Islamic State Khorasan Province
Islamic State Khorasan Province
Islamic State Khorasan Province
Syria–Khorasan; Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham–Khorasan; Wilayat Khorasan; Daesh Khorasan;
Daesh-Khorasan.
The following information is based on publicly available information about Islamic State Khorasan
Province (IS-KP). To the Australian Government's knowledge, this information is accurate, reliable and has
been corroborated by classified information.
Conclusion (#content-index-5)
a terrorist organisation, the AFP Minister must be satisfied on reasonable grounds that the organisation:
is directly or indirectly engaged in, preparing, planning, or assisting in or fostering the doing of a
terrorist act; or
advocates the doing of a terrorist act.
For the purposes of listing a terrorist organisation under the Criminal Code, subsection 102.1(2) of the
Criminal code describes the doing of a terrorist act as including the doing of a specific terrorist act, the
doing of more than one terrorist act and the doing of a terrorist act, even if a terrorist act does not occur.
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a global caliphate and regards all who fail to follow its religious doctrine as apostates and infidels.
The organisation first emerged in October 2014, following a pledge of allegiance made by six former senior
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) members to then IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. In the wake of this
pledge, IS formally announced the formation of its ‘Khorasan’ province in January 2015, and appointed
Hafiz Saeed Khan as IS-KP’s first emir.
Uzbekistan Iran and Bangladesh. The group has also conducted operations in Bangladesh. From 2015 to
2019, IS-KP focused on a strategy of gaining and holding territory. However, following the loss of most of its
territory in early 2019, IS-KP underwent a significant organisational restructure in March 2019, which
included a strategic shift towards urban warfare and the consolidation of its operations to focus on
Afghanistan and parts of north-western Pakistan. This shift in strategy away from territory control has
This escalation has coincided with the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan, with IS-KP buoyed by both the
reduction in counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan and the Taliban’s limited experience dealing with
urban-counter-insurgency. IS-KP has utilised the February 2020 agreement between the United States
(U.S.) and the Taliban to contrast itself to the Taliban. IS-KP projects itself as a globally focused jihadist
group committed to rejecting compromise with the West and accusing the Taliban of appealing solely to a
narrow nationalistic base. While the Taliban has attempted to position itself within the global system of
states, IS-KP commits to a universal Islamic Jihad and seeks to disrupt the global state system.
IS-KP has been increasingly focused on undermining the Taliban regime, with recent attacks targeting
Taliban ‘allies’ (including Russia, Pakistan and China) and Western organisations (including the United
Nations). IS-KP has also continued assaults against civilians and Shia minorities to weaken Taliban
legitimacy and shatter the regime’s narrative that it has restored peace and stability. Since December 2022,
IS-KP has killed four senior Taliban officials and carried out a suicide attack at the funeral of one of the
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victims – Deputy Governor of Badakhshan, Nisar Ahmad Ahmadi. The Taliban has experienced mixed
success in its counter-terrorism efforts against IS-KP, relying on extreme methods with little regard for
civilian casualties.
Despite the above, the relationship between the Afghan Taliban and IS-KP has not been uniformly hostile.
Elements of the Haqqani Network, which has been integrated into the Taliban, have been reported to have
Leadership
IS-KP maintains a hierarchical leadership structure, governed by senior leadership in the form of a Shura
Advisory Council, and led by an emir. IS-KP also utilises commanders at the provincial level and leaders
responsible for various functions of IS-KP’s administration, such as logistics. While early leaders largely
hailed from the core group of TTP commanders who founded IS-KP, this has since diversified.
Originally affiliated to the Haqqani network, al-Muhajir joined IS-KP following its emergence in
Afghanistan and was appointed as the organisation’s seventh emir in June 2020. Described by IS as an
urban warfare expert, al-Muhajir is credited with driving IS-KP’s urban shift and reinvigorating the
organisation following major territorial and leadership losses. Within months of al-Muhajir’s leadership,
IS-KP staged a suicide attack on the Nagarhar central prison in Jalalabad, resulting in the release of 1000
inmates including around 280 IS-KP prisoners. One of those prisoners was Abdul Rahman al-Logari, who
led IS-KP’s attack on Kabul Airport in August 2021, resulting in the deaths of 170 Afghan civilians and 13 U.S.
service members.
Appointed emir in July 2019, Farooqi was previously in charge of IS-KP operations in Pakistan’s Khyber
Agency. Captured by Afghanistan security forces in April 2020, Farooqi was one of the IS-KP prisoners freed
during the Nagarhar central prison attack. In January 2022, Pakistan media reported that Farooqi was killed
during a shootout in northern Afghanistan.
Initially a spokesperson for IS-KP, Khorasani was appointed as the organisation’s fourth emir in August
2018 following the death of his predecessor. In 2019, Khorasani was reportedly demoted following ISKP
setbacks throughout 2018. In May 2020, Khorasani was arrested by Afghan security forces in Kabul.
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Originally from the Orakzai agency, Abu Saad Orakzai led IS-KP from July 2017 to August 2018 when he was
killed in a drone strike in the Jangal Keli village in Nangarhar.
Taking over as IS-KP leader in April 2017, Abu Sayed’s tenure was short-lived after he was killed in a U.S.
drone strike on 11 July 2017.
Initially IS-KP’s deputy leader, Abdul Hasib led IS-KP for nine months until his death during a U.S. raid in
A former commander of the TTP, Khan first pledged allegiance to IS in October 2014. Previously responsible
for TTP’s operations in Orakazi in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas, Khan possessed access to
a wealth of recruitment networks in Pakistan, helping IS-KP secure an early foothold in the strategic
Pakistan/Afghanistan border area. Khan was killed in a U.S. drone strike on 26 July 2016.
Membership
The number of IS-KP militants in Afghanistan is estimated to include around 4000 to 6000 members,
IS-KP recruits primarily from Pakistan and Afghanistan-based Salafists, and foreign sympathisers.
Following territorial losses leading into 2019, IS-KP has shifted its recruitment to focus on disaffected,
IS-KP’s transfer of funds is heavily reliant on a network of hawalas – an informal method of transferring
money – and the use of cryptocurrency. IS-KP utilises several different revenue streams for finance,
including a combination of local donations, exploitation of timber and mineral black markets, kidnapping,
and extortion. IS-KP also receives financial support from IS.
leadership.
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Terrorist activity
IS-KP fighters frequently conduct attacks against civilian and military targets utilising a combination of
weaponry, including firearms and explosives. IS-KP terrorist acts have involved beheadings, violent
IS-KP has also celebrated violent attacks against Western targets and frequently published material in
support of terrorist acts.
Directly or indirectly engaged in preparing, planning, assisting in or fostering the doing of terrorist acts
27 March 2023, IS-KP carried out a suicide attack near the Foreign Ministry in Kabul that killed six
people and wounded 12 others.
9 March 2023, IS-KP killed three people during an attack in Herat Province, Afghanistan.
12 December 2022, two IS-KP fighters carried out an attack at the Kabul Longan Hotel, killing three
people and injuring 18 others.
4 October 2022, IS-KP launched a suicide attack in front of the Russian embassy in Kabul, killing four
people.
2 December 2022, IS-KP attempted to assassinate Pakistani Chargé d’affaires, Ubaid-ur-Rehman
Nizamani, by opening fire from a neighbouring building while Nizamani was taking a walk inside the
Pakistani embassy compound.
30 September 2022, IS-KP launched a suicide attack against an education centre for Hazara girls in
Western Kabul, killing 54 people.
18 June 2022, IS-KP detonated a car bomb outside a Sikh temple in Kabul, killing two people and
injuring three others.
21 April 2022, IS-KP members detonated a bomb at a mosque during prayers in Balkh Province,
Afghanistan, killing 50 people and wounding 100 others.
19 April 2022, an IS-KP suicide bomber blew himself up at a high school in Dasht-e Barchi, west Kabul,
which killed or injured 20 students and teachers.
4 March 2022, IS-KP conducted a suicide bombing at a Shia mosque in Pakhtunkhwa Province, Pakistan,
killing over 56 people and injuring 190 others.
2 November 2021, five IS-KP fighters attacked the Sardar Mohammad Daul Khan military hospital, killing
19 people and wounding 43 others.
26 August 2021, IS-KP were responsible for a bomb blast at Kabul’s Hamid Karzai International Airport,
killing 170 Afghan civilians and 13 U.S. service members.
14 May 2021, IS-KP bombed a Kabul mosque during Friday prayers as worshippers gathered for the Eid
al-Fitr holiday, killing 12 people.
7 July 2022, Al-Azaim Media Foundation produced an 11-minute, 39-second video in Dari, titled “Flames
of Revenge”. The video discusses IS-KP’s ‘revenge’ attack in Kabul against a Sikh temple on 18 June 2022.
In the video, IS-KP shows clips of the attack and Sikh community members mourning, and warns that
the group will target Hindus and Sikhs.
10 March 2022, Al-Azaim Media Foundation produced a 14-minute, 29-second video in Pashto, titled
“Rafidites Not Safe Anywhere”. Utilising a derogatory name for Shi’ite Muslims, IS-KP states that Shi’ites
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are not safe anywhere and warns that “we will kill them without any hesitation because they are
polytheists and are murderers of Sunnis”.
On the basis of these examples, IS-KP is assessed to have directly or indirectly engaged in, preparing,
planning, assisting in or fostering the doing of a terrorist act. The 7 July 2022 and 10 March 2022 videos are
assessed to be IS-KP threats to conduct terrorist acts, which fall within the definition of ‘terrorist act’ in s
100.1 of the Criminal Code.
Other Considerations
Links to Australia and threats to Australian interests
A successful terrorist attack directed or inspired by IS-KP could result in harm to Australians, and the
group’s activities and propaganda have the potential to inspire Australian violent extremists.
Conclusion
On the basis of the above information, the Australian Government assesses that IS-KP continues to be
directly or indirectly engaged in, preparing, planning, assisting in or fostering the doing of terrorist acts.
Last updated:
7 November 2023
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