Badr Organization of Reconstruction and Development

The Badr Organization of
Reconstruction and
Development
AT A GLANCE
Overview
Organization
Strategy
Major Attacks
Interactions
Maps
HOW TO CITE
Mapping Militants Project (MMP). “Badr Organization of Reconstruction and

Development.” Last modified June 2021. https://mappingmilitants.org/node/342
SUMMARY
Formed: 1982
Disbanded: Group is active.
First Attack: 1983-1988: The Badr Organization fought alongside the Iranian
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) during the Iran-Iraq War. They served on the
front line and led attacks against Iraqi forces in southern Iraq (unknown killed,
unknown wounded).1
Last Attack: December 31, 2019: The Badr Organization and other PMF
affiliates organized and participated in demonstrations and later took part in an
attack on the U.S. Embassy compound in central Baghdad (0 killed, unknown
wounded).2
OVERVIEW
The Badr Organization of Reconstruction and Development, formerly known as the Badr
Brigade, is a Shiite militant organization that operates in Iraq and Syria. The Badr
Organization advocates for the creation of a separate Shiite region in southern Iraq and is
closely allied with Iran. Since its establishment, the group has received funding and
support from Iran’s government and military. The Badr Organization was founded as the
armed wing of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), a Shiite political party
formerly known as the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution (SCIRI). In 2012, the
1
Badr Organization broke away from the ISCI to maintain ties with Iran after the ISCI
attempted to disassociate from the nation. The Badr Organization entered Iraqi politics in
2014, founding the Fatah Coalition within Parliament and posting several of its members
to Cabinet positions.
NARRATIVE SUMMARY
The Badr Organization of Reconstruction and Development, formerly known as the Badr
Brigade, was formed in 1982. The group initially served as the armed wing of the
Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI).3 The Badr Organization is
considered one of Iran’s oldest and most important Iraqi proxies because of its close and
lasting ties to Tehran.4
SCIRI was founded in Iran in 1982 by political exiles from Iraq. Iraqi President Saddam
Hussein invaded Iran in 1980, kicking off the Iran-Iraq War that would last until 1988. In
the first years of the war, many Iraqi Shiite political leaders fled to Iran. Iran allowed
these leaders to organize anti-Ba’athist political parties within its borders. Iran
encouraged the new political parties to adopt its revolutionary ideology and provided
them with organizational and financial support. In this context, SCIRI was established in
Iran to uproot and replace Iraq’s Ba’athist regime.5
In 1982, the Badr Brigade was established with Iranian support to conduct intelligence
and other military operations in the Iran-Iraq War. Nominally, the group served as the
armed wing of SCIRI. However, in practice, the Badr Brigade was created to operate on
Iran’s behalf. It received significant funding, training, and strategic guidance from Iran’s
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).6 The group likely played a minor part in the
conflict and depended heavily on Iranian support.7
After Iran made peace with Iraq in 1988, Badr militants were largely inactive until 1991.
Following Iraq’s defeat in the First Gulf War, a domestic uprising challenging the
Ba’athist regime spread across the country.8 Viewing the revolt as an opportunity to
undercut its rival, Iran sent Badr militants to Iraq to co-opt the movement and push for
the creation of a new Shiite theocratic government in Iraq. This shift in goals not well
received by the local population, and the potential for the revolt to take on pro-Iranian,
Shiite aims alarmed both Hussein and U.S. officials monitoring the situation.9 Hussein
targeted the rebels with military force, killing upwards of 50,000 people.10 The Iraqi
military easily defeated the Badr militants, forcing them to retreat to Iran. 11 Until 2003,
the Badr Brigade’s operations were largely limited in scope and consisted of raids and
other small attacks across the Iran-Iraq border.12
After the fall of the Ba’athist regime in 2003, the Badr Brigade returned to Iraq. In 2003
and 2004, U.S. officials called for the Badr Brigade to disband.13 SCIRI, however, did not
accept U.S. calls to disarm. Instead, to appear less militant, SCIRI renamed the Badr
Brigade to the Badr Organization of Reconstruction and Development and claimed that
the group was now only engaged in “cultural activities.”14 Unable to disband the Badr
Organization and other Iraqi militia groups, the United States began encouraging
militants to join the ranks of the Iraqi Security Forces. Badr militants served as police,
2
military, and intelligence forces. In these positions, they reportedly tortured, kidnapped,
and killed Sunni civilians and prisoners, though the group has denied these accusations.15
During this time, the Badr Organization also continued to engage in militant activities
against domestic enemies. Despite calls to disarm, group members continued to carry
weapons and staged attacks against the Mahdi Army – an Iraqi militant group operated by
SCIRI’s ideological rivals, the Sadrists – and British troops in southern Iraq. 16
The Badr Organization soon began operating its own political party, independent of
SCIRI. In 2005, the Badr Organization participated in Iraq’s parliamentary elections as
part of the United Iraqi Alliance, a political coalition that also included SCIRI.17 The
group also began to gain influence in Iraq’s Ministry of Interior, which is responsible for
organizing and managing Iraq’s police forces, beginning in 2004.18 The Badr
Organization would consolidate its hold over the Ministry of Interior over subsequent
years, controlling the Minister post between 2014 and 2018 and incorporating its
members into Iraq’s federal and provincial police forces.
In 2007, SCIRI renamed itself the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) in an attempt
to disassociate itself from Tehran. In 2010, the Badr Organization again ran in
parliamentary elections alongside ISCI as part of the Iraqi National Alliance coalition.19
Badr leader Hadi al-Amiri served as Transport Minister from 2010-2014. In this position,
Amiri cemented his connections with Iran and worked to channel funds to companies
affiliated with the Badr Organization.20
While ISCI aimed to distance itself from its Iranian history, the Badr Organization split
from ISCI in 2012 to continue its own political and military activities and preserve its ties
with Iran.21 The leader of the Badr Organization, Hadi al-Amiri, continued to function as
both the political and military leader of the group after the split.22 In 2014, the Badr
Organization won 22 seats in Iraq’s November 2014 parliamentary elections.23 Badr
member Mohammed Ghabban was appointed as Interior Minister, a critical national
security post within Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi’s government. Through Ghabban,
Badr leader Hadi al-Amiri exercised significant control over Iraq’s security forces. A
Badr affiliate was also appointed to serve as Human Rights Minister.24
Following the rise of the Islamic State (IS) in 2013, the Badr Organization chose to ally
with both Iraqi and Iranian forces to halt IS’s advance. Amiri led the organization to fight
IS alongside other Shiite militias as a part of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF,
Hashd as-Shaabi in Arabic) – a powerful coalition of armed groups comprised of militias
representing Iraq’s various religious and ethnic identities.25 The Badr Organization, the
largest group within the PMF, proved indispensable during the campaign to retake
territory from IS. In particular, the group achieved a series of victories against the Islamic
State in the Diyala Province.26 During the battle for Tikrit in 2015, Badr leader Hadi al-
Amiri reportedly led Iraqi troops alongside Iranian General Qasem Soleimani, the head of
the IRGC’s Quds Force.27
In 2016, the Badr Organization assisted the Iraqi Army in several major offensives
against the Islamic State. However, the group often superseded the Iraqi government’s
3
orders to pursue its own objectives. In May 2016, the group played a pivotal but
controversial role in the offensive on Fallujah.28 This was the first significant event in a
series of military engagements where the Badr Organization provided valuable tactical
assistance to the Iraqi Army while simultaneously subverting orders from the Prime
Minister’s office. Under the plan put forth by the Prime Minister, PMF units – the Badr
Organization included – were to assist with surrounding Fallujah. PMF units would then
wait outside the city with Iraqi armed forces entered Fallujah and liberated its residents.
However, once the city had been surrounded, the Badr Organization did not abide by this
plan and instead sent its own members into Fallujah.29 In June 2016, the Badr
Organization leveraged its connections with Badr affiliates in the Iraqi Security Forces to
enter the city.30 At this time, the Badr Organization was accused of committing a series of
human rights abuses against civilians throughout its participation in the two-week
campaign to retake the city.31 In a 2016 interview with PBS, Badr leader Hadi al-Amiri
commented on the abuses: “I don’t claim that there are never violations that occur during
war.”32
The Badr Organization continued to draw on its connections with the security forces
managed by Iraq’s Interior Minister – a senior member of the Badr Organization – to
pursue its own interests during the Mosul offensive in 2016 and 2017. In Mosul, the Badr
Organization and the other PMF units were directed to take up positions to the west of the
city in Tal Afar to prevent IS from breaking out of the Iraqi encirclement.33 Like in
Fallujah, they were directed to remain outside the city to ensure that Mosul’s Sunni
population felt secure.34 However, some Badr militants donned police uniforms and
blended into the Federal Police forces that entered the city.35 In interviews collected by
the Rise Foundation, local PMF leaders claimed that 60-70% of Federal Police officers
operating in Mosul were affiliated with the Badr Organization.36
While some group members fought in the anti-IS campaign, others continued to run for
office. Senior Badr member Mohammed Ghabban had been serving as Interior Minister –
which oversaw Iraq’s internal security forces – but resigned from the post in 2016.37
Another Badr member, Qasim Mohammad Jalal al-Araji, took over the position in
January 2017 and served until October 2018.38 In 2018, the Badr Organization created the
Fatah Coalition, a political partnership comprised of the political wings of several PMF
units.39 As of March 2021, Hadi al-Amiri leads this coalition.40 The Badr Organization
and Fatah were successful during the 2018 parliamentary elections: of the 329 seats in
Parliament, Fatah won the second most at 47 seats, finishing behind Muqtada al-Sadr’s
Sairoon alliance (who won 54 seats); of Fatah’s 47 total seats, the Badr Organization won
22.41
As one of Iran’s most visible and powerful proxies, Badr has served as a focal point for
public anger against Iran’s influence in Iraq. Since the beginning of mass protests across
southern Iraq and Baghdad in October 2019, AAH has come under considerable scrutiny
from the Iraqi public. Protesters accuse the PMF and the major constituents therein –
AAH included – of participating in the state’s crackdown on demonstrations. By January
2020, the death toll from Iraq’s protests which began in October 2019 had risen to over
600, with thousands of injuries and an unknown number of arrests and torture cases.42
4
Badr has been a focal point public opposition since mass protests against Iraq’s fiscal and
political crises began, of which Iran’s proxies are viewed as both a cause and beneficiary.
Protesters burned Badr’s offices in Baghdad and the home of Qasem al-Araji, former
Interior Minister and a Badr member.43 In January 2020, protesters burned the Badr
Organization’s headquarters in Karbala, prompting clashes between protesters and
security forces.44 Badr has sought to suppress demonstrations and intimidate protesters as
they believe the systemic change to Iraq’s political system the protesters demand would
diminish their influence within the country. Badr Organization leader Hadi al-Amiri
blamed Israel and the United States for instigating the protests, stating they seek to cause
chaos in Iraq and vowing retribution.45
As protests grew in intensity and casualties mounted, Hadi al-Amiri reportedly played a
central role in forestalling then-Prime Minister Adel Abd al-Mahdi’s resignation.46 Amiri,
reportedly at IRGC Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani’s urging, insisted that Abd
al-Mahdi remain as premier in order to stabilize Iraq’s situation and pass reforms
necessary to quiet public discontent. In backing Abd al-Mahdi, Amiri came into conflict
with Muqtada al-Sadr, who had at that point sought to position himself as a “leader” for
the protesters and had become one of the most prominent figures demanding Prime
Minister Abd al-Mahdi’s resignation.47 Amiri and Iran’s interventions ultimately did little
to stabilize the situation, as Abd al-Mahdi submitted his resignation one month later.48
The group played a role in organizing and executing the militia-led demonstrations near
the U.S. embassy compound in central Baghdad. Badr Organization leader Hadi al-Amiri
was photographed attending the demonstration, alongside then-KH leader Abu Mahdi al-
Muhandis and AAH leader Qais al-Khazali.49 The demonstrations escalated into an attack
on the U.S. embassy by protestors.50
Fatah and the Badr Organization played an important role during the formation of the
new Iraqi government in early 2020. Fatah initially opposed Mustafa al-Kadhimi’s
nomination to the Iraqi premiership, given the long-standing ties to the U.S. and the U.K.
Kadhimi developed as director of Iraq’s intelligence apparatus. However, after receiving
the bloc’s choice candidate for the position of Labour & Social Affairs Minister, Fatah
voted to support Kadhimi’s government and cleared the way for Kadhimi’s rise to the
premiership.51 Badr defended Kadhimi’s nomination to the premiership in the face of
public opposition from other militias, particularly Kata’ib Hezbollah. Badr released a
letter justifying his appointment and urging the muqawama (“resistance factions;” a term
used to distinguish Iran-aligned militias in Iraq) to give politics time and avoid further
escalation with the U.S. forces.52 Badr also attempted to reassure the militias that
Kadhimi will prioritize holding negotiations with “the American occupier” to facilitate
the withdrawal of the U.S. military from Iraq.
Hadi al-Amiri resigned from his seat in the Iraqi Parliament in June 2020, though as of
May 2021, Iraqi sources continue to identify Amiri as Fatah and the Badr Organization’s
overall leader. 53 Amiri reportedly resigned his position in Parliament to replace Faleh al-
Fayyadh as Chairman of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) Commission, the PMF’s
internal command apparatus.54 However, as of May 2021, Fayyadh remains Chairman of
5
the PMF Commission. Fatah subsequently released a statement saying these rumors were
“baseless” and that Amiri resigned to focus on his duties as leader of Fatah.55
In July 2020, Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi appointed Badr member Qasem al-
Araji to the highly influential position of National Security Advisor as part of a security
personnel reshuffle.56 Some observers argued that the reshuffle, which replaced PMF
Commission Chairman and Iran loyalist Faleh al-Fayyadh as National Security Advisor,
sought to weaken the Iran loyalists’ influence within the regular armed forces’ command
structure.57 This argument, however, is weakened by Araji’s known affiliation with the
highly influential and staunchly pro-Iran Badr Organization.58
As of May 2021, many observers have argued that the Badr Organization is the most
powerful member of the PMF and is likely the most powerful militia in Iraq. Militarily,
Badr is the leading provider of expertise, materiel, and manpower to the PMF’s support
units, such as its armor, artillery, and missiles directorates, and serves as a liaison
between non-Shia armed groups and the Shiite, Iran-backed militias that form the “core”
of the PMF.59 Like most Iraqi militias of comparable size, pedigree, and influence, Badr
exists in a parastatal “grey area” between official and unofficial status. Moreover, Badr
remains a prominent component group within the PMF, a state institution, while several
of its members have held official state positions or served as members of Parliament in
Iraq. However, Badr and other militias’ command apparatuses generally remain outside
of state control. Despite past attempts to rein in PMF constituent groups’ autonomy, such
groups effectively retain the independence of command while receiving state salaries and
access to the regular armed forces’ equipment.60
While Kata’ib Hezbollah certainly eclipses Badr and all other militias in terms of
battlefield prowess and military capabilities, Badr is understood to be far more powerful
owing to its political strength: through its dominance within Parliament and at the
ministerial level, Badr wields substantial influence over Iraq’s federal police, regular
armed forces, and the PMF.61 Ultimately, Badr’s control over greater numbers of
government ministries and seats within Parliament relative to other militias has enabled
and increased its control over the size and disbursement of the PMF’s portion of the state
budget and military command positions, solidifying its position as the preeminent Iran-
aligned entity active in Iraq today.62 For these reasons, observers have described Badr as
being the operational “heart” of the PMF.63 While Badr’s everyday combat activities
against IS in Iraq have decreased in frequency and scope since 2017, the group has been
militarily active across the country in recent years. Most recently, the group has engaged
against IS primarily in Anbar, Diyala, and Salah ad-Din provinces through its PMF
brigades.64 As of October 2020, PMF brigades known to be under Badr or its affiliates’
control include the 1st, 2nd, 4th, 5th, 10th, 16th, 21st, 22nd, 23rd, 24th, 27th, 52nd, 53rd, 44th, and
110th PMF brigades – forming the largest verifiable constituency within the PMF.65
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
A. LEADERSHIP
6
Hadi al-Amiri (1988-Present): Hadi al-Amiri joined the Badr Organization in 1988,
having been a member of SCIRI for some time beforehand, and has led the Badr
Organization for the past three decades.66 Amiri also served as the political leader of
the Badr Organization since its split from the ISCI in 2012. As Badr’s leader, Amiri
has held several important positions within the Iraqi government. Amiri served as the
Minister of Transportation from 2010-2014 under Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki.67
At some point in 2014 or 2015, Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi gave Amiri command
over Iraq’s Army and police in Diyala province.68 Amiri is believed to have
relinquished overall command in Diyala province sometime after 2016 when units of
the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) agreed to withdraw from the Khanaqin area
of Diyala province following violent clashes between Badr and the Kurdish
Peshmerga in the area.69 As of February 2019, Badr maintains a substantial presence
in Diyala province. A member of the Badr Organization, Mohammed Ghabban, was
appointed as Interior Minister in 2014, and it was widely understood that Amiri acted
through the Interior Minister to exercise significant control over Iraq’s security
forces.70 Ghabban resigned from the Interior Ministry in 2016.71 Another Badr
member, Qasim Mohammad Jalal al-Araji, took over the position in January 2017 and
served until October 2018.72 Amiri resigned from his seat in the Iraqi Parliament in
June 2020, though as of May 2021, Iraqi sources continue to identify Amiri as Fatah’s
overall leader. 73 Amiri reportedly resigned his position in Parliament to replace Faleh
al-Fayyadh as Chairman of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) Commission, the
PMF’s internal command apparatus.74 However, as of May 2021, Fayyadh remains
Chairman of the PMF Commission. Fatah subsequently released a statement saying
these rumors were “baseless” and that Amiri resigned to focus on his duties as leader
of Fatah.75
Muen al-Kadhimi (Unknown to Unknown): As of 2015, Kadhimi served as a leader

of the Badr Organization in western Baghdad.76 As of May 2021, it is unclear which
position, if any, Kadhimi holds within the group. In April 2015, Kadhimi was a senior
commander of the Badr Organization in the fight against the Islamic State in Tikrit.
Kadhimi explained there were no prisoners after this campaign because “everywhere
we captured [Islamic State militants] we killed them because they were the enemy.”77
He was also a senior aide to Hadi al-Amiri in the campaign to drive the Islamic State
out of Falluja in May 2015.78 Little has been reported about Kadhimi’s activities since
2015; however, as of May 2021, Iraqi sources continue to identify him as a “leader”
within the Fatah Coalition in Parliament.79
Mohammed Ghabban (Unknown-Present): In October 2014, Mohammed Ghabban

was appointed Iraq’s Interior Minister. He is a direct subordinate to Amiri in the Badr
Organization., and it was widely understood that Amiri acted through the Ghabban to
exercise significant control over Iraq’s security forces while Ghabban was in office.80
Ghabban resigned from the Interior Ministry in 2016.81
Qasim Mohammed Jalal Hussein al-Araji (Unknown-Present): Araji fought against

Iran in the Iran-Iraq War and was captured by Iran in 1984. During his imprisonment,
he joined the Badr Brigade and continued to support the group both in Iran and in
Iraq. Araji returned to Iraq in 2003 and was arrested by U.S. military forces twice –
7
first in 2003 and then in 2007. After his release in 2010, Araji campaigned for office
in the 2010 parliamentary elections as a member of the Badr Organization.82 Araji
won a seat in Parliament both in 2010 and 2014.83 After Badr member Mohammed
Ghabban resigned as Interior Minister in 2016, Araji took over the position in January
2017 and served until October 2018.84 In 2020, Araji was appointed to the position of
National Security Advisor by Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi.85
B. NAME CHANGES
 The Badr Brigade (1983-2003): The group was originally named the Badr
Brigade when it was founded as an armed wing of SCIRI in 1982.86
 The Badr Organization for Reconstruction and Development (2003-Present): In
2003, the U.S. demanded that the Badr Brigade be disbanded. In response, SCIRI
changed the armed group’s name to the Badr Organization of Reconstruction and
Development to appear less militant.87
C. SIZE ESTIMATES
 June 2009: 10,000 (Council on Foreign Relations).88
 November 2014: Upwards of 10,000 militants (Foreign Policy).89
 April 2018: 10,000 – 50,000 (The Wilson Center).90
 August 2019: 18,000 – 22,000 (Combating Terrorism Center, U.S. Military
Academy, West Point).91
D. RESOURCES
Before the Badr Organization split from ISCI in 2012, the group received financial
support from ISCI.92 However, the main financer of the organization has always been
Iran. In 2005, the Jordanian news site al-Malaf reported that the Badr Organization
received $3 million each month from Tehran.93 In 2014, group founder and leader Hadi
al-Amiri described Iranian support of the organization: “[Iran] gave us weapons, they
gave us ammunition, and they gave us their military experience.”94 As of 2021, the group
continues to receive direct support from Iran.95
As a member of the PMF, the Badr Organization has access to the Defense Ministry’s
budget and the allocations therein for PMF units. It is unknown exactly how much
funding Badr receives from the Defense Ministry, though the 2021 Iraqi federal budget
allocated roughly $2.4 billion for the PMF – nearly 50% more than was allocated to the
PMF in the previous 2019 budget.96 As perhaps the most powerful of the Iran-aligned
militias in Iraq active today, Badr wields substantial control over the PMF’s budget. As
Badr controls many seats within Parliament, it has exerted its political power to increase
its control over the size and disbursement of the PMF’s portion of the Defense Ministry’s
budget, reportedly privileging Iran-aligned groups with larger budget allotments.97
Like many militias in Iraq, Badr operates illegal checkpoints within Iraq from which they
extract revenue by levying illicit taxes on goods and vehicles that pass through. Badr
controls the al-Tahaddi checkpoint east of Fallujah, which observers estimate yields the
8
group roughly $10,000 per day, and the strategic Safra checkpoint in Diyala province,
which yields the group up to $20,000 per day.98 Badr reportedly also gains revenue from
several legitimate businesses it and its affiliates control, such as a stationery company in
Ninewa, a fertilizer plant in Salah ad-Din, and several major oil refineries in Salah ad-Din
province.99
The Badr Organization has also reportedly acquired American-made weapons. In March
2016, reports surfaced of Badr Organizations fighters transporting and operating
American weapons and other military vehicles, including an Abrams tank and a US AT-4
anti-tank rocket. It remains unclear from where the group obtained the weapons. Some
observers have speculated that U.S.-made small arms and military vehicles are frequently
stolen from Iraqi government stockpiles and sold on the black market to the militias and
private buyers.100
Like many militias in Iraq, the Badr Organization possesses its own media apparatus.
Badr controls Al-Ghadeer TV, a satellite channel and news outlet based in Iraq.101 Al-
Ghadeer TV operated a news website until the U.S. Justice Department seized control of
the website in December 2020, shutting the website down and removing its content from
view.102
E. GEOGRAPHIC LOCATIONS
Disclaimer: This is a partial list of where the militant organization has bases and where it
operates. This does not include information on where the group conducts major attacks or
has external influences.
The Badr Organization has operated in Iran, Iraq, and Syria. The group was established in
Iran in 1982. 103 It was primarily based in Iran until 2003, when the group moved to
Iraq.104 Since then, the majority of the group’s military and political operations have
taken place within Iraq. The Badr Organization has fought against the Islamic State in
Diyala, Babil, and Ninewa provinces and the regions surrounding Baghdad.105 The group
has also fought against the Mahdi Army, another Shiite militia, in southern Iraq.106 The
Badr Organization also reportedly sent members to Syria to fight in Syria as part of the
group’s expeditionary unit, Quwet al-Shahid Muhammed Baqir al-Sadr.107 While Badr’s
everyday combat activities against IS in Iraq have decreased in frequency and scope since
2017, the group has been militarily active across the country in recent years. Most
recently, the group has engaged against IS primarily in Anbar, Diyala, and Salah ad-Din
provinces through its PMF brigades.108
As of March 2021, a member of the Badr Organization holds the position of provincial
PMF commander in Iraq’s Dhi-Qar, Diwaniyah, Diyala, Kirkuk, and Muthanna
provinces.109 The Badr Organization also wields substantial influence within Basra’s
provincial government. Most significantly, Badr exercises significant power over Basra’s
provincial police, as former Interior Minister and Badr member Mohammed Ghabban
transferred Badr members into the provincial police force’s rank-and-file and officer
corps.110 Similarly, Badr maintains a substantial political and military presence in Diyala
province, having struck a deal with Kurdish security forces to share command of security
9
operations in the province in 2014.111 A Badr-Kurdish alliance in the provincial council
brought Badr member Muthanna al-Tamimi to the position of governor of Diyala
province in 2013, cementing Badr’s influence over provincial administration.112
STRATEGY
A. IDEOLOGY & GOALS
The Badr Organization follows a Shiite Islamist ideology. The group aims to establish
Iran’s type of Islamist governance in Iraq. Known as Wilayat al-Faqih (guardianship of
the jurists), this doctrine seeks the complete implementation of Shiite governance under
the rule of an Islamic jurist (Faqih) entrusted with temporal political authority over God’s
people.113 For this reason, the group is understood as following a Khomeinist ideology –
one in line with the doctrines promulgated by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who
established Iran’s postrevolutionary theocratic government. The group is also a strong
supporter of Iran’s current Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Badr leader Hadi
al-Amiri has previously described Khamenei as “the leader not only for Iranians but the
Islamic nation.”114 In addition to its Khomeinist aims, the Badr Organization seeks to
obtain greater political influence, expand Shiite power in Iraq, and create an autonomous
Shiite province in southern Iraq.
In 2018, the Badr Organization led the creation of the Fatah Coalition, a political
partnership comprised of several PMF units’ political wings in a bid to transform the
PMF’s battlefield successes against IS and subsequent popularity into political power.115
It appears as though Fatah is the political wing of Iran’s broader effort to gain more
influence in Iraq, given the inclinations of many of its leaders and constituent parties
towards Tehran and its religious authorities. Hadi al-Amiri, leader of both the Badr
Organization and the Fatah Coalition, stated Fatah “is the same project [as] Imam
Khomeini,” confirming Fatah’s ideological leanings toward Iran and its system of
government.116
B. POLITICAL ACTIVITIES
The Badr Organization was originally founded as the armed wing of the Supreme
Council for the Islamic Revolution (SCIRI).117 SCIRI was formed in Iran with support
from the Iranian government to advance the ideology of the Iranian Revolution within
Iraq.118 Once the Badr Organization relocated to Iraq, it soon began operating its own
political party, independent of SCIRI. In 2005, the Badr Organization participated in
Iraq’s parliamentary elections as part of the United Iraqi Alliance, a political coalition
that also included SCIRI.119 The group also began to gain influence in Iraq’s Ministry of
Interior, responsible for organizing and managing Iraq’s domestic security forces
beginning in 2004.120 In 2007, SCIRI renamed itself the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq
(ISCI) in an attempt to disassociate itself from Tehran. In 2010, the Badr Organization
again ran in parliamentary elections alongside ISCI as part of the Iraqi National Alliance
coalition.121 Badr leader Hadi al-Amiri served as Transport Minister from 2010-2014. In
this position, Amiri cemented his connections with Iran and worked to channel funds to
companies affiliated with the Badr Organization.122
10
In 2014, the Badr Organization held 22 seats in Iraq’s Parliament, with two of the seats
held by Faleh Sari Abdashi Akkab and Qasim Mohammed Jalal Hussein al-Araji.123 Badr
member Mohammed Ghabban was appointed as Interior Minister, a key national security
post within Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi’s government. Through Ghabban, Badr
leader Hadi al-Amiri exercised significant control over Iraq’s security forces. A Badr
affiliate was also appointed to serve as Human Rights Minister.124 Ghabban resigned
from the post of Interior Minister in 2016, and another Badr member, Qasim Mohammad
Jalal al-Araji, took over the position in January 2017. Araji served as Interior Minister
until October 2018, when another parliamentary election took place.125
In 2018, the Badr Organization created the Fatah Coalition, a political partnership
comprised of several PMF units’ political wings to transform the PMF’s battlefield
successes against IS and subsequent popularity into political power.126 It appears as
though Fatah is the political wing of Iran’s broader effort to gain more influence in Iraq,
given the inclinations of many of its leaders and constituent parties towards Tehran and
its religious authorities. Hadi al-Amiri, leader of both the Badr Organization and the
Fatah Coalition, stated Fatah “is the same project [as] Imam Khomeini,” referring to
Grand Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the founder of Iran’s theocratic government.127
The Fatah Coalition received the second-largest share of votes in Iraq’s May 2018
parliamentary elections, winning 47 of the 329 seats in Parliament and finishing second
behind Muqtada al-Sadr’s Sairoon alliance (which won 54 seats). Of Fatah’s 47 total
seats, the Badr Organization won 22.128 After winning the largest share of seats, Sairoon
began to assemble a governing coalition shortly after the election.129 In this context,
Fatah claimed a majority of its own after striking an alliance with former Prime Minister
Maliki’s Dawlat al-Qanoon coalition and defecting members of Prime Minister Abadi’s
coalition.130 After a period of parliamentary gridlock, Fatah eventually backed the
formation of Adel Abd al-Mahdi’s government with Sairoon at the head of the governing
coalition in Parliament.131 Prime Minister Abd al-Mahdi’s government collapsed in late
2019 under pressure from mass protests across Iraq.132
Fatah and the Badr Organization played an important role during the formation of the
new Iraqi government throughout early 2020. Fatah initially opposed Mustafa al-
Kadhimi’s nomination to the Iraqi premiership. However, after receiving the bloc’s
choice for the position of Social Affairs Minister, Fatah voted for Kadhimi’s
government.133 Badr defended Kadhimi’s nomination to the premiership in the face of
public opposition from other militias, particularly Kata’ib Hezbollah. Badr released a
letter justifying his appointment and urging the muqawama (“resistance factions;” a term
used to distinguish Iran-aligned militias in Iraq) to give politics time and avoid further
escalation with the U.S. forces.134 Badr also attempted to reassure the militias that
Kadhimi will prioritize holding negotiations with “the American occupier” to facilitate
the withdrawal of the U.S. military from Iraq. Throughout 2020, Badr and Fatah played
central roles in demanding the departure of U.S. troops from Iraq. In the wake of IRGC-
QF commander Qasem Soleimani’s death in a U.S. airstrike in January 2020, Badr and
Fatah lawmakers played an instrumental role in orchestrating the passage of a
parliamentary resolution calling on the government to expel U.S. troops from Iraq.135 In
11
August 2020, Prime Minister Kadhimi visited Washington, D.C. for the second round of
the U.S.-Iraq strategic dialogue and status of forces talks.136 Kadhimi met with President
Trump and several U.S. diplomatic and military officials. Kadhimi’s meeting with then-
U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo was followed by a statement from representatives
of the Badr Organization, saying, “We’re not obligated to accept any agreements
Kadhimi signs with Washington, regardless of their benefits to Iraq, unless they include a
timetable for U.S. forces exiting Iraq.”137
As of May 2021, Amiri continues to lead the Fatah Coalition, despite his resignation from
Parliament in June 2020.138 Amiri reportedly resigned his position in Parliament to
replace Faleh al-Fayyadh as Chairman of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF)
Commission, the PMF’s internal command apparatus.139 However, as of May 2021,
Fayyadh remains Chairman of the PMF Commission. Fatah subsequently released a
statement saying these rumors were “baseless” and that Amiri resigned to focus on his
duties as leader of Fatah.140 In July 2020, Prime Minister Kadhimi appointed former
Interior Minister and Badr member Qasim al-Araji to the position of National Security
Advisor.141
C. TARGETS & TACTICS

In the early 1990s, the Badr Organization transitioned from a guerilla force to a
conventional military organization. The organization possessed heavy weaponry that it
displayed in military parades throughout Iraq.142 Between 2013-2017 members of the
Badr Organization were deployed alongside the regular Iraqi Army as part of the Popular
Mobilization Forces (PMF) to combat the Islamic State (IS). In these operations, the
group utilized the same tactics as those employed by Iraq’s regular security forces. 143 As
of October 2020, PMF brigades known to be under Badr or its affiliates’ control include
the 1st, 2nd, 4th, 5th, 10th, 21st, 22nd, 23rd, 24th, 27th, 52nd, 53rd, 44th, and 110th PMF
brigades – forming the largest verifiable constituency within the PMF.144
The Badr Organization is also suspected of kidnapping Sunnis, using torture tactics, and
murdering Sunni Arabs and clerics.145 During its participation in the campaign to retake
Mosul from IS, the Badr Organization was accused of committing a series of human
rights abuses against civilians.146 In a 2016 interview, Badr leader Hadi al-Amiri
commented on the abuses: “I don’t claim that there are never violations that occur during
war.”147 Badr leader Hadi al-Amiri is believed to have encouraged the use of brutal
tactics, such as “using a power drill to pierce the skulls of adversaries.”148 However,
Amiri has repeatedly denied the use of extreme violence.149
MAJOR ATTACKS
Disclaimer: These are some selected major attacks in the militant organization’s history.
It is not a comprehensive listing but captures some of the most famous attacks or turning
points during the campaign.
1983-1988: The Badr Organization coordinated with the Iranian Islamic

Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to fight against Iraq in the Iraq-Iran War
(unknown killed, unknown wounded).150
12
2004-2006: In a leaked State Department cable from December 2009, Badr
Organization leader Hadi al-Amiri is speculated to have personally ordered attacks on
up to 2,000 Iraqi Sunnis in a brutal sectarian war against Iraq’s Sunni population
(2,000 killed, unknown wounded).151
2006: Hundreds of Iraqis were tortured and executed by armed police working for
Iraq’s Interior Ministry under SCIRI’s control. United Nations human rights chief
John Pace stated that many of these policemen were suspected members of the Badr
Organization (hundreds killed, unknown wounded).152
August 27-28, 2007: Members of the Badr Organization serving in the Iraqi security
forces clashed with Mahdi Army militants in Karbala, Iraq. The New York Times
described the fighting as a result of “a power struggle between rival Shiite groups”
over control of Shiite areas of central and southern Iraq. The violence killed fifty
people, some of whom were Shiite pilgrims who had traveled to the area for a
religious celebration (50 killed, 200 wounded).153
June 2014: After the fall of Mosul, the Badr Organization was victorious in a series
of battles against the Islamic State in Diyala province (unknown killed, unknown
wounded).154
July 2014: Human Rights Watch accused the Badr Organization of killing Sunni
prisoners. It was also speculated that the organization targeted Iraqi Sunnis thought to
be sympathetic to IS (unknown killed, unknown wounded).155
January 2015: The Badr Organization is suspected of killing 72 Iraqi civilians in

Muqdadiyah, Diyala province. Badr leader Amiri denied responsibility for the killings
(72 killed, unknown wounded).156
March-April 2015: The Badr Organization fought alongside a U.S.-led coalition in a

campaign to drive the Islamic State from Tikrit in Salah ad-Din province. It was
reported that Hadi al-Amiri personally led the operation alongside the commander of
the IRGC’s Quds Force, Qasem Soleimani (unknown killed, unknown wounded).157
May 2016: The Badr Organization and other Shiite militias affiliated with PMF
participated in Iraqi security forces’ campaign to recapture Fallujah from IS
February 2017: The Badr Organization and other Shiite militias affiliated with PMF
participated in the Iraqi security forces’ campaign to recapture Mosul from IS
August 2017: The Badr Organization and other Shiite militias affiliated with PMF
participated in Iraqi security forces’ campaign to recapture Tal Afar from IS
December 31, 2019: The Badr Organization and other PMF affiliates organized and
participated in demonstrations near and later an attack on the U.S. Embassy
13
compound in central Baghdad. Observers reported seeing Badr leader Hadi al-Amiri
among the demonstrators (0 killed, unknown wounded).161
INTERACTIONS
A. DESIGNATED/LISTED
 The Badr Organization is not designated as a foreign terrorist organization by the
United States or United Nations. In December 2020, U.S. Representative Joe
Wilson (R-S.C.) introduced the “Badr Organization Designation Act of 2020”
that, if passed, would call for the imposition of sanctions on the group and its
designation as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. As of May 2021, the bill has not
yet come to the floor for a vote in the U.S. House of Representatives.162
 The United Arab Emirates Terrorist Organization List: 2014-Present.163
B. COMMUNITY RELATIONS
The Badr Organization and the PMF more broadly have a complicated relationship with
the Iraqi public. Due to their instrumental role in the fight against the Islamic State (IS),
many Iraqis view the militias as vital to the state’s security apparatus.164 Public opinion
polls conducted in the aftermath of IS’s defeat in November 2017 suggest the Iraqi public
strongly views militias within the PMF structure as positive contributors to local security
– with 91% of Shia respondents and 64.5% of Sunni respondents indicating a positive
view of the PMF.165 However, some Iraqi Shia and Sunni view the Badr Organization as
an integral component of Iran’s efforts to gain political and cultural influence within Iraq
– a matter anathema to some Shiite Arab sectarians and Iraqi Sunnis, the latter of whom
fear losing influence to the militias.166 Moreover, Sunni communities, particularly in
areas controlled by the Badr Organization, tend to dislike the group and other prominent
PMF units due to well-documented instances of abuse committed by the Badr
Organization and other PMF units against Sunni civilians during both Iraq’s insurgency
and the war against IS.167 Most notably in the Sunni-majority Diyala province, where
Badr exercises substantial military and political authority, Badr members reportedly
engaged in a “systematic campaign” to drive out Sunni inhabitants from areas under their
direct control to ensure the election of a Shiite-majority provincial council.168 On the
grounds of Badr’s reported hostility toward Sunni civilians, Sunni politicians at the
federal level vehemently opposed Badr’s nominee for Interior Minister, Mohammed
Ghabban, in 2014.169 In May 2021, the U.S. Department of State released Iraq’s section
of the 2020 Report on International Religious Freedom. The report alleged that Badr,
alongside several other militias, has converted several Sunni mosques in Diyala province
into PMF headquarters.170
The Badr Organization has sought to incorporate Sunni tribal militias into the PMF to
mitigate this animosity. Still, it is unclear if this has fully eased tensions between the
militia and Iraq’s Sunni community. Observers note that Badr members have served as
liaisons between the Sunni Tribal Mobilization Forces and the Shiite militias during the
war against IS and have served alongside their Sunni counterparts in recaptured Sunni-
majority areas in Ninewa, Salah ad-Din, and, most notably, Diyala, where Badr maintains
a near-complete control of provincial politics.171 Badr has also provided weapons,
14
funding, and political patronage to members of these “collaborator” groups.172 Moreover,
the Badr Organization has made significant inroads among Shiite Turkmen living
between the cities of Kirkuk and Tuz Khurmatu due in large part to the Badr
Organization’s instrumental role in liberating this area of Iraq from IS.173
The Badr Organization has previously conflicted with the Peshmerga, the Kurdistan
Region of Iraq’s (KRI) armed forces, and the Kurdistan Region’s government. At times,
this conflict has played out within Iraq’s security and political “grey areas” – contested
territories between the jurisdictions of the federal government in Baghdad and the
Kurdish Regional government in Erbil. The PMF has established itself as the preeminent
security force in these contested areas.174 After Iraq’s regular security forces withdrew
from these “grey areas” and moved to combat IS’s offensive into northern Iraq in 2014,
Badr struck a deal with the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, one of the two major political
parties that govern the KRI, to assume control of areas near Khanaqin, Diyala province –
one of the more contested “grey areas” in Iraq.175 Notionally intended to shore up local
security, Badr’s presence in the area increased in subsequent years to encompass near-
total control of local police and governing councils.176 Kurdish security forces and
political organizations generally came to oppose Badr and the PMF’s substantial presence
in Diyala, as Badr’s control of the local police, military, and provincial government
threatened the Kurds’ hard-fought influence within the province.177 In 2016, units of the
Badr Organization clashed violently with the Peshmerga in the Khanaqin area of Diyala
province.178 A ceasefire agreement struck following the clashes stipulated that Badr and
other PMF units must withdraw from Khanaqin and relinquish some of their police
powers; however, as of February 2019, Badr maintains a substantial political and military
presence throughout Diyala province.179
C. RELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHER GROUPS

The group has a history of conflict with the Mahdi Army, another Shiite militant group
within Iraq loyal to Muqtada al-Sadr.180 The rivalry between the groups – often referred
to as “Badr vs. Sadr” – is a fixture of Shiite politics in Iraq.181 Their rivalry stems from
several personal and political disagreements between the groups, such as the Mahdi
Army’s disapproval of the Badr Organization’s close relationship with Iran.182 Politically,
the Badr Organization supported former Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki, while the Mahdi
Army frequently called for Maliki’s resignation.183 The Sadrists have also challenged
Badr’s control of important elements of Iraq’s bureaucracy. Iraq’s Ministry of the
Interior, which oversees the country’s federal police, had effectively been under Badr’s
control since the formation of Iraq’s first post-invasion elected government in 2005.184
However, beginning in 2007, Sadrists joined the rank-and-file of the federal police,
giving the Sadrists official cover for some of their activities and disrupting Badr’s near-
total control of the police and the interior ministry.185 In October 2019, as mass protests
in Iraq grew in intensity and casualties mounted, Badr Organization leader Hadi al-Amiri
reportedly played a central role in forestalling then-Prime Minister Adel Abd al-Mahdi’s
resignation.186 In doing so, Amiri came into conflict with Muqtada al-Sadr, who had at
that point sought to position himself as the “leading voice” of the protesters and had
become one of the most prominent figures demanding Prime Minister Abd al-Mahdi’s
15
resignation. As a result of their disagreement, Sadr said that he and the Sadrists would not
work with Amiri or Badr again.187
There have also been instances of violence between the groups. Both groups have fought
for control and influence in the Shiite-dominated areas of central and southern Iraq,
including the suburbs of Baghdad. In Sadr City, a neighborhood of Baghdad and Sadrist
stronghold, clashes between Badr and the Sadrists killed five people and wounded an
additional 20.188 In August 2007, violent clashes erupted between the Badr Organization
and the Mahdi Army in Karbala – a city that was dominated by Badr and ISCI-affiliated
security officers. The clashes killed 50 and wounded 200 others; among the victims were
an untold number of civilians.189 This inter-group violence peaked in 2007; as of May
2021, it appears the two groups have not clashed violently since then.
The Badr Organization also has ties to Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH) and Kata’ib Hezbollah
(KH), two Iraqi militant groups also backed by Iran. In June 2014, the Maliki government
answered Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani’s call to form popular militias to respond to Islamic
State’s (IS) offensives into northern Iraq with the creation of the Popular Mobilization
Forces (PMF). The PMF is a state-sponsored umbrella group composed of approximately
forty Iraqi militias.190 Lacking a strong regular security force, the Iraqi government relied
on these militias, some of which had existed for decades, to help liberate IS-held areas.191
The Badr Organization, AAH, and KH – all well-established armed groups by that point
– joined the PMF to combat IS. As of October 2020, PMF brigades known to be under
Badr or its affiliates’ control include the 1st, 2nd, 4th, 5th, 10th, 21st, 22nd, 23rd, 24th,
27th, 52nd, 53rd, 44th, and 110th PMF brigades – forming the largest verifiable
constituency within the PMF.192 Badr’s membership in the PMF, coupled with the fact
that the AAH and KH are also proxies of Iran, has led to speculation that the groups share
a close relationship.193 Though the groups share a common background and ideology, the
groups differ in strategy. Observers note that the Badr Organization transitioned into a
“parochial” group after 2003, primarily seeking to acquire power by establishing firm
social and political power bases within Iraq.194 However, mewer militant groups such as
AAH, KH, and other militias founded after 2003 have remained as “vanguard” groups
that actively seek to achieve their goals through violent means and generally lack a solid
social base; KH maintains this abstentionist outlook to the present day, while AAH has
since become a prominent participant in Iraqi Shiite politics and society.195
As of May 2021, many observers have argued that the Badr Organization is the most
powerful member of the PMF and is likely the most powerful militia in Iraq. Militarily,
Badr is the leading provider of expertise, materiel, and manpower to the PMF’s support
units, such as its armor, artillery, and missiles directorates, and serves as a liaison
between non-Shia armed groups and the Shiite, Iran-backed militias that form the “core
groups” of the PMF.196 While Kata’ib Hezbollah certainly eclipses Badr and all other
militias in terms of battlefield prowess and military capabilities, Badr is understood to be
far more powerful owing to its political strength: through its dominance within
Parliament and at the ministerial level, Badr wields substantial influence over Iraq’s
federal police, regular armed forces, and the PMF, as well as most budgetary decisions
16
made regarding all of these organizations.197 For these reasons, observers have described
Badr as being the operational “heart” of the PMF.198
In addition to their military partnership, the Badr Organization has cooperated with AAH
in politics. Badr Organization leaders notably appeared alongside leaders from KH and
AAH in a 2016 demonstration in Baghdad to mark International Quds Day – a holiday
created by Iran to express it and its affiliates’ opposition to Israel and support for the
Palestinian cause.199 Alongside AAH, Badr is a founding member of the Fatah Coalition,
a parliamentary bloc consisting of the political wings of Iran-aligned Iraqi militias.200
Currently, Badr holds the largest number of Fatah’s seats in Parliament – controlling 22
of Fatah’s 47 total seats.201 Badr Organization leader Hadi al-Amiri led Fatah within
Parliament until his resignation Parliament in June 2020, though as of May 2021, Iraqi
sources continue to identify Amiri as Fatah’s overall leader. 202 In December 2019, Badr
played a role in organizing and executing the militia-led demonstrations near the U.S.
embassy compound in central Baghdad. Badr leader Hadi al-Amiri was photographed
attending the demonstration, alongside then-KH leader Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis and
AAH leader Qais al-Khazali.203 The demonstrations escalated into an attack on the U.S.
embassy by protestors.204
The Badr Organization also has ties with militias representing Iraq’s religious and ethnic
minorities. In particular, the Badr Organization maintains close ties with the Babylon
Brigade, a nominally Christian militia and member of the PMF whose leader, Rayan al-
Kildani, has long been associated with the Badr Organization’s leadership.205
The Badr Organization is an enemy of the Islamic State and its predecessor, Al Qaeda in
Iraq, largely due to IS’s efforts to target the Iraqi Shia population. The Badr Organization
was an active participant in the fight against IS through its participation in the PMF
alongside the regular Iraqi Army.206
D. STATE SPONSORS AND EXTERNAL INFLUENCES

The Badr Organization is heavily influenced and supported by Iran. To this end, the
group is often referred to as Iran’s oldest and one of its most important Iraqi proxies and,
after the creation of Hezbollah in Lebanon, Iran’s second most successful foreign policy
intervention since 1979.207
The Badr Organization was founded in Iran with direct Iranian support. After the start of
the Iran-Iraq War, several Iraqi Shiite political leaders fled to Iran. Iran allowed these
leaders to organize anti-Ba’athist political parties within its borders. Iran encouraged the
new political parties to adopt its revolutionary ideology and provided them with
organizational and financial support. In this context, the Supreme Council for the Islamic
Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) was established in Iran in 1982 as an alternative to the
Ba’athist regime.208
In 1983, the Badr Brigade was established with Iranian support to conduct intelligence
and other military operations in the Iran-Iraq War. Assembled from defecting officers of
Iraq’s Army and other Iraqi Shia, the Badr Brigade nominally served as the armed wing
17
of SCIRI. However, in practice, the Badr Brigade was created to operate on behalf of
Iran. Effectively acting as a unit within Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
(IRGC), the Badr Brigade received significant funding, training, and strategic guidance
from the IRGC.209
After its founding, the organization operated out of Iran for two decades until it moved to
Iraq in 2003. Even after the group relocated to Iraq, it continued to receive direct support
from Iran. In 2005, the Jordanian news site al-Malaf reported that the Badr Organization
received $3 million each month from Tehran.210 In 2014, group founder and leader Hadi
al-Amiri described Iranian support of the organization: “[Iran] gave us weapons, they
gave us ammunition, and they gave us their military experience.”211 As of 2021, the
group continues to receive direct support from Iran.212 In 2014, Hadi al-Amiri stated that
“if it wasn’t for Iran, Baghdad would have fallen” and that he is “proud of this
friendship” between the Badr Organization and Iran.213
The Badr Organization aims to establish Iran’s type of Islamist governance in Iraq.
Known as Wilayat al-Faqih (guardianship of the jurists), this doctrine seeks the complete
implementation of Shiite governance under the rule of an Islamic jurist entrusted with
temporal political authority over God’s people.214 For this reason, the group is understood
as following a Khomeinist ideology – one in line with the doctrines promulgated by
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who established Iran’s postrevolutionary theocratic
government. The group is also a strong supporter of Iran’s current Supreme Leader,
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.215
MAPS
 Syria
 Iraq
1
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3
Beehner, Lionel. "Iraq’s Militia Groups." Council on Foreign Relations. Council on Foreign Relations, 26
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4
Babak Dehghanpisheh, “Special Report: The fighters of Iraq who answer to Iran,” Reuters, November 12,
2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/12/us-mideast-crisis-militias-specialreport-
idUSKCN0IW0ZA20141112; Jones, Seth. “War by Proxy: Iran’s Growing Footprint in the Middle East.”
The Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 11, 2019. 3; Steinberg, Guido. The Badr
Organization: Iran’s Most Important Instrument in Iraq.” German Institute for International and Security
Affairs, July 26, 2017. https://www.swp-
berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2017C26_sbg.pdf. 1.
5
“Shiite Politics in Iraq: The Role of the Supreme Council.” International Crisis Group, Middle East
Report No. 70, November 15, 2007, pg. 2-3. https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-
and-arabian-peninsula/iraq/shiite-politics-iraq-role-supreme-council
6
and-arabian-peninsula/iraq/shiite-politics-iraq-role-supreme-council; "Iran Focus." Iran Focus. N.p., 16
Nov. 2005. Web. 27 Aug. 2012. <http://www.iranfocus.com/en/?option=com_content>.; Beehner, Lionel.
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18
29 May 2015; Susannah George, “Breaking Badr,” Foreign Policy, November 6, 2014,
http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/11/06/breaking-badr/.
7
Report No. 70, November 15, 2007, pg. 5. https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-
arabian-peninsula/iraq/shiite-politics-iraq-role-supreme-council
8
Micah Zenko. “Remembering the Iraqi Uprising Twenty-Five Years Ago.” Council on Foreign Relations,
March 5, 2016. https://www.cfr.org/blog/remembering-iraqi-uprising-twenty-five-years-ago
9
and-arabian-peninsula/iraq/shiite-politics-iraq-role-supreme-council; Micah Zenko. “Remembering the
Iraqi Uprising Twenty-Five Years Ago.” Council on Foreign Relations, March 5, 2016.
https://www.cfr.org/blog/remembering-iraqi-uprising-twenty-five-years-ago
10
Micah Zenko. “Remembering the Iraqi Uprising Twenty-Five Years Ago.” Council on Foreign Relations,
March 5, 2016. https://www.cfr.org/blog/remembering-iraqi-uprising-twenty-five-years-ago
11
Mahan Abedin, “Dossier: The Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI),” Middle East
Intelligence Bulletin, 5 (October 2003)
12
13
Rajiv Chrasekaran and Robin Wright. “Iraqi Militias Near Accord To Disband.” Washington Post, March
22, 2004. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2004/03/22/iraqi-militias-near-accord-to-
disband/33f7133b-c934-4272-a60f-07de8fe17b53/
14
Dexter Filkins. “THE STRUGGLE FOR IRAQ: SECURITY; Failing to Disband Militias, U.S. Moves to
Accept Them.” The New York Times, May 25, 2004.
https://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/25/world/struggle-for-iraq-security-failing-disband-militias-us-moves-
accept-them.html; Lionel Breehner. “Iraq’s Militia Groups.” Council on Foreign Relations, October 26,
2006. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/iraqs-militia-groups
15
Lionel Beehner. “Shiite Militas and Iraq’s Security Forces.” Council on Foreign Relations, November 30,
2005. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/shiite-militias-and-iraqs-security-forces
16
Dexter Filkins. “THE STRUGGLE FOR IRAQ: SECURITY; Failing to Disband Militias, U.S. Moves to
Accept Them.” The New York Times, May 25, 2004.
https://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/25/world/struggle-for-iraq-security-failing-disband-militias-us-moves-
accept-them.html; Lionel Beehner. “Shiite Militas and Iraq’s Security Forces.” Council on Foreign
Relations, November 30, 2005. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/shiite-militias-and-iraqs-security-forces
17
Phebe Marr. “Iraq’s New Political Map.” United States Institute of Peace, Speical Report 179, January
2007. https://www.usip.org/publications/2007/01/iraqs-new-political-map
18
Renad Mansour. “Networks of Power: The Popular Mobilization Forces and the state in Iraq.” Chatham
House, Middle East and North Africa Programme, February 2021, pg. 24.
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/2021-02/2021-02-25-networks-of-power-mansour.pdf
19
Marina Ottaway and Danial Kaysi. “Shi’i Politics: Preparing for Victory and for the Next Battle.”
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, February 26, 2010.
https://carnegieendowment.org/2010/02/26/shi-i-politics-preparing-for-victory-and-for-next-battle-pub-
40261
20
Susannah George. “Breaking Badr.” Foregin Policy, November 6, 2014.
https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/11/06/breaking-badr/
21
"The Badr Organization." Counter Extremism Project. Web. 28 July 2015.
<http://www.counterextremism.com/threat/badr-organization>.
22
"Badr Organization." Terrorismcom. 26 Apr. 2014. Web. 28 July 2015.
<http://www.terrorism.com/2014/04/26/badr-organization>.
23
"Iran News Site Profiles Head of Iraq's Badr Organization - Al-Monitor: The Pulse of the Middle
East."Al-Monitor. 12 Nov. 2014. Web. 11 Aug. 2015.; "The Badr Organization." Counter Extremism
Project. Web. 28 July 2015. <http://www.counterextremism.com/threat/badr-organization>.
24
Loveday Morris. “Appointment of Iraq’s new interior minister opens door to militia and Iranian
influence.” The Washington Post, October 14, 2014. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/appointment-
of-iraqs-new-interior-minister-opens-door-to-militia-and-iranian-influence/2014/10/18/f6f2a347-d38c-
4743-902a-254a169ca274_story.html
19
25
Mansour, Renad, and Faleh A. Jabar. "The Popular Mobilization Forces and Iraq's Future." Carnegie
Endowment. April 2017. Accessed July 2, 2018; Ezzeddine, Nancy, and Erwin Van Ween. "Power in
Perspective: CRU Policy Brief Four Key Insights into Iraq’s Al-Hashd Al-Sha’abi." Clingendael. June
2018. Accessed July 2, 2018; Knights, Michael, Hamdi Malik, Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi. “Honored, Not
Contained: The Future of Iraq's Popular Mobilization Forces.” The Washington Institute for Near East
Policy, May 23, 2020. 102-4.
26
Susannah George, “Breaking Badr,” Foreign Policy, November 6, 2014,
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Badr Organization of Reconstruction and Development

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The Badr Organization of

Mapping Militants Project (MMP). “Badr Organization of Reconstruction and

Disbanded: Group is active.

Muen al-Kadhimi (Unknown to Unknown): As of 2015, Kadhimi served as a leader

Mohammed Ghabban (Unknown-Present): In October 2014, Mohammed Ghabban

Qasim Mohammed Jalal Hussein al-Araji (Unknown-Present): Araji fought against

C. TARGETS & TACTICS

1983-1988: The Badr Organization coordinated with the Iranian Islamic

January 2015: The Badr Organization is suspected of killing 72 Iraqi civilians in

March-April 2015: The Badr Organization fought alongside a U.S.-led coalition in a

C. RELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHER GROUPS

D. STATE SPONSORS AND EXTERNAL INFLUENCES

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