application. On an organizational level the process may be strengthened by
engaging safety professionals for the performance of specific road safety
impact assessments on a frequent and consistent basis.

As a precursor to some degree of standardization on a European level one


might assume that it may help if central road safety research institutes
(BASt, INRETS, SWOV, TRL, etc.) could reach some sort of agreement
as to the specifications of road safety impact assessments. A cooperative
effort on this subject matter may be considered appropriate.

Such a cooperative effort could be aimed in two directions:


- the development of method as such;
- information exchange on specific safety assessments that have been
performed.
From the latter activity some sort of database might be derived including
decisional framework, methodology, results, effects on final decisions. On
the one hand this might provide for easy reference when handling similar
problems, on the other hand such information can be used to help shape
standardized methods.

28
We recommend to use the results of this study as a first draft for a RIA
and to gain experiences with this tool for EU projects on a voluntary
basis before making a RIA compulsory.

We suggest to compare the advantages and drawbacks of a voluntary and


compulsory procedure for RIA. It might be of interest to integrate a RIA-
procedure in the existing decision taking process about road infrastruc-
ture to prevent extra time delays. This means integration of RIA in the
existing EIA -procedures, when this suggestion is followed.

29
7. Proposal for the content of a RIA

7.1. Introduction

We distinguish two phases in a Road Safety Impact Assessment in this


report. First phase: by using scenario-techniques road networks could be
optimized by assessing safety effects due to infrastructural changes in a
network and, eventually, redistribution of traffic in a network. Second
phase: by using auditing techniques road design could be optimized.

The 'audit report' will lead to more discussion amongst design-profes-


sionals and between professionals and decisions-makers. It is to be
expected that the general public will accept the results. The audit report
uses checklists as agreed upon by the professional community (relevant
institutions of design professionals) and by road authorities. A proposal
for the content of a 'audit report' has been described in Chapter 4.

Based on the content of and the experiences with environmental impact


assessments and taking in mind the requirements of a RIA the following
guidelines for a standard chapter classification could be useful for the
'scenario-report':
- introduction
- problem setting and objective
- decisions to be taken and decisions previously taken
- proposed activity and alternatives
- current situation, autonomous development and effects
- comparison of the alternatives
- gaps in know-how, retrospective evaluation
- design and presentation
- summary

7.2. RIA-proposal

Introduction
The content is self-explanatory

Problem setting and objective


Principle: A RIA contains at least "a description of what is aimed for with
the proposed activity".
This describes which problem areas, developments and prognoses have led
to the proposed activity and which problems will be solved. The formula-
tion of the objectives should be subject to a system in which hierarchical
connections are established between the main objectives and the derived
objectives, conflicts are noted and concrete criteria are established, at
which the proposed activity (and alternatives) can be assessed. The objec-
tives have to be formulated as explicit as possible and quantification is
preferred.

Decisions to be taken and decisions previously taken


Principle: A RIA contains at least "an indication of the decisions which
underlie the preparation of the report and an overview of decisions previ-
ously taken by government bodies and relating to the proposed activity

30
and the described alternatives ".

This chapter contains a brief and succinct description of the decision


making process, the decision to which the RIA applies, the phasing of
the decision making process, an overview of the implementation decisions
taken, the relationship to any other (RIA)-procedures and whether any
policy and regulations are in force which restrict the proposed activity.

Proposed activity and alternatives


Principle: A RIA contains at least "a description of the proposed activity
and of the manner in which this will be carried out, as well as a descrip-
tion of the alternatives to this activity which should reasonably be taken
into consideration" and "the alternatives to be described should in any
case include those which enable realization of the best options available
for the improvement of road safety".

Firstly, this describes the consequences if the proposed activity is not


performed, possibly on the basis of various scenarios, where other plans
related to the surrounding area could also be included.
In addition, the various alternatives are dealt with, including the so-called
'most favourable alternative'. It should be argued why certain alternatives
are not considered. This chapter should also consider to what extent other
measures can contribute to a solution for the problems noted.

Current situation, autonomous developments and effects


Principle: A RIA contains at least "a description of the current situation,
in sofar the proposed activity or its alternatives can have consequences
for this situation, and of the anticipated development if neither the activity
nor the alternatives are carried out" and "a description of the conse-
quences which the proposed activity or alternatives can have, as well as
a rationale for the way in which these consequences are determined and
described".

This should determine the extent to which the influence of the proposed
activity and its alternatives reaches. The existing situation and the auton-
omous development (the development which occurs if the project is not
realized) are described on the basis of the literature.
The effects are described on the basis of the following guidelines:
- the method of calculation;
- not only negative effects, but also positive effects and beneficial devel-
opment opportunities;
- relationship between, and cumulation of effects;
- description of overall traffic safety;
- indirect effects, such as amended area zoning and changes in the acces-
sibility of areas.

Comparison of the alternatives


Principle: A RIA contains at least "a comparison of the changes to be
anticipated as a consequence of the proposed activity and in association
with the consequences described for each of the alternatives ".

It should be indicated here which standard quality requirements, target


values and objectives of the policy are considered, giving a preferential
sequence for each aspect. In addition, it should be indicated to what

31
degree each of the alternatives is expected to contribute to the realization
of the objectives.

Gaps in know-how, retrospective evaluation


Principle: A RIA contains at least "an overview of the gaps in the situ-
ation descriptions, the developments and the effects as a result of the lack
of necessary data" and "the competent authority which has taken a deci-
sion during which preparation the RIA was drafted, investigates the con-
sequences of the activity in question if it is undertaken, or after it has
been initiated".

It is described here which information cannot be supplied, what the mar-


gins of error are in the information presented, what is the cause of the gap
in know-how (uncertain prognostication methods, lack of useable methods)
and whether these gaps can be compensated for in the short term.
An important point in this regard is that gaps in knowledge should not
relate to that information which is essential to the decision to be taken.
These should then be completed in cooperation with the competent author-
ity as a matter of priority.
In addition, an evaluation programme should be drawn up in order to
measure the changes that occur, where the established gaps in know-how
and the points of doubt should be included, as well as the efficiency of
the measures and provisions taken.

Design and presentation


Principle: A RIA should contain at least "a summary which offers the
general public sufficient insight to enable its assessment and to evaluate
the consequences of the proposed activity and of the alternatives described
therein ".

In this document, which can be read independently, i.e. 'stands alone', the
following must be dealt with:
- rationale of the objective and importance of the proposed activity;
- in which decision making process the RIA plays a role;
- choice and rationale underlying the alternatives considered;
- description of the baseline situation;
- description of the anticipated effects (of the various alternatives).

7.3. Principal characteristics of the content of a RIA

A RIA contains two phases, as indicated before: in the first phase a scen-
ario-technique could be used to help decision makers to make as explicit
as possible the objectives of an infrastructureplan and to reduce the un-
certainties regarding the road safety impact of alternative solutions. Under
para. 7.2 a proposal has been formulated for this part of a RIA. This
report has to give the general public enough insight and not only the
professionals and decision makers.

To summarize the principal characteristics of a RIA:


• Does not result in a choice, but offers a supported overview of all sen-
sible alternatives which can be considered in the decision
making process, based on a sound description of the baseline situation.
• Leads to the optimum concrete and operational description of the objec-
tives.

32
e Considers all reasonable alternatives.
• Offers an overview of the uncertainties and gaps in know-how which, if
relevant to the decision making process, should be solved as a matter of
priority.
• Leads to an evaluation plan.

33
Literature

Bulpitt, M. (1991). Safety audit in practice. Kent County Council.


P.T.R.C. 19th Annual Summer Meeting, 1991.

Department of Transport (1990a). Road safety audits. Departmental stan-


dard HD 19/90. Department of Transport. Highway, Safety and Traffic.

Department of Transport (1990b). Road safety audits. Advise Note HA


42/90. Department of Transport. Highway, Safety and Traffic.

Drummond, l.A. (1991). Safety audit policy. Northamptonshire County


Council, Planning and Transportation.

Dijkstra, A. & Wegman, F.C.M. (1992). Verkeersveiligheid in de vervoer-


regio. R-92-54. SWOV, Leidschendam.

European Union (1985). Richtlijn van de Raad betreffende de milieu-


effectbeoordeling van bepaalde openbare en particuliere projecten
(85/337/EEG). Publikatieblad van de Europese Gemeenschappen, 27 juni
1985.

IHT (1990). Guidelines for: The safety audit of highways. The Institution
of Highways and Transportation, London.

Jadaan, K. (1993). Road safety audit process: An accident prevention


technique. Works Consultancy Service, Wellington, New Zealand. Confer-
ence on Asian Road Safety 1993, Kuala Lumpur. October 1993.

Janssen, S.T.M.C. (1991). Indicators for traffic safety: A new yardstick for
safety. In: Hakkert, A.S. & Katz, A. (eds.). Proceedings of The Second
International Conference on 'New ways for improved road safety and
quality of life', Tel Aviv, 1991.

Machu, C. (1994). Personal communication about road safety audits in


France. April 1994.

Northamptonshire County Council (1992). Highway safety audit; A422


Brackley Southern By-pass. Northamptonshire County Council, Planning
and Transportation.

OECD (1994). Environmental impact assessment of roads. OECD, Paris.

Proctor, S. & Belcher, M. (1993). The use of road safety audits in Great
Britain. Traffic Engineering + Control, February 1993.

Ross, A.; Ghee, C.E. & Robson, C.G. (1993). Safety audit: An interna-
tional overview. Conference on Asian Road Safety 1993, Kuala Lumpur.
October 1993.

34
SWOV (Koornstra, M.J. a.o.) (Ed.) (1992). Naar een duurzaam veilig
wegverkeer; Nationale Verkeersveiligheidsverkenning voor de jaren
1990/2010. SWOV, Leidschendam.

SWOV (1993). Towards a sustainable safe traffic system in the Nether-


lands. National Road Safety Investigation 1990-2010. SWOV Institute for
Road Safety Research, Leidschendam.

Wegman, F.C.M. (1993). SWOVISI: Een nieuw instrumentarium voor


verkeersveiligheidsanalyses. R-93-4. SWOV, Leidschendam.

35
Dutch road network 1986
Road Km of Motor Motor
type road vehicle vehicle
per day kmxlO6
MW>41 242 81252 7177
MW41 1761 31451 20216
MR 2c 197 16957 1220
MR ic 2108 5877 4522
AR2c 252 18314 1683
AR ic 6537 4927 11756
LR 21 11719 1396 5970
LR 11 31702 314 3631
AU 11519 4471 18798
LU 32142 649 7619
WE 1339 318 155
Totaal 99519 2278 82748

Road Injury Casualties Fatalities


type accidents
MW>41 476 698 30
MW41 1500 2157 111
MR2c 182 282 17
MR ic 475 653 79
AR 2c 455 550 40
AR ic 3540 4826 239
LR 21 3055 3802 224
LR 11 3102 3880 217
AU 25010 27207 477
LU 5754 7517 94
WE 32 37 0
Totaal 43581 51610 1529

Safety indicators, 1986


Road Injury accidents per Casualties Fatalities
type 100 km motor eh. per injury per 100
of road kmx 10 accident casualties
MW>41 197 66 1,47 4.31
MW41 85 74 1,44 5.13
MR 2c 93 150 1,55 5.94
MR ic 23 105 1,38 12.12
AR2c 181 270 1,21 7.22
AR ic 54 301 1,36 4.96
LR 21 26 512 1,24 5.90
LR 11 10 854 1,25 5.60
AU 217 1330 1,09 1.75
LU 18 755 1,31 1.26
WE 2 205 1,16 1.26
Totaal 44 527 1,18 2.96
Table 1. Dutch road safety indicators per road type, for roads inside and
outside urban areas (SWOV).

36
Explanation

MW>41 : motorway; more than four lanes


MW 41 : four-lane motorway
MR 2c dual carriageway motor road
MR ic single carriageway motor road
AR 2c dual carriageway rural arterial
AR 1 c single carriageway rural arterial
LR 21 : two-lane rural local road
LR 11 : one-lane rural local road
AU urban arterial
LU : urban local road
WE : 'woonerf' and 30 km/h-zone

E 3

I 2

LA 2
LRfl
0
0 20,000 40000 60O0 80,000 100,000 120,000

average daily traffic of motor vehicles

Figure 1. Indicators on rural roads in the Netherlands, 1986 (SWOV).

37

You might also like