TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAIR INTRODUCTIONS.............................................................................................3
Giovanna Anneliese Santoro.....................................................................................................3
Ahmad Moqtav Hidayat............................................................................................................... 3
Fasya Zahwa Lathifah Siregar.................................................................................................. 3
INTRODUCTION TO THE COUNCIL.......................................................................... 5
Overview of the UNSC................................................................................................................... 5
Mandate, Functions, and Power of UNSC........................................................................5
Membership of the Council.......................................................................................................6
INTRODUCTION TO THE TOPIC................................................................................ 7
Timeline and Key Events............................................................................................................. 7
Past Actions......................................................................................................................................... 11
Current Situation.............................................................................................................................12
KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS...............................................................................14
FOCUS OF THE DEBATE............................................................................................ 17
International Arms Trade...........................................................................................................17
Political Instability.......................................................................................................................... 18
Citizen Instability........................................................................................................................... 20
Violences of the Myanmar Civil War and its Effects on Civilians......... 20
Humanitarian Access..........................................................................................................22
International Humanitarian Law (IHL)...................................................................23
Role of the UNSC & International View........................................................................... 23
Resolution Mandates of UNSC......................................................................................23
KEY STAKEHOLDERS................................................................................................. 25
Tatmadaw Military Junta..........................................................................................................25
National Unity Government................................................................................................... 26
Local Ethnic Minorities...............................................................................................................26
Neighbouring Countries...........................................................................................................28
CONCLUSION............................................................................................................... 30
QUESTIONS A RESOLUTION MUST ANSWER (QARMAS)............................... 31
BIBLIOGRAPHY............................................................................................................32

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CHAIR INTRODUCTIONS

Giovanna Anneliese Santoro

Greetings esteemed delegates! Welcome to the United Nations Security
Council of Sekolah Bogor Raya MUN 2024. My name is Giovanna and it is
truly an honor to serve as your chair for this council along with my fellow
co-chairs, Fasya and Moqtav. I started MUN at a young age, and having to
actively participate and win numerous awards until now in my sophomore
years, has made me develop an interest in tackling complex international
issues. Frankly enough, my young self would have never imagined
participating in high-political councils like UNSC, but from here I have
discovered my passion for debate. That being said, I look forward to the
substantial discussions and proposed solutions concerning the Myanmar
Civil War, and hope everyone will actively participate in discussions. I wish
you the best of luck, and don’t forget to have fun!

Ahmad Moqtav Hidayat

Hello delegates! My name is Moqtav, and I’m very grateful to be chairing
you in this year’s UNSC council for SBRMUN. Being the only UN Council
with supreme authority, the UNSC has always been a contentious, fiery,
and tense council. This being said, I look forward to the substantial debates
that you are all surely to have! Remember, though, delegates, beyond
awards, and beyond prestige, MUN, most of all, is a place to learn, grow,
and become better people. I hope that you may find the beautiful
communities within it, and someday, even start or lead your own! That
being said, see you all in SBRMUN 2024!

Fasya Zahwa Lathifah Siregar

Greetings delegates! My name is Fasya and it is a pleasure for me to be one
of your chairs in the ever intense Security Council. I am currently a junior in

3
highschool, pushing through A Level Sciences in Sekolah Perkumpulan
Mandiri. I have been actively delegating (and recently chairing) in the MUN
circuit since 2019. Mid-way, I developed a hyperfixation for the heated
negotiations facilitated in high-pol councils, such as the UNSC, which I look
forward to being enthralled with once more. May we address the state of
the Myanmar Civil War by optimising the legal mandates of the committee
along with international cooperative powers, also noting security and
human rights protection of parties involved or affected. Good luck and
Godspeed, delegates!

4
INTRODUCTION TO THE COUNCIL

Overview of the UNSC

History has borne witness to the nature of conflict amongst communities,
empires, nations, and the like. The failure of the League of Nations in
deterring the outbreak of World War II ensued the establishment of the
United Nations on the 24th of October 1945, with one of its five principal
organs being the Security Council. Chapter V of the UN Charter outlines
the Council’s primary responsibility of maintaining international peace and
security, determining when and where a UN peace operation should be
deployed.

Mandate, Functions, and Power of UNSC

Article 24(1) of the UN Charter states that the Security Council's "primary
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security" is its
core mandate. Other than that the UNSC’s implicit, de facto purposes is to
develop friendly ties between countries, to work together to resolve the
global issues and promote respect for human rights, and to serve as a
centre for coordinating international policy.

Article 25 of the UN Charter states that while other UN bodies suggest

actions to the Member States, all UN members agree to accept and
implement decisions made by the Security Council. Since the Security
Council is an essential part of the United Nations in preserving global
peace and security, it is the only body with the authority to make decisions
that Member States are required to carry out. According to Article 25 of the
UN Charter, it is specified in Chapter VII that the resolutions are considered
binding.

5
Membership of the Council
The UN Security Council comprises 15 members, including 5 permanent
and 10 non-permanent members. The Permanent Five (P5) nations include
The People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the United States
of America, the United Kingdom, and France. As of January 1, 2024 the
non-permanent members of the council are Algeria, Ecuador, Guyana,
Japan, Malta, Mozambique, Republic of Korea, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, and
Switzerland. Article 31 of the UN Charter quotes that any member state
that is not named above is designated as an “observer state”, with the
same rights as other member states but the inability to cast substantive
votes.

P5 members have the special ability to reject and entirely fail proposed
resolutions, also known as veto power. Vetoes can only be used during
significant voting, which excludes all voting considerations other than
voting on draft resolutions. An abstention, however, does not constitute a
veto.

6
INTRODUCTION TO THE TOPIC

Timeline and Key Events

Date Event

January 4, 1948 Burma gained its independence from the United

Kingdom and U Nu became the prime minister.

March 1962 U Nu's faction was ousted in a military coup led by

Gen Ne Win, who abolished the federal system and
inaugurated "the Burmese Way to Socialism" -
nationalising the economy, forming a single-party
state with the Socialist Programme Party as the sole
political party, and banning independent
newspapers.

1972-1974 Significant offensives by the Burmese Army took

place and the start of the "4 Cuts" policy's
implementation.

1978-1984 In Arakan State, the Burmese Army attacks Muslim

Rohingya. 250,000 people escaped to Bangladesh
and this is when The Citizenship Law of Burma was
enacted. This law denies some ethnic communities,
notably the Kachin, Karen, Chin, and Rohyinga, the
rights and relief accorded to full citizens, including
the ability to hold public office. These people are
isolated and treated as "associate citizens."

1987-1989 There are widespread anti-government protests in

Burma. Declaring martial law, The State Law and
Order Restoration Council (SLORC) detains hundreds

7
 of individuals, including human rights and
democratic activists, and renames Burma to
Myanmar, changing the name of the country's
capital, Rangoon, to Yangon.

1990-1997 The junta declares general elections. The military

disregards Aung San Suu Kyi's party, the Opposition
National League for Democracy (NLD), despite the
party's resounding victory in the general election.
After six years of house arrest, Aung San Suu Kyi is
released, Burma is granted membership in the
Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), and
Slorc is renamed the State Peace and Development
Council (SPDC). About fifteen ethnic leaders signed
the historic Mae Tha Raw Hta Agreement, which calls
for tripartite dialogue among the military, ethnic
nationalities, and the NLD pro-democracy group.

1998-2001 The ruling council disregards the NLD deadline for

calling parliament into session, 300 NLD members
are released from prison, and student protests are
broken up. Aung San Suu Kyi started secret talks with
the ruling council in October 2000. Major offenses
against the Karen people were committed by the
Burma Army between 2000 and 2001. Shan rebels
and the Burmese army battle near the Thai border.

2003-2004 Khin Nyunt was appointed prime minister in August

2003, and his vision was having a “road map” to
democracy. In October 2003, the Burma Army
launched an attack known as “Power Over the Land”

8
 against the Karen people, as well as against civilians
in Karenni and Karen State. Karen women were
raped, killed, and disfigured by the Burmese Army.

2007-2009 Ongoing Burma Army offenses continue, including

breaking up and arresting Monk’s protesters and
dozens of activists. The UN Security Council finally
condemns the military suppression of nonviolent
demonstrators. The ethnic Karen rebels are among
the “insurgent destructionism” that the state media
blames for the series of bombs and the cyclones that
happened in 2008. Additionally, the government
prohibited Aung San Suu Kyi from pursuing public
office and instead gave the military a quarter of
parliamentary seats.

2009-2012 Hundreds of Muslim Rohingya refugees who showed

up off Thailand's coast to request asylum are being
expelled. Myanmar rejects the existence of the
minority. Then, hundreds of Rohingyas are saved
from boats off the Indonesian shore. Myanmar had
elections in twenty years on November 7, 2010. The
military-backed Union Solidarity and Development
Party declares victory with 80% of the vote. The
election is universally denounced as a scam, and
opposition organisations claim massive fraud.
According to the junta, the election signifies the
change from military to civilian government. Aung
San Suu Kyi, who was forbidden from participating in
the election, is set to be released from house arrest

9
 one week following the results.

The light of peacefulness seems to be seen as by

signing a ceasefire agreement in January 2012,
Burmese authorities and the government came to a
truce with rebels of the Shan ethnic group and
directed the military to suspend operations against
ethnic Kachin rebels.

2012-2018 In the parliamentary by-elections, NLD candidates

triumphed across the board, and Aung San Suu Kyi
was chosen to lead the National League for
Democracy in Myanmar. Just as things seem to be
improving, on March 22, 2013, a state of emergency is
proclaimed due to ethnic conflicts resulting in
fatalities between Muslims and Buddhists. The
National League for Democracy led by Aung San Suu
Kyi won the 2015 Myanmar elections easily.
Nonetheless, a UN report demands that six generals
be tried at the International Criminal Court for
allegedly committing crimes against humanity, war
crimes, and genocide against the Rohingya Muslim
population. Aung San Suu Kyi is also charged with
not doing enough to stop the violence. Myanmar
disagrees with the conclusions.

2021 The coup d'état in Burma on February 1, 2021,

marked the start of the onslaught by the Burma
military. An emergency declaration is made, and
army head Min Aung Hlaing takes over. The largest

10
 crowd since the generals' takeover of power is joining
the anti-coup protests in Yangon and other parts of
Myanmar, numbering in the tens of thousands. The
military's use of force against nonviolent protestors is
condemned by the UN Security Council, which
unanimously demands that the military takeover in
Myanmar be reversed. Min Aung Hlaing is not invited
to the ASEAN meeting because, according to them,
the military has not advanced its five-point plan to
resolve the conflict.

The FBR continues to grow and expand, resulting in

humanitarian crimes and abuses.

Past Actions
The Myanmar Civil War unfolds as a compelling crisis of democracy's battle
against military rule. Since 2021, there has been a military junta in charge
of Myanmar. Millions of people in Myanmar have protested against the
move to no true avail.

The UN Human Rights Council established the Independent Investigative

Mechanism for Myanmar (IMM) in 2018, which is dedicated to holding
offenders accountable and securing justice for victims of grave
international crimes in Myanmar. It has reported to gather substantial
evidence of the widespread burning of civilian homes, the indiscriminate
and disproportionate targeting of civilians with bombs, and the execution
in masse of detainees during military operations during the year that
ended in June. This evidence will then be used to be analyzed and
prepared to share it with the regional, courts or tribunals at the national,

11
regional, or international levels that have the authority to use the data to
bring criminal charges against offenders.

Current Situation
In the midst of ongoing political unrest, the Myanmar Civil War has cast a
shadow over the aspirations for democratic governance in the nation.
However, the coup d’etat has had a devastating humanitarian effect on
civilians. 1.4 million people are displaced and hiding in jungles or hilly areas
without access to food, clothing, medication, or a safe place to sleep as a
result of widespread military operations throughout the nation.
Humanitarian aid is required for around 18 million individuals, including
those facing food insecurity. Tens of thousands of homes in multiple rural
communities were destroyed by fire as part of the military's "four cuts
strategy". Reputable prisons hold around 13,000 inmates in appalling
circumstances. Approximately 8 million kids are not attending school.

There are numerous signs of change as the war moves into its third year.
The junta declared in February 2024 that it would begin implementing the
14-year-old mandatory military service statute. The draft takes place in the
midst of calls for Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, the nation's military leader
and mastermind of the coup in 2021, to resign following a string of
humiliating defeats to rebel organizations with allies. In recent months, the
military has lost control of numerous towns and military bases. Although
these developments don't guarantee the rebels in Myanmar success, they
are putting pressure on the junta and rekindling the resistance.

12
 Picture of areas of junta and operations in the state of Myanmar, taken from:
https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-South-Central/2024/0213/Myanmar-s-civil-war-Is-the-stalem
ate-breaking

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KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

Military Junta A Military Junta is defined as a form of oligarchic military

rule, led by a committee of military leaders. Originating
from the latin word “Jungere” which means “To Join”, or
“meet”, Juntas often form as a result of a group of people
coming together to overthrow a government, often in a
coup d’etat.

The current ruling government in Myanmar, the

Tatmadaw, are considered a military junta as the military
holds an oligarchic rule over the nation, consolidating
power in a small inner circle; the State Administration
Council (SAC), with 18 members as of 2023.

Asymmetric Asymmetric warfare refers to a form of irregular warfare,

Warfare wherein the relative power of one party differs
considerably from another’s. Because of this imbalance in
power, the disadvantaged party often must rely on
unconventional tactics and strategies, like guerilla
warfare or hybrid warfare to cover deficiencies in their
own military force.

Coup D’etat A Coup D’etat refers to a forceful, usually illegal attempt

by a group or individual (usually from a military
background) to overthrow an incumbent leadership.

Coup D’etats are usually done in a sudden and

coordinated manner, with the usurping party taking over
not only the government, but also the media, civilian

14
 infrastructure, and economic assets all at once; as to not
give the incumbent leadership time to mount a
counteroffensive or defend itself.

In the context of the Myanmar conflict, on February 1st,

2021, the NLD, the ruling party at the time, were
overthrown by the Tatmadaw, in a swift, widespread
Coup D’etat. This coup saw a seizing and shutting down
of state infrastructure, internet access, and financial
institutions all throughout the country.

Ethnic Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) is a term first coined

Armed in the Burmese Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement signed
Organisation on October 15, 2015. This term refers to groups who share
(EAOs) three common aspects. 1) Claims to represent an ethnic
identity. 2) Aims to garner support from other ethnic
organisations through alliances and coalitions. And 3)
Has an armed wing, separate from its political wing.

These EAOs operate on a very strong basis of ethnic pride

and identity, and are able to operate because of the
deep-rooted political mistrust and ethnic division
existing within the country. These issues are further
exacerbated by the differing levels of expertise and
experience between the Government and
representatives from EAOs, leading to
miscommunication, misunderstandings, and perceived
unfairness.

Myanmar currently has more than 20 EAOs operating in

15
 its borders, with the most notable ones being the Arakan
Army, Kachin Independence Army, and the United Wa
State Army. These EAOs often form coalitions with each
other, with the most notable one being the Federal
Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee
(FPNCC), a coalition between 7 EAOs who are actively
welcoming Chinese mediation to resolve the internal
conflicts happening within Myanmar.

Internally Internally Displaced Peoples, or IDPs, are individuals or

Displaced groups of people who are forced to flee their home, but
Persons still remain within the borders of their origin country.
(IDPs)
There are currently no international laws which protect
IDPs’ human rights; International Refugee Law does not
address the plight of IDPs either, as they have not
crossed any international borders. Due to this
shortcoming, IDPs face increased risks of vulnerability, as
they have less defined protections, and even have their
sovereignty put into question; do these IDPs belong to
any country? If so, do the governments have a
responsibility to protect them?

Currently, more than 1.95 Million people are displaced in

Myanmar as a result of the conflict. With families forced
to leave to escape death, persecution, or kidnapping by
the Tatmadaw.

16
FOCUS OF THE DEBATE

International Arms Trade: Enabling of human rights violations, arms

embargoes
On April 11, 2023, an attack on Pazigyi village in the Sagaing region was
perpetrated by Tatmadaw pilots flying Russian Yak-130 attack aircraft. The
lack of any binding arms embargoes and the continued inflow of weapons
sales to the Tatmadaw enable them to continue attacks against civilians
and commit human rights violations.

Pictured: 2023 OHCHR report on sources of arms for the Tatmadaw military junta since the coup. The Billion
Dollar Death Trade: The International Arms Networks That Enable Human Rights Violations in Myanmar,
www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/countries/myanmar/infographic-sr-myanmar-2023-05-17.pdf.

Accessed 11 Feb. 2024.

17
While the European Union has taken an initiative to maintain a strict arms
embargo on Myanmar, there are currently no binding resolutions within
the United Nations preventing the sales of arms towards the military junta,
with the only resolution addressing it being A/RES/75/287—a non-binding
recommendation for states to halt sales towards Myanmar. To this end,
Russia, China, Singapore and India have provided more than 80% of the
weapons obtained by the military since the coup, allowing the Tatmadaw
to continue perpetrating human rights violations against civilians,
oppositions, and minority groups .

Political Instability: coup d’etat, ethnic autonomy movements

Myanmar has a long history of political instability marked by military rule,
civil war, and ethnic conflict. The country gained independence from
British colonial rule in 1948 and initially functioned as a parliamentary
democracy. However, in 1962, General Ne Win led a military coup, ushering
in 26 years of military rule. During this time, minority rights were curtailed,
and the nation’s democratic institutions were slowly eroded away. The
country's transition away from full military rule began in 2011, raising hopes
for democratic reforms. Despite some progress, the military retained
significant control and initiated a campaign of ethnic cleansing against the
Rohingya minority.

The coup has triggered myriad unintended effects, including instability

and crime that the generals’ power grab triggered across the country and
beyond. The instability has widened along various tracks, fueled first by
Myanmar’s internal dynamics. Despite two years of unrestrained attacks on
the general population, the junta continues to lose territory to powerful
Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) and the swelling ranks of People's
Defense Force. The junta’s campaign to subdue opposition through
mayhem and destruction has caused food extreme instability and near

18
economic collapse. The coup has also foreclosed any conceivable return of
the million or so Rohingya refugees expelled by the military in 2017, leaving
this burden on Bangladesh and other neighbouring countries
The largest challenge of long-term political stability lies in the diverse
ethnic makeup of the nation. The long history of ethnic divides and
systematised racism against ethnic minorities presents a major challenge
when trying to establish a stable and representative government.
Myanmar recognizes more than one hundred ethnic groups, with the
Bamar ethnic group holding a privileged position in society and
government, while many ethnic minority groups face systemic
discrimination, lack of economic opportunities, and abuses at the hands of
the military. Historically, the military has used ethnic division and animosity
to secure its control, exacerbating tensions and fueling armed conflicts. All
in all, the foundational challenge of any stable government in Myanmar is
to manage the nation’s inherent diversity and establish a system which
acknowledges each ethnic group's history and values; a rigorous balance to
achieve with a very divisive history.

19
 Pictured: Distribution of ethnic groups in Myanmar. Source: Islam, Mohammad Tarequl. Exploring Ethnic
Diversity in Burma , www.researchgate.net/publication/270601211_Exploring_Ethnic_Diversity_in_Burma.
Accessed 24 Feb. 2024.

Citizen Instability
Violences of the Myanmar Civil War and its Effects on Civilians
As part of the basis of Myanmar's violence is Aung San Suu Kyi, the de facto
head of state, and other prominent members of the democratically elected
government were taken into custody and other members of parliament
were forced into hiding as the military of Myanmar staged a coup early in
February 2021. General Min Aung Hlaing, the head of the military junta in
charge, declared a one-year period of emergency after taking over.
Following the coup, protests broke out immediately in the capital city of
Naypyidaw and persisted for months, with demonstrators calling for the
return of democratic administration and civilian authority. Curfews and
other restrictions on gatherings were implemented by the junta in an
attempt to quell protests, and security forces have frequently used lethal
force against demonstrators.

According to reports from Action on Armed Violence (AOAV), the military

government will launch 114% more attacks in 2023. This underscores the
growing tensions between the military, the People's Defense Forces, and
ethnic armed organizations that are vying for autonomy. Given that there
have been 1,825 weapon incidents in Myanmar, including 745 fatalities, the
conflict has consequently resulted in 2,164 documented civilian casualties
from explosive weapons in 2023. This is a 121% and 155% increase in
casualties and deaths, respectively, over 2022. 18% of these deaths and 85%
of the civilian casualties are related to the military. The UN estimates that
the violence has displaced 2.3 million people, but compared to the crises in
Gaza and Ukraine, it received comparatively little international attention.

20
This disparity is explained by the complexity of Myanmar's boundaries and
its lesser strategic importance to Western powers.

Additionally, due to discrimination, the Rohingya population in Myanmar

has difficulty accessing basic services and necessities. This military
dictatorship has previously carried out waves of violence and imposed
sanctions against the Rohingya, including in 2017 of the Rohingya
Genocide. In addition, General Hlaing questioned the Rohingya refugees'
right to return to Bangladesh. The majority of the Rohingya refugees in
Bangladesh reside in camps that are bordered by Myanmar and are the
biggest refugee camps globally, with a chronic lack of humanitarian
assistance. Over 18,000 Rohingya refugees were forcibly moved by the
Bangladeshi government to Basan Char in 2019, where they are prohibited
from leaving and from accessing UN agencies and rights organizations.

Humanitarian Access
The UN warns that over 18 million people, or one-third of Myanmar's
population, need humanitarian assistance and is requesting $1 billion in
donations to address the issue.

The UN's interim humanitarian coordinator for Myanmar, Marculuigi Corsi,

warned that children would bear the brunt of the crisis, with 6 million of
them in need due to displacement, interrupted health care and education,
food insecurity and malnutrition, and protection risks like forced
recruitment and mental distress. In the wake of the deadly Cyclone Mocha,
the military has further restricted humanitarian aid, set fire to food
supplies, crops, and seed stores, destroyed medical facilities, and targeted
medical personnel—all of which are violations of humanitarian law and
constitute additional war crimes. OCHA highlighted that an estimated 1.9
million people who had been prioritized for aid in 2023 were not reached

21
because the majority of UN international aid programs remain
underfunded, and thus called for $994 million (£786 million) in donations
to help the 5.3 million people that have been identified as priorities for aid
in Myanmar in 2024.

One of the P5's national involvement is the reallocation of $42.4 million in

aid by USAID to support and strengthen civil society instead of projects
that would have helped the Government of Burma. USAID will continue to
provide bilateral projects totaling about $69 million to the people of
Burma. especially to protect and enhance the health of Burmese citizens
and to build civil society's capacity to protect democratic spaces, provide
food security, assist independent media, and advance peace and
reconciliation in areas devastated by conflict. Additionally, the US will keep
giving the Rohingya and other vulnerable populations in the states of Chin,
Kachin, Rakhine, and Shan life-saving humanitarian aid.

International Humanitarian Law (IHL)

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) defines international
humanitarian law as a body of regulations that aim to lessen the
humanitarian effects of armed conflict. Intentional delay or refusal of
humanitarian aid during the Myanmar Civil War may amount to flagrant
and serious violations of international humanitarian law and human rights.
Populations in need are entitled to help to guarantee the respect of their
rights to food, shelter, and health as well as life-saving aid under
international humanitarian law and human rights law. The Human Rights
Council has requested the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights
(OHCHR) to monitor and evaluate the general state of human rights in
Myanmar, with an emphasis on accountability for alleged violations of
international humanitarian law and human rights law, and to provide

22
recommendations on further measures required to address the current
crisis (contained in resolution A/HRC/RES/49/23).

Role of the UNSC & International View

Resolution Mandates of UNSC
The citizens of Myanmar have sought assistance from the United Nations
through the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine, given the claims of
crimes against humanity committed by the junta against their own
citizens. Nevertheless, China and Russia’s vetoes have resulted in the R2P
not being brought to the UNSC. China and Russia have blocked aggressive
measures and defended the junta in UN forums to maintain their
geopolitical and economic interests. However, ASEAN has failed to enact a
remedy, as the Myanmar military has never adhered to or implemented
the ASEAN Five-Point Consensus, and nations like Singapore, Thailand,
Vietnam, Cambodia, and the Philippines continue to trade gas, oil, and
weapons with the junta.

The UN Security Council voted 12 in favor, 0 against, and 3 abstentions

(China, India, and the Russian Federation) on December 21, 2022, to adopt
Resolution 2669 (2022) about the civil war in Myanmar. It emphasizes
three main issues: ending the persecution of civilians, releasing all
detainees who were wrongfully imprisoned, and assigning ASEAN the lead
role in carrying out its five-point consensus plan. It also demands the
immediate cessation of all the violence across the nation, the pursuit of
constructive dialogue and reconciliation in accordance with the will and
interests of the people of Myanmar, and to upholding of democratic
institutions and processes, as well as the rule of law, fundamental
freedoms, and human rights.

23
Nonetheless, the resolution falls short of delving deeply enough into
"systematic gross human rights violation," according to Thomas Andrews, a
UN Special Rapporteur on the state of human rights in Myanmar. He thinks
the resolution does not acknowledge the military's takeover of the legally
elected government as a coup d'etat, preferring to refer to it as a mere
proclamation of emergency. It does not go far enough in condemning the
junta's crimes and grave human rights breaches. Additionally, it ignores
the necessity of an arms embargo against the junta in order to put an end
to the murdering and bloodshed of defenseless civilians. It makes no
mention of putting R2P into practice.

Many other UNSC documents, including press releases, assembly

documents, presidential statements, secretary-general reports, Security
Council letters, meeting minutes, assembly documents, Human Rights
Council documents, and other carefully chosen documents that are
essential to serve as a discussion starter, denounce the violence in
Myanmar and highlight the necessity for peace.

KEY STAKEHOLDERS

Tatmadaw Military Junta

The current ruling authority after the 2021 coup, the Tatmadaw military
junta has a vested interest in ensuring a continued domination over
Myanmar, and cracking down on all opposition to ensure that status quo is
maintained. Over a canvas of a dictatorship spanning nearly 60 years, the
influence of the military on Burmese politics has always felt present; even
as the ruling dictatorship gave way to democracy during the 2011-2015
political reforms, the military was still left with the ability to appoint 1/4th of
the nation’s parliament, thus still ensuring a decisive veto over
constitutional amendments (Nisid, 2015). Now once again with conclusive

24
rule over the nation, the military has three key aspects to maintain: 1) A
continued crackdown on all forms of opposition by any means, including
using extrajudicial killings, forced labor, rape, torture, and the use of child
soldiers. 2) A continued resistance of international pressure in the form of
sanctions and the blocking of international humanitarian aid to dissidents
or those opposed to the Tatmadaw. And, 3) Maintaining public support
within regions under their control, ensuring some semblance of legitimate,
justified rule.

As the tide of the armed conflict shifts, the Tatmadaw continually find it
harder and harder to maintain the delicate balancing act between their
internal politics, fighting guerilla warfare against a myriad of rebel groups,
and rising international pressure. The military is losing its ability to exercise
fundamental government functions like tax collection, maintaining public
order, and infrastructure upkeep. Myanmar has essentially been
transformed into a “failing state” by the Tatmadaw, with it being
increasingly incapable of performing effective control over its territory and
borders.

National Unity Government

The National Unity Government (NUG) is a coalition government formed by
members of parliament from the National League for Democracy (NLD)
party ousted after the 2021 coup d’etat. Currently representing the
deposed government of the previous administration, the primary goals of
the NUG are to restore democracy, end military rule, and shift Myanmar’s
national structure into a Federal Democratic Union by reuniting the
numerous ethnic groups. It has drawn supporters by promising national
reforms, and works actively with Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) to
combat the Tatmadaw.

25
The NUG currently administers a paramilitary wing, the People’s Defense
Force (PDF), with an estimated 60,000 armed personnel gathered by
November of 2022. Rallying support from local ethnic groups and the
Burmese people at large, the PDF were the first to declare a “defensive
war” against the Tatmadaw in September of 2021; and they remain the
largest paramilitary force currently engaged in active conflict with the
Tatmadaw.

However, even with their ongoing collaboration projects with regional

EAOs, the NUG still finds difficulty in maintaining a strict sense of solidarity
between itself and local ethnic minorities. As a result of a volatile history
with the old NLD government, many ethnic minorities see more merit in
carving a more autonomous path than fully aligning themselves with the
NUG.

Local Ethnic Minorities

Local Ethnic Minorities play a substantial part when discussing the
Myanmar conflict; these ethnic minorities are usually seen as a
demographic group, but they also impact the conflict through tangible
means, for one example, through EAOs:
a. EAOs, or Ethnic Armed Organizations, are organisations who claim to
represent an ethnic identity, aim to garner mutual recognition with
alliances and coalitions, and have an armed wing separate from their
political body. These EAOs often cooperate with each other to
coordinate attacks, using guerilla warfare tactics to compensate for
their lacking numbers and equipment.
b. EAOs in Myanmar have come into existence not only as a result of
the naturally diverse ethnic demographics, but also a long history of
military subjugation and ethnic divide within the country, with every
minority group essentially playing a competitive, zero-sum game of

26
land control, natural resources and political autonomy, exacerbated
by the curtailment of minority rights by the Tatmadaw, which has
been ongoing since the original 1962 coup by general Ne Win.

Pictured: Ethnic composition of Myanmar in the year 2000. Encyclopædia Britannica, Encyclopædia
Britannica, inc., kids.britannica.com/students/article/Myanmar/111149/media. Accessed 3 Feb. 2024.

This pervasive cultural divide has virtually developed into an intrinsic

part of the nation’s culture, and has exacerbated tensions and
perpetuated a culture of human rights violations, making it
challenging to find inclusive political solutions. The country currently
has more than 20 ethnic armed organisations and hundreds of
armed militias, leading to one of the largest and longest-running
armed conflicts in the world. The conflicts have been largely
triggered on the basis of control of natural resources, land rights, and
the quest for greater political autonomy, but the main perpetuating
factor is a common mindset among minority groups that one
group’s gain is another group’s loss. Regardless, the perception of
the military junta as a common enemy has allowed for greater
mutual understanding between the EAOs, which, as a result, has

27
 given birth to many inter-EAO coalitions like the FPNCC, Federal
Union Army (FUA), and Three Brotherhood Alliance; providing a
glimmer of hope for the reunification of Myanmar and its ethnic
minority groups.

Neighbouring Countries
Being in close proximity to the Myanmar border, the closely neighbouring
countries have a large stake in the conflict; as they are immediately
affected by the spillover caused by the mass migration of refugees, the
growing cross-border trade for drugs and other narcotics in the absence of
law enforcement, as well as general security concerns over armed militias
operating near the border.

Pictured: Geographic region of Indochina, and political borders of Myanmar’s neighbouring countries.
“Myanmar.” REACH Myanmar, reachmyanmar.weebly.com/myanmar.html. Accessed 3 Feb. 2024.

It’s important to note however, that different regional actors are

responding in different ways. For example, Indonesia, China and India have

28
been quietly engaging with key stakeholders; from the junta, to ethnic
armed organisations, to the pro-democracy shadow government to
arbitrate a peaceful solution between all parties. Meanwhile, ASEAN has
taken a much stricter approach; completely banning all Tatmadaw
representatives from attending any meetings until the 5 Point Consensus,
agreed upon by General Min Aung Hlaing during a summit in Jakarta on
April 24, 2021 is successfully implemented—an agreement that had been
entirely neglected by him until now.

29
CONCLUSION

With a mixture of international geopolitical interests, regional and local

stability at hand, the UNSC must take a comprehensive approach in
addressing the issue of the Myanmar crisis. Multiple nations have a vested
interest in seeing the conflict resolved, as the instability within the country
leads to the spillover of not only violence, but also refugees. The region also
acts as a hotbed for drug trade, as the coup has detracted from the efforts
of local law enforcement, and has given an opportunity for minority ethnic
groups to begin drug trafficking operations.

The conflict in Myanmar is a complex issue that has its roots in historical
political upheaval, ethnic tensions, and military dominance. Diplomatic
efforts have failed, and the lack of consensus within the international
community has worsened the suffering of the Myanmar people. The
conflict's trajectory is shaped by key stakeholders, including the ruling
military junta, the National Unity Government (NUG), local ethnic
minorities, and neighbouring countries. The military seeks to maintain
power through repression, while the NUG and ethnic armed organisations
resist military rule and advocate for democratic governance and ethnic
autonomy. Neighbouring countries are grappling with the consequences
of instability and mass displacement along their borders.

A comprehensive approach is essential to achieve lasting peace and justice

in Myanmar. This approach should combine diplomatic negotiations,
humanitarian assistance, and pressure on the military junta. Supporting
grassroots movements for democracy and human rights, fostering
inclusive dialogue among all its numerous stakeholders, and holding
accountable those responsible for violence and human rights abuses are
crucial steps towards achieving lasting peace and justice in Myanmar.

30
QUESTIONS A RESOLUTION MUST ANSWER (QARMAS)

1. Should the UNSC recognize the military junta as de jure government

geostrategically to advantage neighbouring nations, like ASEAN
members? Would international involvement and cooperation, such
as between UNSC member states or ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus
(5PC), strengthen or worsen the condition of Myanmar’s
non-international armed conflict?
2. Following the Chinese-brokered truce between Tatmadaw and EAOs
to press immediate ceasefire, how can further instabilities of trade
borders and refugee protection be hindered?
3. What measures can be taken to ensure a substantial participation of
all relevant stakeholders, including EAOs and civil societies, in the
transition towards a peaceful, representative and inclusive
government in Myanmar?
4. What steps can be taken to ensure the accountability of the military
junta and other parties involved in human rights violations and
abuses in Myanmar?
5. How can the UNSC protect the citizens and residents of Myanmar
faced with violence and possible ethnic cleansing from the
Tatmadaw junta?

31
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