IF12581
IF12581
IF12581
Source: CRS using ESRI and U.S. Department of State map data. Areas of Influence based on ACAPS data and U.N. and media reports.
Notes: STC – Southern Transitional Council. AQAP – Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. All areas approximate and subject to change. Shading
includes lightly populated and uninhabited areas.
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Yemen: Conflict, Maritime Attacks, and U.S. Policy
Conflict Status and U.S. Diplomacy Since December 31, exchanges of fire between Houthi
forces and U.S. forces and U.S. allies have resulted in
Since 2015, conflict has caused widespread humanitarian
deaths of Houthi fighters, damage to merchant vessels, and
suffering and significant infrastructure damage in Yemen,
long the Arab world’s poorest country. In late 2021, the UN threats to U.S. and allied service personnel. Two U.S.
personnel died in a January operation that intercepted a
estimated that 377,000 people had died as a result of the
shipment of Iranian missile components to the Houthis. On
conflict (including combatants) and that nearly 60% of
deaths were from non-military causes, such as lack of food, January 11, 2024, following the passage of UN Security
Council Resolution 2722, U.S. and allied forces conducted
water, or health care. Foreign observers have denounced
dozens of joint strikes on Houthi targets across Yemen.
human rights violations attributed to all parties to the
U.S. and allied strikes on Houthi military targets have
conflict.
continued, as have Houthi attacks on U.S. and allied vessels
Since the Houthi-ROYG truce expired in October 2022, and commercial ships. Some reports indicate that Iran has
fighting has not returned to “pre-truce levels,” but some been sending additional military advisors and more
exchanges of fire and clashes have occurred. Houthi cross- sophisticated weapons to support Houthi actions.
border attacks into Saudi Arabia and coalition airstrikes,
once prominent elements of the war, largely ceased. U.S.
Humanitarian Situation
diplomats, led by Special Envoy for Yemen Ambassador According to the United Nations, 18.2 million people in
Yemen (more than half of Yemenis) need humanitarian
Timothy Lenderking, say they seek to transform the truce
assistance, 4.5 million are internally displaced, and 17.6
into a durable ceasefire, enable a political solution, and
support U.N. Special Representative for Yemen Hans million people are food insecure. Over 90% of food is
imported, making the food supply particularly susceptible
Grundberg.
to international shocks. U.N. appeals remain underfunded.
Since the October 2023 Hamas-led attacks on Israel and The U.N. Humanitarian Response Plan appeal for Yemen
onset of the war in Gaza, Houthi strikes on Israel and on sought $4.3 billion for 2023; by January 31, 2024, it was
commercial shipping vessels and U.S. and allied naval 39.5% funded. The 2024 appeal seeks $2.7 billion. Limits
vessels in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden have prompted on movement and bureaucracy constrain humanitarian
broader congressional attention to Yemen and its future. access, largely in Houthi-controlled areas.
Risks of renewed conflict in Yemen and widening U.S.-
Houthi clashes are evident. In addition to the diplomatic
Counterterrorism
objectives described above, U.S. policy goals in Yemen The State Department assesses that the “security vacuum”
in Yemen empowers Yemen-based terrorist groups, Iran’s
include restoring security to shipping lanes, interdicting
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force, and
Iranian aid to the Houthis, combatting transnational terrorist
Lebanon’s Hezbollah. U.N. sanctions monitors described
groups, and ensuring humanitarian aid delivery.
AQAP in January 2024 as “in decline” and facing
Maritime Attacks and U.S. Responses leadership losses, though senior U.S. counterterrorism
Following the October 7, 2023, Hamas attacks on Israel and officials have noted AQAP’s post-October 7 calls for
Israel’s military response in Gaza, the Houthis began attacks on U.S. citizens and interests. In January 2024, the
targeting Israeli territory as well as commercial vessels Biden Administration announced that the Houthis would be
transiting the Bab al Mandab Strait (see Figure 2). Initially, redesignated as Specially Designated Global Terrorists
the U.S. Navy intercepted Houthi-launched projectiles and (SDGT), effective February 16. Some lawmakers call for a
prevented attempted Houthi seizures of vessels. On redesignation of the Houthis as a Foreign Terrorist
December 18, the U.S. launched Operation Prosperity Organization (FTO), a status with legally defined
Guardian, a coalition formed to patrol the Red Sea. Despite designation and revocation criteria.
international action, continuing attacks have diverted traffic
from the Red Sea and driven up shipping firms’ costs,
Yemen and the 118th Congress
In the 118th Congress, the 2024 National Defense
insurance premiums, and ocean freight rates.
Authorization Act (P.L. 118-31) extends for one year an
Figure 2. Maritime Attacks and U.S. Responses existing ban on U.S. in-flight refueling of aircraft engaged
in hostilities in Yemen’s civil war. The act also requires
annual reporting to Congress on Iran’s support to the
Houthis. Some Members encouraged and support U.S.
strikes on Houthi targets and new efforts to disrupt Iranian
support. Others have questioned the President’s authority to
order broad strikes and warn against possible unintended
consequences. Supplemental appropriations measures in the
House and Senate may provide additional defense funds in
part for counter-Houthi operations. The Administration
seeks to avoid an escalation of conflict that might
jeopardize peace efforts and amplify humanitarian needs.
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Yemen: Conflict, Maritime Attacks, and U.S. Policy
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