Oliveros v. Villaluz, 57 SCRA 163

Case #52
Oliveros vs. Villaluz

57 SCRA 163 G.R. No. L-33362 July 30, 1971
Facts:
On September 25, 1971 after due notice and hearing as ordered by this Court in an earlier case,
respondent court issued its order, directing that "the accused Mayor Jose Rentoria Oliveros of Antipolo,
Rizal, is hereby ordered SUSPENDED pursuant to section 13, of Republic Act No. 3019, from office within
twenty-four hours from receipt of this Order." Petitioner duly complied with the suspension order and
ceased to hold office thereafter.
In the general elections of November 8, 1971, however, petitioner ran for re-election and despite the
pending criminal anti- graft charge against him and his suspension from office won re- election and was
duly proclaimed mayor-elect of Antipolo, Rizal for a new term beginning January 1, 1972 and ending
December 31, 1975.
Petitioner took his oath of office and entered upon the performance of his duties as re-elected mayor of
Antipolo on January 1, 1972. On January 17, 1972, respondent People through the state prosecutor
filed a contempt petition against petitioner, asserting that petitioner's act of "taking over once again the
functions of the office of mayor in the face of a suspension order [of September 25, 1971] constitutes
grave disobedience of or resistance to a lawful order" and that his assumption of office was "illegal and
improper ... deliberately with grave abuse of authority and in open defiance of the order of this
Honorable Court."
Respondent court after hearing rejected Petitioner's answer and pleas that he acted only in obedience
to the mandate of the people of Antipolo who re-elected him to a new term of mayor altogether
different and distinct from his previous expired term during which he was ordered suspended and issued
its challenged order of January 26, 1972 declaring that "the order of suspension dated September 25,
1971 is still subsisting and that accused is still under suspension" and finding petitioner guilty of
contempt of court.
(Petitioner was convicted of contempt of court and sentenced to 4 months of imprisonment and a fine of
P300.00)
Issue:
 Whether a criminal offense for violation of Republic Act 3019 committed by an elective officer during
one term may be the basis of his suspension in a subsequent term in the event of his re- election to
office.
 Whether respondent court's suspension order of September 25, 1971 issued during his expired term as
mayor (1968-1971) automatically applied to a new term to which petitioner mayor was re-elected (1972-
1975) such as to warrant and justify respondent court's challenged order of January 26, 1972 finding him
guilty of contempt of court for having "willfully disobeyed" the said suspension order by assuming on
January 1, 1972 the office to which he had been re-elected as ordained by the Election Code under pain
of forfeiture of his right thereto.
Ruling:
1. Petitioner's reliance on the loose language used in Pascual vs. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija that
"each term is separate from other terms and that the re-election to office operates as a condonation of
the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor" is
misplaced.
The Court has in subsequent cases made it clear that the Pascual ruling (which dealt with administrative
liability) applies exclusively to administrative and not to criminal liability and sanctions. Thus, in Ingco vs.
Sanchez 7 the Court ruled that the re-election of a public officer for a new term does not in any manner
wipe out the criminal liability incurred by him in a previous term.
Since the criminal prosecution against petitioner-accused is concededly not abated by the fact of his re-
election, the pendency of such criminal case under a valid information under Republic Act 3019 may
clearly be and supplies the legal basis for his suspension from office in a subsequent term in the event of
his re-election by virtue of the provisions of section 13 of the Act.
2. There could be no such automatic application or extension of the suspension order of September 25,
1971 to anew term to which petitioner was re-elected in the 1971 elections. At worst, petitioner cannot
be held guilty of willful disobedience of the suspension order for having assumed the office to which he
was reelected when such act contingent upon his reelection was not even prohibited, much less
specified in the suspension order.
From its very terms, the suspension order covered and contemplated only petitioner's then current term
of office to which he was elected (beginning January 1, 1968 and ending December 31, 1971) and no
other term. While the pending criminal prosecution for violation of Republic Act No. 3019 committed by
an elective officer during one term may be the basis of his suspension in a subsequent term if he is re-
elected to the same office, such suspension must be
issued anew upon a supplemental order . As held in Luciano, supra, such suspension is mandatory but
not self-operative under section 13 of the Act and must be ordered by the court where the criminal case
is pending . Here, since the validity of the information was already previously determined and the
criminal case is admittedly pending and has not resulted in acquittal, the court is called upon to issue
anew a supplemental order of suspension once it has verified the supplemental event of the accused's
re- election to office . There having been no such supplemental order of suspension issued in the case at
bar, save for the challenged order of January 26, 1972 which cannot be retroactively held against
petitioner, respondent court's sentence of contempt against petitioner was issued with grave abuse of
discretion and must be set aside.
ACCORDINGLY, respondent court's order of January 26, 1972, declaring petitioner "guilty of contempt of
court under Rule 71" and sentencing him "to four months imprisonment and to pay a fine of P300.00" is
hereby annulled and set aside.
The petition is however dismissed insofar as it prays for annulment of the portion of the order "declaring
him to be under suspension until the present and for the entire duration of the pendency of the case
against him", such new suspension to take effect upon finality of this judgment.

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Case #52

Oliveros vs. Villaluz

elected to the same office, such suspension must be

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