The Last Romans:

Emperor Majorian and the Fall of Rome

A study of the Late Empire and its energetic Emperor

University College Tilburg

Liberal Arts and Sciences
Humanities Major Bachelor Thesis
Thesis Supervisor: Prof. Dr. R.C.H. Lesaffer
Thesis Author: Janus de Vries
Abstract
This paper concerns the reign of Emperor Julius Flavius Valerius Majorianus (r.
457-461), placed within the context of the Empire that had started unravelling in the years
before his ascension. By analysing the state of Rome during its final period, and the way it
faced its barbarian enemies, we can more clearly define and appreciate the sort of task that
the last Emperors had to face.
In so doing, a case will be presented in which the destruction of Rome was not yet
set in stone by the time of Majorian’s reign. From our modern perspective, we are primed to
think of the fall of Rome as a long, progressive and inevitable process. This is part of the
intellectual heritage of Edward Gibbon’s​ Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire​. Though the
paradigm does not hold as much power as it has in the past, as current scholarship includes
a dogged debate on whether the fall of Rome was mainly due to internal causes or due to
external causes, this paradigm remains highly influential.
The linear thinking of progressive decline, or progressive causes of decline, is still
well represented in both traditions. The downside of this perspective is that it does not work
well with such figures as Majorian who defy the paradigm by embodying success, rather
than failure. For Emperor Majorian, the fall of Rome was not something that was as
inevitable as the decline and fall paradigm purports it to be. This has made the case of
Majorian difficult for scholars from Gibbon onward. The solution has often been to present
Majorian as some sort of heroic character who had deserved to live in a better time, but,
through an unfortunate twist of fate, found himself in the Empire’s twilight.
In this aspect, this paper can contribute to the larger debate surrounding the fall of
Rome. By focusing on individuals and opportunities, an additional perspective can be
provided that does not attempt to explain the fall of Rome in a completely systematic way.
Though the goal is not to argue that the fall of Rome was merely down to a series of
particularly unfortunate events heaped upon each other, I believe that individual motives and
characters ought to be given fair attention, especially in the case of such defiant characters
as Emperor Majorian. The paper will explain how, in a period where the Western Roman
Empire is generally considered to be so weak, it was possible that one individual such as
Emperor Majorian managed to turn this loss around, though briefly, and recover almost the
entirety of the Western Roman Empire.

1
Thesis Outline

Introduction and Academic Background 3

Part I: Background 4
The Empire of Honorius, Stilicho and Constantius 5
The Empire of Valentinian and Aetius 8
Interim Conclusions 12
Archaeology In Barbaricum 13
Barbarian Military and Organization before the Border Crossings 16
Discussing the Evidence 18

Part II: Into the Breach 21

Adapting to a new home 22
The Goths 23
The Rhine Crossers 26
Spain and the Suevi 29
The Vandals 31

Part III: Flavius Julius Valerius Majorianus 40

The Life of Majorian through Carmen V 41
Interpreting Carmen V 43
Rousseau’s Hidden Critique 44
Concluding Carmen V 46
Majorian and the Imperial Women 47
Avitus 48
Novellae 49
Asserting Rule 49
Treachery and Defeat 51
Sweet Innocence 52
Ricimer and the Puppet Show 53
Aftermath 56

Conclusions 57

Passing Judgement: Majorianus and his Empire 59

Sources 62

2
List of Figures

Figure I. The Invasions of the Early Fifth Century. 6

Figure II. The State of the Western Roman Empire at the death of Alaric. 8
Figure III. The Western Roman Empire by the End of the Reign of Valentinian III. 11
Figure IV. Princely Graves Beyond the Frontier of the First Three Centuries AD​. 14
Figure V. Evolution of Danish Longhouses. 16
Figure VI. Different Germanic culture groupings​ in Archaeology. 19
Figure VII. The Barbarian Division of Spain in 411. 27
Figure VIII. The Vandal Land Route to Africa. 32
Figure IX. A ‘Vandal’ Horseman in front of ‘his Estate’. 35
Figure X. A ‘Vandal’ Horseman hunting. 35
Figure XI. Vandal Coin with ​Punic motifs. 36

3
Introduction and Academic Background
Although we have learned more about Late Rome and the so-called barbarians and
their invasions since Gibbon’s original study, the fall of Rome remains one of the most
controversial events of European history. Interestingly, the end of our studies on the causes
of the decline and/or fall of the Roman Empire are often not much more enlightening than
Gibbon’s original study was, as the academic world cannot seem to agree on any one way to
explain the issue. For example, in ​The Fall of the Roman Empire: A New History of Rome
and the Barbarians ​(2007), Peter Heather’s (simplified) thesis is that the development of the
barbarian communities across the border meant that the Late Empire faced much stronger
opponents than the Early Empire did, which tipped the odds against the Romans and
eventually caused the end of their Empire. On the other hand, Walter Goffart, writing on the
various Germanic tribes in ​Barbarian Tides: The Migration Age and the Later Roman Empire
(2006) rejects such theses as he argues against the greater unity and strength of the
barbarians in Late Antiquity. Similarly,​ ​Adrian Goldsworthy (​How Rome Fell: Death of a
Superpower​, 2009) sees little reason to name the barbarians as conquerors of Rome,
instead placing the responsibility for the fall of the Empire on Roman infighting, which
occurred so often due to the ease of usurping power in Late Rome.
Rather than also writing a six-volume work on such complicated issues, I will take a
smaller scale approach, focusing on the historical character of Emperor Flavius Julius
Valerius Majorianus, who ruled the Western Roman Empire for four years from 457 to 461.
He is generally considered one of the best Emperors of the Late Empire, with Gibbon even
calling him “(...) a great and heroic character, such as sometimes arise, in a degenerate age,
1
to vindicate the honour of the human species.” By analysing the final period of the Roman
Empire through individual efforts, we can take a different perspective on the fall of Rome
than one that builds up the story from (say) the Dominate onwards. Looking at Majorian’s
accomplishments and defeats provides a valuable insight in the Late Roman state and what
it could do, what it perceived it could do and what it eventually proved it could not do.
In order to achieve this, the paper will first briefly cover the events of the first half of
the fifth century, as most studies on the fall of Rome do. This period is marked by vital
events leading up to the deposition of Romulus Augustulus in 476. As the topic is still subject
to great debate, I feel that a brief summary with a subsequent elaboration of the author’s
position (or bias, if you will) is necessary. This is followed by a brief show of evidence
regarding barbarians before the 5​th​ century. This topic is relevant to both the internal and the
external positions and I think it wise to briefly elaborate on the author’s viewpoints on this
topic as well. Part II will discuss the barbarians more in-depth from the moment that they
crossed over into imperial territory. How they maintained themselves and how they
constructed their first societies is interesting not only by itself, but can tell us something
about how strong and capable their regimes were. Finally, Part III will cover the life of
Majorian, which will then be used as a bridgehead for drawing all of these various aspects
together and making a case that, contrary to intuition, the Empire’s fall was not yet
guaranteed by the time of Majorian’s reign.

1
Gibbon, E. (1781). T​he History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire​, Volume III
4
Part I: Background

5
The Empire of Honorius, Stilicho and Constantius
After the death of Theodosius the Great in 395, the Western and Eastern halves of
the Empire were separated a final time. Though too young to rule, Theodosius’ children,
Arcadius and Honorius, ascended to the thrones of the Eastern and Western Roman
Empires, respectively. Honorius was assisted by his guardian Stilicho, who had been a
friend of his father, and a capable general. Honorius’ rule was a troubled one and Honorius
had to deal with a number of incursions. It is during Honorius’ reign that the various
barbarian groups first entered and established themselves inside the Roman Empire (Figure
1). While some of these groups, notably that of Radagaisus and Uldin, were destroyed, the
other invaders, Alaric’s Goths (the Visigoths), Vandals, Alans and Sueves remained on
imperial soil mostly unharmed.

Figure I. The invasions of the early fifth century. After Heather, 2007.

6
 Perhaps as a response to these invasions, or, as Peter Heather suggests, as a
response to trouble the Romans knew was brewing on the frontier, Roman Britain elected
2
their own Emperors in a series of usurpations. Though the first two did not last long, the
third usurper by the name of Constantine, apparently elected by grace of the confidence
3
inspired by his name, proved a capable enough ruler. Constantine III, as he became known,
took the remainder of the British field army and crossed into Gaul. Though our sources
Orosius and Zosimus are generally hostile to Constantine III, he quickly took control of Gaul,
except for a small area around Arles (Arlelate), as well as Spain. It seems likely that the
Gauls eagerly welcomed Constantine, as Honorius and Stilicho had failed to repel the
4
invaders. Though he did not fully destroy them, Constantine III managed to contain the
5
barbarian menace to Northern Gaul, away from the Gallic heartlands.
Constantine’s position in Gaul and Spain deteriorated rapidly when his general
Gerontius took control of Spain and put forward his own pretender, Maximus. Making use of
the situation, or perhaps being incited by Gerontius, the Rhine invaders broke out of their
6
confinement and resumed their plundering of Gaul. This, in turn, incited the people of Britain
and Armorica to expel Constantine’s officials and take matters into their own hands,
7
effectively achieving independence. The Vandals, Sueves and Alans made use of the
confusion and decided to cross over into Spain in 409. However, after plundering it, the
barbarians quickly ‘betook to the plough’, as Orosius put it (Figure II).

2
Heather (2007), ​The Fall of the Roman Empire: A New History of Rome and the Barbarians​, 211.
3
Orosius, ​History Against the Pagans.​ Book VII. 40.
4
Drinkwater, ​The Usurpers Constantine III (407-411) and Jovinus (411-413)​, 271. Kulikowski (2000),
Barbarians in Gaul, Usurpers in Britain​, 333.
5
Zosimus,​ The History of Zosimus​, Book VI.173. Kulikowski, 333. Goldsworthy, ​How Rome Fell:
Death of a Superpower​, 296.
6
Zosimus, VI. 174.
7
Zosimus, VI. 175.
7
Figure II. The state of the Western Roman Empire at the death of Alaric in 410. After Halsall.

While this was happening, the imperial court hamstrung itself through its execution of
Stilicho in 408, which led to the Gothic invasion of Italy, culminating in the (in)famous sack of
Rome in 410. The politics of the court fell into place when Constantius, a former supporter of
Stilicho came to power. Meanwhile, after sacking Rome, Alaric had died and the leadership
of the Goths passed over to Athaulf, who started moving his Goths out of Italy. The Italian
field army that had previously been stuck between the double threat of Constantine III to the
west and the Goths to the south could now be rallied and put to work. Constantius quickly
set out and managed to eliminate Constantine III and Gerontius relatively quickly.

8
 The Gothic king Athaulf, who had married Honorius’ sister Galla Placidia, who was
taken with the Goths after the sack of Rome, jockeyed for a position in the imperial hierarchy
and aided Constantius in destroying a final usurper, Jovinus. Constantius did not appreciate
such an arrangement and induced a Gothic power struggle in which Wallia came up on top.
King Wallia was much more amenable to making a deal with the Romans than Athaulf had
been and he returned Galla Placidia to Ravenna, in return for a continuation of the grain
supplies. More importantly, Wallia agreed to fight the Alans, Sueves and Vandals for the
Romans. He “wiped out the Siling Vandals, and the Alans (...) who were ruling over the
Vandals and Sueves, suffered such heavy losses that the few survivors placed themselves
8
under the protection of Gunderic, the king of the [Hasding] Vandals.” Having achieved this,
9
Constantius decided to settle his Goths in Aquitaine, for reasons which are still debated
today. Constantius’ ability to stabilise the Empire was matched by his ability to control court
politics, as he married Galla Placidia and became co-emperor in 421. His ambitions were
halted by the flow of time as he died later that year.

The Empire of Valentinian and Aetius

As Honorius’ death followed in 424, the Empire was thrown in dynastic chaos. After
an attempt by one Joannes to claim the purple, the Eastern Empire intervened and placed
Constantius’ and Galla Placidia’s son, Valentinian III, on the throne in 425, at the age of only
10
six. A power struggle for control over the young boy was completed in 433, when Aetius
received the honorary title of ​patricius,​ confirming his supreme status. In the previous years,
Aetius dealt with his political rivals, Felix and Boniface, to emerge as the Western Empire’s
next powerful general. However, in this downtime of the Roman state, the barbarians were
left to make a ruckus of their own. The bishop Hydatius mentions hostile activities by
11
Sueves, bands of rebel Goths, rebel Nori and Franks being active in this period. ​ Moreover,
the Vandals, under Gaiseric, who ascended to the throne in 428, had made their crossing to
12
Africa, arriving in Mauritania in 429.
Thus, though Aetius found himself in control of the Empire, many parts of it had gone
missing, including those political vacuums of Spain and Britain, as well as Vandal
Mauretania and Northern Gaul. Moreover, the Roman infighting from before 433 would also
13
have taken many Roman casualties. Aetius tried his best to take control of the situation. He
enlisted Eastern support which came in the form of general Aspar who was to aid in the war
14
against the Vandals in Africa. This allowed Aetius to focus on campaigns in Gaul, for which
15
he purchased Hunnic aid, trading Roman soil in Pannonia for military support. With his
Hunnic support, Aetius dealt blows to the Goths, that had risen up in revolt again, as well as
16
the Burgundians, who were beaten into submission. He then resettled the survivors as

8
Hydatius, 416-18.
9
Hydatius, 418.
10
Hydatius, 425.
11
Hydatius, 429-433.
12
Hydatius, 429.
13
Halsall, 243.
14
Halsall, 242. Heather, 286.
15
Heather, 287.
16
Hydatius, 436-438.
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 17
Roman allies. Moreover, Aetius dealt with those Armoricans that had thrown off
18
Constantine III’s rule years before. Finally, Hydatius’ Gallaecians seemed to be on their
way to conducting peace settlements with the Sueves and with the other barbarians gone,
19
Spain was put in some kind of order.
However, the Eastern Romans could not afford to keep Aspar in Carthage for long.
After fighting the Vandals to a standstill and securing a treaty, Aspar was recalled by
20
Constantinople. When the coast was clear in 439, Gaiseric took Carthage by surprise. This
led to Aetius having to loosen the reins over Spain and Gaul, which then saw a rise of
21
barbarian and rebel activity, in order to attempt to deal with the Vandal situation. An
attempt to dislodge the Vandals with Eastern Roman aid had to be cancelled and the
Vandals remained in Carthage. A treaty was drawn up to acknowledge the new status quo,
which was much to Gaiseric’s satisfaction as it included a betrothal of Valentinian’s daughter
22
Eudoxia to his son Huneric.
The cancellation of the expedition was due to the aggression of Attila’s Huns.
Recalling the Eastern expeditionary force nevertheless did not stop the Huns from
23
rampaging across the Eastern Empire in the 440’s. Attila then decided to turn westward,
invading Gaul in 451, leading up to the Battle of the Catalaunian Plains (or Campus
Mauriacus), where he was halted by a coalition led by Aetius and Theodoric I of the Goths.
Attila turned his sights to Italy in 452, when he was apparently turned back by Pope Leo I,
though probably more earthly forces like disease and Roman harassment were at work. This
24
would be Attila’s last major offensive, as he died in 453.
Forcing Attila back might have been an impressive feat by Aetius and his allies, but
the Empire was still in a much-diminished position. Moreover, Valentinian III had become
25
restless and fed up with his general and personally assassinated him in 454. In this act, the
Emperor marked himself for death as well. Those dissenters that had been keen to see
Aetius go were now joined by the army, as Aetius retained his popularity with the soldiers
26
even in death. Heather considers Aetius’ death to be an end of an era, as the Huns could
27
no longer be used as a mechanism for maintaining a balance of power. Nevertheless this
balance of power depended heavily upon holding the various powers in check, and the
situation in which those after Valentinian and Aetius would find themselves was precarious
(Figure IV). Whether Aetius was a genius for being able to keep this together, or his reign a
failure for letting the situation get to this point is something that can be debated.

17
Heather, 287.
18
Halsall, 244. Heather, 287.
19
Hydatius, 438. Heather, 288.
20
Hydatius, 439.
21
Halsall, 245.
22
Goldsworthy, 329-330. Halsall, 247. Heather, 291-292.
23
Heather, 306-312.
24
Goldsworthy, 330-333. Halsall, 253-254. Heather, 338-345. Hydatius, 451-453.
25
Hydatius, 454.
26
Heather, 373-374.
27
Heather, 374-375.
10
Figure III. The Western Roman Empire by the end of the reign of Valentinian III. After
Halsall.

11
 Petronius Maximus, who had been one of the chief plotters in both assassinations,
proclaimed himself to be the next Emperor. He ruled for scarcely 3 months before Gaiseric
appeared with a fleet near Ostia, perhaps because Petronius Maximus had married off
Huneric’s betrothed, Valentinian III’s daughter Eudocia, to his son in an attempt to gain
legitimacy. In his attempt to escape Rome, he was torn apart by an angry mob. Petronius
Maximus’ death alone did not satisfy Gaiseric and Rome was sacked again in 455.
Gaiseric’s sack was a lot more thorough than Alaric’s had been and he carried of a great
28
amount of treasure from the city, as well as the widow and daughter of Valentinian.
Avitus, who had been Petronius’ ambassador to the Goths, enlisted their aid to
become the next Emperor, marching into Rome with his Goth allies. However, the Italian
army commanders Majorian and Ricimer withdrew their support and gave battle at Piacenza
(Placentia), and deposed Avitus, in 456. In 457, Majorian claimed the purple.

Interim Conclusions
There are a number of aspects of these years that can be focused on for the 5th
century. Almost every writer who provides a narrative account on the 5th century chooses to
focus on one or a number of aspects that, in their view, are the main reasons of the decline
and/or fall of the Roman Empire. My brief account builds on such narratives, but is inserted
here chiefly to stress the importance of such aspects for the Roman Empire in the first half of
the 5th century, leading up to the reign of Majorian.
Firstly, the barbarian invasions and their subsequent activity are closely linked to
lapses in Roman government, generally in the form of deaths of important political
characters in the Roman world. These lapses were frequently followed by barbarian
attempts to make use of the situation. This is for example the case in the death of Stilicho in
408 which was followed by Alaric’s invasion of Italy. The conflicts between Constantine III
and Gerontius allowed for the barbarian crossing to Spain in 409. The deaths of Constantius
and Honorius in the early 420s, led to a 10-year period of weakened Roman government
and the deaths of Aetius and Valentinian around 455, further weakened the Roman state
and extinguished the Theodosian house.
Nevertheless, this does not mean that the barbarians were merely opportunists.
Especially the Goths and the Vandals (the Vandal-Alan coalition) managed a number of
impressive feats, such as Wallia’s Spanish campaign and Gaiseric’s seizure of Carthage.
Even if some authors downplay the external (barbarian) causes for Roman decline in favour
of internal ones, the barbarians of the 5th century proved to be no pushovers.
Finally, the sources on the barbarian invasions do insist on the destructive nature of
this era. All major Roman factions and all major barbarian factions had to frequently engage
in, or suffer under, violent military campaigns. Considering this continued military activity in
almost every area of the Western Roman Empire, it seems fair to conclude that the suffering
of the peasants can only have led to reduced prosperity and tax income. For this, we do not
even need to mingle in the controversial discussions regarding the economic state of Late
29
Rome’s cities and countryside. As such, the idea of a ‘transformation’ of the Roman Empire

28
Halsall, 378-379. Heather, 378-379.
29
See for example Gwynn: ​A. H. M. Jones and the Later Roman Empire​, mainly chapters 8-10 for
brief descriptions of Jones’ work on Late Roman society.
12
can, in my opinion, be discarded due to all this military activity. As transformation implies a
relatively peaceful transition, the concept does not add anything useful to the discussion
regarding the fall of Rome.
Overall, the period is marked by a continued struggle from the beginning of the 5th
century onwards. This was both in-and external, and the damage done to the Roman state in
the 5th century is neither solely due to internal causes or external ones. Additionally, there
were a few men that did manage to stop the bleeding for a little while. However, these ad
hoc solutions left loose ends for their successors, which kept the situation very volatile.

Archaeology in Barbaricum
Having thus given an account of the various political and population movements of
the factions fighting in against or for the Western Roman Empire up to 457, the next step of
the stage-setting is a more in-depth look into the barbarians before they crossed into the
Empire. Tracing the development of these barbarians can go back a long time, all the way to
the sudden disappearance of traditional barbarian names from the historical record and the
subsequent appearance of new ones, such as the Franks, Goths and Alamanni. The Late
Roman barbarians are however not only different in name from the earlier barbarians, but
also seem more impressive from a political and military standpoint.
Archaeology provides valuable insights into their societies. Most barbarian groups
beyond the close frontier appear to have been formed as a result of Roman influence in the
local societies. Meddling in barbarian politics was an efficient tool for Rome to keep allies
strong, enemies weak and borders secure. One simple Roman control method was
subsidising favoured barbarians with so-called prestige goods, which local leaders could use
30
to improve their position in their local communities. In Barbaricum (‘the land of the
barbarians’) this shows up in the burial record, where so-called princely graves appear as
barbarian chiefs had themselves buried with imported Roman prestige goods. These appear
not only along the immediate frontier, but end up as far as Denmark and Southern Sweden
(Figure IV). Also interesting is the homogeneity between these graves, which can be taken
31
to represent increased connectivity between barbarian groups.

30
Hedeager, ​Rome and Northern Europe from AD 1 - 400​, 128-129. Brather, A​cculturation and
Ethnogenesis along the Frontier: Rome and the Ancient Germans in an Archaeological Perspective​,
145-149. Todd (1997), ​The Germanic Peoples​. Todd (2005), ​Germanic Peoples and Germanic
Society​, 443. Kulikowski (2008), ​Rome’s Gothic Wars: From the Third Century to Alaric​, 37. Heather,
89-90.
31
Hedeager, 131. Brather, 147.
13
Figure IV. A map of the distribution of princely graves beyond the frontier of the first three
centuries AD: first-to second-century burials of the so-called Lübsow type in white and third-
and early fourth-century graves of the so called group ‘Haßleben-Leuna in Black. After
Brather, 2005.

In addition to the increased stratification and political control from the barbarian
‘princes’, many of the settlements the barbarians lived in were also becoming much more
impressive (Figure VI). Perhaps the most important factor is the switch from extensive to
32
intensive agriculture in Barbaricum. Though it has been argued as both cause and effect,
intensified agriculture does allow for the sustenance of an increased population. Larger
33
cemeteries and settlements that also started appearing in the Later Roman periods are
generally taken to indicate a population increase. There are a number of examples of such
34
large settlements, but in Western Europe Wijster is probably the best-known example. For
the Eastern regions of Barbaricum, north of the Black Sea, Heather gives the example of
35
Budesty as one such substantial settlement.

32
Hedeager, 134. Heather, 86-87. Todd (1997), 473.
33
Todd (1997), 472.
34
Hedeager, 134. Todd (1997), 473-474. Todd (2005), 448. Heather, 87. Es, ​Wijster: A Native Village
beyond the Imperial Frontier, 150 - 425 A.D​. Halsall, 132.
35
Heather, 87. Heather (1997), ​Goths and Huns, C. 320 - 425​.
14
 These villages also had other characteristics, such as regular and functional layouts,
enclosures that seem to denote ownership, buildings that can be identified as belonging to a
chief, more stables and granaries and more local industry, of which iron-working is the best
36
example. Especially interesting cases are some Alamannic settlements on soil that had
once belonged to the Empire. This gave them the opportunity to use and make minor
37
changes to the Roman structures that remained there. On the Danube frontier, some
38
Gothic buildings made use of stone in their construction. Additionally the Gothic Tervingi
had an extensive defence system which might have been constructed with imperial support.
39

36
Hedeager, 134. Todd (1997), 473. Todd (2005), 448. Kulikowski (2008), 90. Godlowski,
Jakuszowice: A Multi-period Settlement in Southern Poland​, 673-674. Halsall, 132.
37
Drinkwater, ​The Alamanni and Rome 213-496: (Caracalla to Clovis)​. Ammianus Marcellinus, ​The
Roman History of Ammianus Marcellinus​, Book XVII. 7
38
Heather (2007), 91.
39
Kulikowski (2008), 79.
15
Figure V. Evolution of Danish Longhouses, showing a steady growth in size and complexity
from 500-300 BC, to 100 BC and finally from 200-500 AD. It is interesting to note how it
seems that, even this far north, growth was afoot in Barbaricum, even if not at the same level
as on the frontier. After Hedeager.

Though these are only a number of examples from a vast archaeological field, they
show a steady growth in the various areas of development for the tribes, including
population, centralization, inter-barbarian contacts, trade and craftsmanship. These
developments are especially poignant in the areas immediately bordering the Empire’s
provinces, which show a sort of extra-territorial Romanization, and the creation of a frontier
40
culture between the provinces and bordering Barbaricum. Not only do Roman trade and
prestige goods appear, but more direct examples of barbarian development opportunities
due to Roman favouritism can be found. On the Rhine frontier, the Alamani were living in
former imperial territory, where Ammianus describes Roman villas. On the Danube, the
state-sponsored Gothic Tervingi were able to subdue their neighbours thanks to Roman aid.
These Tervingi thus drove other barbarian tribes, such as the Carpi, into the Empire, forcing
41
the Romans to deal with these unwelcome invaders.

40
Brather, 171-172.
41
Kulikowski (2008), 78-80.
16
Barbarian Military and Organization before the Border
Crossings
Regarding barbarian society and activity towards Rome, there are also a number of
interesting historiographical sources to build upon. In Late Antiquity there were a number of
impressive raids on Roman soil. Perhaps the most interesting is the Gothic (called
Scythians) raid onto Asia Minor described by Zosimus. Zosimus mentions how the Scythians
moved onto the Bosporus and commandeered the ships of the local rulers, who dared not
refuse. This led to the Scythians being able to enter and pillage the cities of Asia Minor,
including great cities such as Trapezos and Nicomedia. Moreover, in one of their naval
assaults they managed to make their way into the Aegean, which allowed them to plunder
42
Greece as well. Kulikowski takes Gregory Thaumaturgus, the ‘Wonderworker’ as a good
example of the war’s calamities, as he answers such Christian questions as what to do with
rape victims, looters, escaped barbarian prisoners and even those that joined the attackers.
43
Overall, this is a good example of some of the havoc the barbarians can cause on imperial
soil and the shock it generated. Though not a fundamental threat on the Empire on their
own, these Scythians in their raids did do serious damage to the lives and livelihoods of the
people of Anatolia and showed a great level of audacity and aptitude in attacking the Empire.
From all the tribes that crossed into the Empire in the late 4th and early 5th century,
the Tervingi are the ones with whom the Empire had had the most contact in the previous
century. This allows us to get some insights into their societal organization. Though the
same tribal organization cannot have carried over when the Tervingi crossed the Danube
and merged with other Gothic tribes to create the Gothic group that would later be led by
Alaric, it provides us with insights into the control of Gothic leaders over their subjects.
One example of this is the story of ​The Passion of St. Saba​. Saba was a poor
Tervingi Christian villager in the late 4th century, when, perhaps to spite the Eastern
Emperor Valens, Christians were persecuted in Gothia by Judge (​Iudex​) Athanaric. The
Judge in Gothic society seems to have been the overall ruler of the Tervingi, with the
Tervingi kings being subordinate to the Judge, though the degree of control and the balance
44
of power is hard to measure. Returning to the persecution, in order to snuff the Christians
out, Athanaric and the Gothic kings made use of small retinues or ‘officials’, if you will, to
45
pass from village to village and oversee the progress.
One test was to oversee the consumption of sacrificial meat dedicated to the pagan
Gods, which, in the village of Saba, were being undermined by the local populace. The
villagers, showing sympathy to the Christians in their village, switched the ‘unclean’ sacrificial
meat for normal meat, that Christians could safely consume. Saba, who was striving for
martyrdom, would not be part of this deception and wished to make his Christianity known to
the aristocratic overseers. His fellow villagers exiled him in order to keep him from stirring up
trouble, though he was readmitted soon after. When another Gothic noble came to the
village to apply the same test, Saba stepped forward as a Christian once more. The noble, in
an act of mercy, merely expulsed Saba for the second time, as he did not conceive a poor

42
Zosimus, Book I. 23-28.
43
Kulikowski (2008), 19.
44
Heather (2007), 95-96. Kulikowski (2008), 101.
45
Heather (2007), 96.
17
villager to be any sort of danger to Gothic society. When travelling to another village to
celebrate Easter, a miraculous snowfall turned Saba back to his own village, where he and
the Christian priest Sansalas were caught and tortured by Atharidus, the son of the Gothic
king Rothesteus. Once more the villagers interfered and Saba was freed, but he chose to
stay and turn himself in. Saba was finally condemned to being drowned in the river. The
soldiers that were sent to drown him considered to let the poor fool go, but Saba urged them
46
to complete their task, and they finally drowned him.
Though this story is of course primarily meant as a saint story, which somes with all
the historiographical flaws that such Christian writing is normally emburdened with, it does
show a reliable picture of Gothic society. Overall, it appears that the collective Tervingi
leadership, decided to persecute the Christians. The villages were supposed to carry out this
order, while enforcement was in the hands of the nobles with their retinues. The information
gap between these nobles and the village elders was large enough for the villagers to be
able to thwart these efforts without engaging in any serious rebellious activity. Even the
soldiers that made up the retinues were willing to let Saba go, which shows that noble
control over their subjects was loose. Drawing these over to society at large, Halsall
concludes that Tervingi society was probably based on the collection of tribute from villages
by their nobles, along with their retinues of warriors, based in centralised or high-status
settlements, which reflect those aspects of increased settlement growth and stratification as
47
discussed previously.

Discussing the Evidence

Taking together the evidence from the plethora of archaeological finds, the various
written sources that describe the exploits of the barbarians and the sources that give us
insights into their lives and societies, we get an image of a potent rival to Roman power. Late
Antique barbarians seem to be more numerous, better organized, more connected to their
peers and generally better at productive activity, ranging from farming to industry. At the top,
leaders were in control over more settlements and lesser nobles than previous
confederations. Finally, Late Antique barbarians were more able to strike farther away from
the frontiers, of which the Black Sea raids are a good example.
Still, relations between the barbarians and Rome are a controversial issue. For
example, Walter Goffart puts his ‘Recipe of the Germans overthrowing the Roman Empire’
on trial, stating that “This ‘inner development’ [of the Germans/barbarians] is not an
established, verifiable fact of ancient history; it is the aggregate of five or six discrete groups
of facts, widely separate in time and space, joined together by emphatic affirmations that
48
they combine into a coherent and progressive tale: the rise of ‘the Germans’." He is not
entirely unjustified in saying this. The idea that all barbarians are essentially the same and
can be lumped together is nothing more than copying the opinions of Roman authors before
us. We can definitely tell that there were differences between various barbarian groups
49
(Figure VI). Neither should all barbarian evidence be casually lumped together. In some
ways, my brief explanation is probably guilty of this method, though this is more so due to

46
Halsall, 3-5. Heather (2007), 96. Kulikowski (2008), 118-120.
47
Halsall, 135.
48
Goffart, ​Barbarian Tides: The Migration Age and the Later Roman Empire​, 27.
49
Halsall, 23.
18
the aim of briefly taking together the various examples than any deliberate effort to piece
disparate things together. Still, some line of defence must be prepared against Goffart and
other authors that would deny the gradual evolution of the northern barbarians.

Figure VI. Different Germanic culture groupings, defined by archaeological findings such as
ceramics, metalware and burial findings. After Halsall.

While the various finds from Barbaricum and the episodes of major barbarian activity
are by no means definitely interrelated or chronological, the way of drawing conclusions from
the evidence we find is to study them by looking at their contexts and developments. Indeed,
looking at each object of study only by its own terms provides us with very little to work with,
especially in the case of archaeology, where one would be digging up evidence solely for the
sake of digging up evidence. Though this was done in the past at major cultural sites,
modern digs set out with a clear purpose. The result of any investigation, whether historical
or archaeological is to be taken up by archaeologists and historians to patch everything

19
together and paint a coherent picture. The usage of archaeological evidence by historians is
of course subject to various debates, as many archaeologists for example argue for the
inherent value of their work, rather than as a supporting tool for historians in general, to
name but one example. Still, the same inherent value also forces us to try to understand and
incorporate it the best we can. Relating to Goffart, if the final picture of an archaeological and
historical investigation is indeed the recipe of the ‘Germans overthrowing the Western
Roman Empire’, it does not necessarily mean it is incorrect due to the usage of evidence
from various times and places. Indeed, trying to trace each barbarian tribe from their earliest
appearance to Late Antiquity is an impossible endeavour. If evidence is scarce, we must
simply make do with whatever we can get our hands on, even if the evidence is disparate.
Following the advice of Halsall, however, acting as if finds from different groupings,
whether archaeological or historiographical apply to other groupings equally is certainly a
mistake as well. Indeed, even comparing historiographical tribes with archaeological cultures
is a dangerous affair. Earlier tendencies to equate these with one another, for example the
Przeworsk culture consisting of Vandals, or the Cernjachov culture being the Goths, have
been shown to be oversimplified These cultures zones incorporate areas probably inhabited
by multiple peoples, and cultural aspects overlap cultural zones. Thus, there are differences,
50
but no demarcations. Drawing conclusions about barbarians ‘in general’, as we still need to
do when comparing them to imperial Rome, then rely on the finding of similar developments
between different groups independently.
Although the evidence is not perfect and the archaeological findings are prone to
discussion just like historiographical sources are, I do think that the overall picture of
stronger and better organized barbarian groupings is correct. However, this is not to say that
Goffart’s ‘Recipe’ is. Aside from Goffart, different authors have differing views on the impact
this would have had on Rome. The examples of Heather’s and Goldsworthy’s have already
been mentioned, and are good ones for them being polar opposites of each other. The role
that barbarians played in the fall of Rome can still be debated upon, but that late barbarian
society was more intricate and that they were capable of grander feats is sufficiently clear.

50
Heather (2007), 199-200
20
Part II: Into the Breach

21
Adapting to a new home
We can clearly see how aspects of barbarian societal growth remained relevant and,
in some ways, got further enhanced since the river crossings of the various groups. As the
Vandals, Alans, Sueves and especially the Goths maintained themselves on imperial soil for
as long as they did, different factors would have impacted the people in the barbarian
groupings. On the one hand, they would have had to deal with various levels of attrition as
they made their way around the country. For example, the Rhine crossers, crossing on the
last day of December, would have struggled to maintain themselves in light of the year’s
winter. Keeping such a varied group together in such dire circumstances must have taken a
lot of work from the barbarian leadership. On the other hand, the time spent within the
borders also had its benefits. For example, it was long enough for some of the barbarian
children to become of age. The Vandal king Gaiseric is a good example of this. As he
became king in 428 and ruled for 49 years after his ascension, we can deduce that he was
either born within imperial borders or crossed into the Empire at a very young age.
Moreover, it seems that most barbarian groupings actually gained followers inside the
borders. The best example of this are Alaric’s Goths, as the group included many Roman
slaves and former followers of Radagaisus, who joined them as they were rampaging across
51 52
Italy and later included many Gallo-Romans in its regime.

The Goths
Arguably the most successful of the barbarian invaders were the Goths, mainly the
branch originally led by Alaric that we now call the Visigoths. They were on imperial soil the
longest of all barbarian groups, having already crossed the Danube in 376. This means they
had the most extensive dealings with the Empire. They were also the ones that were
incorporated most into the empire of all the barbarian groups. For example, kings Theodoric
I and Theodoric II held relatively stable alliances with Aetius and Majorian respectively.
Inversely, under Euric they gave up on the idea of Empire, as, after the defeat of Emperor
Anthemius’ invasion fleet in 468, Euric struck out to claim land for the Goths in his own
name.
Overall, the Goths were endowed with a relatively high degree of ​romanitas​ in
comparison to the other barbarians. (Nominal) allegiance to the Empire remained an
important part of Gothic policy until Euric realised the Empire was dying. They were first
settled as Roman allies by Theodosius the Great and Arcadius continued his father’s policy
by granting Alaric the title of ​magister militum per Illyricum​ prior to the Goths’ invasion of
Italy, meaning they must have been funded and supplied by the treasury of the Eastern
Empire. Even during his invasion of Italy, Alaric only ever wanted a position within the
imperial hierarchy and was clearly amenable to deal with the Romans. Stilicho intended to
ally with Alaric’s Goths in a dispute over the Illyrian provinces with the Eastern court before
53
Radagaisus’ invasion delayed his plans. Before he sacked Rome, Alaric had tried to

51
Heather (2007), 224. Heather, (2011). ​Visigoths and the fall of Rome​, 35-36
52
Heather (2011), 43.
53
Zosimus, Book VI.
22
bargain multiple times for a command on the borders of the Western Empire, including
54
imperial supplies and pay.
By this time, his troops would certainly have looked the part. Though they were
originally a group of refugees in 376, their conflicts with Rome allowed them to loot Roman
55
arms and equipment. They were also joined by other Goths and Romans, who preferred
56
being Goth over being Roman. ​The Gothic track record of battle was also quite impressive.
Neither Alaric nor his successors seemed to have lost a major battle against the Romans,
aside from the Aetius’ victory over Theodoric I and the ‘certain battle’ mentioned by Hydatius
57
that re-established ties between the Goths and Romans during Majorian’s reign. ​Moreover,
when turned against the Vandals, Alans and Sueves in Iberia, Wallia’s Goths easily
annihilated the Alans and Siling Vandals, the remainder of which sought refuge with the
58
Hasdings
By doing so, Wallia finally achieved something akin to what Alaric had set out for, as
Gothic support was traded for a Roman alliance and supplies. This makes the settlement in
Aquitaine the most poignant part of the history of the Goths, as this would be where they
would stay until the end of the Empire. By fighting on the Roman side, Wallia had achieved
what his people had been looking for in previous years, namely a stable alliance with Rome
and a place within the imperial system, even if it was a more marginal one than the one
Alaric first envisioned. What is especially interesting about the Goths is that they straddled
both the Roman and the Gothic hierarchies. The Gothic kings functioned as kings of the
Goths within a Roman province and command structure, but could make use of both their
Roman and their Gothic status at will. In the years following their settlement, the Goths
would expand their power with the help of the local Gallic Romans.
For this reason, Michael Kulikowski could make an interesting case for the troops of
Theodoric and Aetius at the Catalaunian Plains. Kulikowski claims: “When Aëtius and
Theodoric I went to war for several years in the later 430s, both were a part of western
provincial society. Perhaps more significantly, from everything we can tell, Theodoric's
‘barbarian’ and ‘Gothic’ side fielded more men who had been born and raised inside the
frontiers of the empire than did the imperial and ‘Roman’ side of Aëtius—recruited in large
part beyond the frontiers. That is to say, many of the barbarians in the 5th c. West, whom we
are conditioned to think of as invaders, were in fact first-, second- and third-generation
inhabitants of the imperial provinces. However comforting it may be to cling to the old
images of encroaching barbarian waves, the wars of the 5th c. West were not for the most
59
part invasions, but rather civil wars within Roman provinces.” Though I find his conclusion a
bit extreme, as it ignores the basic facts that, there were still real or perceived differences
between Goths and Romans, his argument does show quite well how these provincial
Romans were amenable to signing up with these Goths.
In the same vein, Saint Sidonius Apollinaris, a Gallo-Roman aristocratic writer, Avitus’
son in law and, after Avitus’ reign, a supporter of Emperors Majorian and Anthemius, did not
necessarily have a problem with the Goths. Sidonius left us with a charming description of

54
Zosimus, Book VI.
55
Ammianus Marcellinus, Book XXXI. V, 9. Book XXX., VI. 2-3.
56
Ammianus Marcellinus, Book XXXI. VI. 2-3. Book XXXI. VI. 6.
57
Hydatius, 459. MacDowall, ​Conquerors of the Roman Empire: The Goths,​ Chapter 6. ​¶​Gothic
Military Power.
58
Hydatius, 416-418.
59
Kulikowski (2013), ​The Archaeology of War and the 5th C. ‘Invasions’​, 685.
23
king Theodoric II in a letter to his brother-in-law Agricola. In this letter, Sidonius praises the
barbarian king abundantly. However, this is not merely praise for an allied barbarian,
Theodoric is presented as being (almost) a Roman. This is reflected not only in his own
appearance and behaviour, but also by the way he runs his court. I feel the best way to
summarise it is to use the poet’s own words: “In short, you will find elegance of Greece,
good cheer of Gaul, Italian nimbleness, the state of public banquets with the attentive
service of a private table, and everywhere the discipline of a king's house.” What is still
amusing in his description is Theodoric’s love for dice games after dinner. Sidonius mentions
how “petitions that some wrecked influence had left derelict come unexpectedly to port; I
myself am gladly beaten by him when I have a favour to ask, since the loss of my game may
60
mean the gaining of my cause.” Nevertheless, it is clear that Sidonius tried to paint a
picture of a ruler that had nothing in common with stereotypical skin-clad barbarians. The
overall picture of the king is one akin to a good Roman ruler.
In this sense, Sidonius seems to agree with Kulikowski’s portrayal of Theodoric as an
essentially Western Roman provincial politician. For Sidonius, Theodoric (nominally) being
part of the imperial government was what allowed him to work with him in good conscience.
When Euric finally did away with the idea of Empire, we find Sidonius rebelling against his
61
expansionist policies.
This made him perhaps one of the more upstanding Gallo-Romans. Peter Heather
often stresses the ties of the landowning classes with their land as being their most valuable
possession. Though he mentions it often, the following argument phrases it very well:
“Roman landowners were a small elite, the prime beneficiaries of the hugely unequal wealth
distribution which the Empire’s socio-economic and legal systems protected. When the
central state, due to financial shortages and consequent military decline, became
increasingly unable to fulfill its role of protection, the landowners’ position came under direct
threat, and in some parts of the west (notably southern Britain and northern Gaul), they did
not manage to survive the process of collapse, their properties being acquired by incoming
outsiders. As this perspective underlines that, wherever they could, Roman landowners had
in fact no choice but to come to accommodations with whichever of the new barbarian
kingdoms began to hold sway in their region or risk losing everything that gave them status
and wealth. Some moved quicker than others, certainly, but in the end there was no choice.”
62
The fact that the barbarians were taking over the lands in which the aristocrats’ land and
wealth was based simply meant that, if they were to keep on to their land and wealth, these
aristocrats had to come to terms with their new overlords.
This meant that the times in which Sidonius lived were certainly strange ones. This
process of coming to terms was certainly an awkward one and went hand in hand with both
positive and negative experiences. We have already seen Sidonius’ description of
Theodoric, but he also had something to say when he famously complained of two Gothic
women chattering outside his door in the evening hours. He graciously called them:
63
“quarrelsome, drunken and disgusting creatures, whose like will not easily be seen again.”
When a certain Catullinus asked Sidonius to put his poetic genius to work on a song,

60
Sidonius Apollinaris,​ Delphi Complete Works of Sidonius Apollinaris,​ To Agricola.
61
Sidonius Apollinaris, I Letter to the Lord Bishop Mamertus. II.To his friend Constantius. III To his
brother-in-law Ecdicius. V To the Lord Bishop Agroeclus. X (XI) To the Lord Bishop Graecus.
62
Heather (2011), 43.
63
Sidonius Apollinaris, III To his friend Leo.
24
Sidonius protested on the grounds that the Burgundians whom he had to share his house
with drove away the muse, calling his correspondent lucky that “[he] was not invaded even
before dawn, like an old grandfather or a foster-father, by a crowd of giants so many and so
64
big that not even the kitchen of Alcinous could support them.” On the other hand, he
commended his friend Syagrius for being able to pick up the German tongue so well and so
65
quickly, even calling him “a new Solon in the elucidation of Burgundian law.” Overall then,
some of the difficulties of adapting oneself to the new reality are the same as one would
expect. Still, if one could associate himself with Theodoric, or become a ‘Solon of
Burgundian law’, the situation also provided opportunities. It was perhaps best to attempt to
work with the barbarians from an early stage because, as Heather pointed out, resistance
proved to be futile in the end.
Similarly to how those Gallo-Romans who found themselves within a new barbarian
kingdom preferred to work with it rather than oppose it, the Goths were also the preferred
partner of the Roman state against the other barbarians. Gothic incorporation is perhaps
most poignant during the reigns of Aetius and Avitus, though the ways by which they
obtained their support was different. Avitus included the Goths into his bid for the Empire
from the start, while Aetius had a more turbulent relationship with them. Stilicho, Constantius
and Majorian also had all struggled to keep the Goths involved in their military policies in
some way, so that it does seem that the Gothic power from Aquitaine was crucial to imperial
ambition during the 5th century.
We can make a few assumptions as to why that is. On the most basic level it can
easily be interpreted as the need or desire to align oneself with one of the larger barbarian
power blocks, as the events of the Sack of Rome in 410, Wallia’s annihilation of the Alans
and Silings in 418 and Theodoric's vital support in the Battle of the Catalaunian Plains
indicate that the Goths were a powerful force. Additionally, the Gothic settlement in Aquitaine
was close to the Roman bridgehead between Gaul and Hispania. This also meant that, if the
Goths weren’t kept in check, they could easily expand into Hispania, or cut the Roman
connection between the Italian heartlands and Hispania in an effort to gain access to the
Mediterranean.
In the light of the scarcity of sources on such information, it could be argued that the
decision to appeal to the Goths before any other group was not due to the impressive
position of the Goths. While that is a valid argument, it merely shifts the focus of the issue.
From a Roman point of view, choosing the Goths makes most sense from a military or
ideological standpoint. In other words, if not for the crucial importance of Gothic support,
courting the Goths only makes sense if they show a willingness to play by the Roman
rulebook, once again confirmed by their actions.
In conclusion, the greatest strength for the Goths had been their great flexibility in
adapting and adopting all things Roman. In their 100 years within the Empire, they went from
refugees and plunderers to a full-fledged barbarian kingdom within the Empire. During their
time in the East under Valens, they gained access to Roman arms and armour, while under
Theodosius and Arcadius, they held official posts within the Eastern Empire. Considering the
time they spent in Illyricum when Alaric was ​magister militum​, it makes sense that they would
already have used that time to stabilise and consolidate their position. The invasion of Italy in
the early 5th century, was marked by the masses of the late Stilicho’s soldiers, (barbarian)

64
Sidonius Apollinaris, XII To Catullinus, Senator.
65
Sidonius Apollinaris, V To his friend Syagrius.
25
 66
slaves and other lowborns joining up with the Goths, bolstering their numbers. Ambition
within the Empire went from high stakes with a Gothic puppet Emperor Priscus Attalus and
Honorius’ sister Galla Placidia to low stakes under Wallia, but the settlement in Aquitaine
was all they really needed to set themselves up for success. The period in Aquitaine is
marked by the Gothic assaults on the Spanish barbarians and the Huns, as well as their
incorporation within the Gallic establishment, becoming something that men like Avitus and
Sidonius could align themselves with, as proper Romans.
Regarding this subject, it is perhaps interesting to speculate about the possibility of
imperially sanctioned Gothic control of Spain by Avitus and Theodoric. Returning to the
earlier argument of Kulikowski about the nature of the Goths as being essentially Western
Roman provincial powers, one could easily imagine a situation in which the Goths would
control Spain for the Empire. In this case, the Empire’s failure to keep Spain and the Goths
in line would be due to a failure of incorporating its various people to a representative
degree. Considering the number of Romans happily serving under the Goths, this situation
would then not seem to be too far off.
Perhaps an interesting comparison can be drawn to the Eastern Roman Emperor
Zeno who reigned from 474 to 491. For this discussion, what is interesting about Zeno is his
Isaurian descent. The Isaurians were the designated trouble-makers of Asia Minor, and
Ammianus Marcellinus’ work is full of outbursts of Isaurian raiding, rebellions and banditry all
the way through the 5th century. Zeno himself was a successful military commander who
married his way into the imperial family, eventually finding himself as the sole Emperor of the
East. His reign was not popular, as he was seen as an Isaurian barbarian and he was
deposed, having to fight a number of civil wars to regain his throne. He gained support by
strengthening his ties to his Isaurian countrymen, incorporating them in his bid for power and
67
his the imperial system.
Imagining that Avitus had been successful in maintaining himself in the face of the
Italian resistance under Ricimer and Majorian, his reign might have been rather similar to
Zeno’s in this aspect. If the Goths’ choice of Emperor was enough to placate them, they
could be integrated more thoroughly within the imperial system as one of the major political
factions. The bad faith that had shadowed Romano-Gothic relations ever since the reign of
Theodosius could be dismantled by virtue of this cooperation. Remembering how the goals
of the Goths had always been inclusion into the political system, Avitus presenting Theodoric
with a prestigious government post, such as ​magister militum​ and/or ​patricius,​ might have
worked to finally allow for a relatively peaceful incorporation of the Gothic Kingdom into the
Roman Empire.
Such a chain of events would certainly have been Avitus’ greatest triumph, as it
would completely shift the political scene of the Western Empire. Nevertheless, Avitus’ focus
on including the Goths had estranged other key factions and his reign was struck short by
Ricimer and Majorian. What Theodoric’s and Avitus’ plans had been thus becomes hard to
pinpoint. Nevertheless, when Majorian allied himself with the Goths after Avitus’ reign, Spain
basically came with the package. Apparently, the Goths took good care of Spain in the
Empire’s absence.

66
Heather (2007), 224. Heather (2011), 35-36
Heather (2011),
67
Wilkinson, ​Private Armies and Personal Power in the Late Roman Empire​, 72-75.
26
The Rhine Crossers
The Alans, Sueves and Vandals spent a great deal of their time together by virtue of
their collective Rhine crossing on the last day of 406. The Vandals were almost destroyed in
battle by the Franks, when the Alans rode and broke the Frankish lines, which allowed the
Vandals and Alans to force their crossing into Gaul.68 Where the Sueves were at that time is
not mentioned by Gregory, but as they crossed over into Spain together with the others and
only split up with their division of Spain, we can treat the first period of their migration in
common.
Tracking their movements is difficult to do in detail. Heather attempted to trace their
movements from Gaul to Spain, but his effort is based on slightly unreliable and disparate
sources, including authors like Jerome and making use of coin hoards as clues. It suffices to
say they must have raided far and wide over Gaul, before being halted by Constantine III. In
any case, their story becomes more interesting upon their entering of the Iberian Peninsula.
When they ‘betook to the plough’, the Rhine invaders divided Spain amongst them ‘by lot’,
with the Hasdings taking Gallaecia, the Sueves the North-western part of that same
69
province, the Silings taking Baetica and the Alans taking Lusitania and Carthaginiensis. By
lot seems rather hard to believe, considering that the powerful Alans took the wealthiest
provinces, while the weaker Hasdings and Sueves had to share the poorer region of
Gallaecia (Figure VII).

68
Gregory of Tours. ​A History of the Franks. ​Book II. 9.
69
Hydatius, 411.
27
Figure VII. The barbarian division of Spain in 411. Tarraconensis was held by Gerontius and
Maximus.

What exactly was going in these areas around this time is perhaps harder to
determine. Returning to Hydatius, it is perhaps interesting to note that amidst all the horror
going on in 410 (which he describes in the blackest terms), when the barbarians had just
arrived in Spain, he also mentions a tyrannical tax-collector, and soldiers consuming the
70
stored goods of the cities. By tyrannical tax-collector, Hydatius seems to imply that
Maximus’ (a so-called tyrant) government was still at work in the same regions as the
71
barbarians were plundering.
The peninsula must have been relatively quiet in the period between the barbarian
settlement in 411 and Wallia’s campaign. Hydatius mentions how “the Spaniards (...) who
had survived the disasters surrendered themselves to servitude under the barbarians”,
implying a halt to the widespread disaster that he was talking about only 1 paragraph before.
72
By servitude, Hydatius probably meant a diversion of tax revenue from the Emperor to the
barbarians or an imposition of tribute of some kind, as the barbarians cannot have been so

70
Hydatius, 410.
71
Kulikowski (2010), ​Late Roman Spain and its Cities​, 161-165.
72
Hydatius, 410.
28
 73
numerous as to be able to oppress population as large as that of Roman Spain. If nothing
else, the time in the Spanish provinces would have given our barbarians some breathing
space to finally recover from their adventures after the Rhine crossing in 406. The extent to
which they would have been able to reinforce their numbers with local Hispano-Romans, or
equip themselves with Roman arms in Gothic fashion can only be guessed at.
The peace was finally broken when Constantius sent Wallia’s Goths into Spain in
416. It is interesting how the Goths managed to smack down the Rhine-Crossers in a time
span of only two years before being recalled by Constantius. The most powerful groups, the
Alans and Siling Vandals, were hammered to such an extent that they sought refuge with the
74
Hasding Vandals. At this point then, only two barbarian groups were left in Spain, the
Hasding-Siling-Alan coalition (from now on simply referred to as Vandals) and the Sueves.
Moreover, with the Goths clearing out the Silings and Alans, most of Spain had once again
become properly Roman. After Wallia’s campaigns we once again see Roman officials in the
75
peninsula.
Though they apparently shared the province of Gallaecia before, a quarrel broke out
between the Vandals and Sueves, and the Vandals besieged the Sueves. Asterius, the
comes Hispaniarum​, perhaps sniffing an opportunity to finally eradicate the Spanish
barbarians, decided to engage the Vandals. According to Hydatius “(...) the Vandals
abandoned their blockade of the Sueves and, after a number of men under the ​Vicarius
Maurocellus had been killed while escaping from Bracara, the Vandals quit Gallaecia and
crossed into Baetica.” Though Hydatius states it rather plainly, what he describes sounds
like a disaster for the Romans. Not only did the barbarians stop their infighting, but the
Vandals killed Roman troops and crossed into Baetica, the heart of Roman Spain that Wallia
76
had fought for only a few years ago.
Moreover, the ​magister militum​ Castinus launched an attack with Roman and Gothic
troops onto the Vandals in Baetica. According to Hydatius, he had the Vandals besieged and
77
ready to surrender when he recklessly engaged in open battle and lost the day. As
Honorius’ death in 424 threw the Empire into another war of succession, Castinus’ attempt
against the barbarians would be the last one for a long time, giving the barbarians free reign
in Spain once more.

Spain and the Suevi

The Suevi did not do much to make use of the situation. One attempt to raid into
Baetica in 429, just before the Vandal crossing to Africa, was repulsed by the Vandals, and
78
their king Heremigarius was drowned in a river. Even an attempt to raid the central parts of
Gallaecia was not so successful, as “(...) the people who remained in possession of the
79
more secure forts” put up a successful resistance. More conflicts around 433 and 438
80
seemed to have similar results. Only by 439 do we see some success when a new king,

73
Kulikowski (2010), 163.
74
Hydatius, 416-18
75
Kulikowski (2010), 171-172.
76
Hydatius, 420. Kulikowski (2010), 173.
77
Hydatius, 422.
78
Hydatius, 429.
79
Hydatius, 430.
80
Hydatius, 433-438.
29
Rechila, entered Merida (​Emerita Augusta)​, the capital of the Roman diocese of Spain. This
was followed by him seizing Baetica and Carthaginiensis. A Roman attempt by ​magister
81
utriusque militiae​ Vitus to engage the Sueves met with defeat. ​Kulikowski considers
Rechila’s policy more in the light of exacting tribute and eliminating Roman resistance, thus
securing his own hegemony and making Rome unable to make use of Spain’s resources. An
attempt to systematically occupy the entirety of Spain is unlikely considering the small
numbers of Suevi. This also means he thinks the Romans regained some sort of control over
the important regions of Spain with Vitus campaign, while the Sueves themselves remained
82
in Lusitania.
Rechila’s son Rechiar is an interesting character, as he is the first barbarian to mint
83
coins in his own name, a sign of independence from the Empire. The period from his
ascension in 448 onwards is nevertheless not particularly eventful, aside from the usual
84
occasional plundering and Bagaudae rebel uprisings. With the Romans otherwise
occupied, the military interventions in Spain were done by proxy through the Gothic
85
kingdom. It seems that the Goths were able to keep the Sueves in line for the most part.
Thus, when relations between Goths and Romans were good, Spain was relatively safe.
The Gothic campaigns for Rome deserve some attention in their own light, as they
provide the final moments of Roman influence in Spain. The first Gothic campaign since
Wallia was done by the brother of king Theodoric, Frederic, who dealt with the Bagaudae in
86
Tarraconensis around 454. The next campaigns came from Avitus, the Emperor who
gained the throne with (or by) Gothic support. According to Hydatius, Avitus and Theodoric
both sent envoys to the Sueves, who nevertheless ‘broke their oaths’ and invaded
87
Tarraconensis.
The Romano-Gothic response was an imperially sanctioned invasion of Spain by
Theodoric’s Goths. Continuing the pattern set by Wallia, Theodoric soundly defeated the
88
Sueves and routed them to Gallaecia. The amount of control Avitus would have had over
Theodoric’s Goths is an interesting question in its own right. Avitus himself would have been
busy attempting (and failing) to establish himself as the uncontested ruler of the Empire.
Meanwhile, Theodoric was happily campaigning in Spain as Hydatius reports his sack of
Bracara, in which a great number of Romans were taken captive, had their possession
89
stolen from them and, as is typical for a chronicle, had their churches defiled.
It is fair to imagine that Theodoric was, to a large degree, acting in his own interest.
Through aiding Avitus, a significant Goth-sympathiser was raised to the purple. What
concrete benefits this would bring them is of course difficult to , but it boded well for the
future of the Goths. In any case, at the time of his Spanish campaign, Avitus being Emperor
gave Theodoric a carte blanche in Spain, as long as he kept some manner of loyalty to the
Emperor.

81
Hydatius, 441-446.
82
Kulikowski (2010), 184.
83
Kulikowski (2010), 185.
84
Hydatius, 448-449
85
Hydatius, 452-545.
86
Hydatius, 454.
87
Hydatius, 455-457.
88
Hydatius, 457.
89
Hydatius, 457.
30
 On the other hand, Hydatius’ description of the sack of Bracara may be a bit of an
overreaction, considering he was one of those Christian authors that had the tendency to
paint bleak pictures in anticipation of the impending Apocalypse. Indeed, he focuses more so
on desecration of churches and holy places, comparing it to the heavenly wrath on the city of
Jerusalem, as Bracara was actually taken without bloodshed. It can also be reasoned that,
as Theodoric remained in the city for a few months after the sack, the situation in Bracara
90
cannot have been too bad. Moreover, it is also possible that these Romans were what we
would call Suevi collaborators. As Rechiar was himself a Catholic, the first Christian king of
the Suevi, it could be that the clergy had been willing to attach themselves to the new
91
Christian king.
Whatever the means he used, Theodoric was, at least initially, relatively successful.
92
According to Hydatius, he completely shattered the Suevian kingdom.
Ironically, two new Sueve kings continued on the usual Suevian raids on Spanish territory
even after Theodoric had shattered the kingdom. Theodoric remained in Spain for a while in
order to deal with this regrouped Suevi resistance. Still, by the time of Majorian, the Sueves
were once again confined to the coastal regions of Gallaecia and did not appear to be
particularly threatening.

The Vandals
The Vandal career after the death of Honorius is more interesting than the Suevian
one. In Spain, they were more or less just another minor barbarian group bottled up in the
provinces. While the Suevi always remained in Spain as minor players in the imperial
political system, the Vandals would become Rome’s worst enemy when a revived Carthage
fought it’s fourth conflict with Rome. Despite the consistent attempts by Rome to destroy
them, the Vandals were never dislodged from the valuable Roman territory they held and
many historians credit them with a key role in bringing down Rome.
Considering the importance of the wealthy African provinces and the
unexpectedness of their crossing, the Roman alarm bells must have been set off in 429,
when the Vandals crossed the Straits of Gibraltar. Boniface, the ​comes Africae​, though often
93
accused of conspiring with the Vandals , attempted to hold the line against them but was
defeated in battle. The Vandals besieged Hippo Regius, the home town of St. Augustine,
later in that same year.
Boniface himself returned to Italy to fight his power struggle with Aetius. Interesting to
note in that light as well, is the fact that Boniface, though unable to halt the Vandal invasion,
actually won the battle with Aetius in 432, before expiring from his wounds. With its count
gone, the defence of Africa fell to Aspar, a capable general sent by Constantinople to save
Roman North Africa. With Gaiseric holding Hippo Regius, and Aspar holding Carthage, a
treaty was drawn up in 435, which acknowledged the territorial gains of the Vandals from the
past 6 years (Figure VIII). While Aetius was focusing himself on Northern Gaul, the Vandals

90
Kulikowski (2010), 188.
91
Barbero and Loring, ​The Formation of the Sueve and Visigothic Kingdoms in Spain​, 164.
92
Hydatius, 457.
93
Procopius, ​The Complete Procopius Anthology: The Wars of Justinian, The Secret History of the
Court of Justinian, The Buildings of Justinian, ​The Vandal War, Book III. 455. MacDowall, ​Conquerors
of the Roman Empire: The Vandals​, 57. Goldsworthy, 329.
31
were left to their own devices for the next years. With Constantinople recalling Aspar, the
Vandals took Carthage in 439 by, what Hydatius calls “(...) a great stratagem”. It is probably
fair to say that the Romans had not considered Gaiseric to be the threat that he really was
and were made to immediately regret this carelessness.

Figure VIII. The land route that would have been taken by the Vandals in 429. Including
treaties of 435 and 442. After Heather (2007).

A planned expedition by the combined Empires to dislodge them from their seat in
Carthage came to nothing, as the threat of the Huns loomed too large over the Eastern
94
Empire and their forces had to be recalled to Thrace. ​The next fight for Africa would only
come by the time of Majorian’s reign. The important provinces of Africa and its capital of
Carthage were permanently removed from imperial control. As Africa was often considered
to be the richest region of the Western Empire, its loss led to an immediate financial crisis.
95
This was followed by a flurry of imperial laws to frantically garner more tax revenue.
Vandal North Africa is an interesting subject in its own right. Whereas the Goths are
marked by their ability to incorporate the local Romans and the Sueves got into frequent

94
Goldsworthy, 429-430. Heather (2007), 289-292
95
Heather (2007), 295-297.
32
conflict with the local Gallaecians and other Hispano-Romans, the Vandals had elements of
both approaches, maintaining both ambiguous relations with local Africans (including the
Moors), as well as with the imperial court.
Interestingly, the peace treaty of 442, returned the Mauretanian provinces to the
imperial administration, though how they could effectively govern it might be questioned.
Additionally, Gaiseric’s son Huneric was sent to the imperial court as a hostage. In this same
capacity he was betrothed to Valentinian’s daughter Eudocia, which was the the first
imperially sanctioned marriage between imperial and barbarian royalty. As Huneric was
already betrothed to the daughter of Theodoric, Gaiseric allegedly accused her of treason,
cutting of her nose and ears before sending her back to her father. Finally, a continuation of
the grain tribute from Africa to Rome was agreed upon. This supply probably did not make
up for the loss of the grain shipments that had been coming before the loss of Carthage, or
96
did not come for free. Still, it was somewhat helpful in keeping the poor of Rome fed.
In Africa, meanwhile, the clergy and the nobility suffered under Gaiseric’s rule. The
Vandals had by this time converted to Homoian Christianity (Arianism) and were thus
considered heretics by the Nicene (Catholic) populace. On the other hand, the feeling often
seems to have been mutual, as Gaiseric had started persecutions of the Catholic clergy
soon after his arrival in Africa. Edward Gibbon mentions how the divisions in Christianity
helped Gaiseric in this, as the Donatists aligned themselves with the Vandals, as common
enemy of the Catholic faith. The persecutions and fall of Roman North Africa was thus due to
97
the secret zealotry and fanaticism of these Vandal allies. Of course, Gibbon is known for
his great criticism of Christianity, so he might be slightly biased in his assessment.
Nevertheless, religious tension was real. Our main source for the persecution is a
Catholic bishop named Victor of Vita; a highly biased author. Modern re-examinations of
Victor and other Catholic writers of this period instead suggest that there was no such thing
98
as a religious persecution. Rather, they were simply part and parcel of war and conquest.
In a similar vein, the adoption of Arianism can be explained better by practical purpose than
by the devil’s interference. Some hints in the Catholic sources themselves even allude to
99
this. Moreover, though the persecution was cataclysmic for some circles, it was not as
much so as Victor would have us believe and changed in intensity depending on the needs
100
of the king, clearly showing the political and pragmatic motive, rather than a religious one.
Overall then, the Vandal creed was not aimed at destroying the Catholics in Africa,
but rather was a useful tool, as it allowed for a way to copy the Roman religious model, but
in a distinctly Vandal fashion. This also allowed the Vandal king some control over his
subjects, as he could demand religious conversion from them. The Vandals used a system
of rebaptism, which was a local African Christian tradition, strengthening their ties to the new
African homeland, in order to gain support and cement identity, especially vis-à-vis those
101
who would not convert. Considering how the Vandals had recently accomplished their goal
of finally settling down in a safe and satisfactory region, it makes sense for Gaiseric to

96
Goldsworthy, 330. Halsall, 247-248, Heather (2007), 292-293. Macdowall, 111. Procopius, The
Vandal War, IV, 450.
97
Gibbon, 324-325.
98
Fournier (2017), ​The Vandal Conquest of North Africa​.
99
Fournier, 697-711.
100
Heather, (2007). ​Christianity and the Vandals in the Reign of Geiseric​.
101
Fournier, (2012). ​Rebaptism as a Ritual of Cultural Integration in Vandal Africa​. 244-254.
33
attempt to bind his various followers together before, rather than fighting the Romans, they
would fight amongst themselves.
Dealing with the upper class went similarly, as Gaiseric confiscated noble estates in
Proconsularis in order to hand them out to his followers. These were the so-called ​Sortes
Vandalorum​. Both the nobles and the clergy were hit hardest in Proconsularis, as that was
the key province of Vandal North Africa. In the other provinces oppression of the Catholics
102
and confiscation of noble estates was much less common.
Though the eviction of the Catholic clergy and upper classes was necessary, it was
also part of an attempt of integration with the land of Africa. We have already seen the links
to the Donatists and rebaptism, but the Vandals also strengthened their ties to Africa as a
Roman province. For example, Procopius describes the (6th century) Vandals as the nation
being the most luxurious. “For the Vandals, since the time when they gained possession of
Libya, used to indulge in baths, all of them, every day, and enjoyed a table abounding in all
things, the sweetest and the best that the earth and seas produce. And they wore gold very
generally, and clothed themselves in the Medic garments, (...) and passed their time, thus
dressed, in theatres and hippodromes and in other pleasurable pursuits, and above all else
in hunting.” Procopius also mentions parks and gardens, banquets and “(...) all manner of
103
sexual pleasures”. Though Procopius mainly employs it to contrast the Vandals from the
Moors, who are more accustomed to a harsher lifestyle, it clearly indicates that the Vandals
had, at least by this point, been fully acquainted with all the finer aspects of Roman life.
Of course, we should be careful about such descriptions. Not only is Procopius a very
controversial author, but the way we interpret his descriptions can also easily be prone to
confirmation bias. For example, the below figures have been interpreted as Vandal
horsemen, by grace of the way they wear their hair. The cross mark on his horse is equated
104
to a Sarmatian (and thus Alan) tradition. It should be noted that we simply have no real
way to confirm or deny such statements. As there is no arrow pointing ​Eques Vandali​, it is
probably best not to interpret it in such fashion.

102
Heather, The Fall of the Roman Empire, 293-295. Procopius, The Vandalic War, IV.
103
Procopius, The Vandalic War (Continued), VI.
104
MacDowall, 96.
34
Figure IX. A ‘Vandal’ horseman in front of ‘his estate’. After MacDowall.

Figure X. A ‘Vandal’ horseman hunting. After MacDowall.

Moreover, it is important to note that this conversion to Romano-Punic culture is not

an event, but a process. The rate at which this adoption took place is impossible to tell. The
Vandal Kingdom lasted from the 440’s to its destruction by Belisarius in 534, which gives a
time span of about a century for the evolution of Vandal culture.

35
 Still, the fact the adaptation to Africa was rapid can be deduced from a number of
aspects. The Vandals had made the conscious decision to appeal to a new Punic/African
cultural identity, rather than a Germanic one. One example of this is the dating formula:
105
Anno Karthaginis​, which conveniently ignores all that time not spent in Africa. Additionally,
their coinage showed a distinctly Punic style, rather than Roman styled propaganda (Figure
XII). This allowed them to both distance themselves from the Roman Empire, as well as
strengthen their ties to the new African homeland and their Romano-African subjects. The
material is once again hard to date, so that it is not agreed upon whether some of these
coins can predate the fall of Rome in 476, or if they only came after the Empire fell apart,
106
thus perhaps even claiming a hand in it as chief enemy of Rome.

Figure XI. Vandal coin with a standing warrior and the typically Punic horse head on the
right. Miles, 2017. After Álvarez Jiménez, 2016.

The adoption of this Punic/Carthaginian heritage also makes sense in the light of the
way Rome saw Carthage’s new occupants. Perhaps comparable to Roman historians’
insistent usage of ancient and traditional topoi for describing current events, the Vandals
were often compared to the Carthaginians by the Romans themselves, of which Sidonius
Apollinaris is the most obvious example. His paneygrics to Avitus, Majorian and Anthemius
107
all feature this trope, but he is certainly not the only one to employ it. Additionally, Punic
history was still held in a negative light by a great many Romans, as anti-Punic/African
108
stereotypes remained prevalent even throughout Late Antiquity.
Nevertheless, in the Vandal Kingdom itself the local Africans could, for the most part,
be sufficiently integrated. The local Romano-African populace had clear uses for the
Vandals. Firstly, the Vandals could make use of the pre-existing Roman governmental
structures and occupy them with its own loyalists, Roman or Vandal. Secondly, the Vandals,

105
MIles (2017), ​Vandal North Africa and the Fourth Punic War​. 8.
106
Miles, 4-9.
107
Sidonius Apollinaris, Panegyric II. Panegyric V, Panegyric VII. Jiménes,​ Sidonius Apollinaris and
the Fourth Punic War​, 8-19
108
Miles, 10-12.
36
in acquiring one of the most important ports of the Western Empire (if not the most important
one), had all the maritime knowledge of its populace at its fingertips. For a nation that
emerged from landlocked Germania, the ability to cross over from Spain to Africa, and then
to conduct all their naval raids and invasions from Carthage can only have been possible
with the active participation of local Romano-Africans. Finally, locals continued to form the
lower class as they had always done. If not pressed too hard by their barbarian overlords,
most locals had no problems in working with the invaders.
On the other hand, Procopius mentions that Gaiseric tore down the walls of all cities
of Africa, other than Carthage, so that “(...) neither the Libyans themselves, espousing the
cause of the Romans, might have a strong base from which to begin a rebellion, nor those
sent by the Emperor have any ground for hoping to capture a city and, by establishing a
109
garrison in it, to make trouble for the Vandals.” This event Procopius places after the
Vandal sack of Rome, when the major campaigns against the Vandal kingdom were still to
come. Apparently then, Gaiseric’s control over his new subjects was not absolute. Of course,
Procopius also mentions how “(...) these cities, being without walls, were captured by
Belisarius all the more easily and with less exertion. Gaiseric was then condemned to much
ridicule.” This decision is a double-edged sword. While reducing the ability for rebels or
hostiles to form strongholds, it also allowed for easier capture of cities.
Related to this is Belisarius’ policy towards the local Romano-Africans. Procopius
describes an episode in which he severely punishes his own troops for taking fruit from the
locals. Belisarius argues: “For I have disembarked you upon this land basing my incidence
on this alone, that the Libyans, being Romans from of old, are unfaithful and hostile to the
Vandals, and for this reason I thought that no necessaries [supplies] would fail us and,
besides, that the enemy would not do us any injury by a sudden attack. But now your lack of
self-control has changed it all and made the opposite true. For you have doubtless
110
reconciled the Libyans to the Vandals, bringing their hostility round upon your own selves.”
Belisarius’ policy of appeasing these ‘Romans of old’ paid off in the end, despite his soldiers’
thievery, as it does seem that Belisarius was gladly welcomed in Africa. Taken together
these two aspects indicate that Vandal relations to the locals were two-sided. For some it
provided opportunities to participate in the Vandal administration and other could enrol in the
Vandal navy. On the other hand, those not involved in the Vandal regime did not have a
particular love for it.
The ease by which the Vandal kingdom was taken apart by Belisarius’ expeditionary
force is remarkable. On the one hand, one could argue that the external pressure put upon
the Vandals was simply too much, being overrun by the Romans, after having overrun the
Romans. On the other hand, Belisarius’ expeditionary force should easily have been crushed
by the Vandals. Procopius indeed alludes to this fact a number of times.
Firstly, he mentions how the soldiers literally told Belisarius that they would flee if
Vandal ships would approach them at sea. “(...) for, they said, they were not able to contend
111
against two enemies at once, both men and water.” The Vandal victories against the
Empires after its establishment in Carthage were all naval battles. The Vandal King Gelimer
did not engage Belisarius at sea, which could have ended the war in one single stroke.
Instead, the Vandals were more occupied with crushing a revolt by Godas in Sardinia,

109
Procopius, Book III. The Vandalic War. V, 457.
110
Procopius, Book III. The Vandalic War. XVI.
111
Procopius,The Vandalic War, XIV.
37
possibly instigated by the Romans, than with engaging the Romans before, during, or shortly
after their landing. The ever-present threat of the Vandal navy that Belisarius and his troops
were so afraid of thus never materialised.
Secondly, relating again to the fruit theft and the destructions of walls, Belisarius is
not reported to have encountered any significant resistance walking all over Africa before he
was confronted by the Vandal king at Ad Decimum. The Vandals neither fostered loyalty in
their subjects, nor were they able to enforce it. Gaiseric’s strategy of destroying the walls
was not reverted with constructions of renewed fortifications in key sectors by any of his
successors. Moreover, Gelimer did not properly employ Gaiseric’s strategy with a scorched
earth policy, which would have made managing troop supplies and morale a much greater
challenge for Belisarius. This could easily have weakened his army’s combat effectiveness
to a significant and perhaps crucial degree.
Thirdly, even in the major battle of Ad Decimum in which Belisarius was victorious, it
was a close battle that could easily have swung in favour of the Vandals. Indeed, Gelimer
could have completely routed the Roman force, but gave up his chase to bury one of his
112
brothers who was slain on the field, allowing Belisarius to regroup and counterattack.
Similarly, the Battle at Tricamarum, the final battle that the Vandal King would deliver, also
has the air of a tactical disaster from the Vandal side. Gelimer, who was now joined by his
brother Tzazon, who had crushed Godas’ revolt in Sardinia, took no initiative in this battle.
Gelimer held a static line behind a small stream, with Tzazon’s fresh troops in the centre,
while those Vandals he still had left after Ad Decimum made up the flanks. Belisarius’
lieutenant John the Armenian charged the centre held by Tzazon three times without
incurring a Vandal response. In the third charge, combat became vicious and Tzazon was
113
slain, which led to a mass rout from the Vandals.
All in all, with the way the Vandal kingdom is described by Procopius, it does seem
Belisarius simply managed to exploit the cracks in a kingdom and a king grown complacent,
turning the decline and fall narrative into an ironic twist. Whether the Eastern Roman
conquest of the Vandal Kingdom would have been possible in Gaiseric’s time is an
interesting question. Tracking the Vandal Kingdom throughout its life-span is difficult to do,
but the main difference between Majorian’s and Anthemius’ try for Carthage and that of
Belisarius was the presence of Gaiseric.
Descriptions of the man are not so flattering. Perhaps the fullest description comes
from Jordanes, who says “(...) [he] was a man of moderate height and lame in consequence
of a fall from his horse. He was a man of deep thought and few words, holding luxury in
disdain, furious in anger, greedy for gain, shrewd in winning over the barbarians and skilled
in sowing the seeds of dissension to arouse enmity. Such was he who, as we have said,
came at the solicitous invitation of Boniface to the country of Africa. There he reigned for a
114
long time, receiving authority, as they say, from God himself.” Procopius likewise states
115
that “(...) Gizeric had been excellently trained in warfare, and was the cleverest of all men.”
The image we get could hardly be clearer, and can best be summarised by stating he was
perhaps the most shrewd statesman of Late Antiquity. Nevertheless, his actions speak
louder than his words, as, through his stratagems, he conquered Carthage, defeated

112
Procopius,The Vandalic War, XIX. MacDowall, 137-140.
113
Procopius, The Vandalic Wars (Continued), III. MacDowall, 144-147.
114
Jordanes, ​The Origins and Deeds of the Goths​, The Divided Goths: The Visigoths. XXXIII.
115
Procopius, The Vandalic War, III. 455 AD.
38
Majorian’s invasion fleet and even Anthemius’ combined Western-Eastern invasion fleet with
very few losses, feats which contemporaries never expected.
Perhaps Vandal Africa was held as firmly as it was thanks to one man alone, as the
Vandal Kingdom was at its peak under Gaiseric and slowly started losing territory
afterwards. There are, to my knowledge, no real ways to track the Vandals’ efficiency in
warfare between Majorian’s and Belisarius’ time. Instead, we find losses of chunks of
territory to the Goths (the Ostrogoths) in Sicily, and increased trouble with the Moors. We
find no real way to test the Vandal Kingdom more thoroughly, as the first major conflict it
faced since Anthemius’ expedition was also its last.
Still, considering how they got there in the first place, combined by the numbers they
could churn out in conflict with Rome and Belisarius in later years, it seems that the Vandals
were a dangerous foe. Moreover, Gaiseric’s persona was an awesome one. Gibbon states
that: “(...) in the destruction of the Roman Empire, [Gaiseric’s name] deserved an equal rank
116
with the names of Alaric and Attila”, a claim in which I think he was right.

116
Gibbon, Volume III. 321.
39
Part III: Flavius Julius Valerius Majorianus

40
The Life of Majorian through Carmen V
Majorian’s life is not so well known, especially before his claiming of the purple. Our
major source is Sidonius Apollinaris’ panegyric. Sidonius is an interesting character due to
his association with three Emperors. Before supporting Majorian, he had been an adamant
supporter of the Emperor Avitus, who was his father in law. For Anthemius, the Emperor
after Majorian, he also wrote a panegyric. Relations between Majorian and Sidonius must
have been rather awkward at first, as Majorian was responsible for the death of Avitus.
Moreover, Gaul was the scene of a rebellion against the rule of Majorian and Sidonius’ city
of Lugdunum (Lyon) was one of the chief culprits.
The writing of the panegyric was probably part of an effort by Sidonius to ease out
some of the tensions between Gaul and Italy. Despite the turbulent history, Sidonius was
willing to put aside some differences for the good of his city, as, through writing the
panegyric, he could place himself within the good graces of the fresh Emperor, which would
be good for himself and his city. Thus the panegyric is a risky source to interpret. On the one
hand, relations between Sidonius and Majorian are suspect. On the other hand, panegyrics
were always written to lavish praise upon the Emperor. This means it is full with all of the
rhetoric that we would expect from a fine poet like Sidonius. Nevertheless, it can still be a
valuable source of some of Majorian’s exploits, if we can filter out the many exaggerations in
such a work.
Studying Majorian’s life chronologically starts with Majorian’s family, which was not of
a particularly great dynasty. The first ancestor Sidonius mentions in his panegyric is his
maternal grandfather, also named Majorian. This elder Majorian reached the peak of his
career when he “(...) ruled the land of Illyricum together with the Danube-regions” as
magister militum​ for Emperor Theodosius the Great. He resided in Aquincum (called Acincus
117
by the poet), right on the border of the Empire. G. E. Max infers that he was already
present in this region as ​dux​, perhaps also holding civil and thus judicial power, before being
118
designated ​magister. Sidonius also mentions he fought some conflicts against Goths,
stating that “(...) his troops were launched against the Scythian landsmen and marched over
the Hypanis, and even the camp-followers mocked at frozen Peuce, bidding welcome to the
119
frosts.” With Scythians, Sidonius merely adopted that tradition of assigning classical
names to its current peoples, as we had already seen in the description of the Black Sea
raids. Peuce seems to have been an island in the Danube delta, while the Hypanis was a
river deep in Gothic territory which we now know as the Southern Bug. Thus, grandfather
Majorian is portrayed as having been a capable military man. Still, he is not mentioned by
such historians as Zosimus and Ammianus Marcellinus, so that his career was probably not
successful enough to be worth mentioning by these authors. If that is so, Sidonius perhaps
simply deemed the elder Majorian the one in his family most worthy of praise, and something
he could work with. Interesting to note in this regard is that Emperor Majorian’s father, whom
Sidonius covers next, is never mentioned by name, while his grandfather, who shared the
same name, is.

117
Sidonius Apollinaris, Panegyric V, ¶5
118
Max, ​Majorian Augustus​, 29.
119
Sidonius Apollinaris, Panegyric V, ¶5
41
 Majorian’s father is described as “(...) a renowned man who was content to the end
with a single high office in the imperial service, that he might follow one single friend and
cling to him in times of jeopardy.” With this friend, Sidonius means none other than Aetius.
Apparently, Majorian’s father was so loyal to him that not even offers of being awarded the
consulship swayed his loyalty to the famous warlord. Further, Sidonius says: “He was what
of old the quaestor was to the consuls; he controlled the public funds by right of his office;
and such moderation did he maintain that rumour declared he was thus early saving the
120
future possessions of his son.” His ranking in society can only be guessed at, though it
can be argued that the elder Majorian would probably not have allowed his daughter to
121
marry too far beneath her station.
Overall then, although his family was not one of the great houses of the Roman
world, Sidonius did his best to lavish some praise upon it. For this he chose the logical path
in emphasising their military careers. Both Majorian’s father and his grandfather were in the
military and were connected to great people. For his grandfather this was Theodosius, for his
father Aetius. His father’s connections certainly benefited Majorian, as we find Majorian
himself enrolled in Aetius’ army at a very young age. Sidonius goes through great effort to
mention the various exploits of the young Majorian during this time. Important for us to note
is how this means he is, to all intents and purposes, a soldier first and foremost, not a
statesman trained with a proper liberal arts education.
The next part of the panegyric focuses on Majorian’s qualities as a soldier, including
all the standard martial prowess one would expect. In the panegyric, Majorian outshines
122
such mythical characters as Castor and Pollux. Such extravagant praise doesn’t help us
much. What is somewhat helpful is Sidonius’ description of Majorian’s early career. It mainly
involved campaigns in Gaul, where he accompanied Aetius “(...) as a learner, not as a
soldier (...)”, alluding to the fact that in these Gallic campaigns Majorian certainly would have
gotten his fair share of military experience. Sidonius also mentions exceptional bravery in
123
combat.
The next period in his life was spent in exile, which is, in Sidonius’ panegyric, due to
Majorian’s imperial ambitions through a betrothal with the Emperor’s daughter Placidia. In
124
his native fields, Majorian was, of course, also the best of farmers. Max thinks this period
of political exile was an opportunity for Majorian to make up for his lack of a formal
125
education, though it is impossible to say for sure. Valentinian III returned Majorian to
active service when, after the death of Aetius, he commissioned Majorian to bring Aetius’
126
Bucellarii ​retinue into Valentinian’s control. Of course, Valentinian was murdered too soon
for these ​Bucellarii ​to help him in any way, though we can safely assume that it was not due
to Majorian failing his commission. It is possible that this is the time when he got his title of
comes domesticorum​, though this is not certain.
Returning to Pelagia’s accusation that Majorian was a threat to her imperial ambitions
for her son, we can see it was not entirely ungrounded. When Pelagia is raging to her
husband, she asks: “What realm shall I win for my son (...) if our little Gaudentius is trodden

120
Sidonius Apollinaris, Panegyric V, ¶5
121
Max, 26.
122
Sidonius Apollinaris, Panegyric V, ¶7-8.
123
Sidonius Apollinaris, Panegyric V, ¶8.
124
Sidonius Apollinaris, Panegyric V, ¶10
125
Max, 49.
126
Sidonius Apollinaris, Panegyric V, ¶11.
42
 127
underfoot by this youth’s (Majorian’s) destiny?” With these lines, Pelagia is attesting to
Majorian being a treat to Aetius’ plan to secure the succession of his son, Gaudentius, to the
imperial throne. As the way Aetius intended to do so was through a betrothal of his son to
Placidia (which may have been what pushed the Emperor to execute him), we can conclude
that Majorian was considered to be a likely candidate to be Placidia’s husband.
Though she was Valentinian’s younger daughter, the importance of a political
marriage with her cannot be overstated, as Valentinian had no male heirs and Eudocia, the
older daughter, was already promised to Huneric. The only Roman with a connection to the
imperial house would be the one that married Placidia. A marriage between Majorian and
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Placidia would have designated Majorian to be the next Emperor.
Valentinian’s reasons for such a betrothal are hard to gauge. Sidonius had
mentioned that ‘the court’ wanted to steal Majorian’s father away from Aetius, but he was too
129
loyal. Perhaps they also tried to purchase Majorian’s loyalty, though this time through a
betrothal to Placidia. Considering his evident disapproval for Aetius’ plan to engage
130
Gaudentius with his daughter, Valentinian could have considered Majorian as a possible
counterweight to the Aetian influence in his court. This plan led to his being exiled and
nothing ever came of the marriage plans.
Another point of interest is the succession game after Valentinian III. Apparently,
John of Antioch lists a contention of the throne among Petronius Maximus, one Maximian
and Majorian, with Majorian having support of the late Emperor’s wife, Eudoxia. Anicius
131
Olybrius, who was later betrothed to Placidia, is not listed. It is indeed an interesting idea
that Eudoxia supported Majorian for the purple in this time as it increases the possibilities for
ties between the Theodosian house and Majorian, but John of Antioch is the only source,
which makes the story not very reliable.
Despite what John of Antioch states, Majorian seems to have maintained himself by
somewhat fading into the background during the upheaval of the assassination of
Valentinian, and the subsequent reign of Petronius Maximus. Perhaps Majorian would have
intervened in Valentinian’s death or its aftermath, but was unable to do so as Petronius
Maximus proclaimed himself Emperor before anybody even knew what was going on. The
segment of the panegyric discussing this period also houses the lines most puzzling in this
work: “(...) and so [Petronius Maximus] fell, O Rome, bringing thee lower than he himself was
brought. Yet even when the kindly fates with their golden distaff were evolving the reign of
our present chief; but the calamities of the people shrank from bringing enmity on such a
man.” Sidonius continues: “All who had been chosen to bear the name of Augustus had held
a throne left for them by the Caesars; but he, when thou wert captured and in sore trouble,
created that which he now holds​.​” Next, Sidonius describes a number of successions of
Emperors from the past, before comparing Majorian with Vespasianus and Trajanus: “(...)
Vespasian had been chosen Emperor with the same titles won by the same toil as Trajan’s
and Majorian’s.”
The significance of these lines can certainly be grappled with. In the first lines, it
seems as if ‘our present chief’ is spared from the enmity he justly deserves by the calamities

127
Sidonius Apollinaris, Panegyric V, ¶8.
128
Heather, ​The Fall of the Roman Empire​, 371-372. Max, 46-47. Oost, ​Aetius and Majorian​, 24.
129
Sidonius Apollinaris, Panegyric V, ¶5.
130
Max, 61.
131
Max, 63. Oost, 24.
43
of the people. What the calamities of the people are is clear enough, as the disastrous reign
of Maximus and the 455 sack of Rome must have been fresh in all Romans’ memory.
However, why he deserves enmity, and how the calamities of the people spare him from it is
harder to answer.
Max points out that both Vespasian and Trajan can be considered children of
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circumstance, and that both assumed the throne after the fall of an imperial dynasty. As to
being a benefactor of circumstance, Emperor Avitus, Sidonius’ father in law, had been as
much as an opportunist as Majorian was, so the critique would harm Sidonius’ idol as much
as it would harm Majorian, making it weird for Sidonius to make such an accusation with a
straight face. Regarding the fall of a dynasty, the fact that Petronius Maximus and Avitus
were between Valentinian and Majorian should clean Majorian from the blame of ending the
prestigious Theodosian dynasty, even if Sidonius wisely refuses to mention Avitus. Such a
situation can also be found in Vespasian and Trajan, who came to power shortly (not
directly) after the ending of a previous dynasty. In the case of Majorian, the allegation is
especially suspect as he seems to have held warm ties with the imperial family throughout
most of his career. Moreover, as Majorian, Vespasian and Trajan all came to power shortly
after the ending of a previous dynasty, these men all served to re-establish order after
periods of internal disorder. Overall, this is a good thing.
A different explanation is provided by Philip Rousseau: “By the end of the section,
however, [Majorian] succeeds as smoothly as Vespasian did, or in the style of Trajan after
Nerva (already presented as a model moment) - even though the context within which he
supposedly made his bid included the destruction of Avitus as well as the bloodstained
tyranny of Petronius Maximus.” Then adding: “His personal ambition, already ridiculed by
Aetius's wife, is made ambiguous and insufficiently distinguished from the undesirable
133
qualities of Petronius Maximus, his ostensible predecessor.” While the time in which
Majorian ascended the throne was a dark one, blaming this upon him through a connection
to Petronius’ reign is inappropriate.
Perhaps there is a simpler way to reconcile these issues. Comparing Vespasian and
Trajan with Majorian is an easy fit, as all three were primarily distinguished soldier-emperors
after the reign of a weaker one; the decadent Vitellius for Vespasian, old Nerva for Trajan,
and the tyrannical Petronius Maximus for Majorian. As Avitus is never mentioned through the
entire panegyric, the fact he was between Maximus and Majorian is not such an issue for
rhetorical purposes. We thus get examples of times in which fresh blood was needed after a
period in which the Emperor was tyrannical or ineffective. These Emperors all came to power
after the ending of a dynasty. As such, they are not marked by the dishonour of ending one,
but are rather praised by re-establishing order and, in the case of Trajan and Vespasian, by
establishing a new stable dynasty.
Relating the ‘calamities of the people to the enmity on such a man’ could be done by
considering a personal investment of Majorian into these calamities. Majorian, as ​comes
domesticorum​ had apparently not done anything to stop Maximus or the Sack of Rome, so
enmity would be warranted. However, if we interpret the passage “(Sed) publica damna
(invidiam fugere viri)” as a matter of state involvement by the Emperor, in other words, a
feeling of responsibility and subsequent guilt for allowing such a disaster to occur, (whether
through unwillingness or inability, though probably the latter) does not seem unreasonable

132
Max, 71.
133
Rousseau, ​The Censure in Carmen V​, 256.
44
for any good ruler. Majorian would then be suffering with his people and thus not deserving
enmity.
This line of argument could draw some additional strength from the treatment of the
imperial women by Maximus and Gaiseric. Considering how Placidia’s mother and sister
were first taken and used for marriage by Maximus and then by Gaiseric, Sidonius could
present this episode as being both a tragedy on the political, as well as the personal level.
Though perhaps a bit shaky, I do think this interpretation offers some advantages
over the others I mentioned, as those are built upon tenuous interpretations that are hard to
maintain in the face of their own conclusions. On the other hand, arguing on the basis of
loss, while also hard to prove in a definitively satisfactory manner, is not inherently
inconsistent, as it would simply allow the panegyrist to mention some aspects of personal
involvement, drive and humanitas in the new ruler. It also makes more sense to have both
aspects of these lines carry a single value judgement. It is strange and inconsistent to praise
the succession while not-quite condemning him for his (in)action regarding the miseries of
the state. The interpretations I have offered also both offer a positive cadence, which would
be more logical in a panegyric. Overall, this interpretation allows for a good presentation of
Majorian, both to Sidonius’ audience and to us, as an Emperor thoroughly involved in the
issues of the state.

Rousseau’s Hidden Critique

Long discussion on such a segment is warranted by the great importance of our

source. Sidonius Apollinaris is practically the only first-hand source we have about Majorian
aside from his ​Novellae ​(imperial laws), meaning that Sidonius needs to be examined
thoroughly and critically in order to get a full and fair view of the Emperor. Sidonius could
easily have been quite a biased source, as he was both personally and politically extremely
involved in the reign of his father-in-law Avitus.
Keeping this in mind, Rousseau wrote an article in which he explores the idea of a
hidden message in Sidonius’ panegyric. Sidonius supposedly disapproves of Majorian’s
reign and shows it by voicing his carefully buried critique within his narrative. Additionally,
Rousseau compares the panegyric for Majorian with that of Avitus, which he finds a lot more
hopeful and compelling.
Rousseau’s argument in Majorian’s panegyric builds around the character of Aetius’
wife, Pelagia, (the widow of the late Boniface). It is Pelagia who gives us the stories of
Majorian’s personal prowess and warcraft. However, for her, this is a problem as she thinks
Majorian a threat, accusing him of ‘fighting for himself’ rather than for the Emperor. She
accuses Majorian of desiring to claim the purple which would put a stop to her ambitions for
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her own son, Gaudentius. She then recommends Aetius to deal with Majorian’s friend
Ricimer by “weaving crafty flatteries”, while letting Majorian himself be “attacked with the
135
sword”. This is apparently the reason for Majorian’s exile, as Aetius, scorning the woman,
136
refuses to order his death, but nevertheless exiles him.

134
Sidonius Apollinaris, Panegyric V, ¶8.
135
Sidonius Apollinaris, Panegyric V, ¶8.
136
Sidonius Apollinaris, Panegyric V, ¶9.
45
 Rousseau thinks this passage serves as an antithesis to Majorian’s father. As, in this
segment, Majorian’s personal interests and desire for personal gain are brought to the fore.
This of course in contrast to his father, whom we have already seen displayed as the most
loyal and honourable man. Indeed, his father’s loyalty to Aetius and his son is the only thing
137
we know of his character.
The final part of his argument covers those controversial lines regarding Petronius’
reign and the Sack of Rome. Taking these together, Rousseau concludes that “His personal
ambition, already ridiculed by Aetius' wife, is made ambiguous and insufficiently
distinguished from the undesirable qualities of Petronius Maximus, his ostensible
138
predecessor.” In short, Rousseau draws the following conclusion: “Few allusions could
summarize so clearly the political traditions in comparison with which Majorian appeared
only distorted and dangerous - weakened by self-aggrandizement and menacing in his
armed might, unfettered by respect for the past. Victory in war was necessary to the times
and desirable in those who ruled; but it could not to be waged at the expense of civil freedom
or the stability of the State. It is to his credit that Sidonius did not shrink from making the
139
point.”
Thus, Rousseau’s argument comes down to a hidden dual accusation. Firstly, the
character of Aetius’ wife is the one whose opinions Sidonius ascribes to. Pelagia
acknowledges the great prowess of Majorian in war, but accuses him of not employing them
to the right ends. Rather than working for Rome and the Emperor, he is merely looking to
aggrandize himself. Having both the desire and the ability to do harm to the state, Majorian
is a real danger to Rome. The second part of Rousseau’s argument is that Majorian, in
looking to aggrandize himself, can easily stray from the proper path, and walk the road of a
tyrant. This is why Petronius Maximus features so prominently in the panegyric; Majorian is
accused of being a tyrant of the same calibre.
Overall, I find Rousseau’s argument unappealing. Comparing Sidonius’ optimism in
Avitus’ reign to his less positive attitude towards Majorian can hardly be taken as solid
evidence. Sidonius being more excited and positive in Avitus’ panegyric (if we agree that it is
indeed there in the first place) can be explained more easily by Sidonius’ personal
attachment to Avitus, than by a hidden critique of Majorian. Is it not logical that one is more
keen and excited to see one’s relative and countryman ascend the imperial throne than the
one that killed that same man? Finding a hint of resentment in Sidonius attitude would only
be natural in such circumstances.
Furthermore, accusing one of ambition is rather a strange thing to do in this era, as
all men had to be ambitious. The way in which Majorian’s ambition is aimed is not
particularly different from any of the other major warlords of the 5th century, including Aetius
himself. Of course, Sidonius could easily be tempted to critique the destruction of Avitus and
his Gallic army by the Italian army, but this is, again, not something new to the Roman
political scene. If Avitus had won at Placentia, he probably would have inflicted pains upon
Majorian and Ricimer similar to those that they inflicted upon him.
Finally, the comparison Petronius Maximus-Majorian is suspect. The passage itself is
very ambiguous, and Rousseau's argument is basically based upon his interpretation of

137
Sidonius Apollinaris, Panegyric V, ¶5.
138
Rousseau, 257.
139
Rousseau, 257.
46
Sidonius not creating an adequate distance between the likes of Maximus and Majorian, an
argumentum ad absentia which I do not find particularly convincing.

Final Elements of Carmen V

The description of the early life of Majorian seems as good and reliable as any, and
having thus saved Sidonius from the allegation (or praise) of covertly criticising Majorian, we
can explore some final elements of the panegyric before concluding this interesting piece of
writing.
Carmen V paints the picture of a thoroughly military man. From an early age,
Majorian was apparently involved in the military, and closely associated with Aetius. In the
panegyric, this military career was marked by his great martial and tactical prowess. This
aspect of his character comes back multiple times when Sidonius praises his actions against
other barbarians, and when inciting him to action against the savage Vandals. The goddess
Roma consoles the saddened Africa using the simple words “Pervenit et vincit”, he comes,
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he conquers. Overall, Majorian’s character in Carmen V can be summarised as an active,
ambitious and capable military man.
There are a number of other minor favours Sidonius does for Majorian in the
panegyric which are briefly worth mentioning. Firstly, Sidonius connects Majorian, through
grandfather Majorian, with the land of Pannonia. This region was, especially from the reign
of Aetius onward, a fertile Roman recruiting ground and Majorian’s army for the Vandal
expedition was mainly recruited here. Sidonius himself poetically mentions Bastarnian,
Suebian, Pannonian, Neuran, Hun, Getan, Dacian, Alan, Bellonotan, Rugian, Burgundian,
Visigoth, Alites, Bisalta, Ostrogoth, Procrustian, Sarmatian and Moschan ranging themselves
141
behind Majorian’s eagles. The exercise gave Majorian some connections to his ragtag
barbarian army, which he might have needed as the unit cohesion of this army was not very
high. Sidonius alludes to this as well when he states that “Caesar, (...) stayed a mutinous
outburst with the sword; yet as he thus cut off his own limbs, driven thereto by the
compelling need of his cause, he wept for those he destroyed.” Fortunately, Sidonius turns
this around by saying that “this rising was a benefit to thine arms; henceforth whatever thine
142
orders might be, if a barbarian hearkened not he fell, that the soldiers might fear.”
He does a similar service regarding the cities of Gaul. As Majorian is constructing his
fleet (“Down into the water falls every forest of the Apennines”), “Gaul, though wearied by
unceasing tribute, is now eager to gain approval by a new levy for this end, and feels not a
143
burden wherein she beholds a benefit.” Amusingly, the final part of the panegyric asks
also for a tax reduction in Sidonius’ home city of Lugdunum. Acknowledging his mercy and
144
benign graciousness, Sidonius urges Majorian onward to victory. The tax reduction
Sidonius asked for was later granted.

140
Sidonius Apollinaris, Panegyric V, ¶13
141
Sidonius Apollinaris, Panegyric V, ¶16
142
Sidonius Apollinaris, Panegyric V, ¶17
143
Sidonius Apollinaris, Panegyric V, ¶15
144
Sidonius Apollinaris, Panegyric V, ¶18.
47
From Avitus to Emperor
The next part of Majorian’s life is bound with his predecessor Avitus, who had been
proclaimed Emperor late in 455. Unfortunately, the period itself is also one in which the
details are difficult to track. At first, Majorian seems to have accepted his rule. For his ally
Ricimer, whom Hydatius called a ​comes​, we know that he dealt with “a great horde of
Vandals who had advanced from Carthage towards Gaul and Italy with sixty ships” through
145
some sort of subterfuge. Not much later, another “horde of Vandals had been slaughtered
146
in Corsica”. This action is sometimes attributed to Ricimer, sometimes to Majorian.
Avitus immediately made himself very unpopular in Italy, which quickly led to his
downfall. Ralph Mathisen and Richard Burgess wrote interesting articles in which they
147
grappled with the exact chronology and events of the final moments of the reign of Avitus.
The sources of this time are indeed hard to reconcile. The most likely series of events is as
follows: Avitus had moved into Rome in order to be recognized Emperor, backed by some
sort of Gothic support. Meanwhile, Theodoric was campaigning in Spain for Avitus, or with
his permission. It thus appears Avitus had no idea of the chaos about to unfold around him.
However, this became clear soon enough, as the city of Rome was running low on food due
to the hostilities between Rome and Carthage. As a result, he had to dismiss his Gothic
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troops, whom he had to pay off by melting down remaining Roman statues.
Meanwhile, Ricimer and Majorian revolted, and Remistus, Avitus’ ​patricius,​ was
defeated in battle by Ricimer. Avitus then tried to retreat back into Gaul, but could not
escape from Ricimer. Avitus made his final stand in Placentia, but was soundly defeated.
Majorian himself seemed to have only arrived at the scene in time for the deposition of the
Emperor, rather than the actual battle. Avitus was ordained a bishop, but later killed by
Majorian’s followers. The various reports of the sources regarding Avitus’ death and
deposition can then easily be explained by an imperial effort to sweep Majorian’s
involvement in it under the rug, as being a known murderer would probably hamper his
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efforts of gathering political support, especially in Gaul.
After Avitus’ death followed a period of a number of months in which the imperial
throne was vacant. In this period, Majorian was probably busy gathering the support he
needed to ensure his reign. In the period between the deposition of Avitus and the ascension
of Majorian, there also was a Gallic plot by the name of the ​Coniuratio Marcelliana. ​The
details of this plot are scarce. What its goals were and who it was named after are subject of
150
debate, but the plot did not amount to anything in the end. Sidonius also rather casually
described the incident, either downplaying its importance, or acknowledging it was no
serious threat after all.
Majorian was declared Emperor by the soldiers in April, but held off on the formal
elevation by the Senate until later that year, as he seems to have been lobbying for imperial

145
Hydatius, 455.
146
Hydatius, 455.
147
See Mathisen, ​The Third Regnal Year of Eparchius Avitus​. And Burgess, ​The Third Regnal Year of
Eparchius Avitus: a Reply​.
148
Burgess, 339. Max. 82.
149
Burgess, 339-340, 344.
150
Max, 84-91. See also Max, ​Political Intrigue during the Reigns of the Western Roman Emperors
Avitus and Majorian
48
recognition from the Eastern Emperor Leo. The degree of recognition Majorian received from
Leo is subject to debate, but Majorian made continued overtures to Leo for both recognition
151
and support.

Novellae
Majorian’s goal since his ascension had always been to dislodge the Vandals from
Carthage. Aside from the political support he garnered in Italy and Constantinople, a lot of
other matters needed to be put into place. Mainly the construction of a navy and the
recruitment of an army capable of taking down the Vandals. However, in order to do this
Majorian needed resources. As such, from shortly after his ascension, Majorian issued a
great number of laws (​Novellae​). These were geared against the rampant corruption in the
tax-collection system rather than the levying of new taxes, though the latter also occurred.
Further laws were issued to guard the monuments of Rome, and a number of laws were
passed with the aim of increasing the amount of marriages and possible childbirth, which
included such regulations as women not being able to become a nun before the age of 40.
Finally some efforts were made to increase the power of local city councils and reduce
unnecessary bureaucracy, seemingly also attempts of increasing cohesion between the
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Emperor and his subjects, and reduce bureaucratic inefficiency and corruption.
His energy and intent are praiseworthy, and indeed Gibbon flatteringly summarises
his laws thus: “his laws, remarkable for an original cast of thought and expression, faithfully
represent the character of a sovereign who loved his people, who sympathized in their
distress, who had studied the causes of the decline of the Empire, and who was capable of
applying (as far as such reformation was practicable) judicious and effectual remedies to the
public disorders. His regulations concerning the finances manifestly tended to remove, or at
153
least to mitigate, the most intolerable grievances.” To what extent these laws were
successful is hard to gauge, and these laws can only really tell us something about the
character of the man issuing them and the problems of the state at the time. On the other
hand, some of the laws that dealt with some of the more notable abuses were repealed after
154
his death; they were clearly not popular with the Italian aristocracy.

Asserting Rule
In his time in Italy preparing for his grand conquests, he dealt with two invasions, one
by the Alamanni, when he was not yet Emperor, but held the rank of ​magister militum​ and
one naval assault upon Campania by the Vandals. These are both described in Sidonius’
panegyric. I find Sidonius rather amusing in his description of the Alaman invasion when he
states: “(...) and thou didst send thither Burco with a band of followers, small indeed, but that
155
suffices when ​thou​ bidst them fight.” ​ Apparently, following Majorian’s orders is a
guaranteed path to victory, but it makes it hard to credit him with the victory in any
meaningful sense. For the Vandal raid no Roman commander is named, so it might be that
he led the attack personally. In any case, he caught the Vandals on their way out, as, laden

151
Max, 92-97. Heather. ​The Fall of the Roman Empire​, 391.
152
Max, 112-124
153
Gibbon, 434.
154
Max, 123, 177-178
155
Sidonius Apollinaris, Panegyric V,. ¶14.
49
with spoils, the Vandals were intercepted by Majorian’s force. Being caught off guard, the
Vandals made a desperate final stand, but were quickly routed. Sidonius remarks: “(...) no
man of thine but had been stricken in the breast, none of the foe who was not stabbed in the
156
back.” Apparently, Majorian was a true terror on the battlefield.
Nevertheless, his political movements outside Italy are much more interesting, as his
Italian power base was already secured, but his effective authority ended there in the early
stages of his reign. His first move was to assert himself in Gaul, making him the Italian mirror
of Avitus. Majorian still had a large advantage over his Gallic predecessor however, in the
157
form of Magnus and Aegidius.
Magnus, based in Narbo, gave Majorian his link to Gaul and was later rewarded with
a post of ​praetorian prefect​ of Gaul and the dubious honour of being the last ​magister ​in
158
Spain. Aegidius is the more interesting of these characters. Gregory of Tours claims he
held both a Roman and a Frankish title in this period. Aegidius held control over what would
later become the Domain of Soissons, but was also mentioned to have been king of the
Franks in the period in which Childeric was in exile. A plot against his life before the return of
Childeric also seems plausible, if we are to accept the original idea that Aegidius indeed held
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the Frankish kingship in the first place.
In either case, Aegidius must have had access to a rather substantial military force.
As he held the northernmost fringes of the Roman Empire, it would fall upon him to hold the
Empire’s enemies, mainly the Franks and Visigoths, at bay. He and his son Syagrius
accomplished this feat until 486, even after the end of the Roman Empire. Why Aegidius was
so quick to sign up with Majorian is unknown, but he ended up being one of Majorian’s
staunchest supporters, which is why Majorian made him his ​magister militum per Gallias
sometime in 458. Aegidius was one of the key figures in taking control of Gaul, as the
Emperor was faced with a Gallic-Burgundian revolt in Lugdunum led by the Burgundian king
Gundioc. Moreover, Theodoric apparently felt he needed to support his Burgundian ally and
also sided against Majorian. It was Aegidius that marched in to deal with the
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Lyonese-Burgundian rebels for the fresh Emperor. The harsh penalties that followed the
capture of Lyon probably provide us with the reason for Sidonius’ mentioning the heavy
tribute that Lyon and Gaul had to pay, and why he asked for a tax reduction in Carmen V.
Majorian marched his army over the Alps in winter, in person, if we are to believe
Carmen V, and met up with Aegidius near Arles, which the Goths were besieging, to lift the
siege. What exactly happened in this siege is not entirely clear and even if the siege was at
Arles can be disputed. Details are rather unclear, as the ​Life of Saint Martin​ by Paulinus of
Perigueux is the principal source, which does not tell us very much in a reliable or detailed
161
manner. Nevertheless, this battle might be the ‘certain battle’ that Hydatius mentions as
the cause for Majorian and Theodoric establishing “(...) the strongest vows of peace between
162
themselves. Considering the report came from Nepotian and the Gothic ​comes​ Suniericus,
it would appear that the Goths were returned to some sort of earlier status in which they
were bound to aid in the Empire’s military endeavours. As this still left them a lot of freedom,

156
Sidonius Apollinaris, Panegyric V, ¶14.
157
Max, 138.
158
Kulikowski. ​Late Roman Spain and its Cities​, 196.
159
Gregory of Tours, Book II. 12.
160
Max, 139-140, Kulikowski, 191.
161
MacGeorge, ​Late Roman Warlords​, 85-88.
162
Hydatius, 459.
50
Kulikowski expects the force from Nepotian and Suniericus to be “(...) an imperial army
163
provided by the Gothic king”. Imperial control of Spain thus hinged on Gothic cooperation
once again.
The final figure whose support was particularly useful was Marcellinus of Dalmatia’s.
Marcellinus detached himself from the Western Empire following the turmoil surrounding the
assassinations in the imperial court at the end of Valentinian’s reign. Considering the
barbarian presence near his borders, the extent to which he held power can be questioned,
but it would hardly be possible for Majorian to recruit an army from the Danube without first
re-establishing ties between the Empire and its provinces across the Adriatic. Max suggests
Marcellinus’ reconciliation with the Empire might have been part of Majorian’s continuing
attempts of improving relations with the Eastern Empire. When Leo stopped paying tribute to
the Goths (the Ostrogoths) north of Marcellinus domain, the Goths responded by raiding
Marcellinus. The next time we see Marcellinus, he is fighting the Vandals in Sicily. Though it
is not certain to what extent these events are interrelated, and if and what Majorian’s role in
164
them would have been, it is certainly an interesting possibility.
MacGeorge covered Marcellinus extensively in her book, but, in the end, we simply
do not know much of who this man really was. Subsequently, what his official status had
been, and how this would relate to what troops he had at his disposal is not so clear, though
we know he hired some mercenaries to fight with him in Sicily and Ricimer bribed them away
165
when relations between them became hostile. Marcellinus may have been from a
prominent local family. The presence of a Nepos family is attested with epigraphic evidence
and Marcellinus’ nephew was Julius Nepos, who would later be Emperor, making this link a
good guess. Nevertheless, he must have been a capable and well-respected man, as he is
described as such in the ​Suda.​ MacGeorge does consider Marcellinus serving under
166
Majorian to be based on flimsy evidence. Though she has a point when saying the
evidence is weak, the difference is almost superficial; Majorian and Marcellinus were fighting
the same enemy with the same interests.

163
Kulikowski, 191.
164
Max, 97-98
165
MacGeorge, 41-43, 47.
166
MacGeorge, 40-48.
51
Treachery and Defeat
With the flanks in Gaul and Italy covered by Aegidius and Ricimer and Marcellinus
respectively, the road was now open to carry out the attack that Majorian had been planning
since his ascension. Gaiseric was sufficiently alarmed to send envoys to ask for peace. This
diplomatic exchange might be the inspiration for a legend Procopius gives in which Majorian
pretends to be his own envoy, visiting Gaiseric to examine his strength and the loyalty of his
167
subjects. In any case, Gaiseric prepared himself for the invasion and deployed a scorched
168
earth policy. It would be hard for Majorian to find provisions and defence, with the African
lands being desolated and the cities being stripped of its walls.
However, on the way to the south of Spain, Majorian was stopped dead in his tracks
by Gaiseric’s master stroke. His fleet had been destroyed or captured by the Vandals in a
surprise attack. Hydatius reports: “In May, the Emperor Majorian entered Spain. As he made
for the province of Carthaginiensis, a number of ships which he had been preparing for his
crossing against the Vandals were seized from the Carthaginian shore by Vandals, who had
been given information by traitors. Thus frustrated in his preparations, Majorian returned to
169
Italy.”
Rather anticlimactically, Hydatius’ report on the loss is about as much information as
is available to us. The treachery allegation is a common one in Roman historiography, so
even that does is not very informative. What truly happened at Cartagena has been lost to
history. In any case, it was enough to force an end to Majorian’s campaign and to make him
170
sign a peace treaty, called disgraceful by John of Antioch. The precise details of the treaty
are, once again, lost to us.
Majorian disbanded his army and made his way back to Italy. No other activity is
known from him in this period, other than a dinner party which we know of thanks to Sidonius
171
Apollinaris. Finally, on the way back to Rome, Majorian was arrested by Ricimer, forced to
abdicate and executed.

Sweet Innocence and Intrigue

The loss of his fleet and his execution lead us to an important point in Majorian’s
character and his reign. As both of these events are due to Majorian not properly anticipating
the moves of the most important characters in his political landscape, they can be easily
explained by Majorian’s inability of placing himself within the minds of others. Aside from
these clear examples, there are a number of other moments that show some evidence in this
direction as well. Firstly, whatever Majorian’s own involvement, the plan to have Placidia
married to Majorian, went against the direct wishes of Majorian’s own patron and the most
powerful figure in the Empire. The fact that he did not lose his life, as Pelagia insisted he
should, is probably more so due to factors outside Majorian’s control than thanks to his own
172 173
cunning. This would be either Aetius’ mercy, as Carmen V claims, or the simple reality

167
Procopius, The Vandalic War, VII. 474 AD.
168
Max, 147.
169
Hydatius, 460.
170
Max, 170.
171
Sidonius Apollinaris. Letter to Montius
172
Sidonius Apollinaris, Panegyric V, ¶8.
52
that executing his officer would have been deeply unpopular with Aetius’ troops. The fact
that Majorian lived for Sidonius to tell the tale seems to be good luck more so than anything
else.
174
Sidonius also mentions a mutiny in Majorian’s barbarian army in Carmen V. As
Max explains: “In a somewhat garbled description, Sidonius says Majorian had known of the
mutiny, but had put off punishing the offenders for no reported reason; in so doing, the poet
175
says, he caused greater bloodshed than had he acted at once.” Though Sidonius claims it
boosted his own authority and his army’s morale, it was, once again, not thanks to his own
actions.
Overall, we get the image of a man who was perhaps too caught up in his own affairs
for his own good. As he did not take into account the minds and ambitions of the men
around him, this caused him major trouble at no less than four occasions, with the fourth one
finally being fatal.

Ricimer and the Puppet Show

Ricimer is a character worth a study in his own right, as his importance to the
Western Empire in its final years cannot be overstated. Ricimer was the kingmaker, or rather
Emperor-maker for Libius Severus and Olybrius, as well as the de facto ruler of the Empire
during the various interregna after the reign of Majorian. For our purposes, he is often
considered to have had a looming presence, or direct control, over Majorian. Considering he
won the Battle of Placentia against Avitus and held the most important military posts in Italy
(​magister militum et patricius​), combined with the long history of having a military man acting
as the real power behind the throne, the idea of Ricimer as Majorian’s puppet master has
always been an influential train of thought in Late Roman scholarship, as a result of which
any study on the Emperor Majorian without addressing the issue that is Ricimer is basically
an unfinished project.
Nevertheless, I feel that his importance in the reign of Majorian is rather
overestimated. Granting that Ricimer was indeed the power behind the throne ​after ​the reign
of Majorian, considering Ricimer to be Majorian’s kingmaker as well stems from the
attachment of a later status to an earlier date. Ricimer’s position as being the power behind
Majorian’s throne is not affirmed in Majorian’s reign at all and the actions by which we could
ascribe him this position are only found in Majorian’s rise and fall. These actions could be
interpreted as easily by the standard affairs of politics as by a deliberate effort on Ricimer’s
part to control the throne.
Majorian’s elevation to the purple can be more easily explained through alliance than
puppeteering. Though it was Ricimer that defeated Avitus at Placentia, this is not enough
evidence for making Majorian a Ricimerian puppet. Majorian’s speech to the Senate upon
his ascension gives us a clear clue in this direction: “Our own vigilance, and that of our
father, the patrician Ricimer, (parente patricioque nostro Ricimere) shall regulate all military
affairs, and provide for the safety of the Roman world, which we have saved from foreign
176
and domestic enemies.” Though Ricimer gets this title which, indeed indicates his status of

173
Sidonius Apollinaris, Panegyric V, ¶9.
174
Sidonius Apollinaris, Panegyric V, ¶17.
175
Max, 137.
176
Gibbon, 433. Max, 110-111.
53
‘generalissimo’, as John O’Flynn calls it, Majorian clearly alludes to an alliance and
cooperation between the two warlords, not domination of one by the other. This incidentally
177
makes him the first Emperor since Constantius to be a military man.
Comparing such an address with the political situation in the time of Emperor
Anthemius, who reigned from 467 to 472, is additionally enlightening. In Sidonius’ panegyric
to Anthemius, Ricimer features incredibly prominently, indeed conspicuously so. Sidonius
goes through great pains to ensure that the harmony between Anthemius and ‘The
Unconquerable’ Ricimer is assured in his rhetoric, which is why the wedding between
178
Anthemius’ daughter and Ricimer features as prominently as it does. This emphasis is
rather too great to assume any type of real harmony between these figures within the roles
and functions assigned to them, as later struggles between the two indeed confirmed.
Considering the impressive powerbase that Anthemius brought with him from the East,
Anthemius should easily have been able to control his insubordinate general, but he could
not. If this was the situation in 467, when a new Emperor with the might of the East behind
him had to be so careful around the ​patricius​, what hope would Majorian have had of facing
Ricimer? The only explanation that makes sense is that he did not have any, but indeed did
not need to thanks to their alliance or friendship, paradoxically shown by Ricimer’s
unimportance in such propaganda as Carmen V and Majorian’s ‘inaugural address’, which is
contrasted by the almost frantic efforts of placating Ricimer in Carmen II.
Of course, Ricimer is mentioned in Carmen V, but his importance is much reduced
and, one could argue, Sidonius even makes a tongue-in-cheek comment about Ricimer’s
character in Carmen V. After warning her husband about Majorian aiming for the purple by
claiming the hand of Placidia, Pelagia warns Aetius of Ricimer as well: “Moreover, there is
linked with him in bonds of affection one (Ricimer) who is armed with the spirit of a royal
grandfather (Wallia). Whither canst thou turn? To the world's topmost pinnacle he directs his
fate and both direct their thoughts. Arise and assail them at the same time unawares.
Neither of them wilt thou be able to slay if thou shouldst order that both die; nay, rather
weave crafty flatteries for the one, and let this man be attacked by the sword. But why do I
speak vain words. ‘Tis for naught that we seek to avert these fateful events. He will surely
179
live that he may reign.” In this passage then, Sidonius attests to these bonds of affection
between Ricimer and Majorian, but also poses Ricimer as a man susceptible to ‘crafty
flatteries’. Being accused of being susceptible to such trivialities can hardly be anything other
than an insult. Indeed, it is the polar opposite of those qualities that Sidonius had praised in
Majorian’s father before turning to machinations of Pelagia. Also, Ricimer directs his
thoughts to the world’s topmost pinnacle, but it is Majorian whose fate is directed in that
direction. Perhaps Sidonius is hinting towards some improper ambitions by the barbarian
general.
The relations between Ricimer and Majorian up to his ascension can thus be
summarised. It seems that both men were veterans of Aetius’ army. For Majorian this is
clearly alluded by Sidonius, for Ricimer it can be easily inferred by the simple fact that there
were no other possible career paths that could have brought a barbarian like Ricimer to such
high station in such a short time. Whether or not they fought together is not mentioned, but

177
O’Flynn (1976), ​Generalissimo's of the Western Roman Empire. A.D. 375-493​, 201-202. And
(1983) ​Generalissimos of the Western Roman Empire​, 107-110.
178
Sidonius Apollinaris, Panegyric II. ¶18, ¶23.
179
Sidonius Apollinaris, Panegyric V. ¶8.
54
Sidonius implies that their ‘bonds of affection’ were already formed in such an early stage,
and, as Aetius’ was the only functioning army in the West, it could hardly not be so. During
the last moments of Avitus’ reign, Majorian and Ricimer rebelled together, but were at
different places. The honour of defeating Avitus went to Ricimer (at least in most sources),
but this does not necessarily make him Majorian’s overlord. In Majorian’s address to the
Senate, Ricimer is acknowledged clearly as a friend and ally, though only giving him special
mention among others, such as the Senate and the ‘most valiant’ army. Again, no relation
other than alliance and/or friendship can be justly inferred. This situation is in stark contrast
to the later reign of Anthemius, who, even though he must have been much more powerful
due to the backing of the Eastern Emperor Leo, had to place much effort into placating
Ricimer, as reflected in Carmen II.
Majorian’s further reign also does not give us any indication he was under Ricimer’s
thumb. We have already mentioned Majorian’s laws and how some of these were repealed
by Libius Severus. As it is unlikely that the situation changed so that the support of the
aristocracy had become so much more important than the tax income, it seems that Ricimer
did not approve of this piece of legislation in the first place.
What is also interesting is the power and location of Majorian and his generals during
his reign. Majorian did not reside in Italy for most of his reign. The other major figures of the
‘Majorian faction’, being Aegidius, Marcellinus and Nepotian, were all active on the various
fronts of the Empire, with Aegidius in Gaul, Marcellinus in Sicily and Nepotian in
Romano-Gothic Spain. Ricimer remained in Italy. Perhaps he felt that leaving Italy was not in
his best interest, or perhaps Majorian asked him to remain in Italy to guard against Vandal
attacks. After all, Ricimer had destroyed at least one of the Vandal fleets mentioned by
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Hydatius and perhaps also the other one, as we do not know for sure. As the defence of
Italy was not a task to be taken lightly, it is a logical move for Majorian to leave someone he
could trust in Italy. Or so he may have thought. The main point for now is that, with Ricimer
in Italy and Majorian in Gaul, the ​patricius ​had no way of controlling his supposed puppet.
Other than the plot that eventually ended Majorian’s life, we are not aware of any meaningful
181
activity on the part of Ricimer during this period.
The plot itself does not actually provide any evidence for Majorian being a puppet
either. Common sense dictates the opposite and it tells us something of Ricimer more so
than of Majorian. Nevertheless, the death of Majorian is still worth examining in detail. That
the loss of his fleet at Cartagena was the root cause for his death is a logical starting point.
Even if he was already planning to rid himself of the Emperor in the near future, Ricimer
must have been watching the events in Spain with a close eye. With the assault failed, there
was nothing left for Ricimer to wait for before hatching his plot.
Still, I think Majorian’s position after the loss of his fleet is not as weak as it is
generally portrayed to be. Majorian’s Empire was mostly built up from garnering the support
of a coalition of important figures and their domains. Thus, we find the ‘Majorian faction’
consisting of Majorian, Ricimer, Aegidius, Marcellinus, Nepotian and Theodoric. Leo’s
approval, in whatever form it actually materialised, should also be noted. The army that had
been brought to Spain had by this time not taken any significant losses as far as we can tell,
so it might have been possible for Majorian to call upon them again sometime in the future.
Taken together we find a situation in which Majorian himself does not hold significantly more

180
Hydatius, 456-457.
181
O’Flynn (1976), 202.
55
power than the others, but functions as the glue keeping it all together. Aegidius’ loyalty
seems unquestionable and Marcellinus had an excellent track record of coming to the aid of
the Western Empire, even during the reign of Ricimer (who perhaps can be linked to his
conveniently timed death). Nepotian, who had married Marcellinus’ sister, was a Majorian
loyalist like Aegidius. Finally, Theodoric had been soundly subjugated by Majorian and
lacked, if not the desire, the ability and casus belli to engage in open rebellion. Granted that
Majorian’s strike force was drastically reduced, especially against the Vandals, there was
nothing in his position that inherently denied him the opportunity to try his assault again
sometime in the future. Considering the fact that the Eastern Empire provided Anthemius
with a 1200 ship invasion fleet, Majorian might have been able to solicit some support from
that direction as well. Moreover, the ability to defend his old and new territories was relatively
secure in the hands of his lieutenants in the meantime, as historically confirmed by Aegidius’
domain of Soissons, Julius Nepos’ position in Dalmatia and, if one is willing to count it as
further evidence, the Visigothic kingdom in Spain.
Ricimer himself held on to Italy and the Italian field army. As such, he may have been
more powerful than Majorian alone, but certainly not him and his supporters combined. If we
are to attribute any type of major influence to Ricimer, it is more deserved in his ability to
unmake what Majorian created, rather than to beat it. Aegidius and Marcellinus both refused
to recognize Ricimer’s puppet and proclaimed their loyalty solely to Leo. Theodoric could
easily make use of the situation to oust any Roman officials in Spain and reassert himself in
his (former) domains in both Gaul and Spain. Ricimer was left as ‘generalissimo’, to adopt
Flynn’s wording again, with a puppet Emperor in Italy and an alliance with the Burgundians.
Taking this argument one step further, we can ask if Majorian indeed needed to be
afraid. For Ricimer, foreseeing the events that followed upon the death of Majorian cannot
have been too difficult. Considering Aegidius’, Marcellinus’, Nepotian’s and Theodoric’s
loyalties, he cannot possibly have expected them to fall in line after he murdered their chief
and installed Severus. Theodoric and his Goths had always made use of political upheaval
in the Empire to advance their own interests and, as it was Majorian that held them down,
them breaking free from imperial control was to be expected. Assuming that both Majorian
and Ricimer could make the same calculations, why would Ricimer want to kill his old
comrade? Ricimer’s position in Italy, though not that of an independent ruler was by no
means a weak one. He held the advantage of having (or having had), close ties to his
Emperor and could, in any case, not be dislodged from his seat of power without engaging in
yet another civil war. As Majorian did not bring his army to Italy, Ricimer had nothing to fear
or lose from the Emperor’s presence in Italy and, with the Emperor and Ricimer’s army
conveniently stationed in the same place, one might imagine Ricimer could have imposed
his will on the Emperor much more easily at this period in which Majorian was already down
on his luck anyway. Though, for all we know, he might have tried and failed to do so. On the
other hand, he had nothing to gain from being puppet master of Italy, as achieving this
position cost the Empire the support of every other non-Italian interest group aside from the
Burgundians. With his control stretching no further than Italy, it does not seem that being the
emperor-maker was any more rewarding than being ​magister militum et patricius​ had been.

56
Aftermath
With the loss of the territories outside of Italy, the reign of Majorian can be seen as
the last period in which the Roman Empire was still an Empire, rather than being the
Kingdom of Italy. By Ricimer’s decisions, the last Emperors that had a chance to restore the
Empire, namely Majorian and Anthemius, were stopped in their tracks. By the time Ricimer
had died, the Empire was disintegrated too far for it to assert itself outside Italy. In fact,
holding Italy itself proved impossible.
Though it is perhaps not entirely within the subject of this paper, I think O’Flynn’s
conclusion of Ricimer worth responding to. O’Flynn, in response to those that regard Ricimer
a traitor to the Empire claims that: “[Ricimer] had a conception of the Empire that differed
radically from that of the traditionalists, a conception which unconsciously anticipated the
imperial idea of the Middle Ages. He evidently thought of the Empire as something very lofty
and very remote, a kind of symbol of civilization with which all reasonable men would
naturally want to associate themselves, but which, on the concrete and day-to-day level,
should not be allowed to interfere with the political separateness of its component nations.
Thus the view of Vassili, who sees Ricimer as the great progressive of his age, working
toward a new society, is probably more historically sound than the harshly critical view that
pervades Seeck’s treatment of him and represent a tradition going back to Gibbon. The titles
chosen by both Gibbon and Seeck for their monumental works (​The Decline and Fall of the
Roman Empire​ and ​Geschichte des Untergangs der antiken Welt​ respectively) betray basic
presuppositions which more or less preclude the possibility of seeing the world through
Ricimer’s eyes. It is as unreasonable to expect Ricimer to have enthused over the traditional
forms of the Roman Empire as it would be to expect an African or Indian of the present day
to strive to uphold the nineteenth-century British Empire; what the Commonwealth of the
present day means to its members may serve to give some notion, however remote, of how
182
Ricimer felt about the Empire.”
I think the argument has a number of problems. What O’Flynn does not say here
(though he tacitly admits it) is that Ricimer was basically the one that brought the situation of
the Empire being ‘lofty’, ‘remote’ and with ‘political separateness of component nations’
about, starting with the assassination of Majorian in 461. Claiming to know Ricimer’s mind in
such a fashion is suspect and similarly, the comparison to the British Empire does not really
hold in the way O’Flynn uses it. During Majorian’s reign, the Empire was still very much alive
both ideologically and politically. Perhaps I am guilty of the same way of thinking as Gibbon
and Seeck, because I cannot see his ‘Middle Ages perspective’ as a solid argument for the
consequences of his actions. As far as I am aware, Ricimer was the only Roman sovereign
that destroyed the Empire through carving it up with non-Romans, which makes him even
worse for the health of the Empire than the likes of Honorius, Valentinian and Petronius
Maximus. Although O’Flynn calls him a progressive, one might as well ascribe a certain type
of cowardice to him, letting the Empire be destroyed so he could hold onto the pieces.

182
O’Flynn (1983), 127.
57
Conclusions
Summarising the steps of Majorian’s reign can be done as follows. The first step was
dethroning Avitus. This step can perhaps be described as the necessary evil of Majorian’s
reign. As Peter Heather says when examining Avitus and Sidonius’ panegyric for him: “It was
183
a good try”. The circumstances of Avitus’ ascension, with his general unpopularity, famine
in Rome and the melting of the remaining bits of Rome’s wealth simply meant that Avitus
committed political suicide. The death of Avitus following his defeat is perhaps a blight on
Majorian’s character, but Majorian (and Ricimer) did need him out of the way.
Step two was the reconciliation of Gaul, which shows that Majorian was the best
compromise the Gallo-Romans could have hoped for. Though the Gallo-Romans rebels and
their Burgundian allies got crushed and punished for their disobedience, Majorian later lifted
the heavy tribute imposed upon them. A deliberate effort was made to balance out the
interests of (the aristocracy of) Gaul with the interests of (the aristocracy of) Italy in the
imperial government. This is for example reflected in the distribution of government positions
184
for Gauls and Italians. The letter in which Sidonius describes a dinner which Majorian held
and which was attended by Gallic aristocrats also clearly shows their reverence for him. This
is especially poignant considering the Emperor was about to die at the hands of Ricimer; his
defeat at Cartagena did not hurt the Gallo-Romans’ opinion of the Emperor, or at least not in
185
any significant degree.
At some point close to this process, Marcellinus’ loyalty or support was also secured.
Though MacGeorge convincingly questions some of the relations between Majorian and
186
Marcellinus, Marcellinus was, at any rate, helping with the struggle against the Vandals
with his troops in Sicily, which is all Majorian needed from him. Whether Marcellinus was a
loyal servant of the Empire or a (semi-)independent ruler is thus not as important as the
concrete actions he undertook to help the Empire during this time.
The Goths were the next issue for Majorian. Of course, since Constantius, the Goths
never really fell under Roman control in such an absolute fashion again. Even Aetius had to
carefully manage his relations with the them. Perhaps Theodoric would have returned Spain
to Avitus, had Avitus’ reign been a success, but that remains speculation. The only
conclusion we can draw about Romano-Gothic Spain is that it could indeed easily switch
hands thanks to the Roman government system still in place. Though the Goths seem to not
have been enthusiastic to aid in Majorian’s major venture, Hydatius mentions a combined
187
Romano-Gothic force being sent against the Sueves. ​ The way Majorian handled the
Goths is still respectable, even if not as impressive as Constantius’ masterly blockade or
Avitus’ incorporation. If nothing else, they kept quiet during the remainder of Majorian’s reign
and allowed him to focus on the other fronts.
As already seen, the reintegration of Spain ties in with the Goths, as Roman rule was
restored there by the treaty between Majorian and Theodoric. The degree of Roman control

183
Heather, ​The Fall of the Roman Empire​, 384.
184
Max, 139.
185
Sidonius Apollinaris. Letter to Montius.
186
MacGeorge, 47-49.
187
Hydatius, 460.
58
there can of course be debated. It seems fair to me that the process of ‘re-romanising’ Spain
was merely started by this time. The fact the Goths could so easily take it back is explicable
by the fact that the Romans simply had not had the time and/or resources to strengthen the
diocese of Spain in a fashion that did not involve the Goths, and thus making it able to stand
on its own against them and the Sueves, like Aegidius’ Domain of Soissons could stand
against its enemies. Kulikowski places the end of Roman Spain at the end of the reign of
Majorian precisely because Majorian still attempted to assert himself in Spain. This went
hand in hand with the presence of Roman officials, such as Nepotian and Magnus, that
would never again happen after his reign. Kulikowski explains: “With the withdrawal of
Majorian from Spain and his subsequent execution, Spain ceased to be part of a Roman
Empire, because none of the ephemeral claimants to the throne who followed him could
secure their own positions in Italy and Gaul, let alone govern Spain. No imperial officials are
attested in Spain after 460, and no Spaniards are known to have held imperial office after
that date. The inference is clear: the end of Majorian severed the institutional links between
188
Spain and the imperial government.” Overall, Majorian clearly attempted to reintegrate
Spain to the Empire. Though he failed to do so in a structural manner in the end, as shown
by its relapse into Gothic hands after his death, does not take away the fact he was
successful during his own lifetime.
The final step of Majorian’s plan was taking Carthage. As we do not know what
happened to the fleet, placing blame on Majorian for this failed episode is difficult.
Nevertheless, it does not seem that Majorian had given up on his dream in the least when he
returned to Italy. Perhaps he was brooding so much on what he would do next that he was
apparently not even aware of the danger he was in. We could speculate on what would have
happened if Majorian was still alive to see the 1200 ships invasion fleet sent by Leo, though
that brings us to the realm of fantasy as Ricimer killed Majorian almost as soon as he arrived
in Italy.
Though the goal of his reign was not achieved in the end, Majorian did take all the
necessary steps to set himself and the Empire up for success and a resurgence of Empire.
The fact it failed is, in my opinion, not so much due to the loss of the fleet at Cartagena, as to
Majorian falling victim to intrigue. A comparison can perhaps be drawn to Aetius’ primacy, as
both men were incredibly successful for their times, but both of them finally made a misstep
in underestimating somebody they both thought they knew well, namely Valentinian III for
Aetius and Ricimer for Majorian. The fact this got them killed was the fatal loss of political
capital following a military defeat. Though relatively minor in the grand scheme of things, this
hurt their political standing to such a degree it led to their deaths. Perhaps this can be better
interpreted as the weakness of the Roman political system in the 5th century more so than
by any fault of Aetius’ or Majorian’s. Nevertheless, the argument that they should have seen
it coming is easily dispensed from our position. A final similarity is that the real damage to
Rome followed after these men were killed, when alliances built around their person fell
apart. After the death of Majorian, Rome simply did not have anything left to stand up to all
its enemies and the Empire never recovered. Anthemius’ expedition must be seen in exactly
this light: It was an attempt by the Eastern Empire to bail out and reinvigorate the West.
When it ultimately failed and the Western Empire was thrown back on its own resources, it
was already as hopeless as it would be by its end in 476.

188
Kulikowski, ​Late Roman Spain and its Cities​, 192.
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Passing Judgement: Majorianus and his Empire
We can make a number of final judgements on Majorian and his Empire which help
us explain Majorian’s major success. It is clear that Majorian embodied the ‘Spirit of Rome’,
in that he was a very active and energetic Emperor who focused on the security of the
Empire through the destruction of its enemies of which Rome had far too many at this time.
How he managed to do so shows clear signs of both good statecraft and warfare. With his
experience under Aetius, he must have gained a good level of military experience and
expertise. As Emperor, he managed to flock a number of different factions under his banner
and managed to pit them against the Empire’s enemies with good success. His gains were
secured by passing the responsibility of holding them onto his trusted lieutenants: Magnus
and Aegidius in Gaul and Nepotian in Spain. Arguably, Marcellinus of Dalmatia in Sicily can
also be counted among their number.
This was certainly a great achievement on Majorian’s part, but also shows how the
necessary building blocks were still in place. Bringing these together became more difficult
as time went on due to the increased influence of the barbarian kingdoms settled within the
Empire. In the periods of weakness in the Empire, this is reflected by the gradual
encroachment of these kingdoms that cut off various parts of the Empire, both through direct
occupation and cutting ties between the heartland and the provinces, of which the clearest
examples are the isolation of Spain and Aegidius’ domain after Majorian’s death.
Nevertheless, if the forces of the Empire could be properly combined by a good Roman
ruler, they proved themselves capable of standing up to most of the challenges they faced
even in 457.
In part this is because of the very nature of the Empire and its barbarian kingdoms.
Throughout its existence, men had always wanted to be a part of the Empire. This key
characteristic did not change with the various barbarian settlements, as a result of which a
barbarian façade developed in which they nominally proclaimed themselves adherents of the
Empire and left many imperial structures in place. The Goths are the clearest example of
this, and the Gallo-Roman willingness to switch sides as easily as they did can be explained
in part by this charade. Presumably, many were fine with serving the Gothic kings as long as
they could perceive them as being part of the official Roman system. Aside from Sidonius’
praises of Theodoric, we can also tell that he held Euric, who had given up on this idea of
189
serving the Empire, in low regard. Moreover, Sidonius was part of a rebellion against Euric
in Clermont, of which he was bishop at that time, as a result of Euric’s expansionist policies.
190
Overall, though the Gallo-Romans easily switched their allegiance, this could also work in
favour of Rome if it managed to reassert itself against its enemies.
This is most clear in the case of Spain, which switched its allegiance around with the
Visigoths, as it had always been the Goths that did most of the fighting in Spain. As the
Roman structure was relatively intact, it could easily be reintegrated into the Empire. After

189
Sidonius Apollinaris, VI To Lord Bishop Basilius. VII To his friend Vincentius,
190
Sidonius Apollinaris, I Letter to the Lord Bishop Mamertus. II.To his friend Constantius. III To his
brother-in-law Ecdicius. V To the Lord Bishop Agroeclus. X (XI) To the Lord Bishop Graecus.
60
Majorian’s reign it lacked the military to hold its own against the Goths, presumably because
the troops stationed there were supplied by Theodoric.
The Sueves fit less well into this structure as their relations to the local
Hispano-Romans were relatively hostile, as attested by Hydatius. Thus, we find them in their
province of Gallaecia for a long time quarrelling with the local Gallaecians, before they finally
appear to break out and manage to raid and impose tribute on the other parts of Spain
before being put back in their place by the Goths. This consistent hostility is in stark contrast
to Gothic policy of incorporation of local Romans. Unfortunately for the Sueves, this policy
also made them a clear enemy and made them a target for Romano-Gothic alliances.
The Vandals occupy something of a middle ground, which make them an incredibly
interesting enemy of Rome. They were definitely hostile to the local aristocracy and the
clergy at times, as shown by persecution and the redistribution of the lands in Proconsularis,
but this hostility mostly had a political dimension. Like the Goths, they also took over the
local Roman bureaucratic system, which allowed them to govern Africa very effectively.
Local Romano-Africans and Moors seem to have gotten along reasonably well with the
Vandals. The Vandal naval supremacy and its flirting with the local Punic culture, along with
the introduction of ​Anno Karthaginis​ can only be explained thanks to this connection. Still,
the destruction of the walls of the African cities and the ease by which Belisarius could
march his army through Africa show that there was no love lost between Romans and
Vandals. Perhaps those not connected to the Vandal regime did not care particularly much
for their Vandal overlords, while those that enrolled in its navy and administration were more
prone to feeling a bond, or perhaps they simply exploited the opportunity of making some
money.
Of course, the Moors always had a reputation of being deceitful. Procopius’ story of
Majorian’s adventure to Africa fits in with this scheme, as he was supposedly there to test
their loyalties and see if they could be enticed into joining the Roman side. The reality of the
loyalty of the Moors is hard to examine, as the story is part of a literary topos that fits in well
191
with the classical adventures of Scipio Africanus. Moreover, negative stereotypes about
192
the fidelity of Africans had always existed in Roman society, meaning that reports of
African disloyalty are even more suspect than others.
Majorian could have been able to recapture Africa if he had managed to land his
troops, as Procopius’ ​Vandal War​ does allude to a number of weaknesses in the Vandal
state that made it vulnerable. Though Procopius writes on a later date, it seems fair that
most of these aspects were already in place by Majorian’s time. Unfortunately, the main
aspect of Vandal power, the genius of Gaiseric, prevented Majorian from exploiting these
weaknesses as he would have wanted to do.
Still, an Emperor like Majorian could put all the pieces into place for an assault on the
Vandals and it can be expected that the reconquest of Roman Africa would have
immediately reaffirmed the Western Empire as being the dominant force in the West. With
the wealth of Africa, the other barbarian enemies had little chance of facing Rome on their
own in full-scale warfare, as shown by the incredible tenacity of the Empire’s border guard
Aegidius and the repeated subjugation of the Goths. As the Hunnic Empire had already
fallen apart by Majorian’s time and Rome was already bordered by powerful barbarian

191
Max, 201-202.
Miles, 384-487. See also: Isaac.​ The Invention of Racism in Classical Antiquity​, Chapter VI:
192

Phoenicians, Carthaginians, Syrians.

61
kingdoms, there is no reason to expect that a new invasion could occur that would once
again swing the balance of power into an unfortunate direction. Perhaps then, if Majorian
had been more successful, Rome could have been saved, or at least for the time being.
This presents a problem for the way that historians attempt to structurally explain the
fall of Rome. Focusing on structural issues in the way Rome failed in either internal or
external policies takes away a lot of the agency that characters like Majorian had in the
process. As a result, in such ways of thinking, Majorian often finds himself awkwardly placed
in a grand narrative on the fall of Rome as the exception to the story that is being told. Of
course, it is logical to focus on more than one man in such a grand endeavour, and my
thesis could likewise not possibly hope to explain all the various elements at play in the fall.
Nevertheless, I think a balance must be maintained in the importance we attach to structural
and individual shortcomings and successes and the perspective we take in it, as focusing on
a decline narrative can easily lead to Rome’s more positive aspects being ignored.
For future research, I think this is an especially fertile prospect in studies that focus
on internal causes and effects of Roman decline. The works of Goldsworthy, Halsall and
O’Flynn, for example, all show various balancing acts of interests between the Emperor and
the Empire and various possible dangers. This ‘Imperial Tightrope’ to (over)simplify the
situation, consists of such varied dangers as usurpations and invasions, faction politics,
individual ambitions, the imperial succession game and the management of powerful
generals or generalissimos. Characters like Majorian walked the tightrope incredibly well by
militarily dealing with their external enemies, but were prone to intrigue. Meanwhile,
characters like Honorius and Valentinian were protected from such dangers through their
imperial Theodosian dignity, but, as they were nonentities, invited a lot of conflict as to who
would be the most powerful general or statesman, which weakened the state as well.
Theories that attempt to explain the decline and fall of the Roman Empire (or its fall
and decline) can hardly be expected to properly reconcile such varied figures. Regarding
such figures as individual characters, with their own goals and ambitions, set in a stage
worth examining, allows us to go more in-depth into the issues of their time. Sometimes it is
important to remember history covers people and events as well as processes. Especially in
the case of remarkable figures, such as Majorian, who strive to and succeed in defying the
paradigm of their time, not adhering rigorously to systems of decline (whether in- or external)
can provide some new insights into the fall of Rome. Rather than somewhat glossing over
such characters, as being strange and unfitting in the grand narrative, acknowledging that
the concept of the fall of Rome was not a continuous decay, but rather a series of
interrelated events that influenced the integrity of the Empire, can encourage us to look into
such outliers and widen our perspective as a result.

62
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