The Struggle to Govern the Commons

Thomas Dietz, et al.

Science 302, 1907 (2003);
DOI: 10.1126/science.1091015

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 TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS?

SPECIAL SECTION
REVIEW

The Struggle to Govern the Commons

Thomas Dietz,1 Elinor Ostrom,2 Paul C. Stern3*

Human institutions—ways of organizing activities—affect the resilience of the environ- international agreements on ozone depletion,
ment. Locally evolved institutional arrangements governed by stable communities and was signed in 1987. Before then, ODS concen-
buffered from outside forces have sustained resources successfully for centuries, al- trations were increasing faster than those of CO2;
though they often fail when rapid change occurs. Ideal conditions for governance are the increases slowed by the early 1990s and the
increasingly rare. Critical problems, such as transboundary pollution, tropical deforesta- concentration appears to have stabilized in recent
tion, and climate change, are at larger scales and involve nonlocal influences. Promising years. The international treaty regime to reduce
strategies for addressing these problems include dialogue among interested parties, the anthropogenic impact on stratospheric ozone
officials, and scientists; complex, redundant, and layered institutions; a mix of institu- is widely considered an example of a successful
tional types; and designs that facilitate experimentation, learning, and change. effort to protect the global commons. In contrast,
international efforts to reduce greenhouse gas
In 1968, Hardin (1) drew attention to two more than 90% of large predatory fishes” concentrations have not yet had an impact.
human factors that drive environmental with an 80% decline typically occurring Knowledge from an emerging science of

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change. The first factor is the increasing de- “within 15 years of industrialized exploita- human-environment interactions, sometimes
mand for natural resources and environmen- tion” (14). The threat of massive ecosystem called human ecology or the “second envi-
tal services, stemming from growth in human degradation results from an interplay among ronmental science” (25, 26), is clarifying the
population and per capita resource consump- ocean ecologies, fishing technologies, and characteristics of institutions that facilitate or
tion. The second factor is the way in which inadequate governance. undermine sustainable use of environmental
humans organize themselves to extract re- Inshore fisheries are similarly degraded resources under particular conditions (6, 27).
sources from the environment and eject efflu- where they are open access or governed by The knowledge base is strongest with small-
ents into it—what social scientists refer to as top-down national regimes, leaving local and scale ecologies and institutions, where long
institutional arrangements. Hardin’s work has regional officials and users with insufficient time series exist on many successes and fail-
been highly influential (2) but has long been autonomy and understanding to design effec- ures. It is now developing for larger-scale
aptly criticized as oversimplified (3–6). tive institutions (15, 16). For example, the systems. In this review, we address what
Hardin’s oversimplification was twofold: degraded inshore ground fishery in Maine is science has learned about governing the com-
He claimed that only two state-established in- governed by top-down rules based on models mons and why it is always a struggle (28).
stitutional arrangements— centralized govern- that were not credible among users. As a
ment and private property— could sustain com- result, compliance has been relatively low Why a Struggle?
mons over the long run, and he presumed that and there has been strong resistance to Devising ways to sustain the earth’s ability to
resource users were trapped in a commons di- strengthening existing restrictions. This is in support diverse life, including a reasonable
lemma, unable to create solutions (7–9). He marked contrast to the Maine lobster fishery, quality of life for humans, involves making
missed the point that many social groups, in- which has been governed by formal and in- tough decisions under uncertainty, complex-
cluding the herders on the commons that pro- formal user institutions that have strongly ity, and substantial biophysical constraints as
vided the metaphor for his analysis, have strug- influenced state-level rules that restrict fish- well as conflicting human values and inter-
gled successfully against threats of resource ing. The result has been credible rules with ests. Devising effective governance systems
degradation by developing and maintaining very high levels of compliance (17–19). A is akin to a coevolutionary race. A set of rules
self-governing institutions (3, 10–13). Although comparison of the landings of ground fish crafted to fit one set of socioecological con-
these institutions have not always succeeded, and lobster since 1980 is shown in Fig. 1. The ditions can erode as social, economic, and
neither have Hardin’s preferred alternatives of rules and high levels of compli-
private or state ownership. ance related to lobster appear to
In the absence of effective governance have prevented the destruction
institutions at the appropriate scale, natural of this fishery but probably are
resources and the environment are in peril not responsible for the sharp
from increasing human population, consump- rise in abundance and landings
tion, and deployment of advanced technolo- after 1986.
gies for resource use, all of which have Resources at larger scales
reached unprecedented levels. For example, it have also been successfully pro-
is estimated that “the global ocean has lost tected through appropriate inter-
national governance regimes such
1
as the Montreal Protocol on
Environmental Science and Policy Program and De-
partments of Sociology and Crop and Soil Sciences, stratospheric ozone and the Inter-
Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI 48824, national Commission for the Pro-
USA. 2Center for the Study of Institutions, Population, tection of the Rhine Agreements
and Environmental Change and Workshop in Political (20–24). Figure 2 compares the
Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University,
Bloomington, IN 47408, USA. 3Division of Social and
trajectory of atmospheric concen-
Fig. 1. Comparison of landings of ground fish (gadoids, solid blue
Behavioral Sciences and Education, The National trations of ozone-depleting sub- line) and lobster (dashed red line) in Maine from 1980 to 2002.
Academies, Washington, DC 20001, USA. stances (ODS) with that of carbon Measured in millions of kilograms of ground fish and lobsters
*To whom correspondence should be addressed. E- dioxide since 1982. The Montreal landed per year. International fishing in these waters ended with
mail: pstern@nas.edu Protocol, the centerpiece of the the extended jurisdiction that occurred in 1977 (155).

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 TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS?
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technological developments increase the po- The most important contemporary envi- congruent in scale with environmental events
tential for human damage to ecosystems and ronmental challenges involve systems that and decisions (48, 67). Highly aggregated in-
even to the biosphere itself. Furthermore, hu- are intrinsically global (e.g., climate formation may ignore or average out local in-
mans devise ways of evading governance change) or are tightly linked to global pres- formation that is important in identifying future
rules. Thus, successful commons governance sures (e.g., timber production for the world problems and developing solutions.
requires that rules evolve. market) and that require governance at lev- For example, in 2002, a moratorium on all
Effective commons governance is easier to els from the global all the way down to the fishing for northern cod was declared by the
achieve when (i) the resources and use of the local (48, 58, 59). These situations often Canadian government after a collapse of this
resources by humans can be monitored, and the feature environmental outcomes spatially valuable fishery. An earlier near-collapse had
information can be verified and understood at displaced from their causes and hard-to- led Canada to declare a 200-mile zone of ex-
relatively low cost (e.g., trees are easier to monitor, larger scale economic incentives clusive fisheries jurisdiction in 1977 (68, 69).
monitor than fish, and lakes are easier to mon- that may not be closely aligned with the Considerable optimism existed during the
itor than rivers) (29); (ii) rates of change in condition of local ecosystems. Also, differ- 1980s that the stocks, as estimated by fishery
resources, resource-user populations, technolo- entials in power within user groups or scientists, were rebuilding. Consequently, gen-
gy, and economic and social conditions are across scales allow some to ignore rules of erous total catch limits were established for
moderate (30–32); (iii) communities maintain commons use or to reshape the rules in their northern cod and other ground fish, the number
frequent face-to-face communication and dense own interest, such as when global markets of licensed fishers was allowed to increase con-
social networks—sometimes called social cap- reshape demand for local resources (e.g., siderably, and substantial government subsidies
ital—that increase the potential for trust, allow forests) in ways that swamp the ability of were allocated for new vessels (70). What went

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people to express and see emotional reactions to locally evolved institutions to regulate their wrong? There were a variety of information-
distrust, and lower the cost of monitoring be- use (60–62). related problems including: (i) treating all
havior and inducing rule compliance northern cod as a single stock instead of
(33–36); (iv) outsiders can be excluded recognizing distinct populations with
at relatively low cost from using the different characteristics, (ii) ignoring the
resource (new entrants add to the har- variability of year classes of northern
vesting pressure and typically lack un- cod, (iii) focusing on offshore-fishery
derstanding of the rules); and (v) users landing data rather than inshore data to
support effective monitoring and rule “tune” the stock assessment, and (iv)
enforcement (37–39). Few settings in the ignoring inshore fishers who were catch-
world are characterized by all of these ing ever-smaller fish and doubted the
conditions. The challenge is to devise validity of stock assessments (70–72).
institutional arrangements that help to This experience illustrates the need to
establish such conditions or, as we dis- collect and model both local and aggre-
cuss below, meet the main challenges of gated information about resource condi-
governance in the absence of ideal con- tions and to use it in making policy at the
ditions (6, 40, 41). appropriate scales.
Fig. 2. Atmospheric concentration of CO2 (solid blue line, right Information also must be congruent
Selective Pressures scale) and three principal ODS (dashed red line, left scale). The with decision makers’ needs in terms
The characteristics of resources and so- ODS are chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) 11, 12, and 113 and were of timing, content, and form of presen-
cial interaction in many subsistence so- weighted based on their ozone-depleting potential (156). Data tation (73–75). Informational systems
cieties present favorable conditions for are from (157). ppt, parts per trillion; ppm, parts per million. that simultaneously meet high scientif-
the evolution of effective self-governing ic standards and serve ongoing needs
resource institutions (13). Hundreds of docu- The store of governance tools and ways to of decision makers and users are particularly
mented examples exist of long-term sustainable modify and combine them is far greater than useful. Information must not overload the
resource use in such communities as well as in often is recognized (6, 63–65). Global and capacity of users to assimilate it. Systems that
more economically advanced communities national environmental policy frequently ig- adequately characterize environmental condi-
with effective, local, self-governing rights, but nores community-based governance and tra- tions or human activities with summary indi-
there are also many failures (6, 11, 42–44). As ditional tools, such as informal communica- cators such as prices for products or emission
human communities have expanded, the selec- tion and sanctioning, but these tools can have permits, or certification of good environmen-
tive pressures on environmental governance in- significant impact (63, 66). Further, no single tal performance can provide valuable signals
stitutions increasingly have come from broad broad type of ownership— government, pri- as long as they are attentive to local as well as
influences. Commerce has become regional, vate, or community— uniformly succeeds or aggregate conditions (76–78).
national, and global, and institutions at all of fails to halt major resource deterioration, as Effective governance requires not only fac-
these levels have been created to enable and shown for forests in multiple countries (sup- tual information about the state of the environ-
regulate trade, transportation, competition, and porting online material text, figs. S1 to S5, ment and human actions but also information
conflict (45, 46). These institutions shape envi- and table S1). about uncertainty and values. Scientific under-
ronmental impact, even if they are not designed standing of coupled human-biophysical sys-
with that intent. They also provide mechanisms Requirements of Adaptive Governance tems will always be uncertain because of inher-
for environmental governance (e.g., national in Complex Systems ent unpredictability in the systems and because
laws) and part of the social context for local Providing information. Environmental gover- the science is never complete (79). Decision
efforts at environmental governance. Larger nance depends on good, trustworthy informa- makers need information that characterizes the
scale governance may authorize local control, tion about stocks, flows, and processes within types and magnitudes of this uncertainty, as
help it, hinder it, or override it (47–52). Now, the resource systems being governed, as well as well as the nature and extent of scientific igno-
every local place is strongly influenced by glob- about the human-environment interactions af- rance and disagreement (80). Also, because ev-
al dynamics (48, 53–57). fecting those systems. This information must be ery environmental decision requires tradeoffs,

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knowledge is needed about individual and so- sanctions. Whether enforcement mechanisms sions (76, 101). TEAs and community-based
cial values and about the effects of decisions on are formal or informal, those who impose systems appear to have opposite strengths
various valued outcomes. For many environ- them must be seen as effective and legitimate and weaknesses (101), suggesting that insti-
mental systems, local and easily captured val- by resource users or resistance and eva- tutions that combine aspects of both systems
ues (e.g., the market value of lumber) have to sion will overwhelm the commons gover- may work better than either approach alone.
be balanced against global, diffuse, and hard- nance strategy. For example, the fisheries tradable permit
to-capture values (e.g., biodiversity and the ca- Much environmental regulation in com- system in New Zealand has added comanage-
pability of humans and ecosystems to adapt to plex societies has been “command and con- ment institutions to complement the market
unexpected events). Finding ways to measure trol.” Governments require or prohibit specif- institutions (102, 112).
and monitor the outcomes for such varied val- ic actions or technologies, with fines or jail Voluntary approaches and those based on
ues in the face of globalization is a major terms possible for punishing rule breakers. If information disclosure have only begun to
informational challenge for governance. sufficient resources are made available for receive careful scientific attention as supple-
Dealing with conflict. Sharp differences in monitoring and enforcement, such approach- ments to other tools (63, 77, 113–115). Suc-
power and in values across interested parties es are effective. But when governments lack cess appears to depend on the existence of
make conflict inherent in environmental the will or resources to protect “protected incentives that benefit leaders in volunteering
choices. Indeed, conflict resolution may be as areas” (95–97), when major environmental over laggards and on the simultaneous use of
important a motivation for designing resource damage comes from hard-to-detect “nonpoint other strategies, particularly ones that create
institutions as is concern with the resources sources,” and when the need is to encourage incentives for compliance (77, 116–118).
themselves (81). People bring varying per- innovation in behaviors or technologies rath- Difficulties of sanctioning pose major prob-

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spectives, interests, and fundamental philos- er than to require or prohibit familiar ones, lems for international agreements (119–121).
ophies to problems of environmental gover- command and control approaches are less Providing infrastructure. The importance
nance (74, 82–84), and their conflicts, if they effective. They are also economically ineffi- of physical and technological infrastructure is
do not escalate to the point of dysfunction, cient in many circumstances (98–100). often ignored. Infrastructure, including tech-
can spark learning and change (85, 86). Financial instruments can provide incen- nology, determines the degree to which a
For example, a broadly participatory pro- tives to achieve compliance with environ- commons can be exploited (e.g., water works
cess was used to examine alternative strategies mental rules. In recent years, market-based and fishing technology), the extent to which
for regulating the Mississippi River and its trib- systems of tradable environmental allowanc- waste can be reduced in resource use, and the
utaries (87). A dynamic model was constructed es (TEAs) that define a limit to environmen- degree to which resource conditions and the
with continuous input by the Corps of Engi- tal withdrawals or emissions and permit free behavior of humans users can be effectively
neers, the Fish and Wildlife Service, local land- trade of allocated allowances under those monitored. Indeed, the ability to choose in-
owners, environmental groups, and academics limits have become popular (76, 101, 102). stitutional arrangements depends in part on
from multiple disciplines. After extensive mod- TEAs are one of the bases for the Kyoto infrastructure. In the absence of barbed-wire
el development and testing against past histor- agreement on climate change. fences, for example, enforcing private prop-
ical data, most stakeholders had high confi- Economic theory and experience in some erty rights on grazing lands is expensive, but
dence in the explanatory power of the model. settings suggest that these mechanisms have with barbed wire fences, it is relatively cheap
Consensus was reached over alternative man- substantial advantages over command and (122). Effective communication and trans-
agement options, and the resulting policies gen- control (103–106). TEAs have exhibited portation technologies are also of immense
erated far less conflict than had existed at the good environmental performance and eco- importance. Fishers who observe an unautho-
outset (88). nomic efficiency in the U.S. Sulfur Dioxide rized boat or harvesting technology can use a
Delegating authority to environmental Allowance Market intended to reduce the radio or cellular phone to alert others to
ministries does not always resolve conflicts prevalence of acid rain (107, 108) and the illegal actions (123). Infrastructure also af-
satisfactorily, so governments are experi- Lead Phasedown Program aimed at reducing fects the links between local commons and
menting with various governance approaches the level of lead emissions (109). Crucial vari- regional and global systems. Good roads can
to complement managerial ones. They range ables that differentiate these highly successful provide food in bad times but can also open
from ballots and polls, where engagement is programs from less successful ones, such as local resources to global markets, creating
passive and participants interact minimally, chlorofluorocarbon production quota trading demand for resources that cannot be used
to adversarial processes that allow parties to and the early EPA emission trading programs, locally (124). Institutional infrastructure is
redress grievances through formal legal proce- include: (i) the level of predictability of the also important, including research, social
dures, to various experiments with intense in- stocks and flows, (ii) the number of users or capital, and multilevel rules, to coordinate
teraction and deliberation aimed at negotiating producers who are regulated, (iii) the heteroge- between local and larger levels of governance
decisions or allowing parties in potential con- neity of the regulated users, and (iv) clearly (48, 125, 126).
flict to provide structured input to them through defined and fully exchangeable permits (110). Be prepared for change. Institutions must
participatory processes (89–93). TEAs, like all institutional arrangements, be designed to allow for adaptation because
Inducing rule compliance. Effective gov- have notable limitations. TEA regimes tend some current understanding is likely to be
ernance requires that the rules of resource use to leave unprotected those resources not spe- wrong, the required scale of organization can
are generally followed, with reasonable stan- cifically covered by trading rules (e.g., by- shift, and biophysical and social systems
dards for tolerating modest violations. It is catch of noncovered fish species) (111) and change. Fixed rules are likely to fail because
generally most effective to impose modest to suffer when monitoring is difficult (e.g., they place too much confidence in the current
sanctions on first offenders, and gradually under the Kyoto protocol, the question of state of knowledge, whereas systems that
increase the severity of sanctions for those whether geologically sequestered carbon will guard against the low probability, high con-
who do not learn from their first or second remain sequestered). Problems can also occur sequence possibilities and allow for change
encounter (39, 94). Community-based insti- with the initial allocation of allowances, es- may be suboptimal in the short run but
tutions often use informal strategies for pecially when historic users, who may be prove wiser in the long run. This is a
achieving compliance that rely on partici- called on to change their behavior most, have principal lesson of adaptive management
pants’ commitment to rules and subtle social disproportionate power over allocation deci- research (31, 127).

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 TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS?
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Strategies for Meeting survey of biologists (146). A

the Requirements of search performed by L. Wisen
Adaptive Governance on 22 and 23 October 2003
on the Workshop Library
The general principles for Common-Pool Resources da-
robust governance institu- tabase (147) revealed that,
before Hardin’s paper, only 19
tions for localized resources articles had been written in
(Fig. 3) are well established English-language academic
as a result of multiple em- literature with a specific ref-
erence to “commons,” “com-
pirical studies (13, 39, 128– mon-pool resources,” or
137). Many of these also ap- “common property” in the ti-
pear to be applicable to re- tle. Since then, attention to
the commons has grown rap-
gional and global resources idly. Since 1968, a total of
(138), although they are less over 2300 articles in that da-
well tested at those scales. tabase contain a specific ref-
erence to one of these three
Three of them seem to be par- terms in the title.
ticularly relevant for prob- 3. B. J. McCay, J. M. Acheson, The
lems at larger scales. Question of the Commons:
The Culture and Ecology of
Analytic deliberation. Communal Resources (Univ.
Well-structured dialogue of Arizona Press, Tucson,

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involving scientists, re- 1987).
source users, and interest- 4. P. Dasgupta, Proc. Br. Acad.
90, 165 (1996).
ed publics, and informed 5. D. Feeny, F. Berkes, B. McCay,
by analysis of key infor- J. Acheson, Hum. Ecol. 18, 1
mation about environ- Fig. 3. General principles for robust governance of environmental resources (green, left and (1990).
mental and human-envi- right columns) and the governance requirements they help meet (yellow, center column)
6. Committee on the Human Di-
(13, 158). Each principle is relevant for meeting several requirements. Arrows indicate some mensions of Global Change,
ronment systems, appears of the most likely connections between principles and requirements. Principles in the right National Research Council,
critical. Such analytic de- column may be particularly relevant for global and regional problems. The Drama of the Commons,
E. Ostrom et al., Eds. (Nation-
liberation (74, 139, 140) al Academy Press, Washing-
provides improved infor- ton, DC, 2002).
mation and the trust in it that is essential for 63, 117). Innovative rule evaders can have 7. J. Platt, Am. Psychol. 28, 642 (1973).
information to be used effectively, builds more trouble with a multiplicity of rules than 8. J. G. Cross, M. J. Guyer, Social Traps (Univ. of Michi-
gan Press, Ann Arbor, 1980).
social capital, and can allow for change and with a single type of rule. 9. R. Costanza, Bioscience 37, 407 (1987).
deal with inevitable conflicts well enough 10. R. McC. Netting, Balancing on an Alp: Ecological
to produce consensus on governance rules. Conclusion Change and Continuity in a Swiss Mountain Com-
The negotiated 1994 U.S. regulation on Is it possible to govern such critical commons munity (Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, 1981).
11. National Research Council, Proceedings of the Con-
disinfectant by-products in water that as the oceans and the climate? We remain ference on Common Property Resource Manage-
reached an interim consensus, including a guardedly optimistic. Thirty-five years ago it ment (National Academy Press, Washington, DC,
decision to collect new information and seemed that the “tragedy of the commons” 1986).
was inevitable everywhere not owned pri- 12. J.-M. Baland, J.-P. Platteau, Halting Degradation of
reconsider the rule on that basis (74 ), is an Natural Resources: Is There a Role for Rural Commu-
excellent example of this approach. vately or by a government. Systematic mul- nities? (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1996).
Nesting. Institutional arrangements must be tidisciplinary research has, however, shown 13. E. Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of
complex, redundant, and nested in many layers that a wide diversity of adaptive governance Institutions for Collective Action (Cambridge Univ.
Press, New York, 1990).
(32, 141, 142). Simple strategies for governing systems have been effective stewards of 14. R. A. Myers, B. Worm, Nature 423, 280 (2003).
the world’s resources that rely exclusively on many resources. Sustained research coupled 15. A. C. Finlayson, Fishing for Truth: A Sociological Anal-
imposed markets or one-level, centralized com- to an explicit view of national and interna- ysis of Northern Cod Stock Assessments from 1987 to
mand and control and that eliminate apparent tional policies as experiments can yield the 1990 (Institute of Social and Economic Research,
Memorial Univ. of Newfoundland, St. Johns, New-
redundancies in the name of efficiency have scientific knowledge necessary to design ap- foundland, 1994).
been tried and have failed. Catastrophic failures propriate adaptive institutions. 16. S. Hanna, in Northern Waters: Management Issues
often have resulted when central governments Sound science is necessary for commons and Practice, D. Symes, Ed. (Blackwell, London, 1998),
pp. 25–35.
have exerted sole authority over resources. Ex- governance, but not sufficient. Too many
17. J. Acheson, Capturing the Commons: Devising Institu-
amples include the massive environmental deg- strategies for governance of local commons tions to Manage the Maine Lobster Industry (Univ.
radation and impoverishment of local people in are designed in capital cities or by donor Press of New England, Hanover, NH, 2003).
Indonesian Borneo (95), the increased rate of agencies in ignorance of the state of the 18. J. A. Wilson, P. Kleban, J. Acheson, M. Metcalfe, Mar.
Policy 18, 291 (1994).
loss and fragmentation of high-quality habitat science and local conditions. The results are 19. J. Wilson, personal communication.
that occurred after creating the Wolong Nature often tragic, but at least these tragedies are 20. S. Weiner, J. Maxwell, in Dimensions of Managing
Reserve in China (143), and the closing of the local. As the human footprint on the Earth Chlorine in the Environment, report of the MIT/Nor-
northern cod fishery along the eastern coast of enlarges (144), humanity is challenged to wegian Chlorine Policy Study (MIT, Cambridge, MA,
1993).
Canada partly attributable to the excessive quo- develop and deploy understanding of large- 21. U. Weber, UNESCO Courier, June 2000, p. 9.
tas granted by the Canadian government (70). scale commons governance quickly enough 22. M. Verweij, Transboundary Environmental Problems
Institutional variety. Governance should to avoid the large-scale tragedies that will and Cultural Theory: The Protection of the Rhine and
employ mixtures of institutional types (e.g., otherwise ensue. the Great Lakes (Palgrave, New York, 2000).
23. C. Dieperink, Water Int. 25, 347 (2000).
hierarchies, markets, and community self-
References and Notes 24. E. Parson, Protecting the Ozone Layer: Science and
governance) that employ a variety of decision Strategy (Oxford Univ. Press, New York, 2003).
1. G. Hardin, Science 162, 1243 (1968).
rules to change incentives, increase informa- 2. See (6, 145). It was the paper most frequently cited 25. E. Ostrom, C. D. Becker, Annu. Rev. Ecol. Syst. 26, 113
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VIEWPOINT

Social Capital and the Collective Management

of Resources
Jules Pretty

The proposition that natural resources need protection from the destructive actions resources are commonly owned is fur-
of people is widely accepted. Yet communities have shown in the past and increas- ther increased by suspicions that people
ingly today that they can collaborate for long-term resource management. The term tend to free-ride, both by overusing and
social capital captures the idea that social bonds and norms are critical for sustain- underinvesting in the maintenance of
ability. Where social capital is high in formalized groups, people have the confidence resources. As our global numbers have
to invest in collective activities, knowing that others will do so too. Some 0.4 to 0.5 increased, and as incontrovertible evi-
million groups have been established since the early 1990s for watershed, forest, dence of harm to water, land, and atmo-
irrigation, pest, wildlife, fishery, and microfinance management. These offer a route spheric resources has emerged, so the
to sustainable management and governance of common resources. choices seem to be starker. Either we
regulate to prevent further harm, in
From Malthus to Hardin and beyond, need to be protected from the destruc- Hardin’s words (1), to engage in mutual
analysts and policy-makers have widely tive, yet apparently rational, actions of coercion mutually agreed upon, or we
come to accept that natural resources people. The compelling logic is that press ahead with enclosure and privat-
people inevitably harm natural resources ization to increase the likelihood that re-
Department of Biological Sciences, University of Es-
as they use them, and more people sources will be more carefully managed.
sex, Colchester CO4 3SQ, UK. E-mail: jpretty@essex. therefore do more harm. The likelihood of These concepts have influenced many
ac.uk this damage being greater where natural policy-makers and practitioners. They have

1912 12 DECEMBER 2003 VOL 302 SCIENCE www.sciencemag.org