T H

The other thing that he repeats is that the best way to reconcile contin-
gency and liberty with the prescience and the decrees of God is to subject
future contingents50 to the aspect of God. The same is also my opinion, but
contrary to what his Lordship has all this while laboured to prove. For hith-
erto he held liberty and necessity, that is to say, liberty and the decrees of God,
irreconcilable, unless the aspect of God (which word appears now the first
time in this discourse) signify somewhat else besides God’s will and decree,
which I cannot understand. But he adds that we must subject them accord-
ing to that presentiality which they have in eternity, which he says cannot
be done by them that conceive eternity to be an everlasting succession, but
only by them that conceive it as an indivisible point. To this I answer that as
soon as I can conceive eternity to be an indivisible point, or anything but an
everlasting succession, I will renounce all that I have written on this subject.
I know Saint Thomas Aquinas calls eternity nunc stans, an ever-abiding now;51
which is easy enough to say, but though I fain would, I never could conceive
it: they that can are more happy than I. But in the meantime his Lordship
allows all men to be of my opinion, save only those that can conceive in their
minds a nunc stans, which I think are none. I understand as little how it can
be true, as52 his Lordship says, that God is not just but justice itself, not
wise but wisdom itself, not eternal but eternity itself, nor how he concludes
thence that eternity is a point indivisible and not a succession, nor in what
sense it can be said that an infinite point, and wherein is no succession, can
comprehend all time, though time be successive. These phrases I find not
in the Scripture. I wonder therefore what was the design of the Schoolmen
to bring them up, unless they thought a man could not be a true Christian
unless his understanding be first strangled with such hard sayings.
And thus much for answer to his Lordship’s discourse, wherein I think
not only his squadrons of arguments but also his reserves of distinctions
are defeated. And now your Lordship shall have my doctrine concerning
the same question, with my reasons for it, positively and as briefly as I can,
without any terms of art, in plain English.

My opinion about liberty and necessity

§  First, I conceive that when it comes into a man’s mind to do or not
to do some certain action, if he have no time to deliberate, the doing it or
50 contingents: Def.; contingencies: st. 51 See Aquinas, Summa theologiae .x..
52 true, as his Lordship says,: ed.; true his Lordship says,: MS, st; true,: Def.

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abstaining necessarily follows the present thought he has of the good or

evil consequence thereof to himself. As, for example, in sudden anger the
action shall follow the thought of revenge, in sudden fear the thought of
escape. Also when a man has time to deliberate but deliberates not, because
never anything appeared that could make him doubt of the consequence,
the action follows his opinion of the goodness or harm of it. These actions
I call voluntary; my Lord, if I understand him aright, calls them sponta-
neous. I call them voluntary because those actions that follow immediately
the last appetite are voluntary, and here where there is one only appetite
that one is the last. Besides, I see it is reasonable to punish a rash action,
which could not be justly done by man to man unless the same were vol-
untary. For no action of a man can be said to be without deliberation,
though never so sudden, because it is supposed he had time to deliberate
all the precedent time of his life whether he should do that kind of action
or not. And hence it is that he that kills in a sudden passion of anger shall
nevertheless be justly put to death, because all the time, wherein he was
able to consider whether to kill were good or evil, shall be held for one
continual deliberation; and consequently the killing shall be adjudged to
proceed from election. +
§  Secondly, I conceive when a man deliberates whether he shall do a
thing or not do it, that he does nothing else but consider whether it be better
for himself to do it or not to do it. And to consider an action is to imagine
the consequences of it, both good and evil. From whence is to be inferred,
that deliberation is nothing but alternate imagination of the good and evil
sequels of an action, or, which is the same thing, alternate hope and fear or
alternate appetite to do or quit the action of which he deliberates. +
§  Thirdly, I conceive that in all deliberations, that is to say, in all alternate
succession of contrary appetites, the last is that which we call the will, and
is immediately next before the doing of the action, or next before the doing
of it become impossible. All other appetites to do and to quit that come
upon a man during his deliberation are usually53 called intentions and
inclinations, but not wills; there being but one will, which also in this case
may be called the last will, though the intention change often. +
§  Fourthly, that those actions which a man is said to do upon delibera-
tion are said to be voluntary and done upon choice and election, so that
53 deliberation are usually: MS; deliberations are: st.

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voluntary action and action proceeding from election is the same thing; and
that of a voluntary agent it is all one to say he is free, and to say he has not
made an end of deliberating. +
§  Fifthly, I conceive liberty to be rightly defined in this manner: Liberty
is the absence of all the impediments to action that are not contained in the
nature and intrinsical quality of the agent. As, for example, the water is said
to descend freely, or to have liberty to descend, by the channel of the river,
because there is no impediment that way; but not across, because the banks
are impediments. And though the water cannot ascend, yet men never
say it wants the liberty to ascend, but the faculty or power, because the
impediment is in the nature of the water and intrinsical. So also we say he
that is tied wants the liberty to go, because the impediment is not in him
but in his bands; whereas we say not so of him that is sick or lame, because
the impediment is in himself.
§  Sixthly, I conceive that nothing takes beginning from itself, but from
the action of some other immediate agent without itself. And that, there-
fore, when first a man has an appetite or will to something, to which imme-
diately before he had no appetite nor will, the cause of his will is not the
will itself, but something else not in his own disposing. So that whereas it
is out of controversy that of voluntary actions the will is the necessary
cause, and by this which is said the will is also caused by other things
whereof it disposes not, it follows that voluntary actions have all of them
necessary causes and therefore are necessitated. +
§  Seventhly, I hold that to be a sufficient cause to which nothing is
wanting that is needful to the producing of the effect. The same also is a
necessary cause. For if it be possible that a sufficient cause shall not bring
forth the effect, then there wants somewhat which was needful to the pro-
ducing of it, and so the cause was not sufficient. But if it be impossible that
a sufficient cause should not produce the effect, then is a sufficient cause a
necessary cause, for that is said to produce an effect necessarily that cannot
but produce it. Hence it is manifest that whatsoever is produced is pro-
duced necessarily, for whatsoever is produced has a sufficient cause to
produce it, or else it had not been; and therefore also voluntary actions
are necessitated.
§  Lastly, I hold that ordinary definition of a free agent, namely that a
free agent is that which, when all things are present which are needful to

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produce the effect, can nevertheless not produce it,54 implies a contradiction
and is nonsense; being as much as to say the cause may be sufficient, that is
necessary, and yet the effect shall not follow. +

My reasons
§  For the first five points, where it is explicated, first, what spontaneity
is, secondly, what deliberation is, thirdly, what will, propension, and
appetite are, fourthly, what a free agent is, fifthly, what liberty is; there can
no other proof be offered but every man’s own experience, by reflection on
himself and remembering what he uses to have55 in his mind; that is, what
he himself means when he says an action is spontaneous, a man deliberates,
such is his will, that action or that agent is free. Now he that so reflects on
himself cannot but be satisfied that deliberation is the consideration of the
good and evil sequels of an action to come; that by spontaneity is meant
inconsiderate proceeding56 (or else nothing is meant by it); that will is the
last act of our deliberation; that a free agent is he that can do if he will and
forbear if he will; and that liberty is the absence of external impediments.
But to those that out of custom speak not what they conceive but what
they hear, and are not able or will not take the pains to consider what they
think when they hear such words, no argument can be sufficient, because
experience and matter of fact are not verified by other men’s arguments but
by every man’s own sense and memory. For example, how can it be proved
that to love a thing and to think it good are all one to a man that does not
mark his own meaning by those words? Or how can it be proved that eternity
is not nunc stans to a man that says those words by custom, and never
considers how he can conceive the thing itself in his mind? +
Also the sixth point, that a man cannot imagine anything to begin
without a cause, can no other way be made known but by trying how he
can imagine it. But if he try, he shall find as much reason, if there be
no cause of the thing, to conceive it should begin at one time as at another,
that is, he has equal reason to think it should begin at all times; which is
impossible, and therefore he must think there was some special cause why
54 This definition, which was indeed very commonly given by libertarians (Jesuits and Arminians) in
Hobbes’s time, was apparently first formulated by Molina; see his Liberi arbitrii cum gratiae donis,
divina praescientia, providentia, praedestinatione et reprobatione concordia (ad xiv.) .ii.: illud agens
liberum dicitur quod positis omnibus requisitis ad agendum potest agere et non agere [that agent is said to
be free that, all things required for acting having been posited, is able either to act or not to act].
55 uses to have: MS; uses: st. 56 proceeding: MS; action: st.

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it began then rather than sooner or later; or else that it began never, but
was eternal. +
§  For the seventh point, which is that all events have necessary causes, it
is there proved in that they have sufficient causes. Further let us in this
place suppose any event never so casual, as, for example, the throwing
ambs-ace upon a pair of dice,57 and see if it must not have been necessary
before it was thrown. For seeing it was thrown, it had a beginning, and
consequently a sufficient cause to produce it, consisting partly in the dice,
partly in outward things, as the posture of the parts of the hand, the
measure of force applied by the caster, the posture of the parts of the table,
and the like. In sum, there was nothing wanting which was necessarily
required to the producing of that particular cast, and consequently the cast
was necessarily thrown. For if it had not been thrown, there had wanted
somewhat requisite to the throwing of it, and so the cause had not been
sufficient. In the like manner it may be proved that every other accident,
how contingent soever it seem or how voluntary soever it be, is produced
necessarily, which is that that my Lord Bishop disputes against. The same
also may be proved in this manner. Let the case be put, for example, of the
weather. It is necessary that tomorrow it shall rain or not rain. If therefore
it be not necessary it shall rain, it is necessary it shall not rain; otherwise
there is no necessity that the proposition, it shall rain or not rain, should
be true. I know there be some that say, it may necessarily be true that one
of the two shall come to pass, but not singly that it shall rain or that it shall
not rain, which is as much as to say, one of them is necessary yet neither of
them is necessary. And therefore to seem to avoid that absurdity, they make
a distinction, that neither of them is true determinate [determinately], but
indeterminate [indeterminately]; which distinction either signifies no more
but this, one of them is true but we know not which, and so the necessity
remains though we know it not; or if the meaning of the distinction be not
that, it has no meaning, and they might as well have said, one of them is
true Tityrice but neither of them Tupatulice.58 +
57 I.e. two aces, the lowest possible throw.
58 No doubt Hobbes means to be derisive here, but his precise point remains obscure. The words
Tityrice and Tupatulice (sic in the MS; Titirice and Tu patulice in the st edition) are evidently taken
from the first line of Virgil’s first Eclogue: .i: : Tityre, tu patulae recubans sub tegmine fagi [You,
Tityre, reclining under the cover of a wide-spreading beech tree]. And the word ‘tityre-tu’ was used
in Hobbes’s time to designate a member of a ‘group of well-to-do ruffians who infested London
streets in the th century’ (OED). Lessay has some interesting speculations on what Hobbes may
have had in mind here; see the introduction to his translation of Hobbes’s treatise, p.  n. .

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§  The last thing, in which also consists the whole controversy, namely
that there is no such thing as an agent which, when all things requisite to
action are present, can nevertheless forbear to produce it; or, which is all
one, that there is no such thing as freedom from necessity; is easily inferred
from that which before has been alleged. For if it be an agent, it can work;
and if it work, there is nothing wanting of what is requisite to produce the
action, and consequently the cause of the action is sufficient; and if
sufficient, then also necessary, as has been proved before.
§  And thus you see how the inconveniences, which his Lordship objects
must follow upon the holding of necessity, are avoided, and the necessity
itself demonstratively proved. To which I could add, if I thought it good
logic, the inconvenience of denying necessity, as that it destroys both the
decrees and the prescience of God Almighty. For whatsoever God has
purposed to bring to pass59 by man as an instrument, or foresees shall
come to pass, a man, if he have liberty (such as his Lordship affirms) from
necessitation, might frustrate and make not to come to pass; and God
should either not foreknow it and not decree it, or he should foreknow such
things shall be as shall never be, and decree that which shall never come to
pass.
§  This is all that has come into my mind touching this question since I
last considered it. And I humbly beseech your Lordship to communicate
it only to my Lord Bishop. And so, praying God to prosper your Lordship
in all your designs, I take leave, and am, My most noble and most obliging
Lord,
Your most humble servant,
Rouen, August , .60 Thomas Hobbes.
§  Postscript.61 Arguments seldom work on men of wit and learning when
they have once engaged themselves in a contrary opinion. If anything do
59 This is the point at which the Harley manuscript stops; its last page has apparently been lost.
60 : ed.; : st., EW. Molesworth adds a note here: ‘In the edition of , this date is .’
But Molesworth is wrong; the date printed was indeed . And  is not the right date in any
case. Hobbes tells us in the preamble to his Questions that his treatise was written in ; but that
isn’t right either, according to Lessay, pp. –. Lessay makes a convincing case that the actual date
of composition was August , and I accept his conclusion.
61 This postscript was not included in the first (unauthorized) edition, nor therefore was it printed
by Molesworth in EW. It was first published by Bramhall in his Defence, the text of which was
incorporated by Hobbes into his Questions (in Molesworth’s edition of which in EW it does appear).
The text followed here is that of Bramhall’s Defence and Hobbes’s Questions: the two are virtually
identical.

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it, it is the showing of them the causes of their errors, which is this. Pious
men attribute to God Almighty, for honour sake, whatsoever they see
is honourable in the world, as seeing, hearing, willing, knowing, justice,
wisdom, etc.; but deny him such poor things as eyes, ears, brains, and other
organs, without which we worms neither have nor can conceive such
faculties to be. And so far they do well. But when they dispute of God’s
actions philosophically, then they consider them again as if he had such
faculties, and in that manner as we have them. This is not well; and thence
it is they fall into so many difficulties. We ought not to dispute of God’s
nature; he is no fit subject of our philosophy. True religion consists in
obedience to Christ’s lieutenants, and in giving God such honour, both in
attributes and actions, as they in their several lieutenancies shall ordain.

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