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Voluntary disclosure and information asymmetry in

Denmark
Article in Journal of International Accounting Auditing and Taxation · December 2006

DOI: 10.1016/j.intaccaudtax.2006.08.004
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Accounting and Finance 48 (2008) 159–180
Value relevance of voluntary disclosure in the

J. Banghøj,
ORIGINAL
Blackwell
Oxford,
Accounting
ACFI
©
0810-5391
Journal
XXX T.
The Authors Plenborg/Accounting
ARTICLES
compilation
UKPublishing
and Finance
©Ltd
2007 AFAANZ and Finance XX (2008) XXX–XXX
annual report
Jesper Banghøj, Thomas Plenborg

Department of Accounting and Auditing, Copenhagen Business School, DK-2000
Frederiksberg, Denmark
Abstract
This paper examines whether the level of voluntary disclosure affects the associa-
tion between current returns and future earnings. Economic theory suggests that
firms might find it advantageous to provide additional pieces of information
(i.e. voluntary disclosure) to investors and analysts. Our results indicate that
more voluntary disclosure does not improve the association between current
returns and future earnings (i.e. current returns do not reflect more future earnings
news). This finding raises the question of whether voluntary information in the
annual report contains value-relevant information about future earnings or if
investors are simply not capable of incorporating voluntary information in the
firm value estimates.
Key words: Disclosure; Future earnings; Informativeness
JEF classification: M410
doi: 10.1111/j.1467-629x.2007.00240.x
1. Introduction
This study examines whether a higher level of voluntary disclosure in the

annual report reduces the information gap (asymmetry) between companies and
investors in Denmark. A primary objective of disclosure is to inform analysts
and investors about the amount, timing and uncertainty of future earnings (cash
flows); that is, disclosure helps analysts and investors to predict future earnings
(Verrecchia, 1983). Several studies document that a better disclosure practice
We gratefully acknowledge the helpful comments from Christian Petersen, Peter Ove
Christensen, Bent Jesper Christensen, Frank Thinggaard, Johannes Raaballe and seminar
participants at Aarhus University.
Received 16 November 2006; accepted 27 June 2007 by Ian Zimmer (Deputy Editor).
© The Authors
Journal compilation © 2007 AFAANZ
160 J. Banghφ j, T. Plenborg/Accounting and Finance 48 (2008) 159–180
improves analysts’ forecast accuracy of next year’s earnings (e.g. Lang and
Lundholm, 1996). However, their results might simply reflect that firms manage
their analyst relationship better. Therefore, we take these results one step fur-
ther by conjecturing that voluntary (disclosure) information in the annual report
on future earnings is reflected in current stock prices. This implies that firms
with a high level of (value relevant) voluntary disclosure have a stronger associ-
ation between current stock returns and future earnings than firms with a low
level of (value relevant) disclosure. Therefore, our (alternative) hypothesis is
that the level of voluntary disclosure improves the association between current
stock returns and future earnings.
Only a few studies have addressed this problem. Lundholm and Myers (2002)
and Gelb and Zarowin (2002) are notable exceptions. Based on US data, both
studies find that firms with relatively more informative disclosures ‘bring the
future forward’ so that current stock returns reflect more future earnings news.
However, Gelb and Zarowin (2002) also find that enhanced annual report
disclosures do not make current stock prices more informative. This result
seriously questions the usefulness of voluntary disclosure in the annual report.
As no disclosure index is available in Denmark, it has been necessary to con-
struct one on Danish firms. Our disclosure index purely relies on information
from the annual report, and our results, therefore, are comparable with the ones
reported in Gelb and Zarowin (2002).1
The present study documents an increased level of disclosure across time.
The level of voluntary disclosure, as measured in the present study, increases by
approximately 40 per cent during the period 1996–2000. Our empirical results
support the findings of Gelb and Zarowin (2002). Despite an increased level of
voluntary disclosure, we find that voluntary disclosure from the annual report
does not improve the association between current stock returns and future
earnings. In fact, in some of the alternative specifications, we find that a higher
level of voluntary disclosure in the annual report reduces the association between
current returns and future earnings. Although the objective of the annual report
is to provide useful information to the stakeholders, investors in Danish com-
panies have not benefited from an improved level of voluntary disclosure.
This raises the question of whether value-relevant information about future per-
formance is included in voluntary information in the annual report or if investors
are simply not capable of incorporating voluntary information in the firm value
estimates.
In her speech at the American Accounting Association meeting, Schipper
(2005) argues that investors underweight (or ignore altogether) disclosures.
Hence, she points out that it is important to improve our understanding of how
the market reads disclosure in the annual report. In a review of the empirical
1
The annual report document in the Danish disclosure environment is of relative importance
to other disclosures similar to the USA.
© The Authors
J. Banghφ j, T. Plenborg/Accounting and Finance 48 (2008) 159–180 161
disclosure literature, Healy and Palepu (2000) find that nearly all studies on
disclosure are based on US data. They question whether the results from the USA
can be generalized to non-US countries characterized by a different institutional
setting. For example, Hope (2003) finds that firms’ disclosure practices vary
substantially across countries. This might imply that disclosure serves different
purposes and that the value relevance of the disclosure, therefore, might vary
substantially across countries. More specifically, does disclosure have the same
effect on the association between current stock returns and future earnings
across different institutional settings? Throughout the present paper, there are
comparisons between the US and Danish voluntary disclosure environments
owing to the comparatively larger body of literature in this area conducted for
the US environment.
The Danish corporate ownership structure generally reflects an institutional
setting where frequent heavily concentrated shareholdings and controlling
ownership are prevalent (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). La Porta et al. (1999) find
that Scandinavian countries including Denmark, have a higher level of ownership
concentration than countries such as the USA and Australia. Based on data
from La Porta et al. (1999), New Zealand seems to have a higher level of
ownership concentration than Australia but a smaller level than Denmark. The
existence of more heavily concentrated shareholdings and controlling ownership
in Denmark might imply different reporting practices. For example, firms with
high ownership concentration might be reluctant to provide voluntary disclosure
as owners have alternative ways (inside) of getting information. Consequently,
the market for voluntary disclosure might not be as developed in Denmark as in
Australia or New Zealand, which reduces the chances that voluntary disclosure
is used as a means to diminish the information asymmetry.
However, Warfield et al. (1995) argue that because of greater ownership con-
centration, companies are more likely to disclose accounting information that
reflects firm economics. Other research supports this position. Grossman and
Hart (1980) and Shleifer and Vishny (1986) find that in firms with many share-
holders, it is not worthwhile for an individual investor to monitor manage-
ment’s performance. According to the monitoring ‘theory’ in a setting like the
Danish with a high level of ownership concentration, it is likely that voluntary
disclosure is used as a means to reduce the information asymmetry. Large
shareholders will discipline the management to produce value-relevant informa-
tion that will reduce the information asymmetry.
The above considerations suggest that different ownership concentrations most
likely will have an impact on firms’ disclosure policy. However, it is not possible
to predict a priori how the ownership concentration affects the relationship
between the level of disclosure and the prediction of future earnings.
According to Alexander and Archer (2003), the Danish accounting regulation
has until recently been characterized as liberal and there has only been some
self-regulation to support the loose legal regulation. However, the development
in the last decade seems to indicate that a change is taking place towards a
© The Authors
growing and broader interest in accounting legislation and towards stricter accounting
regulation, especially concerning public companies.
As a consequence of the loose accounting regulation in the past, Danish firms
have been subject to a high degree of freedom when choosing between different
accounting methods and how much information to disclose in the annual report.
Basu et al. (1998) compare the degree of freedom to choose between accounting
methods for 10 countries, including Australia and the USA. Based on nine
accounting items, they find that the accounting practice in the USA and Australia
are similar. If we replicate the study on Danish data, we find that Danish firms
were allowed a higher level of discretion to choose between different accounting
methods for the nine accounting items examined in 1996–2000 (e.g. goodwill,
revaluation of fixed assets and deferred tax). This supports the notion that Danish
firms have been subject to a higher degree of freedom when choosing between
different accounting methods than, for example, Australian firms. Furthermore,
Hope (2003) finds that the level of disclosure among listed Australian and
New Zealand firms is considerably higher than among listed Danish firms.
However, Hope (2003) finds that the enforcement of accounting information
seems similar in Denmark, Australia and New Zealand. This study contributes
to the literature by examining whether companies in a setting with a modest
level of accounting regulation ‘fill out the information gap’ through voluntary
disclosure and thereby improve investor protection. If Danish companies succeed in
reducing the information gap (asymmetry), there are reasons to believe that the
association between current stock returns and future earnings will improve.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section contains
a literature review. In the third section, the research design is outlined. The
sample selection and descriptive statistics are provided in the fourth section,
followed by the empirical results and sensitivity checks. Conclusions and
suggestions for future research appear in the final section.
2. Relation to prior literature
Prior studies attempting to empirically assess the benefits of enhanced disclosure

practices mainly focus on the benefits to the disclosing firm. For example,
Botosan (1997) finds that firms that are not closely followed by financial analysts
experience lower cost of capital with increases in disclosure. In the only study
on disclosure in Denmark, Petersen and Plenborg (2006) find that voluntary
disclosure is negatively associated with proxies for information asymmetry.2
Lang and Lundholm (1996) find the level of analysts’ disagreement (i.e.
earnings forecast) to be driven by the quality of management disclosures. They
2
A review of the European Accounting Review, Journal of Business, Finance and Accounting,
Accounting and Business Research and British Accounting Review over the past 8 years
(1998 – 2005) reveals that empirical studies on disclosure are rare.
© The Authors
argue that as firms disclose more value-relevant information, analysts will rely
more on the disclosed information in preparing their earnings forecast. Their
empirical findings also show that enhanced disclosure practices are associated with
more accurate analysts’ forecasts. In a European study, Vanstraelen et al. (2003)
find that the voluntary disclosure of forward-looking information is associated
with significantly lower dispersion levels and higher accuracy of analysts’
earnings forecast. In contrast, voluntary disclosure on historical information
does not affect either the dispersion or accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecasts.
Contrary to Lang and Lundholm (1996) and Vanstraelen et al. (2003), the
present study measures the association between current returns and future earnings
directly, rather than relying on proxies such as analyst forecasts. As pointed
out by Gelb and Zarowin (2002, p. 35), ‘more accurate analyst forecasts might
be evidence of firms “managing” their analyst relationships better (i.e. whisper
numbers), rather than evidence that there are economically important and
empirically detectable benefits of enhanced disclosure, which suggest that
enhanced disclosure might make prices more informative’.
Only a few studies have examined whether enhanced disclosure is associated
with stock prices that are more informative about future earnings. Miller and
Piotroski (2000) find that when firms include forward-looking statements in their
quarterly earnings announcements, the announcement-period stock returns are
more highly associated with the next quarter’s earnings information. Lundholm
and Myers (2002) find that firms with relatively more informative disclosures
‘bring the future forward’ so that current stock returns reflect more future
earnings news. In a similar study, Gelb and Zarowin (2002) obtain a better
association between current stock returns and future earnings for companies
with better disclosure practices. Gelb and Zarowin (2002) also examine the
usefulness of three disclosure indices.3 They find that enhanced annual report
disclosures do not make current stock prices more informative. In summary,
our literature review supports that a firm’s disclosure practice affects the associ-
ation between current returns and future earnings. However, the disclosure from
the annual report does not contain value-relevant information about future
earnings.
3. Research design
This section discusses the methodology adopted and the construction of the
disclosure index.
3
Both Lundholm and Myers (2002) and Gelb and Zarowin (2002) apply the Association of
Investment Management and Research–Financial Analyst Federation disclosure scores. This
disclosure is based on analyst rank of firms by the informativeness of their disclosures.
Scores are given for the following three disclosure categories: annual report, investor rela-
tions and other publications.
© The Authors
3.1. Methodology
Our approach to measuring current and future earnings news in current returns
follows the work of Kothari and Sloan (1992), Collins et al. (1994), Lundholm
and Myers (2002) and Gelb and Zarowin (2002). Based on the observation that
accounting recognition lags stock returns in measuring value creation, these
papers add future earnings into the regression of current returns on current
earnings. Collins et al. (1994) apply the following specification:
3
Rt = β0 + β1UXt + ∑ βi+1∆ Et ( Xt+i ) + εt , (1)
i=1
where Rt is annual stock returns, UX is unanticipated earnings and ∆ E(X ) is

revision in market expectations from the beginning of period t.
Collins et al. (1994) limit i to 3 years. They find that current returns do not
significantly anticipate earnings changes more than 3 years ahead.
Because the independent variables are not directly observable, we apply the
level of Xt and Xt–1 as proxy for UX. Therefore, our specification becomes:
3
Rt = β0 + β1Xt −1 + β2 Xt + ∑ β3i Xt+i + εt . (2)4
i=1
As pointed out by Lundholm and Myers (2002), by including Xt–1 we allow the
regression to find the best representation of the prior expectation of current
earnings. If the coefficient of Xt–1 is negative (but of similar magnitude), the
earnings follow a random walk. If the coefficient on Xt–1 is zero, then earnings
is being treated as white noise. Consistent with prior published literature, we
expect the coefficients on Xt and Xt+i to be positive.
Collins et al. (1994) point out an error in variables problem. In specification
(2) we apply realized future earnings as proxy for expected future earnings, but
realized earnings has both expected and unexpected components; hence, this
proxy contains a measurement error. Collins et al. (1994) include future stock
returns in the regressions to control for the unexpected component of future
earnings. In an efficient market, the unexpected components will be reflected in
future stock returns. Accordingly, we include future returns as a control variable.
3
Rt = β0 + β1Xt −1 + β2 Xt + ∑ (β3i Xt+i + β4i Rt+i ) + εt . (3)
i=1
4
Gelb and Zarowin (2002) apply an alternative specification:
3
Rt = β 0 + β1∆ Xt + ∑ β2i ∆ Xt+i + ε t .
i=1
We also apply the change specification of earnings. However, as shown in the empirical
section, we obtain results similar to the ones applying a level specification.
© The Authors
In general, future returns should be uncorrelated with current returns in a

regression excluding future earnings. Collins et al. (1994) find that the sign
on future returns is negative and significant, which indicates that irrelevant
components related to future returns are removed from future earnings, leaving
a better approximation to the changes in expectations of future earnings that
occurred in period t.
We assume that companies that disclose information about future earnings
will improve the association between current returns and future earnings. Hence,
there is an interaction between future earnings and the current level of a firm’s
disclosure, which we incorporate in the regression as follows:
3
Rt = β0 + β1Xt −1 + β2 Xt + ∑ (β3i Xt+i + β4i Rt+i ) + β5 Dt + β6 Xt−1 ⋅ Dt
i=1
3
+ β7 Xt ⋅ Dt + ∑ (β8i Xt+i ⋅ Dt + β9i Rt+i ⋅ Dt ) + εt . (4)
i=1
D is the disclosure score. We hypothesize that the association between current

return and future earnings will improve for firms that disclose (current)
information about future earnings; that is, disclosures that reveal information
about the future earnings potential will be incorporated in the current stock
prices by investors. Therefore, the coefficient on the interaction term Xt+i · Dt is
expected to be positive. We do not have any prediction on the coefficient on the
interaction term Rt+i · Dt.
There are 17 variables in equation (4). In addition, we add a number of control
variables. Therefore, in the interest of parsimony we apply a reduced version of
equation (4):
Rt = β0 + β1Xt −1 + β2 Xt + β3 X3 + β 4 R3 + β5 Dt
+ β6 Xt −1 ⋅ Dt + β7 Xt ⋅ Dt + β8 X3 ⋅ Dt + β9 R3 ⋅ Dt + ε t , (5)
where
R3 = The buy and hold return for 3 years period following t. The buy and hold
return is measured as 4 months after the fiscal year end t to 4 months after
the fiscal year end t + 3; and
X3 = The sum of annual earnings for 3 years following t, all deflated by the
market value of equity 4 months after t – 1 fiscal year end.
By aggregating 3 years of data we force each year to have the same coefficient.
However, we reduce the number of independent variables from 17 to 9.
Lundholm and Myers (2002) also adopt the approach and they obtain identical
results with equations (4) and (5).5
5
As a sensitivity test we also run model (4) allowing the coefficients on future earnings and
future returns to vary across time.
© The Authors
Previous studies have documented that the level of disclosure is correlated

with ownership concentration, size and leverage. Petersen and Plenborg (2006)
find a negative correlation between ownership concentration and a firm’s dis-
closure score. Neither Gelb and Zarowin (2002) nor Lundholm and Myers
(2002) control for ownership concentration. Furthermore, Lang and Lundholm
(1993) find that firms with higher disclosure scores are larger than firms with
lower scores. Ahmed and Courtis (1999) provide a meta-analysis of 23 separate
studies of the association between the disclosure level in the annual reports and
various firm characteristics. They find that leverage is correlated with disclosure
level. Therefore, ownership concentration, size and leverage are included in
equation (5) as control variables. In addition, Lundholm and Myers (2002) also
include past growth, risk and presence of accounting loss as control variables.
To rule out that our disclosure score is merely a proxy for these determinants of
the earnings response coefficient, we also include them as additional control
variables.
Leverage is defined as book value of equity scaled by total liabilities. Growth
is measured as the percentage growth in total assets from period t – 1 to t. Loss
is an indicator variable that equals 1 when earnings is negative and 0 otherwise.
Beta (risk) is estimated through a market model regression using at least 24 of
the 60 monthly return observations for the year in question (e.g. 1996) and the
preceding 4 years. The accounting variables (i.e. earnings, book value of equity,
total liabilities and total assets) and monthly stock returns (prices) are retrieved
from Datastream.6 Size (MV) is measured as the log of market value of a firm’s
equity. Ownership concentration (Owner) is measured as shares held by block-
holders, including officers, directors (and their families), trusts, and pension/
benefit plans, and shares held by other firms or individuals that hold more than
5 per cent. The data are obtained from Worldscope International Database,
Greens and annual reports.7 Because Danish ownership data are both difficult
and extremely time consuming to collect, we use ownership data for 1998 as
proxy for the entire 1996–2000 period. A similar assumption is introduced in
previous ownership studies, such as Warfield et al. (1995) on US data and
Gabrielsen et al. (2002) on Danish data.
6
To ensure the data quality, we compared data from Datastream with data from the annual
reports. We found that the data from Datastream correspond with data from the annual
reports and, hence, are reliable.
7
In Denmark, investors owning 5 per cent or more of a corporation’s stock must report their
holdings to the firm, and this information is then published with the company’s annual
report. Despite this requirement, the exact voting power by an investor is not necessarily
known because of the frequent occurrence of dual stock classes. Shares of different stock
classes normally have different voting rights, but shareholders are not required to report the
number of votes attached to their holdings. In eight cases it was necessary to approach the
company for more detailed information about the voting power.
© The Authors
3.2. Construction of the disclosure index
Most prior studies on disclosure use data from the Association of Investment
Management and Research (AIMR) as a proxy for firms’ disclosure policy. As
no disclosure index that resembles the one by AIMR is available in Denmark, it
has been necessary to construct a similar one on Danish firms. The design of
the index is inspired by earlier studies and reports, including Jenkins (1994),
Botosan (1997), PricewaterhouseCoopers (1999) and the Nørby (2001) report.8
Common to these studies is the focus on investors’ needs. Our disclosure index
purely relies on information from the annual report and is based on the following
five subcategories: (i) strategy; (ii) competition and outlook; (iii) production;
(iv) sales and marketing; and (v) human capital.9
A total of 62 indicators within the five groups have been identified (see
Appendix). The Financial Statement Act does not require disclosure of any of
those indicators. Therefore, disclosing any of the 62 indicators is entirely
voluntary.10 Even though the ‘level of disclosure’ is measured by the number of
indicators (i.e. quantitative measure), they should also be qualitative to be
informative. As our index is based on prior research and reports, it provides
some evidence, albeit indirectly, that the indicators are qualitative as well. By
assigning points for each of the 62 information indicators a firm discloses, each
firm gets a score on the disclosure index.11 Because 1 point is assigned for each
piece of information in the annual report, the maximum score is 62.12
4. Sample selection and descriptive statistics
4.1. Sample selection
This study includes 36 industrial firms listed on the Copenhagen Stock

Exchange. We use the annual reports for the period 1996–2000 to construct the
disclosure score.13 The Danish accounting standard setting environment was
8
The Nørby report contains recommendations about proper corporate governance. The
Copenhagen Stock Exchange suggests that firms implement the recommendations from the
Nørby committee.
9
See Botosan (1997) for a discussion of advantages and disadvantages of using the AIRM
disclosure index versus a self-constructed disclosure index.
10
Except in the rare case that the information is needed in order to give ‘a true and fair view’.
11
Scores are robust as all were conducted by a single individual following the specified criteria.
12
Only one point is given for each piece of information even if this piece of information
appears more than once in the annual report.
13
To be able to estimate future earnings, 2000 was chosen as the last year. In fact, 2001
could have been used as the last year but at the time of the data collection we intended to
apply 4 years of future earnings.
© The Authors
stable in that period and characterized by only a few changes in the accounting
policies. The reports were carefully examined, and the relevant pieces of voluntary
disclosure were extracted for each of the five disclosure indices. The final
sample of 36 firms was selected as follows. To obtain variety in disclosure
level, a large sample is preferable. However, we focus on only one industry to
control for other factors besides disclosure that affect the relation between current
returns and future earnings. Because firms in an industry are homogeneous in
their real activities and most likely adopt similar accounting practices (White
et al., 2003), their earnings should have similar timeliness and forecast ability.
The Copenhagen Stock Exchange industrial index consists of 58 firms, and was
chosen as it is the largest index (i.e. the one including the largest number of
firms). Within this group the subgroup 2010 Industrial goods has been selected
comprising 45 firms. Hence, 13 firms in the subgroups ‘Commercial Service
Suppliers’ and ‘Transportation’ were deselected because those firms differ from
the majority of other industrial firms as they do not have any physical produc-
tion line. Finally, a total of 9 firms were eliminated to avoid double counting,
as those 9 firms are represented in the industrial index by two stock classes. The
final sample consists of 36 firms covering the period 1996–2000, totalling 152
firm-year observations.14
4.2. Descriptive statistics
Table 1 provides summary statistics for our sample. The mean (median)
current return is 7.3 per cent (2.4 per cent). The mean (median) current earnings
(deflated by market value) is 11.1 per cent (9.9 per cent). The mean (median)
accumulated 3 year earnings is as expected, roughly three times the size of
current earnings. In contrast, future returns is negative, which might indicate
structural changes in the returns over the sample time period. A closer look at
the returns reveals that differences in measurement periods explain the differ-
ences between current and future returns. Current returns are measured in the
time period 1996–2000, whereas future returns are measured in the time period
1997–2003. For example, future returns are not affected by the strong (current)
returns of 32 per cent in 1996. Furthermore, future returns are affected by poor
(negative) stock market performance in 2001 and 2002. The negative value on
future returns may affect the measure’s ability to proxy for measurement error
in future earnings (the unexpected component of future earnings).15
As evidenced by Panel B of Table 1, the mean (median) disclosure score is
increasing over time from 9.9 (11.0) in 1996 to 14.6 (14.0) in 2000. This trend
14
The final sample size is also affected by missing observations and delistings/listings.
15
As a sensitivity check we replace future returns with growth in investments as a proxy for
the measurement error in future earnings. This is consistent with Collins et al. (1994) who
also apply growth in investments as a proxy for the measurement error in future earnings.
© The Authors
Table 1
Descriptive statistics and disclosure scores
Panel A: Descriptive statistics (152 observations)
Variable Mean Minimum 25% 50% 75% Maximum
Current returns 0.072559 – 0.65584 – 0.16652 0.02425 0.225362 1.365854

Current earnings 0.110929 – 0.87639 0.061137 0.0993 0.17185 0.815636
3 year accumulated earnings 0.245348 – 1.73423 0.050593 0.249902 0.422644 2.168396
3 year accumulated buy –0.07303 – 0.93301 – 0.40753 – 0.16935 0.276606 1.640964
and hold return
Market value 1165.034 19.08 106.15 275.13 868.905 45 055.79
Disclosure score 12.17763 0 7 12 17 30
Current returns (Rt) for year t are the buy and hold returns for the 12 month period starting 4 months
after year t – 1 fiscal year end. Current earnings (Xt) for the year t is ordinary income, scaled by market
value at fiscal year end. Future earnings (X3t) is the sum of ordinary income for the 3 years following
the current year scaled by market value at fiscal year end. Future returns (R3t) are the buy and hold
returns for the 3 year period following the current year. Market value is the market value of equity at
the fiscal year end. DS is the disclosure score.
Panel B: Five types of disclosure scores from 1996–2000
DS STRA COMP PROD MARK HR
n Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
1996 26 9.9 11.0 2.6 2.0 2.7 2.0 3.4 3.0 0.8 1.0 0.4 0.0
1997 31 10.3 11.0 2.8 3.0 2.6 2.0 3.5 3.0 0.8 1.0 0.6 0.0
1998 34 12.5 12.5 3.7 4.0 2.9 2.5 3.6 3.0 0.9 0.5 1.4 1.0
1999 32 13.3 12.5 4.0 4.0 2.9 3.0 3.9 4.0 1.1 0.5 1.3 1.0
2000 29 14.6 14.0 4.6 5.0 3.4 3.0 4.3 4.0 1.0 1.0 1.3 1.0
a
DS is the firms’ individual disclosure score on the 62 indicators. STRA is the firms’ individual disclosure
score on strategic issues (12 indicators). COMP is the firms’ disclosure score on competitive landscape
and outlook (13 indicators). PROD is the firms’ individual disclosure score on production details
(13 indicators). MARK is the firms’ disclosure score on marketing strategy (13 indicators). HR is the
firms’ disclosure score on human capital (11 indicators). n is number of observations.
is the same for all five subcategories. The score for strategy, competition and pro-
duction is significantly higher than for marketing strategy and human resources.
For 2000, the score on strategy was the highest score, suggesting that manage-
ment find information about strategy to be an important issue. Even though the
firms of today are increasingly dependent on intangible resources at large,
including know-how and skills of employees, disclosure on human capital (HR)
is still fairly low.16
16
The modest focus on HR might simply reflect the nature of industry included in the analysis.
© The Authors
Table 2
Pearson correlations (p-values) (n = 152)
Rt Xt–1 Xt X3t R3t DSt MV
Rt 0.03096 0.30064 0.29248 – 0.05954 0.0509 0.11661

0.705 0.0002 0.0003 0.4662 0.5335 0.1525
Xt–1 0.41351 0.20582 0.16332 – 0.04608 – 0.0047
0.00001 0.011 0.0444 0.5729 0.9541
Xt 0.44252 0.22049 – 0.04299 – 0.04169
0.00001 0.0063 0.599 0.6101
X3t 0.54521 – 0.14554 – 0.01594
0.00001 0.0736 0.8454
R3t – 0.10214 – 0.14433
0.2105 0.0761
DSt 0.2299
0.0044
after year t – 1 fiscal year end. Current earnings (Xt) for the year t is ordinary income, scaled by market
returns for the 3 year period following the current year. Market value is the market value of equity at
the fiscal year end. DS is the disclosure score.
Table 2 provides correlations between the dependent and independent variables.

As documented in previous studies, current returns (R) are strongly correlated
with both current (X) and future earnings (X3). Furthermore, current returns are
uncorrelated with future returns (R3). However, future returns are significantly
correlated with future earnings (X3), consistent with Collins et al. (1994). These
correlations indicate that future returns should not influence the results except
through their role as a proxy for the measurement error in future earnings.
The coefficient on the correlation between current returns and the disclosure
score is only 5 per cent and insignificant. This indicates that the disclosure
practice in Danish companies is not necessarily driven by current performance.
Lundholm and Myers (2002) find a positive and significant correlation between
current returns and the disclosure score. However, their correlation coefficient
is only 3 per cent, which indicates that the significance level is affected by the
sample size (n = 4478). Size measured as the market value of equity is correlated
with disclosure. Therefore, larger companies seem to have a more rigorous
information policy. This is consistent with the results reported in Lundholm and
Myers (2002).
5. Empirical results
In the spirit of Lundholm and Myers (2002), we report the results based on
specification (5) above. Using panel data analysis and a specification (model 1)
© The Authors
similar to Collins et al. (1994), we find that the coefficient on current earnings
is positive and significant at the 1 per cent level.17 Furthermore, current returns
contain information about future earnings. The coefficient on X3 is both positive
and significant at the 1 per cent level. This is consistent with accounting recognition
lags stock returns in measuring value creation. The coefficient on R3 is negative
and significant at the 1 per cent level, indicating that realized future earnings
contain measurement error that future returns remove. The coefficient on Xt–1 is
negative but insignificant. The negative sign on X t–1 suggests that earnings
follow a random walk. Hence, based on Danish data we obtain results that are
similar to the ones in Collins et al. (1994).18
In model (2) we include the disclosure score. In general, the results remain
similar to the ones reported in model (1). The coefficient on X3 is still positive
and significant, which suggests that current returns contain information about
future earnings. However, the coefficients on DS and the interaction term of DS
and X3 are not significantly different from zero. As DS*X3 and DS*R3 together
proxy for realized future earnings, a more powerful test examines the joint
significance of DS*X3 and DS*R3. The partial F-test of the joint test of these
variables is 0.10 and insignificant. These results reject the basic idea that
disclosures published in the annual report reveal information about future earnings.
In Table 3, we apply a model where 3 years of accumulated earnings is
included. However, by aggregating 3 years of earnings we are essentially
restricting the coefficient on earnings to be similar for each firm-year. There-
fore, we run a regression where each year of future earnings and future returns
are included in the regression separately. The results are reported in Table 4.
Although the sign of the coefficients on Xt–1 and Xt have the expected sign,
they are not significantly different from zero. Only the coefficient on Xt+1 is
positive and significantly different from zero (10 per cent level). This indicates
that our result in Table 3 is primarily driven by the next year’s earnings. Current
returns do not contain information about earnings 2 or 3 years ahead. This
result contradicts the findings in Collins et al. (1994) and suggests that current
returns in Denmark are less informative about future earnings than current
returns in the USA. More importantly, the coefficient on DS remains close to
zero. The coefficients on the interaction terms DS*Xt+i and DS*Rt+i are in general
not significantly different from zero. A notable exception is the coefficient on
DS*X2, which is positive and significant at the 10 per cent level.19 As pointed
17
All statistics are reported as two-tailed tests.
18
Several deletion procedures have been applied without affecting the results reported. The
deletion procedure applied in the results reported is as follows: all (deflated) 1 year earnings
levels (3 years accumulated earnings) greater than 1.5 (6) have been deleted. Four per cent
of the sample was deleted due to outliers. Our deletion procedure is similar to deletion
procedures applied in other earnings level studies (see e.g. Easton and Harris, 1991).
19
The coefficient on X2 remains still negative for ‘high’ disclosure firms (– 0.74287 + 0.07536).
© The Authors
Table 3
Regression on current returns on current and aggregated future earnings and interactions with disclosure
(n = 152)
Independent variables Model 1 Model 2
Intercept –0.04386 – 0.08566

0.2486 0.3903
Xt–1 – 0.17377 – 0.83604
0.2914 0.2574
Xt 0.47948 0.77901
0.008 0.1506
X3t 0.26517 0.40145
0.0002 0.0512
R3t – 0.22418 – 0.15571
0.0011 0.3119
DS 0.00418
0.5511
DSt*Xt–1 0.03602
0.4449
DSt*Xt – 0.01749
0.5785
DSt*X3t – 0.01039
0.4665
DSt*R3t – 0.00411
0.6877
Adjusted R2 0.1773 0.1646
after year t – 1 fiscal year end. Current earnings (Xt) for year t is ordinary income, scaled by market
returns for the 3 year period following the current year. DS is the disclosure score.
out above, DS*X3 and DS*R3 together proxy for realized future earnings. Con-
sequently, we examine the joint significance of DS*Xt+i and DS*Rt+i. The partial
F-test of the joint test of these variables is 0.71 and insignificant, which
reinforces that voluntary disclosure from the annual report does not bring future
earnings forward in time.
We also included yearly indicator variables in the regressions.20 The resulting
coefficient estimates are consistent with the ones reported in Table 3 and the
significance levels remain unchanged (not tabulated).21
20
We do not run year-by-year regressions because in some of the sample years, we have
only approximately 26 observations, and the models examined estimate up to 21 parameters.
21
Sensitivity checks that are not reported in the tables are available upon request from the
authors.
© The Authors
Table 4
Regression of current returns on current and future earnings and returns and interactions with disclosure
(n = 152)
Intercept Xt–1 Xt Xt+1 Xt+2 Xt+3
–0.14614 – 0.23967 0.83969 1.09832 – 0.74287 0.56698

0.1229 0.5539 0.1592 0.0701 0.2221 0.212
DS DSt*Xt–1 DSt*Xt DSt*Xt+1 DSt*Xt+2 DSt*Xt+3
0.00817 – 0.00267 –0.02295 –0.06487 0.07536 – 0.0307

0.247 0.9388 0.495 0.545 0.0771 0.3745
R1 R2 R3 DSt*Rt+1 DSt*Rt+2 DSt*Rt+3 Adjusted R2
0.09833 – 0.19915 0.09704 –0.00936 –0.00497 – 0.01536 0.1721

0.6234 0.3263 0.6031 0.4502 0.7396 0.244
value at fiscal year end. Future earnings (Xt+i) are the income before extraordinary items for the 3 years
following the current year scaled by market value at fiscal year end (t – 1). Future returns are the annual
buy and hold returns for the 3 year period following the current year. DS is the disclosure score.
To examine if some of the information in the disclosure contain value-relevant

information, we decompose our disclosure index according to the five categories
(strategy, competition and outlook, production, sales and marketing, and human
capital) and run a regression for each subdisclosure index. However, the coeffi-
cients on the disclosure index and interaction terms are not significantly different
from zero (not reported).
We also run regressions including the following control variables: leverage,
growth, loss indicator, risk, size and ownership.22,23 The results are reported in
Table 5. The results remain qualitatively similar to the ones reported in Table 3.
For example, the coefficients on DS*X3 and DS*R3 remain consistently close to
zero and insignificant.
Whereas our earnings metric is ordinary earnings, Gelb and Zarowin (2002)
apply Earnings Before Interest, Tax, Depreciation, and Amortization (EBITDA).
22
Due to the limited number of observations (degrees of freedom), only one control vari-
able is included in the model at a time. This corresponds to Lundholm and Myers (2002).
23
By including control variables we expect to reduce the residuals, although they will also
affect our degrees of freedom.
© The Authors
Table 5
Regressions of current returns on aggregated current and future earnings and interactions with disclosure
and controls for the determinants of earnings response coefficients and the sign of the dependent
variable (n = 152)
Model Growth Size Beta Ownership Leverage Loss
Intercept – 0.03975 0.08031 –0.07877 – 0.14158 – 0.16645 – 0.41683

0.7266 0.647 0.4278 0.4842 –1.48 0.0043
Xt–1 –1.23257 – 0.14667 – 0.83677 –1.83785 –1.68371 0.29626
0.1583 0.8073 0.2693 0.2159 0.0468 0.4114
Xt 0.86709 0.20053 0.76506 1.94998 2.9468 – 0.20044
0.1235 0.7485 0.1588 0.137 0.0003 0.7534
X3t 0.31846 0.29733 0.31470 0.20283 0.11261 0.4843
0.1373 0.2844 0.1215 0.5215 0.6181 0.0072
R3t –0.12879 –0.33211 –0.14181 – 0.45897 – 0.21968 – 0.19236
0.4150 0.3 0.3433 0.2194 0.1601 0.2037
DS – 0.00106 0.01229 –0.00537 0.00409 0.00434 0.02255
0.8950 0.139 0.5325 0.5928 0.5356 0.0322
DSt*Xt–1 –0.06112 0.00809 0.04765 0.06238 0.06262 – 0.04229
0.2662 0.8691 0.4283 0.2442 0.1976 0.1276
DSt*Xt –0.01878 –0.03248 –0.01734 – 0.03805 – 0.05834 0.04243
0.5542 0.4137 0.6075 0.3399 0.0899 0.2886
DSt*X3t –0.00322 –0.00595 –0.00730 – 0.00463 – 0.00567 – 0.02563
0.8419 0.6969 0.6352 0.7639 0.7027 0.032
DSt*R3t –0.00964 –0.00458 0.0014 – 0.00134 – 0.00244 0.01135
0.4114 0.7179 0.9053 0.9075 0.826 0.2415
Control 0.30405 –0.05193 0.26163 0.08719 0.03607 0.00695
0.0435 0.1868 0.0218 0.7256 0.4821 0.9876
Control*Xt–1 0.10008 –0.01876 –0.14939 1.02015 0.10683 0.10169
0.9243 0.913 0.7509 0.5464 0.7031 0.9077
Control*Xt –0.50607 0.13478 0.12888 –1.41167 – 0.64533 0.89959
0.6628 0.3014 0.7191 0.2918 0.0005 0.3613
Control*X3t 0.05860 0.01207 0.08221 0.2795 0.10016 0.93081
0.8453 0.7892 0.6381 0.4394 0.251 0.2343
Control*R3t 0.32629 0.02768 –0.17018 0.43657 0.05755 – 0.44947
0.2059 0.6634 0.2701 0.3716 0.4604 0.4574
Adjusted R2 0.1557 0.1635 0.2210 0.1567 0.2146 0.1511
returns for the 3 year period following the current year. DS is the disclosure score. Growth is defined
as the percentage growth in the firm’s assets from year t – 1 to year t. Size is the natural log of market
value of equity at the end of the firm’s fiscal year t – 1. Beta is calculated using monthly returns from
Datastream over year t – t + 5. Ownership concentration is measured as shares held by blockholders
including officers, directors (and their families), trusts, and pension/benefit plans, and shares held by
other firms or individuals that hold more than 5 per cent. Leverage is calculated as liability/equity for
the fiscal year. Loss is an indicator variable that is set equal to 1 when ordinary income is negative and
0 otherwise.
© The Authors
As a sensitivity check, we replace ordinary earnings with EBITDA. However, the

results (not tabulated) do not seem be affected by the choice of earnings measure.
Collins et al. (1994) and Gelb and Zarowin (2002) apply changes in future
earnings rather than a level specification.24 Assuming earnings follow a random
walk process, earnings change is a more appropriate specification. Therefore, we
replicate our tests above using earnings change. The results (not reported)
remain almost identical to the ones based on our level specification. Hence,
voluntary disclosure does not improve the informativeness of current returns.
As a sensitivity check, we replace future returns with growth in investments
as a proxy for the measurement error in future earnings, consistent with Collins
et al. (1994). However, the results (not reported) remain unchanged.
An explanation for the lack of value relevance of voluntary disclosure might
be that many companies have a similar reporting practice. Therefore, to
improve the variation in the disclosure score we examine a subsample including
only the companies appearing in the top/bottom quartile of the disclosure index.
This procedure not only isolates the most/least informative firms but also reduces
the sample size. Although the coefficient on current earnings is close to zero,
the coefficient on future earnings is positive and significant at the 1 per cent
level (not reported). Furthermore, the coefficient on DS is positive and signifi-
cant at the 10 per cent level. In contrast, the coefficient on the interaction term
is negative, which indicates that a higher level of voluntary disclosure reduces
the association between current returns and future earnings. This works against
our hypothesis that voluntary disclosure informs investors about the amount,
timing and uncertainty of future earnings. The negative coefficient on the inter-
action between disclosure and future earnings is puzzling given the objective of
the disclosure in the annual report.
We also redesigned our disclosure index to include only indicators that we
firmly believe are associated with future earnings. For example, information
about market growth is regarded as important information about future earnings.
In contrast, average age of employees does not appear to be as strongly associated
with future earnings. Based on the redesigned disclosure index, we are not able
to detect any effect on the interaction term (not reported).
As a last sensitivity test, we also examine if companies that improve the level
of voluntary disclosure across time experience a better association between
current returns and future earnings. Specifically, we compare the coefficient on
the interaction term between the disclosure score and future earnings before
and after the improved disclosure score. Based on various specifications, we
are not able to detect any material difference in the coefficient on the inter-
action term (not reported). Therefore, this result reinforces that voluntary
24
Please note that the level specification adopted in this study is equivalent to using the
level of past earnings and the change in current and future earnings.
© The Authors
disclosure does not improve the association between current returns and future
earnings.25
6. Conclusion and future research
The present paper documents industrial firms’ level of disclosure on 62

voluntary issues in annual reports that seem important to investors and financial
analysts. Across time there is an increase in the level of voluntary disclosure.
An examination of the impact of voluntary disclosure on the association
between current returns and future earnings in a setting with high ownership
concentration, low litigation costs, low enforcement of accounting information
and a flexible accounting regime, yields results similar to the ones based on US
data, which are characterized by a different institutional setting. Whereas, Lundholm
and Myers (2002) and Gelb and Zarowin (2002) find that voluntary disclosure
positively affects the association between current returns and future earnings,
Gelb and Zarowin (2002) find that information from the annual report does not
affect the relationship positively. These results raise the question of whether
voluntary information in the annual report contains value-relevant information
about future performance or whether investors are simply not capable of incor-
porating voluntary information in the firm value estimates.
The low and in some cases even negative coefficient on the interaction
between disclosure and future earnings is puzzling given the objective of the
disclosure in the annual report. One explanation is that the voluntary disclosure
misleads analysts’ perception of a company’s future earnings potential; that is,
voluntary disclosure does not contain value-relevant information about future
earnings. Another explanation is that investors might simply not be capable of
incorporating voluntary information in the firm value estimates. Finally, our
disclosure index might contain a measurement bias. For example, some pieces
of information might provide investors with a better understanding of firm
characteristics that determine future earnings potential. By assigning 1 point for
each piece of (voluntary) information in the annual report, we might introduce
a measurement error in our disclosure index. However, Petersen and Plenborg
(2006) apply the same disclosure index and find a negative and statistically
significant association between the level of disclosure and proxies for informa-
tion asymmetry (bid-ask spread and turnover ratio). Hence, voluntary disclosure
25
Various diagnostic testing have been performed. We use the variance inflation factor
(VIF) to explore potential problems with multicollinearity. However, the VIF did not exceed
2 and, therefore, was well below the critical value of 10. Furthermore, we used plots to
detect potential problems with heteroscedacity. We examined plots of the predicted value
and the studentized residuals. These plots support that the residuals are homoscedastic. We
also applied the SPEC option in SAS, which supports the plots.
© The Authors
seems to reduce the level of information asymmetry. However, our results show
that voluntary disclosure does not also make current returns more informative
about future earnings.
Our results are of interest to accounting standard setters. Whereas the objective
of the disclosure is to improve the predictability of future earnings, our results
(and the results of Gelb and Zarowin, 2002) show that voluntary information in
the annual report in Denmark (and in the USA) does not improve investors’
ability to predict future earnings.
Many directions can be taken in future research examining the impact of
voluntary disclosure on the informativeness of current returns. For instance, an
analysis (e.g. interviews) that explores how investors apply voluntary information
might provide insights as to why voluntary information seems value irrelevant.
Furthermore, future studies might distinguish between disclosure that pro-
vides information about good and bad earnings news. Basu (1997) shows that
bad earnings news is more timely than good earnings news. Hence, one might
conjecture that the association between current returns and future earnings
improves for companies that disclose relatively more good (earnings) news.
Future research might also work on better model specifications. For example, our
models seem to contain omitted variables as the R2 statistics are quite low.
Finally, the analyses and results reported in the present paper are based on a
small sample: only one industry and a limited time period of 5 years. Therefore,
the results might not be generalizable to other industries, time periods and/or
capital markets. For example, extending the time period explored might provide
better insights in the comparison between the Danish accounting standard
setting environment and the Australian and New Zealand accounting standard
setting environments as the similarities increase in the move towards Inter-
national Accounting Standards.
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© The Authors
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© The Authors
Appendix
Strategy
A statement of corporate goals or objectives is provided?
A general statement of corporate strategy is provided?
Actions taken to achieve the corporate goal are discussed?
A time frame for achieving corporate goals is provided?
Attitude towards ethic questions is provided
Strategy towards environmental issues is provided?
Detailed segment performance is provided?
Changes in return on common equity or economic value added are provided?
Commercial risk assessments are provided?
Financial risk assessments are provided?
Interest or exchange risks are discussed?
Other risk assessments are discussed?
Competition and outlook
The principal markets are identified?
Specific characteristics of these markets are described?
The market sizes are estimated?
Market share are provided?
The competitive landscapes are discussed?
Barriers to entry are discussed?
The market growths are estimated?
Change in market shares is discussed?
Impact of barriers to entry on profits is discussed?
The impact of competition on profits is discussed?
A forecast of market share is estimated?
Impact of barriers to entry on future profits is discussed?
The impact of competition on future profits is discussed?
Production
A general description of the business is provided?
The principal products/services are identified?
Specific characteristics of these products/services are described?
Speed to market is discussed?
Research and development expenditures are discussed?
Investments in production are discussed?
Product development cycle is discussed?
Ratio of inputs to outputs is discussed?
New products are discussed?
Rejection/defect rates are discussed?
Volume of materials consumed is discussed?
Changes in production methods are discussed?
Changes in product materials are discussed?
© The Authors
Marketing strategy
Marketing strategy is provided?
Sales strategy is described?
Distribution channels are described?
Sales and marketing costs are provided
Brand equity/visibility ratings are discussed?
Customer turnover rates are discussed?
Customer satisfaction level is discussed?
Customer mix is discussed?
Revenues from new products/services are discussed?
Order backlog is provided?
Percentage of order backlog to be shipped next year is provided?
Amount of new orders placed this year is provided?
Change in inventory is discussed?
Human capital
Experience of management team is discussed?
Description of workforce is provided?
Amount spent on education is provided?
Employee retention rates are provided?
Average revenue per employee is provided?
Average age of key employees is provided?
Age of key employees is provided?
Other measurement of intellectual capital is provided?
Investment in ERP is provided?
Strategy for measurement of human capital is discussed?
Strategy regarding ERP system is discussed?
© The Authors
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Voluntary disclosure and information asymmetry in

Article in Journal of International Accounting Auditing and Taxation · December 2006

Christian Petersen Thomas Plenborg

SEE PROFILE SEE PROFILE

The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file.

Value relevance of voluntary disclosure in the

Jesper Banghøj, Thomas Plenborg

Key words: Disclosure; Future earnings; Informativeness

JEF classification: M410

This study examines whether a higher level of voluntary disclosure in the

2. Relation to prior literature

Prior studies attempting to empirically assess the benefits of enhanced disclosure

where Rt is annual stock returns, UX is unanticipated earnings and ∆ E(X ) is

In general, future returns should be uncorrelated with current returns in a

D is the disclosure score. We hypothesize that the association between current

Previous studies have documented that the level of disclosure is correlated

3.2. Construction of the disclosure index

4. Sample selection and descriptive statistics

4.1. Sample selection

This study includes 36 industrial firms listed on the Copenhagen Stock

4.2. Descriptive statistics

Panel A: Descriptive statistics (152 observations)

Variable Mean Minimum 25% 50% 75% Maximum

Current returns 0.072559 – 0.65584 – 0.16652 0.02425 0.225362 1.365854

Panel B: Five types of disclosure scores from 1996–2000

DS STRA COMP PROD MARK HR

Rt Xt–1 Xt X3t R3t DSt MV

Rt 0.03096 0.30064 0.29248 – 0.05954 0.0509 0.11661

Table 2 provides correlations between the dependent and independent variables.

Independent variables Model 1 Model 2

Intercept –0.04386 – 0.08566

Intercept Xt–1 Xt Xt+1 Xt+2 Xt+3

–0.14614 – 0.23967 0.83969 1.09832 – 0.74287 0.56698

DS DSt*Xt–1 DSt*Xt DSt*Xt+1 DSt*Xt+2 DSt*Xt+3

0.00817 – 0.00267 –0.02295 –0.06487 0.07536 – 0.0307

R1 R2 R3 DSt*Rt+1 DSt*Rt+2 DSt*Rt+3 Adjusted R2

0.09833 – 0.19915 0.09704 –0.00936 –0.00497 – 0.01536 0.1721

To examine if some of the information in the disclosure contain value-relevant

Model Growth Size Beta Ownership Leverage Loss

Intercept – 0.03975 0.08031 –0.07877 – 0.14158 – 0.16645 – 0.41683

As a sensitivity check, we replace ordinary earnings with EBITDA. However, the

6. Conclusion and future research

The present paper documents industrial firms’ level of disclosure on 62

Gabrielsen, G., J. Gramlich, and T. Plenborg, 2002, Managerial ownership, information

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DS DStXt–1 DStXt DStXt+1 DStXt+2 DSt*Xt+3

R1 R2 R3 DStRt+1 DStRt+2 DSt*Rt+3 Adjusted R2