De Nigris Processed Presentation 1 Final Wildfires LR
De Nigris Processed Presentation 1 Final Wildfires LR
De Nigris Processed Presentation 1 Final Wildfires LR
Experience in Italy
Michele de Nigris
This is a true story
• Thailand :
• Khao Laem Mount in Nakhon Nayok
province – North of Bangkok – 20 – 29
March 2023
• 8400 ha burned – fortunately no
casualties
• Major impact from air pollution - 2 million
people to hospitals with respiratory
illnesses since the beginning of the year.
• Canada :
• 6497 forest fires in 2023; >800 still active
in October
• 184000 km2 affected
• 220000 persons evacuated
• CO2 emissions: 590 MTons > 1,5 times
Italy for 1 year
• Italy :
• 693 forest fires (July – August 2023)
• 687 km2
• Sicily (July) – Calabria (August) 2
Aim of the presentation
ADDRESS WILDFIRES AS AN
INCREASING THREAT FOR THE
POWER SYSTEM: IMPLICATIONS FOR
RELIABILITY OF SERVICE AND SAFETY
OF OPERATING PERSONNEL
3
Case study
4
Wildfire situation in Italy - 2022
5
Indexes and perspectives
• Scenario: RCP8.5
• Period 2021-2050 wrt 1971-2000
(historical period);
• Increase in the number of days with FWI
> 15
• Summer: +20%
• Autumn: +50%
6
Impact on the power system
450
400
350
• Unplanned line outages become more frequent; 300
• Department of Civil Protection requires deactivation 250
(and grounding) of HV lines located at less than 500 200
Immagine
• The infrared radiation from fire heats up air inside the gap;
• Hot air has a lower density (and lower specific dielectric
withstand capability);
• Large scale tests have demonstrated that decay in
performances, in absence of flames bridging the gap, is
not sufficient to justify significant loss of performances.
10
Air gap performance under fire conditions
Immagine
11
Safety for firefighters – approach distances
System voltage DL: Live working DV: Vicinity zone DA9: Non-electric
[kV] zone [m] [m] work zone [m]
380 2,5 4,0 7,0
220 1,6 3,0 7,0
150 1,2 3,0 7,0
132 1,1 3,0 5,0 12
Step voltage
Immagine
13
Working with fire extinguishing hoses
15
Operative remarks from the TSO viewpoint
PERSONNEL SAFETY:
• FLYING PERSONNEL NOT EXPOSED TO ANY ELECTRICAL RISK;
• GROUND PERSONNEL PROTECTED FROM PHYSICAL RISK OF HEAVY FLUID DROP – Does not operate close to the line during fluid
dropout
SYSTEM MANAGEMENT:
• LINE DE-ACTIVATION MAY IMPACT NATIONAL POWER SYSTEM: NEEDS (IF NECESSARY) TO BE REDUCED AT THE MINIMUM;
• LINE GROUNDING MAY TAKE TOO LONG TO BE SAFE AND EFFECTIVE – Specialised personnel dispatched on evolving fire site
16
Concluding remarks
TO BE DONE:
• Determination of gap behavior in presence of fluid flows characterized by:
• high conductivities (sea water, extinguishing foam, retardants);
• very high flows (conductive fluid drops from helicopters or air
tankers);
• Phase-to-ground insulation system comprising insulators.
RULE OF THUMB:
Maintaining >25 meters from the geometrical imprint of the overhead
transmission line over the ground can be kept as an initial reference,
provided no water flow is projected towards the line.
18
«This work has been partly financed by the Research Fund for
the Italian Electrical System in compliance with the Decree of
Minister of Economic Development April 16, 2018»
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Contatti
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Michele.denigris@rse-web.it
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