Nato Sof
Nato Sof
Nato Sof
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The aim of this this handbook and the checklists contained within it is to practically assist in
the development of a national programme designed to enable all members of society to
contribute to comprehensive deterrence and defence. Use of the handbook will foster a shared
understanding that underscores increased coordination and synergized effects. This handbook
is a key tool for trainers to leverage within their own countries as they develop the
comprehensive deterrent and defence capabilities for their country. While readers may find
significant benefit in this first edition of the comprehensive defence handbook, I welcome your
feedback so that we can improve this handbook as we republish updated versions of yearly.
Your additional considerations, best-practices and recommendations will also be helpful as we
update data in our comprehensive defence courses, seminars and table-top exercises.
Sincerely,
Eric P. Wendt
Lieutenant General, USA Army
Commander
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NSHQ PUBLICATION
3. Publication Updates. NSHQ will review this publication at least annually and update
as needed. Suggestions for updates should be directed to the proponent.
4. Proponent. The proponent of this publication is the NSHQ Strategy, Concepts and
Experimentation Directorate.
5. Distribution. As required.
Eric P. Wendt
Lieutenant General, USA Army
Commander
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C – Critical
S – Substantive
E – Editorial
C/S Sub- Adjudication
Serial Originator Para Comment Rationale
/E Para (NSHQ Doctrine)
Insert then highlight, Rationale will A - Approved
or line out text to be be submitted AA - Approved as
modified and propose for all amended
a recommended comments
NA - Not
course of action.
General observations Approved
without proposed
solutions should not
be submitted.
Note: This table may be copied and pasted into an email to allow for more room to
comment.
Submission:
Submit requests to modify publications to NSHQ Concepts Directorate
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Contents
Foreword – COM NSHQ.................................................................................................. 1
Chapter 1 - Volume II Introduction .................................................................................. 9
Section 1 - Overview .................................................................................................... 9
Section 2 - Organisation .............................................................................................. 9
Summary..................................................................................................................... 10
Chapter 2 - Understanding Comprehensive Defence .................................................. 11
Section 1 - Definitions and Relevance ...................................................................... 11
Section 2 - Risks ........................................................................................................ 13
Section 3 - Contributing to Resilience ....................................................................... 14
Chapter 3 - Malicious Acts............................................................................................. 17
Section 1 - Overview .................................................................................................. 17
Section 2 - Weaponised Information ......................................................................... 17
Section 3 - Cyber Attacks .......................................................................................... 19
Section 4 - Terrorism.................................................................................................. 21
Chapter 4 - Malicious Act: Armed Incursion ................................................................. 25
Section 1 - Overview .................................................................................................. 25
Section 2 - Response Force ...................................................................................... 26
Section 3 - Contributing to Comprehensive Defence against an Armed Incursion 29
Section 4 - Law ........................................................................................................... 31
Chapter 5 - Skills ............................................................................................................ 33
Section 1 - Overview .................................................................................................. 33
Section 2 - Survive ..................................................................................................... 33
Section 3 - Report ...................................................................................................... 46
Section 4 - Evacuate .................................................................................................. 48
Section 5 - Participate ................................................................................................ 51
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Section 1 - Overview
1.1 This volume is designed to form the core of a stand-alone handbook that, once
tailored to a nation’s specific needs, can be provided to every member of society.
Because it is a template, beyond this introductory chapter, the volume is written
as though it is speaking directly to a nation’s residents. However, it uses the
generic terms, such as “the nation.” When adapted for a specific country, officials
may choose to adjust the tone to account for particular cultural and educational
considerations.
1.2 At least one nation that issues this type of handbook to its population uses
humorous illustrations to help maintain the readers’ attention but also notes the
seriousness of the information being communicated. Similarly, when refining the
document to fit a nation’s social personality, officials should be reminded that
over-simplifying the material might cause it to either lose its impact or alienate
the public by insulting the readers’ intelligence.
Section 2 - Organisation
1.4 Volume II has five chapters:
a. The chapter that follows this one begins by explaining comprehensive defenc e
in further detail. It then goes on to discuss how to identify risks that the nation
may face. The chapter concludes by offering different ways that individuals
can contribute to comprehensive defence.
b. The next two chapters present specific methods for individuals to help build
resilience and defend against malicious acts. To cover as broad a range as
possible, it uses four types of acts as examples: cyber attack, weaponised
information, terrorism and armed incursion.
c. The final chapter is the heart of Volume II. The checklists that comprise
Chapter 5 offer specific measures one can take if faced with an armed
incursion, beginning with how to survive if occupied and concluding with
activities individuals can perform to directly support the nation’s defenc e
forces.
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Summary.
1.5 Volume II is the core of a user’s manual. When tailored for a specific nation, it
will help the average member of society understand how they can contribute to
the country’s safety and security, first by being individually resilient and then by
being capable and willing to directly respond to an emergency should it arise.
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The will and ability to withstand external pressures and influences and/or
recover from the effects of those pressures or influences.
2.3 What this means to you. In order for Comprehensive Defence to be effective,
every member of society must understand what it is and how they can contribute
to it.
Military Civil
Business NGO’s
Conventional Government Ministries Industry Clubs
Special Operations Emergency Management Privately Owned Energy Churches
Reserve/Home Etc. Privately Owned Faith Groups
Guard Hospitals Individual citizens
Other Infrastructure
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o This increases the nation’s ability to prevent, respond to and recover from
potential threats—natural, accidental or malicious.
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Section 2 - Risks
2.5 What is a risk? 1
A risk or threat is a natural, accidental or malicious event that may accomplish
one or more of the following:
Interfere with the nation’s ability to govern itself or make decisions free from
external influence
Produce mass casualties or displace a large portion of the population
Substantially disrupt essential goods or services
Require a national-level response
Through its internal planning processes, the nation has precise criteria for
categorizing various risks, such as mass casualties, etc.
1
Although the terms risk and threat have slightly different meanings, they are used here
interchangeably
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2
Example comes from the UK National Risk Register found at ukresillience.gov.uk
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Section 1 - Overview
3.1 What are Malicious Acts?
Any action taken by an individual or organisation, external to the society, the
effects of which threaten your nation’s safety, security, sovereignty or its
peoples’ right to self-determination.
Malicious acts need not be violent or physical. Weaponised information or
nefarious cyber activity may undermine a nation’s independence more
effectively over time than an armed invasion would.
3.3 Quite often, the intended target for weaponised information is the public, not the
government. Therefore, it is particularly important for all members of society to
understand how to recognise and respond to these attacks.
3
It is important, also, to ensure that fact checking sites are unbiased
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4
https://www.ifla.org/publications/node/11174
5
www.onion.com
6
https://www.bbc.com/news/38053324
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7
Stanford History Education Group is often cited for its work in critical thinking and recognising
misinformation https://sheg.stanford.edu/
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Table 3.4 Ten Best practices for Resilience against Malicious Online Activity
Individual • Keep personal information locked down and limit its diffusion;
cyber
• Always double-check the reliability of information seen online;
resilience
measures • Be extremely careful when downloading content from websites;
• Purchase products online from secure and reliable websites
only;
• Always update systems, software, and applications on your
devices;
• Keep antivirus protection current;
• Regularly monitor your bank account and online transactions;
• Be wary of links and files contained in communications coming
from unknown or unreliable sources;
• Verify that address bar reads “https” when conveying
confidential information online;
• Regularly utilize backup systems copies.
3.5 As working remotely has become common in many nations, members of society
should apply additional measures to help reinforce resilience when teleworking.
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Section 4 - Terrorism
3.6 What is terrorism?
There are many definitions for terrorism. The following definition is used by
NATO and applies throughout this handbook:
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3.9 Most terrorist acts follow the same general pattern (Figure 3.2)
During the Target Selection, Planning and Rehearsal phases, terrorists are
gathering information and testing their plans
The objective during this period is to deny them access to the target, detect
their actions if they do manage to gain access to the target and, through
resilience measures, deter them from ultimately taking action
If the terrorist(s) successfully conduct an attack, immediate responses are
similar to those used for natural or accidental events
During the exploitation phase, the terrorists will use various forms of media to
advertise their attack, as they seek both to instil fear and gain support
The measures used against weaponised information come into effect
Table 3.7 Considerations for Building Individual Resilience Against Terrorist Attacks
Aware • Understand national concept for countering terrorism
o Example: UK Model (Figure 3.2)
Phases of a terrorist attack
Target selection
Planning
Training
Attack
Exploitation
Resilience and defence against a terrorist attack
Deny
Detect
Deter
• Stay abreast of local and international trends regarding terrorism
• Be aware of likely terrorist targets
o Crowded places
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3.10 Community watch programmes are particularly effective tools for maintaining
resilience against terrorism.
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3.11 Terrorist attacks may take many forms and be aimed toward any individual, group
or facility
Below are considerations for preventing and responding to two of the most
common types of attacks: Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and active
shooter incidents
Table 3.9 Considerations for Preventing and Responding to IED and Active Shooter
Attack Considerations
Method
IED • Know how to ID suspicious item (HOT)
o Hidden: Is it hidden or concealed
o Obvious: Is it obviously suspicious (wires, lights, etc.)
o Typical: Is it unusual for the circumstance (large backpack at a concert)
• Know response procedures (4Cs)
o Confirm the item is suspicious (HOT)
o Clear the area
o Communicate with authorities
o Control the area (no re-entry, etc.)
Active • Evacuate
Shooter 8 o After identifying safe route
o Leave belongings behind
o Encourage others to evacuate
• Hide
o If evacuation not possible
o Avoid dead ends and bottle necks
o Out of sight of shooter
o Lock, barricade and move away from entrances
o Turn phone to silent, vibrate off
• Take action
o Last resort—when in imminent danger
o Disrupt shooter by whatever means possible
• Contact authorities
• Cooperate when authorities arrive
8
https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/active_shooter_booklet.pdf
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/stay-safe-film
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Section 1 - Overview
4.1 What does an armed incursion look like?
An armed incursion may unfold in many ways
It can begin with a very obvious attacks from the air, land and or sea
The adversary may also use more subtle methods, such as infiltrating
personnel into the nation who have been assigned certain tasks that will
simplify and aid the enemy’s attack
Table 4.1 Considerations to Help Determine if an Incursion will Occur or has Begun
Planning • In general, no matter what form of attack the adversary uses, the overall
and pattern will be similar to a terrorist attack.
executing o Conduct reconnaissance
o Plan
o Rehearse
o Attack
o Consolidate
Possible • Foreign military force breaches targeted nation’s physical border and
methods withdraws quickly (i.e., days or weeks)
of attack
• Foreign military force breaches targeted nation’s physical border and
remains to occupy part or all of the breached nation’s territory
• Foreign power uses paramilitary or disguised forces to covertly invade and
occupy targeted nation or open the way for an overt occupying force
• Some combination of the above possibilities
Possible • The adversary may attempt to confuse, desensitise or deceive the targeted
indicators government and public prior to an incursion.
o Troop movements disguised as exercises
o Weaponised information campaign
o Cyber attacks against detection and early warning systems
4.2 Maintaining the state. In the event of an armed incursion, society’s first priority
will be to prevent or limit death and suffering among its population. Maintaining
the state will be another high priority, which all members of society should
understand
International laws and diplomacy will come into play as the enemy nation
seeks to justify its action among the global community of states
It is essential that the government remain intact.
Should the government cease to exist, the targeted nation’s international
legal personality will be challenged, making it incapable of effectively
representing itself (or its population) in international forums
The occupying power will also challenge the legitimacy of the targeted
nation’s armed forces
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• The occupier will likely declare itself the legitimate head of state and
designate all opposing forces (i.e., the army) to be terrorists or
insurgents.
The targeted nation may decide to relocate its capital and key political leaders .
The chosen location may be outside of the country, based on standing treaties
and agreements
The precise location of the head of state and government may be kept
secret, even as official national business is conducted remotely; e.g., via
internet, couriers, etc.
• Liaison functions
Emergency Response/Rescue Services
• Search and Rescue
• Special expertise (medical, scientific support, etc.)
• Manpower in support of disaster relief
Organisation
Some home guard units are aligned to Armed forces units within the Army,
Navy and Air Force
Some are aligned to civilian response elements
Some individuals assist in various places throughout the emergency
response and defence structures
Some serve only during emergency
Some clubs become part of the home guard during a crisis (parachuting,
mountain rescue, radio, rescue dogs, etc.)
Pay
None, home guard service is voluntary
May be reimbursed for some expenses
4.5 ADC Structure and Functions. The ADC commonly organised into four
elements.
Component Description
Underground Civilian led
Performs Leadership and Command and Control functions
Carries out clandestine political and military actions
Secrecy is paramount
o Operates through a cellular structure
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Component Description
• Cellular structure
o Core cell within it performs the functions of the government
o Core receives its guidance from the government in exile if one
was formed
Adapted Force 9 Conducts combat actions as directed by the Underground
Combination of the traditional armed forces and
predesignated elements of society
o Depending on defence structures, force will comprise the
nation’s standing armed forces, reserve, home guard units and
volunteers from throughout the private and civic sectors
o It is organised, trained and equipped as a standing component
of the defence and security apparatus during peacetime
o Only manned by a small core element
o Will normally use asymmetric (unconventional) tactics
Auxiliary Secretly provides logistical and operational support to the
Underground and Adapted Force
Cellular organisation that is dispersed throughout the
population
o Individual cell may consist of a group or a lone person
o A cell may be asked to carry out a single task (deliver a
message, switch on a light), a continuous mission (provide
medical treatment as required), or circumstances may be such
that they are not called upon at all during the entire course of the
conflict
o For added resilience, members will normally only be provided
the information they require to perform their assigned task(s)
Public Overt political expression of the nation’s will within occupied
Component/Overt territory(ies)
Political Arm
If there is no exiled, displaced or shadow government, the
Public Component may perform the national leadership
function
o Otherwise, it is an extension of the existing government
o May be opposition political party, larger organisation or a single
individual
o May negotiate directly with the installed government or
occupying power
o Ability to function will vary based on the occupying power’s
willingness to tolerate political opposition
4.6 Population. Most of the population will not belong to either of the active elements
described above. They are, nevertheless, capable of contributing to
9
This element is often referred to as the Guerrilla Force because of the tactics it employs and the in-
extremis nature in which it is formed. However, when created as a component of a Comprehensive
Defence, the force is organised, trained and equipped as a standing component of the defence and
security apparatus. Therefore, it is referred to here as the Adapted Force to recognise it as a
combination of the traditional armed forces and predesignated elements of society.
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Comprehensive Defence through low risk, passive activities that inhibit the
occupying force’s ability to consolidate power. For this to occur, the entire
population must be educated, informed, enabled and accounted for in the
planning process.
4.7 In the event of an armed incursion, members of society who are not formally
obligated to contribute to comprehensive defence must decide which of four
options they will select.
4.8 Most nations have provisions within their constitutions that clearly discourage
option ‘a’.
Therefore, the remainder of this chapter will outline choices ‘b’ through ‘d’
Chapter 5 that follows will offer an array of skills that residents can use to
prepare themselves to contribute should the need arise
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4.10 Assisting the territorial defence force. Those who cannot join the defence
forces, or for whom doing so is not feasible, are still able to contribute to
comprehensive defence efforts.
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4.11 Join Territorial Defence Forces. The mission of those who belong to the armed
element of the ADC is relatively clear.
However, those who either cannot or do not wish to participate in armed action
can serve in the TDF auxiliary component.
Section 4 - Law 10. There are some very practical legal considerations to keep in
mind if the nation is attacked.
4.12 Acting in accordance with national obligations to ratified international and regional
human rights treaties is essential to legitmacy and success.
Violations could jeapordize funding, training, equipment, direct participation
or planned conventional military support from allies and partners.
• Popular support from within the nation will be placed at risk.
• Resistance forces must adhere to the LOAC at all times,and especially avoid
targeting civilians and civilian objects. If adversary’s civilian assets are targeted,
they may resort to targeting civilian assets in retaliation.
4.13 If you join the response forces, legal considerations should be included in your
training.
• If you do not receive this training prior to an armed incursion, it is important that
you ensure you engage only in legal acts.
• Response forces will be considered combatants and can be targeted by the
occupying forces under LOAC. Additionally, civilian organizations that take part
10
Resistance Operating Concept
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in the conflict through non-combatant roles may also be targeted while they take
part; e.g., if you drive a truck with military supplies, you may be targeted during
the delivery, but not once you have completed the task. However, you can be
apprehended and detained for posing a security risk.
• You must understand what actions are acceptable and authorised by national and
international laws and norms.
• Should you violate the law while defending against an armed incursion, you could
be held accountable during the conflict or after hostilities end.
• Following occupation, military courts or commissions should be created to fairly
adjudicate occupying forces violations of the LOAC, and should be subject to the
review of international organizations include the U.N. or the ICRC.
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Chapter 5 - Skills
This chapter is directed mainly toward residents who are not part of the ADC or home
guard prior to hostilities but decide to directly or indirectly contribute in the event of an
incursion.
• Survive
• Report
• Evacuate
• Participate
Section 1 - Overview
5.1 The skills are presented within four sections, which generally correspond with
one’s reaction to an armed incursion.
Survive—skills that will help you avoid death or serious bodily injury and
continue to function in the event of an armed incursion, while helping others
do the same
Report—when, how, what and to whom information should be provided
Evacuate—how to move to safety, either as part of a government-directed
evacuation or on one’s own
Participate—skills that will enable you to directly support the home guard or
ADC in the event to of an armed incursion
5.2 Ideally, persons who commit to support or serve the ADC or home guard will be
trained and equipped to fulfil their assigned responsibilities prior to hostilities .
This chapter, therefore, focuses on skills that the average member of society can
use to survive an armed incursion, and should the opportunity present itself,
contribute to the nation’s defence.
5.3 The skills and practices presented here are not unique and most may be applied
in any emergency situation—natural, accidental or malicious. Moreover, this
chapter is not a substitute for training. All members of society should take the
initiative to develop and maintain these individual capabilities well prior to any
potential crisis.
Section 2 - Survive
5.4 Overview. This section details skills and advice on how to survive when facing
an armed incursion. The information is divided into five areas.
Preparing an individual resilience kit to ensure access to food, clothing and
basic necessities
Surviving under hostile conditions—defensive responses to threats that are
either lethal or can cause serious injury
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5.5 Individual Resilience Kit. In case of emergency, you will need food and water,
medicines and hygiene items, clothing and material to keep you warm and dry,
communications capabilities, and tools.
You will also need a backpack with your immediate needs.
All of this should be prepared now and regularly maintained.
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• Depends on • Blankets
nation’s • Sleeping mats
climate • Sleeping bags
• Candles
• Tea lights
• Matches or fire lighter
• Alternative heat source; e.g., gas heater
Communications • Battery, solar or winding-powered radio
• Car radio
• List of important phone numbers
• Extra batteries/power bank for mobile devices
• Mobile phone car charger
Tools • Manual can opener
• Fire extinguisher
• Flashlight
• Head lamp
• Portable cooking stove/camp stove
• Scissors
• Multi-tool
• Duct tape
• Plastic sheeting
• Matches
Other • Baby supplies
• Pet supplies
• Paper printouts
o Insurance policies
o Bank details
o Registration certificates
• Cash in small denominations
• Entertainment items
• Whistle
• Writing material
o Notebooks
o Pens & pencils
Grab & Go Bag • 3 Days’ supply for evacuation
(Figure 5-1)
Nearby • Drop to the ground and cover your head with your hands
detonation
• Use any shelter available
o Buildings, ditches, hollows, trees if outdoors
o Closets, cupboards, tables or walls if indoors
• Do not hasten to leave your shelter because some fragments travel
like a boomerang – circle in the air and hit near ground zero
• If you escaped injuries, assist the wounded to evacuate to a safer
location and provide first aid
• Do not choose damaged buildings for shelter, as these can collapse at
any moment, whether fully or partly
• Use emergency exits if a detonation takes place while you are indoors
• Never use elevators!
• Report incident to authorities as soon as it is safe to do so
Trapped under • You cannot afford to panic
rubble o Breathe deeply, assess your situation and be prepared to do everything it
takes to survive
• Slowly and carefully (so as not to loosen the debris atop you) try to
free your hands and legs
• Check your injuries
o If you are bleeding, squeeze the wound to stop the flow
• If it is cold, lie on your side, snuggle down, and put your arm
underneath your side to reduce contact with the ground
• If you can sit, draw your knees to your chest, bow down and cover
your head with your hand
• Find a way to communicate your presence/location
o Shout
o Make noise with anything available(e.g. hammer a piece of metal or rock
against a pipe), especially if you can tell there are rescuers nearby
• Try to find out if there are more people trapped nearby
• If you have your cell phone, call and report your emergency situation
• Be aware that hourly, rescuers normally shut down any equipment
they are operating to for at least 10-minutes listen for calls for help
• When trying to free yourself, be careful when moving ruined spars,
bricks or other rubble, as they may be supporting a large mass of
debris above you
Chemical or • Do not panic
radiological
• Warn neighbours and relatives
threat
• Leave the contaminated area as quickly as possible
• Move perpendicularly to the wind direction so that wind is blowing on
your side, and bypass low terrains
• Try to breath in chemical or radioactive particles or dust
o Cover your nose and mouth with a disposable mask, towel or folded
handkerchief
o Use a respirator or a gas mask in case you have one
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First Aid. The information that follows is for reference only. It is not meant to be a
substitute for formal first aid training.
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https://www.firstaidforfree.com/ https://deployedmedicine.com/
https://www.marines.mil/Portals/1/Publications/MCRP%203-40A.9%20formerly%20MCRP%203-
02G.pdf?ver=2018-03-13-082229-160
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5.7 Shelter
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• Do not switch on lights before making sure the wires are in order
and have not been damaged
• Check for the smell of gas or other chemical materials in and
around the house
• Prior to consuming any products you left behind, make sure they
are not chemically contaminated, musty or spoiled
• Prior to consuming tap or well water make sure it is clean/not
contaminated
• If you have found yourself near a site where emergency aid is
rendered but your help is not needed, do not disturb the rescuers
without serious cause
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• Use every means available to inform the aggressor state’s society about
the criminal offences and aggression its political figures, leaders, chiefs
or government are waging (choose email, social media or international
media outlets for this)
• Spread information about the actual situation via social media and
mobile communication networks as well as directly (in person)
• If you can do it safely, take video footage of the aggressive actions of
enemy forces and use mediums available (e.g. the Internet) to transfer it
to international media outlets (CNN, BBC, etc.)
• Stage cyber-attacks on information systems of the aggressor or invader
in case Internet connection is still available amidst the armed conflict
• Provide aid to those affected by violence and repressive measures of the
invaders
Taken hostage • Keep in mind, your sole goal is to survive
• Accept the situation and prepare for a wait
• Work to put yourself together and help prevent your fellow hostages
from panicking
• Accept the fact that being afraid is natural
o The initial 15-45 minutes are the peak of risk, so obey your kidnappers’
instructions immediately
• The more time you spend together, the smaller the risk is that the
abductors will harm you
• Do not talk unnecessarily
• Maintain a friendly bearing and do not cheat
• Do not beg, apologise or start crying
• Do not make any observations or suggestions to your kidnappers
• Do not argue with kidnappers or other hostages, adhere to the common
view
• Do not turn your back to the kidnappers unless they direct you to do so
o Eye contact with your abductors is a welcome thing, people tend to kill less
when being looked at, however, do not stare at them without cease;
o Eat if you are offered food, even if you are not hungry
Eating will help you maintain your strength, while refusing will bring in more
hostility
Try to rest,
o Sit if possible
• If the hostage situation persists, try getting some sleep
• Tell the abductors if any of your fellow hostages need medical
assistance
• Speak consistently and in a calm manner, and do not attempt doing
anything before you are allowed to do it
• If you have reason to believe a rescue operation is going to occur soon,
or you can hear noise and shooting, find a safe place, lie down, cover
your head with your hands and do not make any abrupt movements
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o Never start running towards the persons who are conducting the rescue -
they may mistake you for an abductor.
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Section 3 - Report
5.9 Overview. This section provides considerations regarding when, how, what and
to whom information should be reported during an emergency.
The first element of reporting is knowing emergency response numbers,
websites, etc.
If occupied, this may all change. So, it will be important to understand what
critical services and functions the nation will accept from the occupying
power and which will be provided by the underground and auxiliary
If you decide to provide information to the TDF, it will also be important to
know how to make contact without putting yourself or the force at risk. This
may be best accomplished by linking up with the armed forces.
Time seen
Equipment, such as rifles, trucks, etc.
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Section 4 - Evacuate
5.10 Overview. This chapter provides considerations for evacuating your home and
area, either under government direction and guidance or on your own. The
material is arranged as follows:
How to remain prepared
What to consider if evacuation is likely
What information to expect the government to provide if an evacuation
is initiated
Actions to take once the evacuation is initiated
Considerations if it is unsafe to remain in your home but you cannot
evacuate
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Section 5 - Participate
5.11 As noted in Chapter 4, nonviolent resistance is one of the most effective ways
the public can help defend the nation against an armed incursion.
The list below is widely referred to as Gene Sharp’s 198 nonviolent actions. 12
Not all will apply to any one situation, but it is useful to be familiar with all
possibilities.
12
Will add reference
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5.12 Caching items. Below are techniques for establishing a site for hiding items
(cache site). There may be any number of reasons to hide items for future
recovery and use.
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Reference General area located by place name; i.e., region, village, etc.
points for
Immediate Reference Point (IRP)
locating a site
o Durable landmark; i.e., only church or bridge in the vicinity
• Final Reference Point (FRP)
o Unmistakably identifiable
o Will remain fixed for at least as long as the cache is used
o Near enough to the cache to pinpoint the exact location with precise
linear measurements
o Accessible from IRP by simple route description
Pinpointing GPS
methods o Most accurate
o Commonly available during non-emergencies
o GPS satellite access may be blocked during armed incursion
o Place directly beside the FRP (figure XX)
Projection from FRP
o FRP requires one side long enough to permit precise projection
(figure XX)
o May project from two FRPs to an intersection point (figure XX)
o Projections tend to lose accuracy when sighting beyond 50 meters
• Compass heading and distance from FRP (figure XX)
Packaging Thoroughly inspect, clean and dry material before packaging
considerations
Coat with preservative; i.e., oil or paint
Enclose instructions for using material
Conduct submersion test to test seal
Select containers carefully
o Completely watertight and airtight after sealing
o Noiseless when being handled
o Resistant to shook and abrasion
o Lightweight construction
o Able to withstand rodents, insects and bacteria
o Can be closed and reopened easily and repeatedly
o Capable of withstanding highly acid or alkaline soil or water
Security • Always maintain maximum vigilance at the site to avoid detection
measures
• Use lookout if available
o If no lookout, pause, look and listen frequently
• Minimise the use of artificial light (flashlights, lanterns, etc.)
• Have a plan of action in case of interrupted or discovered during
emplacement, maintenance or removal
• Plan time to sterilise burial site after hole has been refilled
o Dispose of excess soil far from burial site (stream is ideal)
o Check to ensure no tools are left behind
o If work is done at night, may need to return to site during the day to
inspect if safe to do so
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13 https://home.chicagopolice.org/about/contact-us/how-to-describe-a-suspect/
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https://whitefleet.net/2015/12/01/military-vehicle-identification-guide-ground-vehicles/
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o Missiles: Some IFVs carry missiles since their main guns lack
the punch of a tank gun.
o Windows: No, except small periscope and sensor openings.
• The primary role of these vehicles is to move troops in and out
of areas where they may be subjected to enemy fire. APCs vary
widely in configuration from simple up-armored SUVs to tank
based vehicles that can withstand immense punishment.
Because their primary mission is to transport troops, APCs are
lightly armed, with at most a grenade launcher or machine gun
and sometimes no armament at all
Amoured
• General. The primary role of these vehicles is to move troops in
personnel
and out of areas where they may be subjected to enemy fire.
carriers
APCs vary widely in configuration from simple up-armored SUVs
to tank based vehicles that can withstand immense punishment.
Because their primary mission is to transport troops, APCs are
lightly armed, with at most a grenade launcher or machine gun
and sometimes no armament at all.
o Size: Varies, from SUV-sized to tank or IFV-sized
o Guns: A few machine guns, grenade launchers, or no
armament. Does not have a turret-mounted autocannon
o Missiles: Some APCs are modified to carry missiles, but this is
not common
o Propulsion: Tracked or wheeled
o Windows: Some have none, others have armored windows
similar to a truck or SUV. Depends on armor level and chassis
used
Notes: Many APCs are modified to perform specialized tasks,
such as serving as a combat ambulance, serving as a mortar
platform, etc. In this case the base vehicle is still an APC but the
role is no longer troop transport.
Reconnaissance • General. Reconnaissance vehicles are high mobility vehicles
vehicles designed to move around the battlefield rapidly, gathering
information and probing enemy defenses while engaging any ill-
protected contacts. The chassis layout, level of protection and
armament of these vehicles varies widely, as many different
chassis designs can be modified to fit the recon role. A common
reconnaissance vehicle layout is a small, lightly armored 4×4
with a relatively large autocannon or machine gun mounted in a
turret. Almost all modern light tanks are built as reconnaissance
vehicles. Unfortunately, it is very difficult to tell based on
appearance when a vehicle (for example an IFV) has been
modified from its original design to a reconnaissance layout;
many IFVs and APCs are changed to reconnaissance vehicles
by adding improved optics and communications equipment.
o Size: Large SUV to small tank
o Guns: Often one low-velocity cannon, autocannon, or machine
gun in a small turret
o Missiles: Some are armed with missiles
o Propulsion: Wheeled or tracked
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Turret
• Rotating armoured
structure on the top
of the vehicle
Armament
• Varies from
machineguns to
large cannons
• In turreted vehicles
the heavy armament
is found in the turret
Tracks
• Notice that
tanks have
wheels inside
of the tracks
• These are
often covered
by panels
called skirts,
or obscured
by grass
• However, if
you can see
the wheels,
count them
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5.15 Describing Terrain. The TDF will use information about the terrain to support
all planning and decisions. This section will provide the tools necessary to
provide information regarding streams and rivers, ground slope, and the
movement of personnel. It is not necessary for you to know exactly how the
information will be used. In fact, for security purposes, it is best to know as little
as possible. However, you should trust that sometimes seemingly useless
pieces of information may help the TDF will determine where the enemy has
been, where they may go next and where they cannot go.
100m
Vertical
Distance
(V)
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Calculating • Modern smart devices are often equipped to measure elevation, distance,
vertical etc.
and
• If such a device is not available distance and eleveation may be measured
horizontal
distances via the pace method (see figure below).
o This method is most accurate for slopes of less than 30 percent grade, and
requires practice to master.
o Stand at the bottom of the slope with your head and eyes level.
o Sight a spot on the slope.
This spot should be easily identifiable.
If it is not, another person should go forward to mark the location.
o Walk forward and stand on the marked spot.
Record the number of paces.
Repeat this procedureuntil the top of the slope (estimate fractions of an eye
level) is reached.
o Compute the vertical distance by multiplying the number of sightings by
the eye-level height(1.75 meters).
Compute the horizontal distance by totaling the number of paces and
convertingthem to meters by multiplying by 0.75 (or the known pace-to-meter
conversion factor).
o Calculate the percent of slope by substituting the values into the percent-
of-slope format.
What to look • If footprints are deep and the pace is long, the party was moving
for rapidly (A).
o Long strides and deep prints with toe prints deeper than heel prints
indicate running.
• Prints that are deep, short, and widely spaced, with signs of scuffing
or shuffling indicate the person is carrying a heavy load (B).
o If the party members realize they are being followed, they may try to hide
their tracks.
• Persons walking backward have a short, irregular stride (C).
o The prints have an unnaturally deep toe, and soil is displaced in the
direction of movement.
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• Women tend to with feet pointed slightly inward, while men walk with
their feet straight ahead or pointed slightly to the outside (D).
o Prints left by women are usually smaller and the stride is usually shorter
than prints left by men.
5.16 Summary. The skills in this chapter are focused on responding to an armed
incursion. However, many of the same steps will help you survive and assist
others in the event of any emergency. They are measures you can take to
increase and maintain your individual resilience and contribute to national
comprehensive defence.
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