G.R. No.

L-19450 May 27, 1965

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
SIMPLICIO VILLANUEVA, defendant-appellant.

FACTS:
The Chief of Police of Alaminos, Laguna, charged Simplicio Villanueva with the
Crime of Malicious Mischief before the Justice of the Peace Court of said municipality.
Said accused was represented by counsel de officio but later on replaced by counsel de
parte. The complainant in the same case was represented by City Attorney Ariston Fule,
having entered his appearance as private prosecutor, after securing the permission of
the Secretary of Justice. One of the conditions was that he would be considered on
official LOA and would not receive any payment for his services every time he appears
at the trial of the case.
The appearance of City Attorney Fule as private prosecutor was questioned by
the counsel for the accused. Invoking the rule that when an attorney had been
appointed to the position of Assistant Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal, he ceased to
engage in private law practice.
In responses to the allegation, Justice of the Peace Court issued an order
sustaining the legality of the appearance of Atty. Fule.
The counsel for the accused then presented a motion invoking Sec. 32 of Rule
127, now Sec. 35, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of the Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Whether or not Atty. Fule violated sec. 32 of Rule 127, now Sec.
35, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court?
HELD:
The JP Court ruled on the motion by upholding the right of Atty. Fule to appear in
the case as a private prosecutor and that he was not engaged in private practice law.
Sec. 31 of Rule 127 of the Rules of Court provides that in the justice of the peace court
a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed
by him or with the aid of an attorney. Assistant City Attorney Fule appeared in the
Justice of the Peace Court as an agent or friend of the offended party who is also a
relative. It does not appear that he was being paid for his services or that his
appearance was in a professional capacity. Hence, the court dismissed the appeal
without costs.
 Cayetano V. Monsod
GR No. 100113

FACTS:
Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position
of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission
on Appointments. Commission on Appointments confirmed Monsod’s nomination.
Cayetano, as a citizen and a taxpayer, opposed and challenged the nomination and the
subsequent confirmation of the Commission because allegedly Monsod does not
possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten years. Petitioner filed a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition praying that said
confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections be declared null and void.
“Section 1. (1) There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and
six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time
of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and
must not have been candidates for any elective positions in the immediately preceding
elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the
Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not Monsod possesses the required qualification for the position of
Chairman of COMELEC under Sec. 1 (C) OF Article IX of the 1987 Constitution?
HELD: Yes
The court held that Monsod possesses the required qualification for the position.
Practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings,
the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges
and courts, and in addition, conveying. In the instant case, Atty. Monsod is a member of
the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with the grade of
86.55%. After passing the Bar, he worked in his father’s law office and with various
company either as legal and economic consultant or as chief executive officer. Atty.
Monsod’ s past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-
entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer legislator of both
the rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he
has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
 ULEP V. LEGAL CLINIC GR NO. 553

FACTS:
This is a petition praying for an order to the respondent to cease and desist from
issuing certain advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other
than those allowed by law.
Petitioner claims that the advertisements reproduced by respondents are
champertous, unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the
confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a
member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and offended by the said
advertisements.
Respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisements at its instance,
but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal
support services" through paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic
machines.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the services offered by respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as
advertised by it constitutes practice of law and, in either case, whether the same can
properly be the subject of the advertisements.
HELD: Yes
The court rule that acts of the respondent constitutes practice of law. Practice of
law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedures, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to
perform those acts which are characteristic of the profession. The practice of law is not
limited to the conduct of cases in court. Generally, it includes legal advice and counsel,
and the preparation of legal instruments and contract by which legal rights are secured,
although such matter may or may not be pending in a court.
When a person participates in a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in
the practice of law. Applying the criteria, respondent Legal Clinic Inc. is, as advertised,
engaged in the “practice of law”. The standards of the legal profession condemn the
lawyer's advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his
profession advertise his talents or skill as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising
his goods.
.
 DOMINADOR P. BURBE, Complainant, v.
Atty. ALBERTO C. MAGULTA, Respondent.

FACTS:
Dominador P. Burbe, filed a Complaint for the disbarment or suspension or any
other disciplinary action against Atty.Alberto C. Magulta with the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
Complainant alleged that Atty. Magulta received an amount of P25,000 as filing
fee for the Regwill complaint to whom respondent has failed to file in the court.
Respondent then admitted that he had not at all filed the complaint because he had
spent the money for the filing fee for his own purposes.
Respondent, in his answer, claimed that there is no lawyer-client relationship
existed between him and the complainant. He then argued that he had never
inconvenience, mistreated or deceived the complainant and that it was the latter who
abuse his service by not paying any service fee.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent, Atty. Magulta, is guilty of violating the Code Code of
Professional Responsibility.
HELD: Yes
The court ruled that failure of respondent to fulfill this obligation due to his misuse
of the filing fees deposited by complainant, and his attempts to cover up this misuse of
funds of the client, which caused complainant additional damage and prejudice,
constitutes highly dishonest conduct on his part as a member of the bar. The
respondents claim that there is no lawyer-client relationship existed between him and
complainant, because the latter never paid him for services rendered was denounced
by the court. According to the rules of the court, a lawyer-client relationship was
established from the very first moment when a complainant asked the respondent for
legal advice. Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that
lawyers should not neglect legal matters entrusted to them. This Court has likewise
constantly held that once lawyers agree to take up the cause of a client, they owe
fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in
them.
 MARCOS V. PRIETO, Complainant, v. ATTY. OSCAR B. CORPUZ and JUDGE
FERDINAND A. FE, Respondents

FACTS:
An administrative complaint was filed by Atty. Marcos V. Prieto, against
respondent Judge Ferdinand A. Fe, both as a member of the bar and bench, and
respondent Atty. Oscar B. Corpuz as a member of the bar, for dishonesty, serious
misconduct prejudicial to the integrity and dignity of the Judiciary.
Complainant implies that not only did the respondent lawyer had free access to
the records of Civil Case No. 1081-BG through the help of respondent Judge who was
the former counsel of the plaintiff who was also the complainant in the in the said Civil
Case, he was also given the liberty to copy what perhaps would help him in his quest to
win the case. Complainant maintains that the act of respondent Judge in allowing the
respondent lawyer to copy the complaint in Civil Case No. 1081-BG and to present it to
court as the latter's work does violence to Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides that a judge should be the embodiment of
competence, integrity and independence.
The Second Division of the Court referred the instant administrative case to
Court of Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation. Pursuant thereto,
Justice Salonga set the case for hearing and directed the complainant and the
respondents, and their witnesses, if any, to appear before her and to submit documents
relevant to the complaint.
In her report, Justice Salonga recommended the dismissal of the complaint
against respondents, and that complainant be reprimanded for filing the frivolous
complaint. Accoridng to Salonga, records of this case clearly shows that the present
administrative case is unfounded, as it is devoid of factual and legal basis. Petitioner's
allegations in support of his complaint against the respondents are mere allegations
founded on speculation and conjecture.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the instant administrative case in itself is frivolous and in violation
of the Code of Professionally Responsibility.
HELD: Yes
The court upheld the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the instant administrative
case in itself is frivolous, calculated merely to harass, annoy, and cast groundless
suspicions on the integrity and reputation of both the Respondents. The mere fact that
respondent lawyer had adopted relevant and substantial portions of the complaint filed
by the respondent judge does not in any way bespeak of any illegal or unethical practice
on his part. It is evident that complainant purposely written the petition to mislead the
Court and cast a doubt on the integrity and dignity of the Respondents. Adopting the
above-findings made in the petition against the respondents, the court ruled that there is
merit in separate counter-petitions filed by the respondents to hold petitioner
administratively liable for filing an unfounded and frivolous suit. Hence, Atty. Marcos V.
Prieto was sanctioned for filing this unfounded complaint as it violates the proper
administration of justice.
 CBD Case No. 176 January 20, 1995
SALLY D. BONGALONTA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. PABLITO M. CASTILLO and ALFONSO M. MARTIJA, respondents.

FACTS:
Complainant charged respondents who are both, members of the Philippine Bar, with
unjust and unethical conduct, to wit: representing conflicting interests and abetting a scheme to
frustrate the execution or satisfaction of a judgment which complainant might obtain.
The letter-complaint stated that complainant filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig,
for estafa. She also filed, a separate civil action, where she was able to obtain a writ of
preliminary attachment and by virtue thereof, a piece of real property registered in the name of
the Abuel. Atty. Castillo was the counsel of Abuel in the aforesaid criminal and civil cases.
During the pendency of these cases, one Gregorio Lantin filed a civil case for collection
of a sum of money based on a promissory note, also with the Pasig Regional Trial Court,
against the Abuel. In the said case Gregorio Lantin was represented by Atty. Martija. A writ of
execution was, in due time, issued and the same property previously attached by complainant
was levied upon.
It is further alleged that in all the pleadings filed in these three (3) aforementioned
cases, Atty. Pablito Castillo and Atty. Alfonso Martija placed the same address, the same PTR
and the same IBP receipt number. Thus, complainant concluded that the civil case filed by
Gregorio Lantin was merely a part of the scheme of the Sps. Abuel to frustrate the satisfaction
of the money judgment which complainant might obtain in the civil case he filed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondents are guilty of violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility?
HELD:

The Court find respondent Atty. Pablito M. Castillo guilty committing a falsehood
in violation of his lawyer's oath and of the Code of Professional Responsibility for using,
apparently thru his negligence, the IBP official receipt number of respondent Atty.
Alfonso M. Martija. The court further held that the practice of law is not a right but a
privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess, and continue to
possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. One of
these requirements is the observance of honesty and candor. For this reason, he is
required to swear to do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court.
 A.C. No. 1512 January 29, 1993
VICTORIA BARRIENTOS, complainant,
vs.
TRANSFIGURACION DAAROL, respondent.
FACTS:
Complainant Victoria C. Barrientos filed a complaint for the disbarment of
respondent Transfiguracion Daarol, a member of the Philippine Bar, on grounds of
deceit and grossly immoral conduct.
Respondent, already a married man and about 41 years old, proposed love and
marriage to complainant, then still a 20-year-old minor, knowing that he did not have the
required legal capacity. Respondent then succeeded in having carnal relations with
complainant by deception, made her pregnant, suggested abortion, breached his
promise to marry her, and then deserted her and the child.
In his defense, the respondent claimed that complainant consented to have
sexual intercourse with him because of her love to him and he did not resort to force,
trickery, deceit or cajolery; and that the present case was filed against him by
complainant because of his failure to give the money to support complainant while in
Cebu waiting for the delivery of the child.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent should be disbarred as a lawyer.
HELD: Yes,
By his acts of deceit and immoral tendencies to appease his sexual desires,
respondent Daarol has amply demonstrated his moral delinquency. Hence, his removal
for conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar on the grounds of deceit and grossly
immoral conduct in violation of Sec. 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court is in order. The court
find respondent Daarol morally delinquent and as such, should not be allowed
continued membership in the ancient and learned profession of law (Quingwa v. Puno,
19 SCRA 439 [1967]). The practice of law is a privilege accorded only to those
who measure up to the exacting standards of mental and moral fitness. Accordingly,
the court find respondent Transfiguracion Daarol guilty of grossly immoral conduct
unworthy of being a member of the Bar and is hereby ordered DISBARRED and his
name stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys.
 B.M. No. 712 July 13, 1995
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMISSION TO THE BAR AND OATH-TAKING OF
SUCCESSFUL BAR APPLICANT AL C. ARGOSINO, petitioner.
RESOLUTION
FACTS:
A criminal information was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
charging Mr. A.C. Argosino along with thirteen (13) other individuals, with the crime of
homicide in connection with the death of one Raul Camaligan in the course of "hazing"
conducted as part of university fraternity initiation rites. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused
then entered into plea bargaining with the prosecution and as a result of such
bargaining, pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of homicide through reckless
imprudence. This plea was accepted by the trial court. Mr. Argosino and his colleagues
filed an application for probation with the lower court. The period of probation was set at
two (2) years.
Mr. Argosino filed a Petition for Admission to Take the 1993 Bar Examinations.
He was allowed to take the 1993 Bar Examinations. He passed the Bar Examination.
He was not, however, allowed to take the lawyer's oath of office.
Mr. Argosino then filed a Petition with this Court to allow him to take the
attorney's oath of office and to admit him to the practice of law, averring that Judge
Pedro T. Santiago had terminated his probation period.
ISSUE:
Whether or not participation in the hazing fell short of the required standard of the
good moral character for taking the lawyers’ oath of office.
HELD:
The practice of law is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be granted
to everyone who demands it. Rather, it is a high personal privilege limited to citizens
of good moral character, with special educational qualifications, duly ascertained and
certified. It needs no further argument, therefore, to arrive at the conclusion that the
highest degree of scrutiny must be exercised as to the moral character of a candidate
who presents himself for admission to the bar.
Mr. Argosino's participation in the deplorable "hazing" activities certainly fell far
short of the required standard of good moral character. Thus, participation in the
prolonged and mindless physical beatings inflicted upon Raul Camaligan constituted
evident rejection of that moral duty and was totally irresponsible behavior, which makes
impossible a finding that the participant was then possessed of good moral character.
Mr. Argosino must, in other words, submit relevant evidence to show that he is a
different person now, that he has become morally fit for admission to the ancient and
learned profession of the law.
In re: Sycip 92 SCRA 1
FACTS:
Two separate Petitions were filed before this Court 1) by the surviving partners of
Atty. Alexander Sycip, and 2) by the surviving partners of Atty. Herminio Ozaeta, who
died praying that they be allowed to continue using, in the names of their firms, the
names of partners who had passed away.
Petitioners base their petitions on the following arguments:
1. Under the law, a partnership is not prohibited from continuing its business under a
firm name which includes the name of a deceased partner; in fact, Article 1840 of the
Civil Code explicitly sanctions the practice when it provides in the last paragraph that:
The use by the person or partnership continuing the business of the partnership name,
or the name of a deceased partner as part thereof, shall not of itself make the individual
property of the deceased partner liable for any debts contracted by such person or
partnership. 1
2. In regulating other professions, such as accountancy and engineering, the legislature
has authorized the adoption of firm names without any restriction as to the use, in such
firm name, of the name of a deceased partner; 2 the legislative authorization given to
those engaged in the practice of accountancy — a profession requiring the same
degree of trust and confidence in respect of clients as that implicit in the relationship of
attorney and client — to acquire and use a trade name, strongly indicates that there is
no fundamental policy that is offended by the continued use by a firm of professionals of
a firm name which includes the name of a deceased partner, at least where such firm
name has acquired the characteristics of a "trade name." 3
3. The Canons of Professional Ethics are not transgressed by the continued use of the
name of a deceased partner in the firm name of a law partnership because Canon 33 of
the Canons of Professional Ethics adopted by the American Bar Association declares
that:
... The continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner when permissible by
local custom, is not unethical but care should be taken that no imposition or deception is
practiced through this use. ... 4
4. There is no possibility of imposition or deception because the deaths of their
respective deceased partners were well-publicized in all newspapers of general
circulation for several days; the stationeries now being used by them carry new
letterheads indicating the years when their respective deceased partners were
connected with the firm; petitioners will notify all leading national and international law
directories of the fact of their respective deceased partners' deaths. 5
5. No local custom prohibits the continued use of a deceased partner's name in a
professional firm's name; 6 there is no custom or usage in the Philippines, or at least in
the Greater Manila Area, which recognizes that the name of a law firm necessarily
Identifies the individual members of the firm. 7
6. The continued use of a deceased partner's name in the firm name of law partnerships
has been consistently allowed by U.S. Courts and is an accepted practice in the legal
profession of most countries in the world.8
ISSUE: Whether or not the firms may continue to use the partnership name despite the
death of a partner.
HELD:
No. The public relations value of the use of an old firm name can tend to create
undue advantages and disadvantages in the practice of the profession. The Court
believes that, in view of the personal and confidential nature of the relations between
attorney and client, and the high standards demanded in the canons of professional
ethics, no practice should be allowed which even in a remote degree could give rise to
the possibility of deception.
Secondly, Art. 1840 of the Civil Code treats more of a commercial partnership with a
good will to protect rather than of a professional partnership. It is tacit in the above
provision that names in a firm name of a partnership must either be those of living
partners and in the case of non-partners, should be living persons who can be
subjected to liability.
While it is true that Canon 33 does not consider the continued use of the name of
a deceased or former partner in the firm name of a law partnership as unethical when
such a practice is permissible by local custom. However, no local custom permits or
allows the continued use of a deceased former partner’s name in the firm names of law
partnerships. Firm names, under our custom, identify the more creative and/or more
senior partners or members of the law firm.
 IN RE: DISBARMENT OF ARMANDO PUNO.
FLORA QUINGWA complainant,
vs.
ARMANDO PUNO, respondent.
FACTS:
Complainant, Flora Quingwa filed a complaint charging Armando Puno, a
member of the Bar, with gross immorality and misconduct.
In her statement, complainant claimed, that respondent took her to the Silver
Moon Hotel. Respondent registered and signed the registry book as 'Mr. and Mrs. A.
Puno. After registering at the hotel, respondent shoved complainant inside the room
where he began to molest her. Complainant submitted to respondent's plea for sexual
intercourse because of respondent's promise of marriage and not because of a desire
for sexual gratification or of voluntariness and mutual passion. After their said sexual
intimacy, complainant repeatedly implored respondent to comply with his promise of
marriage but respondent refused to comply. Complainant then gave birth to a child.
The respondent denied all the material allegations of the complaint, and as a
special defense averred that the allegations therein do not constitute grounds for
disbarment or suspension under section 25, Rule 127 of the former Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent should be disbarred for gross immorality and
misconduct
HELD:
One of the requirements for all applicants for admission to the Bar is that the
applicant must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral
character (Section 2, Rule 127 of the old Rules of Court, now section 2, Rule 138).
When his integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not enough that he denies the
charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence for the relator
and show proofs that he still maintains the highest degree of morality and integrity,
which at all times is expected of him. Respondent denied that he took complainant to
the Silver Moon Hotel and had sexual intercourse with her but he did not present
evidence to show where he was on that date
Disbarment or suspension is not to be taken as a limitation on the general power
of courts to suspend or disbar a lawyer. It is within the power of the supreme court to
remove a member of the bar not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession,
but also for gross misconduct, which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of
the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him. Under the circumstances,
we are convinced that the respondent has committed a grossly immoral act and has,
thus disregarded and violated the fundamental ethics of his profession.
 G.R. No. L-23815 June 28, 1974
ADELINO H. LEDESMA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RAFAEL C. CLIMACO, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental, Branch I, Silay City, respondent.
Adelino H. Ledesma in his own behalf.
Hon. Rafael C. Climaco in his own behalf.
FACTS:
Atty. Ledesma filed a motion to withdraw as counsel de parte when
he was appointed Election Registrar of the Municipality of Cadiz, Province of Negros
Occidental. Judge Climaco denied the motion and, instead, appointed him as counsel
de oficio for the 2 defendants. Petitioner filed a motion to withdraw as counsel de oficio,
premised on the policy of the COMELEC to require full time service as well as on the
volume or pressure of work of petitioner, which could prevent him from handling
adequately the defense. Judge Climaco denied the motion to withdraw and likewise
denied the motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Ledesma should be allowed to withdraw as counsel de officio consi
dering his appointment as Election Registrar.
HELD:
No. The Court reiterated that there was no incompatibility between Atty.
Ledesma’s duty as counsel de oficio and the performance of his task as an election
registrar of the COMELEC. The law is a profession, not a trade or a craft. Those
enrolled in its ranks are called upon to aid in the performance of one of the basic
purposes of the State, the administration of justice. To avoid any frustration thereof,
especially in the case of an indigent defendant, a lawyer may be required to act as
counsel de officio. Hence, what is incumbent upon him as counsel de oficio must be
fulfilled. It is important to note that Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions, there are times, when duty to court and client takes precedence over
promptings of self-interest.
 LESLIE UI VS ATTY. IRIS BONIFACIO
FACTS:
In the case of Ui vs. Bonifacio (A.C. 3319), an administrative complaint for
disbarment was instituted against Atty. Iris Bonifacio for allegedly carrying on an
immoral relationship and bigamous marriage with a married man.
Complainant claimed that his husband Carlos Ui, was carrying on an illicit
relationship with respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio and that they children together and has
been living under the same roof. In her complaint, Leslie alleged that Atty. Bonifacio was
aware of the subsisting marriage of Carlos prior to her bigamous marriage with him and
added that respondent falsified the date of the bigamous Marriage Contract.
In her defense, respondent averred that when she met Carlos Ui the latter
introduced himself as a single man. She stated that during one of their trips abroad,
Carlos Ui formalized his intention to marry her and they in fact got married in Hawaii,
USA. After their marital union, the spouses decided to live separately. When
complainant informed about her subsisting marriage with Carlos Ui, Atty. Bonifacio
terminated and distance herself from Carlos. Likewise, the erroneous date at the
bigamous Marriage Contract was unintentional considering that she only received the
copy of the document from Carlos.
The Integradted Bar conetends that Complainant's evidence had prima facie to
established the existence of the "illicit relationship" between the respondent and her
husband. The same evidence however show that respondent Carlos Ui was still living
with complainant which is necessary and indispensable proof to at least create probable
cause for the offense charged. The instant complaint was dismissed for lack of evidence
to establish probable cause for the offense charged.
ISSUE: Whether or not Bonifacio conducts herself in an immoral manner for which she
may be disbarred from the practice of law.
HELD:
No. The Supreme Court concurred with the decision of the IBP and held practice
of law is a privilege that can be revoked, subject to the mandate of due process, once a
lawyer violates his oath and the dictates of legal ethics. If good moral character is a sine
qua non for admission to the bar, then the continued possession of good moral
character is also requisite for retaining membership in the legal profession. A member
of the bar should have moral integrity in addition to professional probity. In the case at
bar, Atty. Bonifacio acted in good faith when she distanced herself from Carlos upon
knowing the latter’s subsisting marriage. However, the court asserted that Atty.
Bonifacio should have been more prudent in her personal life by checking the
background of her husband and by distancing herself from scandalous situation. The
respondent was also REPRIMANDED for knowingly and willfully attaching a falsified
Certificate of Marriage with a stern warning that a repetition of the same will merit a
more severe penalty.

ERWIN B. JAVELLANA, petitioner, vs. DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL

GOVERNMENT AND LUIS T. SANTOS, SECRETARY, respondents. [G.R. No.
102549. August 10, 1992.] GRIÑO-AQUINO, J p:
FACTS:
An Administrative Case was filed against Atty. Javellana, an elected City
Councilor for: (1) violation of Department of Local Government (DLG) Memorandum
Circular No. 80-38 dated June 10, 1980 in relation to DLG Memorandum Circular No.
74-58 and of Section 7, paragraph b, No. 2 of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known
as the “Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees,” and
(2) for oppression, misconduct and abuse of authority.
The basis of the Administrative case is the appearance of petitioner as counsel
for a case against respondent who is a public official without prior authority of the DILG
Regional Director, in violation of DILG Memorandum Circular No. 80-38 which provides:
Councilors are allowed to practice their professions provided that in so doing an
authority . . . first be secured from the Regional Directors pursuant to Memorandum
Circular No. 74-58, provided, however, that no government personnel, property,
equipment or supplies shall be utilized in the practice of their professions
As to members of the bar the authority given for them to practice their profession
shall always be subject to the restrictions provided for in Section 6 of Republic Act
5185. In all cases, the practice of any profession should be favorably recommended by
the Sanggunian concerned as a body and by the provincial governors, city or municipal
mayors, as the case may be.
And Circular number. 90-81
Section 7 of Republic Act No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees), states that (b) Public Officials . . . during their incumbency
shall not: (1) . . . accept employment as officer, employee, consultant, counsel, broker,
agent, trustee or nominee in any private enterprise regulated, supervised or licensed by
their office unless expressly allowed by law; (2) Engage in the private practice of their
profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided that such practice will
not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions: . . .
In relation to the case, petitioner was allegedly in violation of Section 90 of the
Local Government Code of 1991 which provides that:
(b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or
teach in schools except during session hours: Provided, That sanggunian members
who are members of the Bar shall not:
(1) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local government
unit or any office, agency, or instrumentality of the government is the adverse party;
(2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the
national or local government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office;
(3) Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings involving the local
government unit of which he is an official; and
(4) Use property and personnel of the Government except when the sanggunian
member concerned is defending the interest of the Government.
On the other hand, Javellana filed a Motion to Dismiss the administrative
case against him on the ground mainly that DLG Memorandum Circulars Nos. 80-
38 and 90 – 81, Section 90 as unconstitutional because the Supreme Court has the
sole and exclusive authority to regulate the practice of law.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is in violation of Circulars Nos. 80-38 and 90-81 and
Section 90 of the Local Government Code
HELD:

With respect to the present case, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the respondent, Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), in issuing the
questioned DLG Circulars Nos. 80-30 and 90-81 and in denying petitioner's motion to
dismiss the administrative charge against him.
The complaint for acting as a counsel in a case against City Engineer
Divinagracia is in effect a complaint against the City Government of Bago City, of which
petitioner Javellana is a councilman. Hence, judgment against City Engineer
Divinagracia would actually be a judgment against the City Government. By serving as
counsel for the complaining employees and assisting them to prosecute their claims
against City Engineer Divinagracia, the petitioner violated Memorandum Circular No.
74-58 (in relation to Section 7[b-2] of RA 6713) prohibiting a government official from
engaging in the private practice of his profession, if such practice would represent
interests adverse to the government.
Petitioner's contention that Section 90 of the Local Government Code of 1991
and DLG Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 violate Article VIII, Section 5 of the
Constitution is completely off tangent. Neither the statute nor the circular trenches upon
the Supreme Court's power and authority to prescribe rules on the practice of law. The
Local Government Code and DLG Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 simply prescribe
rules of conduct for public officials to avoid conflicts of interest between the discharge of
their public duties and the private practice of their profession, in those instances where
the law allows it.
 G.R. No. L-34882 - CRISPINIANO V. LAPUT, ET AL. vs. JOSE BERNABE

FACTS:
This is a petition for a writ of mandamus to require the judge of the first branch of the
municipal court of the City of Manila to recognize the right of an accused person to avail himself
of the services of an agent or friend, not a licensed attorney-at-law, to aid him in the litigation.
It appears from the pleadings that Catalino Salas was charged in the municipal
court of the City of Manila with the crime of damage to property through reckless
imprudence. Thereupon, Salas authorized Crispiniano V. Laput to represent him in the
case. Laput, it may be observed, is a law student and, accordingly, not a recognized
member of the Philippine Bar. The written appointment of Laput was duly presented in
court, but the respondent judge before whom the case was to be tried refused to allow
Laput to act as the counsel of Salas. Hence, this petition for a writ of mandamus.

ISSUE: Whether or not the existing Municipal Court of the City of Manila can be
considered a court of a justice of the peace within the meaning of Section 34 of the
Code of Civil Procedure allowing a party to conduct their litigation with the aid of an
agent or friend appointed by them for that purpose, or with the aid of a lawyer.

HELD:

Code of Civil Procedure was approved in Act No. 190, and therein in section 34
was found the following: "Any party may conduct his litigation in a court of a justice of
the peace, in person or with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that
purpose, or with the aid of a lawyer; in any other court a party may conduct his litigation
personally or by the aid of a lawyer, and his appearance must be either personal or by
the aid of a duly authorized member of the bar." When the Code of Civil Procedure was
placed on the statute books, there were in the City of Manila justice of the peace courts
to which section 34 naturally applied. In these justices of the peace courts, there could
have been no question that a party could conduct his litigation with the aid of an agent
or friend appointed by him for that purpose. When the justice of the peace courts were
abolished, the law was made to provide for a municipal court which was to have the
same jurisdiction in civil and criminal cases, and the same incidental powers as the
justice of peace courts of the City of Manila. Accordingly, an error was committed in the
municipal court in not allowing Crispiniano V. Laput to act as an agent or friend of
Catalino Salas to aid the latter in conducting his defense.
 G.R. No. L-51813-14 November 29, 1983
ROMULO CANTIMBUHAN, NELSON B. MALANA, and ROBERT V.
LUCILA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. NICANOR J. CRUZ, JR., Presiding Judge of the Municipal Court of
Parañaque, Metro Manila, and FISCAL LEODEGARIO C. QUILATAN, respondents.

FACTS:

This case involves a petition for a writ of mandamus to require the judge of the
first branch of the Municipal Court of the City of Manila to recognize the right of an
accused person to avail himself of the services of an agent or friend, not a licensed
attorney-at-law, to aid him in the litigation.
The accused, Catalino Salas, appointed Petitioners Nelson B. Malana and
Robert V. Lucila senior law students to represent him in a criminal case. However, the
judge refused to allow Laput to act as Salas' counsel and claims that appearances of
friends of party-litigants should be allowed only in places where there is a scarcity of
legal practitioner. For, if we are to allow non-members of the bar to appear in court and
prosecute cases or defend litigants in the guise of being friends of the litigants, then the
requirement of membership in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the additional
requirement of paying professional taxes for a lawyer to appear in court, would be put to
naught.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused has the right to conduct his litigation with the aid of
an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose.

HELD:

The court finds merit in the petition. Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,
clearly provides that in the municipal court a party may conduct his litigation in person
with the aid of an agent appointed by him for the purpose. Thus, in the case of Laput vs.
Bernabe, 55 Phil. 621, a law student was allowed to represent the accused in a case
pending before the then Municipal Court, the City Court of Manila, who was charged for
damages to property through reckless imprudence. "It is accordingly our view that error
was committed in the municipal court in not allowing Crispiniano V. Laput to act as an
agent or friend of Catalino Salas to aid the latter in conducting his defense."
 EN BANC

[Bar Matter No. 810. January 27, 1998.]

IN RE: PETITION TO TAKE THE LAWYER’S OATH BY ARTHUR M. CUEVAS, JR.

FACTS:
Petitioner Arthur M. Cuevas, Jr., recently passed the 1996 Bar Examinations. His
oath-taking was held in abeyance in view of the Court’s resolution which permitted him
to take the Bar Examinations "subject to the condition that should (he) pass the same,
(he) shall not be allowed to take the lawyer’s oath pending approval of the Court. This is
due to his previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting In Homicide. The
conviction stemmed from petitioner’s participation in the initiation rites of the LEX
TALIONIS FRATERNITAS, a fraternity in the SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW, where
Raul I. Camaligan, a neophyte, died as a result of the violence inflicted upon him.
Petitioner prays that "he be allowed to take his lawyer’s oath by attaching
certifications attesting to his righteous, peaceful and law-abiding character including the
statement of Atty. Gilbert D. Camaligan, father of the deceased hazing victim.

ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioner Arthur M. Cuevas Jr. be allowed to take the lawyer’s
oath

HELD:
The petition before the Court requires the balancing of the reasons for
disallowing or allowing petitioner’s admission to the noble profession of law. His
deliberate participation in the senseless beatings over a helpless neophyte which
resulted to the latter’s untimely demise indicates absence of that moral fitness required
for admission to the bar. And as the practice of law is a privilege extended only to the
few who possess the high standards of intellectual and moral qualifications the Court is
duty bound to prevent the entry of undeserving aspirants, as well as to exclude those
who have been admitted but have become a disgrace to the profession.
However, by fulfilling the conditions and attaching various certifications attesting
to his righteous, peaceful and civic-oriented character prove that he has taken decisive
steps to purge himself of his deficiency in moral character and atone for the unfortunate
death of Raul I. Camaligan. Hence, the court resolve to allow petitioner to take the
lawyer’s oath.
 FIRST DIVISION
[ A.C. No. 5281, February 12, 2008 ]
MANUEL L. LEE, Complainant, vs. ATTY. REGINO B. TAMBAGO, Respondent.

RESOLUTION
FACTS:

Complainant Manuel L. Lee charged respondent Atty.Regino B. Tambago with

violation of the Notarial Law and the ethics of the legal profession for notarizing a
spurious last will and testament, he averred that his father, the decedent Vicente
Lee, Sr., never executed the contested will. Furthermore, the spurious will contained
the forged signatures of Cayetano Noynay and Loreto Grajo, the purported witnesses
to its execution. Complainant questioned the absence of notation of the residence
certificates of the purported witnesses Noynay and Grajo. He alleged that their
signatures had likewise been forged and merely copied from their respective voters’
affidavits.
In his reponse Respondent alleged that that complainant was not a legitimate
son of the decedent Vicente Lee, Sr. and that the will in question was validly executed.
Respondent further stated that the complaint was filed simply to harass him because
the criminal case filed by complainant against him in the Office of the Ombudsman "did
not prosper. “Respondent did not dispute complainant's contention that no copy of the
will was on file in the archives division of the NCCA. He claimed that no copy of the
contested will could be found there because none was filed.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is in violation of the Notarial Law and Ethics of the
Legal Profession

HELD:

The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions.[44] A breach of these

conditions justifies disciplinary action against the erring lawyer. A disciplinary sanction is
imposed on a lawyer upon a finding or acknowledgment that he has engaged in
professional misconduct.
Respondent, as notary public, evidently failed in the performance of the
elementary duties of his office. Contrary to his claims that he "exercised his duties as
Notary Public with due care and with due regard to the provision of existing law and had
complied with the elementary formalities in the performance of his duties xxx," we find
that he acted very irresponsibly in notarizing the will in question. Such recklessness
warrants the less severe punishment of suspension from the practice of law. It is, as
well, a sufficient basis for the revocation of his commission and his perpetual
disqualification to be commissioned as a notary public.
 DOLORES C. BELLEZA, Complainant, v. ATTY. ALAN S.
MACASA, Respondent.

FACTS:

Complainant Dolores C. Belleza filed a complaint for the disbarment against

respondent Atty. Alan S. Macasa for mishandling the criminal case involving his son.
Said complainant avail the services of the respondent thru the referral of their mutual
friend. Respondent agreed to handle the case for P30,000.
The following day, complainant made a partial payment, thru their mutual friend.
She also gave him an additional payment and the balance money. On all three
occasions, respondent did not issue any receipt.
The respondent then received P18,000 from complainant for the purpose of
posting a bond to secure the provisional liberty of her (complainant's) son. Again,
respondent did not issue any receipt. When complainant went to the court the next day,
she found out that respondent did not remit the amount to the court.
Complainant demanded the return of the P18,000 from respondent on several
occasions but respondent ignored her. Moreover, respondent failed to act on the case
of complainant's son and complainant was forced to avail of the services of the Public
Attorney's Office for her son's defense.

ISSUE: WON complainant violated the code of professional responsibility.

HELD:

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or

deceitful conduct.
Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or
received for or from the client.
Rule 16.02 - A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from
his own and those others kept by him.

Respondent Grossly Neglected

The Cause of His Client

CANON 17 - A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE

SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.

CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND

DILIGENCE.

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

CANON 19 - A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL WITHIN THE
BOUNDS OF THE LAW.
 A lawyer who accepts the cause of a client commits to devote himself
(particularly his time, knowledge, skills and effort) to such cause. He must be ever
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him, constantly striving to be worthy
thereof. Accordingly, he owes full devotion to the interest of his client, warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of his client's rights and the exertion of his utmost learning,
skill and ability to ensure that nothing shall be taken or withheld from his client, save by
the rules of law legally applied.
He must bear in mind that by accepting a retainer, he impliedly makes the
following representations: that he possesses the requisite degree of learning, skill and
ability other lawyers similarly situated possess; that he will exert his best judgment in
the prosecution or defense of the litigation entrusted to him; that he will exercise
reasonable care and diligence in the use of his skill and in the application of his
knowledge to his client's cause; and that he will take all steps necessary to adequately
safeguard his client's interest.
A lawyer's negligence in the discharge of his obligations arising from the
relationship of counsel and client may cause delay in the administration of justice and
prejudice the rights of a litigant, particularly his client. Thus, from the perspective of the
ethics of the legal profession, a lawyer's lethargy in carrying out his duties to his client is
both unprofessional and unethical.

Respondent Failed to Return

His Client's Money
The fiduciary nature of the relationship between counsel and client imposes on a
lawyer the duty to account for the money or property collected or received for or from
the client.
As a rule, the right of a lawyer to a reasonable compensation for his services is
subject to two requisites: (1) the existence of an attorney-client relationship and (2) the
rendition by the lawyer of services to the client.31 Thus, a lawyer who does not render
legal services is not entitled to attorney's fees. Otherwise, not only would he be unjustly
enriched at the expense of the client, he would also be rewarded for his negligence and
irresponsibility.

CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND THE
DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR
Indeed, a lawyer who fails to abide by the Canons and Rules of the Code of
Professional Responsibility disrespects the said Code and everything that it stands for.
In so doing, he disregards the ethics and disgraces the dignity of the legal profession.
Respondent was undeserving of the trust reposed in him. Instead of using the money
for the bond of the complainant's son, he pocketed it. He failed to observe candor,
fairness and loyalty in his dealings with his client. He failed to live up to his fiduciary
duties. By keeping the money for himself despite his undertaking that he would facilitate
the release of complainant's son, respondent showed lack of moral principles. His
transgression showed him to be a swindler, a deceitful person and a shame to the legal
profession.
 A.M. No. SDC-97-2-P February 24, 1997
SOPHIA ALAWI, complainant,
vs.
ASHARY M. ALAUYA, Clerk of Court VI, Shari'a District Court, Marawi City,
respondent.
FACTS:
Sophia Alawi was (and presumably still is) a sales representative (or coordinator)
of E.B. Villarosa & Partners Co., a real estate and housing company. Ashari M. Alauya
is the incumbent executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi
City,
It appears that through Alawi's agency, respondent executed a contract for the
purchase on installments by Alauya of one of the housing units belonging to E.B
Villarosa & Partners Co. In connection therewith, a housing loan was also granted to
Alauya by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).
Not long afterwards, addressed a letter to the President of Villarosa & Co.
advising of the termination of his contract with the company asserting that his consent
was vitiated by gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of
confidence by the aforesaid sales agent and that the contract is onerous and
controversial.
On the same date, Alauya also Vice-President, Credit & Collection Group of the
National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) to void his contract with
Villarosa & Co.; and asking for cancellation of his housing loan in connection therewith,
which was payable from his monthly salary deductions.
Complainant then filed a complaint to which she appended a copy of the letter of
an envelope bearing the typewritten words, "Free Postage - PD 26." In that complaint,
she accused Alauya of:
 "Imputation of malicious and libelous charges with no solid grounds through manifest
ignorance and evident bad faith;"
 Usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only regular members of the Philippine Bar
may properly use.
In his comment Alauya contended that it was he who had suffered "undue injury,
mental anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings and untold financial suffering,"
considering that the payment of the housing loans had been deducted from his salary.
He then denied the mailing of certain letters; that the words: "Free Postage - PD
26," were typewritten on the envelope by some other person, and as far as he knew, his
subordinate mailed the letters with the use of the money he had given for postage, and
if those letters were indeed mixed with the official mail of the court, this had occurred
inadvertently and because of an honest mistake.
Alauya also justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the assertion that it is
"lexically synonymous" with "Counsellors-at-law." a title to which Shari'a lawyers have a
rightful claim, adding that he prefers the title of "attorney" because "counsellor" is often
mistaken for "councilor," "konsehal" or the Maranao term "consial," connoting a local
legislator beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does not consider himself a lawyer.

HELD:
The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees
(RA 6713) inter alia enunciates the State policy of promoting a high standard of ethics
and utmost responsibility in the public service. Section 4 of the Code commands that
"(p)ublic officials and employees at all times respect the rights of others, and refrain
from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public order,
public safety and public interest." More than once has this Court emphasized that "the
conduct and behavior of every official and employee of an agency involved in the
administration of justice, from the presiding judge to the most junior clerk, should be
circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. Their conduct must at all times be
characterized by, among others, strict propriety and decorum so as to earn and keep
the respect of the public for the judiciary."
Righteous indignation, or vindication of right cannot justify resort to vituperative
language, or downright name-calling. As a member of the Shari'a Bar and an officer of a
Court, Alauya is subject to a standard of conduct more stringent than for most other
government workers. As a man of the law, he may not use language which is abusive,
offensive, scandalous, menacing, or otherwise improper. As a judicial employee, it is
expected that he accord respect for the person and the rights of others at all times, and
that his every act and word should be characterized by prudence, restraint, courtesy,
dignity. His radical deviation from these salutary norms might perhaps be mitigated, but
cannot be excused, by his strongly held conviction that he had been grievously
wronged.
As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has already had
occasion to declare that persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members
of the Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before Shari'a courts. While one who
has been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine
Bar, may both be considered "counsellors," in the sense that they give counsel or
advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an "attorney." The title of "attorney" is
reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and
successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who
are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, respondent Ashari M. Alauya is hereby REPRIMANDED for the
use of excessively intemperate, insulting or virulent language, i.e., language
unbecoming a judicial officer, and for usurping the title of attorney; and he is warned
that any similar or other impropriety or misconduct in the future will be dealt with more
severely.
 IN THE MATTER OF THE INTEGRATION OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES
49 SCRA 22

FACTS:
Republic Act. No. 6397 entitled “An Act Providing for the Integration of the
Philippine Bar and Appropriating Funds Therefore” was passed in September 1971. In
1972, the Supreme Court formed a Commission on Bar Integration and in December
1972, the Commission earnestly recommended the integration of the bar on the basis of
the said Report and the proceedings had in Administrative Case No. 526 of the Court.
Based on pages 3 to 5 of the report, Integration of the Philippine Bar means the
official unification of the entire lawyer population of the Philippines.
This requires membership and financial support (in reasonable amount) of every
attorney as conditions sine qua non to the practice of law and the retention of his name
in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.
Designed to improve the position of the Bar as an instrumentality of justice and
the Rule of Law, integration fosters cohesion among lawyers, and ensures, through their
own organized action and participation, the promotion of the objectives of the legal
profession, pursuant to the principle of maximum Bar autonomy with minimum
supervision and regulation by the Supreme Court.

ISSUES: WON
1. Does the Court have the power to integrate the Philippine bar?
2. Would the integration of the bar be constitutional?
3. Should the Court ordain the integration of the bar at this time?

RULING:

On the first issue, the Court held that it may integrate the Bar in the exercise of
its power, under Article VIII, Sec. 13 of the Constitution, "to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law."
Indeed, the power to integrate is an inherent part of the Court’s constitutional authority
over the Bar.

The second issue hinges on the following constitutional rights of lawyers:

freedom of association and of speech, as well as the nature of the dues exacted from
the lawyer, i.e., whether or not the Court thus levies a tax. The Court held:
 1. Integration is not violative of freedom of association because it does not compel
a lawyer to become a member of any group of which he is not already a member.
All that it does is “to provide an official national organization for the well-defined
but unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is already a
member.” The lawyer too is not compelled to attend meetings, participate of
activities, etc. The only compulsion is the payment of annual dues. Assuming,
however, that it does compel a lawyer to be a member of an integrated bar, the
court held that “such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of
the state”
2. Integration is also not violative of the freedom of speech just because dues paid
by the lawyer may be used for projects or programs, which the lawyer opposes.
To rule otherwise would make every government exaction a “free speech issue.”
Furthermore, the lawyer is free to voice out his objections to positions taken by
the integrated bar.
3. The dues exacted from lawyers is not in the nature of a levy but is purely for
purposes of regulation.

As to the third issue, the Court believes in the timeliness of the integration.
Survey showed an overwhelming majority of lawyers who favored integration.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court, by virtue of the power vested in it by Section 13 of
Article VIII of the Constitution, hereby ordains the integration of the Bar of the
Philippines in accordance with the attached COURT RULE, effective on January 16,
1973.

Is the integration of the Bar a violation of the right to association and freedom of
speech as a lawyer?
No.
The integration of the Philippine Bar is “perfectly constitutional and legally
unobjectionable” and, within the context of contemporary conditions in the
Philippines, has become an imperative means to raise the standards of the
legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to
discharge its public responsibility fully and effectively.
 A.M. Nos. 1302, 1391 and 1543 April 26, 1991
PAULINO VALENCIA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ARSENIO FER CABANTING, respondent.
CONSTANCIA L. VALENCIA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. DIONISIO C. ANTINIW, ATTY. EDUARDO U. JOVELLANOS and ATTY.
ARSENIO FER. CABANTING, respondents.
LYDIA BERNAL, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. DIONISIO C. ANTINIW, respondent.
FACTS:
These consolidated administrative cases seek to disbar respondents for grave
malpractice and misconduct in the exercise of their legal profession.

1. Administrative Cases No. 1302 and 1391.

Complainant Paulino Valencia and his wife allegedly bought a parcel of land,
where they built their residential house, from a certain Serapia Raymundo, an heir of
Pedro Raymundo the original owner. However, they failed to register the sale or secure
a transfer certificate of title in their names.
A conference was held in the house of Atty. Jovellanos to settle the land dispute
between Serapia and the Valencia spouses since both were relatives and distant kin of
Atty. Jovellanos. Serapia was willing to relinquish ownership if the Valencias could show
documents evidencing ownership. Paulino exhibited a deed of sale written in the Ilocano
dialect. However, Serapia claimed that the deed covered a different property. Paulino
and Serapia were not able to settle their differences
Serapia, assisted by Atty. Arsenio Fer. Cabanting, filed a complaint against
Paulino for the recovery of possession with damages.
The Valencias engaged the services of Atty. Antiniw. Atty advising them to
present a notarized deed of sale in lieu of the private document written in Ilocano. For
this purpose, Paulino gave Atty. Antiniw an amount of P200.00 to pay the person who
would falsify the signature of the alleged vendor.
The Court of First Instance rendered a decision in favor of plaintiff, Serapia
Raymundo with the belief that the said document is not authentic.
Serapia sold 40 square meters of the litigated lot to Atty. Jovellanos and the
remaining portion she sold to her counsel, Atty. Arsenio Fer. Cabanting.
 Paulino filed a disbarment proceeding against Atty. Cabanting on the ground that
said counsel allegedly violated Article 1491 of the New Civil Code as well as Article II of
the Canons of Professional Ethics, prohibiting the purchase of property under litigation
by a counsel.
The appellate court dismissed the petition of Paulino. Valencia, daughter of
Paulino, filed a disbarment proceeding against Atty. Antiniw for his participation in the
falsification of the “deed of sale”; and also, against Attys. Jovellanos and Atty.
Cabanting for purchasing a litigated property allegedly in violation of Article 1491 of the
New Civil Code; and against the three lawyers, for conspiring in the said Civil Case.

2. Administrative Case No. 1543.

A deed of donation involving the transfer of a piece of land by the grandparents
of complainant in favor of her parents, was lost during the last world war. For this
reason, her grandmother (the living donor) executed a deed of confirmation of the
donation with renunciation of her rights over the property.
Notwithstanding the deed, her grandmother still offered to sell the same property
in favor of the complainant, ostensibly to strengthen the deed of donation (to prevent
others from claim-ing the property).
On consultation, Atty., Antiniw advised them to execute a deed of sale. Atty.
Antiniw allegedly prepared and notarized the deed of sale in the name of her
grandfather (deceased at the time of signing) with her grandmother's approval.
The aunt of the complainant who had a claim over the property filed a complaint
against her and her counsel, Atty. Antiniw for falsification of a public document. The
fiscal exonerated the counsel for lack of evidence, while a case was filed in court
against Lydia Bernal.
Complainant then filed a disbarment proceeding against Atty. Antiniw for illegal
acts and bad advice.

ISSUE:
I. Whether or not Atty. Cabanting purchased the subject property in violation of
Art. 1491 of the New Civil Code.
II. Whether or not Attys. Antiniw and Jovellanos are guilty of malpractice in
falsifying notarial documents.
III. Whether or not the three lawyers Conspired with one another
HELD:
I
Under Article 1491 of the New Civil Code:
The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public of judicial
auction, either in person or through the mediation of another:
(5) . . . this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to
lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation
in which they make take part by virtue of their profession.
Public policy prohibits the transactions in view of the fiduciary relationship involved. It is
intended to curtail any undue influence of the lawyer upon his client. Greed may get the
better of the sentiments of loyalty and disinterestedness. Any violation of this prohibition
would constitute malpractice (In re: Attorney Melchor Ruste, 40 O.G. p. 78) and is a
ground for suspension. (Beltran vs. Fernandez, 70 Phil. 248).
Art. 1491, prohibiting the sale to the counsel concerned, applies only while the
litigation is pending. (Director of Lands vs. Adaba, 88 SCRA 513; Hernandez vs.
Villanueva, 40 Phil. 775).
In the case at bar, while it is true that Atty. Arsenio Fer. Cabanting purchased the
lot after finality of judgment, there was still a pending certiorari proceeding. A thing is
said to be in litigation not only if there is some contest or litigation over it in court, but
also from the moment that it becomes subject to the judicial action of the judge.
Hence, it is not safe to conclude, for purposes under Art. 1491 that the litigation
has terminated when the judgment of the trial court become final while
a certiorari connected therewith is still in progress. Thus, purchase of the property by
Atty. Cabanting in this case constitutes malpractice in violation of Art. 1491 and the
Canons of Professional Ethics. Clearly, this malpractice is a ground for suspension.
The sale in favor of Atty. Jovellanos does not constitute malpractice. There was
no attorney-client relationship between Serapia and Atty. Jovellanos, considering that
the latter did not take part as counsel in Civil Case.

II.
The court gave credence to the testimony of Paulino that Atty. Atiniw has direct
participation in the falsification of the deed of sale. When an individual's integrity is
challenged by evidence, it is not enough that he deny the charges against him; he must
meet the issue and overcome the evidence for the relator and show proofs that he still
maintains the highest degree of morality and integrity which at all time is expected of
him.
A lawyer owes entire devotion to the interest of his client, but not at the expense
of truth. The first duty of a lawyer is not to his client but to the administration of justice.
His conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of law and ethics.
While a lawyer must advocate his client's cause in utmost earnestness and with the
maximum skill he can marshal, he is not at liberty to resort to illegal means for his
client's interest. It is the duty of an attorney to employ, for the purpose of maintaining the
causes confided to him, such means as are consistent with truth and honor.
Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. By far, the most
important of them is mindfulness that a lawyer is an officer of the court.
Disbarment, therefore, is not meant as a punishment depriving him of a source of
livelihood but is rather intended to protect the administration of justice by requiring that
those who exercise this function should be competent, honorable and reliable in order
that courts and the public may rightly repose confidence in them. (Noriega vs. Sison,
125 SCRA 293). Atty. Antiniw failed to live up to the high standards of the law
profession.
The other charges of malpractice against Atty. Jovellanos should be dismissed
for lack of evidence.
III
There is no evidence on record that the three lawyers involved in these
administrative cases conspired in executing the falsified "Compraventa Definitiva" and
rigged the Civil Case No. V-2170.
 Besides, the camaraderie among lawyers is not proof of conspiracy, but a sign of
brotherhood among them. One of the fourfold duties of a lawyer is his duty to the Bar. A
lawyer should treat the opposing counsel, and his brethren in the law profession, with
courtesy, dignity and civility. They may "do as adversaries do in law: strive mightily but
(they) eat and drink as friends." This friendship does not connote conspiracy.

G.R. No. 86250 February 26, 1990

ALBERTO F. LACSON, EDITHA F. LACSON, ROMEO F. LACSON and ZENA
F. VELASCO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. LUIS R. REYES, in his capacity as presiding judge of Branch 22 of the
Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 22, and/or Multiple Sala, Imus, Cavite, and
EPHRAIM J. SERQUINA, respondents.

FACTS:
Respondent petitioned the court in his capacity as counsel for the heirs, the
herein petitioners, and as executor under the will.

Atty. Ephraim Serquina filed a "motion for attorney's fees" against the petitioners,
alleging that the heirs had agreed to pay, as and for his legal services rendered, the
sum of P68,000.00.
The lower court granted respondent’s motion for attorney’s fee and ordered
petitioner heirs to pay the lawyer the sum of P65,000.00 as true and reasonable
attorney's fees which shall be a lien on the subject properties.
Thereafter, Atty. Serquina moved for execution. The respondent court issued an
order granting execution.
The petitioners submit that the decision, and the orders, are nun and void for the
following reasons: (1) the respondent court never acquired jurisdiction over the "motion
for attorney's fees" for failure on the part of the movant, Ephraim Serquina, to pay
docket fees; (2) the respondent court gravely abused its discretion in denying the heirs'
notice of appeal for their failure to file a record on appeal; and (3) the respondent court
also gravely abused its discretion in awarding attorney's fees contrary to the provisions
of Section 7, of Rule 85, of the Rules of Court.

HELD:
I.
Anent docket fees, it has been held that the court acquires jurisdiction over any
case only upon payment of the prescribed docket fee. In the case at bar, the "motion for
attorney's fees" was clearly in the nature of an action commenced by a lawyer against
his clients for attorney's fees.
It may be true that the claim for attorney's fees was but an incident in the main
case, still, it is not an escape valve from the payment of docket fees because as in all
actions, whether separate or as an offshoot of a pending proceeding, the payment of
docket fees is mandatory.
Assuming, therefore, that Atty. Serquina's demand for attorney's fees in the sum
of P68,000.00 is valid, he, Atty. Serquina, should have paid the fees in question before
the respondent court could validly try his "motion".
II.

It is pointed out that an attorney who is concurrently an executor of a will is

barred from recovering attorney's fees from the estate. The Rule is specifically as
follows:
SEC. 7. What expenses and fees allowed executor or administrator. Not to charge for
services as attorney. Compensation provided by will controls unless renounced. — An
executor or administrator shall be allowed the necessary expenses in the care,
management and settlement of the estate, and for his services, four pesos per day for
the time actually and necessarily employed, or a commission upon the value of so much
of the estate as comes into his possession and is finally disposed of by him in the
payment of debts, expenses, legacies, or distributive shares, or by delivery to heirs or
devisees, of two per centum of the first five thousand pesos of such value, one per
centum of so much of such value as exceeds five thousand pesos and does not exceed
thirty thousand pesos, one-half per centum of so much of such value as exceeds thirty
thousand pesos and does not exceed one hundred thousand pesos, and one-
quarter per centum of so much of such value as exceeds one hundred thousand pesos.
But in any special case, where the estate is large, and the settlement has been
attended with great difficulty, and has required a high degree of capacity on the part of
the executor or administrator, a greater sum may be allowed. If objection to the fees
allowed be taken, the allowance may be reexamined on appeal.
If there are two or more executors or administrators, the compensation shall be
apportioned among them by the court according to the services actually rendered by
them respectively.
When the executor or administrator is an attorney, he shall not charge against
the estate any professional fees for legal services rendered by him.
When the deceased by will makes some other provision for the compensation of
his executor, that provision shall be a full satisfaction for his services unless by a written
instrument filed in the court he renounces all claim to the compensation provided by the
will.
The rule is therefore clear that an administrator or executor may be allowed fees
for the necessary expenses he has incurred as such, but he may not recover attorney's
fees from the estate. His compensation is fixed by the rule but such a compensation is
in the nature of executor's or administrator's commissions, and never as attorney's fees.
The next question is quite obvious: Who shoulders attorney's fees? We have
held that a lawyer of an administrator or executor may not charge the estate for his fees,
but rather, his client. Mutatis mutandis, where the administrator is himself the counsel
for the heirs, it is the latter who must pay therefor.
In that connection, attorney's fees are in the nature of actual damages, which
must be duly proved. They are also subject to certain standards, to wit: (1) they must be
reasonable, that is to say, they must have a bearing on the importance of the subject
matter in controversy; (2) the extent of the services rendered; and (3) the professional
standing of the lawyer. In all cases, they must be addressed in a full-blown trial and not
on the bare word of the parties. And always, they are subject to the moderating hand of
the courts.
The Court is not persuaded from the facts above that Atty. Serquina is entitled to
the sum claimed by him (P68,000.00) or that awarded by the lower court (P65,000.00).
The records also reveal that Atty. Serquina has already been paid the sum of
P6,000.00. It is our considered opinion that he should be entitled to P15,000.00 for his
efforts on a quantum meruit basis. Hence, we hold the heirs liable for P9,000.00 more.

G.R. No. 77042-43 February 28, 1990

RADIOWEALTH FINANCE CO., INC., et al., petitioners
vs.
INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE BANK AND COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioners Radiowealth, Inc. (RWI) and Radiowealth Finance Company, Inc.

(RFC) applied for and obtained credit facilities from private respondent International
Corporate Bank (Interbank). Petitioners Domingo Guevara (Guevara, for short) and
D.M.G., Inc., acted as sureties to the obligations contracted by RWI and RFC. The
obligations of petitioners were accordingly covered and evidenced by promissory notes,
trust receipts and agreements.
A common stipulation in the covering promissory notes, trust receipts, and
continuing surety agreements between the borrowing petitioners and the lending private
respondent provided, to wit:
In the event of the bringing of any action or suit by you or any default of the
undersigned hereunder I/We shall on demand pay you reasonable attorney's fees and
other fees and costs of collection, which shall in no cases be less than ten percentum
(10 %) of the value of the property and the amount involved by the action or suit.
From 1978 to 1980, petitioners were not able to comply with their obligations on
time with Interbank due to subsequent severe economic and financial reverses.
Petitioners thus asked Interbank for a restructuring of their outstanding loans, but the
parties were not able to arrive at a mutually acceptable proposition.
Interbank, constrained to seek judicial remedy, through its counsel Norberto J.
Quisumbing and Associates.

IV. whether or not attorney's fees require proof (Rollo, p. 243).

As a basic premise, the contention of petitioners that this Court may alter, modify
or change even an admittedly valid stipulation between the parties regarding attorney's
fees is conceded. The high standards of the legal profession as prescribed by law and
the Canons of Professional Ethics regulate if not limit the lawyer's freedom in fixing his
professional fees. The moment he takes his oath, ready to undertake his duties first, as
a practitioner in the exercise of his profession, and second, as an officer of the court in
the administration of justice, the lawyer submits himself to the authority of the court. It
becomes axiomatic therefore, that power to determine the reasonableness or the
unconscionable character of attorney's fees stipulated by the parties is a matter falling
within the regulatory prerogative of the courts.

And this Court has consistently ruled that even with the presence of an
agreement between the parties, the court may nevertheless reduce attorney's fees
though fixed in the contract when the amount thereof appears to be unconscionable or
unreasonable . For the law recognizes the validity of stipulations included in documents
such as negotiable instruments and mortgages with respect to attorney's fees in the
form of penalty provided that they are not unreasonable or unconscionable (Philippine
Engineering Co. vs. Green, 48 Phil. 466).
It is to be remembered that attorney's fees provided in contracts as recoverable
against the other party and damages are not, strictly speaking, the attorney's fees
recoverable as between attorneys and client spoken of and regulated by the Rules of
Court. Rather, the attorney's fees here are in the nature of liquidated damages and the
stipulations therefor is aptly called a penal clause, So long as such stipulation does not
contravene law, morals, or public order, it is strictly binding upon the defendant
(Polytrade Corporation vs. Blanco, 30 SCRA 187 [1969]). However:
"Liquidated damages, whether intended as an indemnity or a penalty, shall be
equitably reduced if they are iniquitous or unconscionable. For this reason, we do not
really have to strictly view the reasonableness of the attorney's fees in the light of such
facts as the amount and character of the service rendered, the nature and importance of
the litigation, and the professional character and the social standing of the attorney. We
do concede, however that these factors may be an aid in the determination of the
inequity or unconscionableness of attorney's fees as liquidated damages