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Updated February 7, 2024

Yemen: Conflict, Maritime Attacks, and U.S. Policy


Yemen is a conflict-afflicted nation along the strategic Bab resign. A U.N.-mediated transition and national dialogue
al Mandab Strait, one of the world’s most active shipping sought to broker new governing arrangements. The Houthi
lanes. Since 2015, a civil war has pitted the Iran-backed movement (alt. Ansar Allah or Partisans of God), a north
Houthi movement against Yemen’s internationally Yemen-based Zaydi Shia network, opposed U.N.-backed
recognized government, its backers, and other anti-Houthi outcomes and resumed the insurgent posture they had taken
forces. Foreign intervention complicates the conflict, which in previous rounds of fighting with the ROYG. In 2014, the
has contributed to what United Nations agencies have Houthis seized the capital, Sana’a, and later advanced on
described as “one of the largest humanitarian crises in the Aden. ROYG leaders fled and requested international
world.” An uneasy truce has frozen conflict lines since intervention. In March 2015, a coalition led by Saudi
2022 (Figure 1). Houthi attacks on international shipping Arabia began a military campaign against the Houthis,
have drawn major international attention back to Yemen whose attacks across Yemen’s borders grew in complexity
since October 2023, and have prompted U.S.-led coalition and scope with deepening support over time from Iran. The
counterstrikes. In December 2023, President Joe Biden United States has provided logistical, intelligence, and
notified Congress that “a small number” of U.S. forces advisory support to the coalition, but ended aerial refueling
pursue counterterrorism missions in Yemen. and limited arms sales to Saudi Arabia in response to
civilian casualties and congressional action.
Overview and Key Stakeholders
Long-running Yemeni disputes over governance and energy In 2019, tensions among anti-Houthi forces in the ROYG
resources have deepened since 2015 amid foreign influence (backed by Saudi Arabia) and the separatist Southern
and intervention. The Republic of Yemen was formed by a Transitional Council (STC, backed by the United Arab
1990 merger of the Sana’a-led Yemen Arab Republic (a Emirates) led to open warfare. A 2020 power-sharing
former Ottoman province, then Zaydi Shia-ruled kingdom) agreement formed a coalition government. Since 2022, an
and the Aden-led People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen eight-person Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) has led
(a former British colony and protectorate, then independent Yemen’s internationally recognized government. That year,
Marxist regime). North-south tensions and conflict have the ROYG and Houthis signed a truce, halting military
recurred since the 1960s, and a southern independence operations and establishing humanitarian measures. Lines
movement remains active. Tribal networks and local actors of conflict, in some areas mirroring Yemen’s pre-
are the most influential parties in many areas of the country. unification borders, remain frozen (Figure 1). Meanwhile,
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the
Arab Spring-era protests and unrest led the president of the
Islamic State have remained active in remote areas.
Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG) in 2012 to
Figure 1. Yemen: Key Actors and Approximate Areas of Influence
As of January 2024

Source: CRS using ESRI and U.S. Department of State map data. Areas of Influence based on ACAPS data and U.N. and media reports.
Notes: STC – Southern Transitional Council. AQAP – Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. All areas approximate and subject to change. Shading
includes lightly populated and uninhabited areas.

https://crsreports.congress.gov
Yemen: Conflict, Maritime Attacks, and U.S. Policy

Conflict Status and U.S. Diplomacy Since December 31, exchanges of fire between Houthi
forces and U.S. forces and U.S. allies have resulted in
Since 2015, conflict has caused widespread humanitarian
deaths of Houthi fighters, damage to merchant vessels, and
suffering and significant infrastructure damage in Yemen,
long the Arab world’s poorest country. In late 2021, the UN threats to U.S. and allied service personnel. Two U.S.
personnel died in a January operation that intercepted a
estimated that 377,000 people had died as a result of the
shipment of Iranian missile components to the Houthis. On
conflict (including combatants) and that nearly 60% of
deaths were from non-military causes, such as lack of food, January 11, 2024, following the passage of UN Security
Council Resolution 2722, U.S. and allied forces conducted
water, or health care. Foreign observers have denounced
dozens of joint strikes on Houthi targets across Yemen.
human rights violations attributed to all parties to the
U.S. and allied strikes on Houthi military targets have
conflict.
continued, as have Houthi attacks on U.S. and allied vessels
Since the Houthi-ROYG truce expired in October 2022, and commercial ships. Some reports indicate that Iran has
fighting has not returned to “pre-truce levels,” but some been sending additional military advisors and more
exchanges of fire and clashes have occurred. Houthi cross- sophisticated weapons to support Houthi actions.
border attacks into Saudi Arabia and coalition airstrikes,
once prominent elements of the war, largely ceased. U.S.
Humanitarian Situation
diplomats, led by Special Envoy for Yemen Ambassador According to the United Nations, 18.2 million people in
Yemen (more than half of Yemenis) need humanitarian
Timothy Lenderking, say they seek to transform the truce
assistance, 4.5 million are internally displaced, and 17.6
into a durable ceasefire, enable a political solution, and
support U.N. Special Representative for Yemen Hans million people are food insecure. Over 90% of food is
imported, making the food supply particularly susceptible
Grundberg.
to international shocks. U.N. appeals remain underfunded.
Since the October 2023 Hamas-led attacks on Israel and The U.N. Humanitarian Response Plan appeal for Yemen
onset of the war in Gaza, Houthi strikes on Israel and on sought $4.3 billion for 2023; by January 31, 2024, it was
commercial shipping vessels and U.S. and allied naval 39.5% funded. The 2024 appeal seeks $2.7 billion. Limits
vessels in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden have prompted on movement and bureaucracy constrain humanitarian
broader congressional attention to Yemen and its future. access, largely in Houthi-controlled areas.
Risks of renewed conflict in Yemen and widening U.S.-
Houthi clashes are evident. In addition to the diplomatic
Counterterrorism
objectives described above, U.S. policy goals in Yemen The State Department assesses that the “security vacuum”
in Yemen empowers Yemen-based terrorist groups, Iran’s
include restoring security to shipping lanes, interdicting
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force, and
Iranian aid to the Houthis, combatting transnational terrorist
Lebanon’s Hezbollah. U.N. sanctions monitors described
groups, and ensuring humanitarian aid delivery.
AQAP in January 2024 as “in decline” and facing
Maritime Attacks and U.S. Responses leadership losses, though senior U.S. counterterrorism
Following the October 7, 2023, Hamas attacks on Israel and officials have noted AQAP’s post-October 7 calls for
Israel’s military response in Gaza, the Houthis began attacks on U.S. citizens and interests. In January 2024, the
targeting Israeli territory as well as commercial vessels Biden Administration announced that the Houthis would be
transiting the Bab al Mandab Strait (see Figure 2). Initially, redesignated as Specially Designated Global Terrorists
the U.S. Navy intercepted Houthi-launched projectiles and (SDGT), effective February 16. Some lawmakers call for a
prevented attempted Houthi seizures of vessels. On redesignation of the Houthis as a Foreign Terrorist
December 18, the U.S. launched Operation Prosperity Organization (FTO), a status with legally defined
Guardian, a coalition formed to patrol the Red Sea. Despite designation and revocation criteria.
international action, continuing attacks have diverted traffic
from the Red Sea and driven up shipping firms’ costs,
Yemen and the 118th Congress
In the 118th Congress, the 2024 National Defense
insurance premiums, and ocean freight rates.
Authorization Act (P.L. 118-31) extends for one year an
Figure 2. Maritime Attacks and U.S. Responses existing ban on U.S. in-flight refueling of aircraft engaged
in hostilities in Yemen’s civil war. The act also requires
annual reporting to Congress on Iran’s support to the
Houthis. Some Members encouraged and support U.S.
strikes on Houthi targets and new efforts to disrupt Iranian
support. Others have questioned the President’s authority to
order broad strikes and warn against possible unintended
consequences. Supplemental appropriations measures in the
House and Senate may provide additional defense funds in
part for counter-Houthi operations. The Administration
seeks to avoid an escalation of conflict that might
jeopardize peace efforts and amplify humanitarian needs.

Christopher M. Blanchard, Specialist in Middle Eastern


Affairs
Source: CRS, using data from U.S. Department of Defense and Abigail G. Martin, Research Assistant
media reports. Attack and response data subject to change.
IF12581

https://crsreports.congress.gov
Yemen: Conflict, Maritime Attacks, and U.S. Policy

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to
congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress.
Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has
been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the
United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be
reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include
copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you
wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF12581 · VERSION 3 · UPDATED

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