626377

Roland Barthes at the Collège de France
Contemporary French and Francophone Cultures 22

Contemporary French and Francophone Cultures
Series Editors
EDMUND SMYTH CHARLES FORSDICK
Manchester Metropolitan University University of Liverpool
Editorial Board
JACQUELINE DUTTON LYNN A. HIGGINS MIREILLE ROSELLO
University of Melbourne Dartmouth College University of Amsterdam
MICHAEL SHERINGHAM DAVID WALKER
University of Oxford University of Sheffield
This series aims to provide a forum for new research on modern and contem-
porary French and francophone cultures and writing. The books published
in Contemporary French and Francophone Cultures reflect a wide variety of
critical practices and theoretical approaches, in harmony with the intellectual,
cultural and social developments which have taken place over the past few
decades. All manifestations of contemporary French and francophone culture
and expression are considered, including literature, cinema, popular culture,
theory. The volumes in the series will participate in the wider debate on key
aspects of contemporary culture.
Recent titles in the series:
6 Jane Hiddleston, Assia Djebar: Out 14 Andy Stafford, Photo-texts:
of Africa Contemporary French Writing of
7 Martin Munro, Exile and Post- the Photographic Image
1946 Haitian Literature: Alexis, 15 Kaiama L. Glover, Haiti Unbound:
Depestre, Ollivier, Laferrière, A Spiralist Challenge to the
Danticat Postcolonial Canon
8 Maeve McCusker, Patrick 16 David Scott, Poetics of the Poster:
Chamoiseau: Recovering Memory The Rhetoric of Image-Text
9 Bill Marshall, The French Atlantic: 17 Mark McKinney, The Colonial
Travels in Culture and History Heritage of French Comics
10 Celia Britton, The Sense of 18 Jean Duffy, Thresholds of Meaning:
Community in French Caribbean Passage, Ritual and Liminality in
Fiction Contemporary French Narrative
11 Aedín Ní Loingsigh, Postcolonial 19 David H. Walker, Consumer
Eyes: Intercontinental Travel in Chronicles: Cultures of
Francophone African Literature Consumption in Modern French
12 Lawrence R. Schehr, French Post- Literature
Modern Masculinities: From 20 Pim Higginson, The Noir Atlantic:
Neuromatrices to Seropositivity Chester Himes and the Birth of the
13 Mireille Rosello, The Reparative in Francophone African Crime Novel
Narratives: Works of Mourning in 21 Verena Conley, Spatial Ecologies:
Progress Urban Sites, State and World-Space
in French Cultural Theory
LUCY O’MEARA
Roland Barthes
at the Collège de France
LIVERPOOL UNIVERSITY PRESS

First published 2012 by
Liverpool University Press
4 Cambridge Street
Liverpool
L69 7ZU
Copyright © 2012 Lucy O’Meara
The right of Lucy O’Meara to be identified as the author of this book has been
asserted by her in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a

retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic,
mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without
the prior written permission of the publisher.
British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication data

A British Library CIP record is available
ISBN 978-1-84631-843-6
Typeset by XL Publishing Services

Printed and bound by CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon CR0 4YY
Je devrais sans doute m’interroger d’abord sur les raisons qui ont pu
incliner le Collège de France à recevoir un sujet incertain, dans lequel
chaque attribut est en quelque sorte combattu par son contraire. […] Il
me faut bien reconnaître que je n’ai produit que des essais, genre ambigu
où l’écriture le dispute à l’analyse.
Roland Barthes,
inaugural lecture at the Collège de France,
7 January 1977
Contents
Acknowledgements viii
Note on Abbreviations and References ix
Introduction 1
1 Barthes’s Heretical Teaching 27
2 Leçon and ‘Longtemps, je me suis couché de bonne heure…’ 52
3 Comment vivre ensemble, Le Neutre and their Context 87
4 Japonisme and Minimal Existence in the Cours 118
5 La Préparation du roman: The Novel and the Fragment 163
Afterword 200
Appendix: List of Roland Barthes’s Seminars and Lecture 205

Courses at the École pratique des hautes études and the
Collège de France, 1963–1980
Bibliography 207
Index 220
vii
Acknowledgements
I thank the Arts and Humanities Research Council and the School of
Modern Languages and Cultures at the University of Nottingham for
their financial support for the original research, and the Irish Research
Council for the Humanities and Social Sciences for a research grant in
2009–10. I am extremely grateful to Diana Knight and Patrick
O’Donovan for their generosity and for the invaluable advice they
provided during the elaboration of this project. Thanks to all of the
following people for their help: Anthony Cond of Liverpool University
Press, Claude Coste, Jonathan Culler, Katie Jones, Nikolaj Lübecker, Éric
Marty, Jutta O’Meara, Michael Sheringham. Finally, particular thanks
to Tim Robb for his unfailing encouragement and support.
viii
Note on Abbreviations and References
Throughout the text, references to works by Barthes are given by abbre-
viated title and page number. Titles of works have been abbreviated as
indicated below. All articles by and interviews with Barthes are referred
to as they appear in the 2002 five-volume edition of the Œuvres
complètes. References to the Collège de France lecture notes include the
date of the relevant lecture as well as a page reference. All references to
book-length texts by Barthes are to the individual Seuil editions of these
works, with the exceptions of Roland Barthes par Roland Barthes,
Fragments d’un discours amoureux and La Chambre claire, which are
referred to as they appear in the Œuvres complètes. Full publication
details of all works cited are to be found in the bibliography. In the cases
of articles by and interviews with Barthes, full details of the original publi-
cation (dates, journals, interviewers) are given in a note following each
first reference.
C Prétexte Roland Barthes: colloque de Cerisy

CC La Chambre claire
CVC Carnets du voyage en Chine
CVE Comment vivre ensemble
DZE Le Degré zéro de l’écriture
EC Essais critiques
ES L’Empire des signes
FDA Fragments d’un discours amoureux
L Leçon
LA Séminaire: le Lexique de l’auteur
‘Longtemps’ ‘Longtemps, je me suis couché de bonne heure…’
JD Journal de deuil
M Michelet
My Mythologies
N Le Neutre
OC, I Œuvres complètes tome I. 1942–1961
OC, II Œuvres complètes tome II. 1962–1967
ix
x Roland Barthes at the Collège de France
OC, III Œuvres complètes tome III. 1968–1971

OC, IV Œuvres complètes tome IV. 1972–1976
OC, V Œuvres complètes tome V. 1977–1980
PR La Préparation du roman I et II
PT Le Plaisir du texte
RB Roland Barthes par Roland Barthes
SFL Sade, Fourier, Loyola
S/Z S/Z
Note on the use of the recordings of the lectures

Where I have expanded quotations from the lecture notes with trans-
criptions from the recordings, this is indicated by the use of pointed
brackets < >. Transcriptions are my own and are made from the record-
ings of Leçon, Comment vivre ensemble, Le Neutre, and La Préparation
du roman.
Introduction
Il essaye (ou il ne peut s’empêcher) de tenir un discours qui ne s’énonce pas

au nom de la Loi et/ou de la Violence; c’est-à-dire qui ne soit ni politique,
ni religieux, ni scientifique. Il ne lui reste donc plus que le discours esthétique.
Comment pourrions-nous encore appeler ce type de discours? Tout
simplement le discours individualiste.
Roland Barthes par Roland Barthes (inédits)
The shield of the Collège de France shows a book resting on a leafy back-
ground, with the legend ‘Docet Omnia’ – ‘Everything is taught’ – framed
by stars. It is inlaid in the floor of the Collège’s main entrance on Rue
des écoles in Paris. Elsewhere in the building, Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s
phrase describing the institution’s promotion of experimental,
unregulated teaching is carved in large gilded letters into the wall: ‘Ce
que le Collège de France, depuis sa fondation, est chargé de donner à ses
auditeurs, ce ne sont pas des vérités acquises, c’est l’idée d’une recherche
libre’. Roland Barthes taught at the Collège de France from 1977 to 1980
as holder of the Chair of Literary Semiology. He imagined having his
own motto for his lectures. Not carven, but effaceable, it would be a sign
hung beside the bust of Henri Bergson in the lecture theatre where Barthes
lectured on Saturday mornings. The sign would feature a quotation from
Montaigne’s Essais: ‘Je n’enseigne point. Je raconte’.1 Montaigne was an
enthusiastic adopter of mottoes, having Greek and Latin maxims, many
of them drawn from Sceptic texts, cut into the rafters of his study: ‘Iudicio
alternare’, he reminded himself, and ‘Que sçay-je?’2 The carvings at the
Château de Montaigne prioritise inquiry, reflection, and abstention from
quick decisions. Barthes is drawn to this intellectual spirit: he reminds
his audience in 1978 of the medal that Montaigne had had struck in 1576,
which depicted a set of balanced scales, and the Pyrrhonian legend
‘Epokhe’: I hold back.3 Barthes imagines erecting a notice which would
demonstrate that he too will abstain from judgment: ‘Comment mettre
sur ma demeure ou mon entreprise intellectuelle un écriteau: “Fermeture
de jugement pour congé annuel”?’ (N, 254).
The imagined mottoes that Barthes wishes to display upon his
1
2 Roland Barthes at the Collège de France
teaching at the Collège de France are the ‘signs’ of an intellectual project

that is radically self-effacing, at the same time as it makes subjectivity
central to the investigation. It is the argument of this book that the
Collège de France lectures represent an important addition to Barthes’s
corpus which allows us to arrive at a new reading of his thought. This
new reading involves opposing those perceptions of Barthes according to
which the potency of Barthes’s work diminishes towards the end of his
life as it becomes more subjective and aesthetic in focus. I shall argue that
the value of this late work inheres in its questioning of the grounds of
subjectivity, and its coverage of important critical, ethical and social
problems via a deliberately contingent discourse. All of Barthes’s work
as cultural and literary theorist, including his increasingly creative late
work, involves, ultimately, the complex relationship between the indi-
vidual and ideology, and an imagining of how this relationship might
change for the better. Utopian thought, always rooted in subjective
response to social conditions, is central to Barthes’s conception of the
importance of his work as writer.4 The Collège de France represents the
apogee of Barthes’s career as a public intellectual. This book examines
his conception of the role of the intellectual as shown in his teaching
there; his elaboration of particular social values; his emphasis on
everyday life; and his desire to valorise aesthetic experience, often seen
as less valuable than discourses of religion, philosophy or science. I shall
place these issues in the context of post-’68 French thought and certain
insistent themes therein, notably the idea of community; the doctrine of
intellectual engagement (which Barthes believes needs to be refined); and
the instrumentalisation of Asian thought in French theory. A preoccu-
pation throughout the book, and notably in the final chapter, is Barthes’s
extensive use of fragmentation in his writing and teaching: I shall consider
the ways in which techniques of fragmentation are linked to his anti-
systematic thought generally. The book will also examine the
institutional context of post-war French thought in the humanities by
focusing on the particular status of the Ecole pratique des hautes études
and the Collège de France, both of which played important roles in the
careers of several of the most influential thinkers in post-war French
theory: Barthes, Bourdieu, Foucault, Derrida and Lévi-Strauss.
Barthes’s chair at the Collège de France is in literary semiology, the
emphasis lying with the qualifier. Barthes is interested in the ability of
literary language to express the complexity of the world, and to evade,
in a kind of perpetuum mobile, the crushing force of ideological language.
The positive charge of literature is celebrated in his inaugural lecture at
the Collège de France in January 1977. Barthes subsequently gives four
Introduction 3
lecture courses: Comment vivre ensemble, focusing on the problems of

communal life; Le Neutre, which explores the ideal of a ‘neutral’, non-
conflictual mode of being; and La Préparation du roman I et II, in which
he examines the fantasy of writing a novel. In all four of these series,
Barthes treats his material indirectly, relying on metaphors and shunning
definition, concept, and pre-organised goals. His thought is aesthetic
insofar as it is perspectival in its approach to epistemology: Barthes’s
continual question, formulated in Nietzschean terms, is ‘what does this
mean for me?’5 This aesthetic contingency and individualism are linked
to an ethics of the intellectual. Barthes is radically distrustful of the idea
of the intellectual as mouthpiece for truth. For Barthes, rather, the intel-
lectual is important as somebody who will assume his/her own
contingency and interests, and demonstrate that ‘il n’y a pas de vérité qui
ne soit liée à l’instant’ (N, 18 February 1978, 39). This uncovering of the
occultation of the arbitrary that usually takes place in discourses of power
– including intellectual discourse – is central to Barthes’s work.
Significantly, Barthes opens his inaugural lecture at the Collège de France
by describing himself as an essayist. The unstable, destabilising nature of
that genre, shuttling as it does between art and theory, is ideally suited
to the work that Barthes wishes to do. Additionally, the intellectually
independent nature of the Collège de France favours the staging of
Barthes’s aesthetic, counter-ideological theories. This is what this book
shows.
Barthes’s Montaignian mottoes indicate both his rejection of dogma-
tism and his investment in the importance of individualistic discourse.
He describes his teaching as a tentative process in which he is only barely
ahead of his audience: ‘Ceci est une recherche en train de se faire. Je crois
en effet que, pour qu’il y ait une relation d’enseigenement qui marche, il
faut que celui qui parle sache à peine un peu plus que celui qui écoute
(parfois même, sur certains points, moins […]). Recherche, et non
Leçon’.6 Thus he rejects intellectual showmanship. As the Montaigne
‘sign’ says, ‘Je n’enseigne point’. But the second half of that motto is ‘Je
raconte’. Personal experience is central to the work. In the Essais,
Montaigne’s avowals that he is not providing any authoritative knowl-
edge always have as their correlate the fact that he will talk about himself:
‘Qui sera en cherche de science, si la pêche où elle se loge: il n’est rien de
quoi je fasse moins de profession. Ce sont ici mes fantaisies, par lesquelles
je ne tâche point à donner à connaître les choses, mais moi’.7 Thus
Montaigne refuses confinement to any disciplinary subject, and shapes
the ‘essai’ as a questing, oppositional genre, in which the vagaries of his
own interests dictate every digression.8 In a strikingly similar fashion,
Barthes, in his inaugural lecture at the Collège de France in 1977, declares

that his teaching will be based on personal fantasy: ‘C’est à un fantasme,
dit ou non dit, que le professeur doit annuellement revenir, au moment
de décider du sens de son voyage’.9 In this way, he adds, the teacher can
debunk expectation, ‘dévie[r] de la place où l’on l’attend’. An ‘enseigne-
ment fantasmatique’ is conceived of by Barthes as a discourse that refuses
ideological systems, sidelining them in favour of a focus on the constantly
shifting, contingent complex that is the relationship between the self and
its environment. Barthes, like Montaigne, discusses the importance of
objects ‘for him’. Though this initially leads to a loss of general signifi-
cance, his hope is that this is found at another level, by virtue of the
presentation of his own tastes as a ‘universal particular’. His subjective
tastes are explicitly used to generate subjects in which he hopes his
listeners will also invest their interest, such that a more universal impor-
tance is established. This book examines how this oscillation between the
particular and the universal is brought about.
This discourse, which aimed above all at eliciting the listeners’ own
critical engagement with experience, was delivered to a large and diverse
audience. All lectures at the Collège de France are open to the public.
Barthes was nominated to the Collège by Michel Foucault, and elected
by a majority of only one vote in May 1976. Required to provide 26
hours of teaching per year on a topic of his choice, to be divided between
lectures and ‘seminars’ at will, he gave four individual lecture courses
and two ‘seminar’ series with invited speakers between January 1977 and
his death in March 1980.10 His weekly lectures, like those of Foucault,
drew a considerable crowd who queued for hours in advance before
filling the Collège’s largest lecture theatre as well as an adjacent room
furnished with a video link-up. Enthusiastic listeners recorded Barthes’s
every word onto cassette. Barthes wrote very full lecture notes, and
tended to read them out with minimal improvisation. However, his
lecture notes were not included in any of the posthumous publications
edited by Seuil’s François Wahl during the 1980s.11 Wahl asserted that
Barthes would not have wished the lecture notes to be published due to
his strict distinction between spoken and written texts, and also claimed
that neither lecture notes nor recordings existed in sufficiently complete
form to permit any kind of publication. In summer 1991, an unautho-
rised transcription of part of one of Barthes’s lectures from the 1978
Neutre series appeared in Bernard-Henri Lévy’s journal, La Règle du
jeu.12 This led to a court case in September 1991, in which the journal’s
publishers were convicted of breach of copyright and ordered to pay
damages to Barthes’s half-brother and heir, Michel Salzedo.13 When
Introduction 5
Salzedo subsequently deposed the archive of Barthes’s manuscripts with

the Institut Mémoires de l’Édition contemporaine (IMEC) in 1996, it
became apparent that full handwritten notes for all of Barthes’s Collège
de France lectures existed, and could be supplemented by the amateur
recordings of the lectures.14 The texts of Barthes’s notes for Comment
vivre ensemble: simulations romanesques de quelques espaces quotidiens
(delivered from January to May 1977), and Le Neutre (delivered from
February to May 1978), were published in November 2002. The final
two lecture courses, La Préparation du roman I et II (December 1978 to
March 1979, and December 1979 to February 1980) appeared one year
later. Also made available were MP3 recordings on CDs of the entirety
of the lectures.15 Éric Marty oversaw the publications, which were
released alongside his 2002 re-edition of Barthes’s Œuvres complètes.
Since the Collège de France material has appeared, Marty has embarked
upon a series of publications of the notes of Barthes’s seminars at his
previous place of employment, the École pratique des hautes études, also
in Paris.16 In 2009, to the ire of François Wahl, two diaristic texts of
Barthes’s were published: Carnets de voyage en Chine, which catalogues
Barthes’s experiences of visiting China as part of a Tel Quel delegation
in 1974, and Journal de deuil, a collection of ‘fiches’ expressing Barthes’s
grief after the death of his mother in 1977.17
When preparing the Collège de France material for publication,
Marty and his editorial team chose not to issue a transcription of the
lectures or an edited text combining the oral and written versions of the
originals. The published texts are in most respects identical to Barthes’s
manuscript notes. Unobtrusive editorial notes are present in footnotes;
these pinpoint or elaborate Barthes’s references, gloss any abstruse terms,
provide links to other texts by Barthes, and occasionally add an elucida-
tory phrase from the relevant oral recording. Marty was determined not
to turn these notes into an entirely book-like text. His preface to the series
stresses that ‘ces notes sont davantage ce qu’on pourrait appeler un infra-
texte’ (Marty in CVE, 12). Their nature is not textual so much as
epitextual, in Genette’s sense: provisional, oral, self-reflexive.18 The texts
are published as part of Seuil’s Traces écrites collection, which is devoted
to the publication of lectures and seminars. The covers are designed to
resemble a spiral-bound cahier, and the text is printed in a typeface remi-
niscent of typewritten script. Littered with Barthes’s ellipses, arrows,
brackets and abbreviations, the text appears within wide margins, in
which the reader can make notes, as Barthes did in his scripts. The visual
appearance of the books thus seeks to remind the reader of the contin-
gent nature of the material.
These are strange texts in a quasi-archival mode. They share this

curious status with many other texts: there has been a general trend in
French publishing over the last fifteen years whereby the pedagogical
work of post-war French thinkers in the human sciences has become
available on a large scale.19 Following the publication of notes from a
selection of Merleau-Ponty’s Collège de France lecture notes during the
mid-1990s, the publication of transcriptions of Michel Foucault’s
lectures began in 1997 and is ongoing. Émile Benveniste’s final lectures
at the Collège de France have just been published, and more publications
are projected.20 The notes of Jacques Derrida’s seminars at the École des
hautes études en sciences sociales are being published almost simultane-
ously in French and in English translation.21 For all of these thinkers,
their ‘archive enseignante’ is becoming part of their œuvre; the peda-
gogical material arrives late, supplementing the corpus, and enabling
scholars other than those who attended the lectures to undertake a study
of these thinkers’ pedagogy. In the case of Barthes, the Collège de France
lecture notes permit a retroactive assessment of his thought, as Jürgen
Pieters and Kris Pint point out in their introduction to a collection of arti-
cles about Barthes’s Cours.22 Pieters and Pint portray the Barthes of the
Collège de France period as being ‘in the uneasy situation whereby the
theoretical doxa he opposed was to a great extent influenced by his own
thinking’. The lecture courses show us ‘a man shadowboxing with an
earlier self’: Barthes’s literary semiology seeks the inclusion of aspects of
language and literature overlooked by his previous, more systematic
semiology. This mission is inherently risky, as Pieters and Pint remind us:
‘this revision often turned into a mere regression’.23 The lectures are thus
a ‘riddle’ of sorts, not least because the fantasies that they employ are
never realised. Thus the lectures, far from being ‘a final post-scriptum’
to Barthes’s œuvre, constitute instead ‘an invitation to return to [the]
œuvre’ and to recalibrate Barthes’s legacy.24
In thus returning to the œuvre, however, we need to be aware of the
formal specificity of these texts. These are situated, semelfactive texts,
whose moment has passed. The two seminar series, ‘Qu’est-ce tenir un
discours? Recherche sur la parole investie’ (1977) and ‘La métaphore du
labyrinthe: Recherches interdisciplinaires’ (1978–79), are incomplete,
consisting only of Barthes’s notes, without the interventions of the invited
speakers whose presentations constituted the bulk of the series: it is for
this reason that I shall not analyse these seminars in detail. Similarly, I
shall not analyse the seminar on ‘Proust et la photographie: examen d’un
fonds d’archives photographiques mal connu’ (1980), which was not
given due to Barthes’s untimely death.25 The lecture series, on the other
Introduction 7
hand, despite their partly interlocutory character, are monologic, and

thus self-contained. I have found it logical to accept the lecture notes a
priori as a textual addition to Barthes’s corpus, though with the caveat
that these are indeed not books.26
Barthes’s forced monologism is both uncomfortable and enabling. At
the Collège, he feels ill at ease being the sole speaker, not privy to the
circulation of ideas amongst his listeners, and distressed by seeing people
standing, or sitting uncomfortably on floors or windowsills in order to
hear him speak. But he plays on this too: from the declaration of the
‘enseignement fantasmatique’ onwards, all of the lectures play upon the
forced centrality of himself. His resistance to the magisterial form of the
lecture leads to a style that constitutes its own dialogism, with Barthes
constantly breaking up his own discourse, organising the material in an
aleatory fashion, and undercutting his own mastery by a deliberately
heavy reliance on others’ material. This very idiosyncratic lecturing style
serves to underline the counter-ideological message of Barthes’s work.
The lecture courses beneficially refocus our attention on Barthes’s philos-
ophy of form, and the manner in which much of the substance of his
work inheres in its formal experimentation. This experimentation is elab-
orated within his pedagogy: Barthes’s last three published books, Roland
Barthes (originating in a seminar), Fragments d’un discours amoureux
(based on two years of seminars) and La Chambre claire (partially elab-
orated during the Préparation du roman I lectures) are each, in terms of
their construction, richly inventive.27 A similar formal innovation is
found in the lecture courses, where Barthes exerts himself to practise an
unmagisterial teaching in a magisterial setting.
The first lecture course, Comment vivre ensemble: simulations
romanesques de quelques espaces quotidiens (January–May 1977),
begins with a lengthy setting-out of what this method will involve.
Drawing heavily on Gilles Deleuze’s Nietzsche et la philosophie, Barthes
opens the first lecture by discussing the Nietzschean opposition between
‘method’ and ‘culture’.28 Whereas a method implies that the thinker has
a predetermined goal towards which he wishes to advance directly,
‘culture’ involves allowing thought to be formed by various unpre-
dictable forces including one’s unconscious. ‘Culture’ is a routing
towards heterogeneity: ‘des bribes, des bornes de savoirs, de saveurs’. It
is this idea of heterogeneity, which will not be hierarchised in accordance
with any preconceived goal, which will inform Barthes’s methodology,
as will the idea of the fantasy – for fantasy could be seen as ‘origine de
la culture (comme engendrement de forces, de différences)’ (CVE, 12
January, 34). The ‘fantasme’ of the first lecture course is the ‘vivre-ensem-
ble’, an ideal of both personal and collective living which Barthes desig-
nates using the word ‘idiorrythmie’, a term borrowed from the
vocabulary of Greek orthodox monasticism. Barthes discovered the word
in L’Été grec, a recent book by Jacques Lacarrière.29 In this study of Greek
monasticism, Lacarrière discusses the monks of Mount Athos who inau-
gurated a community which was only lightly regulated, and which thus
constituted an alternative to the highly regulated monastic community
from which they had broken.30 ‘Idiorrythmie’ refers to the individual
rhythm or pace at which each of these monks lived. For Barthes, idior-
rythmie is a form of living which manages to reconcile the problems of
social living and those of a life too solitary, producing a quotidian ideal
which balances the right mixture of elements of companionship and
space. This idiorrythmic fantasy is distinguished from the most common
exemplars of living together: Barthes makes it clear at the outset that he
is not going to discuss the family or the couple: ‘le lieu du couple n’est
pas balayé par le fantasme qui précisément ne veut pas voir l’immuable
chambre à coucher, la clôture et la légalité, la légitimité du désir’.
Similarly, the recognised marginalism of groups which have an overt
cause – communes, convents, phalansteries – is not of interest, for these
groups are structured ‘selon une architecture de pouvoir’ and are thus
‘déclarativement hostiles à l’idiorrythmie’ (CVE, 12 January, 39–40).
Throughout the lecture series, Barthes examines the conditions that
are required for the attainment of such an imagined ‘idiorrythmie’, and
those that are antipathetic to it. The important questions regard whether
idiorrythmie is possible in our culture, and whether a small group could
exist in which the benefits and comforts of communal living would be
experienced without that sense of community impinging too much upon
one’s sense of individuality, and without an ideological ‘telos’ ultimately
determining the group. Barthes examines these issues using a heteroge-
neous corpus. On the one hand, texts treating monasticism and
cenobitism are examined. Barthes refers often to the problems of ancient
Western monastic life, which he associates with the repressive aspects of
Christianity. He promotes the much more desirable conjunction of the
group and the individual that he sees in the ‘bouddhisme doux’ of the
monks of Ceylon. This is the first occurrence in the Cours of the positive
‘eastern’ exemplars which we will see Barthes employ throughout his time
at the Collège: this is discussed in Chapter 4. The other important group
of texts in Comment vivre ensemble is a set of five ‘textes-tuteurs’ (CVE,
4 May, 182) each of which allows Barthes to examine the implications
of certain types of space and community. Thus Palladius’ Histoire lausi-
aque, a fifth-century account of Egyptian, Palestinian and Syrian monks,
Introduction 9
is linked to the space of the desert.31 Thomas Mann’s The Magic

Mountain is used to discuss the ‘autarkic’ space of the sanatorium.32
Robinson Crusoe provides material for consideration of solitude and the
idea of the hide-out or lair.33 Gide’s La Séquestrée de Poitiers is also
examined for what it reveals regarding obsessive solitude,34 and Zola’s
Pot-Bouille stages the space of the archetypal ‘immeuble bourgeois’.35 By
using these texts as well as the monastic intertexts and various other
sources including reference works such as the Encyclopaedia Universalis,
Barthes elaborates his fantasy of the ideal ‘vivre-ensemble’. Both positive
and negative aspects of communal life are examined, and the question of
the imbrication of power in language is constantly present. Running in
tandem with the Comment vivre ensemble lectures, the seminar on ‘Tenir
un discours’ is concerned with the force and ‘intimidation’ inherent in
certain uses of language; after sessions by seven invited speakers,
Barthes’s contribution to the seminar is an analysis of Charlus’s speech
to the narrator in Proust’s Le Côté de Guermantes.36
The fantasy of retreat is examined in Comment vivre ensemble as a
‘solution individualiste à la crise du pouvoir’ (59). Its central problem-
atic is the search for the ‘distance critique’ between oneself and others.
Barthes characterises this research as a ‘problème d’éthique de la vie
sociale’ (222). The search for idiorrythmie is a search for ‘le Souverain
Bien’ (178), which in fact, Barthes concludes, can only ever be found in
writing, thanks to its shifting and fragile nature. Thus, in the final lecture
of the series, Barthes gently refuses to put together any set of prescrip-
tions which would define the nature of the ‘vivre-ensemble’, and says
simply that what is desired is ‘délicatesse’: ‘une distance qui ne casse pas
l’affect’ (179). This is a theme to which he will return in the following
year’s lectures.
At the end of this first lecture series, Barthes describes at some length
the manner in which the lectures have been structured. There has not
really been a method – for, as he had explained in the first lecture of the
series, method must be rejected given that it is a ‘chemin droit [qui]
fétichise le but comme but’, serving only ‘généralité, ‘moralité’ (12
January, 33). Rather, there has been ‘un protocole d’exposition’ (4 May,
180). Before the series began, Barthes wrote material sufficient for the
entire series of lectures. Dipping into his corpus of texts, he identifies
‘traits’ or ‘figures’ that are relevant for the discussion of the ‘vivre-ensem-
ble’. These figures are then named, and shuffled into alphabetical order.
The lecture series is thereby composed of fragments, whose sequence
aspires to no ultimate outcome beyond that of gesturing, in each case,
towards the fantasy which is at the origin of the lecture series. The mate-
rial is then delivered in the arbitrary alphabetical order, with no further

constraint except the time-slot of each lecture. The system of
‘traits/figures/cases’, Barthes says in the final lecture, is just like that
employed in Fragments d’un discours amoureux. This methodological
overlap reveals a concern with the role of the intellectual and with that
assigned to the reader or listener that is both writerly and pedagogical.
Using the ‘traits’, whether in the writing of Roland Barthes par Roland
Barthes and the Fragments d’un discours amoureux, or in these lectures,
is deliberately non-exhaustive. Each ‘figure’ of the lover’s discourse is
‘offert au lecteur pour qu’il s’en saisisse, y ajoute, en retranche et le passe
à d’autres: autour de la figure, les joueurs font courir le furet’ (FDA, 30).
Similarly, Barthes sees his lecturing role as being merely indicative of
areas of interest that may be worth pursuing. He expects that the Collège
de France audience run with the suggestions he provides them with,
suggesting that the course is like a jigsaw puzzle: ‘Je suis le fabricant (l’ar-
tisan) qui découpe le bois. Vous êtes les joueurs’ (CVE, 4 May, 181).
The attempt at a collaborative activity cannot truly be accomplished
within the monologic lecture format, but it is important to Barthes to
insist that his lecturing is discreet, incomplete, and non-didactic. What
he provides are ‘touches successives: une goutte de ceci, une lueur de cela’.
He often uses the idea of flashes, ‘scintillations’ or ‘nuances’, when
discussing his assemblage of lecture material. Here the ‘touches of colour’
are likened to those in tachistic or divisionistic painting: while the work
is in process, it is not obvious from the juxtaposition of colours what the
final image will look like:
On juxtapose les couleurs sur la toile, au lieu de les mélanger sur la palette.
[…] [Moi,] je juxtapose les figures dans la salle de cours, au lieu de les
mélanger chez moi, à ma table. La différence, c’est qu’ici il n’y a pas de
tableau final: ce serait, au mieux, à vous de le faire’ (181, my emphasis).
On the recording, we hear him add, <Je n’ai pas une philosophie du Vivre-
Ensemble>. No result is provided by the cours; if there is to be one, the
listener has to furnish it for herself, using the materials Barthes has made
available. The incompletion and fragmentation are constitutive.
Barthes’s motivations for this type of structuring are aesthetic, episte-
mological and also ethical: he believes that the method of fragmentation
and digression will, in keeping with the subjects under discussion, keep
the dogmatism of discursive authority at bay. It is made clear that the
mode of experience of the lectures (‘on ne comprend pas où ça va’), as
brought about by the aleatory and digressive method, is the central point
of his enterprise:
Introduction 11
Ce que je viens de dire de la non-méthode laisse entendre qu’au fond le ‘sujet’

(quaestio) n’est pas pertinent. Quoi que je choisisse comme ‘sujet’ [l’année
prochaine] […], la pratique digressive, le droit à la digression. Je dirai tant
et toujours la même chose. L’indirect sera là, qui est d’ordre éthique. Il s’agira
d’une Éthique. (CVE, 184)
The following year’s lecture course, Le Neutre (February–June

1978), is also taken up by the examination of what Barthes characterises
as a social and ethical problem. The aleatory structuring is reinforced:
this time the ‘figures’ are alphabetised and then placed in a new order,
according to numbers Barthes found in a 1959 statistical table. The
Neutre is a slippery series of sketchings of what ‘the neutral’ might be,
and why Barthes desires it. Lexically, the term has Blanchotian reso-
nances, though these are not explored by Barthes in any detail.37 He
defines ‘le neutre’ as ‘toute inflexion qui esquive ou déjoue la structure
paradigmatique, oppositionnelle, du sens, et vise par conséquent à la
suspension des données conflictuelles du discours’ (N, 261). The fantasy
of this series arises from a distaste for the surrounding logomachy.
Le Neutre bears witness to Barthes’s weariness of what he calls ‘la
demande de position’ (18 February, 45). There is, he contends, a social
requirement that one should always be prepared to make judgments and
defend them, because, due to the agonistic nature of language, not to
have an opinion at all (to be neutral) is considered reprehensibly weak.
Faced with this, Barthes desires the possibility of abstaining from judg-
ment, of retreating – ‘le droit à se taire’ (49). Barthes had hinted at this
in his inaugural lecture, when speaking of the way in which language
forces us into affirmation; it was in this context that he made his noto-
rious statement that ‘[La langue] est, tout simplement: fasciste, car le
fascisme, ce n’est pas d’empêcher de dire, c’est d’obliger à dire’ (L, 14).
The fantasy of ‘le neutre’ is the fantasy of a mode of discourse – and,
concomitantly, a mode of being – which would suspend the conflict
which Barthes sees as being inherent to much social discourse and behav-
iour. Barthes elucidates the ideal by examining both positive and negative
examples. The figures that ‘renvoient aux modes conflictuels du discours’
(N, 261) include ‘Colère’, ‘Arrogance’, and ‘Affirmation’. But Barthes
has also found examples of attitudes which suspend conflict or offer
strategic means by which one can temporarily evade the conflictual logic
by which language and thus social interaction are structured. Examples
of such ‘figures’ are ‘Bienveillance’, ‘Silence’, ‘Délicatesse’, ‘Wou-Wei’,
and ‘L’Androgyne.’
The neutral is related to idiorrythmie. It can be seen as the positive
distance between human subjects, a respectful space in which expecta-
tions and judgments are minimised. An active version of the neutral can
be found in linguistic acts, such as the oblique evasion of persistent ques-
tioning practised by figures such as Pyrrho’s disciple, Eurylochus, and
the character of Mélisande in Debussy’s opera Pelléas et Mélisande. The
neutral is also attained in certain phsyical and mental states, such as the
drug-induced tranquil hyper-consciousness described by Baudelaire in
Les Paradis artificiels, or Rousseau’s description in Les Rêveries du
promeneur solitaire of his sense of being part of a great cosmic whole.
Barthes is particularly interested in these states of existence in which hier-
archy and social identity are nullified. In order to discuss these states of
‘minimal existence’, Zen and Tao writings are particularly important to
Barthes. The corpus of material for Le Neutre includes an esoteric selec-
tion of material ranging from ancient Greek texts – notably texts on the
Sceptics – to medieval theology to De Quincey, Michelangelo, and
Pasolini. Barthes explains that his sources are almost exclusively drawn
from ‘la bibliothèque de ma maison de vacances [à Urt]’ (34). Within the
schematic of Le Neutre, and its yearning for retreats, feints, deviations
from expectation, the use of the library at Urt can be seen as an a priori
retreat. The course is built upon a ‘réponse à côté’ to the question of
‘quelle bibliothèque?’
In Le Neutre Barthes imagines what it would be like to leave behind
the conflictual interaction that is brought about by our adherence to
binary oppositions. To do this, he has perforce to begin from these binary
oppositions (between conflict and tranquillity, East and West, active and
passive). Barthes insists that attaining a conduct which would be beyond
such oppositional paradigms would involve not the passivity that we tend
to associate with the idea of neutrality, but rather an endlessly renewed
effort. It is so difficult, in fact, to achive neutrality in our society that it
can only be attained temporarily, as when Rousseau retreats to Lake Biel
and writes his Rêveries. Only in certain spaces can the neutral be imag-
ined. Thus Comment vivre ensemble’s ideal of retreat and idiorrythmie
is implicitly present in Le Neutre. The similar structuring of Comment
vivre ensemble and Le Neutre, which constitutes its own insistent topos,
also confers a thematic unity on both of these courses. I shall be tracing
the related ideals of community and retreat in Chapter 3.
In October 1978, Barthes announces that he wishes profoundly to
change the form of his writing. This declaration is made in the lecture
‘Longtemps, je me suis couché de bonne heure…’ This lecture, antholo-
gised after Barthes’s death, is broadly similar to the first lecture of La
Préparation du roman I (December 1978–March 1979), and outlines the
concerns of that lecture series.38 Barthes’s desire to write a creative work
Introduction 13
which would articulate ‘la vérité des affects, non celle des idées’
(‘Longtemps’, 469) brings about a change in the structuring of his
lectures. Both of the Préparation series are structured sequentially while
retaining the originary protocol of the fantasy. In the first Préparation
lecture, Barthes speaks of his desire to break with his previous intellectual
work and with the oppressive public expectation it involves: ‘[L]e sujet
écrivant subit une pression sociale pour l’amener (le réduire) à se gérer
lui-même, à gérer son œuvre en la répétant: c’est ce ronron qui doit être
interrompu’. The alternative to this is to embark upon what Barthes calls
a ‘vita nuova’, calling to mind the ‘new life’ fantasies of Dante and of
Jules Michelet. This ‘new life’ can only be envisaged through writing:
Or, pour celui qui écrit […] il ne peut y avoir de Vita Nova […] que la
découverte d’une nouvelle pratique d’écriture. […] Car face au ‘ronron’ de
la gestion, deux voies s’ouvrent: 1) ou bien le silence, le repos, le retrait […];
2) ou bien reprendre la marche dans une autre direction, c’est-à-dire
batailler, investir, planter, avec le paradoxe bien connu: ‘Passe encore de
bâtir, mais planter à cet âge!’ (PR, 2 December 1978, 29–30).
This citation sums up the two main directions of all the Collège de France
teaching – ‘retrait’ and ‘marche.’ He has already explored ‘la dilection
du Neutre, de la Retraite’ (PR, 30) in Comment vivre ensemble and Le
Neutre. Now, the ‘marche’ is towards the idea of a novel, which shim-
mers at the horizon ‘à titre de mirage’; the fantasy-based method, as
Barthes says at the end of Comment vivre ensemble, ‘est de l’ordre du
Plus tard. Tout travail est ainsi assumé en tant qu’il est animé par le Plus
tard. L’Homme = entre le Jamais plus et le Plus tard. Il n’y a pas de
présent: c’est un temps impossible’ (CVE, 183).
The first Préparation du roman course, subtitled De la vie à l’œuvre,
is concerned with how to transmute the matter of one’s own life into the
desired new form. Barthes states that his imagined novel would docu-
ment his present experience, and its ‘dimensions affectives, relationnelles’
(PR, 16 December 1978, 45). The exploration of how one might write a
novel thus begins by examining the initial practice of all writing: note-
making. In order to find out how he might make the transition from the
‘notation’ of the present to the long form of the novel, Barthes examines
the ‘forme brève’ of the Japanese haiku. The haiku is chosen because it
exemplifies for Barthes literature’s ability to render the absolute individ-
uality of the ephemeral moment. The haiku, the study of which forms
the bulk of De la vie à l’œuvre, is to be a propaedeutic for the novel,
which, though a long form, would ideally conserve the intensity of the
haiku. The series concludes with Barthes’s admission that his own love
for the fragment as a genre means that, much as he wants to translate the
haiku’s qualities into a longer form, this ‘fantasme’ is, after all, unten-
able: Barthes figures his technical inability to write a continuous, fictional
form as a strongly felt resistance to fabulation. The question of his oscil-
lation between the fragment and the desire for the novel will be treated
in Chapter 5.
The second Préparation series, subtitled L’Œuvre comme volonté
(December 1979–February 1980), moves to an examination of the mate-
rial, real-world conditions that are necessary in order to write the
proposed work. This series has a tripartite structure, corresponding to
what Barthes describes as the three ‘épreuves’ which the writer must
undergo in order to produce his work. This classically linear structure is
determinedly – even, perhaps, parodically – conventional, with a clear
introductory section and three chapters or acts. At the outset, however,
Barthes tells us that there will be no conclusion, but rather ‘une
Suspension, un Suspense final dont je ne connais pas moi-même la réso-
lution’ (184). The first trial is that of the difficult choice of a form for the
postulated work. For Barthes, the most profound formal choice is
between fragmentation and the continuous. When discussing this oppo-
sition, he employs Mallarmé’s distinction between the ‘Album’ and the
‘Livre’. This is a significant paradigm which I discuss in detail in Chapter
5. The second ‘épreuve’ that the writer must undergo is entitled ‘Patience’,
and involves the practical challenges faced by the writer who must
organise his life in order to provide the time, space, and inspiration
required to plan and write the work. This section deals exhaustively with
timetables and domestic arrangements, citing many examples from the
diaries and correspondence of writers such as Proust, Kafka and Flaubert.
The final trial discussed in L’Œuvre comme volonté is that of ‘sepa-
ration’ and the sense of being ‘inactuel’ or out of time. Barthes considers
the question of how the would-be writer can reconcile his desire for liter-
ature and for writing with the strident demands of sociality. Barthes had
outlined this theme in his inaugural lecture, when he claimed that May
’68 had inaugurated a crisis in pedagogical values, one of whose results
is that literature is now ‘désacralisée’ (L, 40). Given that literature is not
central to the concerns of the majority of people, the writer is ‘exilé’ (PR,
16 February 1980, 359). The end of this series is taken up with Barthes’s
preoccupations regarding the place of literature in society and the
survival of literary language. He concludes that the writer needs explic-
itly to ‘assume’ his status as an exile, in order to transform any pessimism
regarding the marginality of literature into a ‘Forme intense
d’Optimisme’. Finally, he adds that he is incapable of producing the novel
or the ‘Degré zéro de l’Œuvre’ which has formed the fantasy of the last
Introduction 15
two lecture series. The last lecture admits this, but remains determinedly
open and unresolved in the end, gesturing towards a future time in which
the work that Barthes imagines, characterised as ‘simple, filiale, [et] désir-
able’ (PR, 23 February 1980, 377–78), could be written. Citing Arnold
Schönberg’s statement that, in the wake of the post-serial music he
shaped, it is still possible to write music in C major, Barthes concludes
his final lecture thus: ‘C’est là, pour finir, l’objet de mon désir: écrire une
œuvre en Ut majeur’ (PR, 23 February 1980, 384). ‘Ut majeur’ are the
final words of La Préparation in the way that ‘l’Utopie du langage’ is the
final phrase of Barthes’s first book Le Degré zéro de l’écriture.39 The work
in C major, despite its untimely nature, remains new in being, to the last,
a project. Barthes hands it on, pointing out that this desired work could
be written by somebody else (‘l’Œuvre que je voudrais ou écrire, ou qu’on
écrive aujourd’hui pour moi)’ (378).
Throughout the four series of lectures, Barthes focuses on imbuing his

pedagogical writing with unmagisterial, ‘provisional’ qualities. Reading
these texts is frequently disorientating: we stagger, as Barthes does, ‘entre
des bribes, des bornes de savoirs, de saveurs’ (CVE, 34). The ‘Cours-
Livre’ or ‘Cours-Théâtre’ (PR, 229) is generically unstable, as Andy
Stafford has pointed out: the interplay of elements of criticism, fiction
and experiment leads to ‘what Barthes calls in La Préparation du roman,
following the German Romantics, “bariolage”, an inter-generic (or
extra-generic) form’.40 As Chapter 5 shows, Barthes cannot produce the
fantasised ‘roman bariolé’, but perhaps it is achieved within the Cours
themselves, and within their essayism. For it is in fact, after all, the essay
that is pre-eminent: an essayism in filiation with Montaigne and with the
German Romantics is the very form which accommodates the collapse
of rhetorical codings that Barthes explicitly desires, while providing
an all-encompassing, permissive form in which one can explore diverse
forms and fields of knowledge – always admitting one’s own contingency.
Since Montaigne, the essay has been concerned with the problemati-
sation of genre, and with a rejection of concept-driven logic which tends
to exclude specificity. Montaigne indicates this in ‘Des Livres’ in a
diatribe against hidebound rhetoric. He vigorously condemns the style
of Cicero, with its definitions, dissections (‘partitions’), and wordiness.
Such ‘longueries’ are frustrating and inessential: ‘pour moi, qui ne
demande qu’à devenir plus sage, non plus savant et éloquent, ces
ordonnances logiciennes et Aristotéliques ne sont pas à propos’. He seeks
instead a frank discourse which declares the author’s personal interests
and which does away with obfuscatory generic conventions: ‘il ne me

faut point d’allèchement, ni de sauce: je mange bien la viande toute
crue’.41 Seneca and Plutarch satisfy his desire for immediacy, for they
treat ‘science’ in ‘pièces décousues’, leading to a style that is gratifyingly
‘plein de points et saillies, [et] de choses’.42 Against the pre-eminence of
discursive systems, with their conflicts and hierarchies, Montaigne sets
the details of taste which render truth, as Jean Starobinski comments,
‘more individual, different, and, by this very fact, more apt to become
universalised’.43
Montaigne is on the side of fragmentation, of thinginess. He finds his
echo in Barthes, who proceeds by rupturing the ‘longueries’ of doctrinal
discourse – not only because, like Montaigne, he gets bored, but for the
more serious reason that the compacity of discourse must be disrupted
in order that its ideological sway be attenuated. Commenting upon the
system of ‘traits’ in Comment vivre ensemble, he writes: ‘il convient de
casser la fixité du langage et de nous rapprocher de notre discontinu
fondamental’. While the fragmentation of discourse may be only a small
step in this direction – ‘un faux discontinu, ou un discontinu impur,
atténué’ – it is worthwhile nonetheless: ‘il est la plus petite concession
que nous soyons contraints à faire à la fixité du langage’ (CVE, 52).
Throughout his career, Barthes writes in short bursts for this very reason.
Much of Barthes’s œuvre is a collection of notes in various directions,
which refuse to assemble themselves under one totality. It is for this
reason that he is regarded by some thinkers – notably those hostile to the
essay as genre, such as Pierre Bourdieu – as insubstantial and flighty. I
shall examine in Chapter 2 the manner in which Barthes plays upon such
imputations of impurity. Though both Montaigne and Barthes employ
the rhetorical tactic of self-deprecation (‘[Je suis] un sujet incertain’),
making it clear that they can offer no overarching theory, both share a
deep conviction of the value of their contingent discourses. The essay-
istic is the individualistic, and as a forum for knowledge is thus more
helpful to individuals than the generalisations of system are. Indeed,
abjuring system becomes vital, because, as Knight points out, ‘one of the
problematic aspects of the structuralist orthodoxy which Barthes himself
helped to fashion was precisely the gap it inserted between language and
the world’.44 And at the Collège de France, as I discuss in Chapter 1,
Barthes wants to produce a discourse which is ‘moins technique et plus
“humain”’.45
The ‘humanisation’ of discourse comes about through the insertion
of sensuous detail: in this too Barthes is the heir to the Montaigne who
discusses his liking for salted beef, for unsalted bread.46 In Roland
Introduction 17
Barthes, he discusses his desire to insert ‘sensual’ detail into ‘le discours
de l’essai’. In this way a double benefit is gained: ‘apparition somptueuse
d’une matérialité et distorsion, écart brusque imprimé au murmure
intellectuel’. Thus he commends The Sorrows of Young Werther for its
sudden introduction of a description of a dish of buttered peas. More
immediately still, in certain haikus, ‘la ligne des mots écrits s’ouvre
brusquement et c’est le dessin même du mont Fuji ou d’une sardine qui
vient gentiment occuper le lieu du mot congédié’ (RB, 709–10). The
importation of sensual detail here is attributable to a desire to use liter-
ature to overcome human alienation from reality. Additionally, it is a
strategy by means of which the arrogance of conflictual discourse can be
set aside: in Le Neutre, Barthes discusses the attraction of this thingifi-
cation for Rousseau, who spends his time at Lake Biel describing the
plants of the island: ‘jouissance de substituer un savoir irénique (peut-
être obsessionel: chosification, inventaire), à un combat d’idées’ (N, 13
May, 181). This same temptation is what leads Barthes to include in the
Collège de France lectures references to so many tactile objects and expe-
riences: reaching for one’s bedside table in the dark; drinking tea on a
wet afternoon; knocking over a bottle of ink; walking in the countryside
above the Adour; reading a menu written in chalk. Not for nothing does
the word ‘experience’ – the title of Montaigne’s final, culminatory Essai
– appear as a ‘mot d’ordre’ at the end of Barthes’s inaugural lecture:
‘Vient peut-être maintenant l’âge d’une autre expérience. […] Cette
expérience a […] un nom illustre et démodé […]: Sapientia: nul pouvoir,
un peu de savoir, un peu de sagesse, et le plus de saveur possible’ (L, 46).
The special status of the Collège de France as an institution which allows
a teaching unfettered by considerations of syllabi or qualifications means
that this essayistic teaching, incongruous though it may (deliberately) be,
is possible.
Barthes links his liking for the sensuous object which disrupts intel-
lectual discourse to a way of writing which rejects conceptualisation in
favour of using intellectual ‘objects’ to advance thought:
Différent du ‘concept’ et de la ‘notion’, qui sont, eux, purement idéals, l’objet
intellectuel se crée par une sorte de pesée sur le signifiant: il me suffit de
prendre au sérieux une forme (étymologie, dérivation, métaphore) pour me
créer […] une sorte de pensée-mot qui va courir, tel l’anneau du furet, dans
mon langage. (RB, 709)
At the Collège de France, these ‘pensées-mots’ are the fantasmes

informing each lecture series. Each series unfurls out of one ‘object’: idior-
rythmie; the neutral; the novel. But these are not concepts, and their truth
is never established. Rather, they are approached obliquely, in simula-
tion, imagination, and above all through metaphor. As a good post-

Nietzschean, Barthes is profoundly distrustful of the ‘tyrannie du
concept’ (N, 20 May, 200), both in theory and in life, because of its elision
of nuances. The concept as generalising instrument makes no place for
the non-systematisable, the contingent, or what Adorno calls the ‘non-
identical’.47 ‘A word becomes a concept’, writes Nietzsche,
insofar as it simultaneously has to fit countless […] cases which are never
equal and thus altogether unequal. Every concept arises from the equation
of unequal things. Just as it is certain that one leaf is never totally the same
as another, so it is certain that the concept ‘leaf’ is formed by arbitrarily
discarding these individual differences and by forgetting the distinguishing
aspects. […] We obtain the concept, as we do the form, by overlooking what
is individual and actual.48
It is insofar as the concept is a reductive force that Barthes feels it imper-

ative that we turn away from it; he quotes Nietzsche in Le Neutre, adding
that the concept is a ‘force réductrice du divers, du devenir qu’est le
sensible, l’aisthèsis’. The Greek word for sensation quoted here is also at
the root of the word ‘aesthetic’. No coincidence this, for to defend
aisthèsis (feeling), as Barthes wishes, involves an aesthetic method – the
use of metaphor: ‘si l’on veut refuser la réduction, il faut dire non au
concept, ne pas s’en servir. Mais, alors, comment parler, nous autres,
intellectuels? Par métaphores. Substituer la métaphore au concept: écrire’
(N, 20 May, 201). An aesthetic approach to discourse is closely linked
to Nietzsche’s perspectivism and to his rejection of ‘truth’ in favour of
the idea of multitudes of truths, each invested with personal interest.
In the table of the ‘phases’ of his career included in Roland Barthes
Barthes declares his most recent phase, from 1973 onwards, as being
under the sign of Nietzsche (RB, 718–19).49 It is an argument of this book
that the late Barthes is not only Nietzschean but also Kantian,
Schlegelian, and Adornian.50 He shares the priorities of many of the most
important thinkers of the German aesthetic tradition, with the exception
of Hegel. Barthes’s late work is an assent to Adorno’s statement in
Minima Moralia that ‘the whole is the false’: this reverses Hegel’s priori-
tisation of totality.51 Barthes’s mistrust of the concept means he is
anti-idealist, concerned with everything that Hegel’s dialectics leaves out:
the singular, the specific, and the individual relation with the world. In
this respect Barthes shares the basic principles of Nietzsche and Adorno,
who reject Hegel’s systematism and promote the cognitive power of the
aesthetic.52 Nietzsche, and Adorno in his wake, have their roots in Kant
and in the Jena Romantics of the 1790s, though they both tend to gloss
over their debts to the Romantics.53 Andrew Bowie has demonstrated the
Introduction 19
importance of Romantic thought to Nietzsche’s conception of language.

It is largely thanks to the influence of Romantic thought that Nietzsche
can formulate his questioning of the value of truth, and characterise the
truth instituted by language as ‘a repressive reduction to identity of some-
thing which inherently resists our identifications’.54 For Nietzsche as for
Schelling and the Romantics, modernity is negatively associated with the
rule of the concept, which excludes ‘“intuition”, in the sense of the partic-
ular, immediate relation to the world which concepts cannot capture’.55
Nature plays an important place in these thinkers’ theories, as it did in
Kant’s Critique of Judgment. Similarly, Adorno insists on the importance
of nature (absent in Hegel’s aesthetic theory), and advances his own more
austere conception of modernity as a repressive force. Art, in Adorno’s
renewal of Romantic aesthetics, becomes the only locus of the articula-
tion of the non-identical. For all of these thinkers, the most vital work
to be undertaken within theory is the defence of individual quiddity in
the face of pervasive, systematising concepts. Also, the Schlegel brothers,
Nietzsche and Adorno all share a conviction of the importance of prac-
tising paratactical, fragmented style.
It is no surprise then that Barthes’s late theory is increasingly close in
preoccupation to this tradition, or that his final lectures, as I show in
Chapter 5, involve a celebration of the German Romantic conception of
the fantasised work. His avowed debt to Nietzsche mobilises, often
implicitly, echoes of Kantian and Romantic theory. These German influ-
ences constitute a thread running throughout this book. Barthes’s final
work is, as Knight has pointed out, increasingly marked by ‘Romantic
affects […]: love, pity, and a preoccupation with death’.56 It is the dying
Nietzsche, mad with pity, who appears in the final pages of La Chambre
claire; in this post-Romantic thinker Barthes sees his own desperate desire
for the dead or about-to-die referent of the photographic image.57
Beginning with the invocation of Nietzsche’s idea of ‘culture’ in the first
Comment vivre ensemble lecture, Nietzsche is a tutelary figure
throughout this teaching; I examine in Chapter 2 the manner in which
Barthes licenses his idiosyncratic lecturing methodology, with its tactics
of simulation and fantasy, by recourse to the Nietzschean archetype of
the artist.
The Collège de France teaching takes place during a period in
Barthes’s writing which is entirely consumed by aesthetic matters; indeed,
Barthes’s late work has been castigated for a retrenching into the
aesthetic.58 His published work during this period consists almost exclu-
sively of essays on aesthetic objects: music, painting, literature, film.
These late texts are examined in this book alongside the Collège de France
teaching. Through an exploration of the lectures’ most insistent forms

and themes, in tandem with a wide-ranging analysis of Barthes’s output
in the 1970s generally, I arrive at a reassessment of the critical and ethical
priorities of the ‘late Barthes’. His final book, La Chambre claire, is often
dubbed a ‘novel’ by critics. In fact this text is the essay par excellence and
the acme of Barthes’s aesthetic, essayistic method, at the crux of which
is the problem of how to reconcile the individual and society, the partic-
ular response and universal norms. Aesthetic judgment, as Kant showed
in the Critique of Judgment, is the arena within which this oscillation
between subjective response and more universal importance takes place.
All aesthetic judgment is based on pleasure or on pain; Barthes extends
this Kantian precept when he states that ‘on étudie ce que l’on désire ou
ce que l’on craint’ (N, 261). The ability of the aesthetic experience to help
us to organise our sense of our place in the world is thus central to
Barthes’s late work, and this is made clear in the Collège de France
lectures, with their insistent questions: how can a refusal of conflict be
recognised? How can grief be expressed? How can we overcome the gap
that language institutes between ourselves and the world? How can we
criticise the workings of power without becoming part of them ourselves?
For Barthes, as he suggests in his inaugural lecture, the answer to these
as to so many other questions lies in literature itself, and its ever-renewed
attempts to represent the grain of existence.
As a professor of literary semiology, Barthes teaches us the impor-
tance of the aesthetic to our sense of our place in the world, the many
ways in which kaleidescopic everyday reality can be articulated in
language, and the value of the non-instrumentalisable, whatever that
might be: reticence; elusive social accord; a kind of teaching that is not
goal-oriented. These ideals are all present in the ‘fantasmes’ informing
the four lecture series. Barthes’s reflections in these lectures are ‘pour
[lui], une façon de chercher – d’une façon libre – [s]on propre style de
présence aux luttes de [s]on temps’ (N, 33). Barthes is of ongoing rele-
vance because he is a thinker emblematic of modernity: he is tormented
by the endless proliferation of meaning, by ‘la marque intolérable du sens
affiché, du sens oppressif’ (RB, 699), and by its suffocation of particu-
larity. He faces the problem of wanting individual expression, but
wanting that expression to also have some general validity without being
oppressive. He seeks a still place, a ‘minimal existence’ in which expres-
sion would be as exact and piercing as grief and love themselves, social
relations would be transparent and peaceable, and meaning would be
non-combative. This is why Barthes’s teaching at the Collège de France
is vitally, affirmatively ‘fantasmatique’.
Introduction 21
Notes
1 Roland Barthes, La Préparation du roman I et II. Notes de cours et de séminaires

au Collège de France 1978–1979 et 1979–1980, ed. Nathalie Léger (Paris:
Seuil/IMEC, 2003), p. 234, and oral recording, La Préparation du roman I et II.
Cours au Collège de France 1978–1980 [CD MP3] (Paris: Seuil/Sonopress,
2003), session of 15 December 1979. The phrase is from Montaigne’s ‘Du
repentir’, in Essais, ed. Emmanuel Naya et al. (Paris: Gallimard/Folio, 2009),
vol. III, p. 37.
2 Alain Legros, Essais sur poutres: Peintures et inscriptions chez Montaigne (Paris:
Klincksieck, 2003).
3 ‘L’abstinence pyrrhonienne’ in Barthes, Le Neutre. Notes de cours au Collège de
France 1977–1978, ed. Thomas Clerc (Paris: Seuil/IMEC, 2002), p. 227.
4 See Diana Knight, Barthes and Utopia: Space, Travel, Writing (Oxford:
Clarendon, 1997).
5 ‘“Essence”, “the essential nature”, is something perspectival and always presup-
poses a multiplicity. At the bottom of it there always lies “what is it for me?”’;
Nietzsche, The Will to Power, trans. Walter Kaufman and R.J. Hollingdale (New
York: Vintage, 1967), p. 556.
6 Barthes, Comment vivre ensemble: simulations romanesques de quelques espaces
quotidiens. Notes de cours et de séminaires au Collège de France, 1976–77, ed.
Claude Coste (Paris: Seuil/IMEC, 2002), p. 52.
7 Montaigne, ‘Des Livres’, Essais, vol. II, p. 118.
8 Réda Bensmaïa has demonstrated that Barthes’s work is part of an ‘essayistic’
filiation of writers, from Montaigne through the German Romantics to Blanchot.
The Barthes Effect: The Essay as Reflective Text, trans. Pat Fedkiew
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987). Antoine Compagnon
discussed the influence of Montaigne on Barthes at the Cerisy colloquium on
Barthes’s work in 1977: ‘L’Imposture’, in Prétexte: Roland Barthes. Colloque
de Cerisy (Paris: Union générale d’éditions, 1978), pp. 40–56.
9 Barthes, Leçon (Paris: Seuil, 1978), p. 44. Kris Pint has examined at length the
psychoanalytic underpinnings of the Barthesian ‘fantasme’ in The Perverse Art
of Reading: On the Phantasmatic Semiology in Roland Barthes’s Cours au
Collège de France, trans. Christopher M. Gemerchak (Amsterdam: Rodopi,
2010). The focus of Pint’s study is on the nature of the reader’s fantasmatic
involvement with the text she is reading.
10 ‘The term ‘séminaire’, while it can be used in the same sense as the English word
‘seminar’ (i.e. a small group), tends to be used in France to refer to what in English
would be called a ‘course (of lectures)’. Barthes’s ‘séminaires’ at the Collège de
France were delivered to a very large audience, but differed from the lecture
courses in consisting largely of presentations from invited speakers.
11 As well as posthumous collections of essays, Wahl published the autobiograph-
ical text Incidents, which includes the diary Soirées de Paris, in 1987 (Paris:
Seuil).
12 ‘Le Désir de neutre’, transcribed by Laurent Dispot. La Règle du jeu, 5 (1991):
36–60.
13 See Lucy O’Meara, ‘“L’Affaire Barthes” and Ownership of the Voice’, in
Transmissions: Essays in French Thought, Literature and Culture, ed. Bradley
Stephens and Isabelle McNeill (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2007), pp. 141–60.
14 The Barthes archives were moved from IMEC to the Bibliothèque Nationale de
France (Richelieu site) in 2011.
15 There are recordings of every lecture, with the exception of the final Comment
vivre ensemble session, of which only the first half exists.

16 Roland Barthes, Le discours amoureux: séminaire à l’École pratique des hautes
études 1974–1976 suivi de Fragments d’un discours amoureux: inédits, ed.
Claude Coste (Paris: Seuil, 2007); Le Lexique de l’auteur: séminaire à l’École
pratique des hautes études 1973–1974, Suivi de fragments inédits du Roland
Barthes par Roland Barthes, ed. Anne Herschberg Pierrot (Paris: Seuil, 2010);
Sarrasine de Balzac: séminaires à l’École pratique des hautes études 1967–1968
et 1968–1969, ed. Claude Coste and Andy Stafford (Paris: Seuil, 2011)
17 Barthes, Journal de deuil: 26 octobre 1977–15 septembre 19 79, ed. Nathalie
Léger (Paris: Seuil/IMEC, 2009), and Carnets du voyage en chine, ed. Anne
Herschberg Pierrot (Paris: Christian Bourgois/IMEC, 2009). François Wahl
opposed these publications vehemently: see ‘Roland Barthes aurait été révolté’,
interview with Grégoire Leménager, Le Nouvel Observateur, 21 January 2009.
<http://bibliobs.nouvelobs.com/essais/20090121.BIB0811/roland-barthes-
aurait-ete-revolte.html> [accessed 22 January 2009].
18 Genette defines the ‘épitexte’ as a text which is provisional or contingent: drafts,
autobiographies, self-reflexive commentaries, and all oral and public perform-
ances. Genette, Seuils (Paris: Seuil, 1987), p. 11.
19 For a comparative study of Barthes’s and Foucault’s teaching which focuses
strongly on the materiality of the manuscripts and the particular status of the
teaching archive, see Guillaume Bellon, L’Inquiétude du discours: Barthes et
Foucault au Collège de France (Grenoble: ELLUG, 2012).
20 Benveniste, Dernières leçons au Collège de France (1968–1969), ed. Jean-Claude
Coquet and Irène Fenoglio (Paris: EHESS/Gallimard/Seuil, 2012).
21 For a representative selection of published pedagogical material, see Maurice
Merleau-Ponty, Notes de cours au Collège de France: 1958–1959 et 1960–1961,
ed. Claude Lefort (Paris: Gallimard, 1996); Michel Foucault, ‘Il faut défendre la
société’. Cours au Collège de France (1975–1976), ed. Mauro Bertani and
Alessandro Fontana (Paris: Seuil/Gallimard, 1997); Jacques Derrida, Séminaire:
La bête et le souverain (Tome I: 2001–2002), ed. Michel Lisse, Marie-Louise
Mallet and Ginette Michaud (Paris: Galilée, 2008).
22 ‘Introduction’, in Roland Barthes Retroactively: Reading the Collège de France
Lectures, ed. Jürgen Pieters and Kris Pint, Paragraph 31.1 (2008), pp. 1–8.
Several of the articles in this collection also appear in French in Sémir Badir and
Dominique Ducard, eds., Roland Barthes en Cours (1977–1980): Un style de vie
(Dijon: Éditions universitaires de Dijon, 2009).
23 Jonathan Culler, in his contribution to the Pieters and Pint volume, demonstrates
his belief that Barthes’s very late work on literature is ‘vitiate[d]’ by the biogra-
phical ‘retour de l’auteur’ and the consideration of ‘œuvre’ at the expense of
‘texte’ in La Préparation du roman II. ‘Preparing the Novel: Spiralling Back’, in
Pieters and Pint, eds., Roland Barthes Retroactively, pp. 109–120 (p. 119).
24 Pieters and Pint, ‘Introduction’, p. 7.
25 Barthes’s notes for ‘Tenir un discours’ appear in CVE, pp. 185–220; the notes
for ‘La métaphore du labyrinthe’ appear in PR, pp. 165–79. The notes and
accompanying photographs for ‘Proust et la photographie’ appear in PR, pp.
385–457. For a reading of the Proust seminar, see Kathrin Yacavone, ‘Reading
Through Photography: Roland Barthes’s Last Seminar “Proust et la photogra-
phie”’, French Forum, 34.1 (2009): 97–112.
26 My study of the lectures is based on both reading and listening to the material.
In most cases my citations are from the printed text, supplemented where perti-
nent by transcriptions from the recordings.
27 Barthes, Roland Barthes par Roland Barthes (Paris: Seuil, 1975); Fragments d’un
discours amoureux (Paris: Seuil, 1977); La Chambre claire: note sur la
Introduction 23
photographie (Paris: Gallimard/Seuil, 1980).

28 Barthes had concluded his final seminar of 1976 at the École pratique des hautes
études with a discussion of this Nietzschean opposition. See Gilles Deleuze,
Nietzsche et la philosophie (Paris: PUF, 1962), pp. 123–26.
29 Jacques Lacarrière, L’Été grec. Une Grèce quotidienne de 4000 ans (Paris: Plon,
1976).
30 There are still idiorrythmic ‘skites’ or communites of hermits living on Mount
Athos alongside more regulated cenobitic monasteries. See Graham Speake,
Mount Athos: Renewal in Paradise (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002).
Cenobitic monks live communally, praying, eating and working together, under
the authority of a head monk. Idiorrythmic monks live and work alone and
dispose of their own goods. According to Lacarrière, the only gathering they all
attend is the evening prayers (L’Été grec, p. 40).
31 Pierre Griolet, ed., Palladius: les Moines du désert. Histoire lausiaque (Paris:
Desclée de Brouwer, 1986).
32 Thomas Mann, The Magic Mountain [1924], trans. H.T. Lowe-Porter
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969).
33 Daniel Defoe, Robinson Crusoe [1719], ed. and intro. John Richetti
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 2001).
34 André Gide, La Séquestrée de Poitiers [1930] (Paris: Gallimard, 1977).
35 Émile Zola, Pot-Bouille [1882] (Paris: Gallimard, 1982).
36 Marcel Proust, À la recherche du temps perdu [1913–27], 3 vols. (Paris:
Gallimard/Pléiade, 1954), vol. II, pp. 553–61.
37 ‘Le neutre-le fragmentaire’ is a key term in Blanchot’s L’Entretien infini (Paris:
Gallimard, 1969). Despite a certain amount of thematic overlap, Barthes and
Blanchot are difficult to align due to the vastly different frameworks of their
respective œuvres: Barthes’s work prioritises socio-historical situatedness,
notably regarding the use of language, whereas Blanchot’s arguments tend gener-
ally towards the ontological or mythical. It is clear throughout his career that
Barthes admires Blanchot, but he states in La Préparation du roman that this
admiration is in spite of the fact that ‘mon projet récuse le sien’ (380). Christophe
Bident has characterised their divergence by saying that ‘Blanchot was a man of
the absolute, Barthes a man of plurality’; ‘R/M, 1953’, Paragraph, 30.3 (2007):
67–83 (p. 68). Éric Marty argues convincingly that despite the thinkers’ shared
investment in the term, their conceptions of the ‘neutre’ are differently motivated.
Blanchot is haunted by lack, whereas Barthes is tormented by an over-abundance
of meaning. What links these thinkers, Marty argues, is not so much shared theo-
retical preoccupations as a shared drive towards a force which would escape
mastery, and which they both name ‘neutre’. Marty, ‘Maurice Blanchot, Roland
Barthes, une “ancienne conversation”’, Les Temps modernes, 654 (2009):
74–89. Leslie Hill believes that Barthes misreads Blanchot, but also states that
the two thinkers’ conceptions of the neutral are radically different: ‘While for
Blanchot the Neuter was what preceded all manifestation, challenging the priv-
ilege of the visual, for Barthes it was the opposite, as the infinite detail of the
figures described in Le Neutre testifies; it was what manifested itself without end
within the interstices and discontinuities of the paradigm’. Radical Indecision:
Barthes, Blanchot, Derrida, and the Future of Criticism (Notre Dame: University
of Notre Dame Press, 2010), p. 136.
38 The ‘Longtemps, je me suis couché de bonne heure…’ lecture was first published
in Inédits du Collège de France 3 in 1982, and subsequently in Le Bruissement
de la langue: essais critiques IV, ed. François Wahl (Paris: Seuil, 1984), pp.
313–25. I refer to it as it appears in OC, V, 459–70.
39 Le Degré zéro de l’écriture, suivi de Nouveaux essais critiques (Paris: Seuil,
1962), p. 67.
40 Andy Stafford, ‘“Préparation du romanesque” in Barthes’s Reading of
Sarrasine’, in Pieters and Pint, eds., Roland Barthes Retroactively, pp. 95–108
(pp. 104–105).
41 Montaigne, ‘Des Livres’, Essais, vol. II, pp. 127–28.
42 ‘Des Livres’, Essais, vol. II, p. 126.
43 Starobinski, ‘The Body’s Moment’, trans. John A. Gallucci, Yale French Studies
64 (1983): 273–305 (p. 303).
44 Barthes and Utopia, p. 8.
45 ‘Rencontre avec Roland Barthes’, interview with Nadine Dormoy Savage for The
French Review, February 1979. OC, V, 735–43 (p. 741).
46 Montaigne, ‘De l’expérience’, Essais, vol. III, p. 456. Cf. Barthes’s list of likes
and dislikes, ‘J’aime, je n’aime pas’, in Roland Barthes, OC, IV, 575–774 (p.
692).
47 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, trans. E.B. Ashton (London: Routledge, 1990).
48 ‘On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense’, in The Nietzsche Reader, ed. Keith
Ansell Pearson and Duncan Large (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), pp. 114–23 (p.
117).
49 Douglas Smith has demonstrated that Nietzsche’s thought was revived in France
in the early 1970s, not only in Deleuze’s work, but also in Sarah Kofman’s and
Pierre Klossowski’s. Transvaluations: Nietzsche in France, 1872–1972 (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1997). On the influence of Nietzsche on French theory,
see also Alan D. Schrift, Nietzsche’s French Legacy: A Genealogy of
Poststructuralism (New York: Routledge, 1995).
50 Kant’s aesthetic theory was outlined in the Critique of Judgment in 1790.
Critique of Judgment, trans. James Creed Meredith (Oxford: Clarendon, 1986).
Karl Wilhelm Friedrich Schlegel and his brother August Wilhelm Schlegel began
publishing what subsequently came to be seen as the founding texts of German
Romanticism in the late 1790s. As Kai Hammermeister has shown in The
German Aesthetic Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002),
Adorno’s post-war work is a refinement of paradigmatic late-eighteenth-century
aesthetic theory. Barthes seems to have been unaware of Adorno’s thought. There
are nonetheless striking similarities between the two theorists’ work, which I
discuss in ‘“Not a Question but a Wound”: Adorno, Barthes and Aesthetic
Reflection’, Comparative Literature, Spring 2013 [article currently in press].
51 Minima Moralia: Reflections from Damaged Life, trans. E.F.N. Jephcott
(London: Verso, 1978), p. 50. This statement is the inversion of Hegel’s ‘The
true is the whole’ in Phenomenology of Mind, trans. J.B. Baillie (London: Harper,
1967), preface, §20. Barthes is certainly counter-Hegelian at the end of his career,
though dialectical materialism had a role to play in his earlier, Marxist work.
Nikolaj Lübecker has written about the indebtedness of Le Degré zéro de l’écri-
ture to a Hegelian tradition of social philosophy in Community, Myth and
Recognition in Twentieth-Century French Literature and Thought (London:
Continuum, 2009), p. 6, pp. 113–39. Andy Stafford has pointed out that
Barthes’s use of the figure of the spiral in his late work to discuss repetition in
modernity allows him partly to ‘accommodat[e] both Nietzsche and Hegel’,
because this figure is ‘progressive without being teleological, dialectical without
totalising’. Roland Barthes, Phenomenon and Myth: An Intellectual Biography
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1998), p. 184.
52 See Hammermeister, The German Aesthetic Tradition, for an excellent account
of these thinkers’ aesthetic theories. Adorno’s Negative Dialectics demonstrates
at length his opposition to Hegelian dialectics and his argument that philosophy
must concern itself with the non-identical aspects which do not fit in Hegel’s
Introduction 25
schematisations.
53 Hammermeister, German Aesthetic Tradition, p. 143, p. 194.
54 Bowie, Aesthetics and Subjectivity: From Kant to Nietzsche, 2nd edn
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003), pp. 290–91. For more on
Romantic theory, see Bowie’s From Romanticism to Critical Theory: The
Philosophy of German Literary Theory (London: Routledge, 1997), pp. 65–89.
55 Bowie, Aesthetics and Subjectivity, p. 291.
56 Barthes and Utopia, p. 10.
57 ‘J’entrais follement dans le spectacle, dans l’image, entourant de mes bras ce qui
est mort, ce qui va mourir, comme le fit Nietzsche, lorsque le 3 janvier 1889, il
se jeta en pleurant au cou d’un cheval martyrisé: devenu fou pour cause de Pitié’
(CC, 883).
58 Annette Lavers states that Barthes’s use, in later work, of terms such as ‘plea-
sure’, ‘charm’ and even ‘aesthetic’ itself meant that he was ‘on the way to being
fully integrated into the bourgeoisie’. Roland Barthes: Structuralism and After
(London: Methuen, 1982), p. 207.
1
Barthes’s Heretical Teaching
J’ai peu de popularité. Pourquoi? Parce que j’ai subordonné la question des
intérêts à la question de l’âme. […] Point d’école. Pourquoi? Parce que je
n’ai pas exagéré l’importance des formules, parce que je n’ai voulu asservir
aucun esprit, mais au contraire les affranchir tous, leur donner la force
vivante qui fait juger et trouver, développer les facultés d’invention. […] Une
foule d’hommes ébranlés m’ont dit ou écrit en sortant du Collège de France:
‘Nous recommençons de croire à la vie. Nous n’avons rien appris chez vous.
Seulement notre âme, absente, est rentrée en nous’.
Jules Michelet, Cours au Collège de France, 1851
À l’issue de [l]a leçon inaugurale [de Barthes] au Collège de France, […] une
jeune fille inconnue a bondi sur moi avec véhémence, avec colère:
‘Qu’admirez-vous là-dedans? D’un bout à l’autre il n’a rien dit!’ Ce n’était
pas tout à fait exact, il avait dit sans cesse mais en évitant que cela se fige en
un quelque chose: selon cette méthode qu’il mettait au point depuis de
longues années, il s’était retiré de ce qu’il disait, au fur et à mesure.
Alain Robbe-Grillet, ‘Le parti de Roland Barthes’, 1981
On 14 March 1976, Roland Barthes was elected to the ‘chaire de sémi-

ologie littéraire’ at the Collège de France. Acceptance into the Collège
comes via the approval of one’s peers and (nominally) of the Institut de
France.1 The fact that Barthes was elected by the professorial body of the
Collège de France by a majority of only one vote illustrates perfectly a
tension in the Collège itself between conservative and slightly more
radical values: Barthes was, for many, a more controversial choice than
his competitor for the chair, the semiologist Claude Bremond. His
‘présentateur’, Michel Foucault, represented the more nonconformist
pole of the establishment, having acceded to the Collège de France in
1970. Claude Lévi-Strauss was elected in 1959. Thus when Barthes
arrived, as François Dosse points out, three of the four ‘mousquetaires’
of the high period of French structuralism were now enshrined in this
most prestigious of institutions.2 We shall see in this chapter that it is the
particular status and institutional ethos of the Collège that make it, from
Barthes’s point of view, the ideal institution in which to teach. However,
as he pointed out in a 1979 interview, ‘au Collège de France, […] il y a
des contradictions entre des attitudes très novatrices et un aristocratisme
27
incontestable’.3 These contradictions are brought about by the Collège’s

paradoxical status: it is arguably the most eminent academic institution
in France, but it is not part of the mainstream university system.4
I have found it helpful to use the work of Pierre Bourdieu as a means
to contextualise Barthes’s career in what we could call the marginal
academy in France. Given the paucity of material treating these institu-
tions, Bourdieu’s ‘sociology of intellectuals’ becomes very useful.
Interestingly, Bourdieu is extremely hostile to Barthes’s intellectual
endeavour. I shall use Bourdieu’s own theoretical framework to argue
against the criticisms Bourdieu levels at Barthes. Bourdieu’s Homo acad-
emicus, published in 1984, is a study of the French academy during the
1960s and ’70s.5 Bourdieu devotes a section of the text to the ‘hérétiques
consacrés’ of the French academic field. These are figures such as Lévi-
Strauss, Foucault – and, though he does not say so, Bourdieu himself –
who are employed in research-led institutions such as the École pratique
des hautes études and the Collège de France. These thinkers operate at a
remove from the mainstream university system, partly because, in
Bourdieu’s analysis, they lack ‘les titres sociaux ouvrant l’accès aux posi-
tions socialement dominantes’.6 They have little clout in the university
field, but widespread notoriety beyond it. Their employment in the
‘marginal’ institutions means they are free to pursue pedagogical and
research goals which are far removed from the criteria of reproduction
and performance which govern more mainstream institutions. They are
concerned with ‘[la production d’]un savoir nouveau, voire hérétique,
[et] l’aptitude et l’inclination à produire un tel savoir’.7
Bourdieu’s characterisation of Barthes as a ‘hérétique consacré’
provides a useful rubric under which to examine the tensions brought
about, in Barthes’s late pedagogy, by his dual status as an intellectual
marginal to the university system, and as a professor at the most elite
institution in France. There is a link between the ethos of the ‘heretical’
institutions in which Barthes was employed and the evolution of his peda-
gogical philosophy, itself heretical in the manner in which it challenges
the norms of magisterial teaching.
The École pratique des hautes études and the Collège de France:
Heretical Institutions
In the recording of Barthes’s inaugural lecture at the Collège de France,

we hear him thanking the friends and colleagues who have helped him
during the course of his career. Omitted from the published version, this
Barthes’s Heretical Teaching 29
brief section occurs at the start of the lecture, when Barthes explains that
his institutional status is ‘incertain’. Even though his career has been
‘universitaire’, he says, he does not have ‘les titres qui donnent ordi-
nairement accès à cette carrière’ (L, 7). Thus, he implies, his career was
facilitated by those who had the goodwill to overlook this lack: <Il y a
fallu, couronnée par celle que le Collège veut bien me témoigner, la
confiance d’un certain nombre d’amis dont je ne puis oublier l’appui>
(Leçon oral). The friends instrumental to his early career and
development of his thought are <Philippe Rebeyrol, qui m’appela comme
lecteur à l’Institut français de Bucarest, au sortir d’une longue maladie;
[et] Julien Greimas qui m’initia à la linguistique lorsque nous étions
collègues à l’université d’Alexandrie>.8 His subsequent employment was
thanks to <Lucien Febvre et Georges Friedmann [qui] m’ont permis de
me former à la recherche au sein du CNRS, [et] Fernand Braudel et mes
collègues de l’École des hautes études [qui] m’ont fait, voici quinze ans,
le plus beau cadeau que l’on puisse faire à un homme: la conjonction d’un
métier et d’une passion> (Leçon oral).9
The expressing of debts of gratitude at the start of the lecture is, of
course, an institutional convention. Barthes uses this convention,
however, to explain his own unconventional academic trajectory; his
description of his career as a series of ‘cadeau[x]’ offered by ‘amis’ substi-
tutes individuals’ recognition of his worth for institutionally sanctioned
credentials. The manner in which he describes his feelings upon accession
to the Collège is in line with this tactic, for here Barthes insists that his
election to the Collège provokes in him an emotion of pleasure, rather
than a conviction that this institutional recognition is deserved: ‘[J]e me
détournerai des raisons qui ont amené le Collège de France à m’accueillir
– car elles sont incertaines à mes yeux – pour dire celles qui font pour
moi, de mon entrée dans ce lieu, une joie plus qu’un honneur; car
l’honneur peut être immérité, la joie ne l’est jamais’ (L, 8). This routing
of institutional prestige away from formality and towards a personal
appreciation anticipates the method of Barthes’s future teaching at the
Collège de France. Moreover, to express his sense of his appointment as
a gift rather than a prize allows Barthes figuratively to retain his intel-
lectual autonomy by proposing himself as an independent who has
chosen to accept this gift. Barthes’s accession to the ‘plus glorieux des
temples de savoir’10 is the logical endpoint of a career which was both
marginal and prestigious. Barthes, though lacking the normal academic
credentials, occupies posts in the best-regarded research institutions in
his country. These posts at the École pratique des hautes études (hence-
forth EPHE) and the Collège de France allow him to be involved in higher
education without being trammelled by the curricula and bureaucracy of

the mainstream university system.
Both the EPHE (founded 1868) and the Collège de France (founded
1530) were originally set up in order to provide alternatives to the
teaching provided by the Parisian facultés. The Collège de France was
founded by François I in order to facilitate the teaching of subjects such
as Hebrew which were not provided by the university at the time. Since
its opening, all lectures have been completely open to the public without
constraint.11 In his history of the Collège as a ‘lieu de mémoire’,
Christophe Charle has described the Collège as ‘la première pierre de
l’édification d’un contre-pouvoir intellectuel, le premier endroit où s’est
jouée cette longue partie d’échecs entre le savant et le politique qui forme
l’argument de l’histoire culturelle française’.12 It is an institution entirely
apart from the more controlled university system, and thus has always
fostered idiosyncratic thought, ‘la spécialisation qui brise les cadres
scolaires habituels, [et] l’appel à des individualités qui échappent en partie
aux moules traditionnels ou les contestent’.13 Charle is also careful to
note, however, that the state does have some involvement in the Collège’s
staffing: this is apparent from the election process, and at some points in
its history the Collège has counted amongst its teaching body ‘autant
d’exemples de la dépendance du Collège de France à l’égard de son
protecteur, l’État republicain, qui l’utilise pour institutionnaliser des
enseignements qui vont dans le sens de sa politique anticléricale ou
antisocialiste’.14 This was particularly notable during certain tumultuous
periods of the nineteenth century: after Napoleon III’s coup d’état of
1851, for example, Edgar Quinet, Adam Mickiewicz and Barthes’s hero
Jules Michelet were all dismissed from their Collège professorships in
1852. In the late twentieth century, however, the Collège’s autonomy has
been firmer, in Charle’s account. He adds that the Collège’s always
considerable prestige has been enhanced in the post-war era by the
appointment of several professors with a considerable standing outside
the academic arena: his examples are Pierre Boulez, Paul Valéry, and
Raymond Aron – Barthes, Foucault and Lévi-Strauss would also count
in this classification. In an era of major university expansion in France,
Charle concludes, the Collège de France has returned fully to its original
brief of fulfilling ‘un rôle que l’Université ne peut plus assurer, même dans
les disciplines traditionnelles[:] la consécration de l’innovation’.15 Thus
it has managed to ‘faire coïncider son mythe fondateur et son histoire
réelle’.16
The politician and historian Victor Duruy described the EPHE
shortly after he had founded it as ‘un germe que je dépose dans les murs
lézardés de la vieille Sorbonne; en se développant, il les fera crouler’.17 In

his role as ‘Ministre de l’Instruction publique’, Duruy’s aim was to reju-
venate the French university system. This was not to be undertaken by
internal reform, but rather by the addition of a new institution that would
remain peripheral to the main system. In this manner the model for the
EPHE was the Collège de France, along with institutions such as the École
normale supérieure and the École polytechnique. Duruy was interested
in using teaching methods not yet in use in the French university, taking
his inspiration from the German model of the seminar. Classes at the
EPHE are still conceived of as research seminars rather than lecture series.
Similarly, the title of ‘professeur’ was deliberately avoided by Duruy:
lecturers at the EPHE are called ‘Directeurs d’Études’. The new estab-
lishment was to be research-led but with a vocational bent, as evinced by
the word ‘pratique’ in its title. Like the Collège de France, the EPHE
would not concern itself with awarding degrees. The Collège de France,
in fact, awards no qualification of any kind to its listeners. At the EPHE
there is no preparation for any university exam, though the institution
does award masters and post-doctoral qualifications, as well as its own
in-house diplomas. Staff at both institutions provide research supervi-
sion: Barthes continued to act as directeur d’études for several students
after his accession to the Collège de France.
In 1947, a sixth section of the EPHE, entitled ‘Sciences économiques
et sociales’, was formed by Fernand Braudel, Lucien Febvre and Charles
Morazé. They had received funding from the Rockefeller foundation to
do so.18 Braudel et al. lent their relatively high standing as historians to
the establishment of the less prestigous discipline of sociology within the
École. As the section initially had a small budget, most of the academics
employed had, perforce, posts in other establishments as well. According
to Revel and Wachtel, historians of the EPHE, the new section appealed
particularly to specialists ‘dont le cursus et la forme des travaux ne corre-
spondent pas toujours aux règles académiques communes’.19 Certainly
the Sixth Section rapidly gained a reputation for studying non-standard
subjects: Barthes’s 1963–64 course, for example, studied ‘des systèmes
contemporains de signification: systèmes d’objets (vêtements, nourriture,
logement)’. As Niilo Kauppi has pointed out, this interest in everyday life
was consistent with the interests of the Annales school – of which Braudel
was the foremost representative – and with the orientation of the Section
and the École towards subjects considered as ‘vulgar from the point of
view of traditional research’. This was research that redefined the limit
separating ‘the academic from the avant-garde, and the anachronism of
the Sorbonne from the topicality of essayism’.20 The section generally was
untrammelled by disciplinary constraints. Greimas’s and Barthes’s semi-

ological seminars were particularly fashionable during the 1960s and
early ’70s. Barthes’s class was nominally a seminar in ‘sociology’, but
was attended by a heterogeneous group of students with specialisms in
psychoanalysis, literature, the visual arts and philosophy as well as soci-
ology. The success of these seminars contributed to the setting up, in
1965, of a new subsection within the section entitled ‘Sémantique, sémi-
ologie et linguistique’. In this year Barthes also became Secretary of the
school.21
During his time at the EPHE, Barthes was surrounded by many of
the most innovative researchers working in Paris at the time. As well as
Braudel and Febvre, his colleagues included Raymond Aron, Pierre
Bourdieu, Edgar Morin, Gaëtan Picon and Lucien Goldmann, as well as
his assistants Gérard Genette and Christian Metz (both appointed in
1968). Such was the success and dynamism of the Sixth Section that in
1975, it devolved to become the École des hautes études en sciences
sociales (EHESS). The EHESS, a major research centre, currently employs
hundreds of staff in its main centre and associated research centres, and
has 3000 registered students.22
At the EPHE/EHESS, the ‘Directeurs d’Études’ are not required to
have any particular academic qualifications, and they can lecture on any
subject of their choosing. Likewise, the Collège does not require any
particular qualification from its staff. Given the Collège’s position at the
top of the French intellectual hierarchy, it is naturally the case that a
certain proportion of its teaching staff, elected to the Collège at the
apogee of their careers, have been successful within the mainstream
academy (whether in the ‘facultés’ or in the ‘grands établissements’ such
as the ENS), and are in possession of the qualifications – such as the agré-
gation – that are required in those spheres.23 Indeed, many of the Collège’s
professors are in no way ‘heretical’. As Barthes himself pointed out, there
is a strong current of conservatism at this institution. This is not what
commentators on the Collège tend to stress, though: a pride in the Collège
as republican institution informs (French) assessments of its free-spirit-
edness. The salient point, in any case, is that ‘traditional’ qualifications
are not required by either the EPHE or the Collège. It is for this reason
that these marginal institutions tend to be the logical place of employ-
ment for those experts in a given field who do not have the ‘normal’
qualifications. This, combined with the emphasis on innovative,
research-based teaching, means that the EPHE and the Collège tend to
be staffed by the most independent thinkers of any given field. At the
time of Barthes’s election to the Collège de France the human sciences
were represented by, amongst others, Lévi-Strauss, Foucault, Raymond

Aron, Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, Georges Duby, and Fernand Braudel
and Georges Dumézil (both at this point emeritus).
The Collège de France’s only stipulation with regard to its professors
is that they must teach a lecture course each year in which the material,
related to their own research, is new. As Barthes points out in Leçon, ‘le
professeur n’y a d’autre activité que de chercher et de parler, […] de rêver
tout haut sa recherche’. At the Collège, one is exempt from the proce-
dures of ‘juger, choisir, promouvoir, s’asservir à un savoir dirigé’ (L,
9–10) and thus abstracted from mechanisms of professionalism and stan-
dardisation. Barthes sees the institution as being a ‘ruse’ of history
because it is ‘un lieu que l’on peut dire rigoureusement: hors-pouvoir’
(9). In Le Lexique de l’auteur, Barthes describes the EPHE in identical
terms as ‘la ruse de l’Histoire, la maille du filet, un produit aberrant de
la liberté’ (LA, 276). ‘Comment peut-on être heureux dans une institution
(qui est un petit morceau d’État)?’ Barthes asks. The answer is that the
EPHE feels less like an institution than like ‘une société d’esprits libres
(étudiants et enseignants mêlés), à ce qu’on eût appelé au XVIIIe siècle
une académie (de savoir et de langage)’. Though he is concerned that
history will catch up with the École (‘y reprendra fatalement ses droits’),
for now it is ‘le champ libre d’un savoir-vivre intellectuel’ (LA, 277).
What Barthes values in this institution is the liberty afforded to him in
his choice of subjects to teach, the diversity of his colleagues, and the
lightness of the bureaucratic structure (LA, 276n). Above all, it is the
pleasure of the seminars themselves that he enjoys. In Roland Barthes
par Roland Barthes, a photograph of a smiling Barthes surrounded by
thirteen of his séminaristes appears above a handwritten text in which
he praises ‘l’espace du séminaire’ for its affective, ‘romanesque’ nature.
Bourdieu: Essayism and the Heretics
The heretical scholars who are employed in the marginal institutions

tend, Bourdieu shows, to have accumulated a degree of intellectual noto-
riety which generally tends to outstrip that of their university-based
counterparts. Their names are linked to ‘isms’ such as structuralism, and
they are widely discussed in the press, influential on the boards of schol-
arly journals, and well-known abroad. Their books are usually published
in pocket editions. Indeed the identification of the ‘consecrated heretics’
as a category is partly due to the specificities of publishing in the 1960s
and 1970s. During this period, as distinct from the interwar period,
essays in literary and cultural theory were published in affordable paper-

back form. Thus a widespread forum existed for the articulation of
intellectual arguments that combined literary and ‘scientific’ elements.
The diffusion of theory in essay form meant that, as Niilo Kauppi puts
it, the intellectuals who produced them could ‘accumulate capital of intel-
lectual fame regardless of the internal criteria of either the literature or
university fields’.24 To this in part was due the ascendancy of the struc-
turalist ‘mousquetaires’ (Lévi-Strauss, Barthes, Foucault, Lacan) into the
‘nouveaux maîtres’ of French thought.25 It is in fact success as an essayist,
and within the profane sphere of journalism, that is at the heart of
Bourdieu’s conception of Barthes’s ‘heresy’.
For Bourdieu, Barthes cannot be a serious thinker, because he is an
essayist. It is implicit in his argument that Barthes’s accession to the
Collège de France is facilitated by a notoriety achieved by intellectually
disreputable means. In the preface to the English translation of Homo
academicus (1988), Bourdieu makes this clear:
Roland Barthes represents the peak of the class of essayists, who, having
nothing to oppose to the forces of the field, are condemned, in order to exist,
or subsist, to float with the tides of the external or internal forces which
wrack the milieu, notably through journalism…26
In Bourdieu’s lexis, essayism is a bad word. He made this clear in his

inaugural lecture at the Collège de France, in which he makes an oppo-
sition between ‘la science rigoureuse’, and the bourgeois thinking of
catch-all essay-writing – ‘l’essayisme planétaire’.27 In the Homo acade-
micus preface, he makes this much clearer in his evaluation of Barthes.
As a representative of the ‘class of essayists’, Barthes
gives instantaneous expression to all the changes in the forces of the field
while appearing to anticipate them, and in this respect it is sufficient to
follow his itinerary, and his successive enthusiasms, to discover all the
tensions which were applied to the point of least resistance of the field, where
what is called fashion continually flowers.28
In Bourdieu’s view, it is in the nature of essayism to be mundane and

merely fashionable. He testifies frequently to his absolute disdain for the
essay as genre. Marielle Macé, in her recent study of the fortunes of the
essay in France during the twentieth century, discusses Bourdieu as just
one example of a strong tradition of denigration of this essay.29 Bourdieu
is firmly committed to a defence of what he calls ‘rigorous science’. The
posthumously published Esquisse d’une auto-analyse makes it clear that
it is of vital importance for Bourdieu that he distinguish his work from
that of literary and philosophical intellectuals, whom he sees as egotis-
tical lone-ranger figures who do not practise the discipline, and
disciplinary purity, that he himself espouses.30 This is why he distanced

himself from philosophy in order to devote himself to the more collec-
tive and rigorous work of sociology. Bourdieu’s endeavour is entirely
premised on claims to authority: sociology is the supreme arbiter, and
objectivity is always possible when sociological principles are applied to
an object. Within this system of values essayism must be seen as feuil-
letonistic and insufficiently strict. Barthes’s work, of course, involves
taking this prejudice regarding the essay on board in order to debunk it,
in the belief that essayism, with its aesthetic method, its disregard for
arbitrary divisions between objects of knowledge, and its scepticism of
the possibility of objectivity, is extremely valuable. The hostile nature of
Bourdieu’s evaluation of Barthes highlights the resistance towards
Barthes’s work which is typical of a French tradition, practised before
Bourdieu by Julien Benda and after him by his disciple Jacques
Bouveresse, of castigating ‘mere’ literarity, especially when it is combined
with theoretical endeavour.31 Bourdieu’s disdain for Barthes is a disdain
for disciplinary impurity and the practice of an essayism based on
aesthetic, as opposed to rational or moral, thought. His critique of
Barthes is useful not only because it informs us about the institutional
context and the stakes at play in the marginal institutions in which
Barthes taught, but also because his trenchant distrust of Barthes’s whole
intellectual project refocuses our attention on the specificity of that
project and on how it is deployed in his teaching.
Bourdieu’s account of the ‘heretics’ is neatly illustrated by an account
of the ‘querelle de la nouvelle critique’ in the early 1960s, in which
Barthes’s Sur Racine was attacked by the Sorbonne professor Raymond
Picard for involving, precisely, a heretical critical account of Racine’s
work which involved non-traditional interpretive methods.32 The
Barthes–Picard quarrel is a boon to Bourdieu, involving as it does two
diametrically opposed protagonists who embody a whole series of oppo-
sitions – conservatism versus iconoclasm, the Sorbonne versus the École
pratique, literary history versus the new ‘sciences humaines’, agrégé
versus non-agrégé. Bourdieu is clearly fascinated – though also infuriated
– by how Barthes profited from this affair. He refers to Barthes’s quarrel
with Picard in his own inaugural lecture at the Collège de France in 1981,
in Homo academicus, and again at more length in the English preface to
Homo academicus (1998). Bourdieu here insists that the quarrel is, on
Barthes’s part, motivated by ‘the obscure sentiment of revenge felt by the
outsider’.33 He uses the affair as a means to explain to anglophone readers
the complexities of the French academic system. Barthes is his tutelary
example of the ‘heretic with a vocation to become a heresiarch’.34
Bourdieu deliberately conflates Barthes with the institutions which

employ him: ‘[he] condens[es] in his social being the tensions or contra-
dictions inherent in the awkward position of the marginal academic
institutions like the Ecole des Hautes Etudes “après Braudel”’, he
writes.35 Like others employed in similar institutions – Bourdieu’s exam-
ples are Foucault, Althusser and Derrida (he omits himself) – the critical
tenor of Barthes’s work is, in Bourdieu’s analysis, due to a petulance
regarding his professional situation: all these thinkers ‘share an anti-insti-
tutional mood homologous in its form to that of a considerable fraction
of students’. Bourdieu ascribes this to their frustration with ‘the discrep-
ancy between their already considerable fame in the outside world, that
is, outside the university and also outside France, and the subaltern status
which is accorded them inside the French university world’.36 Whether
having a position as directeur d’études in the EPHE really constitutes a
‘subaltern’ position is very debatable: although it is not part of the main-
stream university, it is by Bourdieu’s own admission (he worked there
himself) both ‘prestigieuse et dynamique’. To attribute the anti-institu-
tional tenor of the work of Barthes, Foucault and others to a career-long
sulk at their ‘rejection’37 by the mainstream university system is reduc-
tive. In Barthes’s case, the ethos of the marginal institutions certainly had
an effect on his thinking and his teaching methodology. Bourdieu figures
this negatively. Clearly, however, the liberation from the responsibilities
of the standard academic trajectory had many positive effects.
‘Les naufragés de l’université’
In interviews given after his election to the Collège, Barthes points out
that his employment in marginal institutions has allowed him a far
greater intellectual freedom than he could have had had he been part of
the university proper. Discussing this with Pierre Boncenne in April 1979,
he points out that, through being prevented by his tuberculosis from
following a standard academic career (ENS and/or agrégation,
university), this has actually been lucky (‘ce[la] a été ma chance’), because
he has ended up having the ideal career: ‘Du point de vue professionnel,
j’ai eu la meilleure vie que je pouvais avoir puisque j’ai été accueilli –
quitte à être contesté – dans cette Université que j’aimais bien depuis le
début, mais accueilli dans des lieux assez marginaux et hors pouvoir’. He
explains to Boncenne that this marginality is important in terms of its
liberatory effects on pedagogy. The teaching that takes place in these
institutions is not obliged to conform to any curricula, and its success is
not measured in terms of students’ performance. Thus this teaching has

more scope for ideological critique than a faculté-based teaching which
is partly dictated by the demands of the academic and commercial
marketplace:
Ces institutions sont marginales pour des raisons de style mais aussi pour
une raison objective qui n’a pas été bien comprise lorsque j’en ai parlé dans
ma leçon inaugurale: le Collège de France et, en grande partie, l’École
pratique des hautes études ne délivrent pas de diplômes. On n’est donc pas
entraîné dans un système de pouvoir, ce qui crée une marginalité objective.38
Because he is employed by institutions whose only stipulation is that

their staff teach research-based material, Barthes can teach on any subject
he chooses. More importantly, given Barthes’s increasingly a-teleological
thought during the 1970s, the results of this teaching do not need to be
measurable, and there is no ‘savoir dirigé’ (L, 10) or pre-defined goals
that have to be met. He need only present the unfurling of his own
thought on the subject he has chosen to explore.39 The emphasis on
research as process (rather than completion) is particularly explicit at the
Collège de France and championed as the core of its ethos: often quoted
in discussions of the Collège is Ernest Renan’s remark that this institu-
tion aims especially at producing ‘la science en voie de se faire’.
The university is concerned with the consolidation of canonical
knowledge. In instrumentalist terms, then, as Bourdieu points out, the
university’s teaching is ‘destiné à produire des enseignants’, whereas the
teaching in the marginal institutions is ‘destiné à préparer à la recherche
proprement dite’. Bourdieu also discusses value judgments based on
perceptions of the usefulness of the types of knowledge promulgated by
the respective establishments. The university, he writes, ‘doit inculquer
[ce qui est] académiquement ratifié et homologué, donc digne d’être
enseigné et appris (par opposition aux “modes” et à toutes les hérésies
modernistes)’. The marginal institutions, on the other hand, ‘consecrate’
a knowledge that is heretical in its refusal of the norms of academic repro-
duction: the EPHE was known for its often casual approach to
disciplinary divisions. Claude Lévi-Strauss has remarked that the Collège
de France, similarly, offers ‘une concession à un esprit indiscipliné’.40 The
marginal institutions will be attractive to a certain type of student for
two reasons: firstly, their raison d’être is to provide a kind of teaching
(in terms of both material and method) that is not available elsewhere.
Secondly, this teaching is provided in many cases by intellectuals whose
work has some standing outside the sphere of the academy. The personal
reputations of such intellectuals as well as the oppositional nature of their
work are attractive to students, especially in the wake of May ’68.
At the time of Bourdieu’s research, Barthes was still at the EPHE.

Bourdieu remarks that the EPHE, though ‘universitairement mineure’,
deploys a ‘poids déterminant […] dans le champ universitaire’. He
attributes this to an ‘effet d’institution qu’elle est sans doute la seule, entre
tous les établissements universitaires français, à exercer’. This ‘effect’ is
brought about by efficient and ambitious management which guarantees
the École’s unique prestige, dynamism, and sense of liberty from ‘des
servitudes scolaires des facultés ordinaires’.41 Thus an ‘effet d’institution’
as well as a personal reputation for ‘heretical’ thought combine to make
Barthes’s teaching at both the EPHE and the Collège de France popular.
Barthes’s seminar was very fashionable amongst those who sought an
alternative to mainstream teaching.42 Calvet, who was one of Barthes’s
former séminaristes as well as his biographer, describes the motivations
of the ‘séminaristes’ who attended Barthes’s classes at the EPHE as
follows:
Dans la salle, outre le cercle des proches, des fidèles, qui d’année en année
se retrouvent là pour la même communion, il y a des âmes en errance,
préfiguration sans doute d’un mai 68 à venir, qui ne reconnaissent pas leurs
désirs dans l’enseignement universitaire traditionnel. ‘C’était un peu le
radeau de la méduse’, commente l’un d’eux, ‘les naufragés de l’université,
ceux qui se sentaient mal ailleurs’.43
Calvet implies that the attraction of Barthes’s teaching inheres largely in

its non-magisterial qualities, which were appealing even before 1968, and
even more in tune with the zeitgeist thereafter. There are many testaments
by Barthes’s former students to his gifts as a teacher.44 All agree that his
teaching was always radically opposed to the traditional authoritative
model of master and pupil. In a 1971 article entitled ‘Écrivains, intel-
lectuels, professeurs’, Barthes discusses at length the ‘discours du
professeur’ and the authoritative assumptions that it embodies. This
essay is notable for its marked hostility towards the spoken word and the
positions it forces upon the speaker: in this way it anticipates Leçon’s
railing against the ‘fascism’ of language and praise for the polysemous
force of literature. Here, Barthes discusses how the situatedness of spoken
language reifies its message: ‘le contexte est par statut réducteur du sens,
le mot parlé est “clair”; le bannissement de la polysémie sert la Loi. […]
Parler, c’est exercer une volonté de pouvoir’.45 His teaching therefore
must try to pluralise the monology of the spoken word, by using the
model of writing – for, after all, ‘c’est parce que j’ai écrit que je parle’
(897). Barthes suggests in this article the necessity of bringing about an
alteration of the circulation of authority within the teaching space, such
that the ‘violence’ of didacticism is somewhat attenuated. These changes
are conceived in spatial terms: ‘il faudrait substituer à l’espace magistral

d’autrefois […] un espace moins droit, moins euclidien, où personne, ni
le professeur ni les étudiants, ne serait jamais à sa dernière place. […]
Dans l’espace enseignant, chacun ne devrait être à sa place nulle part’.
Barthes states that he finds this lack of permanent situatedness reassuring
(‘rassur[ant]’): ‘s’il m’arrivait de trouver ma place, je ne feindrais même
plus d’enseigner, j’y renoncerais’ (899). The ideals of floating and disper-
sion that this article advocates are of course relatively easy to achieve
within the privileged space of Barthes’s EPHE seminar: Barthes teaches
very gifted students and it is the norm for students to make lengthy
presentations on their areas of specialism.46 Thus speech ‘circulates’.
This article indicates that Barthes’s pedagogical philosophy was in
line with post-’68 calls for changes in the academic teaching relationship.
As the ‘séminariste’ Patrick Mauriès sees it, Barthes’s tactics were
successful: ‘l’incroyable impact’ of Barthes’s teaching was, Mauriès
writes, due to its diametric distance from ‘[le] terrorisme du savoir, l’in-
timidation universitaire, l’affirmation dépitée des petits maîtres’.47 This
was due both to the nature of the institution and to Barthes’s own
strongly felt imperatives. In their foreword to a 1970 collection of arti-
cles reviewing the role of the university teacher, Madeleine Chapsal and
Michèle Manceaux ask a question which Barthes seems already to have
answered in his seminars: ‘N’est-il pas temps de casser l’un des plus vieux
rapports du monde, celui qui unit le maître à l’élève, pour y substituer le
rapport des élèves entre eux?’ The teacher’s role, they point out, is to
facilitate relationships between the students themselves (this seems a
truism in, for example, the context of current UK pedagogy, but would
certainly have been rather more daring a proposal in the paternalistic
academy of post-Gaullist France). ‘À la limite’, they conclude, ‘le bon
professeur ne serait-il pas avant tout celui qui ne “gêne” pas la vie du
groupe et sa capacité de création spontanée?’48 Barthes loved the semi-
nars at the EPHE because he could observe the intellectual currents
running between the students: the caption beneath the photograph of the
séminaristes in Roland Barthes mentions the circulation of thoughts and
desires between all members of the ‘phalansteric’ space of the seminar.
This reminds Barthes of ‘[le] mot de Nietzsche: “l’enchevêtrement des
rapports amoureux”’ (RB, 743).
In the article ‘Au Séminaire’ (1974), Barthes discusses three ‘prac-
tices’ of education. The first is ‘l’enseignement’, which is a fundamentally
reproductive practice, indexed upon manuals and discourse.49 The
seminar space forecloses all ‘enseignement’ of this kind, as ‘aucun savoir
n’est transmis (mais un savoir peut être crée), aucun discours n’est tenu
(mais un texte se cherche)’. Instead, the models of ‘apprentissage’ and

‘maternage’ are favoured. Barthes conceives of apprenticeship along
‘oriental’ lines: the teacher works quietly in front of the apprentice,
speaking little, but accomplishing that which the apprentice will in due
course perform herself: ‘une compétence se transmet silencieusement’.
This idea of apprenticeship subsequently guides Barthes’s teaching at the
Collège de France, though there the term ‘fantasme’ is substituted for
‘apprentissage’. The fantasme is demonstrated, rather than discoursed
upon – this is ‘apprentissage’ rather than ‘enseignement’. As Barthes says
in Le Neutre, ‘je ne fabrique pas le concept de Neutre, j’étale des Neutres’
(36, 18 February). The final practice identified in ‘Au Séminaire’, ‘moth-
ering’, is explained by using the metaphor of the mother who silently,
lovingly supports the child who is learning to walk: ‘elle incite et entoure:
l’enfant demande la mère et la mère désire la marche de l’enfant’.50
Neither discourse nor demonstration is required. Barthes reprises this
model of the child and its mother in Leçon, as we shall see in Chapter 2.
In sum, in the seminar, ‘l’enseignement’ – understood negatively as
mere copying – is thwarted (‘déçu’), as all those in the room work together
to produce the object of knowledge. Barthes’s writing about the seminar
is romantic in tone and can seem improbably idealistic. The testaments
of Barthes’s former students imply, however, that many of these goals
were achieved in his seminars. The main pedagogical aim of Barthes’s
teaching at the EPHE and later at the Collège de France was to encourage
his listeners to respond creatively to the material offered to them: the
material itself is subsidiary to the thoughts to which it may give rise. As
Kristeva puts it, ‘il n’est pas un homme à message’.51 His teaching style
implicitly critiques of the norms of academic teaching, in which, he says
in his seminar in 1973, all teachers are in the position of ‘examinateur’,
the subject-who-knows and who must be imitated: ‘savoir comme modèle
(chose à copier)’.52 Barthes instead views himself as being, just like his
students, a researcher: ‘il cherche, comme les autres: chercher, c’est ne
pas savoir’ (LA, 54–55). A dispersive teaching method is thus paramount,
and Barthes attempted to carry over the methods of his teaching at the
EPHE to his cours magistraux at the Collège de France, which themselves
constitute ‘une critique de la discursivité scientifique’ (LA, 49).
The Form of Barthes’s Teaching:

‘Pas de discontinuité entre l’École et le Collège’
Commencer, c’est toujours, à un étage du sujet: enchaîner […] J’enchaîne

sur ce que je disais. Où? À l’École pratique des hautes études. Quand?
L’année dernière. […] ‘Donc, je disais’: en assumant ce mot ici, je voudrais
indiquer que pour moi il n’y a pas de discontinuité entre l’École et le Collège.
(CVE, 187)
Three days after his inaugural lecture at the Collège de France, Barthes
was interviewed by Bernard-Henri Lévy. When asked to characterise ‘la
parole pédagogique’, Barthes replies that ‘le rapport enseignant-enseigné’
is a ‘rapport de désir réciproque qui implique la possibilité de la déception
et donc de la réalisation’.53 Lévy believes that this very interactive concep-
tion of teaching will have to be altered now, given Barthes’s new position.
He asks Barthes whether his status as a professor at the Collège de France
will change the ‘nature de ce lien pédagogique’. Lévy is suggesting that
the increased fame attendant upon Barthes’s new job will make it more
difficult for him to teach in a non-magisterial way: the forum of the
teaching – what Barthes called in ‘Au Séminaire’ ‘la géométrie grossière
des grands cours publics’54 – will surely enforce a change of method.
Barthes insists that his ‘lien’ with his listeners will not change, given that
the fundamental situation is the same – his listeners attend his classes
purely out of choice: ‘j’ai toujours eu, dans le cadre de mes séminaires,
un rapport “idyllique” à l’enseignement. Je ne me suis jamais adressé qu’à
des sujets qui me choisissent, qui viennent là pour m’écouter, et à qui je
ne suis pas imposé. Conditions privilégiées qui sont aussi, par définition,
celles d’un cours au Collège’ (381). Lévy counters that there must be a
difference, given that Barthes’s EPHE teaching was seminar-based,
whereas the Collège teaching will consist mainly of cours magistraux. ‘Le
séminaire suppose le dialogue,’ he says, ‘et le cours le soliloque’. Barthes’s
arguably specious reply implies that this distinction is not necessarily
clear-cut, and that for a student to listen may be as active an experience
as for her to speak: ‘Il y a un fâcheux préjugé qui veut que dans un rapport
pédagogique, tout soit dans celui qui parle, et rien dans celui qui écoute.
Alors qu’il passe, qu’il se passe à mon avis autant de choses ici que là. Il
ne faut pas censurer l’écoute, au nom de la parole. Écouter peut être une
jouissance active’. Furthermore, he points out that according to the same
‘fâcheux préjugé’, the lecturer’s discourse is always a ‘soliloque […]
magistral’: this need not be the case. Rather, he says, ‘on peut fort bien
penser le soliloque comme une sorte de théâtre, à la limite frauduleux, flou
et incertain, où se mène un jeu subtil entre la parole et l’écoute’ (381–82).
In this interview, Barthes is trying to make it understood that, despite

his accession to a prestigious institution with a uniquely magisterial style
of teaching, the goals and the practice of his own pedagogy will not
change. The most important factors moulding Barthes’s teaching are
common to both the EPHE and the Collège. Firstly, the listeners attend
out of choice. Secondly, there is no obligation to conform to a curriculum
or to measure the results of the teaching. Thirdly, and most crucially,
Barthes’s own pedagogical philosophy – facilitated, of course, by the
statutes of both institutions – remains the same. He is committed to a
pedagogical discourse which tries not to be repressively authoritative. He
wants above all to provoke a plurality of response in the listeners. The
belief that the listeners’ responses are more important than the discourse
which gives rise to them is constant throughout Barthes’s EPHE teaching,
and becomes arguably even more important after his arrival at the
Collège de France, given that his later writing and pedagogy are
concerned more explicitly than hitherto with Barthes’s ‘envie d’accéder
[…] à une pratique de discours qui ne fasse pas pression sur autrui’ (PR,
41). This is a teaching that has been, and continues to be, anti-thetic and
anti-paternalistic, defined against scholarly monologism and the repro-
duction of extant knowledge. In Leçon, as we shall see in Chapter 2,
Barthes presents his teaching persona as being that of a child, forming
fantasies in a realm free of authoritarianism. His teaching is defined
against what he refers to in ‘Ecrivains, intellectuels, professeurs’ as ‘Loi’.55
In such claims to radicalism we find again the heady rhetoric of ‘La Mort
de l’auteur’, in which the reader’s response was posited as a revolutionary
force overcoming ‘Dieu et ses hypostases, la raison, la science, la loi’.56
Such a stance is well-suited to the EPHE with its oppositional ethos,
but may sit ill with the conservatism and prestige of the Collège de France
– and with Barthes’s increased fame and mainstream success. When
Barthes moves from the EPHE to the Collège the number of people
attending his lectures increases enormously. This is not explained simply
by saying that Barthes’s EPHE teaching consisted of restricted seminars
and the Collège teaching of lectures open to the public. For in fact the
‘séminaires’ had become extremely popular by the end of Barthes’s tenure
at the EPHE. Between 1962 and 1976, attendance increased cumula-
tively. Barthes perforce evolved a discursive teaching style over this time.
Initially, the attendance seems to have been relatively small, and it was
this that allowed Barthes to elaborate his thoughts concerning the egal-
itarian pedagogy facilitated by the ‘phalansteric’ space of the seminar.
Barthes wanted his teaching to involve a circulation, between teacher and
students, of ideas and ‘désirs’ in an atmosphere of ‘intimité’ and ‘commu-
nauté’.57 Insofar as it was possible, Barthes tried to import the diffusive

qualities of a more seminar-like teaching into his larger lectures.
However, by 1971–72, the seminar had become ‘circus-like’, in Barthes’s
jaundiced assessment (LA, 51). According to Calvet, the students
themselves complained about this ‘notoriété conjuguée à un phénomène
de mode [qui] a transformé le séminaire en “show”’.58 The number of
students far exceeding that suitable for a round-table seminar, in 1972
Barthes took to a dual system, whereby each year’s teaching comprised
two halves. One was ‘un séminaire élargi, ouvert aux auditeurs libres et
consacré à la recherche du directeur d’études’ (i.e., a series of lectures)
and the other a ‘séminaire restreint, réservé aux stagiaires, titulaires et
étudiants du 3e cycle’.59 Barthes mentions the benefits of the restricted
numbers for the smaller seminar, compared to ‘l’asphyxie croissante des
séminaires précédents’, as it allowed for group-based forms of work.60
Still, in some years, he chose to give ‘une exposition suivie’ of his own,
even to the smaller group: this was the case in 1968 and 1969, in the
‘Sarrasine’ seminars: ‘ce n’est ni une discussion d’idées ni un monologue
didactique, mais l’élaboration d’une écriture intellectuelle[.] [C]ette année,
nous avons délibérément choisi une exposition suivie, présentée d’un bout
à l’autre par le directeur d’études, sans appel à des exposés extérieurs’.61
Even in the seminar space, then, Barthes believed that the students’
listening – when he himself is lecturing discursively – is as creatively
important as their vocal contributions (we have seen his explanation of
this in the Lévy interview). This is why he dedicated S/Z, the product of
the ‘Sarrasine’ seminars, to ‘[s]es étudiants, [s]es auditeurs, [s]es amis qui
ont participé à ce séminaire’: the text was written, Barthes states, ‘selon
leur écoute’ (S/Z flyleaf). Though the benefit of this ‘écoute’ accrues much
more to Barthes than it does to the ‘auditeurs’, the point is that the
creative power of the listeners is affirmed, given that Barthes claims that
his own writing has been facilitated by this silent force. Speaking of the
dedication of S/Z to his ‘séminaristes’ in a 1971 interview for Tel Quel,
Barthes stresses the importance of a productive listening in any teaching
relationship: ‘Je suis persuadé qu’étudiants et professeurs réalisent déjà
bien souvent entre eux des communautés de travail; en tout cas, c’est le
régime normal à l’École des Hautes Études’. He points out that this is not
a question simply of letting the students speak:
Le paradoxe, eu égard au discours académique et au discours contestataire,
c’est de suggérer ceci: […L]a libération ne consiste pas à donner à l’étudiant
le droit de parler (mesure minimale), mais à tenter de modifier le circuit de
la parole – non pas son circuit physique (‘prendre’ la parole), mais son circuit
topologique […]; autrement dit, de se rendre conscient de la véritable
dialectique […] de la relation enseignante; selon cette dialectique, l’écoute

n’est pas seulement active […] – l’écoute est productrice.62
A subtle provocation is what is important. In this instance, the students’

listening ‘produces’ Barthes’s own writing. Six years later, the produc-
tive force of listening is expected to work the other way around: what
Barthes says is designed to produce creative reflection in the minds of his
listeners. In Comment vivre ensemble, Barthes remarks that the ideal
lecture course would be one where ‘ce qu’il [le professeur] dit serait en
retrait par rapport à ce qu’il suscite’ (CVE, 181).
So, by the time of his arrival at the Collège, Barthes was not unused
to the practice of lecturing to large crowds.63 His time at the EPHE had
allowed him to elaborate a discourse which, though magisterial in form,
was by no means magisterial in intention. But the ‘rapport idyllique’ with
students who only came to hear him out of choice was altered, or perhaps
abolished, by the enormous popularity of Barthes’s lectures at the Collège
de France. Barthes’s media profile was at this time higher than it had been
at any previous point in his career: the bestselling success and stage adap-
tation of his 1977 book Fragments d’un discours amoureux, his
appearance on Bernard Pivot’s television programme Apostrophes, and
his regular column in the Nouvel Observateur (1978–79) gave him the
status of a literary celebrity.64 Public lectures by such a figure were bound
to be popular. The Collège’s largest lecture hall was overcrowded and
queueing began hours in advance. ‘C’est presque devenu une histoire
drôle’, as a commentator in Le Monde wrote, in 2002; ‘un conférencier,
intrigué par le succès aussi subit qu’inespéré de ses séances au Collège de
France, s’en enquiert auprès d’une vieille dame, qui l’éclaircit
aimablement: “Pour assister au cours de Barthes qui suit le vôtre, il vaut
mieux s’asseoir à l’avance…”’.65 In the presence of these huge crowds,
Barthes seemed to be quite uncomfortable. Marty explains the rather
cumbrous beginnings of the Comment vivre ensemble cours – Barthes’s
first at the Collège – by saying that Barthes was still getting used to the
new milieu of the Collège and the crowds (he does not mention that there
had been some crowding problems at the EPHE too):
Barthes met un certain temps avant d’acquérir son tempo; d’abord parce
qu’il est, je crois, assez malheureux de se trouver au Collège de France. Il
vient de quitter l’espace du séminaire où il avait un rapport phalanstérien à
quelques disciples et il passe à un public nombreux, dans des conditions
matérielles très inconfortables. Par ailleurs, en rédigeant ses premiers cours,
il est confronté à une sorte de gêne; la demande de l’auditoire auquel il est
exposé d’une manière nouvelle pour lui, semble lui enjoindre de faire de son
cours une performance. Assez vite, les choses se stabilisent et prennent un
cours plus serein.66
The presence of many tape-recorders and microphones added to the sense

that this was a ‘performance’ – though Barthes reminded his listeners, on
one occasion, that his lectures should not, in spite of appearances, be
regarded as a display of knowledge, but rather as the execution of a
personal research: ‘Un cours n’est pas une performance, et il ne faut pas,
autant que possible, y venir comme à un spectacle qui enchante ou déçoit
– ou même […] qui enchante parce qu’il déçoit. Il y a ici un “dessein”
que j’essaie de tenir […] semaine après semaine, et peut-être année après
année’ (PR, 35).67 For a listener to treat the cours as a ‘spectacle’ would
mean that s/he would not invest sufficiently in the ‘dessein’; understand-
ably enough, Barthes wants listeners who are fully engaged with the aims
of his project.
The huge attendance and its concomitant weight of adulation also
imposed on Barthes the myth-like weight of being a ‘grand prêtre de l’uni-
versité française’.68 Barthes’s reluctance to be ‘on show’ is thematised in
the lectures themselves, notably in Le Neutre.69 The new forum of
Barthes’s teaching brought about other more practical concerns: the fact
that the Collège de France lectures are open to the public, in the broadest
possible sense, meant not only an overcrowding of the lecture theatre but
a compositional problem: what audience should the lecturer have in
mind?70 The audience was now far more diverse than that at the EPHE,
which had consisted largely of students steeped in the intellectual trends
of the day. This led to a problem regarding the orientation and register
of Barthes’s teaching – but also had liberating effects: Éric Marty has
pointed out that the EPHE seminar was notable for a certain theoretical
orthodoxy. For example, the presence of several influential psycho-
analysists including Jacques-Alain Miller imposed a certain tenor upon
discussions in the seminar.71 Such theoretical moulds could be either
abjured or retained at Barthes’s discretion at the Collège de France. Alain
Finkielkraut, who attended Barthes’s EPHE seminars in the early 1970s,
has commented that despite the governing theoretical norms of the
period, at the Collège de France, ‘Barthes semble s’émanciper de tout
système’.72
At the Collège, Barthes was addressing people of widely differing
ages, professions, and nationalities. In a 1979 interview, Barthes
discussed this issue:
Quant au public du Collège, je ne le connai[s] pas. Il n’y a que deux ans que
j’ai un public, et c’est quelque chose de nouveau pour moi. C’est un vrai
public, puisque tout le monde vient là, il n’y a pas d’inscriptions. Moi-même
je ne saurais pas le définir. Je vois bien que les âges sont très mélangés, je
sens bien que les niveaux culturels sont différents, et par là même je suis
entraîné vers un discours, je dirais moins méthodologique, moins technique
et plus ‘humain’.73
How can the discourse required for the teaching of semiology become
more ‘humain’? To a certain extent, the public perception of Barthes at
this time is that his work is arcane and irritatingly neologistic: Burnier
and Rambaud’s lampoon, Le Roland-Barthes sans peine, based on the
‘joke’ that Barthes’s French is as incomprehensible as a foreign language,
was published in 1978.74 How can Barthes make his discourse – and his
discipline – appealing and vital for his diverse public? The answer lies in
the title of his chair, ‘sémiologie littéraire’. With this new discipline,
Barthes wants to work on a (re)insertion of the human, the banal, and
the interactional aspects into a discipline which will no longer even be
‘semiology’ as it has been previously conceived. He writes in his presen-
tation of his work to the Collège de France in 1975 that a ‘pur classement
dont le sujet humain serait illusoirement absent’ is not for him. Rather,
‘[c]’est le statut difficile de la sémiologie […] qui a constamment inspiré
ma recherche – et non l’intention de constituer une science canonique des
signes’.75 Semiology as science is to be sidelined in favour of contingent,
‘impur’ human aspects. The new semiology ‘serait dès lors ce travail qui
recueille l’impur de la langue, le rebut de la linguistique […]: rien moins
que les désirs, les craintes, les mines, les intimidations, les avances, les
tendresses, les protestations, les excuses, les agressions, les musiques,
dont est faite la langue active’ (L, 31–32, my emphasis). The emphasis
on the human subject, then, will bring about the expansion of the disci-
pline, thereby making it more appealing to a diverse audience. This
emphasis will also come to embody, in paradoxical fashion, what Barthes
sees as the true scientificity of his work. This scientificity inheres in his
use of his own subjectivity to arrive at truths which are relevant for all
of us. ‘Sémiologie littéraire’, is to be, very literally, a human science.
Claude Coste has noted the manner in which the Collège de France cours
pave the way for the culmination of Barthes’s individualistic generalisa-
tion in La Chambre claire. Writing about Comment vivre ensemble in
2000, Coste points out that Barthes ‘travaille à partir de lui-même sans
renoncer à une forme de généralité. Cette démarche impossible,
profondément idiorrythmique, conduit tout droit à la science du
particulier que La Chambre claire mettra en œuvre deux ans plus tard’.76
The foundations for the book on photography are laid in the method-
ology of the Collège de France courses. For it is there that Barthes
accomplishes the move to an aesthetic discourse inspired by what he calls
in La Chambre claire a ‘mathesis singularis’: a science of individuality.
This method is announced in Leçon and essayed in the first lecture course,
Comment vivre ensemble, with its explanation of the organising prin-
ciple of the ‘fantasme’. We see in La Chambre claire the endpoint of the
‘new science’ towards which Barthes is working during the entire dura-
tion of his teaching at the Collège de France; indeed we can say that La
Chambre claire is born from the teaching itself: its main ideas concerning
the ‘noème’ of photography are outlined in the 17 February 1979 lecture
of La Préparation du roman I (PR, 113–18), and the text of La Chambre
claire is written shortly after that lecture course concludes.77 An exami-
nation of the inaugural lecture and the 1978 lecture entitled ‘Longtemps,
je me suis couché de bonne heure…’ reveals the manner in which Barthes
prepares the ground for the aesthetic discourse which he wants to attain.
This is a discourse which has as its guiding fantasme the expression of
an absolute singularity which yet manages to attain general relevance. It
requires that his own status – that of essayist, of critic – be problematised.
Leçon and ‘Longtemps’ perform such a beneficial problematisation.
Notes
1 The election procedure at the Collège de France is as follows: on the vacation of

a chair because of death or retirement, all the professors of the Collège vote to
create a chair (the existing chair may also be retained, if there is a suitable new
candidate for it). A likely candidate for this chair is then named, with a second
and sometimes third candidate also chosen as a possibility. The candidate must
visit incumbent professors and also present his/her ‘travaux antérieurs’ as well
as a ‘projet d’enseignement’ in a report distributed to all the professors (see
Barthes’s ‘Travaux et Projets’ in Nathalie Léger, ed., Roland Barthes au Collège
de France 1977–1980 (Paris: IMEC, 2002), pp. 95–101). Each candidate is then
verbally recommended in a ‘hearing’ before the Collège by an incumbent
professor. Foucault was Barthes’s ‘présentateur’. After the presentation of each
candidate, the professors vote to fill the chair and formally designate the
majority-chosen candidate. The Collège’s administrator then asks the relevant
academy of the Institut de France to approve the professors’ decision (the Institut,
as a rule, confirms what the Collège has decided), and the Minister of Education
is asked to give his/her assent to the decision. The ‘Decret portant nomination
d’un professeur au Collège de France’ is signed by the President, the Prime
Minister, and the Minister for Universities (respectively Valéry Giscard
d’Estaing, Jacques Chirac and Alice Saunier Seïté, in Barthes’s case).
2 Dosse, Histoire du structuralisme, 2 vols. (Paris: La Découverte, 1992), vol. II,
p. 166. The fourth ‘musketeer’ is Lacan.
3 ‘Roland Barthes s’explique’, interview with Pierre Boncenne for Lire, April 1979.
OC, V, 744–57 (p. 748).
4 There are few extant studies of the French educational system, and fewer still of
the intricacies of the relationships between the different types of establishment
(facultés, grands établissements, institutions marginales). Antoine Compagnon
has noted that, by comparison with other countries, France has ‘pas, ou peu,
d’histoires de l’Université, encore moins du “haut enseignement”’ (La Troisième
république des lettres: de Flaubert à Proust (Paris: Seuil, 1983), p. 21). For a
useful study of the evolution of the French academy through the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries see Terry Clark, Prophets and Patrons: The French
University and the Emergence of the Social Sciences (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1973), though his primary focus is on the study of sociology.
The only critical history of the Collège de France is Christophe Charle’s chapter
‘Le Collège de France’ in Les Lieux de mémoire, ed. by Pierre Nora, 3 vols. (Paris:
Gallimard, 1986), vol. II, pp. 389–42. François Dosse’s Histoire du structural-
isme makes many illuminating references to the various spheres of the French
academy in its narration of the careers of the intellectual avant-garde of the
human sciences.
5 Pierre Bourdieu, Homo academicus (Paris: Minuit, 1984).
6 Homo academicus, p. 137.
7 Homo academicus, p. 136.
8 See Calvet’s biography of Barthes for a full account of Barthes’s career and how
his tuberculosis affected his academic trajectory. Barthes’s only academic qual-
ification was a classics degree from the Sorbonne; his illness and subsequent stays
in sanatoria prevented him from studying for the agrégation. Barthes’s close
friend, Philippe Rebeyrol, pursued the course that Barthes himself wanted to
follow, entering the École normale supérieure in 1936. According to Calvet,
Barthes told a friend in 1976 that his illness preventing him from entering the
ENS with Rebeyrol was ‘la plus grande douleur de sa vie’. Louis-Jean Calvet,
Roland Barthes 1915–1980 (Paris: Flammarion, 1990), p. 59.
9 Barthes held posts as ‘stagiaire de recherches’ and as ‘attaché de recherches’ at
the CNRS from 1952 to 1954 and from 1954 to 1955 respectively. At the invi-
tation of Fernand Braudel, he took up the junior position of Chef de travaux at
the École pratique des hautes études in 1960. In 1962 he was awarded a direc-
torship of studies in ‘Sociologie des signes, symboles et représentations’, and
remained in this position until his election to the Collège de France in 1976.
10 Didier Eribon, Michel Foucault (1926–1984) (Paris: Flammarion, 1991), p. 232.
11 The Collège is currently visited by approximately 100,000 listeners per year.
Attendance has increased since the renovations of 1998.
12 Charle, ‘Le Collège de France’, p. 390.
16 Charle, ‘Le Collège de France’, p. 422. The teaching body at the Collège de France
consists currently (2012) of 47 professors. These are classed under ‘Sciences
mathématiques, physiques et naturelles’; ‘Sciences philosophiques et sociolo-
giques’; and ‘Sciences historiques, philologiques et archéologiques’. A list of all
professors from 1530 onward is available to download from the Collège de
France website: <http://www.college-de-france.fr/default/EN/all/ins_cha/liste_
des_professeurs.htm> [accessed 14 December 2011].
17 Cited in Gabriel Monod, Portraits et souvenirs (Paris: Calman-Lévy, 1897), p.
129.
18 Jacques Revel and Nathan Wachtel, Une École pour les sciences sociales: de la
VIe section à l’École des hautes études en sciences sociales (Paris: Cerf/L’École
des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, 1996), pp. 14–16. The Rockefeller
Foundation initially funded a quarter of the Sixth Section’s budget.
19 Revel and Wachtel, Une École pour les sciences sociales, p. 23.
20 Niilo Kauppi, The Making of an Avant-Garde: Tel Quel, trans. Anne R. Epstein
(Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 1994), p. 120.
21 Jacques le Goff wrote an appreciation of Barthes’s administrative work at the
EPHE in his ‘Barthes administrateur’, Communications, 36 [special issue on
Barthes] (1982): 43–48. Barthes resigned from his position as secretary in 1974,
and was appointed to the École’s scientific committee.
22 Source: website of the École des hautes études en sciences sociales,

<www.ehess.fr> [accessed 18 December 2011].
23 In Homo academicus, Pierre Bourdieu points out that the ‘disciplines les plus
classiques’ at the Collège de France tend to be represented by ‘“universitaires
éminents”, qui ont suivi la filière classique’ (p. 141).
24 Kauppi, The Making of an Avant-Garde, p. xvii.
25 In his interview with Sartre in Sartre aujourd’hui, a special issue of L’Arc,
Bernard Pingaud referred to Lévi-Strauss, Barthes, Foucault and Lacan as the
‘nouveaux maîtres’. ‘Jean-Paul Sartre répond’, L’Arc, 30 (1966): 90–101.
26 Bourdieu, ‘Preface’, in Homo academicus, trans. Peter Collier (Oxford: Polity,
1998), pp. xi–xxvi (p. xxii).
27 Bourdieu, Leçon sur la leçon (Paris: Minuit, 1982), p. 30.
28 Bourdieu, ‘Preface’, in Homo academicus (1998), p. xxii.
29 Marielle Macé, Le Temps de de l’essai: histoire d’un genre en France au XXe
siècle (Paris: Belin, 2006), passim.
30 Bourdieu, Esquisse pour une auto-analyse (Paris: Raisons d’agir, 2004), passim.
31 See Jacques Bouveresse, Prodiges et vertiges de l’analogie: De l’abus des belles-
lettres dans la pensée (Paris: Raisons d’agir, 1999), in which he states that ‘A
côté de l’abus de pouvoir “scientiste”, il en existe un (le “littérarisme”) qui
consiste à croire que ce que dit la science ne devient intéressant et profound
qu’une fois retranscrit dans un langage littéraire et utilise de façon
“métaphorique”, un terme qui semble autoriser et excuser presque tout’ (jacket
blurb).
32 Barthes, Sur Racine (Paris: Seuil, 1963). Raymond Picard, Nouvelle critique ou
nouvelle imposture? (Paris: Pauvert, 1965).
34 Bourdieu, ‘Preface’, in Homo academicus (1998) p. xix.
36 Bourdieu, ‘Preface’, in Homo academicus (1998), p. xix.
37 Bourdieu, ‘Preface’, in Homo academicus (1998), p. xix.
38 ‘Roland Barthes s’explique’ (Lire, April 1979). OC, V, 748.
39 For a full list of the subjects Barthes chose for his EPHE seminars, see the
Appendix.
40 Claude Lévi-Strauss with Didier Eribon, De près et de loin (Paris: Odile Jacob,
2001), p. 109.
41 Bourdieu, Homo academicus, p. 145.
42 Kristeva’s Les Samouraïs features the character of Bréhal, a barely fictionalised
version of Barthes. Those in Bréhal’s seminars think the Sorbonne is ‘ringard’.
Bréhal’s classes are very popular as he lectures on literature so skilfully that he
resembles an ‘artiste’ who can speak to everyone. Les Samouraïs (Paris:
Gallimard, 1992), p. 14.
43 Calvet, Roland Barthes, p. 193.
44 See Renaud Zuppinger, ‘Notes étourdies écrites pendant un séminaire de Roland
Barthes’, in Barthes, special issue of L’Arc 54 (1974): 87–90; Patrick Mauriès,
Roland Barthes (Paris: Gallimard, 1992); and Julia Kristeva, ‘La voix de Barthes’,
in Roland Barthes, special issue of Communications 36 (1982): 119–23, for a
representative sample of séminaristes’ praise of Barthes’s teaching.
45 ‘Écrivains, intellectuels, professeurs’, originally published in special issue on
Barthes of Tel Quel 47, Autumn 1971. OC, III, 887–907 (pp. 888–89).
46 Barthes’s seminar was the site of many important intellectual interventions
during the late ’60s and early ’70s – for example, Philippe Sollers elaborated his
work on Mallarmé in the seminar, and Marthe Robert presented her study of
Kafka. Niilo Kauppi has also noted the close links between the seminar and Tel
Quel: articles from many séminaristes, including Marthe Robert, Hubert

Damisch, Gérard Genette, Jean-Michel Rey, Severo Sarduy, Tzvetan Todorov
and Julia Kristeva, were published by the journal during the late 1960s and the
’70s. Kauppi, The Making of an Avant-Garde, pp. 78–79 and p. 122.
47 Mauriès, Roland Barthes, p. 48.
48 Madeleine Chapsal and Michèle Manceaux, eds., Les Professeurs pour quoi
faire? (Paris: Seuil, 1970), p. 14.
49 ‘Au Séminaire’, OC, IV, 502–11 (p. 506).
50 ‘Au Séminaire’, p. 506. As many critics have noted, Barthes’s models of knowl-
edge often invoke the mother and maternal love. See for example Knight’s
chapter ‘Maternal Space’ in Barthes and Utopia, pp. 244–69.
51 Kristeva, ‘La voix de Barthes’, p. 119.
52 ‘Au Séminaire’, p. 506.
53 ‘À quoi sert un intellectuel?’, interview with Bernard-Henri Lévy for Le Nouvel
Observateur, 10 Jan. 1977. OC, V, 364–82 (p. 381).
54 ‘Au Séminaire’, L’Arc, 1974. OC, IV, 502–11 (p. 502).
55 ‘Ecrivains, intellectuels, professeurs’, p. 907.
56 ‘La Mort de l’auteur’, Manteia, 1968. OC, III, 40–45 (p. 44).
57 1972 EPHE course summary, OC, IV, 191.
58 Calvet, Roland Barthes, p. 221.
61 1968 EPHE course summary, OC, III, 76.
62 ‘Réponses’, interview with Jean Thibaudeau for Tel Quel, Autumn 1971. OC,
III, 1023–44 (p. 1036).
63 Before any professional academic involvement, Barthes had lectured in his youth:
Calvet describes the lectures on music that Barthes gave to a ‘salle bourrée’ while
at the Sainte-Hilaire du Touvet sanatorium in 1943 (Roland Barthes, p. 76).
64 The episode of Apostrophes entitled ‘Parlez moi d’amour’ (29 April 1977), also
featuring Françoise Sagan and Anne Golon, is available to download from the
website of the Institut National de l’audiovisuel: <http://www.boutique.ina.fr>.
65 Fabienne Dumontet, ‘Roland Barthes: Fragments d’un discours’, Le Monde, 30
November 2002.
66 Jacques Henric, ‘Roland Barthes: cours et nouvelles œuvres complètes: entretien
avec Éric Marty’, Art Press, 285 (2002): 48–54 (p. 49).
67 Bernard Comment has pointed out that the tape recording of the lectures was
overtly tolerated by Barthes: he was in the habit of having a break forty-five
minutes into each lecture so that the owners of the tape recorders might rush
down and turn over their cassettes. Roland Barthes, vers le neutre (Paris:
Christian Bourgois, 1991), p. 146.
68 The term is drawn from Gérard Petitjean’s (1975) article, ‘Les grands prêtres de
l’université française’ (Le Nouvel Observateur, 7 April 1975) which consciously
employs a vocabulary of worship in its treatment of ‘prêtres’ such as Foucault,
Barthes and Lacan.
69 See Ch. 3 below.
70 Valéry had attested to the same problem: ‘Moi je me perds en moi du haut de
ma chaire! Ah! Si je n’avais que cinq auditeurs comme Renan. Ça irait tout seul!
Mais une salle pleine d’on ne sait qui, c’est très fatigant. On se demande qui viser,
quel degré de culture, de tension, il faut songer à satisfaire’. Cited in Charle, ‘Le
Collège de France’, p. 419.
71 Author’s conversation with Éric Marty, April 2010.
72 Alain Finkielkraut, ‘Barthes et le roman’, interview with Éric Marty and Antoine
Compagnon, in Ce que peut la littérature, ed. Alain Finkielkraut (Paris:
Stock/Panama, 2006), pp. 217–40 (p. 219).

73 ‘Rencontre avec Roland Barthes’, interview with Nadine Dormoy Savage for The
French Review, February 1979. OC, V, 735–43 (p. 741).
74 Michel Antoine Burnier and Patrick Rambaud, Le Roland-Barthes sans peine
(Paris: Balland, 1978).
75 Barthes, ‘Travaux et projets’, in Léger, ed., Roland Barthes au Collège de France,
pp. 95–96.
76 Claude Coste, ‘Comment vivre ensemble: simulations romanesques de quelques
espaces quotidiens’, in Léger, ed., Roland Barthes au Collège de France, pp.
35–59 (p. 54).
77 The first Préparation series concludes on 10 March 1979. La Chambre claire is
written between 15 April and 3 June 1979.
2
Leçon and ‘Longtemps, je me suis couché
de bonne heure…’
The objective wealth of meanings encapsulated in every intellectual phenom-

enon demands of the recipient the same spontaneity of subjective fantasy
that is castigated in the name of objective discipline.
Adorno, ‘The Essay as Form’, 1958
Mieux valent les leurres de la subjectivité que les impostures de l’objectivité.
Barthes, La Préparation du roman, 2 December 1978
Early in La Chambre claire, Barthes explains that in his writing he has

always hovered between two sorts of discourse; he feels the ‘inconfort’
of a subject ‘ballotté entre deux langages, l’un expressif, l’autre critique’.
His only sense of certainty, within the network of discourses in which he
finds himself, is that he feels an ineradicable ‘résistance […] à tout système
réducteur’ (CC, 794).1 His own subjectivity, ‘“l’antique souveraineté du
moi” (Nietzsche)’, must be used as a methodological starting-point.
Selecting the photographs he would use for the book, Barthes had the
‘bizarre’ thought that perhaps, after all, it is by examining contingent
individuality that a general validity can be reached – a ‘mathesis’ or
knowledge which would respect particularity, and yet ultimately lead to
the attainment of general truths:2
Pourquoi n’y aurait-il pas, en quelque sorte, une science nouvelle par objet?
Une Mathesis singularis (et non plus universalis)? J’acceptai donc de me
prendre pour médiateur de toute la Photographie: je tenterais de formuler,
à partir de quelques mouvements personnels, le trait fondamental,
l’universel sans lequel il n’y aurait pas de Photographie. (CC, 795)
Here we see the culmination of a method which Barthes had been setting
out with increasing confidence over the course of the Collège de France
teaching: the ‘idée bizarre’ of a mathesis singularis was in gestation during
this time.
This chapter will trace the paradoxical combination of the personal
and the general – or ‘scientifique’, connoting both science and knowl-
edge – in Barthes’s inaugural lecture at the Collège de France, and the
lecture given in Paris and New York the following year, ‘Longtemps, je
52
Leçon and ‘Longtemps, je me suis couché de bonne heure…’ 53
me suis couché de bonne heure…’ These are the only two texts from
Barthes’s Collège de France teaching which were published before 2002,
and in them we discover not only the manifestos for the form and preoc-
cupations of Barthes’s lecture courses, but also an important articulation
of the contradictions inherent in the status and mindset of this ‘conse-
crated heretic’. These texts articulate the profound tensions of Barthes’s
time at the Collège de France: tensions between the literary and the scien-
tific (or semiological); the teacher and the writer; the critic and the artist.
These texts set up a lecturing style which seeks ultimately to outline what
in La Chambre claire is called ‘la science impossible de l’être unique’
(847) or ‘une science du sujet, dont peu m’importe le nom, pourvu qu’elle
parvienne (ce qui n’est pas encore joué) à une généralité qui ne me réduise
ni ne m’écrase’ (801). This search for a realm of knowledge and of love
that is immune to any ‘système réducteur’ is, of course, problematic for
many critics of Barthes. The ‘impossible science’ proposes that through
an examination of the self’s most profound emotional responses we
discover an ‘intraitable réalité’ (CC, 885) that refuses further analysis.
This, says Jonathan Culler, is ‘Nature slip[ping] back into [Barthes’s]
writing’. However, as Culler also implies, this new endeavour is also
linked to the ‘systematic endeavours he [has] renounce[d]’.3 Though
apparently a radical departure, Barthes’s new science is connected to his
previous writing, and though the presence of a ‘Nature’ unmediated by
culture is at the heart of La Chambre claire, I contend that this endeavour
is an extension of his career-long uncovering of what lies beneath codes.
The difference is the change of interest regarding what lies beneath: no
longer concerned with political uses of the sign, Barthes now wishes to
demonstrate the individual impulses that underlie any attempt at objec-
tivity, thus inaugurating a new – though apparently regressive –
demystification.
This individual science or knowledge is, of course, much more diffi-
cult to discuss and to classify than, for example, the ‘science canonique
des signes’ that Barthes rejects in ‘Travaux et projets’. This is the point.
The fact that the ‘sémiologie’ Barthes is interested in has a ‘statut diffi-
cile’ allows Barthes great freedom of play, and the rejection of
disciplinary ‘purity’ as an ideal makes way for the inclusion of the hetero-
geneity of objects, and the dilettantism of method, that Barthes personally
favours and which he will deploy in his first lecture course under the
rubric of ‘paideia’. Julia Kristeva describes, in 1971, this taste of Barthes’s
for heteronomy and subjectivity in critical discourse. She could almost
be writing about Leçon itself: ‘“Le critique”, lui, se charge d’indiquer
l’hétéronomie […] par l’introduction de l’instance du sujet, en assumant
une parole représentative, localisée, contingente, déterminée par son “Je”

et donc par celui de son destinataire’.4 Kristeva, anticipating Barthes’s
‘science du particulier’, describes his desire for what she calls ‘eteros’ as
‘l’annonce de la réserve barthésienne qui rapproche le savoir du procès
de la vérité’. In this ‘réserve’, she continues, ‘la connotation morale
s’efface si l’on admet que l’irruption, dans la vérité neutre de la science,
d’un sujet de l’énonciation n’invalide pas cette vérité, mais rappelle son
opération, sa genèse objective’.5
Kristeva’s rather oblique reference to a ‘connotation morale’ here in
her description of Barthes’s methodology is interesting. For a moral
connotation is heavily present in Leçon, brought about by the use of a
typical inversion of terms. Just as Barthes had, in Le Plaisir du texte,
claimed ‘perversion’ as a positive term in literary appreciation, he now
claims ‘l’impur’ as a value. In terms of the thematics Barthes sets up in
Leçon to herald his teaching, the most important idea is that of hybridity
or impurity, which Barthes uses to explain his theoretical approach.
Given that, for Barthes, literature is mathesis, or the multifarious repos-
itory of all knowledge (‘toutes les sciences’), thus a ‘sémiologie littéraire’,
if it is to take in charge this multiplicity, must be hybrid by its very nature.
Barthes’s literary semiology, in its hybridity and prioritisation of
personal response, will thus deploy a version of Kantian aesthetic judg-
ment. Barthes’s ‘impurity’ is consonant with a continental reception of
the Critique of Judgment, according to which the Critique constitutes a
‘radical undoing of the categorial divisions between knowledge, morality
and aesthetics’.6 Barthes wants the ‘divisions between knowledge’ to be
friable, and believes that aesthetic judgment has a liberatory critical
power that complements the more deterministic type of thought to be
found in cognition and morality.
Judgment is defined by Kant as ‘the faculty of thinking the particular
as contained under the universal’.7 The domain of the aesthetic involves
a type of judgment profoundly different from the ‘determining’ (‘bestim-
mend’) judgment involved in the domains of rationality and morality.
Knowledge and judgment proceed in these areas by subsuming partic-
ular facts and problems under pre-existing universal laws. But such
judgments cannot account for the entirety of human experience – they
leave out emotion and contingency, and instances where the particular
does not slot easily into the universal. Hence the Critique of Judgment,
with its account of another form of cognition, which occurs when, as
Kant puts it, ‘only the particular is given, and the universal has to be
found for it’.8
The important Kantian point is that judgments of taste, although they
arise from entirely subjective, contingent experiences, have a genuine

claim to universal validity, via the ‘sensus communis aestheticus’. It is
this passage from the particular to the universal, without the reduction
and generalisation of universal laws, that is important for Barthes, as it
is this possibility of having a non-reductive account of the subject’s partic-
ularity, without falling into self-indulgent personal accounts that have
no broader applicability, that he feels is the imperative for intellectual
writing. In fact, what is most valuable about the theory of aesthetic judg-
ment is the way it permits a movement between, or a problematisation
of, categories which in other discourses are considered to be entirely sepa-
rable – subjectivity and objectivity; feeling and cognition; art and
sociality. Kant describes aesthetic judgment as a ‘middle articulation’
(Mittelglied), which permits an articulation of the ‘gulf’ (‘Kluft’) that
otherwise separates the faculties of cognition and morality. Occupying a
middle position, aesthetic discourse is not concerned uniquely with taste.
Its concerns are also linked to questions of ethics and morality. For
Barthes, the incorporation of aesthetic discourse into theory is, essen-
tially, a moral question: it is imperative that the writer avow her own
personal investment in the topic under study, while also striving to render
this investment instructive for the reader. The ‘sensus communis’ is pre-
supposed, but this is not the same as a pre-existing concept which can be
fallen back on. It is pre-supposed and also still to be made, by requesting
that others acknowledge the validity of one’s own taste, and is therefore
not grounded in what Barthes would call ‘myths’ of culture. A theory
that proceeds using aesthetic judgment has to respond to contingency,
and incorporate an avowal of pleasure or pain into all attempts at pres-
entation of knowledge. Using aesthetic judgment foregrounds the
difficult, processual nature of judgment, which ideological discourse
tends to suppress.
In Barthes’s view, prioritising a wilfully individualistic disciplinary
impurity will lead to a discipline which will end up being morally supe-
rior to a ‘pure’ science, precisely because of its explicit retention of the
subject’s emotional response. ‘Impurity’, in other words, is the hallmark
of an approach which, necessarily heterodox because of the subject-
matter, also has the aim of seeking to uncover that which other disciplines
wish to keep hidden. Adorno, the pre-eminent post-Kantian thinker of
the aesthetic, articulates this in his essay on the essay form – a text
remarkably similar to Leçon in many ways. As Adorno puts it, the ‘inner-
most formal law’ of the essay must be ‘heresy’, whereby ‘[t]hrough
violations of the orthodoxy of thought, something in the object becomes
visible which it is orthodoxy’s secret and objective aim to keep invisi-
ble’.9 We find at the ‘innermost’ level of Barthes’s pedagogy – in his atti-

tude to the epistemological status of his own thought – a heresy that
mirrors the heretical licence provided by the institution of the Collège de
France.
Barthes wishes to set himself up as deviating from what he chooses
to see as the besetting norms of false objectivity and repressively author-
itative metalanguage. In attempting to propose an alternative, he needs
to demonstrate firstly that he has left his own ‘rêve de scientificité’ and
its positivism behind. Secondly, he needs to show that his own new,
looser values represent a new and improved way of ‘doing’ semiology,
whose new methodology, because based on an up-front subjectivity, will
be more thoroughly representative of truth than the positivist science
against which he defines it. His manner of doing this is typically para-
doxical. Throughout Leçon we see repeated rhetorical moves wherein
Barthes re-valorises terms generally understood to be negative. In addi-
tion to the paramount term of ‘impur[eté]’, he arrogates to himself other
terms that are deliberately distanced from ideas of rigour and precision,
such as ‘indirect’, ‘fragmentation’, ‘fantasme’ and ‘oubli’. Linked to this
methodological lexis is the term ‘artiste’, which Barthes uses to describe
and valorise his own tactics, methodology and status. We shall look at
these sets of terms in turn as we examine Leçon.
Leçon and the Impurity of ‘la sémiologie littéraire’
The opening of Leçon employs precisely the same rhetorical tactic as the
early sections of La Chambre claire quoted above. Barthes presents
himself as a hybrid subject who has always been choosing between
various approaches to writing, and who is therefore of uncertain status.
This presentation of himself has the benefit – as it does in La Chambre
claire – of then making it seem a logical correlate that, in this morass of
uncertainty, subjectivity must be used as the unifying principle for
writing. Leçon opens with Barthes’s description of himself as a ‘sujet
incertain’ who is inherently paradoxical: ‘chaque attribut [en moi] est en
quelque sorte combattu par son contraire’. He states that his favoured
form of writing in the past has thwarted his desire that his writing have
scientific status: ‘s’il est vrai que j’ai voulu longtemps inscrire mon travail
dans le champ de la science, littéraire, lexicologique et sociologique, il
me faut bien reconnaître que je n’ai produit que des essais, genre ambigu
où l’écriture le dispute à l’analyse’ (L, 7, my emphasis). In the recording
of the lecture, Barthes uses the same adjective to describe both himself
and his genre of choice: ‘incertain’. Carlo Ossola in his article on the
drafts of Leçon shows that the other adjective Barthes considered to
describe the essay as genre was ‘tourmenté’.10 All three adjectives – ‘incer-
tain’, ‘ambigu’, ‘tourmenté’ – emphasise what Barthes chooses to see as
the problematic status of his preferred form. He is in agreement with
Adorno, who in the mid-1950s declares that ‘the essay is condemned as
a hybrid, […] the form has no compelling tradition, [and] its emphatic
demands are met only intermittently’.11 Adorno makes this declaration
in order the better to frame his defence of the essay’s heterodox virtues.
Barthes wishes to claim the essay’s tentativeness and hybridity as quali-
ties that inhere in his own person, and that he will promulgate in his
teaching. Capitalising upon the idea of the essay as genre, Barthes defines
himself as an essayist (an experimentalist) in order to lay the ground for
the rest of the lecture.12 Barthes is, as it were, the essay itself, with the
term ‘essai’ having an important polysemy here. In Adorno’s formula-
tion, ‘[t]he word Versuch, attempt or essay, in which thought’s utopian
vision of hitting the bullseye is united with the consciousness of its own
fallibility and provisional character, indicates […] something about the
form’. Anticipating what the Leçon wants us to think, Adorno writes
that this ‘something’ is
to be taken all the more seriously in that it takes place not systematically
but rather as a characteristic of an intention groping its way. The essay has
to cause the totality to be illuminated in a partial feature, whether the feature
be chosen or merely happened upon, without asserting the presence of the
totality.13
Barthes emphasises his affinity with the essay genre at the start of Leçon,
not only to describe his previous writing practice, but because, of the
formal alternatives available, the essay is the one that best corresponds
to the tentative, pluralistic nature of his thought and his pedagogy.
The opening of Leçon continues with Barthes saying that though his
research has been linked to the ‘développement de la sémiologie’, he has
little right to ‘représenter’ this discipline, ‘tant j’ai été enclin à en déplacer
la définition’. To this image of his own inconstancy he adds a statement
which implies that he has deliberately distanced himself from semiology
as it has gathered momentum and become increasingly popular: ‘[J’ai été]
plus proche de la revue Tel Quel que des nombreuses revues qui, dans le
monde, attestent la vigueur de la recherche sémiologique’ (L, 7–8). Not
merely a formulaic declaration of humility given the illustrious surround-
ings, this opening paragraph of the (published) lecture is a gambit aiming
to prove Barthes’s credentials as a thinker who always challenged or
‘displaced’ the axioms of the fields he has worked within. Thereby, the
impurity of his thought is demonstrated, as well as his refusal of univocal

meaning whether at the level of signs themselves, or at the level of the
self-definition of disciplines. Listeners are prepared firstly for a new
departure in Barthes’s thought, and secondly for an idiosyncratic
programme of research whose status will be ‘incertain’. He declares that
the disciplinary space that he is in the process, during the Leçon, of
shaping for himself at the Collège de France, will be subjective, multi-
faceted, prone to displacement, and fundamentally opposed to the thetic
and the univocal.
The lecture continues by showing that Barthes feels he has now
sufficiently demonstrated his distance from positivist knowledge: ‘C’est
donc, manifestement, un sujet impur qui est acceuilli dans une maison
où règnent la science, le savoir, la rigueur et l’invention disciplinée’ (L,
8). Barthes’s own distance from rigorous science is later mirrored in the
new semiology’s distance from a more axiomatic semiology. Barthes
explains this by declaring that ‘la sémiologie dont je parle […] est négative
[…] non en ce qu’elle nie le signe, mais en ce qu’elle nie qu’il soit possible
de lui attribuer des caractères positifs, fixes, anhistoriques, acorporels,
bref: scientifiques’ (L, 35–36). This ‘apophatique’ semiology has no
constancy. But its lack of integrity is, we are encouraged to believe, its
most honourable quality, for it is in its refusal of any a priori articles of
faith that it manages to track closely the mutations of the sign over the
time; thus it is an ‘active’ semiology, as Barthes points out. It is fluid, and
has an implied corporeality. Although what this corporeality might mean
in real terms is unclear, the implication is that this semiology is at work,
temporally, with the human subject. It evolves as meanings evolve
through usage. Furthermore, this semiology is with the subject in that it
refuses any false objectivity:
La sémiologie [maintenant] […] ne peut être elle-même un méta-langage.
C’est précisément en réfléchissant sur le signe qu’elle découvre que toute
relation d’extériorité d’un langage à un autre est, à la longue, insoutenable:
[…] je ne puis être à vie hors du langage, le traitant comme une cible, et dans
le langage, le traitant comme une arme. (L, 36)
Barthes here mentions the belief that ‘le sujet de la science est ce sujet-là
qui ne se donne pas à voir’ (L, 36). For the writing (or teaching) subject
to make himself an overt part of the study at hand, then, would be
counter-scientific – because, in Adorno’s words, ‘to the instinct of scien-
tific purism, every expressive impulse in the presentation jeopardises an
objectivity that supposedly leaps forth when the subject has been
removed’.14 Like Adorno, Barthes shows that the equation of an imper-
sonal discourse with authenticity of scholarly discourse may well be a
fallacy. He then goes further, by declaring that his recognition that the
use of metalanguage in semiology is no longer relevant for his practice
makes him in fact more advanced than those who would deny his semi-
ology ‘tout rapport avec la science’. He is always already ahead:
Il faut leur suggérer que c’est par un abus épistémologique, qui commence
précisément à s’effriter, que nous identifions le métalangage et la science,
comme si l’un était la condition obligée de l’autre, alors qu’il n’en est que le
signe historique, donc récusable; il est peut-être temps de distinguer le méta-
linguistique […] du scientifique, dont les critères sont ailleurs (peut-être que
[…] ce qui est proprement scientifique, c’est de détruire la science qui
précède). (L, 37)
Having apparently played down the capacities of his semiology by

describing it as negative and as being unqualified to stand as a pure meta-
language outside of any other language it chooses to critique, Barthes
then uses precisely these qualities to exalt his discipline. For if he has
defined this semiology as a negative space, then it follows that it can be
filled momentarily and successively by all the possible fields of knowl-
edge that it may find in the heterogeneous space of literature. His
semiology proposes to marry a semiological analysis of the emotions,
effects, and subjective energy of discourse with that infinite field of types
of discourse which is literature. There is an explicit aestheticisation of
the discipline. Here again we see the theme of impurity. Barthes describes
the new semiology as working on ‘l’impur de la langue, […] les désirs,
les craintes, les mines’, everything that constitutes ‘la langue active’. This
semiology gets its hands dirty, unlike linguistics, which Barthes describes
as ‘travaill[ant] sur un immense leurre, sur un objet qu’elle rendait
abusivement propre et pur, en s’essuyant les doigts à l’écheveau du
discours, comme Trimalcion aux cheveux de ses esclaves’ (L, 31).15
The conjunction of literature and semiology will involve the best of
both worlds, with ‘le retour incessant au texte […], la plongée régulière
dans la plus complexe des pratiques signifiantes, à savoir l’écriture’
preventing semiology from becoming dogmatic, while at the same time
‘le regard sémiotique’ will mean that the use he makes of literature will
not fall back into indulgent stereotypes such as ‘le mythe de la créativité
pure’ (L, 35). Thus each element of the partnership will correct the other’s
faults, as well as leading to a productive symbiosis, as a note from Le
Neutre shows: ‘chaire de sémiologie littéraire = 1) Littérature: codex de
nuances + 2) Sémiologie: écoute ou vision des nuances’ (N, 18 February,
37). The impure new semiology is uniquely qualified, then, to deploy its
activity in a multitude of spheres. Flitting here and there, it has a far
greater mobility than other disciplines, and can draw meanings from
these other schools of thought in order to enrich itself. This semiology

will use methods drawn from all of these fields to provide an illuminating
temporary distortion (anamorphosis) of the materials it chooses to alight
upon in its readings. Thus literary semiology can, in fact, constitute a
global but unoppressive theory, because it recognises the heteronomy of
meaning, having departed from linguistics to meet all the other discourses
which generate meaning.
So this semiology, like the signs it studies, has no fixed characteris-
tics, and therefore is not sufficiently pure or definable to be a discipline:
‘ce n’est pas une discipline’ (L, 37). This, of course, is only an apparent
abasement: Barthes states this in order to exalt his semiology to a position
of ubiquity: ‘J’aurais souhaité que la sémiologie ne prît ici la place
d’aucune autre recherche, mais au contraire les aidât toutes, qu’elle eût
pour siège une sorte de chaire mobile, joker du savoir d’aujourd’hui,
comme le signe lui-même l’est de tout discours’ (L, 38). One early
commentator on Leçon, Ian McLeod, feels that with this statement,
Barthes has ‘thrown semiology entirely away’.16 But, though Barthes
carefully expresses his hopes for literary semiology in non-hierarchical
terms, he has actually elevated semiology to the ur-discipline.
Of course, precisely because of Barthes’s inversion of terms, there is
no sense in Leçon of anything other than a retrenching into the personal:
‘Je sais ce qu’une telle définition a de personnel’ (L, 32), Barthes declares.
McLeod quotes this declaration, saying that the weakness of Barthes’s
conception of semiology ‘force[s]’ him ‘to resort to a claim for subjective
privilege’.17 McLeod seems to have been hoodwinked by Barthes’s rhet-
oric. For in fact the lines of ‘force’ are held by Barthes himself and
strengthened by the institution he is now part of, which encourages indi-
vidualistic research. Thus, as Barthes points out, a ‘personal’ definition
of his semiology is exactly what is required by the Collège: ‘Il me semble
[…] que l’institution d’une chaire au Collège de France entend moins
consacrer une discipline que permettre à un certain travail individuel, à
l’aventure d’un certain sujet, de se poursuivre’ (L, 32). Furthermore,
though the overall tenor of Leçon, as we have seen, highlights the impor-
tance of subjectivity, the message of the lecture is by no means exhausted
by the presence of that theme. For beneath the careful declarations of
personal predilection, all the subjacent claims are on behalf, not of
Barthes himself, but rather, of literature. ‘L’enseignement des lettres,’
says Barthes, ‘est déchiré jusqu’à la fatigue entre les pressions de la
demande technocratique et le désir révolutionnaire de ses étudiants’ (L,
10). At this ‘moment historique’, therefore, it is literature, and how his
new semiology can be attentive towards literature, that Barthes is
concerned with. Aesthetic response is pre-eminent. As Leyla Perrone-

Moïses has pointed out, the necessity of attending to literature is the
lecture’s main point, even though this tends to be obscured by attention
to the lecture’s argument about language. ‘The lecture aroused strong
objections,’ writes Perrone-Moïses, ‘mainly due to the assertion that
“language is fascist”’:
What was less observed was that this provocative assertion [was] intended
to prepare, in the discourse, the ascendancy and definition of a word that
he had himself depreciated in his previous phases. This word, placed at the
most jubilant moment of the Lesson, is literature.18
It is an idea of literature (which is not quite the same as literature

itself) that impels the methodology set out in Leçon and carried out in
Comment vivre ensemble and Le Neutre. For if Leçon has demonstrated
that Barthes’s new semiology, though not scientific in the strict sense, is
more ‘scientifique’ than science itself in being protean and shifting, what
the lecture also needs to do is to demonstrate in what way literature will
guide the deployment of this semiology. It is the ‘mathetic’ nature of liter-
ature which will provide such guidance. ‘Mathésis’ is the first of three
‘forces’ that Barthes ascribes to literature, the other two being ‘Mimésis’
and ‘Sémiosis’ (L, 17). His only explanation of the term is to declare that
‘la littérature prend en charge beaucoup de savoirs’ (L, 17). Mathesis, the
desire for knowledge, will always be fulfilled by literature.
Leçon and the Encyclopedic Teaching

of Comment vivre ensemble and Le Neutre
The philosopher Frederick Van de Pitte, discussing Descartes’s use of the

term, explains that mathesis, used in conjunction with the complement
universalis, is often understood to refer to a universal method for math-
ematics. This is erroneous, argues Van de Pitte. Rather, ‘Descartes use[s]
the term mathesis in its Greek […] sense’ as referring to the possibility of
knowledge in or of any field (not just mathematics).19 Thus, if mathesis
is ‘a science of necessary relations’, mathesis universalis is ‘the transfor-
mation of such systems of necessary relations into genuine scientia by
providing the underlying conditions for the very possibility of knowl-
edge: that general science which is the ground and source of all the
particular sciences’.20 Van de Pitte’s understanding of the term accords
with Barthes’s. Furthermore, it chimes to a large extent with Barthes’s
conception of literature, and of literary semiology – the latter term being,
as Michael Sheringham points out, ‘virtually a tautology’:21 both litera-
ture and literary semiology are the ‘joker du savoir’ (L, 38), providing a
universal ground for knowledge. Barthes characterises literature in Leçon
as that which makes all of knowledge possible in one discipline – for he
states that ‘[s]i […] toutes nos disciplines devaient être expulsées de
l’enseignement sauf une, c’est la discipline littéraire qui devrait être
sauvée, car toutes les sciences sont présentes dans le monument littéraire’
(L 18). Barthes has not yet begun to hint at the elaboration of what in
La Chambre claire is called a ‘Mathesis singularis’; the first intimations
of this will be found in ‘Longtemps, je me suis couché de bonne heure…’
For the purposes of Leçon and the two lecture courses which precede the
‘Longtemps’ lecture (Comment vivre ensemble and Le Neutre), it is the
more generalised idea of ‘mathésis’ which is important. The description
of literature under the rubric of the ‘force’ of mathesis is, along with the
theme of the ‘fantasme’, what forms the methodology of those lecture
series.
Continuing his characterisation of literature as ‘mathetic’, Barthes
employs the etymology of the first half of the word ‘encyclopedia’ to
explain his veneration for literature and to hint at the method he will
employ in his lectures. He points out that literature is ‘véritablement
encyclopédique’ because it ‘fait tourner les savoirs[.] Elle n’en fixe, elle
n’en fétichise aucun; elle leur donne une place indirecte, et cet indirect
est précieux’ (L, 18). The reference to the ‘turning’ of knowledge within
literature calls to mind the first half of the Greek term ‘enkyklios paideia’,
which gives us the word ‘encyclopédie’. ‘Enkyklios’ means circular or
cyclical – i.e. recurring, but also everyday.22 Barthes’s image, then, of liter-
ature ‘turning’, in an egalitarian fashion, the wheel of ‘les savoirs’,
corresponds – as Barthes the classicist was undoubtedly aware – to the
classical understanding of ‘enkyklios paideia’ as an unspecialised,
general, everyday education. As Maarten de Pourcq tells us, the term ‘is
used [in classical Greek] to signify a kind of general education, before
one goes to the [more specialised] schools of rhetorics or philosophy’.23
The fact that literature was ‘put forward as an encyclopedic source of
knowledge’, says De Pourcq, led to its being denigrated by some classical
philosophers as having ‘polymathia’ without the necessary ‘control or
mastery’ over this ‘multi-knowledge’.24 Barthes makes a similar point
about literature holding all knowledge only very loosely in its palm, when
he describes it as giving ‘les savoirs’ ‘une place indirecte’. Far from
agreeing with those who would reproach literature’s lack of systematic
knowledge, though, this is of course what Barthes sees as the most
‘précieux’ and important aspect of literature. As De Pourcq says:
It is exactly this encyclopedic and non-controlling aspect which brings

Barthes to literature[;] […] it is precisely as a remedy for th[e] fragmenta-
tion of the sciences and their distancing from life that Barthes wants to posit
his […] literary semiology.25
For it is literature’s indirect presentation of ‘les savoirs’ that allows it to

work ‘dans les interstices de la science’ (L, 18) and to resist ‘la pureté’ of
‘[les] discours typés qui l’entourent: les philosophies, les sciences, les
psychologies’ (L, 25–26). A teaching method that is guided by the
literary, then, would be one that would overcome the limitations of the
‘typé’ or scientific approach to knowledge, and allow the indirect pres-
entation of ‘les savoirs’, in a manner which will be general,
non-specialised. Literature is thus the model for Barthes’s practice. For
Barthes’s understanding of literature is that it traverses many forms of
knowledge. If Barthes can mirror this active power of literature in his
own pedagogy, then, he can ‘reveal and thus neutralis[e] the Cyclopean
arrogance of singular disciplines, and, more widely, the power of
language itself’.26 A place for singular expression would thereby be
created. Thus perhaps the question of how Barthes’s ‘discours’ is to
become more ‘humain’ is answered.
The encyclopedic nature of literature cannot be fully replicated in
Barthes’s cours. This is firstly because Barthes cannot – and does not wish
to – present himself as having sufficient authority to expound all the
multi-faceted aspects of knowledge he finds within literature. Secondly,
according to Barthes, our current society, saturated by information over-
load and fragmented into hermetically sealed idiolects, can no longer
produce a holistic work: an encyclopedia of our world is no longer
possible. He points this out at the end of Comment vivre ensemble, saying
that we cannot, as Diderot and his team did, ‘maîtrise[r]’ all knowledge,
because ‘aujourd’hui: plus d’exhaustivité possible du savoir, entièrement
pluralisé, diffracté en langages incommunicants. L’acte encyclopédique
n’est plus possible’ (CVE, 4 May, 182). However, through ‘indirect’
methods, the encyclopedic nature of knowledge (which Barthes favours
over ‘typé’ or specialised knowledge) can be hinted at. Literature
inaugurates this method. As Barthes wrote in 1967, ‘il n’est certainement
pas une seule matière scientifique qui n’ait été à un certain moment traitée
par la littérature universelle: le monde de l’œuvre est un monde total, où
tout le savoir […] prend place’. Literature thereby gives us ‘cette grande
unité cosmogonique dont jouissaient les anciens Grecs, mais que l’état
parcellaire de nos sciences nous refuse aujourd’hui’.27 So, accepting the
‘parcellaire’ nature of knowledge in our time, but desiring nonetheless
somehow to reflect the ‘cosmogonique’ potency of literature in his
teaching, the imperative for Barthes is that ‘soit en écrivant, soit en

enseignant’, he employs the ‘opération[s] fondamentale[s]’ of ‘la frag-
mentation’ et ‘la digression’ (L, 42). Literature inspires a productive
dialectic between totality and fragmentation. In this manner, Barthes
explains in his retrospective account of his method in Comment vivre
ensemble, one can perform the ‘acte encyclopédique par excellence’ of
opening a folder of knowledge: ‘À tout instant j’ai dit (presque à chaque
figure): “Nous ouvrons seulement un dossier”’. In this manner, ‘[un]
geste encyclopédique’ is made, which for Barthes has ‘sa valeur de fiction,
sa jouissance: son scandale’ (CVE, 4 May, 182). Mathesis can still be
sketched out, but not filled in – permanent filling in being neither possible
nor desirable any more. In Comment vivre ensemble and Le Neutre, with
their plethora of ‘figures’ drawing on ethnological, theological, literary,
anthropological and other discourses, one does indeed have the impres-
sion of a series of ‘gestes encyclopédiques’.
The second half of the term ‘encyclopédique’ is, of course, ‘paideia’,
from the word for ‘child’. Barthes does not overtly mention the idea of
‘paideia’ in Leçon – we have to wait until the first lecture of Comment
vivre ensemble, five days later, for the use of this term. There is, however,
an important set of references to the child and to fantasy towards the end
of Leçon, which provides an extra gloss to the ‘paideia’ set out in the
opening Vivre ensemble lecture. In that lecture of 12 January 1977 –
which sets out the methodology of Comment vivre ensemble that will
also be carried out in Le Neutre – ‘paideia’ is explained as belonging to
the Nietzschean distinction between ‘méthode’ and ‘culture’, as set out
in Deleuze’s Nietzsche et la philosophie.28 Deleuze describes Nietzsche’s
conception of ‘method’ as an aprioristic philosophy: ‘La méthode
suppose toujours une bonne volonté du penseur, “une décision
préméditée”’. Culture, on the other hand, is ‘essentiellement dressage et
sélection’:
Un dressage qui met en jeu tout l’inconscient du penseur. Les Grecs ne
parlaient pas de méthode, mais de paideia; ils savaient que la pensée ne pense
pas à partir d’une bonne volonté, mais en vertu de forces qui s’exercent sur
elle pour la contraindre à penser.29
Barthes points out that the difference between ‘méthode’ and ‘culture’ is
essentially a difference concerning the idea of one’s journey through
knowledge: if one uses ‘méthode’, there is a ‘chemin droit’, a ‘démarche
vers un but, protocole d’opérations pour obtenir un résultat’. ‘Méthode’,
therefore, is concerned with ‘généralité’, ‘moralité’ (CVE, 33) – or in
Nietzsche’s words, ‘cette contrainte à former des concepts, des espèces,
des formes, des fins, des lois…ce monde des cas identiques’ (L, 34). This,
for Barthes, is problematic, because it engenders a false objectivity, and

because it skips over everything which does not lead to a pre-defined goal.
‘Méthode’ leaves out vital areas of the subject (‘subject’ in both senses
here of the topos and the individual): ‘Le sujet, <quand il suit la
méthode>, abdique ce qu’il ne connaît pas de lui-même, son irréductible,
sa force’ (CVE, 33). Implicit here is the Nietzschean idea of ‘truth’ as a
repressive levelling of something which, in reality, is a-systematic, recal-
citrant, contingent. The ‘truth’ in language, in Nietzsche’s view, compels
us to identity-thinking. This suspicion is also a powerful idea in Leçon.
‘Méthode’ assumes a knowledge in advance of where the investigation is
to lead, and a (false) mastery over oneself and one’s topic. Little wonder,
then, that Barthes uses the Nietzschean paradigm here in order to reject
this term. Barthes wishes to disqualify all claims to mastery. This disqual-
ification can be accomplished, as Leçon has already told us, by means of
fragmentation. In order to ally himself to the term ‘culture’ (as set out in
the Nietzschean opposition), Barthes must allow his thought – and his
exposition of his subject – to fragment into multiple directions and roles.
Towards the end of Leçon, Barthes mentions the gift-giving games of a
child. He wishes to model his teaching upon the erratic, repetitive jour-
neys of a child that offers a series of mundane gifts to its mother. Note
the references to circular (kyklios) movements in this description of the
child (paidos):
J’aimerais donc que la parole et l’écoute qui se tresseront ici soient
semblables aux allées et venues d’un enfant qui joue autour de sa mère, qui
s’en éloigne, puis retourne vers elle pour lui rapporter un caillou, un brin de
laine, dessinant de la sorte autour d’un centre paisible toute une aire de jeu,
à l’intérieur de laquelle le caillou, la laine important finalement moins que
le don plein de zèle qui en est fait. (L, 42–43)
Just as the mother receives the heterogeneous and often banal gifts
proferred by the child, the ‘auditeurs’ at the Collège will be presented
with a set of encyclopedic ‘gestes’ in which bits and pieces of knowledge
will be touched upon. This is what it means to ‘se placer dans la paideia’.
Barthes’s explanation in his first ‘proper’ lecture of what this means, in
terms of methodology, recalls the terms used at the end of the inaugural
lecture: ‘Culture, comme “dressage” (≠ méthode), renvoie pour moi à
l’image d’une sorte de dispatching au trace excentrique: tituber entre des
bribes, des bornes de savoirs, de saveurs. […] Culture, ainsi comprise
comme reconnaissance de forces, est antipathique à l’idée de pouvoir’
(CVE, 12 January, 34). Barthes’s taking of a Nietzschean paideia as his
methodological model means that the lectures are to be ‘imprévisible’,
without a teleology. The thinker’s mastery is deliberately undone by his
willingness to proceed unmethodically, flitting – as the ‘chaire mobile’

(L, 38) of literary semiology does – from one area of interest to another,
staggering between snippets of information in the manner of a small
child. The deliberately aleatory construction of the first two lecture
courses is of course a cognate tactic. The lectures, therefore, are as erratic
as a child might be – and as ‘incertain’ as the essay as genre is. ‘The essay,’
Adorno tells us, ‘does not develop its ideas in accordance with discursive
logic. It neither makes deductions from a principle nor draws conclusions
from coherent individual observations. It coordinates elements instead
of subordinating them’.30 The many directions of thought are retained as
an ideal, rather than being organised into one single direction by a
terminus a quo. Thus the polymathic nature of the endeavour is made
present as a selection of ‘moments’ which are ‘interwoven as in a carpet’
– or ‘tissés’ as in a text. ‘The thinker,’ says Adorno, ‘does not actually
think[,] but rather makes himself into an arena for intellectual experi-
ence, without unravelling it’.31
To undo ‘maîtrise’ is to undo authority. With the renunciation of
authority comes the willingness to cede authority to others. Given that
Barthes states at the end of Leçon that his Collège de France teaching
will be placed under the aegis of ‘désapprendre’ and ‘oubli’ (L, 46), it is
no coincidence that, as Claude Coste points out in his preface to
Comment vivre ensemble, ‘Barthes accumule les savoirs, multiplie les
références souvent érudites, les emprunts au grec ancien, mais ses
connaissances, le plus souvent de seconde main, ne valent jamais pour
elles-mêmes’ (CVE, 25). A large proportion of the material he uses for
Comment vivre ensemble and Le Neutre is secondary, and reference
works such as the Encyclopaedia Universalis and the Dictionnaire des
sciences sociales crop up frequently in the margins. The ‘encyclopedic
gesture’ is thus made in a very literal sense. This is a tactic not so much
of innovation but of recycling. Barthes is aware of the banality that this
may lead to, and states this as his aim: at the end of Comment vivre
ensemble, he declares that within the lectures’ ‘symphonie de proposi-
tions’, ‘le rêve’ would be ‘une sorte de banalité non oppressante’ (CVE,
181). There is no oppression – though of course there may be frustration
on the part of those expecting a more sequentially erudite discourse –
because there is no demonstration of authority. The responsibility (or
authority) is delegated away from Barthes himself and given to the mate-
rial; this is precisely the point of paideia as force. As De Pourcq puts it,
paideia ‘selects, disturbs, distorts and forgets’.32 All of those processes are
to be viewed as positive. In Comment vivre ensemble and Le Neutre, the
encyclopedic, aleatory staggering (‘tituber’) between discourses, opinions,
and facts constitutes an ‘aire de jeu’ in which, just like the pebble and the
stone which the child offers its mother, the ‘propositions’ are ultimately
less important than ‘le don plein de zèle qui en est fait’ (L, 43).
Another important aspect of the renunciation of authority fore-
grounded at the end of Leçon is the idea of the fantasy. This is
thematically linked to the childish-ness of paideia through the mention
of the child, or rather the son: when he outlines the importance of the
‘fantasme’, Barthes says that to use the fantasy as the basis for teaching
is to elude capture, as a child does:
C’est à un fantasme, dit ou non dit, que le professeur doit annuellement
revenir […]; de la sorte il dévie de la place où on l’attend, qui est la place du
Père, toujours mort, comme on le sait; car seul le fils a des fantasmes, seul
le fils est vivant. (L, 44)
Interestingly, with the ‘fantasme’ we are returned to Barthes’s tricksy

tactics of asserting the ‘scientifique’ nature of a methodological proce-
dure that appears to be anything but scientific. Barthes sets up his defence
of the fantasy as being ‘scientifique’ by asking the rhetorical question
‘comment oser parler, dans le cadre d’une institution, si libre soit-elle,
d’un enseignement fantasmatique?’ (L, 43). Barthes is clearly pleased to
be able neatly to answer this question by referring to one of his illustrious
predecessors at the Collège de France, Jules Michelet:
Si l’on considère un instant la plus sûre des sciences humaines, à savoir
l’Histoire, comment ne pas reconnaître qu’elle a un rapport continu avec le
fantasme? C’est ce que Michelet avait compris: l’Histoire, c’est en fin de
compte l’histoire du lieu fantasmatique par excellence, à savoir le corps
humain; c’est en partant de ce fantasme […] que Michelet a pu faire de
l’Histoire une immense anthropologie. (L, 43–44)
This proves it, Barthes concludes: ‘La science peut donc naître du
fantasme’. If science springs from fantasy, then, quod erat
demonstrandum, ‘c’est à un fantasme, dit ou non dit, que le professeur
doit annuellement revenir’ (L, 44) in order to guarantee his discourse.
The justification of the use of fantasy here is interesting in that it runs
counter to the values that one might expect such a justification to mobilise
– values such as the ‘mythe de la créativité pure’ mentioned earlier in
Leçon, for example. Rather, fantasy is unexpectedly defended on the
basis of its scientificity. This is in line with Leçon’s concerted effort to
establish Barthes’s new semiology as being ‘scientifique’ at another turn
of the screw, because of its recognition of the subjective investment that
occurs in the investigation of any apparently objective phenomenon. In
his use of fantasy, then, Barthes makes the same point as Adorno when
the latter points out that
in order to be disclosed, […] the objective wealth of meanings encapsulated

in every intellectual phenomenon demands of the recipient the same spon-
taneity of subjective fantasy that is castigated in the name of objective
discipline. Nothing can be interpreted out of something that is not inter-
preted into it at the same time.33
Barthes, though, is even more trenchant than Adorno in arguing that the
subjective is objective, and in invoking illustrious names in order to make
this point – which is not fully argued, but merely presented as given. In
the first Vivre ensemble lecture, explaining the use of the ‘fantasme’ as
principle, Barthes once again points out that the fantasy is scientific, this
time using Bachelard:
Science et fantasme: Bachelard: intrication de la science et de l’imaginaire.
[…] La science se constituerait par décantation des fantasmes. Sans discuter
ceci (on pourrait dire qu’il n’y a pas de décantation, mais surimpression du
fantasme et de la science), admettons que nous nous plaçons avant cette
décantation.
Barthes concludes this point by saying that we can – or should – view ‘le
fantasme comme origine de la culture (comme engendrement de forces,
de différences)’ (CVE, 34).
Though he is never mentioned, it must be the historical philosophy
of Giambattista Vico that Barthes has in mind here – more so in Leçon
than in this first lecture of the Vivre ensemble, because Leçon refers to
Michelet. Michelet was heavily influenced by Vico and almost single-
handedly introduced Vico to French readers with his translations from
the Scienza Nuova and selections of Vico’s other work.34 Familiar with
Michelet, Barthes would also have been familiar with Vico’s principle of
the fantasia. For Vico, human thinking begins initially with the power of
imagination (‘fantasia’ in Italian). It is the use of this fantasia that leads
to the founding of society itself. Early in the Scienza Nuova, Vico explains
this as follows:
We find that the principle of [the] origins both of languages and of letters
lies in the fact that the first gentile peoples, by a demonstrated necessity of
nature, were poets who spoke in poetic characters. This discovery […] is the
master key of this Science. […] The poetic characters of which we speak
were certain imaginative genera (images for the most part of animate
substances, of gods or heroes, formed by their imagination) to which they
reduced all the species or all the particulars appertaining to each genus;
exactly as the fables of human times […] are intelligible genera reasoned out
by moral philosophy. […] Since these genera […] were formed by most
vigorous imaginations [fantasia] […], we discover in them true poetic
sentences…35
For Vico, fantasia is the force by which man originally moulded the world
itself to his understanding, and is therefore the primal form of knowl-
edge. Donald Verene shows how fantasia is key at every stage of Vico’s
account of the development of civilisation. He writes that for Vico, ‘all
nations begin in the same way by the power of the imagination (fantasia)
to make the world intelligible in terms of gods’. This age then ‘gives way
to a second age, in which fantasia is used to form social institutions and
types of character or virtues in terms of heroes’. Verene shows that, in
the last stage, Vico believes that false objectivity triumphs – wrongly –
over the more subjective and productive force of fantasia:
Finally, these two ages, in which the world is ordered through the power of
fantasia, decline into an age of rationality, in which the world is ordered in
purely conceptual and logical terms and in which mental acting is finally
dominated by what Vico calls a barbarism of reflection (barbarie della rifles-
sione).36
This dovetails neatly with what Barthes implies both in Leçon and in
‘Longtemps, je me suis couché de bonne heure…’ when he valorises the
use of subjectivity and of fantasy in his teaching as being more ‘scien-
tifique’ than the positivist ‘science des signes’ from which he distances
himself. At the heart of all four lecture courses is a fantasy: in Comment
vivre ensemble, it is the fantasy of idiorrythmie; in Le Neutre, the fantasy
of a neutral or non-arrogant mode of being; and in La Préparation du
roman I and II, the fantasy of ‘le Roman pas comme les autres’ (PR, 38).
The use of fantasia, coming back on on a Vichean spiral, is – in accor-
dance with Barthes’s defence of the ‘fantasme’ in Leçon and the first
lecture of the Vivre ensemble – only apparently anachronistic and only
apparently self-indulgent: in fact, this tactic returns to the first principle
of the scienza nuova.
A ‘poetic’ fantasy, which in Vico’s sense is rather more poietic than
generically poetic, thus intermingles art and science. It is as such impure,
and may even be childlike (‘seul le fils a des fantasmes’). We have seen
that Barthes characterises himself and his thought in Leçon as impure
and childlike. He uses the figure of the artist in the same way. The theme
of the artist forms the strongest link between Leçon and the lecture
‘Longtemps, je me suis couché de bonne heure…’, which sets out the
preoccupations of Barthes’s final two years of teaching at the Collège de
France.
The Literary Semiologist as ‘artiste’
The term ‘artiste’ is drawn from Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals. After

the death of God, Nietzsche needs to come up with emblems of a new,
anti-paternalistic way of thinking. The alternatives to religious authori-

tarianism are precisely those figures invoked by Barthes in Leçon – the
artist and the child. These figures are valuable because they have the
capability of imagining a non-hierarchised mode of being. The artist and
the child, in their curiosity, do not respect the order of things. They are
happy to ‘émietter l’univers, perdre le respect du Tout’37 – that is, to
affirm the death of God in their independent thinking. If Barthes takes
the child and the artist as models for his thought, he thereby inaugurates
a deliberately wayward methodology of fragmentation, chance,
curiosity. We have already seen how the idea of the child feeds into
Barthes’s use of paideia as a strategy in his teaching. In ‘Longtemps, je
me suis couché de bonne heure…’, we will see how Barthes explains his
fantasy of a ‘Roman’ which would manage to express ‘pathos’: the
Nietzsche quotation concerning ‘émiettement’ is of vital importance for
Barthes in this context.38
‘Longtemps’ is the manifesto for the final two years of Barthes’s
Collège de France teaching, which are radically different in methodology
and in content to the first two years of lectures. In Leçon, Barthes defines
his new non-discipline, literary semiology. By the time he delivers the
‘Longtemps’ lecture in October 1978, it seems that semiology has fallen
by the wayside, as Barthes is now describing only his fantasy of a novel.
However, there is a continuity of theme between Leçon and ‘Longtemps’;
this continuity is provided by the figure of the Nietzschean artist and the
thematic importance of hybridity, invoked initially by reference to the
essay genre. In ‘Longtemps’, Barthes decides that the form he is searching
for is a ‘tierce’ (or hybrid) form that combines the best attributes of the
essay and the novel; this work would be, ‘selon la typologie niet-
zschéenne, […] du côté de l’Art, non de la Prêtrise’ (‘Longtemps’, 470).
This ‘typologie’ has already been mentioned in Leçon, when Barthes uses
it to describe the new semiologist. The semiologist’s role changes because
of the nature of the new semiology, which, as we have seen, is constantly
mutating as the signs it studies shift their connotations. If the semiolo-
gist thus treats the sign as ‘un spectacle imaginaire’ – and if he has
renounced the practice of metalanguage – his task is of a new and
different order: ‘Le sémiologue serait en somme un artiste’. Barthes
quickly points out that this is not a value-judgment: ‘(ce mot n’est ici ni
glorieux ni dédaigneux: il se réfère seulement à une typologie)’ (L, 39).39
This is disingenuous, as elsewhere he turns the Nietzschean ‘typologie’
to which he is referring (which he does not explain here) into a paradigm
in which the ‘artiste’ represents the positive pole, and the ‘prêtre’ the
negative.40
Barthes understands Nietzsche’s ‘artiste’ as representing a creative

and active force, in opposition to the ‘prêtre’, who is a reactive repre-
sentative of oppressive morality. In the final lecture of La Préparation du
roman I, Barthes says that for Nietzsche, the ‘Artiste’ is ‘un type absolu
que l’on ne peut réduire’, whereas the ‘Prêtre’ is associated with
‘Politique, Ressentiment’ (PR, 23 February 1980, 383). The ‘prêtre’ is
linked to asceticism, purity, and, of course, Christianity. Barthes makes
it clear that he associates the ‘prêtre’ not only with religious authoritar-
ianism, but with any orthodoxy which promulgates a reductive or
repressive understanding of the world. So a priestly world is the world
Nietzsche diagnosed – a world of unquestioned norms: ‘nous sommes,’
Barthes declares at the end of the Préparation lecture of 8 December
1979, ‘dans l’Ère générale du Ressentiment: des Prêtres, Papes,
Ayatollahs, Moralistes du Politique’ (PR, 218). By contrast, the ‘artiste’,
free of ‘ressentiment’, has the ability (like the child) to interpret the world
in accordance only with his own imagination and desire, without any
hidebound set of moral prescriptions. The ‘artiste’, thus conceived, is
therefore the ideal emblem of Barthes’s new semiologist in Leçon. For
this semiologist will deploy no set of rules but that dictated to him by his
own fantasme. There is no deduction and no extrapolation; the semi-
ology wanders where it will:
La sémiologie de celui qui parle ici n’est pas une herméneutique: elle peint,
plutôt qu’elle ne fouille. […] Ses objets de prédilection, ce sont les textes de
l’Imaginaire. […] J’appellerais volontiers ‘sémiologie’ le cours des opérations
le long duquel il est possible – voire escompté – de jouer du signe comme
d’un voile peint, ou encore: d’une fiction. (L, 39–40)
There are several terms here that appear at first glance to imply a
light-hearted or casual approach to the study of signs: ‘pein[dre]’,
‘prédilection’, ‘jouer’, ‘fiction’. Like the term ‘fantasme’, however, these
terms are only apparently self-indulgent. Beneath this veneer lies an
imperative (‘escompté’): viewing the sign as a fiction is necessary in order
for this semiology to evade and erode the discourse of power. This is in
accordance with Barthes’s career-long demystificatory effort. It is only if
one can recognise that the meanings with which signs are invested are to
a certain extent arbitrary – or rather, historical as opposed to natural –
that one will be able to reserve independence of judgment and exist free
of ressentiment. For to elude the ‘discours de pouvoir’ (by treating the
sign as a fiction) is to elude ‘tout discours qui engendre la faute, et partant
la culpabilité, de celui qui le reçoit’ (L, 11).41
Barthes has demonstrated, ever since Mythologies, that the ability to
read the layers of ideological connotation that lie on top of the sign is the
critic’s most important role. He reiterates this in Comment vivre

ensemble, saying that for a ‘pensée critique’, ‘toute coutume est une forme
déguisée de loi’. He quotes some lines from Brecht which he had consid-
ered using as the epigraph for Mythologies: ‘Sous la règle découvrez
l’abus’ (CVE, 20 April, 165).42 Twenty years after Mythologies, the same
‘pensée critique’ remains – but in different terms: the ‘critique’ is now an
‘artiste’, who deploys a critical creativity in viewing the sign as a ‘fiction’.
This is made clear in Barthes’s tribute to the film director
Michelangelo Antonioni, written in January 1980. The text begins as
follows: ‘Dans sa typologie, Nietzsche distingue deux figures: le prêtre et
l’artiste’. Barthes will examine Antonioni under the rubric of the ‘artiste’.
He lists the ‘forces’ or ‘vertus’ of the artist: ‘la vigilance, la sagesse et […]
la fragilité’.43 ‘Sagesse’ is also used at the end of Leçon when Barthes
describes how he will use ‘sapientia’ as a principle in his teaching (L, 46).
Barthes describes in ‘Cher Antonioni’ what this ‘sagesse’ means. We
discover here the imperative that, in the quotation from Leçon above, is
cloaked in the words ‘jouer’ and ‘fiction’:
J’appelle sagesse de l’artiste, non une vertu antique, encore moins un
discours médiocre, mais au contraire ce savoir moral, cette acuité de
discernement qui lui permet de ne jamais confondre le sens et la vérité. Que
de crimes l’humanité n’a-t-elle pas commis au nom de la Vérité! […]
L’artiste, lui, sait que le sens d’une chose n’est pas sa vérité; ce savoir est une
sagesse, une folle sagesse, pourrait-on dire, puisqu’elle le retire de la
communauté, du troupeau des fanatiques et des arrogants.44
The ‘artist’ practises the ‘moral’ task of differentiating between meaning

and would-be truth. There is a slippage of terminology – from mytholo-
gist to critic to semiologist to writer to artist – but no fundamental change
in Barthes’s conception of the task at hand. Only the status of the
discourse changes. For whereas the mythologist is ‘condamné au méta-
langage’ (My, 232), the discourse of the ‘artist’ is primary. As we have
seen, Leçon announces Barthes’s renunciation of metalanguage, in accor-
dance with his growing conviction that it is necessary to use subjectivity
as the founding principle of criticism. This criticism, changing the ‘degree’
of its language, would thus become an ‘art’, as we have seen that the
semiologist becomes ‘en somme un artiste’.
The term ‘artiste’ mainly serves to underline Barthes’s distancing of
himself from ‘scientific’ studies of the sign. But the term is also employed
to denote a rarity: there are few artists, and their combat against the ‘trou-
peau des fanatiques et des arrogants’ is heroic, because the numbers are
so unmatched. Barthes writes at the opening of ‘Cher Antonioni’ that
‘we’ are surrounded by ‘prêtres’: ‘Des prêtres, nous en avons aujourd’hui
à revendre: de toutes religions, et même hors religion; mais des artistes?’45

The essay ends on the same note: having explained the implications of
the artist’s third ‘force’ – that of ‘fragilité’ – Barthes concludes that one’s
situation, ‘dès lors qu’on n’est plus prêtre’, is ultimately a situation of
solitude: ‘être artiste aujourd’hui, c’est là une situation qui n’est plus
soutenue par la belle conscience d’une grande fonction sacrée ou sociale;
ce n’est plus prendre place sereinement dans le Panthéon bourgeois des
Phares de l’Humanité’.46 This passage is strikingly similar to the passage
in Leçon in which Barthes elegiacally – but artfully – describes literature
after ‘mai 68’ as a deserted landscape: ‘la littérature est désacralisée, les
institutions sont impuissantes à la protéger et à l’imposer comme le
modèle implicite de l’humain. Ce n’est pas […] que la littérature soit
détruite: c’est qu’elle n’est plus gardée’ (L, 40–41). This is not merely a
regretful postmodern assessment. It is a stratagem which allows Barthes
to set out a neat position for the new semiology which he has, up to this
point in the lecture, been defining. The next sentence of the lecture makes
this strategy clear: ‘La sémiologie littéraire serait ce voyage qui permet
de débarquer dans un paysage libre par déshérence: ni anges ni dragons
ne sont plus là pour le défendre’ (L, 41, my emphasis). The post-’68
climate, in which ‘la maîtrise littéraire’ (L, 40) has ‘dispar[u]’, provides
a conveniently untenanted location in which Barthes can practise his un-
masterly pedagogical discourse and his predilection for literature: ‘[mon]
regard peut alors se porter, non sans perversité, sur des choses anciennes
et belles, dont le signifié est abstrait, périmé’. This smacks of defiance.
By this stage of his career Barthes is willing to scandalise his former
admirers by abjuring his previous, transgressive theoretical positions,
and allying himself to what could be perceived as a reactionary emphasis
on literature. The institutional ethos of the Collège de France licenses
this, by allowing Barthes to pursue an ‘enseignement que […] rien n’est
appelé à sanctionner, sinon la fidélité de ses auditeurs’ (L, 41).
By sleight-of-hand, then, Barthes has by the end of Leçon constructed
a rhetorical stage upon which his ‘artistic’ claims to subjective privilege
are demonstrated to be, in fact, moral imperatives in a society dominated
by (plural) ‘discours de pouvoir’. ‘Cher Antonioni’ shows how Barthes
views the situation of the ‘artist’ he claims in Leçon, however subtly, to
be. Whereas the first two years of Barthes’s teaching at the Collège de
France employ an aleatory and encyclopedic approach to material from
many disciplines (works of fiction, religious treatises, ethnological works,
dictionaries, letters, etc.) in order to illuminate the ‘fantasmes’ of the
‘vivre ensemble’ and the ‘neutre’, it is in the final two years of teaching
that the idea of a primary discourse (a writing that is ‘du côté de l’Art’
(‘Longtemps’, 470)) moves to the forefront of Barthes’s preoccupations.

The programme for La Préparation du roman I and II is set out in the
‘Longtemps’ lecture. Here Barthes describes his desire for a ‘tierce forme’
(461) founded on his own subjectivity, which will, beyond generic
distinctions, become a sort of ‘Scienza Nuova’ (470) – a further step
towards the ‘mathesis singularis’ he outlines in La Chambre claire.
‘Longtemps, je me suis couché de bonne heure…’:

From the ‘incertain’ to a scienza nuova of the ‘intime’
The lecture entitled ‘Longtemps, je me suis couché de bonne heure…’ was

delivered at the Collège de France on 19 October 1978, and given again
in November at New York University, this time under the title ‘Proust et
moi’. The lecture is quite obviously placed under the sign of Barthes’s
affinity with Proust. I shall discuss the lecture further in Chapter 5 in the
context of my examination of Barthes’s fantasy of the ‘Roman’. Barthes
identifies with Proust, because, like him, after his mother’s death he feels
an urgent desire to practise a new form of writing: ‘je m’identifie à lui’,
he writes: ‘confusion de pratique, non de valeur’ (459). The choice to be
made is the choice between ‘l’Essai (la Critique)’ and ‘[le] Roman’ (460).
Barthes is intrigued by the manner in which Proust managed, in 1909,
finally to start the Recherche, having resolved the hesitations that had
dogged his work since the death of his mother four years previously.47 It
is the prolongation (from Leçon) of the theme of the ‘incertain’ that is of
interest in ‘Longtemps’, along with the manner in which Barthes uses
Proust as a keystone in his argument that subjectivity, fantasy and simu-
lation must form the basis of a new science (a new mathesis).
At the start of the lecture, Barthes carefully points out that his ‘iden-
tification’ with Proust does not represent his own self-elevation to the
same level as ‘l’auteur prestigieux d’une œuvre monumentale’. Rather,
his identification is with ‘l’ouvrier […] modeste, qui a voulu entreprendre
une tâche à laquelle […] il a conféré un caractère absolu’ (459). Barthes
openly identifies aspects of his personal life with aspects of Proust’s: a
major intermediary here is George Painter’s biography of Proust, a clear
source of fascination for Barthes.48 There is a willed provocativeness
about Barthes’s identification with Proust, despite the disclaimer that this
is not a preening comparison of himself to the great novelist. The
provocativeness inheres in identifying, as Barthes claims, with ‘Marcel’
rather than with ‘Proust’: ‘marcellisme’ is a wilful abandonment to a
personal investment in literature and a quasi-biographical interest in the
compositional dilemmas of the writer. This is part of the exercise in

detheorisation that Barthes undertakes throughout much of the Collège
de France teaching. Indeed, though Proust is, throughout Barthes’s
career, a writer of talismanic importance,49 it is only once Barthes begins
sloughing off the theoretical moulds he had done so much to form in the
1960s that Proust assumes more of an explicit presence in Barthes’s
writing.50 As Kathrin Yacavone has pointed out, ‘it was only after Barthes
turned to a specific “writerly” practice of reading, namely one rooted in
the pleasure-seeking subject as discussed in, and exemplified by, Le
Plaisir du texte (1973), that Barthes’s identification with Proust finds a
theoretical justification in his work’.51
Barthes has always been interested in the mystery of the composition
of the Recherche: how did Proust finally manage to make it work? In this
way, Proust is the gateway to the coverage, in La Préparation du roman
II, of the obstacles which writers must overcome in order to write the
desired works: ‘le choix’, ‘le doute’; ‘la patience’; ‘horaires, régimes’;
‘démarrages, crises, freinages’. Jonathan Culler is critical of the way this
approach mobilises what he considers to be regressive biographism,
observing that it ‘involves a turn away from reflection on language’.52
However, Culler also points out that Barthes’s focus, in La Préparation
du roman II, on how the Recherche finally took shape is in some respects
innovative: ‘This discussion involves an interesting shift in ways of
thinking about the novel in general and Proust in particular: vision from
the beginning rather than the end, where the finished work is a given and
one analyses the significance of different elements in that context’.53
In the ‘Longtemps’ lecture, Barthes explains that Proust, like himself,
is torn between the essay (defined as being characterised by metaphor)
and the novel (characterised by metonymy): ‘Proust est un sujet divisé
[…]; il sait que chaque incident de la vie peut donner lieu ou à un
commentaire (une interprétation), ou à une affabulation qui en donne ou
en imagine l’avant et l’après narratif’ (460). From 1905 until the summer
of 1909, Proust is uncertain. Barthes’s description here of Proust’s
hesitation is remarkably similar to his description of himself at the start
of Leçon, where, as we have seen, the adjective ‘incertain’ is used
strategically: ‘L’indécision de Proust est profonde […]; il a déjà écrit, et
ce qu’il a écrit (notamment au niveau de certains fragments) relève
souvent d’une forme mixte, incertaine, hésitante, à la fois romanesque et
intellectuelle’ (461). Compare this to the successive versions of the
opening of Leçon, in which Barthes defines both himself and the essay
in the same terms, as ‘incertain’, ‘ambigu’. For Barthes as for Proust,
‘[l’]indécision est profonde’, but also ‘elle est peut-être chérie’
(‘Longtemps’, 461). Barthes explains that Proust clearly is attached to

generic indecision given that ‘[il] a aimé et admiré des écrivains dont il
constate qu’ils ont pratiqué, eux aussi, une certaine indécision des genres:
Nerval et Baudelaire’ (461). For Barthes, the attachment to the ‘incer-
tain’ is due more to his sense of its poietic and pedagogical value. A
teaching which is ‘incertain’ in its method is true to the mathetic quali-
ties of literature, and also manages by virtue of its impurity to evade
the ‘discours du pouvoir’. This teaching ‘dévie de la place où on l’attend’
(L, 44).
In Leçon, then, the ‘indécision’ that Barthes later realises that he
shares with Proust is positive and enabling. However, by the time of the
‘Longtemps’ lecture, the change in Barthes’s personal circumstances
caused by the death of his mother means that he is no longer contented
by the analytical nature of his writing. He wants his writing now to
become primary: ‘quoi, toujours jusqu’à ma mort, je vais écrire des
articles, faire des cours, des conférences, sur des “sujets”, qui seuls
varieront, si peu! (C’est le “sur” qui me gêne)’ (‘Longtemps’, 466). His
‘indécision’ must somehow be transmuted in order to lead to a ‘forme
nouvelle’ (467). It is precisely because Proust managed to alchemise his
‘indécision’ that he is an important figure for Barthes. Proust’s ‘indéci-
sion’ is the basis for a profound generic innovation. Barthes explains that
it is the manner in which the narrator describes sleep – at the opening of
Du Côté de chez Swann – that permits the synthesis of writing styles from
which the whole work issues forth: ‘Le sommeil fonde une autre logique,
une logique de la Vacillation, du Décloisonnement’ (462). For the
‘immense édifice du souvenir’ can only be articulated if chronology is
interrupted. Thus the thematic importance of sleep provides Proust with
the means to construct his work. Sleep will ‘ouvrir les vannes du Temps:
la chronologie ébranlée, des fragments, intellectuels ou narratifs, vont
former une suite soustraite à la loi ancestrale du Récit ou du
Raisonnement, et cette suite produira sans forcer la tierce forme, ni Essai
ni Roman’ (463).
Barthes therefore locates Proust’s transmutation of his writerly
dilemma in his discovery of the myriad possibilities inherent to a state
(sleep) normally considered as unproductive. The narrator’s confinement
to the ‘self-cancelling impossibility’54 of the phrase ‘je dors’ at the opening
of the Recherche is the key that unlocks the subsequent enormous flow
of recollection, just as in ‘Combray’, the work is seen to emerge from the
narrator’s cup of tea. Apparent reduction leads, in fact, to creative expan-
sion, because a ‘nouvelle logique’ is at work. Barthes needs to discover a
similarly enabling ‘logique’. Thus he concludes the first part of the
‘Longtemps’ lecture by demonstrating how Proust is in this way a tutelary

figure for him: ‘Si j’ai dégagé dans l’œuvre-vie de Proust le thème d’une
nouvelle logique qui permet – en tout cas a permis à Proust d’abolir la
contradiction du Roman et de l’Essai, c’est parce que ce thème me
concerne personnellement’ (465). Drawing upon Proust, Barthes’s own
‘nouvelle logique’ is to consist in a reduction – which is to be considered
as an expansion – to his own self:
Je vais […] parler de ‘moi’. ‘Moi’ doit s’entendre ici lourdement: ce n’est pas
le substitut aseptisé d’un lecteur général […]; ce n’est personne d’autre que
celui à qui nul ne peut se substituer, pour le meilleur et pour le pire. (465)
The desire to speak personally is, paradoxically, not egotistical. Proust

is a vital catalyst for Barthes because he is the paradigmatic writer of ‘la
vérité de l’affect’ (PR, 10 March 1979, 155). Novelistic language, for
Barthes, is a way to bear witness to the lives of those one loves. Proust’s
writing about Marcel’s grandmother is Barthes’s model for his writing
about his own mother in La Chambre claire. Thus what appears to be a
dual egotism – the desire to speak personally, and the identification of
himself with Proust – is in fact the expression of a generous, even a
desperate, longing to do justice to other, beloved people. Proust is the
emblem, for Barthes, of the consecration of one’s own life to the project
of writing an affective work, and thereby perhaps attaining a ‘vita nova’.
Speaking personally would rebuff any mathesis universalis: ‘C’est
l’intime qui veut parler en moi, faire entendre son cri, face à la généralité,
à la science’ (465). The second part of the lecture will indicate that a
particular ‘science particulière’ of ‘simulation’ will constitute, as Proust’s
tierce forme does, an innovative method. With this method, Barthes can
synthesise his ‘indécision’ on a new plane, beyond the territory of the
‘sur’ (‘c’est le “sur” qui me gêne’). Simultaneously, he can construct a
pedagogical landscape in which he can obey his own most personal
conviction – that he must somehow express his love for his mother in
writing.
Part two of the ‘Longtemps’ lecture begins with Barthes using Dante
to explain that he feels he has reached the ‘mezzo del camin’, a sense of
mortality and urgency which inaugurates a profound change in one’s life.
For Proust, this mid-point was ‘certainement la mort de sa mère’. For
Barthes it is the same event, though he does not name his mother, for
whom he is experiencing ‘un deuil cruel, […] unique et comme irré-
ductible’. This grief, he says, ‘peut constituer pour moi cette “cime du
particulier”, dont parlait Proust; quoique tardif, ce deuil sera pour moi
le milieu de ma vie’ (467). It is from this most intense point of grief – the
‘cime’ – that his future work must depart.

Proust knew that it is ‘à la cime du particulier qu’éclot le général’.55
This phrase, partly quoted by Barthes in ‘Longtemps’, is glossed at greater
length in the sixth Préparation du roman I lecture (20 January 1979),
when Barthes is discussing the haiku’s ‘individuation’ (PR, 77). The
haiku outlines an utterly ephemeral event, viewed by an individual at a
given brief moment. The conditions that give rise to the haiku are fleeting
and always past. It is a form which, for Barthes, is the ne plus ultra of
‘individuation – de la Saison, du Temps qu’il fait, de l’Heure comme indi-
viduation’. One important aspect of ‘individuation’, Barthes points out,
is that of ‘[l]’individu contre le système’. The haiku draws him into
thinking about individualistic philosophies, which in a post-Sartrean
liberal climate of intellectual engagement are frowned upon: ‘Il faut partir
de ce vieux cheval de bataille: l’individualisme discrédité (cf. critique
sartrienne de la démocratie bourgeoise […] + critique marxiste + critique
gauchiste: vraie conjuration contre l’individualisme!)’ (77). From this
point, Barthes states, he can imagine operating his usual ‘tactique du
déplacement’ when thinking about the ‘rapport entre le monde de
“systèmes”, c’est-à-dire des discours réducteurs (politiques, idéologiques,
scientifiques, etc.) et l’étouffement de “l’individu”’. A general or ‘scien-
tific’ discourse, then, is one which, unlike the haiku, accords no
importance to the quiddity of the individual. The Proust quotation –
‘cette très belle expression: “C’est à la cime du particulier qu’éclôt le
général”’ (PR, 78) – is one of several ‘références’ he provides here as
examples of ways to re-examine the problem of how the subject can fit
without distortion or reduction into the ‘système’.
It is when we read the full Proust quotation in the context of a defence
of ‘individuation’ that the use of the words ‘cime du particulier’ in the
‘Longtemps’ lecture becomes clearer. Proust’s declaration to Halévy
suggests precisely the conjunction that Barthes has been working towards
since he posited, in Leçon, that ‘la science peut naître du fantasme’ (L,
44). The conjunction of the utterly individual with the universal brings
about a new understanding of the term ‘scientifique’: the ‘cime du parti-
culier’ is ‘scientifique’ in the sense that – according to Barthes – it leads
to the mobilisation of a generally worthwhile knowledge. But it is not
‘scientifique’ insofar as it is not a ‘discours réducteur’. Rather, writing
from the ‘cime du particulier’ means rendering, as the haiku and the
Recherche do, the emotion of the individual in a way that, while (ideally)
as universally recognisable as love and death, is also extraordinarily
private and ephemeral: the haiku tells of moments that are long vanished;
Proust’s narrator describes his childhood; and following these models,
Barthes wants to ‘dire ceux que j’aime, […] [afin de] témoigner qu’ils
n’ont pas vécu […] “pour rien”’ (‘Longtemps’, 469). This is writing that,
in refusing the old ‘science’, refuses the discourse of analysis (the ‘sur’),
or the discourse of intelligence. At the start of Contre Sainte-Beuve,
Proust writes:
Chaque jour j’attache moins de prix à l’intelligence. Chaque jour je me rends
mieux compte que ce n’est qu’en dehors d’elle que l’écrivain peut ressaisir
quelque chose de nos impressions, c’est-à-dire atteindre quelque chose de
lui-même et la seule matière de l’art. Ce que l’intelligence nous rend sous le
nom de passé n’est pas lui.56
Barthes, by 1978, concurs. The death of his mother has altered his intel-
lectual investment in the world of ‘idées’, and now he wishes to examine
instead a ‘Roman (fantasmé, et probablement impossible)’ whose ‘vérité’
is ‘la vérité des affects, non celle des idées’ (‘Longtemps’, 469) – which,
to bring us back to Nietzsche again, makes of the ‘Roman’ an instance
of ‘l’Art, non de la Prêtrise’ (470). The new science is an art of the indi-
vidual.
As the quotation from the Préparation has already made clear,
Barthes is aware that such an apparently indulgent ‘art’ sits badly with
the tenets of the theoretical and political climate. It also does not chime
with perceptions of the role of the intellectual, if the intellectual is s/he
who speaks truth to power in order to uncover injustices. We have
already seen, though, that while Barthes believes his teaching – by virtue
of both its methods and the location in which it now takes place – is ‘hors
pouvoir’, he conceives his intellectual effort, characterised as ‘indirect’,
as being more a flight away from (ahead of) power, than a direct combat
with the orthodoxy. This has been his explicit conviction at least since
1971, when, in the preface to Sade, Fourier, Loyola, he points out that
in the absence of any language that is truly external to ideology, the ‘seule
riposte’ available cannot be ‘affrontement’ or direct opposition, but
rather, theft: ‘fragmenter le texte ancien de la culture, de la science, de la
littérature, et en disséminer les traits selon des formules méconnaissables,
de la même façon que l’on maquille une marchandise volée’. Referring
to the texts of Sade, Fourier and Loyola, he declares that their ‘interven-
tion sociale’ consists in the manner in which they ‘excéde[nt] les lois
qu’une société, une idéologie, une philosophie se donnent pour s’accorder
à elles-mêmes’ (SFL, 15).
Barthes’s ‘intervention sociale’ in 1978 consists precisely in the belief
that a focus on the particular is what is required in a climate that figures
such retrenchment into the self as shameful or irresponsible. In an inter-
view given a few weeks before the ‘Longtemps’ lecture, Barthes makes
this position clear. ‘Depuis deux cent ans,’ he says, ‘nous sommes
habitués par la culture philosophique et politique à valoriser
énormément, disons, le collectivisme en général. Toutes les philosophies
sont des philosophies de la collectivité, de la société, et l’individualisme
est très mal vu’. There is no longer ‘ou très rarement’ a philosophy ‘de la
personne’. Thus, he says,
Peut-être faut-il justement assumer cette singularité, ne pas la vivre comme
une sorte de dévalorisation, de honte, mais repenser effectivement une
philosophie du sujet. Ne pas se laisser intimider par cette morale, diffuse
dans notre société, qui est celle du surmoi collectif, avec ses valeurs de
responsabilité et d’engagement politique. Il faut peut-être accepter le
scandale de positions individualistes.57
Asked by the interviewer whether individualism is really such a ‘scandale’

as he implies, Barthes rather defensively replies, ‘Oh, si, c’est un scandale
pour tout ce qui pense et théorise, disons, depuis Hegel! Toute
Philosophie qui essaye de se soustraire à ces impératifs de collectivité est
extrêmement singulière, et […] a une mauvaise image’ (553). He needs
to assert (if not demonstrate) this ‘scandale’ in order to construct a valori-
sation for his own individualistic practice.
At the end of the ‘Longtemps’ lecture, such a valorisation is provided
by reference to Vico. It is here that Barthes sets out his idea of ‘simula-
tion’. For, though it is unlikely that he will actually write a novel, ‘ce
Roman utopique, il m’importe de faire comme si je devais l’écrire’ (470).58
This simulation will lead, he implies, to a new order of knowledge: ‘Je
me mets en effet dans la position de celui qui fait quelque chose, et non
plus de celui qui parle sur quelque chose.’ Vico is latently present here,
just as he is when the principle of ‘fantasme’ is discussed in Leçon. The
close of the lecture is indebted to Vico’s philosophy of knowledge. For it
was Vico who argued that we can only have true knowledge of some-
thing that is humanly made or practised; this is the meaning of his ‘verum
factum’ principle.59 He positions himself against Descartes’s mathemat-
ical method. A Cartesian philosophy inspired by mathematical method
is prone to lead to what Stephen Toulmin calls ‘[an] idea of timeless,
eternal standards, applicable to arguments-in-general in abstraction from
their practical contexts’; this is in Vico’s view a ‘Cartesian delusion, […]
[a] dead end’.60 Vico believes that, when one is speaking of what he calls
the ‘civil world’, it is only the knowledge of making something that can
count if one is to arrive at an understanding of that thing. Thus, as Peter
Burke tells us in his study of Vico, with the ‘verum factum’ principle,
‘Vico turn[s] Descartes on his head. Descartes had argued, in his
Discourse on Method, that the study of history was a waste of time
because we cannot acquire any certain knowledge of the human past, as

we can (he claimed) of mathematics and the world of nature’.61 The equiv-
alent Cartesian argument to be levelled at Barthes – which Barthes seems
to have in mind at the end of ‘Longtemps’, given his evident desire to
prove the status of his own discourse – would be that his postulation of
an impossible novel, to be discussed without recourse to metalanguage
(‘j’abolis le discours sur le discours’), can have no epistemological or
‘scientifique’ value. Vico’s and Barthes’s riposte would be that knowl-
edge based on human creation is ‘actually more certain than the
[scientific] principles governing the natural world’.62
The simulation of practice leads to a new way of looking: ‘le monde
ne vient plus à moi sous la forme d’un objet, mais sous celle d’une écriture,
c’est-à-dire d’une pratique: je passe à un autre type de savoir […] et c’est
en cela que je suis méthodique’. Furthermore, Barthes defines this
methodology as being – in the manner of the ‘fantasme’ in Leçon – more
‘scientifique’ even than science itself:
‘Comme si’: cette formule n’est-elle pas l’expression même d’une démarche
scientifique, comme on le voit en mathématiques? Je fais une hypothèse et
j’explore, je découvre la richesse de ce qui en découle; je postule un roman
à faire, et de la sorte je peux espérer en apprendre plus sur le roman qu’en
le considérant seulement comme un objet déjà fait par les autres.
(‘Longtemps’, 470)
So Barthes has constructed a reasoning whereby the element of ‘analyse’,

which partly made up his ‘incertain’ writing, can be excluded from his
pedagogy and discourse, in order to allow him to focus fully on the
‘romanesque’ aspect that he desires for his writing. However – and here
is where the reasoning really licenses itself – this does not mean that the
new writing and pedagogy are robbed of analytical teeth. Rather, the
analysis is folded into another level of the discourse, such that, like the
‘fantasme’, beneath the appearance of extreme individuality it has the
capacity to make valuable comment about generality, or, as Barthes
describes it, ‘[le] monde’ itself. The lecture ends as follows:
Peut-être est-ce finalement au cœur de cette subjectivité, de cette intimité
même dont je vous ai entretenus, peut-être est-ce à la ‘cime de mon
particulier’ que je suis scientifique sans le savoir, tourné confusément vers
cette Scienza Nuova dont parlait Vico: ne devra-t-elle pas exprimer à la fois
la brillance et la souffrance du monde, ce qui, en lui, me séduit et m’indigne?
(‘Longtemps’, 470)
Barthes has used Vico to cunning effect to back up his claim that his
writing and teaching henceforth, though appearing to have nothing to
say beyond referring to himself and his desire for a novel, will thereby,
precisely, be saying something new and different in an intellectual context

in which such individualism is (in Barthes’s view) a ‘scandale’. The
‘scienza nuova’ will involve the principle of ‘identification’: as we have
seen, the ‘Longtemps’ lecture begins by explaining Barthes’s ‘identifica-
tion’ with Proust’s ‘pratique’. It is then the listeners’ decision as to
whether or not they wish to identify with Barthes. Barthes points this out
again in the second Préparation series: ‘Ce cours […] n’aura rien, hélas,
d’un thrilling, puisque ce sera l’histoire intérieure d’un homme qui veut
écrire […] et délibère des moyens d’accomplir ce désir’ (PR, 15 December
1979, 234). This man is not only Barthes himself, but also all of those
writers to whom he will refer during the lectures. The principle of the
general in the particular is clear here: ‘Cet homme, dont le récit
commence, sera tous ces noms: eux, moi. Mais sera-t-il vous, ou même
l’un d’entre vous?’ Barthes is well aware that the identification may not
take place: ‘peut-être peu à peu [le Cours] se dépeuplera, de quoi lasser
la curiosité des uns et la fidélité des autres’ (PR, 235). This is not his
concern, however. The important point is that the cours has been estab-
lished on a ground which employs a methodology of ‘simulation’ defined
as ‘scientifique’ (at another turn of the spiral). Thereby, Barthes has given
himself a rhetorical warrant for the work that he wants to do in the wake
of his mother’s death. This work (travail) involves the gesturing, through
personal divagations and poietic preoccupation, towards a work (œuvre)
which would manage to articulate ‘la vérité des affects’ (‘Longtemps’,
469). The idea of the making is nourished by the desire for this truth; a
much-reduced verum factum.
There is little doubt that, in his teaching at the Collège de France, Barthes
uses his sense of the uncertainty of his status to his advantage. Setting
out the methodogical programme for the four lecture courses, both Leçon
and the ‘Longtemps’ lecture employ uncertainty as an enabling principle.
Also common to both is a deft treatment of ‘l’opposition des sciences et
des lettres’ (L, 21) which enables Barthes to defend a literary teaching on
the basis of an idiosyncratic conception of ‘science’. Barthes wishes to
use aesthetic judgment to shuttle between both sides of the paradigms he
sets up, and at the same time to end up beyond them, in a position that
he conceives to be methodologically and epistemologically superior. He
wishes to synthesise and depart from any binarism which reduces him to
being one or the other. This is the essayist’s prerogative. According to
Pierre Bourdieu, Barthes had been employing this synthetic method in his
work ever since Sur Racine (1963). Even then he wanted to have it all,
Bourdieu comments. This passage from Bourdieu is remarkably prescient

of the preoccupations of the ‘Longtemps’ lecture:
En s’affirmant capable de réunir l’imagination scientifique du chercheur […]
et la liberté iconoclaste de l’écrivain […], d’annuler l’opposition
sociologiquement si puissante entre les traditions et des fonctions jusque-là
incompatibles, Sainte-Beuve et Marcel Proust, l’École normale et les salons,
la rigueur désenchantée de la science et le dilettantisme inspiré des
littérateurs, il joue évidemment sur les deux tableaux, essayant ainsi […] de
cumuler les profits de la science et les prestiges de la philosophie ou de la
littérature. Comme si, à l’âge de la science, l’aggiornamento passait
inévitablement par cette sorte d’hommage que le vice essayiste rend à la vertu
scientifique.63
Bourdieu disapproves of Barthes’s deliberate disciplinary impurity.

Barthes is aware that both the ‘impureté’ and the ‘individualisme’ that
he wants to mobilise are ‘un scandale pour tout ce qui pense et théorise’.
This is at least partly why he believes his procedure is worthwhile. The
deliberately ‘scandalous’ procedure brings about an apparently harmo-
nious methodology which enables him to explore the objects of his own
‘fantasmes’. But it also obeys his deeply felt imperative of producing a
discourse which is untouched by – though not actually standing up to –
the ‘discours de pouvoir’ (L, 11). That he can set about such an idio-
syncratic ‘new science’ is of course thanks to his privileged position at
the Collège de France, which allows him to pursue this intellectual ‘aven-
ture’ (L, 32). The effects of the institution on Barthes’s writing are to be
found in the way that the ‘essayism’ of the Collège de France lecture notes
involves digression, self-effacement, and an emphasis on the provisional.
In response to the magisterial position which he occupies, Barthes focuses
on imbuing his pedagogical writing with unmagisterial qualities. Andy
Stafford has written about this, pointing out that for Barthes, ‘the more
“institutional” or more constrained the context, the more corrosive and
provisional the writing that emerges’.64 These tactics are also, perhaps,
the privilege of the older thinker: the savour of the term ‘scientifique’,
employed in a new and looser way, derives from the tension between
its new meaning and the older one that was employed in Barthes’s
structuralist work. Barthes’s endeavour is then, in Culler’s words,
‘provocative precisely because familiar terms are being used in new ways
– to loosen the theories they once helped to build’.65 What we see, in the
Collège de France teaching, is Barthes employing the privilege of age; as
he says at the end of Leçon, ‘vient peut-être maintenant l’âge d’une autre
expérience: celle de désapprendre, de laisser travailler le remaniement
imprévisible que l’oubli impose à la sédimentation des savoirs, des
cultures, des croyances que l’on a traversés’ (L, 46). After this point, it
is up to his listeners to decide whether such a tactic is one of self-indul-

gence or of intransigence.
Notes
1 References to La Chambre claire are to the text as it appears in OC, V, 784–892.

2 Mathesis: mental discipline, learning or science, especially mathematics (OED).
Mathesis is defined in Liddell and Scott’s Greek-English Lexicon as the act of
knowing, but also the desire for knowledge and education. It also has a
Foucauldian inflection: Foucault used the term in Les Mots et les choses to mean
‘science universelle de la mesure et de l’ordre’. Les Mots et les choses (Paris:
Gallimard, 1966), p. 70. Barthes views literature as ‘mathesis’, a means to under-
stand the world. See ‘La littérature comme mathésis’ in RB, OC, IV, 694. In Le
Lexique de l’auteur, he defines mathesis as ‘un savoir sans scientificité’ (LA, 333).
3 Jonathan Culler, Barthes (London: Fontana, 1983), p. 120.
4 Julia Kristeva, ‘Comment parler à la littérature?’, in Polylogue (Paris: Seuil,
1977), pp. 23–54 (p. 48).
5 Kristeva, ‘Comment parler’, p. 49.
6 J.M. Bernstein, The Fate of Art: Aesthetic Alienation from Kant to Derrida and
Adorno (Oxford: Polity, 1992), p. 7.
7 Kant, Critique of Judgment, p. 15.
8 Kant, Critique of Judgment, p. 15.
9 Theodor Adorno, ‘The Essay as Form’, in Notes to Literature: Volume One, ed.
Rolf Tiedemann, trans. Shierry Weber Nicholsen (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1991), pp. 3–23 (p. 23).
10 Carlo Ossola, ‘Leçons de la Leçon’, in Léger, ed., Roland Barthes au Collège de
France, pp. 17–33 (p. 22).
11 Adorno, ‘The Essay as Form’, p. 3.
12 Claire de Obaldia’s chapter on Barthes ‘the encyclopedic and the novelistic’ in
The Essayistic Spirit: Literature, Modern Criticism, and the Essay (Oxford:
Clarendon, 1995) (pp. 146–80) provides an inspiring account of Barthes’s use
of the generic uncertainty of the essay. The first chapter of her study is also
extremely useful in this regard (pp. 1–64). Marielle Macé provides an assessment
of Barthes as essayist in her Le Temps de l’essai (pp. 207–62).
15 In The Satyricon, Trimalchio, greedy and ostentatious, throws lavish feasts and
is served by many slaves. Petronius Arbiter, The Satyricon, trans. and intro. P.G.
Walsh (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).
16 Ian McLeod [writing as ‘I.S.M.’], ‘Powers Plural: Barthes’s “Lecture”’, Oxford
Literary Review, 4.1 (1979): 29–30 (p. 29).
17 McLeod, ‘Powers Plural’, p. 29.
18 Leyla Perrone-Moïses, ‘Leçon: Testament and Prophecy’, in Back to Barthes:
Twenty Years After, special issue of Yale Journal of Criticism, 14.2 (2001):
463–68 (pp. 463–64).
19 Frederick Van de Pitte, ‘The Dating of Rule IV–B in Descartes’ Regulae ad direc-
tionem ingenii’, Journal of the History of Philosophy, 29 (1991): 375–95 (p.
387).
20 Van de Pitte, ‘Dating of Rule IV–B’, p. 394.
21 Sheringham, ‘Seminal Digressions’, Times Literary Supplement, 17 March 2006,
pp. 7–8 (p. 7).

22 See the Chambers dictionary entry for encyclopedia: ‘enkyklios paideia general
education (opposed to professional or special education), from enkyklios
circular, recurring, everyday, from en in, and kyklos circle, and paideia educa-
tion, from pais, paidos a child’.
23 Maarten de Pourcq, ‘The Paideia of the Greeks: On the Methodology of Roland
Barthes’s Comment vivre ensemble’, in Pieters and Pint, eds., Roland Barthes
Retroactively, pp. 23–37 (p. 28). I am indebted for my understanding of the term
paideia to this inspiring article. De Pourcq demonstrates that Barthes’s use of the
term ‘paideia des Grecs’ is deliberately – and perhaps misleadingly – ‘anti-histor-
ical’ (p. 24), in its conflation of several ancient Greek cultures and epochs.
24 De Pourcq, ‘The Paideia of the Greeks’, p. 28.
25 De Pourcq, ‘The Paideia of the Greeks’, pp. 28–29.
26 Sheringham, ‘Seminal Digressions’, p. 7.
27 ‘De la science à la littérature’, Times Literary Supplement, 28 Sept. 1967. OC,
II, 1263–70 (p. 1263).
28 The section occurs in Deleuze, Nietzsche et la philosophie, pp. 123–26.
29 Deleuze, Nietzsche et la philosophie, pp. 123–24.
32 De Pourcq, ‘The Paideia of the Greeks’, p. 32.
34 The bibliography of Barthes’s Michelet gives the dates of Michelet’s translations
of Vico in the 1820s and ’30s. For an account of the influence of Vico’s theory
of history on Michelet, see Patrick H. Hutton, ‘Vico’s Theory of History and the
French Revolutionary Tradition’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 37.2 (June
1976): 241–56. Somewhat in line with my discussion of mathesis singularis,
Edmund Wilson discusses the manner in which Michelet managed in his work
to combine general historical overview with a focus on individual historical
objects. See To the Finland Station (London: Collins/Fontana, 1974).
35 Vico, The New Science of Giambattista Vico: Unabridged Translation of the
Third Edition (1744) with the addition of ‘Practic of the New Science’, trans.
Thomas Goddard Bergin and Max Harold Fisch (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 2004), pp. 21–22. Cf. Le Neutre: ‘Vico: construit la théorie générale de
l’imagination, faculté née avant les autres: la connaissance imaginative ou sagesse
poétique = forme première de toute connaissance ¡ le langage poétique a précédé
celui de la prose: les fables, “universaux de l’imagination”’ (1 April, 139).
36 Donald Phillip Verene, ‘Vico’, The Johns Hopkins Guide to Literary Theory and
Criticism, ed. Michael Groden and Martin Kreiswirth. <http://www.litguide.
press.jhu.edu>. 2005 [accessed 18 April 2008].
37 Nietzsche, quoted in Deleuze, Nietzsche et la philosophie, p. 26, and by Barthes
in ‘Longtemps, je me suis couché de bonne heure…’ (OC, V, 463).
38 See Ch. 5 below.
39 Cf. Le Neutre: ‘Ma visée = n’être ni maître ni disciple, mais, au sens nietzschéen
(donc, aucun satisfecit), “artiste”’ (18 March, 98).
40 The third essay of the Genealogy of Morals looks at the ‘ascetic ideal’ and how
it is viewed by different groups, of whom ‘artists’ and ‘priests’ are only two; the
other four are philosophers, women, physiological casualties and saints. See On
The Genealogy of Morals, trans. and intro. Douglas Smith (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1996), pp. 77–136.
41 For an interesting discussion of Leçon’s conception of the power inherent in
language, see Michael Holland, ‘Barthes, Orpheus’, in Roland Barthes I, special
issue of Paragraph, 11.2 (1988): 143–71. Holland critiques the problems
inherent in Barthes’s desire ‘to free discourse from power’ – which, as Holland
points out, ‘is not to eliminate power from discourse’ (p. 164). See also Mary
Bittner Wiseman’s discussion of Leçon in The Ecstasies of Roland Barthes
(London: Routledge, 1989), pp. 38–64.
42 Coste’s note gives the full Brecht quotation from L’Exception et la règle: ‘Sous
le familier, découvrez l’insolite, / Sous le quotidien, décelez l’inexplicable. / Puisse
toute chose dite habituelle vous inquiéter. / Dans la règle découvrez l’abus / Et
partout où l’abus s’est montré, / Trouvez le remède’ (CVE, 165 n.32).
43 ‘Cher Antonioni’, written for the ceremony in which Antonioni was presented
with the ‘Archiginnedio d’Oro’ prize, 28 January 1980, in Bologna. Published
in Cahiers du cinéma, May 1980. OC, V, 900–905 (p. 900).
44 ‘Cher Antonioni’, p. 901.
47 The article ‘Ça prend’, published in Magazine littéraire in January 1979 (OC,
V, 654–56), treats the same mutation.
48 George D. Painter’s two-volume biography of Proust (1959 and 1965) was first
published in French in 1966. Marcel Proust: A Biography (Harmondsworth:
Penguin, 1983).
49 ‘Proust, c’est un système complet de lecture du monde’. ‘Roland Barthes contre
les idées reçues’, interview with Claude Jannoud for Le Figaro, 27 July 1974.
OC, IV, 564–69 (p. 569).
50 Éric Marty has pointed out that although – or perhaps because – Proust is the
major intertext for Barthes, Proust is very rarely analysed directly in Barthes’s
work. Apart from the ‘Longtemps’ lecture, the only texts devoted to Proust are
‘Une idée de recherche’ (1971; OC, III, 917–21); ‘Proust et les noms’ (1967,
anthologised in Nouveaux essais critiques in 1972; OC, IV, 66–77); the session
on the ‘discours Charlus’ in the seminar Tenir un discourse (CVE, pp. 203–18);
and the short article ‘Ça prend’ (1979; OC, V, 654–56), the ideas in which are
discussed in PR, 2 and 9 February 1980, pp. 328–33. Marty characterises all the
published interventions on Proust as ‘très timides’. Marty, ‘Marcel Proust dans
“la chambre claire”’, L’Esprit Créateur 46.4 (2006): 125–33 (p. 125).
51 Yacavone, ‘Reading Through Photography’, p. 99.
52 Culler, ‘Preparing the Novel’, p. 109.
53 Culler, ‘Preparing the Novel’, p. 117.
54 Hill, Radical Indecision, p. 145.
55 The phrase appears in a letter to Daniel Halévy of 19 July 1919. Marcel Proust,
Choix de lettres, ed. Philip Kolb (Paris: Plon, 1965), p. 216.
56 Proust, Contre Sainte-Beuve (Paris: Gallimard, 1954), p. 43.
57 ‘Propos sur la violence’, interview with Jacqueline Sers for Réforme, 2 September
1978. OC, V, 549–53 (p. 553).
58 All subsequent citations from ‘Longtemps’ in this chapter are from OC, V, 470.
59 This principle is set out in a work from 1710, De Antequissima Italorum sapi-
entia. The ‘verum factum’ criterion is important in Vico’s later work, including
the Scienza nuova.
60 Stephen Toulmin, Human Understanding: The Collective Use and Evolution of
Concepts (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), p. 23, p. 33.
61 Peter Burke, Vico (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 78.
62 Burke, Vico, p. 78.
63 Bourdieu, Homo academicus, pp. 154–55.
64 Stafford, ‘“Préparation du romanesque”’, p. 105.
65 Culler, Barthes, p. 121.
3
Comment vivre ensemble,
Le Neutre and their Context
Ne pas oublier que nous sommes très précisément dans une phase active de
déconstruction ‘saine’ de la ‘mission’ de l’intellectuel: cette déconstruction
peut prendre la forme d’un retrait, mais aussi d’un brouillage, d’une série
d’affirmations décentrées.
Barthes, Le Neutre, 6 May 1978
At the end of his inaugural lecture, Barthes states that the time has come
for him to teach in a particular way: ‘Vient peut-être maintenant l’âge
d’une autre expérience: celle de désapprendre’. The first two lecture series
at the Collège de France quite obviously stage this ‘désapprentissage’,
forming a sprawling, deliberately unauthoritative constellation of areas
of knowledge. Barthes’s fantasies of the ideals of the ‘vivre-ensemble’ and
the ‘neutre’ are sketched by recourse to a heterogeneous corpus of texts,
and the exposition of his own views is intercut throughout by the aleatory
method employed, and by exhortations to the listeners to consider every-
thing Barthes is saying as merely a ‘dossier’ that is opened; it is up to
them to take each idea further.
The methodology and ideals of Comment vivre ensemble and Le
Neutre are very closely linked. In this chapter I shall examine Barthes’s
treatment and organisation of his material, and discuss how his
‘fantasmes’ can function as a teaching device. The lectures’ insistent
theme of spatiality will also be examined as it relates to the listeners’
experience of and investment in the topics of the lectures. The ideals of
the idiorrythmic community – which in fact is a solitude with benevolent
interruptions – and of neutral discourse and behaviour, are examined for
what they reveal of Barthes’s distaste for intellectual and political
discourse in the specific context of the late 1970s in France. As I shall
show, Barthes’s rejection of the narratives of Marxism and psycho-
analysis overlaps to a certain extent with the preoccupations of other
contemporary theorists, as does his thinking about community.
Generally, however, these lectures show Barthes recoiling from the intel-
lectual norms of his time: ‘On étudie ce que l’on craint’, as Barthes says
87
in the course summary of Le Neutre (261). However, he also studies ‘ce

que l’on désire’: in the final part of the chapter, I shall examine how the
negativity evident throughout these two lecture series is at the root of
Barthes’s active, creative fantasy, whereby he imagines a type of writing
and a way of being which would accomplish what he called in Roland
Barthes ‘l’exemption du sens’ (RB 664).1 This mode of being would be
utopically untouched by the ‘arrogance’ of ideology and of prevailing
intellectual discourses, and would, in an ‘unschooled’ but vital manner,
approach the materiality of the world itself. In this way, the idiorrythmic
and neutral fantasies ‘peu[vent] renvoyer à des états intenses, forts,
inouïs’ (N, 32).
‘Désapprentissage’ in Comment vivre ensemble and Le Neutre
In his preface to the Collège de France lectures and seminars, Éric Marty
notes that this material is marked by an ‘étrange négativité’: Barthes’s
methodology reveals a desire to escape from the ‘mystifications
spécifiques de l’intellectuel: mystification de la maîtrise, mystification de
la persuasion, mystification de la “théorie”, aliénation du prestige,
aliénation de la domination et du conflit’. What this means, he writes, is
that we find a ‘quasi-absence de Barthes à son propos’ (CVE, 11) as he
tries to problematise the prolix, authoritative nature of academic pres-
entation. It is certainly clear from even a cursory glance at the pages of
Comment vivre ensemble and Le Neutre that Barthes attempts to
minimise his authority. His approach to his material stages a certain
‘désapprentissage’ in being deliberately far removed from standard
academic norms of presentation: digressive, vague, and often inconclu-
sive, the material includes many lists, excerpts copied from literary texts,
and second-hand material gleaned from encyclopedias. The flow of infor-
mation is continually interrupted by the ‘système des traits’ which groups
the material into alphabetically ordered titled fragments. ‘Devise du
joueur de cartes’, declares Barthes in the second lecture of Comment vivre
ensemble; ‘“Je coupe”, j’agis contre la fixité du langage’ (19 January, 52).
The use of heterogeneous material is, he writes in his course summary,
in accordance with the nature of semiology: thus he has assembled the
‘traits’ of the lecture series from ‘[une] masse de modes, habitudes, thèmes
et valeurs du “vivre ensemble”, and then allied to these ‘traits’ various
digressions, ‘alimentées au savoir historique, ethnologique ou
sociologique’. He insists throughout that this series is prospective and
suggestive: ‘le soin [est] laissé aux auditeurs de remplir ces dossiers à leur
Comment vivre ensemble, Le Neutre and their Context 89
guise et le rôle du professeur [est] principalement de suggèrer certaines

articulations du thème’ (CVE, course summary, 221–22). The commen-
dation of the material to the listeners’ care bespeaks a concern that this
education should indeed constitute a leading out, and that the teacher’s
findings be considered secondary to the additional avenues of inquiry to
which they may lead in other minds. The counterpart of this commen-
dation is Barthes’s own presentation of himself as unauthoritative,
hesitant: he characterises the fantasy of the ‘vivre-ensemble’ as a
‘projecteur incertain qui balaye d’une façon saccadée des fragments de
monde, de science, d’histoire – d’expériences’ (51).
Barthes’s research for Comment vivre ensemble involved reading a
large amount of material which might provide details to flesh out the
fantasy of ‘idiorrythmie’ that he had read about in Lacarrière’s descrip-
tion in L’Été grec of the skites on Mount Athos. Though the fantasy is
named throughout as the ‘vivre-ensemble’, the term ‘idiorrythmie’
pinpoints more precisely the nature of Barthes’s fantasy, the emphasis of
which is not on the togetherness of ‘ensemble’, but rather on the peace-
able solitude of the ‘idios’, happily interrupted by a light ‘rhythm’. This
is a vision of a solitude anchored by affective links with a community.
Working outwards from Lacarrière’s description of the Athonite skites,
Barthes read many texts treating pre-cenobitic monasticism. He is fasci-
nated by anchorites and idiorrythmic monks; the descriptions of their
lives have, he writes, ‘[le] même valeur de dérangement et de projection
(pour moi) que l’Extrême-Orient’ (4 May, 183). However, he also notes
that much of this reading was ‘décevant’ (12 January, 38), due to the
inevitable dominance of religious models in which, increasingly, power
is imposed. The histories of Western monasticism that he reads crystallise
around the founding of cenobitism by Pachomius in the fourth century
and the installation of the rule of St Benedict in the sixth century.2
Thenceforth, cenobitic monasteries, organised according to written rules
and a hierarchical structure, comprehensively eclipsed the independent
semi-anchoritic and idiorrythmic communities:
Le cénobitisme, comme liquidation de l’anachorétisme (érémitisme […] et
idiorrythmie, considérés comme des marginalités dangereuses, résistantes à
l’intégration dans une structure de pouvoir), est strictement contemporain
(avec Pacôme) du renversement qui a fait passer le christianisme de religion
persécutée (des martyrs) au statut de religion d’État, c’est-à-dire du Non-
Pouvoir […] au Pouvoir.
Barthes ascribes major importance to this shift, even implying that it is

in this ‘collusion de la religion et du pouvoir’ that we can locate the
‘séparation de l’Orient et de l’Occident’ (12 January, 41). His preference
here, as throughout all the teaching at the Collège de France, is for the
Eastern model: Buddhist monks of Ceylon, Egyptian pre-cenobitic
monks, and the idiorrythmic monks of Mount Athos.3 All of these
communities allow their members to reap the benefits of belonging
without being subject to strong regulation. Thus they represent for
Barthes the non-repressive ideal of idiorrythmie. On the whole, however,
Barthes’s reading of the monastic histories bears witness to the depressing
inevitability with which restrictive power structures take hold in any
given societal grouping. Idiorrythmie becomes marginalised, ridiculed,
and increasingly impossible.
In his desire to find both idiorrythmic and counter-idiorrythmic
elements Barthes turns, naturally, to literature. He is particularly
interested in the way in which space is treated in each of the five ‘textes-
tuteurs’ (Gide’s La Sequestrée de Poitiers, Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe,
Zola’s Pot-Bouille, Mann’s The Magic Mountain, and the Lausiac
History of Palladius). In accordance with the lecture series’ subtitle –
‘simulations romanesques de quelques espaces quotidiens’ – each text
exemplifies a certain ‘lieu’ or ‘maquette’: the bedroom; the den; the apart-
ment block; the sanatorium; and the desert. The texts by Gide and Defoe
treating dens take increasing precedence as the lecture series continues,
demonstrating Barthes’s pre-eminent interest in the organisation of soli-
tary life. He is intrigued by the horrifying insalubrity in Gide’s account of
the real-life ‘séquestrée’ who lived imprisoned for twenty-five years in a filthy
room in her mother’s house. On a related note, he includes some excerpts
from A la Recherche du temps perdu which refer to tante Léonie, ‘[qui]
“n’a pas voulu quitter Combray” (= territoire), puis sa maison (= repaire),
puis son lit (niche, nid)’ (20 April, 157). This fascination with the private
space recurs in Le Neutre and La Préparation du roman II, and is linked
to the desire for a ‘vita nuova’ and to the possibility of creation.
Comment vivre ensemble is about the desire for a relationship to the
community that is chosen, never imposed. Barthes seeks ‘quelque chose
comme une solitude interrompue d’une façon réglée: le paradoxe, la
contradiction, l’utopie d’un socialisme des distances’ (12 January, 37).
His focus is on individualisation rather than on any homogenising
communitarian ideal or telos. This thematic desire for space and indi-
viduation is mirrored in the aerated form of the lectures. As mentioned
above, Barthes constantly reminds the listeners that these initial investi-
gations should be superseded by what the listeners themselves find
interesting about the ‘vivre-ensemble’. In this way, the lectures present a
discourse which, insofar as it can within the constraints of the magiste-
rial lecture, tries to prioritise difference and the individual choice that is
at the heart of the idiorrythmic fantasy.

Le Neutre shares the formal protocol of Comment vivre ensemble
and marshals a similarly eclectic corpus. The ideal of ‘le neutre’ is artic-
ulated initially in terms arising from structural linguistics, as ‘tout ce qui
déjoue le paradigme’ (N, 31, 18 February). The neutral can be sought or
aspired towards in one’s everyday life: Barthes explains that every ‘inflex-
ion’ of discourse or behaviour which tries to suspend or nullify conflict
provides a glimpse of the neutral ideal: ‘Tout le Neutre est esquive de
l’assertion. […] On comprend maintenant où tend le Neutre (je ne dis
pas: “ce qu’il est” car dogmatisme définitionnel; plutôt: découvrir une
région, un horizon, une direction)’ (75–76, 4 March). The dispersive
approach of Comment vivre ensemble continues. Gobbets of information
from texts and from observation of daily life are presented, but Barthes
claims, perhaps disingenuously, that he never ‘interprets’ them: ‘je prends
des bribes référentielles (en fait des bribes de lecture) et je leur fais subir
une anamorphose: procédé connu de tout l’art manièriste’ (98, 18
March). The neutral is found in an endlessly unfurling series of ‘nuances’:
Buddha being offered a flower by his disciple; the complex aesthetic of
the Japanese tea ceremony; the hyper-awareness that Baudelaire
describes as the result of taking hash; the variegated appearance of
watered silk; Pyrrho’s student Eurylochus swimming across a river to
escape from persistent questioning; Zen koans. All of these exemplify a
singularity which loosens the compacity of a doxa based on conflict and
the reduction of difference.
Throughout his career, Barthes worked towards ‘the neutral’, and
always made clear that it would be a language (momentarily) free from
ideology.4 In order to clarify this further, Barthes also devotes lectures to
traits which go against the neutral, such as arrogant language, aggressive
questioning, reductive conceptualisation. The canvas is large: Barthes
devotes one trait to ‘les idéosphères’ and the powerful consistency of
‘systèmes langagiers forts’ such as psychoanalytic language and the
discourse of Christianity (124, 25 March). However, his most revealing
examples are those taken from everyday life. In a discussion of the arro-
gance of language, he quotes a journalistic reference to the pianist Alfred
Cortot: ‘j’ai lu cette semaine dans la presse une phrase typiquement arro-
gante. […] [I]l pourrait s’agir de politique, mais non: de musique […]:
“quand le plus grand pianiste français de ce siècle meurt, le 15 juin 1962,
il y a […] de la gêne dans l’air”’. Barthes objects to this loftiness, which
he considers both a solecism and an aggression: ‘ce genre de palmarès
expéditif est inacceptable: en art, pas de “le plus grand”. […] Arrogance
insupportable’ (80, 11 March). His point is not that the expression of
personal opinion leads to arrogance; indeed, Barthes believes the overt

assumption of subjectivity in one’s discourse is vital. The problem is the
masking of personal interest under a mendaciously ‘objective’ discourse.
As such, this snippet from Télérama represents an example of ideology
itself, whose primary characteristic, as Barthes has demonstrated ever
since Mythologies, is the presentation of vested interests as ‘natural’ and
inevitable.5 Countering this, the ‘tentative idiorrythmique’ as well as the
‘désir de neutre’ would work towards the suspension of the ‘discours du
Il va de soi’ (CVE, 81, 9 February) and its false, reductive ‘naturalness’.
Le Neutre strides across its various terrains of knowledge more confi-
dently than its predecessor. Where Comment vivre ensemble tended often
to conceal Barthes’s desire for retreat and silence under material which
treated these subjects dispassionately, Le Neutre articulates clearly
Barthes’s intense desire for an alternative to the conflictual logosphere
he inhabits. More personal anecdotes are included. Barthes also demon-
strates more spontaneity, reading out ‘supplements’ in the form of letters,
remarks and reading suggestions from listeners at the start of many of
the lectures. One of the supplements leads to an exemplary performance
of the neutral on Barthes’s part: on 13 May 1978, he reads out an ill-
spelled anonymous letter he has just received, which implies that if he,
Barthes, is so troubled by the demands of public life, then ‘vous n’avez
qu’à vous retirer et nous “foutre la paix” aussi!’ (177). Commenting
wryly on the patronising and aggressive nature of anonymous commu-
nications, Barthes decides to insert, at this point in the series, the figure
on ‘La Retraite’, which was originally scheduled to be delivered later on:
‘Donc, pour répondre à l’anonyme: je me retirerai (y compris du Collège)
à mon rythme, et non sur injonction!’ (190).
Where the metaphors used to describe the methodology of Comment
vivre ensemble connoted tentativeness (the flickering lamp), those in Le
Neutre imply skill. Barthes is a diviner: ‘J’ai promené le Neutre […] le
long […] d’un réseau de lectures, c’est-à-dire d’une bibliothèque […].
[C]ertains passages peuvent cristalliser autour de la notion de Neutre
comme une sourcellerie fantaisiste: je lis, la baguette se lève’ (33–34, 18
February). He identifies his pedagogical practice with that of the Sophists,
quoting Bacon’s account of Aristotle, who derided the Sophists’ non-
dogmatic approach by saying that they were like cobblers who, rather
than teaching people how to make shoes, instead set out a large variety
of shoes to be examined (36, 18 February). Barthes is on the side of
Epictetus, who writes ‘A carpenter does not come up to you and say
“Listen to me discourse about the art of carpentry”, but he makes a
contract for a house and builds it. Do the same thing yourself’.6 He sets
out a variety of neutral traits rather than defining the concept of the
neutral. He conceives of teaching as ‘apprentissage’ rather than instruc-
tion.7 Again, this ideal is associated by Barthes with Eastern spaces,
always the locus, for Barthes, of discretion. He wants his teaching to be
like that of the calligrapher: ‘le maître [oriental] ne corrige pas, il
accomplit devant l’élève ce que l’élève doit peu à peu accomplir seul’ (117,
25 March).
Barthes’s admiration of a (fantasised) Eastern model of teaching
means that Asian texts have a privileged place in Le Neutre’s corpus. One
of the four epigraphs to the lecture series is an excerpt from Lao-Tzu, in
which he describes himself as lacking all the certainty, intelligence and
aptitudes of other people.8 Barthes is fascinated by the Tao model of the
‘sage’ who is not concerned with valorising his self-image and exists
peacefully without engaging in argument. Skeptic texts are prioritised for
similar reasons: the Skeptical ideal of ‘épochè’ aims to suspend the
‘données conflictuelles du discours’ (N, course summary, 261), and thus
is associated by Barthes with the means to dissolve the compacity of the
‘discours du Il va de soi’. The Skeptics do not hold categorical opinions,
particularly where non-evident issues are concerned, in the belief that
such opinions will lead almost automatically to conflict. The typical
Skeptic utterance, as Benson Mates tells us, is ‘dokei moi’: ‘it seems to
me now’. Confining oneself to an openly perspectival point of view
means, ultimately, that ‘there will be less strife’.9 Barthes frequently
mentions the Pyrrhonic suspension of dogmatism, and seeks for a prolon-
gation of such neutral conduct in more recent texts, such as Rousseau’s
Rêveries du promeneur solitaire, Tolstoy’s War and Peace, and, inter-
mittently, Blanchot’s L’Entretien infini.
Prefiguring the concerns of La Préparation du roman II and its metic-
ulous accounts of the would-be writer’s practical organisation of the day
and of the writing room, the Neutre lectures are threaded through by
many quotations from accounts of the lives of writers, such as a biog-
raphy of Spinoza and Thomas de Quincey’s Confessions. Maria van
Rysselberghe’s Cahiers de la petite dame are referred to particularly
often, as Barthes savours her descriptions of Gide’s crotchety reactions
to the intellectual squabbles of his day.10 All of these texts are valued for
their consideration of a life apart from sociality. Having already exam-
ined religious retreat in Comment vivre ensemble, he examines the
writer’s retreat in the longest figure in the Neutre series, ‘Retraite’.
Rousseau’s, Swedenborg’s and Proust’s withdrawals from social life and
the conscecration of their days to writing provide potent material for
Barthes’s fantasy: ‘retraite évidemment liée à l’idée d’une mutation
radicale, complète de vie: fantasme très actif, surtout quand on vieillit (le
problème étant non pas de vieillir, mais entrer vivant dans la vieillesse)’
(N, 191, 13 May). The fantasies of all four of Barthes’s lecture series can
be seen at this juncture in Le Neutre: idiorrythmie, the neutral and the
novel are all present in the fantasy of a room of one’s own, far removed
from one’s normal tasks, in which everything is, spatially, just right for
writing: ‘le Neutre serait une pratique subtile de la bonne distance entre
les repères (y compris les repères humains de l’espace affectif. Neutre =
espacement (production d’espace) et non distanciation, mise à distance’
(189–90, 13 May). This rejoins Comment vivre ensemble’s fantasy of
‘l’aporie d’une mise en commun des distances’ (CVE, 37, 12 January),
and the desire to ‘change[r] de place, […] [de] naître de nouveau’ (PR,
284, 19 January 1980) through the postulated writing of a novel which
would be ‘un discours sans arrogance, [qui] ne m’intimide pas; […] une
pratique de discours qui ne fasse pas pression sur autrui: […] ¡ Roman:
écriture du Neutre? (PR, 41, 9 December 1978). Beneficial intersubjec-
tive distance, and the desire for non-oppressive speech, as explored in
Comment vivre ensemble and Le Neutre respectively, are the prerequi-
sites for the ultimate fantasy of an affective writing which is in no way
intimidatory. The novel is, for Barthes, the emblem of such a writing.
Spatialisation and the fantasme
Spatialisation is the pre-eminent metaphor linking all the lecture courses,

but especially Comment vivre ensemble and Le Neutre. Space is disper-
sive and freeing.11 In line with the ‘impure’ ideals of Leçon, these lecture
series are set up as broad, open areas of investigation, constituting an
idiorrythmic space: ‘l’idiorrythmique ne protège pas une “pureté”, c’est-
à-dire une identité. Son mode d’implantation dans l’espace: non la
concentration, mais la dispersion’ (CVE, 94, 2 March). Rhythm itself is
spatial for Barthes, who has learned from Émile Benveniste’s article on
rhythm that rhuthmos originally referred to a distinctive, individualised
form.12 According to Benveniste, it was after Plato that rhythm came to
be conceived of as an established order imposed upon the individual from
the outside. Barthes seeks a return to rhythm as a ‘forme improvisée,
modifiable […]; configuration sans fixité ni nécessité naturelle’ (CVE,
38, 12 January).13 Power works by imposing a rhythm on the individual
which is not in keeping with that individual’s own rhythm: Barthes illus-
trates this by describing a mother dragging along, too fast, a child who
cannot keep up. This ‘dysrythmie’ is something Barthes wishes to avoid
in his lectures, staying insofar as he can in the same place and at the same
pace as the listeners. And all of them, listeners and speaker, should main-
tain between each other a ‘distance inter-individuelle’ and also a ‘distance
critique’ with relation to the workings of ideology (CVE, 178, 4 May).
Geographical space and social space merge into the same ideal, which
Barthes wishes to provide in the articulation of his fantasmes.
But, given the quiddity of the fantasy, can it really be used produc-
tively in the teaching of individuals each with their own history and
fantasies? Barthes’s implicit conviction is that the fantasmatic method as
well as the invocation of literature will allow his listeners the space to
recognise their own desires in what he is discussing. Taking his cue from
Barthes’s discussion of the fantasy as a ‘Dialectique du Désir et de
l’Amour, d’Érôs et d’Agapè’ (PR, 39), Kris Pint has dealt sensitively with
this question. Pint suggests that ‘Barthes’ method of teaching tried to
reconcile the loneliness of Eros – an incommunicable phantasmatic
involvement of the subject in that one object of desire – with Agapè, a
sympathetic, universal care of the other’. Pint also suggests that it is the
agapè-esque model of sympathy for the other which Barthes values above
all in the reading process. In reading literature we encounter ‘a sympa-
thetic Other which offers [us] a discourse that helps to put [our] affects
into words’.14 Barthes sought to provide this experience in a teaching
consisting of an eclectic, shifting set of vignettes and ideas in which each
member of the audience might find, at least momentarily, the ‘sympa-
thetic Other’ or the expression of their own desire. This model
incorporates the ideal of the vivre-ensemble itself. The fantasy is shared,
socially, but a beneficial distance is maintained by the non-dogmatic
method which permits the listener her own space of response.
Additionally, Barthes guards against his fantasme being hermetically
sealed by staging his subjectivity in a certain way. As Claude Coste has
noted, the importance of a fully assumed subjectivity does not equate to
biographism.15 Rather, the ‘je’ that Barthes articulates frequently opens
out into generality. Barthes points out how his particular fantasme relates
to very generic fantasies, such as the fantasies of retreating to the country
(CVE, 59) or of decluttering (CVE, 171). When he discusses the ‘prox-
emics’ of his own bedroom at night, he is really describing a universal
particular: ‘Soir: je me couche, j’éteins, je m’enfonce sous les couvertures
pour dormir. Mais j’ai envie de me moucher. Dans l’obscurité, j’allonge
le bras, j’atteins sans me tromper le premier tiroir de la table de nuit…’
(CVE, 155, 20 April). There are many such vignettes in which the audi-
ence can easily see themselves. The descriptions of negative traits also
allow Barthes to articulate widely felt feelings. In Comment vivre
ensemble, he examines the somewhat abstruse concept of ‘xéniteia’,

which referred originally to the pre-Pachomian ascetic monk’s actual
physical solitude, as well as to his mental sensation of exile. Barthes gives
the rich connotations of xéniteia contemporary resonance by explaining
it as the feeling of being foreign within one’s own country, social class,
and institutions: ‘Par exemple, si l’on permet cet exemple très personnel,
chaque fois que je lis Le Monde: je suis pris d’un accès de Xéniteia’ (175,
27 April). We are all susceptible to this feeling that the world is going
about its business in a way that is not quite in tune with ourselves.
Discussing the relation between xéniteia and the mercenary soldier’s
‘peregrinations’ in another country, Barthes articulates this strangeness
– a sensation of being lost or ignored, which is related to the feeling of
‘accidie’ which he discussed in the opening trait of the lecture series
(‘Acédie’, pp. 53–56): ‘Et si chacun de nous […] se sentait comme merce-
naire dans le monde où il est placé: service payant et détaché de diverses
causes qui ne sont pas les nôtres, envoyés sans cesse par ces causes dans
des régions où nous sommes étrangers?’ (171, 27 April). From ancient
monasticism to his own recoiling from the style of Le Monde, by way of
the image of the exiled soldier, this particular ‘scintillation’ of Barthes’s
fantasme allows the listeners implicitly to think about their own frustra-
tions – perhaps the irritations of work or of family relationships – and
thus to engage further with the desire for space which Barthes is sketching.
Occasionally, however, Barthes’s ‘je’ in the lectures is exclusive rather
than inclusive. This occurs particularly when Barthes talks about the
demands placed upon him as a public intellectual. At the end of the first
Neutre lecture, within the figure on ‘La Fatigue’, Barthes describes this
weariness: ‘forme de fatigue: celle de la “position”, du “rapport à”:
“Comment vous situez-vous par rapport au marxisme, au freudisme, à
x, à y?” […] Fatigue: la demande de position. Le monde actuel en est
plein […], et c’est pour cela qu’il est si fatigant: difficulté à flotter, à
changer de place” (N, 45, 18 February). Both Le Neutre and Comment
vivre ensemble bear witness to Barthes’s despair at the way in which a
parti pris is always required of him. The intellectual must have a firm
view on everything, and it is difficult to shift allegiances, or to have none.
Every position solidifies. Similarly, every community ultimately becomes
sclerotised by hierarchical power, as its cause, customs and regulations
become increasingly rigid. Groups too cannot ‘float’ or ‘change place’.
Comment vivre ensemble poses, throughout, the question of whether one
can have ‘un (petit) groupe sans Télos’. ‘Un tel groupe est-il viable? […]
N’y a-t-il pas affinité entre l’idiorrythmie et l’absence de Télos et
inviabilité d’un groupe sans Télos? Autrement dit: le groupe
idiorrythmique est-il possible?’ (CVE, 83, 9 February). The sad answer,

for Barthes, is that such a group cannot exist: this lecture series frequently
documents the way in which every community ultimately becomes a
ground for the exercise of power. Barthes’s point here, as Patrick ffrench
has stated, is a political one: ‘[Every community] ends up mirroring the
society from which it separates, and Barthes suggests this particularly of
the communities established in the wake of 1968 in France’.16 The idior-
rythmic ideal can only ever be attained briefly, in the ‘flashes’ or
‘scintillations’ by which Barthes structures his lectures. The ideal itself is
fragile, hedged about on all sides by the calcifying forces of collective
regulation. To suspend the urge towards the telos, as to suspend the
‘demande de position’ discussed in Le Neutre, requires strength and vigi-
lance. This is why Barthes’s ‘neutral’ is a strong value, ‘intense, fort, inouï’
(N, 32, 18 February). Neutral values are viewed negatively in our logos-
phere as being weak and passive; trying to suspend conflict by espousing
neutral values requires, he says, an extreme concentration of energy –
that of assuming ‘l’image (fausse, mais inévitable) du flasque, <du
feutré>!’ (N, 104, 18 March). This energy is particularly required given
the very politicised nature of intellectual life in the 1970s in France.
In Le Neutre, Barthes imagines abandoning the situations which
require of him to articulate, in his capacity as public intellectual, a
factional point of view. He quotes at length an anecdote from the Cahiers
de la petite dame which seems to him to be ‘parodiquement prémonitoire
à l’égard de ce qui arrive quotidiennement à l’intellectuel d’aujourd’hui’.
Being badgered to sign a certain manifesto, and not fully caring about
the issue involved, Gide ultimately says in exasperation, ‘Je ne réponds
rien, je laisse tomber, je suis en voyage’ (N, 148–49, 29 April). Barthes
savours this inactivity for its refusal of the conflictual machinery of the
manifesto and counter-manifesto: ‘Leçon de neutre (non aplati, imperti-
nent, et même drôle face à tous ces casse-pieds sérieux de l’engagement)’
(150). Most of this lecture is given over to the creativity of ‘réponses à
côté’ (148) and the ways in which such responses, by refusing to answer
unsought questions directly, allow other forms of dialogue to resonate.
Thinking about the manner in which Zen koans tend to puncture
pomposity, Barthes imagines having the audacity to practise a similar
feint:
Imaginez un instant qu’aux grandes questions pompeuses, arrogantes,
dissertatives, dont est abusivement tissée notre vie sociale, politique, matière
à interviews, à tables rondes, etc. ([…] “Pensez-vous que l’écrivain cherche
la vérité? ‘Pensez-vous que l’écriture est vie?’, etc.), imaginez que quelqu’un
réponde: ‘Je me suis acheté une chemise chez Lanvin’, ‘Le ciel est bleu comme
une orange’, ou que, si cette question vous est posée en public, vous vous
leviez, enleviez un soulier, le mettiez sur votre tête et quittiez la salle ¡ actes
absolus car déjouant toute complicité de réponse, toute interprétation. (N,
156)
Not able to perform such feats, Barthes merely imagines them instead in
his lectures. His notes for Le Neutre reveal his belief that the only way
he could truly avoid the demands for opinion and judgment that are
constantly ‘targeted’ at him, even while he is in a period of deep
mourning, would be to suspend his presence to the world by means of a
drastic physical retreat: ‘le monastère, le désert – l’érémetisme’ (N, 255).
We see here, more clearly than in Comment vivre ensemble itself, the
subjacent reasons for the choice of depopulated scenes in that series.
Sewn through all the irenic themes of Comment vivre ensemble and
Le Neutre is the question of how to protect oneself from the regimes of
meaning and sociality prevalent in one’s society. As can readily be seen,
the fantasy of a space pure of the will to power that tends to be inscribed
within language is one that has been constant in Barthes’s work since his
first book, Le Degré zéro de l’écriture (1953). He has always seen himself
as marginal. Discussing this in an interview in 1978, Barthes says that
his writing is always concerned with ‘un sujet délibérément marginal par
rapport à toutes les formes de société’. This is a subject wilfully setting
himself aside from ‘[les] grands espoirs, de type massif, sociaux’. Implicit
in this is Barthes’s view of himself as intellectually marginal, ‘individu-
alis[t]e’.17 This ‘individualism’, which smacks somewhat of a romantic
pose, is a strategy that Barthes has pursued throughout his career as part
of what Stephen Heath called a ‘vertige du déplacement’.18 By the late
1970s this strategy has acquired a more stubborn and self-protective
edge. This is partly attributable to Barthes’s personal circumstances, not
least his increased fame – including the weekly spectacle of the Collège
lectures themselves – and his grief after his mother’s death in late 1977.
However, the lectures’ articulation of an explicit desire for marginality,
and their imagining of spaces and behaviours at a remove from collec-
tive topoi, is also a response to the normative aspects of Barthes’s
intellectual context. The lectures clearly represent a concerted step aside
from the political demands of the post-’68 Parisian milieu, and from
narratives of intellectual legitimation, including standard utopianism.
Patrick ffrench has drawn attention to the manner in which much of
Barthes’s late work ‘can be read as a counter-strategy to the intense politi-
cization of the [1970s], deflecting the demand for politics toward a subtle
and delicate ethics of affective and corporeal relations’.19 Such a ‘deli-
cacy’ is unsystematic. This is demonstrated by Barthes’s refusal, at the
end of Comment vivre ensemble, to construct a utopia of the vivre-
ensemble. For Barthes believes that all utopias, from Plato to Fourier,
search for ‘une façon idéale d’organiser le pouvoir’ (177, 4 May).
Fundamentally, Barthes finds most utopian thought dissatisfying not
only because of its regulatory urge, but also because its canvas tends to
be too large, and thus reductive of individual difference. This is a long-
standing view of Barthes’s: in 1963, he explained to interviewers that ‘les
grands mouvements d’émancipation idéologique – disons, pour parler
clairement, le marxisme’, as well as ‘[les] grande[s] utopie[s]’, consistently
fail to discuss ‘l’homme privé’ and ‘la possibilité du bonheur’. While
many ‘interspatial’ utopias have been described, he says, ‘l’espèce de
micro-utopie qui consisterait à imaginer des utopies psychologiques ou
relationnelles, cela n’existe absolument pas’.20 At the Collège de France,
he explicitly seeks to sketch such a ‘micro-utopie’, which would be, he
says in Comment vivre ensemble, ‘la recherche figurative du Souverain
Bien quant à l’habiter’ (177). This ‘Souverain Bien’ involves a profound
principle of ‘individuation’ (178). The positive charge of the lectures is
their focus on such individuation. In this respect Barthes’s utopian
thought bears similarities to that of Adorno, who expresses in Minima
Moralia a similar desire for heterogeneity and the non-identical:
Abstract utopia is all too compatible with the most insidious tendencies of
society. That all men are alike is exactly what society would like to hear.
[…] An emancipated society, on the other hand, would not be a unitary state,
but the realization of universality in the reconciliation of differences.21
This non-systematic, Romantic prioritisation of differences is at the heart

of Barthes’s ‘contingent, anonym[ous]’ utopia (CVE, 177). In his superb
discussion of the ethics of deferral and distance in Comment vivre
ensemble, ffrench links Barthes’s deferral of utopia to his attitude
towards the political: ‘“Putting it off until later” not only suggests utopia
(a never-to-be-realized social state); it is also congruent with Barthes’s
mistrust of the hysteria of speech, of the demand inherent in face-to-face
discourse’.22 Barthes’s temporal deferral – a tactic employed again in La
Prépration du roman – is mirrored by the spatial distance that is so impor-
tant in the organisation of the cours – separation, distinction, mistrust of
the whole.
Barthes and his Contemporaries: Factionalism, Politics
The lectures show Barthes in open reaction against collective explana-

tory discourses. Marxism and psychoanalysis in particular are at this
point associated by Barthes with a pernicious ‘arrogance’: ‘l’arrogance
du discours agresse partout où il y a foi, certitude, volonté de saisir, de

dominer’ (N, 195, 20 May). Additionally, Barthes associates Marxist and
Freudian discourses with the prioritising of conflict in Western discourse
generally. These ‘philosophies du conflit’ involve an ‘amplification’ and
‘approfondissement’ of conflict, naturalising it by making it ‘un moteur,
un fonctionnement’ (N, 166, 6 May).23 This is a naturalisation which
Barthes seeks to reveal and suspend, as Le Neutre makes clear. Barthes’s
rejection of such globalising theoretical discourses is the sign of his
profound distaste for the intellectual norms of his day. However, as we
shall see, this refusal to perpetuate what Lyotard was at this time dubbing
the ‘grand narratives’ of theory also has some points in common with the
anti-totalising turn in French thought that was occurring at this time.
Barthes’s urge for individualism can be condemned as a tactic of self-
protective enclosure. However, it is necessary to recognise, in his rejection
of conflictual collective narratives such as those provided by Marxism
and psychoanalysis, a concerned reading of the contemporary crisis in
socialism and left-liberalism.24 The intellectual left is somewhat rudder-
less during this period. After the post-war phase of Marxist hegemony
headed by figures such as Sartre and Althusser, the 1970s see the crum-
bling away of the previously solid Marxist system of reference, as there
is unease regarding Soviet expansionism and growing realisation of the
genocides and atrocities on which Stalin’s and Mao’s regimes were based.
As has been well documented elsewhere, the publication of Solzhenitsyn’s
The Gulag Archipelago in France in 1974 was extremely important in
this regard, transforming French intellectual politics in the latter half of
the 1970s.25 Immediately following the publication of Solzhenitsyn’s text,
philosophers such as André Glucksmann, Claude Lefort and Bernard-
Henri Lévy began publishing works condemning Marxism and
totalitarianism.26 By 1977–78 such writers’ works had crystallised into
an anti-totalitarian movement incorporating a critique of the Parti
communiste français (PCF). The journal Tel Quel, largely as a result of
editor Philippe Sollers’s devoted (and contra-PCF) Maoism in the wake
of ’68, had had a period of lefter-than-left Maoist fervour, which ended
decisively in 1976 as the horrifying reports of life in revolutionary China
became impossible to ignore.27 Sollers abandoned Maoism in order to
ally himself with those who advocated the repudiation of Marxism –
notably Lévy, and also other members of the group of anti-Marxist
‘nouveaux philosophes’, including Maurice Clavel.
This political and inter-intellectual allegiance-forming is precisely the
type of factionalism that Barthes claims he has no time for, as his delight
in Gide’s dismissal of politico-intellectual squabbles makes clear. The
lectures, especially the Neutre series, evince a profound desire to distance

himself from the essentially conflictual nature of political debate. In Le
Neutre he rather airily states that he is not interested in making statements
either for or against the ‘nouveaux philosophes’, the controversial intel-
lectual story du jour: ‘Nouveaux philosophes ¡ moi: trop pyrrhonien
pour connaître mon propos d’adhésion ou de refus’ (N, 118, 25 March).
This is disingenuous, given some ongoing politico-intellectual allegiances,
especially those formed through his great friend Sollers. In May 1977,
Barthes writes a distinctly partisan open letter praising Lévy for his
Barbarie à visage humain, then just published.28 This letter may perhaps
have been written at Sollers’s request: Christofferson tells us that Sollers
was heavily involved in promoting Lévy’s book.29 Barthes’s public
allegiance to Sollers’s intellectual project, as evidenced by his preparation
for publication, during 1978, of a collection of his articles on Sollers is
significant, and sits at odds with Barthes’s avowed abjuring of politico-
intellectual gamesmanship.30 In the Neutre lecture of 13 May, Barthes
discusses Sollers under the rubric of ‘Oscillation’, arguing that Sollers is
resented for his unwillingness to adhere to one intellectual position only
and for his unsettling of the ‘unité du discours intellectuel’. Barthes praises
Sollers’s struggle against ‘la tendance de l’image à se stabiliser, à se retenir’
(N, 13 May, 173). His assessment of Sollers thus sits with his more general
dissatisfaction with a doxa premised upon consistency and stereotype.
Nonetheless, this ardent defence of one of the most provocatively polem-
ical intellectual figures then active in France is very jarring in the context
of Barthes’s advocation of the suspension of conflictual values. Indeed,
Barthes’s valuable support of Tel Quel throughout this decade, though it
is likely to have been premised upon personal friendships rather than
support for the journal’s at times almost hysterical prises de position,
presupposes a set of intellectual allegiances that are far from neutral.31
Affiliations such as this govern to a certain extent Barthes’s profes-
sional choices during this period. The decision to publish his article
‘Délibération’ in Tel Quel in 1979, for example, may have been taken as
an overt act of allegiance to Sollers. These choices do not equate,
however, to any alignment with a particular intellectual position. The
lectures make it very clear that Barthes is urgently concerned with the
postulation of a discourse that is exempt from the collective. As Yue Zhuo
states, Barthes persistently demonstrates his ‘resistance to the mandated
discursive continuities of the group, to the historical flow and to the
myths of fusional collectivity’.32 The crisis in liberalism brought about
by the end of faith in Marxism is, as communality of crisis, something
from which Barthes distinguishes himself. It is significant, though, that
Barthes’s focuses at this time bear striking resemblances to some of the

broader intellectual preoccupations of the day, themselves in reaction to
the crisis and informed by a sceptical spirit similar to Barthes’s. Notable
in this context is Jean-François Lyotard’s Instructions païennes (1977),
an important precursor to La Condition postmoderne (1979).33 The text
is written in a quasi-Socratic dialogue form, and is partly taken up by
mocking references to the cliquishness of the nouveaux philosophes.
More seriously, it calls for a localisation of knowledge which would reject
the grand narratives that have previously organised intellectual response,
notably Marxist and Freudian narratives. Lyotard advocates an end to
the ‘piety’ which these discourses have previously inspired, arguing that
in the case of Marxism, this has had pernicious results: ‘l’injustice que
[le récit marxiste] engendre procède de la piété même qu’il appelle et qu’il
exige’.34 Countering such faith, an ‘instruction païenne’ would consist in
a beneficial scepticism, notably with regard to the grand narratives. A
‘pagan’ political or ethical programme would be one that disdains the
universal and the ‘prétention à l’omnitemporalité’, and eschews the ills
of doctrinal allegiances.35 This loss of piety would lead to a beneficial
particularisation of knowledge.
Lyotard was to build upon these anti-universalist ideas in subsequent
texts: as his rallying cry in Le Postmoderne expliqué aux enfants puts it,
‘guerre au tout, témoignons de l’imprésentable, activons les différends,
sauvons l’honneur du nom’.36 His metaphor of impiety – and indeed the
sceptical aspects of Lyotard’s theory of the postmodern generally –
furnishes an interesting parallel with the methodology and critical spirit
present in Barthes’s lectures.37 The patchworked, ‘unschooled’ method
of Comment vivre ensemble and Le Neutre represents an approach to
knowledge that is wilfully ‘pagan’. Barthes comments on this explicitly
when discussing his use of the monastic material in Comment vivre
ensemble: ‘je dois préciser ceci: une théorie de la lecture est possible. […]
Lire en s’abstrayant du signifié: lire les Mystiques sans Dieu. […] Il faut
imaginer ce qui se passerait si l’on généralisait la méthode de lecture par
exemption du signifié, de tout signifié’. Barthes provides as an example
the idea of reading Sartre without allowing the signified of ‘engagement’
to dominate one’s reading. The reading thereby arrived at would be
‘souverainement libre’:
la loi vient toujours du signifié, en tant qu’il est donné et reçu comme dernier.
Les effets d’une exemption de la foi, où qu’elle se trouve (y compris
aujourd’hui de la foi politique qui a remplacé la foi religieuse pour toute la
caste intellectuelle), sont […] incalculables, presque insupportables. <C’est
pour ça que c’est une théorie à venir.> Car ce qu’il s’agit de périmer, de rendre
insignifiant, ce sont les générateurs de culpabilité. (CVE, 19 January, 43)
The literal reading-without-God of the monastic material is a micro-

cosm of the more general reading-without-faith, or reading without the
Il va de soi, that occurs in Barthes’s material more generally. This refusal
of telos is central to the fantasmes of the first two lecture series, and also
is an instance of Barthes’s refusal of the ‘signifieds’ of politics. In a 1975
interview, Barthes states when prompted that his relationship to the polit-
ical is ‘discret, mais obsédé’. There is an important distinction to be made
between ‘“le” politique’ (the political), which is ‘un ordre fondamental
de l’histoire, de la pensée, de tout ce qui se fait, de tout ce qui se parle’
(and which, since it is related to reality itself, is central to his work),
and“la” politique’, which is politics qua ‘discours ressassant, discours de
la répétition’, and is therefore intolerable. Barthes remarks in this inter-
view that his position as an intellectual who does not wish to produce
political discourse is ‘souvent culpabilisée’. He concludes that one of the
urgent tasks of the contemporary ‘avant-garde’ is to attack this problem
of the intellectual’s sense of ‘culpabilité’ with regard to politics: ‘ce qu’on
cherche, c’est un mode de présence dans le discours du politique qui ne
soit pas ressassant’.38 The method of Comment vivre ensemble and of Le
Neutre, as the quotation regarding ‘exemption de foi’ above makes clear,
evolves out of a desire to de-pietise, in the face of a leftist orthodoxy that
has become stifling, both the role of the intellectual and the standard
topoi of intellectual enquiry: as he puts it in Le Neutre, ‘ne pas oublier
que nous sommes très précisément dans une phase active de déconstruc-
tion “saine” de la “mission” de l’intellectuel: cette déconstruction peut
prendre la forme d’un retrait, mais aussi d’un brouillage, d’une série d’af-
firmations décentrées’ (N, 173, 6 May).
The ‘discreet but obsessed’ relation to the political appears themati-
cally throughout Comment vivre ensemble and Le Neutre. It shapes Le
Neutre’s valorisation of indirect response. The ideal of ‘discretion’ is
constant. In Comment vivre ensemble, Barthes discusses his weariness of
the dogmatic loquacity of political discourse using the term ‘parrèsia’
(frankness). Barthes interprets this as any ‘excès social de langage,
arrogance de language, volonté d’appropriation par le langage, vouloir-
saisir par le langage’. The ideal instead would be a quasi-Taoist ‘maîtrise’
or reserve in language (CVE, 172, 27 April). Le Neutre expands on this
discreet ideal at great length in figures such as ‘Silence’, ‘Délicatesse’,
‘Fatigue’, ‘Retraite’ and ‘Wou-Wei’. Tact and the implicit are themes
throughout and their valorisation is a political point itself, as Barthes
points out. Totalitarian societies forbid the implicit, ‘car l’implicite, c’est
la pensée qui échappe au pouvoir’. But in democratic societies too, the
implicit is frowned upon. Barthes speaks with repugnance of the
moralism of frankness – an imperative which, when deployed in institu-

tional and political language, forecloses nuance: ‘Laïcisation du rejet de
l’implicite, morale de la franchise. […] Nous en avons maintenant un
surgeon politique. Politique = non dit ¡ Donc on dit sans cesse qu’on dit
tout’. He associates frankness with aggression and stupidity: ‘Combien
de fois, dans notre vie, nous avons affaire à des gens “francs”: […] on se
dédouane d’être indélicat (sans délicatesse); mais ce qu’il y a de pire avec
la franchise, c’est qu’elle est en général une porte […] grande ouverte sur
la bêtise’ (N, 25 February, 52–53). The anti-axiomatic urge of the Neutre
series – ‘le Neutre ne peut se dire franchement’39 – is as much an attack
on the deceptive catchphrases of politicians (and fellow intellectuals) as
it is a furious defence of the value of the implicit. From this defence
follows Barthes’s willed abstention from the discourses by which he is
surrounded. This is why Montaigne is the exemplary intellectual figure
for Barthes: he placed a high value on reserve and judiciousness, but the
vitality of his engagement with the issues of his own time was in no way
lessened by this. Barthes contrasts this ‘abstinence pyrrhonienne’ sadly
with the more broad-brush intellectual imperatives of his own time:
Montaigne, en 1576, fait frapper un jeton avec […] une balance en équilibre
et une devise pyrrhonienne: ‘Je m’abstiens’. […] [I]l faudrait […] interroger
soigneusement Montaigne: vie et œuvre, pour dégager en quoi ou là où il ne
s’est pas abstenu (car homme très mêlé à son temps et mêlé publiquement):
c’est-à-dire, non pas réviser, mais affiner la doctrine sartrienne de
l’engagement, maniée par les intellectuels depuis vingt ans <en France>, un
peu brutalement. [<avec rudesse>] (N, 227, 27 May)40
This resistance to the simply political is seen also in Comment vivre

ensemble, in Barthes’s refusal to examine ‘macro-groupements’ – groups
structured by power – or the groupuscules of May ’68. He deliberately
focuses instead on the idios and the ‘redoutable problème’ of distance
(CVE, 110), via an arcane Greek classificatory vocabulary. This ‘discreet’
but still ‘obsessed’ relation to the vivre-ensemble is also seen in the anti-
teleological finale of the series, with its absence of a ‘utopia’ of the
vivre-ensemble.
Community: Barthes, Blanchot, Nancy
The most striking overlap between Barthes’s thought at this time and that
of his contemporaries crystallises around the theme of community. The
disenchantment with ‘grand narratives’ and concerns about de-localised
political appropriation of meaning is partly at the root of a movement in
French thought in the early 1980s which considered the question of

community. Barthes’s reflections in 1977 on the sclerotic movement by
which all communities become suffused by power can be seen as prefig-
uring the studies of community written six years later by Maurice
Blanchot and Jean-Luc Nancy, both of whom are influenced by Bataille’s
pre-war thinking regarding community.41 A more recent account of
community which partly resonates with Barthes’s ideas is Giorgio
Agamben’s The Coming Community.42 At first glance the impossibility
of Barthes’s vivre-ensemble would appear to have much in common with
Blanchot’s ‘unavowable’ community. This is misleading. Blanchot’s
Communauté inavouable is concerned with May ’68 and with the rela-
tionship of the ill-matched couple in Duras’s La Maladie de la mort.43
These discussions cover the models of community Barthes explicitly
leaves out of his fantasy of ‘living-together’ (the couple, and the group-
with-a-cause; both, in Blanchot’s analysis, shortlived). Blanchot believes
that May ’68 was a form of community ‘sans projet’, and celebrates its
‘liberté de parole’ in a heady Romantic idiom: ‘Le Dire primait le dit. La
poésie était quotidienne. […] [C’était] une manière encore jamais vécue
de communisme que nulle idéologie n’était à même de récupérer ou de
revendiquer. Pas de tentatives sérieuses de réformes, mais une présence
innocente…’44 While Barthes also celebrated the use of language in May
’68 – notably the wall posters, which represented for him ‘[une] explo-
sion de la subjectivité sauvage, […] du plaisir du langage’45 – his attitude
towards any group’s ‘prise de parole’ is fundamentally mistrustful.
Where Blanchot discusses interactional ethics, Barthes is more
concerned with the keeping of distance. But in its refusal of telos,
Barthes’s vivre-ensemble bears some resemblance to the version of
community proposed in Jean-Luc Nancy’s La Communauté désœuvrée
(1983). Nancy has shown that the 1980s and 1990s saw a growth of
interest in descriptions of community that were not subtended by either
a communist, or, more broadly, a communitarian project.46 Nancy shares
with Blanchot the idea that there is no graspable common substance to
the community. Focusing on the relation between individuals, Nancy
discusses in Heideggerian terms the inappropriable, resistant ‘ground’
formed by the community. He critiques the idea that a community must
always have a telos under which all goals are subsumed: this does not
have to be the case, he argues, and indeed may be pernicious. Despite this
partial overlap with Barthes’s ideas, however, Nancy’s and Blanchot’s
discussions of unknowable, inoperative communities tend, not least due
to their quasi-messianic rhetoric, to be far removed from Barthes’s, whose
focus on the individual’s ways of coping ethically and affectively with the
demands of existing amongst other people is much more particularised

– and thereby more universalisable. As Michael Sheringham notes, ‘for
Barthes, the subject – as distinct from the defined and regimented indi-
vidual, spoken for by organized knowledge – is fundamentally an
everyday subject, rooted in everydayness: in transient moods, embodied
desires, in likes and dislikes’.47 His considerations of the vivre-ensemble
do not have the ontological resonance of Blanchot’s and Nancy’s work
on community, because of their origin in the fantasme and their
unschooled, cut-up concreteness. Barthes is aware of the marked stylistic
differences between his own work and that of his most famous contem-
poraries in the fields of literary and cultural theory. He ascribes the
distinctiveness of his thought to the fact that, unlike many of his contem-
poraries, who had backgrounds in philosophy rather than literature, he
thinks ‘avec les mots et pas avec les idées; pas avec les raisonnements’.48
Barthes’s distrust of the concept leads him to organise his thought
according to metaphor instead: ‘Mes concepts n’ont pas toute la rigueur
que leur donnent d’habitude les philosophes’.49 This absence of rigour is
clearly to be figured positively, as it leads to a different emphasis and a
more experiential philosophy.
The Subject: Barthes, Foucault, Hadot
The subject, in Barthes, is never unhooked from its surroundings. The

subtitle of Comment vivre ensemble, ‘simulations romanesques de
quelques espaces quotidiens’, reminds us of this. What are the spaces
(literal, affective, linguistic) that give the subject access to a sense of the
‘Souverain Bien’ (CVE, 177)? Barthes’s preoccupation with the subject
and with how best to protect and care for it allies his late work with the
near-contemporaneous work of Michel Foucault. From 1980 onward,
Foucault reorients his work toward a consideration of the care of the self.
This shift is articulated by recourse to the canon of ancient philosoph-
ical texts, notably Plato, Seneca and Epictetus.50 Foucault’s Collège de
France lecture course Subjectivité et vérité (1980–81) marks the first
lengthy consideration of these issues. The following year’s lecture series,
L’Herméneutique du sujet (1981–82), sees Foucault beginning to elabo-
rate his ideas regarding ‘le souci de soi’, subsequently developed in the
third volume of his history of sexuality, Le Souci de soi (1984).51 He is
interested in the ancient authors that Barthes also mentions in his lectures,
and fascinated by Greek ideas of askèsis and parrèsia, and the question
of how to control one’s own negative impulses.52 Foucault was working
towards the idea that an ethical life could be conceived of in aesthetic

terms. In this sphere of enquiry, the canonical texts of classical philos-
ophy, consisting in dialogue and instruction, are examined not for what
they reveal about philosophical system, but for their advice about coping
with everyday life.
The work of Pierre Hadot, which urges a detheorisation of philos-
ophy as discipline, is at the root of Foucault’s interest in philosophy’s
relationship to lived experience. Hadot, a historian of philosophy, was
proposed at Foucault’s suggestion for a chair at the Collège de France,
and acceded to the ‘Chaire de pensée hellénistique et romaine’ in 1982.53
Hadot resists the abstraction of philosophy and insists on thought as a
spiritual exercise which aims to transform your daily life.54 His work
involves a repudiation of modern philosophy’s assumption that ancient
philosophers were attempting to construct systems of thought. Modern
philosophy is not very well able to account for the incoherencies or
contradictions in the ancient texts. Hadot’s position is that these contra-
dictions only appear as such if one’s starting point is that the systematic
construction of a body of thought was these thinkers’ goal. In fact, says
Hadot, the primary reference must be to lived experience, from which
these ancient texts emanated. Hadot lays useful emphasis on the dialogic
nature of Greco-Roman philosophy and its rootedness in the reality of
daily interaction. The ancient philosophers’ pedagogical works were not
conceived in order to communicate propositional, conceptual knowl-
edge. Rather, they sought to train disciples and help them to ‘orient
themselves in thought, in the life of the city, or in the world’.55 As he puts
it in Exercices spirituels (1977),
la philosophie ne consiste pas dans l’enseignement d’une théorie abstraite,
encore moins dans une exégèse de textes, mais dans un art de vivre, dans
une attitude concrète, dans un style de vie déterminé, qui engage toute
l’existence. L’acte philosophique ne se situe pas seulement dans l’ordre de
la connaissance, mais dans l’ordre du ‘soi’ et de l’être: c’est un progrès qui
nous fait plus être, qui nous rend meilleurs.56
This is a body of work based on praxis rather than doctrine – praxis

that we have lost sight of, in Hadot’s view. Hadot describes the Greco-
Roman pedagogical dialogues (such as those found in the writings of
Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius) as ‘spiritual exercises’, making it clear
that the term ‘spiritual’ is chosen faute de mieux: he has ‘resigned’ himself
to the use of this term because other qualitative adjectives, such as
‘psychic’, ‘moral’ or ‘intellectual’, do not cover all the aspects of the exer-
cises.57 The exercises, all of which are elaborated in the goal of guiding
the interlocutor, aimed to teach us how to cope with the difficulty of
everyday life by loosening our limited, ego-based conception of the

world, and allowing it to cede instead to an awareness of our belonging
to a more cosmic whole. Thus would true wellbeing be attained.
According to Hadot’s compelling argument, this existential ethics was
the real goal of ancient philosophy: with the installation of Christianity
as a state religion in many countries, however, philosophy gradually lost
its ‘spiritual’ remit and became restricted to theory, subsequently
becoming increasingly doctrinal and systematic.58 This abstraction of
philosophy from the matter of existence itself is the tragedy of philos-
ophy now for Hadot, who advocates a return to the exercises in order to
learn how to live more peacably in our present: ‘[Une] attention au
moment présent est en quelque sorte le secret des exercices spirituels’.59
This philosophy is interactive, concerned with the self’s imbrication with
other selves, and with the surrounding environment: ‘Le sentiment
d’appartenance à un Tout me semble être l’élément essentiel [des
exercices spirituels]: appartenance au Tout de la communauté humaine,
appartenance au Tout cosmique. Sénèque résume cela en quatre mots:
“Toti se inserens mundo”: “se plongeant dans la totalité du monde”’.60
The ancient philosophical texts teach us to care for ourselves, but never
in isolation.
Hadot’s historicisation of ancient philosophy had, as Arnold I.
Davidson has shown, a profound impact on Foucault’s thought from
1977, when he read the essay ‘Exercices spirituels’, until his death.61
Foucault found Hadot’s focus on the ethical, ‘life-based’ aspects of
ancient philosophy extremely useful for the articulation of his own
interest in an ethics of the care of the self. After Foucault’s death, Hadot
commented on Foucault’s understanding of his ideas and on his use of
ancient philosophy.62 Foucault is not wrong to insist on an ‘esthétique
de l’existence’, he writes: ‘Il est vrai que la sagesse antique consiste
partiellement dans un “souci de soi”’. However, Foucault’s exegesis of
these ideas is too limited: ‘dans cet exercice, le sage antique ne trouve pas
de plaisir dans son moi individuel, comme le pense Foucault, mais il
cherche à dépasser son moi, pour se situer à un niveau universel, pour se
replacer dans le Tout du monde dont il est une partie’.63 Foucault places
rather too much emphasis on the ‘self’ and on self-serving pleasure,
bracketing out the aspects of the Stoic texts he studies which make
reference to a more universal reality.64 Nonetheless, there is a value of
localisation in Foucault’s ‘experimentation’ on the self, as Patrick ffrench
has pointed out. Indeed, Foucault’s subjective turn could perhaps be
allied, as ffrench remarks, to Lyotard’s suggestion in Instructions
païennes that we follow individualised, ‘pagan’ ethical programmes.65
Hadot’s detheorisation of philosophy and his focus on ‘le sentiment

d’existence’ means that it is he, of all of Barthes’s contemporaries, who
provides the most illuminating gloss for Barthes’s thought. Hadot’s work
provides the scholarly elaboration, via a study of texts from the Greek
and Roman philosophers through Montaigne, Rousseau and Bergson, of
the ideas which Barthes seems to intuit with regard to the the relation
between the subject and its environment. From within philosophy, Hadot
calls for the same reorientation of philosophy towards lived experience
that Barthes, from a different angle, calls for in his lectures. Barthes too
resists conceptualisation and abstraction, in keeping with the imperatives
of ancient thought.66 Notably in Comment vivre ensemble and Le Neutre,
Barthes constantly ties his preoccupations with sociality to the real diffi-
culties of ‘life in the city’: how to keep the right distance, how to respond
to demands, how to be well in one’s work. Central to the problematics
of both these series is the ideal of ‘délicatesse’. As tact, this is a benefi-
cially spatialising force. It is also, for Barthes, a vigilant awareness of
existence similar to the ‘sentiment d’existence’ that Hadot finds central
to the ‘exercices spirituels’. In a supplement to Le Neutre, Barthes
describes this feeling:
En sortant, le soir, au crépuscule, en recevant avec intensité des détails
infimes, parfaitements futiles, de la rue: un menu écrit à la craie sur la vitre
d’un café, […] un tout petit prêtre en soutane remontant la rue Médicis, etc.,
j’ai eu cette intuition vive […] que descendre dans l’infiniment futile, cela
permettait d’avouer la sensation de la vie. […] La délicatesse est donc du
côté du vivant, de ce qui fait sentir la vie, de ce qui en active la perception:
la saveur de la vie toute pure, la jouissance d’être vivant. (N, 11 March, 79)
Le Neutre could be characterised as a quest for this blissful awareness of

life: in this way it extends Comment vivre ensemble’s search for ‘le
Souverain Bien quant à l’habiter’ (CVE, 178). But while in the Vivre
ensemble Barthes’s attention to his present is sometimes obfuscated by
the layering of his own desires with historical and literary accounts of
similar impulses, Le Neutre makes the present, existence-centred nature
of its project very clear: ‘Ce que je cherche, dans la préparation du cours,
c’est une introduction au vivre, un guide de vie (projet éthique): je veux
vivre selon la nuance’, he states in the first lecture of the series (N, 18
February, 37). The investigation of the neutral is an investigation of ‘un
rapport juste au présent, attentif et non arrogant’ (25 March, 118).
In Hadot’s account of ancient philosophy as ‘spiritual exercises’,
elaborated within a dialogic situation (teaching), and aiming to show
how to live better, we find what seems to be a parallel to Barthes’s sense
of the import of his own teaching. In the spiritual exercises, the exhibi-
tion of the ‘authentic presence’ of the philosopher, as he tries to elabo-

rate his lesson, is vital. As the philosopher struggles to articulate his sense
of what the good life might be, it is the presence of his listeners, the
concessions that must be made to them, that make the discourse prac-
tical, rather than merely dogmatic. In his lectures, Barthes seeks to
elaborate a ‘discours humain’ by exhibiting his own fantasmes. Literary
semiology is not a system: were it to be, it could only speak to other
specialists. Barthes’s conception of his role, in conjunction with the non-
reproductive educational remit of the Collège de France, means that
Barthes can teach in a manner akin to Hadot’s conception of antique
philosophy, which is a search for the sagesse that would allow us to exist
in a peaceful state, experiencing an exact vision of the world.
Comment vivre ensemble and Le Neutre are frequently deeply negative

in tone, as Barthes discusses the sclerotising effects of dogma. Comment
vivre ensemble is a historicisation of how an idiosyncratic collectivity
without telos is impossible in the context of a Western world-view which
prioritises active regulation. This series is haunted by Pachomius, the rule
of St Benedict, and many other avatars of power, whether they be bureau-
cratic or conventional. Le Neutre is suffused by an alarmed distaste for
the conflictual bases of interaction and of intellectual discourse. Thus
both series are informed by a fantasy that is in reaction against the
prevailing norms of Barthes’s society, and specifically, his political and
intellectual context. They articulate a negative: ‘Le Neutre, c’est ce Non
irréductible: un Non comme suspendu devant les endurcissements de la
foi et de la certitude et incorruptible par l’une et par l’autre’ (N, 18
February, 40). But these reactive fantasies can be turned into positives.
As Barthes tells us in Le Neutre, weariness is creative: ‘Le droit à la fatigue
[…] fait partie du nouveau: les choses nouvelles naissent de la lassitude
– du ras-le-bol’ (25 February, 49). The yearning for a retreat from norma-
tive demands figures in both these series, and is a ‘fantasme très actif’,
linked to ‘l’idée d’une mutation radicale, complète de vie’ (N, 13 May,
190). The desire for displacement figured so frequently in these lectures
is consonant with the restive nature of all of Barthes’s work.
Both series demonstrate Barthes’s inventiveness in imagining alter-
natives to the status quo. The repressive aspects of our regimes of
meaning and our ways of being together can be departed from in the
imagining of a new, positive askèsis: this is the goal of the idiorrythmic
fantasy of the vivre-ensemble, located in the space of the ‘skite’ (‘askiti-
cia’, ‘lieux d’ascèses’). In Comment vivre ensemble, Barthes imagines a
new ‘régime, genre de vie, diaita, diète’ (12 January, 36). This work
would be undertaken in a delicate language, of which we are given ‘scin-
tillations’ in Le Neutre. The fears alluded to in these first two series could
then, perhaps, be finally articulated in the novel of the Préparation’s
fantasy: ‘Peut-être le fantasme persistant du roman-à-écrire implique-t-il
ceci: puisque sans carapace, invisible à quiconque, envie d’un espace
d’écriture où ce pathos cesserait d’être clandestin’ (N, 259).
The postulation of these fantasies does not involve an abstention
from the present: Barthes makes it clear in Comment vivre ensemble and
Le Neutre that these projects are Barthes’s way of approaching his
immediate context: ‘une réflexion sur le neutre, pour moi: […] mon
propre style de présence aux luttes de mon temps’ (N, 18 February, 33).
The underlying focus of these lectures is on the grain of existence itself.
Barthes’s doleful assessment of the compulsive aspects of his logosphere
(‘le fascisme, c’est d’obliger à dire’67) is in some ways nihilistic, but there
is a core of affirmativeness allied with a fascination with the everyday
stuff of life. Tellingly, what Barthes likes most in Robinson Crusoe is its
‘quotidienneté, […] l’organisation ménagère de la vie, la hutte, le jardin
aux raisins, la bucolique’ (CVE, 16 March, 123). When events interrupt
this focus on things, enforcing a narrative, the ‘charme puissant’ of the
book is lost for him. Throughout Comment vivre ensemble and Le
Neutre, Barthes’s fantasies are situated, spatialised, involving a dream of
perfect relationality which would be unmediated by the reifying effects
of language: ‘distance et égard, absence de poids dans la relation et,
cependant, chaleur vive de cette relation. Le principe en serait: ne pas
manier l’autre, les autres, ne pas manipuler, renoncer activement aux
images (des uns, des autres). […] = Utopie proprement dite’ (CVE, 4 May,
179–80). Indeed the most striking motifs of all Barthes’s late work
involve a relationship with others articulated mutely through things: the
lover wearing dark glasses in Fragments d’un discours amoureux; the
image of the child playing with pebbles near its mother in Leçon; the
grieving Barthes going through old photographs in La Chambre claire.
As Edward Said puts it, there is a longing for ‘the silent quiddity of
objects, undisturbed by the intervening yammerings of language’.68 The
most distressing example of this longing comes in the Journal de deuil,
with its desperation for ‘la lettre’ of absolute grief in all its weight: ‘Le
chagrin, comme une pierre…/ (à mon cou, / au fond de moi)’ (JD, 117).
Language falls frustratingly short: ‘Désespoir: le mot est trop théâtral, il
fait partie du langage. / Une pierre’ (JD, 122). In this yearning for an
articulation of the materiality of his grief, Barthes takes on what, in
Leçon, he says literature too incessantly tries to tackle: ‘ce qui est toujours
un délire[:] […] l’inadéquation fondamentale du langage et du réel’

(L, 22).
In his reachings for everyday objects, Barthes shares some qualities
with modernist authors. In Very Little…Almost Nothing, Simon
Critchley writes about how, in a post-Nietzschean era – an Adornian era,
perhaps – of distrust of narratives of progress and meaning, the focus on
the ordinary and tangible becomes vital.69 Abjuring overarching narra-
tives, these writers give us things instead. Hence Beckett’s paraphernalia
of bicycles, tape recorders and dustbins; Wallace Stevens’s ponds, trees
and mud. ‘What each of these authors is concerned with,’ writes
Critchley, ‘is what we might call the sheer mereness of things. In other
words, when we learn to shake off the delusions of meaning and achieve
meaninglessness, then we might see that things merely are and we are
things too’.70 Barthes is working towards such an understanding. What
Critchley describes is another version of what Hadot believes the central
message of the ‘exercices spirituels’ to be:
[Une attention au moment présent] délivre de la passion […]; elle facilite la
vigilance en la concentrant sur le minuscule moment présent, toujours
maîtrisable, toujours supportable, dans son exiguïté; elle ouvre enfin notre
conscience à la conscience cosmique […] en nous faisant accepter chaque
moment de l’existence dans la perspective de la loi universelle du cosmos.71
In the next chapter I shall examine Barthes’s desire for a state in which
an awareness of ‘le minuscule moment présent’ would contain everything
necessary for a sense of wellbeing. This fantasy involves the assumption
of existential and aesthetic ideas which Barthes conceives to be impos-
sible in the Western logosphere. He must go East.
Notes
1 Knight has discussed Barthes’s desire for a realm beyond ideological interests:
‘Barthes often insisted on the beyondness of this utopian realm, somewhere on
the far side rather than the near side of meaning, and therefore to be distinguished
from any pre-semiological golden age’. Barthes and Utopia, p. 7.
2 On Pachomius, see Philip Rousseau, Pachomius: The Making of a Community
in Fourth-Century Egypt (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999).
Benedict, founder of several monasteries and Abbot of Monte Cassino in Italy,
wrote his ‘rule’ as a guide to the regulation of Christian monasteries. The rule
continues to be extremely influential in ecclesiastical life. The Rule of St Benedict,
ed. and trans. Carolinne White (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 2008).
3 Barthes considers Mount Athos to be an ‘oriental’ space.
4 The fragment on ‘le neutre’ in Roland Barthes par Roland Barthes (1975) gives
an indication of the persistence of this theme and how it appears in Barthes’s
writings: ‘Figures du Neutre: l’écriture blanche, exemptée de tout théâtre
littéraire – le langage adamique – l’insignifiance délectable – le lisse – le vide […]

– la discrétion […] – l’absence d’imago – la suspension de jugement, de procès –
le déplacement – […] le principe de délicatesse – la dérive – la jouissance: tout
ce qui esquive ou déjoue ou rend dérisoires la parade, la maîtrise, l’intimidation
(RB, 707).
5 See Barthes’s comments on the theme of ‘ce qui passe pour naturel aux yeux de
la plupart’ in a 1975 interview, in which again he quotes his favourite lines from
Brecht: ‘C’est un thème bien ancien chez moi, puisque c’est lui qui alimente déjà
les Mythologies, qui se donnent pour une dénonciation du “ce qui va de soi”.
C’est aussi un thème brechtien: “Sous la règle, découvrez l’abus”. Sous le naturel,
découvrez l’histoire, découvrez ce qui n’est pas naturel, découvrez les abus’.
‘Vingt mots-clés pour Roland Barthes’, interview with Jean-Jacques Brochier for
Le Magazine littéraire, Feb. 1975. OC, IV, 851–75 (p. 853).
6 Epictetus, Discourses 3, 21, 4–6, in Discourses and Selected Writings, trans.
Robert Dobbin (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 2008). This statement is quoted by
Pierre Hadot in illustration of his statement that ‘[le] discours sur la philosophie
n’est pas la philosophie’. Hadot, ‘La Philosophie comme manière de vivre’, in
Exercices spirituels et philosophie antique, 2nd edition (Paris: Albin Michel,
2001), pp. 289–304 (p. 293).
7 See Ch. 1 above.
8 The other epigraphs are from texts by Tolstoy, Rousseau, and, as a counter-
example to the neutral, Joseph de Maistre. The Tolstoy and Rousseau epigraphs
are discussed in Ch. 4.
9 Benson Mates, ‘On Refuting the Skeptic’, Proceedings and Addresses of the
American Philosophical Association, 58.1 (1984): 21–35 (p. 24).
10 Maria van Rysselberghe, Cahiers de la Petite Dame, Cahiers André Gide IV,
1945–1951 (Paris: Gallimard, 1977). On Barthes’s affinities with Gide, see
Stafford, Roland Barthes, pp. 193–96 and passim.
11 Knight’s essential study of Barthes, Barthes and Utopia, is a fascinating account
of the ways in which Barthes’s utopian thought is spatial.
12 Émile Benveniste, ‘La notion de “rythme” dans son expression linguistique’, in
Problèmes de linguistique générale, 2 vols. (Paris: Gallimard, 1969–74), vol. I,
pp. 327–35 (p. 330).
13 Yue Zhuo has discussed the spatial aspect of rhuthmos in ‘The “Political”
Barthes: From Theatre to Idiorrythmy’, French Forum, 36.1 (2011): 55–74.
14 Pint, Perverse Art, pp. 261–62.
15 ‘Paradoxalement, la portée fantasmatique, subjective du cours, n’implique
aucune dimension d’ordre biographique’. Coste, ‘Comment vivre ensemble’, p.
46.
16 Patrick ffrench, ‘How to Live with Roland Barthes’, SubStance 38.3 (2009):
113–24 (p. 122).
17 ‘Entre le plaisir du texte et l’utopie de la pensée’, interview with Abdallah
Bensmaïn, L’Opinion (Morocco), 6 February 1978. OC, V, 533–40 (p. 535).
18 Stephen Heath, Vertige du déplacement: lecture de Barthes (Paris: Fayard, 1974).
19 ffrench, ‘How to Live with Roland Barthes’, p. 117.
20 ‘Sur le cinéma’, interview with Michel Delahaye and Jacques Rivette for Cahiers
du cinéma, September 1963. OC, II, 255–66 (p. 265)
21 ‘Mélange’, in Mimina Moralia, pp. 102–103.
22 ffrench, ‘How to Live with Roland Barthes’, p. 114.
23 Cf. Le Neutre, 165: ‘Tout dans l’univers, le monde, la société, le sujet, le réel,
[est] soumis à la forme du conflit: pas de proposition plus reçue: les philosophies
occidentales, les doctrines, les métaphysiques, les matérialismes, les
“sensibilités”, les langages courants, tout énonce le conflit (le conflictuel) comme
la nature même’.
24 See Nikolaj Lübecker: ‘With his insistence on the neutral and the general attempt
to escape “Hegelian” socialism, Barthes is challenging the widespread belief in
the progressive potential of the struggle for recognition’. Community, Myth and
Recognition, p. 132.
25 Alexandre Soljénitsyne, L’Archipel du Goulag, 1918–1956, 3 vols. (Paris: Seuil,
1974). See Michael Christofferson’s chapter on ‘The Gulag as a Metaphor’ in
French Intellectuals Against the Left: The Antitotalitarian Moment of the 1970s
(New York: Berghahn, 2004), pp. 89–110, for a discussion of reactions to the
Solzhenitsyn text. See also Sunil Khilnani, Arguing Revolution: The Intellectual
Left in Postwar France (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993) and Pierre
Rigoulot, Les Paupières lourdes: les Français face au goulag, aveuglements et
indications (Paris: Presses universitaires, 1991).
26 See for example Lefort, Un Homme en trop: essai sur l’archipel du goulag de
Soljénitsyne (Paris: Seuil, 1975); Glucksmann, ‘Le Marxisme rend sourd’, Le
Nouvel Observateur 484 (4 March 1974), 80; La Cuisinière et le mangeur
d’hommes: essai sur les rapports entre l’État, le marxisme et les camps de
concentration (Paris: Seuil, 1975); Lévy, La Barbarie à visage humain (Paris:
Grasset, 1977).
27 Barthes had visited China as part of an enthusiastically Maoist Tel Quel dele-
gation in 1974; see discussion in Ch. 4 below. On Tel Quel’s abandonment of
Maoism, see Patrick ffrench, The Time of Theory: A History of Tel Quel
1960–1983 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995), pp. 225–27. Sollers makes the journal’s
abjuring of Maoism clear in an interview with Maurice Clavel, ‘A propos du
“Maoisme”’, Tel Quel 68 (Winter 1976).
28 ‘Lettre à Bernard-Henri Lévy’, Les Nouvelles littéraires, 26 May 1977. OC, V,
314–15. This eulogistic letter discusses, in a deliberately oblique way, Lévy’s style
and articulation of an ‘éthique de l’écriture’ (p. 315).
29 Christofferson, French Intellectuals, p. 206.
30 Sollers écrivain was published by Seuil in 1979. According to Philippe Forest,
Sollers had asked Barthes to put together the collection in order to combat the
hostile criticism that Sollers was then experiencing. Forest, Histoire de Tel Quel
1960–1982 (Paris: Seuil, 1995), p. 558.
31 Philippe Forest states that throughout the ’60s and ’70s, ‘le plus sûr des soutiens
de Tel Quel, sinon le plus actif politiquement, est certainement Roland Barthes’.
Regarding the journal’s Maoism, Forest’s view is that Barthes was ‘la recrue
consentante d’un combat pour lequel il n’est pas question qu’il monte en première
ligne mais auquel il ne monnaye guère la caution de son nom ou celle de sa
prestige’. Histoire de Tel Quel, pp. 360–61.
32 Zhuo, ‘The “Political” Barthes’, p. 58.
33 Jean-François Lyotard, Instructions païennes (Paris: Galilée, 1977); La
Condition postmoderne (Paris: Minuit, 1979).
34 Lyotard, Instructions, p. 11.
35 Lyotard, Instructions, p. 28.
36 Lyotard, Le Postmoderne expliqué aux enfants (Paris: Galilée, 1986), p. 34.
37 A further overlap between Lyotard’s and Barthes’s interests is shown in the essay
Derrida wrote about Lyotard after his death: Derrida tells us that Lyotard’s
Masters’ dissertation, written in the late ’40s, examined philosophies of indif-
ference including the Epicureans’ ataraxia, Stoic apatheia and adiaphora, Taoist
wu-wei and Zen ‘not-thinking’. These are all touchstones in Barthes’s lectures.
Derrida, ‘Jean-François Lyotard (1924–1998): Amitié à tout rompre – Lyotard
et nous’, in Chaque fois unique, la fin du monde (Paris: Galilée, 2003), pp.
255–89 (p. 255).
38 ‘Vingt mots-clés pour Roland Barthes’, interview with Jean-Jacques Brochier for
Le Magazine littéraire, February 1975. OC, IV, 851–75 (p. 862).
39 ‘La Chronique’, Le Nouvel Observateur 18 December 1978–26 March 1979
(weekly), OC, V, 625–53 (p. 638).
40 In their preface to the recent Gallimard edition of the Essais, Naya, Reguig-Naya
and Tarrête emphasise the indirect but vital engagement with social problems
that is demonstrated in Montaigne’s writing: ‘S’il ne joua pas vraiment de rôle
politique direct, Montaigne fut pourtant la conscience de son temps’ (‘Préface’,
Essais, vol. I, pp. 7–83 (pp. 14–15)).
41 Maurice Blanchot, La Communauté inavouable (Paris: Minuit, 1983); Jean-Luc
Nancy, La Communauté désœuvrée (Paris: Christian Bourgois, 1986). Some of
the material in Nancy’s text was originally published in 1983 in the journal Aléa.
A valuable collection of essays on community from this period is Miami Theory
Collective’s Community at Loose Ends (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 1991). Nancy has continued his reflection on community in La
Communauté affrontée (Paris: Galilée, 2001), written as a new preface to
Blanchot’s La Communauté inavouable. For more on Bataille, Blanchot and
Nancy’s thought regarding community, see Ian James, ‘The Narrow Margin’, in
Blanchot romantique: A Collection of Essays, ed. John McKeane and Hannes
Opelz (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2010), pp. 263–74.
42 Giorgio Agamben, La comunità che viene (Turin: Einaudi, 1990); The Coming
Community, trans. Michael Hardt (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
1993). Agamben’s concern with the ‘Whatever’, or a singularity beyond predi-
cates, chimes with Barthes’s hostility, as evinced in Comment vivre ensemble and
Le Neutre, towards reductive naming, and his longing for a sense of wellbeing
within a community that would not revolve around ‘images’ of others.
Agamben’s thesis is that if we can imagine a singularity without predicates, then
our own singularity would be ‘freed from the false dilemma that obliges knowl-
edge to choose between the ineffability of the individual and the intelligibility of
the universal’ (p. 1).
43 Marguerite Duras, La Maladie de la mort (Paris: Minuit, 1982).
44 Blanchot, La Communauté inavouable, p. 53.
45 ‘Structuralisme et sémiologie’, interview with Pierre Daix for Lettres françaises,
July 1968. OC, III, 77–83 (p. 79).
46 Nancy, La Communauté affrontée, passim.
47 Michael Sheringham, Everyday Life: Theories and Practices from Surrealism to
the Present (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 204.
48 ‘Entre le plaisir du texte et l’utopie de la pensée’, interview with Abdallah
Bensmaïn, L’Opinion (Morocco), 6 February 1978. OC, V, 533–40 (p. 537).
See also Barthes’s comments on philosophy in the Lexique de l’auteur seminar:
‘L’écriture, ce n’est pas une question de style, c’est un congé donné au signifié,
à l’idée; c’est la pensée-mot, c’est donc se retirer de la pensée. Philosophes? Même
avec brio et style, tous restent dans l’idée, la pensée-pensée: sauf Nietzsche’ (LA,
p. 62).
49 ‘A quoi sert un intellectuel?’, interview with Bernard-Henri Lévy for Le Nouvel
Observateur, 10 January 1977. OC, V, 364–82 (p. 379).
50 On this shift in Foucault’s work, see Patrick ffrench, ‘Foucault and Life as a Work
of Art’, in Michael Sheringham and Johnnie Gratton, eds., The Art of the Project:
Projects and Experiments in Modern French Culture (New York: Berghahn,
2005), pp. 204–18.
51 Foucault, L’Herméneutique du sujet: cours au Collège de France (1981–1982),
ed. Frédéric Gros (Paris: Seuil/Gallimard, 2001); Histoire de la sexualité III: le
souci de soi (Paris: Gallimard, 1984). Subjectivité et vérité is yet to be published.
52 See for example his lecture of 10 March 1982 on ‘La parrhêsia comme attitude
éthique et procédure technique’. L’Herméneutique du sujet, pp. 355–77. On
Foucault’s conception of ethics, see Arnold I. Davidson, ‘Ethics as Ascetics’, in
The Cambridge Companion to Foucault, ed. Gary Gutting (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 115–140.
53 Hadot had been a directeur d’études in the Fifth Section (Sciences religieuses) of
the EPHE since 1964, specialising in Latin patristics and theology and mystics
of the Greco-Roman era. See the first two chapters of the collection of interviews
with Jeannie Carlier and Arnold Davidson, La Philosophie comme manière de
vivre (Paris: Livre de Poche, 2003), for further details on Hadot’s career and
interests, including the part he played in the introduction of Wittgenstein’s
thought to France: his Wittgenstein et les limites du langage (Paris: Vrin, 2004)
collects articles originally published from 1959 to 1962.
54 See especially Exercices spirituels et philosophie antique (Paris: Albin Michel,
2001).
55 Arnold Davidson, ‘Pierre Hadot and the Spiritual Phenomenon of Ancient
Philosophy’, in Pierre Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises
from Socrates to Foucault, trans. Michael Chase (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), pp.
1–45 (p. 21). This introduction by Davidson to Hadot’s most important essays
in translation is a superb introduction to Hadot’s work.
56 ‘Exercices spirituels’, in Exercices spirituels, pp. 19–74 (pp. 22–23).
57 Exercices spirituels, p. 20.
58 Hadot also locates the institutionalisation of philosophy in universities as a factor
which has distanced philosophy from its original concern with spiritual exer-
cises.
61 ‘Exercices spirituels’, subsequently published in Exercices spirituels et
philosophie antique, was first published in the Annuaire de la Ve Section de
l’École pratique des hautes etudes, tome LXXXIV, 1977, pp. 25–70. On Hadot’s
influence on Foucault, see Davidson, ‘Spiritual Exercises and Ancient
Philosophy: An Introduction to Pierre Hadot’, Critical Inquiry 16.3 (1990):
475–82, and also ‘Pierre Hadot and the Spiritual Phenomenon’.
62 See the essays ‘Réflexions sur la notion de “culture de soi”’ and ‘Le Sage et le
monde’ in Exercices spirituels, pp. 323–32 and 343–60 respectively. Both essays
were originally published in 1989.
63 Hadot, Exercices spirituels, p. 345. See also La Philosophie comme manière de
vivre, p. 217: ‘Foucault ne met pas suffisamment en valeur la prise de conscience
de l’appartenance au Tout cosmique, et la prise de conscience de l’appartenance
à la communauté humaine’.
64 Hadot refutes Foucault’s selective reading of the Stoics as follows: ‘Il semble,
d’un point de vue historique, difficile à admettre que la pratique philosophique
des stoïciens et des platoniciens n’ait été qu’un rapport à soi, une culture de soi,
un plaisir pris en soi-même. Le contenu psychique de ces exercices me semble
tout autre’ (Exercices spirituels, p. 326).
65 ffrench, ‘Michel Foucault: Life as a Work of Art’, p. 213.
66 Diana Knight, analysing the references made by Barthes in his mid-’70s work to
Socratic texts, has pointed out there are certain links between Barthes and
Socrates as teachers, as Barthes himself implied: ‘When one of the audience at
[the Cerisy colloquium on Barthes in 1977] asks Barthes: “what might Socrates
produce, if we imagine a Socrates who lived after Freud […]”, Barthes replies in
his own name and about his own work. Pointers to the Socratic intertext are
therefore launched […] by Barthes, […] in the context of a Barthes surrounded
by his much younger disciples-cum-friends. […] There are obvious links between
Barthes and Socrates as famous teachers and supposed corrupters of the young
(and ironic parallels such as the trauma of their deaths for an academic genera-
tion both intellectually and emotionally dependent)’. Knight, ‘Roland Barthes:
An Intertextual Figure’, in Michael Worton and Judith Still, eds., Intertextuality:
Theories and Practices (Manchester: University of Manchester Press, 1990), pp.
92–107 (p. 94).
67 Barthes elaborated on this statement in the final session of Le Neutre: ‘C’est dans
ce sens que j’ai pu parler d’un fascisme de la langue: la langue fait de ses manques
notre Loi, elle nous soumet abusivement à ses manques’ (N, 3 June, 237–38).
68 Edward Said, Beginnings: Intention and Method (London: Granta, 1985), p.
328.
69 Simon Critchley, Very Little…Almost Nothing: Death, Philosophy and
Literature, 2nd edn (London: Routledge, 2004).
70 Critchley, Very Little, p. xxiv.
71 Hadot, Exercices spirituels, pp. 27–28.
4
Japonisme and Minimal Existence in the Cours
At the instant when our mental activity almost merges into an unconscious
state – that is, the relationship between subject and object is forgotten – we
can experience the most aesthetic moment. This is what is implied when it
is said that one goes into the heart of created things and becomes one with
nature.
Otsuji (Seki Osuga), Collected Essays on Haiku Theory
‘The Other Scene’: Barthes, his Contemporaries, and the Orient
Throughout Barthes’s Cours at the Collège de France we see several

profound themes that reveal the influence of Oriental thought as
imported into the West largely by Alan Watts and D.T. Suzuki.1 Barthes’s
sketching of the haiku as leading to an aesthetic experience which over-
comes the sense of division between one’s self and one’s environment; his
suggestions that we conceptualise space and time differently; his digres-
sive, incomplete methods of exposition; and his espousal of ‘suspension’
because of his reluctance to be pinned to a specific subject-position, all
stem in part from his fascination with Taoist thought and Japanese
aesthetics. He frequently refers in the Cours to the peaceable, liberatory
ideals he sees in the ‘Orient’, defined in opposition to an ‘Occident’ whose
logomachy is characterised by conflict. There is a problem of conflation
here, of course: Diana Knight has shown that ‘Barthes’s key utopias are
projected into the “Orient”’, and pointed out that the subsumption of
such ‘totally distinct parts of the world’ as China and Japan under the
label of ‘the Orient’ is problematic – or rather, ‘part of the problem to
be discussed’.2 In the Cours, the ‘Orient’ includes Mount Athos in Greece,
the Buddhist monks of Sri Lanka, and memories of Barthes’s time spent
in Morocco. However, the ‘Orient’ is mainly associated with Taoism,
Zen, and the Japanese haiku. The largely Japanese slant of Barthes’s
Orient stems from Barthes’s fascination with the country after visiting it
in the late 1960s.
Barthes’s writing about Japan in L’Empire des signes (1970) and
about China in ‘Alors, la Chine?’ (1974) has been covered in depth by
118
Japonisme and Minimal Existence in the Cours 119
critics.3 Such criticism covers the important question of whether Barthes

produces an exoticising Orientalist discourse. My view is that he does
not: his writing about China and Japan is shaped, above all, by a sardonic
awareness of what Westerners expect to find in these countries, and by
a concomitant rejection of these expectations. The article ‘Alors, la
Chine?’, notably, received hostile criticism at the time of its publication
precisely because of its refusal to conform to the paradigm of Western
responses to contemporary China: either dogmatism or facile liberalism.
It strove instead to articulate a subjective, indirect response.4 In the book
on Japan, Barthes openly states that his account of the ‘traits’ he finds
interesting in that country is informed by the self-interrogation Japan has
fostered in him, rather than by any desire to portray the country:
‘L’auteur n’a jamais, en aucun sens, photographié le Japon. Ce serait
plutôt le contraire: le Japon l’a étoilé d’éclairs multiples’ (ES, 14). While
such statements cannot simply absolve Barthes from the dangers of
Orientalism, it is clear that his project centres upon the critique of the
conventions of Western thought rather than upon any more nefarious
instrumentalisation of the Eastern other. Indeed, Barthes’s explicitly
imagined Japan is, as Eric Hayot points out, an effort to ‘create a third
space that attempts to shed the orientalism of a knowledge-based reading’.5
Barthes’s use of a hypostatised ‘Japan’ to discuss ways of thinking
unfamiliar to the West is typical of his context. During this period, many
Parisian theorists were using the Orient in their work as a means of
critique. This was arguably inaugurated by Foucault. Foucault opens Les
Mots et les choses (1966) by discussing a story by Borges which outlines
the strange system of classification used in a Chinese encyclopedia.
China, writes Foucault, is for us the symbolic locus of utopian ways of
thinking:
cette distorsion du classement qui nous empêche de le penser, […] Borges
l[a] donne pour patrie mythique une région précise dont le nom seul
constitue pour l’Occident une grande réserve d’utopies. La Chine, dans notre
rêve, n’est-elle pas justement le lieu privilégié de l’espace? […] Il y aurait
ainsi, à l’autre extrémité de la terre que nous habitons, une culture vouée
tout entière a l’ordonnance de l’étendue, mais qui ne distribuerait la
prolifération des êtres dans aucun des espaces où il nous est possible de
nommer, de parler, de penser. 6
Foucault makes the hypothetical nature of the invocation of ‘China’ clear.

China as alterity becomes the sign of utopia – but it is a dream of China
that allows us Westerners to conceive of our own reality differently. In
the Paris of the early 1970s, this use of what Patrick ffrench calls the
‘other scene’ of thought in French theory came to a feverish head, notably
in the offices of Tel Quel. 7 This journal was concerned with analysing
the workings of ideology, and one way of doing this was by referring to
non-Western signifying systems. From 1968 onwards, Philippe Sollers
became increasingly interested in Chinese thought, and thence became a
Maoist.8 It was at this point that the ‘Chinese dreams’ of Parisian intel-
lectuals began their downward curve into hard reality. Members of Tel
Quel, along with Barthes, made a trip to China in Spring 1974. It was
after this trip that Barthes wrote ‘Alors, la Chine?’9 The real encounter
with China was frustrating as the trip was so controlled. The official
version of China offered to the French intellectuals in the form of factory
visits and speeches about China’s productivity was repetitive and flatly
political. In response to the Tel Quel-ian questions about revolution,
working conditions, Lin Piao, and so on, the same responses were always
given – what Barthes calls ‘briques’ of stereotyped opinion. Barthes’s
impressions of the trip to China, as registered in ‘Alors’ and in the recently
published Carnets du voyage en Chine (2009), are of ‘fadeur’, a lack of
interpretable signifiers, and an abundance of Maoist clichés. The visit
marked the start of Parisian Maoists’ disillusionment with China.
For Barthes, the trip to China involves a shutting down of interpre-
tation. The political text of China is enforced such that no creative or
utopian thought is possible: ‘Aucun farfelu, aucune surprise, aucun
romanesque. Écriture difficile’ (CVC, 186). Japan, however, retains all
the beneficial force of alterity that Barthes requires from the ‘other scene’.
For this reason, I have chosen to refer to Barthes’s invocations of the
‘Orient’ in the Cours as japonisme – though I am aware of the cultural
conflation involved. Jan Walsh Hokenson uses the term ‘japonisme’ in
Japan, France and East-West Aesthetics, her study of French writers’
fascination with Japan and utilisation of Japanese motifs and aesthetics
in their work.10 Hokenson reminds us that the term ‘japonisme’ is gener-
ally used to refer to the use of Japanese-inspired graphic techniques in
painting and drawing, but shows that though initially confined to the
visual arts, japonisme rapidly became an important current in literature
as French writers began, from the late nineteenth century onwards, to
incorporate Japanese aesthetics into their work. The goal in each case
was to rejuvenate French aesthetics. This tradition seeks to be revolu-
tionary: japoniste authors always render a Japanese-inspired aesthetic in
order to ‘critique […] the very grounds of occidental arts and letters’. It
is a project centred upon France itself, and concerned with the ‘expres-
sive problems’ attendant upon the calcification of the conventions of
French literature. Japonisme is therefore ‘only secondarily about Japan,
imagined source of proposed solutions’.11
The term ‘japonisme’ eludes the value-laden connotations of Said’s
term ‘orientalism’. Hokenson has powerfully argued the case for viewing
japonisme positively, since it is a triadic model whereas Orientalism is
dual. Orientalist criticism cannot account for the elusive position which
Barthes is trying to attain – an interstitial position outside of both French
and Japanese symbolic systems, in which new possibilities of meaning
are imagined. Orientalism is a binary paradigm (self/other, East/West,
coloniser/colonised). Although there is a certain Manichaeism which has
to exist in L’Empire des signes and subsequently in the Cours in order
for Barthes to make his points about combating Western logomachy, his
project here is in a profound sense not binary, as he struggles against
dualistic conceptions of the world and of our place in the world.12 This
struggle seeks the complex; the operation of the neutral requires at least
a third position.
Japonisme from L’Empire des signes to the Collège de France
Barthes is fascinated by Japan because it is the country where ‘il a

rencontré le travail du signe le plus proche de ses convictions et de ses
fantasmes’. Another way of putting this is that it is ‘le [pays le] plus
éloigné des dégoûts, des irritations et des refus que suscite en lui la
sémiocratie occidentale’ (ES, blurb). A critique of the ‘West’ frames the
glowing representation of Japan. The text is thus typically japoniste in
manifesting its perception of marked differences between French and
Japanese systems of meanings, which are, as Hokenson puts it, ‘discov-
ered just in time to rescue if not supplant the always dying Cartesian,
Christian, and bourgeois modes of French thought’.13
The opening paragraph of L’Empire des signes makes it clear that
Barthes is less interested in the ‘représent[ation]’ or ‘analyse’ of ‘la
moindre réalité’ than he is in evading the ‘gestes majeurs du discours occi-
dental’ with their mimetic and hermeneutic imperatives. In fact, he writes,
‘l’Orient m’est indifférent’. What he is interested in is a ‘jeu inventé’, a
selections of ‘traits’ drawn from his conception of the Orient which
would give rise to ‘l’idée d’un système symbolique inouï, entièrement
dépris du nôtre’ (ES, 11). Barthes examines the Japanese relationship to
the symbol (insofar as he can) in order to bring about a ‘secousse’ and
‘un certain ébranlement de la personne’. In this way ‘la compacité de
notre narcissisme [occidentale]’ can be exposed (ES, 12–14).
Japonisme is by this time the form of Barthes’s utopianism, for its
tenets correspond to Barthes’s deeply felt belief – expounded upon in
several interviews given after the publication of L’Empire des signes –
that the French relationship to the sign, as well as its tradition of criti-
cism, requires a problematisation and rejuvenation. Japan is used as a
gauge for the arbitrary but naturalised problems of the Western rela-
tionship to meaning. He tells Raymond Bellour in 1970 that ‘il faut
maintenant porter le combat plus loin, tenter de fissurer […] l’idée même
de signe […] [ainsi que] le discours occidental en tant que tel, dans ses
fondements, ses formes élémentaires’.14 Barthes’s talk of ‘fissuring’ the
symbolic in this interview is rather over-stated: it bespeaks a pugnacity
– perhaps inspired by Tel Quel – which has been left behind by the time
Barthes accedes to the Collège de France. The idea of broadening the
scope of criticism, though, remains, and this is due to the effects of
Barthes’s encounter, while visiting Japan in the late 1960s, with a
symbolic system he sees as being radically different to our own. Inter-
cultural comparison furthers his awareness that the forms of our
language limit our comprehension of the world. By 1970 Barthes no
longer wishes (exclusively) to undertake demystificatory criticism limited
to individual uses of signs within French culture.
L’Empire des signes is an important precursor to the Cours. For it is
the encounter with Japan that crystallises Barthes’s desire to shake up the
foundations of our relationship to language and its dictation of how we
view our sense of being in the world. We must recognise the arbitrari-
ness (or even paradoxicality) of our own semantics and social
expectations. We see a critique of these in the Cours. Japanese poetics
and aesthetics are vital to Barthes in his elaboration of a reconciliation
between the subject and the world. The use of Oriental philosophy and
Japanese aesthetics enables Barthes to move beyond merely ideological
criticism and actually into a new mode of criticism, which involves the
rethinking of the most fundamental aspects of Western thought – space,
time, the position of the subject and its intersection with the environ-
ment.
In the 1970 interview with Bellour, Barthes explains his sense of the
relevance and urgency of what I am calling his japonisme. After his
encounter with Japan, he wants to grapple with ‘notre Occident, notre
culture, notre langue et nos langages’ in order to arrive at ‘“une nouvelle
façon de sentir”’, une “nouvelle façon de penser”’ (OC, III, 669.) Bellour
argues that this conception of criticism is no longer political, implying
that it is an insular utopianism, and accusing Barthes of shutting himself
up in a Mallarmean ‘cabinet [de] signes’.15 Barthes replies censoriously,
saying ‘je ne pense pas qu’attendre soit s’enfermer’. We are habituated
to viewing enclosure as something negative, in accordance with a
romantic mythology which values openness. Yet ‘contre-clôture’ is not
openness, he states, but rather ‘l’exemption du centre’. It is this which

we should work towards in our thought, and a logic of decentring is
precisely the instructive complex that we can find in Japanese culture.
Barthes’s conviction of this is extensively apparent in L’Empire des
signes. We can use this decentring to figure the utopianism which will
help us to tolerate our own society. He uses the Japanese house as a
metaphor: ‘C’est précisément ce que j’ai cru apprendre du Japon:
l’habitat, telle la maison japonaise, est supportable, délicieux même, si
l’on parvient à le vider, à le démeubler, à le décentrer, à le désorienter, à
le désoriginer’ (OC, III, 670). The space we live in now can be made bear-
able by the idea of its being emptied out.
The importance of the metaphor of the house is clear when we look
at Barthes’s references to Japanese interior architecture in L’Empire des
signes. This space is not merely the exemplar of ideals of delicacy and
mobility – though these are, of course, important, as we will see in our
discussion of the Cours. Japanese spaces such as the ‘corridor de Shikidai’
also constitute for Barthes the locus of aesthetic values which run counter
to the most fundamental aspects of Westerners’ way of interacting with
our environment. These spaces have much to teach us about the limita-
tions of our hermeneutic and dualistic ways of seeing, according to which
the human subject understands and masters the object which is the world.
An image of the ‘corridor de Shikidai’ appears on pages 68–69 of the
Seuil edition of the text.16 The caption beneath it, though entirely in
keeping with the thematics of the void that operates throughout the text,
is rather too cryptic to seem to be making any point concerning aesthetics
or epistemology. ‘Renversez l’image,’ the caption simply tells us: ‘rien de
plus, rien d’autre, rien’ (ES, 69). When he discusses the ‘corridor de
Shikidai’ in the final section of L’Empire des signes, entitled ‘le cabinet
des signes’, the critical import of the nothingness of the corridor becomes
clear. This corridor is ‘encadré de vide et n’encadrant rien’. ‘Il n’y a en
lui de place pour aucun meuble. […] Dans le corridor, comme dans
l’idéale maison japonaise, privé de meubles (ou aux meubles rarifiés), il
n’y a aucun lieu qui désigne la moindre propriété’ (ES, 149–50). This
space, therefore, frustrates the most deep-seated interpretive impulses
and orientation mechanisms of the Westerner: ‘Ni siège, ni lit, ni table
d’où le corps puisse se constituer en sujet (ou maître) d’un espace: le centre
est refusé (brûlante frustration pour l’homme occidental, nanti partout
de son fauteuil, de son lit, propriétaire d’un emplacement domestique)’
(ES, 150). This has implications that go beyond the issue of domestic
comfort. Barthes is problematising here the Westerner’s interaction with
his environment, and his sense of himself as a subject in opposition to (in
mastery of) his surroundings. The Japanese house, in giving this subject
nothing which allows him to ‘se constituer en sujet’, acts as a reminder
that that mode of being is not the only possible one. In fact, given that
that mode of being is based on a dualism between subject and surround-
ings, it is potentially combative. Barthes’s use of the word ‘maître’ implies
our sense that our environment is subjugated to the will we impose on
it. The ‘corridor de Shikidai’, Barthes suggests, is instructive in figuring
to us a non-dualistic mode of experience based on an acceptance of and
sense of integral union with one’s environment. In this room, as he writes
in the final line of L’Empire des signes, there is ‘rien à saisir’ (ES, 150).
Implicit in this is Barthes’s sense of an ideal ethics of interaction. In
the Skira edition of the text, this becomes clear. For here, within the
‘cabinet des signes’ section that closes the text, there is a photograph of
a ‘tokonama’ alcove in the corner of a Japanese room. Normally used to
display art, such alcoves traditionally have transom windows to
maximise light. Beneath the photograph of this empty space, whose
internal lines create yet more empty spaces, appears the caption ‘Aucun
vouloir-saisir et cependant aucune oblation’ (ES Skira, 149). This space
is the model of how our presence in the world, and our interaction with
others, should be; the ideal is one of acceptance, without any connota-
tion of ownership (‘[sans] la moindre propriété’).
The fact that Barthes sketches this ideal by referring to a space whose
‘centre est refusé’ (ES, 150) is no accident: to refuse the centre is to offend
a deep-seated Western sense of propriety and priority. Concomitantly,
to call for a ‘decentring’ is in line with an anti-Occidental deconstructive
tendency very much in vogue in poststructuralism.17 The apparently
cryptic words with which Barthes concludes L’Empire des signes – ‘Rien
à saisir’ – can be read as the motto for Barthes’s japonisme. His employ-
ment of the terms ‘vouloir-saisir’ and ‘non-vouloir-saisir’ in later work
immediately preceding the Cours indicate that it is in these terms that he
conceptualises the subtle combat against dualism. An examination of the
japoniste ideal of ‘non-vouloir-saisir’ is necessary before we turn to
japoniste figures in the Cours.
‘Non-vouloir-saisir’ in Fragments d’un discours amoureux and Leçon
Two statements in Leçon can be seen as revealing in advance the

centrality that the combat against dualism will have in the subsequent
Cours. The first comes at the end of the first section of the lecture. Having
explained that the Collège de France is an institution which allows great
freedom in teaching, Barthes says that this freedom means we must inter-
rogate the assumptions in play in our own intellectual discourse: ‘[il faut]
se demander sous quelles conditions et selon quelles opérations le
discours peut se dégager de tout vouloir-saisir’. This ‘interrogation’ of
his own discourse will constitute ‘le projet profond de l’enseignement qui
est aujourd’hui inaugurée’ (L, 10).
The ‘vouloir-saisir’ had been discussed in Fragments d’un discours
amoureux, prepared for publication during the months preceding the
delivery of the inaugural lecture. That text concludes with the figure
‘Sobria ebrietas’ which meditates on the importance of ‘non-vouloir-
saisir’ for the lover.18 The idea of ‘non-vouloir-saisir’ is an expression
‘imitée de l’Orient’, writes Barthes. To achieve this state is to manage not
to seek to assimilate the beloved’s fundamental alterity: ‘Je décide: doré-
navant, de l’autre, ne plus rien vouloir saisir’. If this is successful, the
resolution not to ‘seize’ the other will exist without being apparent: ‘Il
faut que le vouloir-saisir cesse – mais il faut aussi que le non-vouloir-
saisir ne se voie pas: pas d’oblation’ (FDA, 285). This is almost an exact
repetition of the caption beneath the image of the tokonama alcove in
L’Empire des signes: ‘Aucun vouloir-saisir, et cependant aucune
oblation’ (ES Skira, 149).
Worth noting here is how the Fragments figure the ‘NVS’ as being
achievable only if the subject manages to fall outside language – that is,
to overcome dualism. The resultant non-dualistic state is exemplified, for
Barthes, by a Zenrin poem he has taken from Watts: to achieve NVS, he
writes:
Il faut que je parvienne (par la détermination de quelle fatigue obscure?) à
me laisser tomber quelque part hors du langage, dans l’inerte, et, d’une
certaine manière, tout simplement: m’asseoir (‘Assis paisiblement sans rien
faire, le printemps vient et l’herbe croît d’elle-même’). (FDA, 286–87)19
Outside language, a silent and harmonious space is imagined – one that

encompasses a peaceful relationship with both nature and the beloved.
We will see the same harmony in the epigraphs to Le Neutre and in the
haiku in La Préparation du roman. This, writes Barthes in the Fragments,
is a Taoist idea: ‘De nouveau l’Orient: ne pas vouloir saisir le non-vouloir-
saisir; laisser venir (de l’autre) ce qui vient, laisser passer (de l’autre) ce
qui s’en va; ne rien saisir, ne repousser rien: […] produire sans
s’approprier, etc. Ou encore: “Le Tao parfait n’offre pas de difficulté,
sauf qu’il évite de choisir”’ (FDA, 287). Watts explains the harmony that
Barthes is describing in terms that make its critical import more apparent:
Taoism, Confucianism, and Zen are expressions of a mentality which […]
sees man as an integral part of his environment. Human intelligence is not
an imprisoned spirit from afar but an aspect of the whole intricately balanced
organism of the natural world.20
A figuring of such non-dualistic harmony, writes Watts, is based on the

important insight that binary conceptions of meaning do not actually
reflect the reality of being in the world: ‘The insight which lies at the root
of Far Eastern culture is that opposites are relational and so fundamen-
tally harmonious’.21 Stark, value-based binarisms therefore become
irrelevant.
If we understand the non-vouloir-saisir at the end of the Fragments
as implying the utopian attainment of a non-dualistic harmony, we can
conjecture what it means to make, as Leçon states, the same ideal the
‘projet profond’ of the Collège de France teaching. A teaching based on
the non-vouloir-saisir will concertedly work against the intimidations
inherent to the arrogant or ideological use of discourse: as we are told
elsewhere in Leçon, ‘la méthode ne peut porter ici que sur le langage lui-
même, en tant qu’il lutte pour déjouer tout discours qui prend’ (41). The
method of the Cours will employ digression and suspension as a means
of encouraging interpretive response: this is non-vouloir-saisir in action
as an ethics of noncommittal which seeks not to influence the train of the
listener’s subsequent engagement with the material. Non-vouloir-saisir
also implies a thematics of tact, lightness, and suspension. The non-
vouloir-saisir is reflected in the Cours in figures such as ‘délicatesse’ and
the idea of the ‘aération’ of the haiku. It informs the ‘moralité’ (a term
used in Barthes’s articles on Cy Twombly) that Barthes seeks to elabo-
rate during the Cours.
A second statement from Leçon heralds those ideas in the Cours
which can be productively placed within a matrix of Japanese ideas. This
occurs during the build-up to the infamous statement ‘la langue […] est
tout simplement: fasciste’ (L, 14). In Nietzschean fashion, Barthes
discusses the grammatical and, by extension, existential and
interpersonal choices forced upon him by the structures of the French
language: ‘Dans notre langue française […], je suis astreint à me poser
d’abord en sujet, avant d’énoncer l’action qui ne sera plus dès lors que
mon attribut: ce que je fais n’est que la conséquence et la consécution de
ce que je suis’ (L, 12–13). An absolute schism, in other words, is posed
between the subject and his surroundings (in which both he and his
actions in fact exist in synthesis). This is pure Cartesianism: the ego is
isolated. What Barthes is intimating here is the absurdity of this concep-
tion of ourselves. Our languages have made this style of individuality so
fundamental, however, that the absurdity is hard to spot, and harder still
to combat.
Barthes’s recognition of the ‘paradox’ of the ego-feeling in Leçon

marks the starting-point of his subsequent articulation of different modes
of consciousness in which the interrelation of the self and the environ-
ment will be emphasised. The other points he makes about the choices
enforced by language emphasise the sense of paradox:
Je suis obligé de toujours choisir entre le masculin et le féminin, le neutre ou
le complexe me sont interdits; de même encore, je suis obligé de marquer
mon rapport à l’autre en recourant soit au tu, soit au vous: le suspens affectif
ou social m’est refusé. (L, 13)
The impossibility of ‘le complexe’ in our language results in a sense of

extreme frustration, for it is clear that the harmonious complex (i.e. the
non-dual, the unisolated ego) does exist, but is veiled. As Watts puts it,
‘the separation, the difference [i.e. dualism] is […] what we notice; it fits
the notation of language, and because it is noted and explicit it is
conscious and unrepressed’.22 Our language as social institution repre-
sents the world as ‘an assemblage of distinct bits and particles’, thereby
holding us at arm’s length from our environment, and imprisoning us
within our ego-feeling. ‘The defect of [such a worldview] is that [it]
screens out or ignores (represses) interrelations’.23 Barthes says the same
thing: ‘Ainsi, par sa structure même, la langue implique une relation fatale
d’aliénation’ (L, 13).
Overcoming the power inherent to language, then, involves not only
employing a tactic and ethic of the non-vouloir-saisir (an idea drawn from
Tao), but also the combating of the ego-feeling which imposes fixed
subject positions and requires, in terms of linguistic interaction, opinions
which are clear-cut (based on the binarism of meaning) and not neutral.
We must change our consciousness so that the ego-feeling is exposed and
what it represses revealed. This, according to Watts, is the central goal
of Eastern ‘ways of liberation’.24 Altering the ego-consciousness (or
decentring the subject, as a poststructuralist idiom might have it) requires
an effort to overcome the dualism between self and surroundings. This
effort, if successful, would achieve what Bernard Comment calls ‘un
rapport transparent du sujet au monde (sur le mode, peut-être, d’une
fusion qui rendrait caduques ces dernières catégories)’.25
According to Watts and Suzuki – Barthes’s main sources on these
subjects – if we manage to see the workings of linguistic and social
convention for what they are, i.e. as configurations that do occur, rather
than configurations that must occur (culture, not nature), we will achieve
a radically new consciousness. For Suzuki, this is satori itself:
‘Intellectually, [satori] is the acquiring of a new viewpoint. The world
now appears as if dressed in a new garment, which seems to cover up all
the unsightliness of dualism, which is called delusion in Buddhist phrase-

ology’.26 Zen, in Suzuki’s account, consists in the eradication of the
alienation caused by the ego-feeling and the divisive dualities it constructs
between self and environment. Overcoming dualism is also at the fore-
front of Japanese aesthetic consciousness. Barthes displays his
understanding of this inextricability of aesthetics from philosophy in
L’Empire des signes, as we have seen in his appraisal of the ‘corridor de
Shikidai’. Indeed, when considering Japanese thought, it is impossible to
separate aesthetics from philosophy: while aesthetic theories tend to be
regarded in the West as peripheral to the more ‘central’ philosophical
matters (epistemology, metaphysics, ethics), no such marginalisation of
the aesthetic viewpoint has occurred in East Asia, where aesthetics are
considered to be integral to philosophy.27 It is the awareness of the prob-
lems of dualism that makes the Japanese aesthetico-philosophical
complex so interesting to Barthes. It may be that the Japanese language
itself predisposes the subjects who speak it to a consideration of these
problems: Japanese is intrinsically more ambiguous than most Indo-
European languages. Barthes remarks in L’Empire des signes on the way
complex Japanese syntax makes the speaking subject seem like ‘une
grande enveloppe vide de la parole’, as opposed to the ‘noyau plein qui
est censé diriger nos phrases’ (ES, 16). The ego-feeling itself is demon-
strably imbricated in Japanese syntax to a far lesser degree than is the
case in the Indo-European languages. Maurice Coyaud, in a collection of
translated haiku used by Barthes for La Préparation du roman I, points
up this fundamental difference: ‘Le sujet (nom, pronom), facultatif en
japonais, ne peut pas être purement […] éliminé en français’.28
Kenneth Yasuda, in his writings on the haiku, provides a concise
digest of the radical differences between the conceptions of dualism in
Japan and in the West. His questioning of the categories of subject and
object resonates with the excerpt from Leçon quoted above. These cate-
gories, he writes, ‘have never become as rigidly dualistic in Japan as in
Occidental thinking and their oneness in experience is generally under-
stood and accepted [in Japan]’. Conversely, ‘due to the historical
associations around words such as subject and object, or form and
content, the English [or French] words themselves seem immediately to
suggest separate entities rather than distinguishable aspects of a whole’.29
We must overcome these categories at a certain point, writes Yasuda, for
otherwise we will be disbarred from a true experience of reality. He
discusses the unity of subject and object in the haiku’s poetics:
What then are the uses of such words as subject and object – a dualism that
has long plagued Western philosophy – in dealing with aesthetic experience?
[…] They are useful terms, as long as it is remembered that, in the aesthetic
experience, the subject cannot exist without the object, nor the object
without the subject, since they are one. Only as they are one, in a concrete
and living unity, is there an aesthetic experience.30
‘A true aesthetic moment’, as understood by Yasuda and the classical

haiku theorists whose work he channels in his essay, depends upon a
transcending of ‘what we call the subjective or objective attitude’.31
Barthes is aware of the intersection of Eastern aesthetics with existential
and ethical questions: by examining these issues we can assess the import
of Barthes’s articulations of new modes of consciousness and of criticism
in the Cours and in other late texts.
Japoniste/Japanese Aesthetics
Suzuki gives us a brief digest of the most vital aspects of Japanese

aesthetics. He writes that ‘imbalance, asymmetry, the “one-corner”,
poverty, sabi or wabi (incompletion, imperfection) simplification, alone-
ness, and cognate ideas make up the most conspicuous and characteristic
features of Japanese art and culture’.32 What we notice here is that
Japanese aesthetics often valorise concepts that in Western thought
would be regarded as the weaker aspect of any paradigm: perishability as
opposed to permanence; economy of means (e.g. light, sparse brushwork)
as opposed to impressively demonstrated technique (e.g. oil-painting that
covers the canvas); monochrome as opposed to colour; brevity as
opposed to length; silence as opposed to sound, and so on. Japanese
aesthetics, as Hokenson points out, are thus in sharp contradistinction
to ‘traditional Western arts’ which value ‘symmetry, complication, inte-
gral completion or unity, monumentality or perdurance in time, and, not
least, symbol’.33 To assent to the interest of these tenets is easily done,
but as Barthes continually points out during Le Neutre, to actually
espouse similar values in one’s conduct – for example by being silent or
without opinion in a discursive situation that requires the lengthy expo-
sition of a certain point of view – is generally inadmissible in the Western
logomachy. Donald Keene emphasises a similar point when he outlines
the principles of Japanese aesthetics using the foundation text
Tsurezuregusa (Essays in Idleness) written by the priest Kenkō in
1330–33.34 Kenkō advocates transitoriness as an aesthetic principle. ‘In
all things, it is the beginnings and ends that are interesting,’ he writes.
‘Are we to look at cherry blossoms only in full bloom, the moon only
when it is cloudless? […] Branches about to blossom or gardens strewn
with faded flowers are worthier of our admiration’.35 Barthes is aware of

this principle; as he remarks in one of the haiku sessions in La Préparation
du roman, ‘pour les Japonais, dit-on, ce n’est pas, à proprement parler,
la fleur de cerisier qui est belle; c’est le moment où, parfaitement
épanouie, elle va faner’ (PR, 93). But, as Keene observes, such a principle
‘contradict[s] commonly held Western views on the same subjects. The
Western ideal of the climactic moment – […] when the soprano hits high
C, or when the rose is in full bloom – grants little importance to the begin-
nings and ends’.36 In this respect Japanese aesthetics subvert Western
conceptions of value, prestige and even of time (the ‘time’ of the artwork
ascends to an apex or climax). It is for this reason that they constitute
the logical base upon which to consider Barthes’s attempts to counter
these Western assumptions.
We have seen with Yasuda that the Japanese idea of the oneness of
artist with her material works against the ego-feeling, as there is no sense,
as there is in Western language and aesthetics, of the subject (artist)
having control over the material (object): there is ‘rien à saisir’. Rather,
artist and material, or organism and environment, become one – a field,
as Watts would call it.37 We have the same field-perception in Barthes
when he discusses, in La Préparation du roman I, hyper-consciousness
and diffusion of the self into one’s surroundings. As we shall see, identi-
fication is sought between our subjective consciousness and the dynamic
of our environment; the goal is to express such identification in a work
which seeks to provoke a comparable perception.
Also, the haiku brings about a different conception of time: the inter-
play between its ephemeral brevity and a sense of the infinite is one of its
central characteristics. Even the smallest thing, of course, can contain the
infinite. This is why the haiku is the most cultivated poetic form in Japan:
brevity is seen as the privileged access to liberation from limiting ideas
of duration. Much Japanese art seeks to express infinity – or marvellous
reality – by escaping from the constraints of space and time. The twen-
tith-century Japanese theorist Shūzō Kuki (1888–1941) writes that ‘the
most eminent characteristic of Japanese art in general [is] the expression
of the infinite’.38 In his lecture ‘The Expression of the Infinite in Japanese
Art’, Kuki employs the classical haiku (of Bashō’s school) as the exem-
plification of Japanese aesthetics in their pure form. The haiku’s principle
of suggestion – a principle it shares with most other Japanese art forms
– is essential also in allowing the dynamism of imaginative force to over-
come dualistic constraints: ‘the élan […] of the infinite can be expressed
in poetry not only by an asymmetric and fluid form, but also by the
employment of suggestive expression which outstrips time in a kind of
anticipation’, Kuki points out. ‘It is not necessary to express and disclose
everything; it is only necessary to indicate with several essential lines and
leave the rest to the active play of the imagination’.39 Suggestiveness
creates vital silences. We see here a foundational similarity between these
principles and Barthes’s own pedagogical imperatives.
Barthes is fascinated by the haiku’s inherent ability to outstrip
conventional modes of signification and perception. In L’Empire des
signes, he describes the haiku as a liberation from occidental ideas
regarding subjectivity, space and time, and the connotative layers of
language. The haiku is the means to escape from dualism. In arresting
our incessantly descriptive, interpretative language, it problematises our
very systems of meaning. Thus with the haiku (and the Zen ideal of satori)
we arrive at ‘une suspension panique du langage, le blanc qui efface en
nous le règne des Codes, la cassure de cette récitation intérieure qui
constitue notre personne’ (ES, 101). Our ego-feeling is destabilised by
the haiku’s preclusion of metalanguage. At a deeper level, the
preconditions of the haiku’s existence force us out of rigid subject
positions and make us approach a more holistic conception of the world
as an all-encompassing thisness: ‘Le haïku, […] articulé sur une
métaphysique sans sujet et sans dieu, correspond au Mu bouddhiste, au
satori zen, qui n’est nullement descente illuminative de Dieu, mais “réveil
devant le fait”, saisie de la chose comme événement et non comme
substance’ (ES, 105). The ‘réveil devant le fait’, which comes about
through a rupture of the symbolic codes constitutive of our sense of self,
is a vitally important ideal for Barthes in Le Neutre and La Préparation
du roman I. At the root of this necessary rupture is the twin imperative
to problematise the most fundamental frames for the ego feeling: our
sense of time and our sense of space. For a true apprehension of the world
itself (the overcoming of dualism) must be, as Kuki shows, dependent on
‘the expression of the liberation from time and space’.40
Japoniste Figures in the Cours
Neutre = espacement (production d’espace) et non distanciation, mise mise

à distance. Notion très importante en japonais, le ma: espacement de temps,
d’espace: règle la temporalité et la spatialité: ni entassement, ni
‘désertification’. (N, 13 May, 190)
1. Ma: the interval

Barthes’s critical relationship to the codes of Western meaning (and
subjectivity) brings about a sense of distance vis-à-vis these codes. This
is a distance which Barthes employs thematically in Fragments d’un

discours amoureux under the rubric of marginality. Distance becomes a
vitally important value in the Cours. A light-handed regulation of (inter-
social) distance is at the heart of Comment vivre ensemble’s ideal of
idiorrythmie. The vivre-ensemble is characterised by ‘aération, distances,
différences’ (72), and he concludes the course by emphasising the impor-
tance of ‘la distance inter-individuelle’ (178). ‘La distance critique,’ he
tells us, ‘serait sans doute le problème le plus important du Vivre-
Ensemble: trouver et régler la distance critique, au-delà ou en deçà de
laquelle il se produit une crise’ (178). In today’s society, he continues, it
is space itself ‘qui coûte cher’, which constitutes ‘le bien absolu’ (179).
To be surrounded by a certain amount of space and to be comfortable
with the limits thereof constitutes idiorrythmie itself, or a certain utopia:
‘Don de place: serait constituant de la règle (utopique)’ (179). Comment
vivre ensemble concludes by figuring ‘la distance comme valeur’ and
imagines the perfect idiorrythmie as ‘une distance qui ne casse pas l’affect
[…]; une distance pénétrée, irriguée de tendresse’ (179).
Distance is conceived as the locus of both practical and affective
concerns. The figuring of idiorrythmie itself as distance also imbues the
idea of distance with the subversive attributes of the idiorrythmic
impulse. Critical distance is a complex ideal, given its imbrication with
emotional interaction: it is both an objective and a subjective category,
involving ‘la bonne distance entre les repères (y compris les repères
humains de l’espace affectif)’ (N, 13 May, 189). We should use the
Japanese attitude as an ideal, Barthes says: ‘Prolongeons l’attitude
japonaise […] qui ne conceptualise ni le temps ni l’espace, mais seulement
l’intervalle, le rapport de deux moments, de deux lieux ou objets ¡
essayons de concevoir […] l’espacement entre les sujets’ (N, 190). This
idea of distance as encompassing both the external and the internal
(emotional) life is one that can be usefully glossed by the uniquely
Japanese consciential concept of Ma, to which Barthes refers frequently
in the Cours. By problematising our demarcation of temporal and spatial
categories, the idea of Ma or ‘the interval’ allows us to figure ‘la bonne
distance’ as the shorthand for a non-dualistic ethical ideal involving rela-
tionships with others as well as one’s relationship to power. In giving us
a more complex sense of the interaction and succession of moments and
of states, and by figuring a positive emptiness, Ma provides an interesting
ground upon which to examine the Cours’ exploration of alterations of
our consciousness (our ego-feeling) and of modes of conduct which
promote the overcoming of dualism.
Ma is the Japanese understanding of space/time. This concept is
without parallel in Indo-European languages, which strictly separate the

categories of space and time. The architect Arata Isozaki explains this
difference as follows:
We d[o] not traditionally have a concept of space or a concept of time like
in Western philosophy or thought. We only [have] ‘ma’, no space, no time.
When the philosophical concepts of space and time arrived in Japan […]
somebody had to translate the words time and space. […] [To] ‘ma’ was
added chronos: chronos plus ‘ma’ means time; and emptiness plus ‘ma’
means space.
In Japan, then, to think about space means to think about time, and vice
versa. ‘The direct meaning of “ma”,’ Isozaki tells us, ‘is the in-between,
the space between object and object, and at the same time, the silence
between sound and sound’.41
Isozaki created an exhibition entitled ‘Ma. Espace/temps au Japon’
which was shown at the Musée des arts décoratifs in Paris in Autumn
1978. Isozaki claims that the ideas in the exhibition subsequently influ-
enced Foucault and Derrida.42 They certainly interested Barthes, who was
already aware of the concept of Ma, having mentioned it in Le Neutre
in May 1978.43 Barthes’s short report on the exhibition written for the
Nouvel Observateur in October of that year explains the concept of Ma
to readers. Ma is any interval in either space or time – any linking
distance, in other words: ‘toute relation, toute séparation entre deux
instants, deux lieux, deux états: Ma’.44 The exhibition on Ma consitutes,
he says, a ‘méditation’ on ‘cette idée d’intervalle’. We discover herein the
principle of ‘“discrétion” (mot approximatif)’ (OC, V, 476). The exhi-
bition is ‘discreet’ in that its displays are sparse, characterised by ‘rareté’
and by a very subtle symbolism. Barthes’s implicit point here is that the
sensitive display of objects illustrating such aesthetic principles as sabi
(the beauty of imperfection) or utsuroi (transitory beauty) reveals an
approach to meaning that is different to ours in being more subtle. This,
of course, has always been Barthes’s point about Japan; he believes that
in this respect the Japanese relationship to signs is ‘superior’ to our own:
‘là-bas, le symbole ne se réduit pas à un emblème: c’est un passage, fluide,
délié, instantané, qui ne relève d’aucun lexique’ (OC, V, 477). In this
exhibition, the discretion of the displays involves for Westerners ‘[une]
difficulté d’appréhension’ but also an ‘apaisement’, which occurs in the
viewer because ‘le symbolisme des arrangements est extrêmement ellip-
tique’ (OC, V, 477).
The exhibition on Ma has underlined for Barthes a subtle Japanese
aesthetic of fluidity and lightness. Barthes’s use of the word ‘discrétion’
to describe this implies the tipping over of the aesthetic into an ethical
(or interactional) value: as we already know, aesthetics in Japan tends to

be inseparable from ethico-philosophical questions, and thus the consid-
eration of Ma – a relational concept – naturally involves a reflection upon
relations between human subjects. For this reason, Barthes’s description
of Ma as discretion is an extension of the issues at the end of Comment
vivre ensemble in May 1977 when he refers to the utopian ideal of ‘la
bonne distance’ as ‘délicatesse’. ‘Délicatesse’ as a relational value involves
the same light, balanced interaction as does Ma or discretion. It also
suggests a comparably fluid use of the symbolic, whereby what Barthes
calls ‘images’ (a negative term for Barthes, implying reductive pigeon-
holing) are renounced: ‘renoncer activement aux images (des uns, des
autres). […] = Utopie proprement dite, car forme du Souverain Bien’
(CVE, 4 May, 179–80).45 This imagined goodness, then, is premised
upon a respect for the interval between oneself and the other – a respect
which does not preclude emotion – and upon a renunciation of the intru-
sion of the symbolic into the relationship. Barthes says the same thing
when he announces that utopia itself is ‘le bon rapport du sujet à l’affect,
au symbole’ (CVE, 177).
Ma can be viewed as aiding our understanding of relationality as the
latter is figured in Comment vivre ensemble and, more implicitly, in Le
Neutre. It is another avatar of the non-vouloir-saisir, which valorises a
certain willed distance (the interval) from the other. This runs counter to
our Western impulse to possess (saisir) through interpretation. Instead
of seeking to embody the other with our interpretive assumptions of
knowledge about him/her (our image of the person), we must instead be
willing to accept the person as uncategorisable, or neutral.
2. Ma: receptive emptiness

Robert Pilgrim, in an article that discusses Ma as a ‘religio-aesthetic
paradigm’, convincingly demonstrates that Ma is a liberatory – or non-
dualistic – concept: ‘Ma ultimately deconstructs all boundaries (as
mind-created constructs and orders imposed on the chaos of experi-
ence)’.46 Ma involves both observable phenomena as well as experiential
or emotional states, and in both cases is at the edge of thought. The
founding breakdown of temporal and spatial distinctions, according
to Pilgrim, entails a breakdown of other categories, such as subject/
object divisions. Commenting on Isozaki’s definition of Ma, Pilgrim
writes that
The collapse of space and time as two distinct and abstract objects can only
take place in a particular mode of experience that ‘empties’ the objec-
tive/subjective world(s); only in aesthetic, immediate, relational experience
can space be ‘perceived as identical with the events or phenomena occurring

in it’.47
Ma, then, encompasses more than the idea of the intervallic. Ultimately,
it brings us to ‘the edge of all processes of locating things by naming and
distinguishing’,48 via the figuring of emptiness as receptivity. Barthes
figures the emptying of the self into the world: he approaches ideas
concerning this state in his use of the Rousseau and Tolstoy epigraphs to
Le Neutre as well as in his discussions of the haiku and of Baudelaire’s
Les Paradis artificiels. Throughout the Cours, also, he demonstrates an
awareness of the philosophical base of Taoism, which understands noth-
ingness as the ultimate context of our being. He had hinted at this idea
of a nourishing void several times in L’Empire des signes; one striking
example of this is the description of Tokyo as being held together by the
empty space at its centre: this void ‘donn[e] à tout le mouvement urbain
l’appui de son vide central’ (ES, 50). 49
In his first lecture on the haiku (the fourth lecture of the first
Préparation series), Barthes emphasises the importance of ‘aération’ in
the haiku. This is in the first instance to do with the typographical ‘dispo-
sition de la parole sur la page’ (PR, 6 January 1979, 59), but also runs
deeper than this. Barthes sees ‘aeration’ as being axiomatic in the haiku
given that it is a form of ‘oriental’ art. All oriental art, he says, demon-
strates a ‘respect’ for space. Barthes frequently invokes Japan to figure a
beneficial void, particularly with regard to the symbolic. His under-
standing of satori, for example, emphasises the manner in which Zen
teaching points constantly to ‘the void’. Hokenson deftly underscores the
link between Barthes’s (correct) understanding of Zen and the use of its
tenets in his own writing: ‘A discourse [is] written by Zen in figures
pointing to the nothingness of all things in order to enable illumination,
sudden shocking perception that void – as non-meaning – is a site of cogni-
tion’. Barthes’s ‘sleight of hand’, Hokenson states, is shown by his
construction of a ‘correspondence’ between Zen and his own writing. This
is ‘less an ethnological than an aesthetic figure for writing outside the occi-
dental mode, free […] from constructed meanings. As Zen writes, from
a metaphysics of void, so Barthes will write, from a poetics of deficit’.50
In the first Préparation lecture on the haiku, we find that Barthes’s
understanding of the ‘oriental void’ has been inflected by his awareness
of Ma. It is now the relational aspect of space which he finds interesting:
Tout l’art oriental […]: respect de l’espace, c’est-à-dire […] de l’espacement.
On sait: le japonais ne connaît guère les catégories kantiennes de l’Espace et
du Temps, mais celle – qui les traverse – de l’Espacement, de l’Intervalle:
Ma. (PR, 59)
The haiku, then, embodies this relationality. In line with this, its ‘aera-
tion’ hints at a happy state of the recognition of difference and respect
for an implied ‘distance critique’. For, he says, ‘quand on parle du “Vide”
(oriental), ce ne doit pas être dans un sens bouddhiste mais plus
sensuellement comme une respiration, une aération et […] une “matière”’
(PR, 59). To conceive space itself as matter is to respect the interval and
its subversion of stereotype and generalisation: ‘Mot d’un physicien: “S’il
n’y avait pas d’espace entre la matière, tout le genre humain tiendrait
dans un dé à coudre” ¡ Le haïku: c’est “l’anti-dé à coudre”, l’anti-
condensation totalisante, et c’est cela que dit le tercet haïkiste’ (PR, 59).
This is the essential point, Barthes implies, though it rests on other
‘interprétations thématiques’ of the ‘protestation de Vide’ – the void
understood as ‘pulsion respiratoire, désangoisse de l’étouffement,
fantasme de l’Oxygène, de la Respiration Euphorique, Jubilatoire’ (PR,
59).51
Barthes’s references to the ‘oriental’ void as a notional space which
allows him to ‘breathe’ are less fanciful than they may at first appear.
The theme of aeration is used critically, in a manner similar to the employ-
ment of the terms ‘rien à saisir’ and ‘vouloir-saisir’. The sense of aeration
is brought about for Barthes when he witnesses values or conducts which
operate within a non-dualistic conception of the world. Hence the impor-
tance of Japan. The most minute aspects of Japanese culture can bring
about destabilisation and aeration of our own assumptions, as Barthes
shows in L’Empire des signes when he discusses, in a section entitled
‘L’interstice’, the cooking of tempura. The batter coating of tempura, he
writes, is so light as to become abstract: ‘l’aliment n’a plus pour enveloppe
que le temps […] qui l’a solidifié’ (ES, 40). Thus even here Ma is at work,
bringing about an alteration of Barthes’s attitude to this food. The best
way we can describe this, writes Barthes, ‘en raison de nos ornières
thématiques’, is that it is ‘du côté du léger, de l’aérien, de l’instantané, du
fragile, du transparent, […] du rien, mais dont le vrai nom serait
l’interstice sans bords pleins, ou encore: le signe vide’ (ES, 40). The desire
sketched here for a permeability of boundaries between spaces, and for
a concomitant sense of aeration, will be seen again when Barthes
discusses the transparency of the border between self and world,
with reference to Rousseau, Tolstoy, and the photographs of Daniel
Boudinet.
3. Ma: the interstice

Recognising the interval means recognising negative space but construing
it as positive. The most profound endeavour of the first three of Barthes’s
Cours is arguably the positive rendering of conducts generally viewed (in

Barthes’s socio-linguistic sphere) as negative and weak: solitude,
neutrality, ephemerality.52 Barthes proceeds by highlighting the appar-
ently empty spaces skirted by the linear, goal-obsessed Western
logomachy. These spaces are not valorised or obvious, but subtly present
– hence Barthes’s method. Such spaces, as Pilgrim puts it, are ‘referred to
as creative/substantial negative spaces, imaginative spaces, or emotional
spaces that the positive spaces, narrative sequences, or forms of [a
discourse] help create but into which they dissolve’.53
The Ma-inspired figuring of empty space as liberatory is an excellent
emblem for the aesthetic and ethic Barthes is working towards. We see
this in the last essay Barthes completed before his death.54 ‘Cher
Antonioni’ addresses the director Michelangelo Antonioni directly and
praises his brave artistic principles. Barthes commends the filmmaker for
the ‘subtilité’ of his work: ‘votre art consiste à toujours laisser la route
du sens ouverte, et comme indécise, par scrupule’.55 This principle – akin
to the Japanese aesthetic principle of suggestion – is vital for ‘l’artiste
dont notre temps a besoin’, as it staves off dogmatism. Antonioni’s art
meets Barthes’s criteria for the efficacy of the modern artist’s methods.
When Barthes insists further on Antonioni’s use of subtlety he illustrates
it by using the idea of the productive empty space. Meaning always goes
further than what is directly said, writes Barthes; artists ensure this by
imbuing their work with a sort of ‘vibration’: ‘L’objet représenté vibre,
au détriment du dogme’ (OC, V, 902). Barthes thinks of Matisse drawing
an olive tree and discovering that observing the empty spaces between
the branches led to ‘[une] nouvelle vision’ and allowed him to escape
from ‘l’image habituelle de l’objet dessiné, [le] cliché “olivier”’.56 This
was a discovery running counter to the tenets of Western art: ‘Matisse
découvrait ainsi le principe de l’art oriental, qui veut toujours peindre le
vide, ou plutôt qui saisit l’objet figurable au moment rare où le plein de
son identité choit brusquement dans un nouvel espace, celui de
l’Interstice’ (902). Barthes is perhaps alluding here to the ‘one-corner’
style of Oriental painting, in which the sparsely painted object is prized
for its evocation of infinity. Barthes states that Antonioni’s art too has
interstitial qualities, and it is this that gives it a relationship with ‘l’Orient’
that runs deeper than mere content (he mentions here Antonioni’s film
China (1972)).57 Note the conjunction here between the interstice and
non-Western thought: ‘Votre art est lui aussi un art de l’Interstice […] et
donc, d’une certaine manière aussi, votre art a quelque rapport avec
l’Orient’ (902, my emphasis).
Barthes’s association of the interstice with the Orient is linked to his
understanding of Ma (not directly mentioned here). Ma, in what Barthes

refers to as its ‘non-Kantian’ elision of time and space, indicates not just
the interval between identifiable objects, but the interval in thought that
permits the figuring of more nuanced modes of being than we have hith-
erto imagined – in short, utopianism. For Barthes to think his way out
of the logomachy of his own linguistic sphere, he needs such an interval.
His understanding of Ma is, then, a more specific or nuanced version of
his setting-up of the inverted-commas ‘Japan’ in L’Empire des signes. Ma
is the gap between ‘Orient’ and ‘Occident’, a space for thinking that seeks
to be unprescribed. Barthes is of course perfectly aware of the constructed
nature of the gap between his imagined Orient and his Occident, and
aware too that the artifice does not diminish its use-value. ‘La langue
inconnue’, he tells us near the beginning of L’Empire des signes, gives
him a sense of ‘respiration, aération émotive’. The haiku and the idea of
Ma give him this sense too. He feels the slight ‘vertige’ of being
surrounded by a ‘vide artificiel, qui ne s’accomplit que pour moi’. In a
certain sense, he floats: ‘je vis dans l’interstice, débarrassé de tout sens
plein’ (ES, 21).
It is clear from the essay on Antonioni that the interstice is for Barthes
an important figure for sketching both the ethical and the aesthetic value
of the artwork. In Leçon, it is literature as ‘tricherie’ that allows language
continually (if infinitesimally) to elude the empire of ideology as it
extends itself through stereotype and dogmatism. In the Cours, the same
goal is sought through a practice of openness which we could describe
as the valorisation of the interstice. The interstice is both the recognition
and outlining of the ‘creative/substantial negative spaces’ ignored by the
French logomachy – idiorrythmie, the neutral suspension of judgment,
silence, weariness, tact, the unwillingness to interpret – and the manner
in which these ‘spaces’ are presented to the audience. ‘Je ne suis pas là
quand on m’attend,’ as Barthes says in Le Neutre; ‘je réalise une atopie
de langage (mais ne soyons pas triomphant: cette atopie sera récupérée
sous la nomination du “farfelu”)’ (N, 29 April, 160). To be regarded as
precious or silly is both a result and an expedient of the interstitial tech-
nique. We can infer this from a statement at the end of Comment vivre
ensemble, when Barthes says that the ideal lecture-course (‘le rêve’) would
be characterised by ‘une sorte de banalité non oppressante, aérée (cf.
‘Délicatesse’)’ (181). Banality is itself an interstice, an un-value, some-
thing not supposed to be recognised. To assume it is to enter into the
interstice fully, a space unrecognised by one’s socio-linguistic sphere and
therefore freely creative. In line with this, the imagined space that the
writer must figure to himself is the interstice. Barthes posits this at the
end of La Préparation du roman II. The rejection of overt marginality

here chimes with the refusal in Comment vivre ensemble to examine polit-
ically defined communes or, in post-’68 parlance, groupuscules: ‘Place
de l’écrivain,’ he asks: ‘la Marge? Il y en a tant: il finit par y avoir une
arrogance de la Marginalité ¡ Je préfère lui substituer l’Image de
l’Interstice: Écrivain = homme de l’Interstice’ (PR, 377).
We see in this quotation the caution that one’s position should not
be ‘arrogant’. The point is to distance oneself from the ego-feeling, from
the hermeneutics of the image, from position-taking itself (‘la proposi-
tion doit être incomplète – sinon c’est une position’ (CVE, 181)). Leçon
heralds this tendency to deny the construction of a positive image. We
find out there that Barthes’s semiology from now on will focus on empti-
ness rather than plenitude: ‘La sémiologie dont je parle est à la fois
négative et active,’ Barthes announces. ‘Quelqu’un en qui s’est débattue,
toute sa vie […], cette diablerie, le langage, ne peut qu’être fasciné par
les formes de son vide – qui est tout le contraire de son creux’ (L, 35).
The idea is that the sign should vibrate, in the sense in which Barthes
employs that word in the Antonioni essay. It follows from this that the
‘image’ of the practitioner of such a semiology must itself vibrate, as it
were: there is a logic here which dictates Barthes’s digressive practice and
its (attempted) refusal of the prestigious role of the leader who has an
obvious and socially sanctioned goal. This methodology is also reflected
thematically in the Cours, appearing frequently under the rubric of the
Taoist idea of wu-wei.
4. Wu-wei, xéniteia, Twombly

Tao and Chan (Zen) had different roots in China, but were exported to
Japan, where both philosophies gained specifically Japanese inflexions.58
The Tao principle of wu-wei literally means ‘not-making’ or non-
action.59 This does not mean simple idleness, though idleness, as we will
see, is a concept Barthes derives from it and valorises in the way he
valorises banality. Wu-wei is part of Barthes’s japoniste complex of ideas,
given that his understanding of it is closely linked to his understanding
of (Japanese) Zen as gleaned from Suzuki and especially Watts – the latter
mingles Tao with his discussion of Zen in The Way of Zen.
Taoism involves the assimilation of the ways (the tao) of nature into
one’s own conduct. Wu-wei, in eschewing ego-based choosing, works
towards the harmonisation of self with environment. Barthes’s under-
standing of wu-wei is drawn from Grenier’s L’Esprit du Tao (1957),
though he would also have read about it in the contemporary text by
Alan Watts, The Way of Zen (1957).60 Watts encapsulates the radical
otherness of wu-wei to Western systems of thought when he mentions

the religious and ontological principles underpinning it: ‘whereas God
produces the world by making (wei), the Tao produces it by “not-
making” (wu-wei) – which is approximately what we mean by
“growing”’.61 This leads to a complex (non-dualistic) conception of our
place in the world, based on an organic sense of being which precedes
linguistic divisions: ‘A universe which grows utterly excludes the possi-
bility of knowing how it grows in the clumsy terms of thought and
language’.62 Categorisation has no place in the Taoist worldview.
This bypassing of the divisions of language is what appeals to Barthes;
he also takes an evident delight in the ‘scandale’ of the idea of wu-wei in
a culture which makes value judgments about people’s status based on
their levels of action and decisiveness. ‘Wou-wei’ is mentioned frequently
during the Cours, and, as one of the figures of the neutre, takes up one
and a half of the lectures in that series. During his first mention of it in
Comment vivre ensemble, Barthes comments that ‘[le] Wou-wei [aurait]
des incidences politiques parfaitement scandaleuses’. As a mode of
conduct, it is ‘inconcevable’ for us, he explains, because ‘toute notre civil-
isation est dans le Vouloir-Agir’ (CVE, 124). It requires a discipline that
is extraordinarily difficult to achieve. Non-action as harmonisation is an
interstitial space that is constantly threatened by the active margins
surrounding it. The challenge, as Barthes sees it, is ‘non seulement
[d’]éviter l’événement, mais encore ne pas le susciter. […] S’abstenir
d’exercer une autorité, de remplir une fonction. […] Ne pas juger, parler
peu, ne plus connaître les oppositions logiques et morales, et d’une
manière générale toute distinction’ (CVE, 16 March, 124). One’s absten-
tion from dualistic choosing has somehow to be accompanied by a
genuinely non-dualistic thought. Barthes returns to this ‘acte-limite’, as
he calls it, in Le Neutre, using Grenier’s text: ‘Initiation au Tao:
“commencer par ne plus juger ni parler; puis on ne juge plus ni ne parle
mentalement”’ (58). This would be a sort of ‘silence intégral’, says
Barthes, which would become one with the profound silence of nature:
‘silence de toute la nature, éparpillement du fait-homme dans la nature:
l’homme serait comme un bruit de la nature’ (N, 58). This intermingling
of organism and environment is the goal at the heart of Tao.
Barthes’s desire to foil the construction of an ‘Image’ (understood as
a recognisable, stereotypical social role) means that wu-wei – and Taoism
generally – is a useful model for him. Tao’s practices reveal that it does
not confuse our social role with our fundamental identity, in the manner
to which we in the West (or indeed in the societies within which Tao
developed its spirit of critique) are so prone. Taoism refuses any prestige
accruing through or from one’s social role – hence its abstinence from
judging. The Tao Te Ching demonstrates this causality: sociality is based
on reductive, dualistic naming, and so in order to remain in sync with
the complexity of nature one must not choose between these dualisms:
‘The whole world recognises the beautiful as the beautiful, yet this is only
the ugly; the whole world recognises the good as the good, yet this is only
the bad. […] Therefore the sage keeps to the deed that consists in taking
no action’.63 Barthes understands the thought underlying this as a
profound refusal of social prestige, which facilitates a wisdom the more
nourishing for being unknown. It is in these terms that he discusses Tao
in Comment vivre ensemble under the figure of ‘xéniteia’ or exile.
The desire for ‘xéniteia’ is the very Barthesian desire to shift position
as soon as ‘un langage, une doctrine, un mouvement d’idées […]
commence à prendre, à se solidifier, […] à devenir une masse compacte
d’habitudes […] (un sociolecte)’. He wants to be ‘exiled’ from stereotype:
‘aller ailleurs, vivre ainsi en état d’errance intellectuelle’ (CVE, 27 April,
175). In order for this exile not to turn into another (solidifiable) posi-
tion, however, Barthes needs an assistant concept: that which – utopically
– would allow him intellectual freedom without being noticed. He names
this concept ‘sténochôria’ (‘espace étroit’). Through the idea of
sténochôria, xéniteia becomes internalised, along the lines laid out by
Taoism’s ‘conduite profonde qui vise à ne pas se faire remarquer’. The
exile is then ‘un exil si intérieur que le monde ne le voit guère. Sagesse
qui reste inconnue, intelligence non divulguée, vie cachée, ignorance
qu’ont les autres du but que je poursuis, refus de la gloire, abîme de
silence’ (CVE, 172). For Barthes, this self-effacing conduct is desirable
because it represents the opposite of arrogance, whether in discourse or
in conduct. Implicit here again are ideas of tact and discretion – which
Barthes frequently associates with Japan:64 ‘Xéniteia n’est pas sans
rapport avec la politesse. Non la “politesse” superficielle et mondaine
(de classe) de l’Occident, mais la politesse de l’Orient’ (CVE, 173). This
‘politesse’ is part of a positive, japoniste complex of values that for
Barthes includes the terms ‘discrétion’, ‘délicatesse’, ‘l’interstice’, and
‘non-vouloir-saisir’.
These values, disseminated throughout the first three Cours, can seem
elusive. Such ideas, because paradoxical to our socio-linguistic habits,
are difficult to speak of. Barthes is aware of the aporetic problem, and
links it again to Tao. He quotes Lao-Tzu: ‘Celui qui connaît le Tao n’en
parle pas; celui qui en parle ne le connaît pas’, and adds in parenthesis
‘C’est bien mon cas! Noter toujours la même aporie du Neutre. […]
Neutre = impossible: le parler, c’est le défaire, mais ne pas le parler, c’est
manquer sa “constitution”’ (N, 25 February, 57–58). Given that no defi-

nition of the sought-for values can be given, it is helpful to see them in
action in Barthes’s criticism. Barthes sees the work of the American
abstract painter Cy Twombly (1928–2011) as illustrating the principle
of ‘délicatesse’.
Twombly’s work is layered with scribbles, graffiti, illegibilities. His
canvases are large, often airy, lending themselves to being read but then
frustrating that impulse. Some of Barthes’s own watercolours, probably
not coincidentally, bear a certain resemblance to Twombly’s graphoma-
niacal work. Both of Barthes’s 1979 essays on Twombly were produced
for catalogues of Twombly’s paintings, with some of the material
common to both essays.65 Barthes’s thinking about Twombly is partially
inflected by his understanding of Ma. In the Préparation du roman lecture
of 10 March 1979, he mentions Twombly as an exemplar of sparseness.
Twombly’s work, like Anton Webern’s short musical pieces, is charac-
terised by what Barthes calls ‘Rarus’. This, he says, is similar to ‘le Ma:
notion qui, elle, permettrait de parler de la peinture: Twombly, les
Orientaux’ (PR, 147). The end of the near-contemporary essay on
Twombly, ‘Sagesse de l’art’, demonstrates a deft rhetorical causality
whereby it is posited that Twombly shares qualities with ‘the Orient’ by
virtue of his non-dogmatic style of painting. The logic here is clearer if
one bears in mind Barthes’s association between the interstice and the
Orient, in which (notional) realm alone are the values of discretion and
suggestion truly valorised. Twombly’s canvas or page, though ‘silent’, is
lent its significance by the sparse ‘trait[s], hachure[s], forme[s]’ that are
dispersed upon it. We are reminded not just of the one-corner style of
Japanese painting, but of the general Tao principle of nothingness as the
most profound context of being. Barthes quotes the Tao Te Ching here:
‘L’être, dit le Tao, donne des possibilités, c’est par le non-être qu’on les
utilise’. This phenomenon, which renders inapplicable the ideas of ‘le
nombre et l’unité, la dispersion et le centre’ is, we may infer, anti-
interpretive. The aesthetic of Twombly’s work is quite other to those
‘peintures excitées, possessives, dogmatiques [qui] imposent le produit’.
Twombly’s sparse work is remarkable for Barthes in displaying an ethic
that, though common in Eastern philosophies, is unique in our
logosphere: ‘L’art de Twombly – c’est là sa moralité, et aussi sa grande
singularité historique – ne veut rien saisir; il se tient, il flotte, il dérive
entre le désir […] et la politesse; qui est le congé discret donné à toute
envie de capture’ (OC, V, 701–702). Twombly’s work, then, exhibits the
relational values that Barthes is working towards in the Fragments and
in Comment vivre ensemble and Le Neutre. He sees Twombly’s success
in demonstrating the ‘délicat’ (701) as being without parallel in

Twombly’s own culture (‘l’Occident’). ‘Si l’on voulait situer cette
moralité,’ writes Barthes in conclusion,
on ne pourrait aller la chercher que très loin, hors de la peinture, hors de
l’Occident, hors des siècles historiques, à la limite même du sens, et dire,
avec le Tao Tö King: ‘Il produit sans s’approprier, /Il agit sans rien attendre,
/Son œuvre accomplie, il ne s’y attache pas, /Et puisqu’il ne s’y attache pas,
/Son œuvre restera’ (OC, V, 702).
Twombly’s work is, for Barthes, the most thoroughgoing embodi-

ment of an ethic-aesthetic that is generally inadmissible in the West. There
are other figures who gesture more fleetingly towards a conduct remi-
niscent of wu-wei: Barthes discusses these in ‘Wou-wei’, towards the end
of the Neutre course. Wu-wei problematises the ‘morale de la volonté,
du vouloir (saisir, dominer, vivre, imposer sa vérité)’, and is, therefore,
‘structuralement un Neutre: ce qui déjoue le paradigme’ (N, 27 May,
223). The attainment of this neutral in the West can only ever be brief,
‘rare et surtout partielle’ says Barthes; we see it only in ‘des moments,
des tendances, des aspects de quelques individus’. The examples he
provides here are Leonardo da Vinci as seen by Freud, John Cage, and
Prince Andrei from Tolstoy’s War and Peace.66 He quotes War and Peace.
The Prince is going on a journey in the springtime, and sees an oak tree:
‘La vue de cet arbre provoqua en lui une éclosion de pensées nouvelles,
désespérées mais pleines d’un charme mélancolique’. The conjunction
between the contemplation of nature and the imagining of a new mode
of living is important here. The excerpt continues:
Au cours de ce voyage, il soumit sa façon de vivre à un nouvel examen
approfondi et aboutit […] à cette conclusion désenchantée mais apaisante,
qu’il ne devait rien entreprendre, mais achever tout bonnement sa vie sans
faire le mal, sans se tracasser, sans rien désirer. (N, 224)
Barthes presents this excerpt almost without comment, his only remark
being that Christian morality lends a slightly ‘masochiste’ tone, as the
prince sees his new, simple life with a certain ‘désenchantement’. For
Barthes, the imagining of this unified life, the accomplishment of a
profound wu-wei, and the manner of its apprehension, are deeply envi-
able.
At the start of La Préparation du roman I, Barthes describes an
epiphanic moment of wu-wei or of satori that occurred to him in April
1978. This description appears to be rhetorically modelled on the War
and Peace excerpt that he had quoted on 27 May 1978. The first
Préparation lecture opens with Barthes explaining that he desperately
wants a new writerly goal, as he is becoming overwhelmed by the ‘pres-
sion sociale’ (PR, 2 December 1978, 29) and repetition he now associ-
ates with his work, which seems to involve largely ‘la gestion’ of former
ideas. The decision to radically change his goals and to work towards a
‘vita nova’ happened suddenly, he says, on 15 April 1978. We see here
precisely the same markers as in the Prince Andrei excerpt – here is the
peacable natural setting: ‘Lourdeur de l’après-midi. Le ciel se couvre, un
peu frais. Nous allons [à un] joli vallon de la route de Rabat’. And here,
the sense, on his return from the outing, that his life must change: this is
the liberatory realisation that ‘il ne devait rien entreprendre’, just like the
prince:
Seul, triste ¡ Marinade. […] Éclosion d’une idée: […] entrer en littérature,
en écriture; […] ne plus faire que cela. […] Faire cesser la division du sujet,
au profit d’un seul Projet, le Grand Projet: image de joie, si je me donnais
une tâche unique. […] Tout instant de la vie fût désormais travail intégré au
Grand Projet. (PR, 32)
This idea of the unification of his goals is a moment of pure insight, and
as such it is a liberation from the more atomised generic and social
codes which have been governing his work and his attitude to it. ‘Ce 15
avril en somme’, Barthes concludes, ‘[c’est une] sorte de Satori,
d’éblouissement’ (PR, 32).
The mention of satori, as well as the natural setting of Barthes’s ‘real-
isation’, also implies that the unification at stake here is not only that of
Barthes’s work; there is a hint here at the idea of a non-dualistic unifi-
cation of the subject with his environment. Though Barthes does not
pursue this further at this juncture of the Préparation lecture, he returns
to it later in his discussions of the haiku. However, for a more thorough
sketching of the idea of the diffusion of the self into its surroundings, we
must return first of all to the opening of Le Neutre.
5. ‘Je n’avais nulle notion distincte de mon individu’

In the first Neutre lecture, Barthes reads four short texts ‘en guise
d’épigraphes’ (N, 18 February, 27). The first of these, by Joseph de
Maistre, is an indication of the arrogance from which the neutral seeks
to distance itself. The other three epigraphs, from texts by Tolstoy,
Rousseau, and Lao-Tzu, bear witness to the neutral. All four excerpts are
read by Barthes without comment. The ‘portrait de Lao-Tzeu par lui-
même’ relates specifically to the theme of wu-wei. It invokes the Taoist
valorisation of negativity, which Taoists believe to be far less limiting
than the use of positive terms.67 Hence the negativity of Lao-Tzu’s
description of himself; what is valued is the idea of an unknown wealth
of meaning lying behind a bland exterior. Our knowledge of Barthes’s
desire for xéniteia and stenochôria allows us to understand his affinity

with these lines:
Moi seul, suis calme, mes désirs ne se manifestent pas; je suis comme l’enfant
qui n’a pas encore souri. […] Les autres ont tous du superflu; moi seul semble
avoir tout perdu; mon esprit est celui d’un sot. […] Les autres ont l’air
intelligent; moi seul semble un niais. (N, 30)
The Tolstoy and Rousseau epigraphs announce a related idea, hitherto

unseen in the Cours but which gains significance in Le Neutre and La
Préparation du roman I. Both these excerpts involve an experience
wherein Prince Andrei and Rousseau respectively experience a sudden
and astonishing peace of mind, which is linked in both cases to a sense
of oneness with the surrounding environment. Pierre Hadot speaks of
such moments as being central to the ancient ‘exercices spirituels’: what
is at stake here is a ‘conscience cosmique’ which allows one to escape all
worry.68 Indeed, just like Barthes, Hadot finds evidence of this ‘conscience
cosmique’ in Rousseau’s Rêveries du promeneur solitaire.69 In Tolstoy’s
text, Prince Andrei falls on the battlefield at Austerlitz and, instead of
being aware of the hue of battle around him, experiences a great calm:
Il ne vit plus rien. Il n’y avait plus au-dessus de lui que le ciel, un ciel voilé,
mais très haut, immensément haut, où flottaient doucement des nuages gris.
‘Quel calme, quelle paix, quelle majesté! songeait-il. Quelle différence entre
notre course folle, parmi les cris et la bataille, […] et la marche lente de ces
nuages dans ce ciel profond, infini!’ (cited in N, 18 February, 29)
Andrei realises that the immense sky represents the real significance of
existence, as the futility of battle and the ‘rage stupide’ of men cannot:
‘Comment ne l’ai-je pas remarqué jusqu’alors? […] Oui, tout est vanité,
tout est mensonge en dehors de ce ciel sans limites. Il n’y a rien,
absolument rien d’autre que cela’. It may even be that the sky itself is a
mask for the ultimate nothingness that surrounds us: ‘Peut-être même
est-ce un leurre, peut-être même n’y a-t-il rien, à part le silence, le repos’
(N, 29). The prince is diffused into his surroundings: the abolition of divi-
sion between his self and his environment entails the realisation that all
dualistic division – anything that is not nothingness, space or silence – is
pointless. He experiences, in a very precise sense, satori: the revelation
of the this-ness of the world.
Barthes has found a description of a remarkably similar revelation in
Rousseau’s Rêveries du promeneur solitaire – a text in which Hadot tells
us we see ‘à la fois l’écho de la tradition antique et le pressentiment de
certaines attitudes modernes’.70 Rousseau experiences this as he gazes at
the sky after an accident on the road. There is the added element here of
the sense of loss of individuality:
J’aperçus le ciel, quelques étoiles et un peu de verdure. […] Je naissais dans

cet instant à la vie, et il me semblait que je remplissais de ma légère existence
tous les objets que j’apercevais. […] Je n’avais nulle notion distincte de mon
individu; […] je ne savais ni qui j’étais ni où j’étais. […] Je sentais dans tout
mon être un calme ravissant. (cited in N, 30)
Rousseau’s satori, then, goes a step further than Prince Andrei’s, in

explicitly attaining the loss of subjectivity.71
Barthes’s use of Tolstoy and Rousseau here to figure the neutre can
be called a japoniste idea, though its implications go beyond the aesthetic
considerations that define japonisme for Jan Walsh Hokenson. The figu-
ration of a non-dualistic, intersubjective conception of the world is, as
we have seen, central to Japanese aesthetics. The Tolstoy and Rousseau
excerpts testify to an experience which is entirely consistent with satori
as it is written about by Zen masters and commentators on Zen such as
Watts and Suzuki. For satori involves not the apprehension of a myste-
rious doctrinal truth, but rather the realisation that self and world are
one. As Prince Andrei puts it, ‘Il n’y a rien, absolument rien d’autre que
cela’ – or, as the Zen master Hakuin exclaims at the moment of his satori:
‘How wondrous! There is no birth-and-death from which one has to
escape, nor is there any supreme knowledge after which one has to
strive!’72 Barthes fully grasps the import of satori as the revelation, once
the filters of language which had coloured our view have been done away
with, of the world itself. Discussing satori in Le Neutre, he points out
that using the word ‘illumination’ to describe satori is not quite appro-
priate, for the illumination is of nothing – or of everything: ‘on ne voit
rien sinon peut-être qu’il n’y a rien à voir’. Rather, by virtue of the ‘ébran-
lement de la logique du moi-social’ (N, 29 April, 156), one attains a
realisation of the interconnectedness of phenomena, a relationality that
our divisive language-forms and social codings had hitherto screened
from our consciousness. There is no intervening symbolic code between
self and world; there is nothing to interpret. Satori and its literary form,
the haiku, allow immediacy of relation and experience. There is a certain
overlap here with some of the concerns of phenomenology. Husserl and
Merleau-Ponty, for example, envision a return to such a heightened
perception of the world. For Merleau-Ponty – as for Hadot, incidentally
– philosophy is the means by which one can ‘rapprendre à voir le
monde’.73 Barthes’s understanding of satori involves not only perception
of the world, however, but a concomitant loosening of subjectivity. As
Bernard Comment puts it, ‘une pareille expérience immédiate du réel
implique une destitution du sujet, l’effacement de son enveloppe
constitutive, la sortie du rapport duel sujet-objet pour tenter une
expérience indistincte de l’événement’. He concludes that ‘C’est le monde

phénoménal en son ainsité, et sans projection du moi (désormais
obsolète), qui doit être atteint’.74 So the self is diffused. The mid-twen-
tieth-century Zen master Sokei-an Sasaki describes this phenomenon:
‘One day I wiped out all the notions from my mind,’ he writes. ‘I gave
up all desire. I discarded all the words with which I thought’. He describes
satori as a movement inwards:
Ztt! I entered. I lost the boundary of my physical body. I had my skin, of
course, but I felt I was standing in the center of the cosmos. […] I had never
known this world. I had believed that I was created, but now I must change
my opinion: I was never created; I was the cosmos; no individual Mr Sasaki
existed.75
Barthes is aware of the complexity of the notion of individuation and

its intersection with the environment in the Zen worldview: he devotes
the whole of his third lecture on the haiku to these issues. Individuation,
he suggests, consists precisely in the conjunction of ‘l’irréductibilité, la
nuance fondatrice, le Tel […] de l’individu (sujet civique et
psychologique)’ and ‘tel moment de cet individu: […] [le] Temps qu’il
fait, [la] couleur, [le] phénomène’ (PR, 20 January 1979, 78). The appar-
ently banal question of the weather becomes fundamental to our
non-dualistic sense of self.76 Barthes uses a quotation from Baudelaire’s
Les Paradis artificiels to illustrate this: ‘Ceux qui savent s’observer eux-
mêmes […] ont eu parfois à noter, dans l’observatoire de leur pensée, de
belles saisons, d’heureuses journées, de délicieuses minutes’. If we take
this a step further, says Barthes, we leave metaphor behind, and we
become our surroundings: ‘vous serez la saison, la journée, la minute;
votre sujet: comblé et épuisé par elle ¡ vous devenez baromètre’ (PR,
78). He goes on to conclude the lecture by suggesting that individuation,
understood as the relationship between our self and our environment,
seems both to strengthen our sense of our own quiddity, and to weaken
our ego-feeling altogether:
L’individuation […] est à la fois ce qui fortifie le sujet dans son individualité,
son ‘quant à moi’ […] et aussi, à l’extrême contraire, ce qui défait le sujet,
le multiplie, le pulvérise et en un sens l’absente ¡ oscillation entre l’extrême
impressionnisme et une sorte de tentation mystique de la dilution, de
l’anéantissement de la conscience comme unitaire: très classique et ultra-
moderne. (PR, 79)
6. L’intraitable
The Préparation lectures on the haiku represent a continuation of
L’Empire des signes’s conception of the haiku as entailing a ‘réveil devant
le fait’. As we already know from L’Empire des signes, the haiku is the
object of Barthes’s writerly desire because of the manner in which its tel,
its distilled and indivisible representation of a moment, repels interpre-
tation and seems to forbid any symbolic substitution. The haiku ‘stops’
language and confronts us with the world. In the Préparation lectures,
Barthes still insists on this. The haiku, he says in his lecture on the haiku
and the photograph, gives us, as the photo does, the ‘effet de réel’, the
certainty that the evoked moment did exist.77 Language is jolted:
‘J’entends par effet de réel l’évanouissement du langage au profit d’une
certitude de réalité: le langage se retourne, s’enfouit et disparaît, laissant
à nu ce qu’il dit’ (PR, 17 February 1979, 113). It is this stripped quality
which makes the haiku a model for the ‘moments de vérité’ which Barthes
wants his imagined novel to consist of. As we will see in Chapter 5,
Barthes focuses on two excerpts from Proust and Tolstoy to figure the
pathetic force of ‘moments de vérité’. Their ‘truth’ is analogised by
recourse to Japanese aesthetics: why are these moments so ‘vrai (et non
seulement réel ou réaliste)’, he asks? Because they render fragility: ‘Parce
que cette radicalité du concret désigne ce qui va mourir: plus c’est concret,
plus c’est vivant, et plus c’est vivant, plus cela va mourir; c’est le utsuroi
japonais ¡ sorte de plus-value énigmatique donnée par l’écriture’ (PR,
10 March 1979, 158). We hear him add in the lecture that this value
<justifie intégralement, en dehors de toute théorie, l’écriture>. The haiku
and the aesthetic principles it mobilises are an essential propaedeutic to
the focus on the ‘Intraitable’ of life and emotion which Barthes imagines
representing in his fantasised novel – and which he does represent in La
Chambre claire: the final words of La Chambre claire designate its
anguished core: ‘l’intraitable réalité’ (CC, 885). The real itself is found,
laceratingly, in the Winter Garden photograph of Barthes’s mother. This
discovery is akin to the ‘moments de vérité’ which Barthes discusses in
the Préparation. These are ‘moment[s] de l’Intraitable’. No dialectic is
possible, as with grief: ‘on ne peut ni interpréter, ni transcender, ni
régresser; Amour et Mort sont là, c’est tout ce qu’on peut dire. Et c’est
le mot même du haïku’ (PR, 159).
The haiku – and Zen thought generally – encourage a serene accept-
ance of what Barthes calls ‘l’intraitable’ and what Watts calls now: ‘There
is only this now’.78 Satori represents a secular revolution in our under-
standing, whereby we finally realise that there is no possible
transcendence of any kind, and no interpretation necessary. ‘When Fa-
ch’ang was dying,’ writes Watts in the concluding lines of The Way of
Zen, ‘a squirrel screeched on the roof. “It’s just this”, he said, “and
nothing else”’.79 We are familiar, from La Chambre claire, with Barthes’s
version of this: ‘c’est cela!’ ‘Le satori,’ he states in Le Neutre, ‘rompt avec
la vision courante qui acclimate, apprivoise l’événement en le faisant
rentrer dans une causalité, une généralité, qui réduit l’incomparable au
comparable’ (N, 221). If we experience the satori that reveals to us the
‘intraitable’ of the world, then we are in the realm of the ‘incomparable’,
which is also the banal: experiences (love, death) that happen to every-
body, about which nothing can be said to transform them: they just
happen. Barthes describes the neutral as a ‘mouvement’ which would
allow one to accept ‘une certaine pensée de la mort comme banale, car
dans la mort, ce qui est exorbitant, c’est son caractère banal’ (N, 25
March, 119).
Barthes employs Suzuki’s ‘Zen dialectic’ in both Le Neutre and La
Préparation to insist on this matteness of understanding. Suzuki tells us
that as we follow Zen teaching, we go through two stages of looking at
the world, in order to reach a third.80 At first, the mountains are merely
mountains. This stage, says Barthes, is the stage of ‘bêtise, tautologie’.
This stage is followed by a period of interpretation and questioning: ‘à
la suite d’un bon enseignement Zen les montagnes ne sont plus des
montagnes’; this is the stage of ‘intelligence, paranoïa’. Finally, however,
we attain the ‘asile du repos’ wherein ‘de nouveau les montagnes sont
des montagnes’; this, Barthes tells us, is the desirable state of ‘innocence
(mystique), sapience, “méthode” (= Tao)’ (N, 6 May, 164–65). If we have
reached the Tao itself (the ‘way’), we have reached an acceptance of
nature’s workings, and of ‘l’Intraitable’. This acceptance, Barthes
reminds us in the Préparation, is only possible ‘si l’on a traversé
l’interprétation – souffrir d’une mort = il faut traverser toute une
“culture” du deuil; et la culture = ce qui vient d’abord, l’absolument
spontané’ (PR, 127). The final stage is a ‘sagesse’: this word is resonant
in Barthes’s late work, from Leçon to the essay on Twombly. Here,
‘sagesse’ consists in acceptance, which is also ‘la saisie de la naturalité de
la chose. […] Et ici, on retrouve Bashô, le haïkiste […]: “Vous aurez beau
regarder toutes choses, rien n’est semblable au croissant de la lune”’ (PR,
127). We are simply here – this is the banal, incomparable teaching of
Zen: ‘L’être manifesté existe. […] Ici, pas de doctrine de l’illusion, ni de
l’ignorance, de Maya, ni d’Avidya. Les phénomènes existent’ (N, 217).
By means of the Zen dialectic, Barthes emphasises a literal, natura-
listic reading of the world in which singular response is respected.
Crucially, there is a refusal of the Hegelian dialectic. A reading of La
Chambre claire makes it clear that Barthes feels the synthesising dialectic
is a force which traduces the intensity of personal response. His study of
photography angrily resists such a synthesis: ‘Je ne puis transformer mon
chagrin […]; aucune culture ne vient m’aider à parler cette souffrance

que je vis à même la finitude de l’image […]: ma Photographie est sans
culture: lorsqu’elle est douloureuse, rien, en elle, ne peut transformer le
chagrin en deuil. […] La Photographie est indialectique’ (CC, 862).
Barthes’s grief leads him to an Adornian position of the rejection of the
totalising force of the dialectic. Hegelian dialectics, in Adorno’s reading,
reduces particularity by subsuming it under a general movement. Adorno
advocates a focus on that which resists such levelling:
The matters of true philosophical interest at this point in history are those
in which Hegel […] expressed his disinterest. They are nonconceptuality,
individuality, and particularity – things which ever since Plato used to be
dismissed as transitory and insignificant, and which Hegel labeled ‘lazy
Existenz’. Philosophy’s theme would consist of the qualities it downgrades
as contingent.81
‘Lazy Existenz’ is the vital core of Barthes’s late thought.
7. L’existence minimale
Having arrived at an understanding of the Intraitable that results from
a rejection of dualism, Barthes seeks to elaborate an ethic-aesthetic which
will accommodate this understanding. It is the idea of the non-dualistic
field and of individuation as attendant upon weather which informs
Barthes’s sketchings of an ‘existence minimale’ (and an attendant imag-
ined ‘discours minimal’) from 1978 onwards. The ‘existence minimale’,
though utterly subjective, is a repudiation of Western egotism, and a
defence of what Adorno would call the ‘non-identical’.
The haiku aesthetic is again the ideal propaedeutic here. The classical
haiku always has a reference to the season or weather within it – the kigo,
or season-word. In rendering the ‘charge existentielle’ of the surrounding
environment it puts in play, says Barthes, ‘le sentir-être du sujet, la pure
et mystérieuse sensation de vie’ (PR, 20 January 1979, 72). In tandem
with this, the haiku’s mobilisation of the absolute individuality of a situ-
ated moment seems to involve the diffusion of the subject into the
surroundings so arrestingly evoked. This is how Barthes sees a Zenrin
poem which he quotes frequently in his late work, stating in le Neutre
that he has often wanted to use it as an epigraph for his texts.82 He almost
certainly read it first in Watts. The French translation of the poem is
‘Assis paisiblement sans rien faire, le printemps vient et l’herbe croît
d’elle-même’. Watts sees this as reflecting the ideal of the unified mind:
‘this “by itself” is the mind’s and the world’s natural way of action’.83
The ego has been abolished. Discussing the poem under the rubric of
Wou-wei in the final Neutre lecture, Barthes discusses the importance of
its syntax. The poem’s serenity is the result not only of the still, natural
setting, but also of the anacoluthon which removes the subject from the
poem, just as Barthes wishes the Western ego to be neutralised in writing:
‘anacoluthe: entre la désignation de la posture et l’évidence cosmique, le
sujet disparaît: il n’y a pas d’ego: il y a une posture et la nature’ (N, 3
June, 233). In La Préparation II, he sees the poem as being the embodi-
ment of a fantasy of idleness: ‘fantasmer une certaine expérience, sinon
du néant […], du moins du Nul’ (PR, 8 December 1979, 216). Discussing
the poem in the interview ‘Osons être paresseux’ in December 1979,
Barthes says that the ‘rupture de construction’ whereby it seems that it
is springtime that is sitting, rather than the human subject, indicates the
dispersion of the subject’s consistency: ‘Il est décentré, il ne peut même
pas dire “je”. Cela serait la vraie paresse. Arriver, à certains moments, à
ne plus avoir à dire “je”’.84
The ‘Assis paisiblement’ poem, then, represents a non-dualistic exis-
tence, wherein the constraints and illusions of the ego-feeling are
overcome, and one attains a oneness with nature. Barthes discusses this
in the Neutre lecture, where he tells us that the poem always reminds him
of seeing a child sitting on a wall in a ‘village marocain “oublié”’ in the
late 1960s:
<J’ai vu assis sur un mur un enfant qui était ‘assis paisiblement sans rien
faire’, et j’ai eu une sorte de satori. C’est-à-dire que m’est venu brusquement
l’évidence de la vie pure, sans vibration de langage. L’enfant m’a servi ici de
guru, de médiateur.> (N, 3 June, 233)
This ‘pure life’ could be called ‘existence minimale’: this is the term
Barthes employs elsewhere in Le Neutre to designate a fully neutral life
which would be untouched by the arrogance of a conflictual logosphere.
‘L’existence minimale’ would be a state of ‘unicité vague, indécise du
corps’ (N, 18 March, 110). This could be seen negatively – as lethargy,
perhaps – or have a positive epistemological charge, as in the Rousseau
and Tolstoy epigraphs. This state could be defined in terms of strength
and autonomy, he implies: ‘l’existence minimale la plus forte: l’existence
non pas simple (il ne s’agit pas d’un sentiment primitif) mais dépouillée
d’attributs’ (111). In April 1978, Barthes writes a short text on Voltaire
and Rousseau for Le Monde where he repeats the same points more
clearly, and defines ‘l’existence minimale’. In such a state, as in the ‘Assis
paisiblement’ poem, the subject is problematised. Time itself becomes
individuated, while the subject is diffused – much as in Sasaki’s satori.
Hadot has noted that in Rousseau’s Rêveries, there is a close link between
Rousseau’s ‘extase cosmique’ and ‘la transformation de son attitude
intérieure à l’égard du temps’.85
Rousseau, after his accident reported in the second ‘Promenade’ of

the Rêveries, is the cosmos: ‘je remplissais de ma légère existence tous les
objets que j’apercevais’.86 Barthes discusses this: ‘Le sujet “déconstruit”:
[…] l’ego est bien là, mais c’est pour mieux dire qu’il se quitte, […] se
porte au bout de lui-même, là où il se dissout dans le moment: c’est le
moment qui est subjectif, individuel, ce n’est pas le sujet, l’individu’.
Rousseau reaches a state with which we in the West are still unfamiliar,
Barthes continues; a state of ‘l’abandon de tout paroxysme, l’éloignement
de cette violence de langage, que nous croyons “moderne”’. We are
mistaken in placing our faith in the ‘violence’ of language, and we repress
the reality of existence in so doing. This violence is
rien d’autre que le refoulement d’une valeur pourtant bien connue d’autres
civilisations (je pense à l’Orient): l’existence minimale: car ‘exister’ ne se sent
pas forcément dans la violence, mais aussi dans ce peu de ciel, d’étoiles, de
verdure, qui permit à Rousseau de ‘partir’, c’est-à-dire de raconter. 87
‘Existence minimale’, is, of course, wu-wei itself – or, as Barthes

shorthands it in the Vita Nova plans, ‘le rien faire philosophique’ (OC,
V, 1008).88 It is a state which, as it reveals no apparent desire, tends to
be negatively characterised. It is laziness, in fact. Barthes, in the 1979 Le
Monde interview, suggests that we revalorise such laziness. He tells
Enthoven that real laziness ‘serait au fond une paresse de “ne pas
décider”, de l’“être là”. Comme les cancres. […] Ils ne participent pas, il
ne sont pas exclus, ils sont là […] comme des tas.’ Sometimes this is an
enviable state: ‘être là, ne rien décider, […] ne rien déterminer’ (OC, V,
764). This peaceable indolence is in line with Tao teaching, but is a
conduct frowned upon in our society, which, as we have seen, is defined
for Barthes by the ‘vouloir-agir’. He has used the image of the ‘tas’ two
days previously in the second L’Œuvre comme volonté lecture, when he
muses on wu-wei as running counter to the desire to write. Wu-wei, he
says here, is the desire for a life ‘qui extérieurement ne bouge pas, où l’on
ne lutte pas’. This desire is represented in our society by ‘des images
discréditées. […] Celle du Tas: être comme un Tas’. He rather comically
adds ‘pourquoi pas comme une bouse? […] Ou encore comme une larve
[?]’ The emphasis, he adds, must be on sensibility. We return here to the
idea of individuation as the intersection between a subject emptied of its
ego feeling, and its surrounding environment: ‘une larve – mais – tout est
là […] – une larve sensible, c’est-à-dire en un sens – […]: l’intériorité
rendue à son absolu, à son affirmation nue’. This is wu-wei itself, he
continues, quoting the Tao Te Ching: ‘“sorte de passivité humble”,
éloignée de tout désir de violence ou de rivalité […], mais au fond une
espèce d’“activité spontanée et inépuisable”. Larve sensible, Tas pensant:
seul contact du Tas avec l’extérieur: pression de l’atmosphère, sensibilité

barométrique’ (PR, 8 December 1979, 217). We have seen the idea of
the self as barometer before: it is the key to Barthes’s appreciation of the
haiku in De la vie à l’œuvre – and, as we begin to realise, it is crucial too
to Barthes’s imagining of a neutral, non-dualistic existence, which repu-
diates the codes and values of a social and linguistic sphere determined
by action and the conflict of paradigms.
The haiku renders the ‘nuance’ of a given moment, and in doing so
reminds us of the ‘intraitable’ of life itself beneath the vibrations of
language. Barthes figures this state in his fourth lecture on the haiku.
Here we see that the state of minimal existence is concomitant with the
form that renders it (the haiku), for both require no commentary. There
is a ‘défaillance de discours’:
Ce chemin de la Nuance (qui est parti du Temps qu’il fait et qui le suit): quoi
donc, au bout? Eh bien la vie, la sensation de la vie, le sentiment d’existence;
et nous savons que ce sentiment, pour être pur, intense, glorieux, parfait, il
faut qu’un certain vide s’accomplisse dans le sujet; même lorsque la
jubilation (d’amour) par exemple est la plus intense, c’est parce qu’il y a dans
le sujet un vide de langage; lorsque le language se tait, qu’il n’y a plus de
commentaire, d’interprétation, de sens, c’est alors que l’existence est pure.
(PR, 27 January 1979, 84)
What he has realised, Barthes explains, is the vitality of the banal. Its
minimalism is liberatory: ‘En somme, découvert à fond, le Temps qu’il
fait suscite en nous ce seul discours (minimal): qu’il vaut la peine de vivre’.
He cites here an excerpt from the diary he kept at Urt during the summer
of 1977, which was later to be partially published in ‘Déliberation’,
Barthes’s essay on the diary form:89 ‘De nouveau, après des jours bouchés,
une matinée de beau temps, éclat et subtilité de l’atmosphère: une soie
fraîche et lumineuse; ce moment vide (aucun signifié) produit une
évidence: qu’il vaut la peine de vivre’ (cited in PR, 84). This, he implies,
is writing that hints at the haiku aesthetic as well as indicating ‘existence
minimale’. Were he a haiku poet, he adds, he would have said the same
thing ‘d’une façon plus essentielle et plus indirecte (moins bavarde)’ (PR,
84). Interestingly, another entry from the Urt diary, published in
‘Délibération’, refers to another such moment of calm. Here Barthes
explicitly links his sense of integration with the environment to a Japanese
aesthetic principle:
La fenêtre est grande ouverte sur la fin plus claire d’une journée grise.
J’éprouve alors une euphorie de flottement; tout est liquide, aéré, buvable
(je bois l’air, le temps, le jardin). Et, comme je suis en train de lire Suzuki, il
me semble que c’est assez proche de l’état que le Zen appelle sabi. (OC, V,
674)
It becomes clear that Barthes is working towards a minimalist ethic

which is inspired by Japanese aesthetic principles and Taoist philosophy,
and which implicitly critiques the Western, Cartesian logomachy for its
repudiation of such an ethic. This existence can be attained if one reduces
as much as possible one’s complicity with ‘l’arrogance du monde’. This
desire is mandarinal, perhaps; impractical, probably; utopian, certainly
– yet admirable nonetheless for its figuring of a mode of existence which
has no adverse effect upon others. In a figure on ‘Intensités’, destined for
but not given in the Neutre series, Barthes describes this minimalism: it
is a ‘style de conduite qui tend à diminuer la surface de contact du sujet
avec l’arrogance du monde […] et non pas avec le monde, l’affect,
l’amour, etc’. It is an ethical minimalism, then – ‘mais nullement
[minimalisme] esthétique ou affectif’ (N, 249). Though it is the haiku –
an extremely pared-down form – that mobilises Barthes’s conception of
the ‘existence minimale’, the aesthetic to be worked towards is not
minimal. It contains, rather, the incomparable complexity of the
‘intraitable’ – which, paradoxically, is rendered through writing the
banal discourse of the weather and the subject’s environment at a given
instant. Such pastoral contemplation – wu-wei itself – engenders a
serenity that may be at odds with writing: for how can one write if one
is within wu-wei? Barthes approaches this question in L’Œuvre comme
volonté, when he discusses how wu-wei inhibits the desire to write. Here
we see the question answered: wu-wei elicits a contemplation of nature
which is itself as powerful as the desire to write:
Ce sentiment [le wou-wei] a pris un soir une forme ‘romantique’ […]: le soir
du 14 juillet, […] tour en auto dans la campagne; sur un chemin de hauteur
[…] nous arrêtons l’auto et nous descendons; nous sommes entourés d’un
paysage vallonné, vers l’Adour d’un côté, et de l’autre vers les Pyrénées; l’air
était absolument paisible, inerte même: pas un bruit, quelques fermes
blanches et brunes piquées au loin […], une odeur de foin coupé. […] Je
vivais […] une sorte de point zéro du Désir; tout en moi était aussi étale que
le paysage: force, splendeur, vérité aussi souveraine que le Vouloir-Écrire.
(PR, 15 December 1979, 220)
It is possible, then, that the cultivation of a non-dualistic conception

of one’s being in the world will lead to a blank state (the ‘point zéro du
Désir’ mentioned here, or the ‘non-vouloir-saisir’ taught by the Tao)
which will be the productive beginning of a new aesthetic. This, then,
would be the answer to the question posed in the 1978 text on Voltaire
and Rousseau, ‘D’eux à nous’. Barthes has shown us Rousseau, in the
Rêveries, falling out of the violence of language and into a state of
serenity. Existence, he writes, need not be felt only in the ‘vouloir-agir’;
it inheres also ‘dans ce peu de ciel, d’étoiles, de verdure’. It is these
surroundings which permit Rousseau to ‘“partir”, c’est-à-dire […] racon-

ter’. And so we reach, Barthes concludes, the question of narrative: ‘voici
de nouveau le Récit, et voici de nouveau la question moderne qui nous
est posée – ou la contrainte qui nous est rappelée: comment écrire sans
ego?’ (OC, V, 455). Perhaps, within the confines of our own linguistic
forms, we can only ‘write without ego’ in snatches, as Rousseau and
Tolstoy struggle to.
It seems, however, that the aesthetic of the ‘existence minimale’
remains utopian, at least for writing. It may exist in visual form – perhaps
in Twombly’s paintings, whose ‘rareté’ reminds Barthes of the aerating
spaces between the branches in Japanese flower-arranging. It is not only
in non-representational art, though, that Barthes finds this aesthetic. In
an untitled article from 1977, he indicates that Daniel Boudinet’s pastoral
photographs also embody the aesthetic of the ‘existence minimale’.90
Boudinet’s ‘géorgiques’, as Barthes calls them (OC, V, 322), are without
ideological vibration: they tread the ‘ligne de crête’ between the two
‘abîmes’ of naturalism and aestheticism (317). They are, then, an art of
the interstice. They are as serene as the haiku, and similarly indirect:
‘L’auteur dit indirectement le paisible, pour que nous nous reposions.
[…] D’ordinaire, la photographie affirme; ici, elle produit la paix’ (320).
There are many correspondences between the qualities Barthes sees in
these photographs and the tenets of Japanese aesthetics and philosophy
that he values. The serenity he finds in the photographs is replicated in
his text. There is, as Barthes says, ‘nul combat’ here; rather, ‘quelque
chose d’austère et de neutre’ (322). In these photos he finds repose and
space. We see here again the idea of aeration: ‘Les photographies de D.B.
sont très musicales. Elles ont un effet d’apaisement, opère une sorte de
catharsis subtile, jamais violente: le corps respire mieux, il boit ce que
Baudelaire appelait l’ambroisie végétale’ (327). These photos, it is
implied, are as free of ideology as the haiku is. It is for this reason that
even the darkest photograph, of foliage and undergrowth, still engenders
a sense of freedom: ‘Ces frondaisons verticales sans air, sans ciel,
inexplicablement, me donnent à respirer; elles m’élèvent l’“âme” […], et
pourtant, je veux aussi m’enfoncer dans l’obscur de la terre: bref, une
moire d’intensités’ (318). The ethic may be minimalist, but there is
maximal experiential intensity. This can happen in an aesthetic space
which is devoid of dualism and of any endoxal use of the sign.
Barthes uses a Polaroid photograph by Boudinet as the frontispiece of La

Chambre claire. It is the only colour photograph in the book, and one of
only two photographs in the book not to feature a human subject.91

Taken inside a darkened room, it is a photograph of blue curtains,
through which the light from outside the window is diffused. There is a
gap of purer white light. This photograph seems an apt emblem of the
ethic and aesthetic that Barthes is working towards from 1977. We see
in this photograph suggestion, the interstice, the banal. We glimpse
brightness. Barthes uses Japanese aesthetic principles – sometimes very
loosely – to imbue his late work with values he sees as running counter
to the tenets of the Western logomachy. He hopes these values will lead
to an enriched and peaceable sense of existence within the world. The
critical force of this work, though diffuse, is potent nonetheless: Barthes
makes us question the very grounds of our subjectivity. It is the use of
Japanese aesthetics that gives this critique its positive and affirmative
charge. It is the arresting nature of the haiku and the Japanese concep-
tion of space-time that aids Barthes in resisting category thinking. That
is why japonisme is important for him as for other French writers. As
Hokenson puts it, Barthes uses the Japanese aesthetic ‘as a means of
rethinking the Occident via Japan. This art can […] teach Westerners
how to resist […] the sectarian ideology of “Je” and thereby “l’Homme”.
Postmodern negatives and unnamables become, in a japoniste aesthetics
of plenitude, unique means to affect and presence, subtended with post-
modern aesthetic pleasure’.92
The aim of Barthes’s japonisme is to encourage, if not effect, a trans-
formation of our relationship to the world. In this, it can be seen as
sharing the aims of Tao and Zen. In a more immediate sense, Barthes’s
teaching itself, with or without the japoniste themes it contains, can be
seen as exemplifying certain Japanese aesthetic principles in its sugges-
tive, ‘one-corner’ style. He meets Shūzō Kuki’s criteria of the ‘true artist’
who is an ‘educator of humanity’ in revealing the beauty and complexity
which is attainable once we overcome our restrictive understanding of
time and subjectivity. ‘He teaches man to liberate himself from time’, says
Kuki, describing this artist:
But he does not model himself on the unpracticed educator who takes
pleasure in showing off his ideas. […] He believes in the value of suggestion,
in the power of the imagination. He knows how to bring about an active
spontaneity on the part of spectators. Thus it is that he gives indication only
of those points of view in which the latter may place themselves; he only
traces lines and only points out directions in order that the spectators them-
selves may themselves follow these. […] The task of the spectators remains
intact: it is incumbent upon them to make the great leap.93
Barthes’s Cours concertedly mobilise both an aesthetic and a pedagog-

ical ethic of suggestion. We have seen in this chapter the manner in which
Barthes seeks a minimal existence in which subjectivity would be fused

with the ‘intraitable’ of the world. In the next chapter, I shall examine
Barthes’s attempts to figure the writing of the ‘intraitable’ of his
emotions.
Notes
1 Alan W. Watts (1915–73) played a major role in raising awareness of Eastern

philosophies amongst Western readers. D.T. Suzuki (1870–1966) wrote many
books on Zen and lectured on Eastern philosophies in the US. On the reception
of Zen in the US, see Gereon Kopf, ‘Zen in the Contemporary United States’, in
The Encyclopedia of Monasticism, ed. William M. Johnston, 2 vols. (Chicago:
Fitzroy Dearborn, 2000), vol. I, pp. 1424–25.
2 Knight, Barthes and Utopia, pp. 14–15.
3 For negative critiques of L’Empire des signes as an Orientalist text, see for
example Scott L. Malcomson, ‘The Pure Land Beyond the Seas: Barthes, Burch
and the Uses of Japan’, Screen, 26.3–4 (1985): 23–33; Darko Suvin, ‘The Soul
and the Sense: Meditations on Roland Barthes in Japan (À propos of L’Empire
des signes)’, Canadian Review of Comparative Literature, 18.4 (1991): 499–531;
David Scott, Semiologies of Travel: From Gautier to Baudrillard (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2004); Marie-Paule Ha, Figuring the East: Segalen,
Malraux, Duras and Barthes (New York: State University of New York Press,
2000). Dalia Kandiyoti offers a critique of both L’Empire des signes and ‘Alors,
la Chine?’ in her ‘Roland Barthes Abroad’, in Jean-Michel Rabaté, ed., Writing
the Image after Roland Barthes (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,
1997), pp. 228–42. Lisa Lowe’s account of what she perceives as the ideological
problems inherent to both those texts is compelling: see Critical Terrains: French
and British Orientalisms (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991). Even-handed
accounts of L’Empire des signes are to be found in Lynn Higgins, ‘Barthes’s
Imaginary Voyages’, in Mike and Nicholas Gane, eds., Roland Barthes, 3 vols.
(London: Sage, 2004), vol. III, pp. 147–61; Trinh T. Minh-Ha, ‘The Plural Void:
Barthes and Asia’, in Diana Knight, ed., Critical Essays on Roland Barthes (New
York: Hall, 2000), pp. 209–18; Rick Rylance, Roland Barthes (Hemel
Hampstead: Harvester, 1994); and Charles Forsdick, ‘(In)connaissance de l’Asie:
Barthes and Bouvier, China and Japan’, Modern and Contemporary France, 14.1
(2006): 63–77.
4 Barthes noted the negative reaction to ‘Alors, la Chine?’ in a postface added to
the article when it was published in booklet form by Christian Bourgois in 1975.
It was originally published in Le Monde on 7 June 1974. OC, III, 516–26.
5 Eric Hayot, Chinese Dreams: Pound, Brecht, Tel Quel (Ann Arbor: University
of Michigan Press, 2004), p. 126.
6 Foucault, Les Mots et les choses, pp. 10–11.
7 ffrench, The Time of Theory, p. 171.
8 See ffrench, The Time of Theory, pp. 115–16. In a note, ffrench notes the prepon-
derance of articles on Chinese and Japanese subjects appearing in Tel Quel from
late 1968 through 1971 and beyond. Sollers’s Maoism was partly premised on
opposition to the Parti communiste français. A major influence on Sollers was
Maria Antonietta Macciocchi’s book De la Chine (Paris: Seuil, 1971).
Macciocchi was banned from both the French and the Italian communist parties
because of her Maoist allegiances. It was she who organised the Tel Quel trip to
China.
9 The other travellers were Philippe Sollers, Julia Kristeva, François Wahl and
Marcelin Pleynet. Kristeva fictionalised parts of the trip in Les Samouraïs (Paris:
Gallimard, 1992), and Pleynet’s diary of the trip was published in 1980: Le
Voyage en Chine: Chroniques du journal ordinaire 11 avril–3 mai 1974 – extraits
(Paris: P.O.L., 1980). Alex Hughes has discussed these two texts in ‘Bodily
Encounters with China: On Tour with Tel Quel’, Modern and Contemporary
France 14.1 (2006): 49–62.
10 Jan Walsh Hokenson, Japan, France, and East-West Aesthetics: French
Literature, 1867–2000 (Madison, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press,
2004).
11 Hokenson, Japan, blurb.
12 I understand dualism as encompassing more than Manichaeism. ‘Dualism’, as
Watts, Suzuki and other theorists of Zen understand and employ the term,
implies much more than the binarism of meaning: it has a profound existential
dimension. For these theorists, it is the division between our selves and our envi-
ronment that is dualistic, and it is this sense that must be overcome in order for
enlightenment to be achieved.
13 Hokenson, Japan, p. 18.
14 ‘Sur S/Z et L’Empire des signes’, interview with Bellour in Les Lettres françaises,
20 May 1970. OC, III, 655–70 (p. 669).
15 Barthes refers to the ‘cabinet des Signes’ as ‘l’habitat mallarméen’ on the
penultimate page of L’Empire des signes (149). The reference is to another japon-
iste, Paul Claudel, who calls Mallarmé the ‘reclus du cabinet des signes’ in his
‘Mallarmé, le catastrophe d’Igitur’ in Accompagnements. See Claudel, Œuvres
en prose, ed. Jacques Petit and Charles Galpérine (Paris: Gallimard/Pléiade,
1965), pp. 510–11.
16 There is a distinction to be made between the currently available Seuil edition of
L’Empire des signes and the original Skira edition, which is laid out more
lavishly, and contains nine extra images as well as supplementary information
in the ‘Table des illustrations’.
17 Steve Odin points out that the decentring, disoriginating principles of post-
structuralism are frequently used, post-Barthes, to account for the radical
differences between Eastern and Western systems. ‘Over the past decade,’ he
writes in 1990, ‘we have seen […] poststructuralism, along with its critical
strategy of deconstruction, emerge as an important new transcultural method
for East-West comparative philosophy […]. Against the background of the differ-
ential logic of acentric Zen Buddhism, the art, literature, cinema, and other sign
systems in the Japanese text have been analyzed as a fractured semiotic field with
no fixed centers’. Odin, review of Postmodernism in Japan by H.D. Harootunian
and Miyoshi Masao, Philosophy East and West, 40.3 (1990): 381–87 (pp.
381–82).
18 See Éric Marty’s section ‘Le Non-Vouloir-Saisir’ in his ‘Sur les Fragments d’un
discours amoureux’ for an illuminating analysis of this idea. The ‘NVS’, says
Marty, is another name for the Neutre. Marty, Roland Barthes, le métier d’écrire
(Paris: Seuil, 2006), pp. 323–36 (p. 326).
19 Watts’s The Way of Zen (London: Thames and Hudson, 1957), translated into
French as Le Bouddhisme Zen, is cited in the bibliographies of Fragments d’un
discours amoureux and La Chambre claire. It was first published in France by
Payot in 1969.
20 Watts, Way of Zen, p. 175.
22 Watts, Psychotherapy East and West (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1961), p. 38.
23 Watts, Psychotherapy, p. 37.

24 In Pyschotherapy, Watts refers to Taoism, Zen Buddhism and Confucianism as
‘ways of liberation’. The liberation is from the damaging conventions imposed
by our social institutions, including the convention of the ego-feeling.
25 Comment, Roland Barthes, vers le neutre, p. 27.
26 Daisetz Teitaro Suzuki, An Introduction to Zen Buddhism, ed. Christmas
Humphreys, foreword by C.G. Jung (London: Rider, 1969), p. 95.
27 See Graham Parkes, ‘Ways of Japanese Thinking’, in Nancy Hume, ed., Japanese
Aesthetics and Culture: A Reader (Albany: State University of New York Press,
1995), pp. 77–108.
28 Maurice Coyaud, Fourmis sans ombre: Le Livre du haïku (Paris: Phébus, 1978),
pp. 54–55.
29 Kenneth Yasuda, ‘Approach to Haiku’ and ‘Basic Principles’, in Hume, ed.,
Japanese Aesthetics and Culture, pp. 125–50 (p. 135).
30 Yasuda, ‘Approach to Haiku’ and ‘Basic Principles’, p. 135.
31 Yasuda, ‘Approach to Haiku’ and ‘Basic Principles’, p. 135.
32 Suzuki, Zen and Japanese Culture (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993),
pp. 27–28. A Japanese art-form of central traditional importance is the ‘one-
corner’ style which originated with Bayen (Ma Yüan, 1175–1225). Suzuki tells
us that this form ‘is psychologically associated with the Japanese painters’
“thrifty brush” tradition of retaining the least possible number of lines or strokes
which go to represent forms’ (Zen and Japanese Culture, p. 22). Wabi-sabi refers
to the Japanese philosophy of the beauty of imperfection. See Haga Koshiro,
‘The Wabi Aesthetic Through the Ages’, in Hume, ed., Japanese Aesthetics and
Culture, pp. 245–78, for more on this. Suzuki, defining wabi/sabi as the spirit
of tea, writes that ‘wabi, which literally means “solitariness”, “aloneness”, and
more concretely, “poverty”, is, we might say, what characterizes the entirety of
Japanese culture reflecting the spirit of Zen’ (Zen and Japanese Culture, p. 253).
34 Donald Keene, ‘Japanese Aesthetics’, in Hume, ed., Japanese Aesthetics and
Culture, pp. 27–41.
35 Kenkō, Essays in Idleness: The Tsurezuregusa of Kenkō, trans. Donald Keene
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), p. 115.
36 Keene, ‘Japanese Aesthetics’, p. 31. François Jullien has written at length about
how the European literary tradition of the depiction of heroism would have been
unthinkable in ancient China, due to an entirely different conception of process
and achievement. Traité de l’efficacité (Paris: Grasset, 1996).
37 Throughout Psychotherapy East and West, Watts refers to the necessity of
coming to a new and healing worldview of our organism as being an integral
part of its environment. He is partially indebted to Dewey and others in his
conclusion that ‘organism/environment is a unified pattern of behaviour […] –
not an interaction but a transaction’ (p. 33).
38 Shūzō Kuki, ‘Considerations on Time: Two Essays Delivered at Pontigny During
the Décade of 8–18 August 1928’, in Stephen Light, Shūzō Kuki and Jean-Paul
Sartre: Influence and Counter-Influence in the Early History of Existential
Phenomenology (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1987), pp.
43–67 (p. 62). As Light’s fascinating study shows, it was Kuki who introduced
Heidegger’s thought to Sartre. His lectures at Pontigny succinctly presented to a
French audience the radically other conceptions of time and aesthetics in Japan.
Hokenson has pointed out that ‘[Kuki’s] Pontigny lectures […] now read, in
retrospect, like something of a primer for Barthes’s japonisme’ (Japan, p. 363).
39 Kuki, ‘Considerations on Time’, pp. 55–56.
40 Kuki, ‘Considerations on Time’, p. 51.
41 Isozaki Arata, ‘Interview with Hans Ulrich Obrist for UnDo.net: Guide to the
Contemporary Art in Italy’, 29 November 2000, <http://www.undo.net/cgi-
bin/openframe.pl?x=/cgi-bin/undo/features/features.pl%3Fa%3Di%26cod%3
D22> [accessed 11 February 2012].
42 ‘[The] exhibition was very well received in Paris,’ Isozaki told Hans Obrist:
‘Michel Foucault [became] interested in Japanese culture and came to Japan
afterwards and went to the Zen temple, tried to practice meditation […]. And
Jacques Derrida also found his key concept espa[c]ement is similar to “ma”’.
The exhibition subsequently travelled to the US and northern Europe.
43 See N, 190: ‘l’attitude japonaise (≠ kantisme) […] ne conceptualise ni le temps
ni l’espace, mais seulement l’intervalle, le rapport de deux moments, de deux
lieux ou objets’.
44 ‘L’intervalle’, Le Nouvel Observateur, 23 October 1978. OC, V, 475–77 (p.
475). The text is followed in the Œuvres Complètes by Barthes’s ‘jeu de l’oie’ (a
diagram of the exhibition space with accompanying rather cryptic captions)
written for the exhibition catalogue.
45 See Barthes’s paper ‘L’Image’ given at the conference on his work at Cerisy in
June 1977 for more on his ideas concerning the negative image of the person as
constructed by others (OC, V, 512–19).
46 Richard B. Pilgrim, ‘Intervals (“Ma”) in Space and Time: Foundations for a
Religio-Aesthetic Paradigm in Japan’, History of Religions, 25.3 (1986): 255–77
(p. 257).
47 Pilgrim, ‘Intervals’, p. 265.
49 Much of the critical literature on Barthes’s ‘orientalism’ focuses on his fascina-
tion with the ‘vide’ he sees as characterising oriental thought. This fascination
can be easily fitted into an Orientalist critique when aligned with traditionally
Orientalist figures of the passive, inscrutable Orient. Thus Dalia Kandiyoti writes
censoriously about the ‘aesthetics of the void’ that Barthes sees in Loti’s Aziyadé.
She is concerned that ‘in constructing a utopia of absolute difference, based on
liquidation and absence’, Barthes permits the ‘return’ of a repressed ‘exoticism’.
‘Roland Barthes Abroad’, p. 236.
51 In Barthes’s interview with The French Review in February 1979 (a month after
this lecture), he again describes ‘les cultures orientales’ in terms of breathing. The
Orient, he says, is useful because it represents an absolute alterity to Western
cultures. This alterity is vital to his intellectual life: ‘Ce que je peux percevoir,
par reflets très lointains, de la pensée orientale me permet de respirer’. OC, V,
741–42.
52 See Jean-Pierre Richard on Barthes’s praise in Le Neutre for ‘cette vertu
apparemment paradoxale qu’est le flasque. […] [C’est] un choix de ne pas choisir,
de ne rien sacrifier dans l’ouverture de toute une multiplicité du désirable. […]
le refus d’un éréthisme de l’option (ne pas vouloir opter, c’est aussi, et encore,
ne pas vouloir saisir)’. Roland Barthes, dernier paysage: essai (Paris: Verdier,
2006), p. 32.
54 The essay on Stendhal, ‘On échoue toujours à parler de ce qu’on aime’, is
Barthes’s final piece of work, but had not been fully corrected before the acci-
dent in February 1980 which led to his death a month later.
55 ‘Cher Antonioni…’, Cahiers du cinéma, May 1980. OC, V, 900–905 (p. 901).
See the discussion of this text in Ch. 2 above.
56 Compare L’Empire des signes, where Barthes discusses Japanese flower-
arranging as an art of the interstice: ‘[C]e qui est produit, c’est la circulation de
l’air, dont les fleurs, les feuilles, les branches […] ne sont en somme que les
parois…’ (ES, 63).
57 China [Chung Kuo / Cina], dir. Michelangelo Antonioni (Radiotelevisiona
Italiana, 1972). Antonioni was invited to China by Mao. The filmmaker’s visit
was controlled in much the same way as the Tel Quel delegation’s visit. The
documentary’s settings are thus restricted to the locations which Antonioni was
allowed to visit, such as factories, a collective farm, and Shanghai port. However,
the film was denounced as anti-Chinese, and was not shown in China until 2004.
58 Tao was exported to Japan from the seventh century onwards, Zen from the
twelfth century. For more on the assimilation of Chinese philosophies into
Japanese culture, see David Pollack, The Fracture of Meaning: Japan’s Synthesis
of China from the Eighth through the Eighteenth Centuries (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1986).
60 Watts is in the bibliography of Fragments d’un discours amoureux, whereas Jean
Grenier’s L’Esprit du tao (Paris: Flammarion, 1957) makes a first appearance in
Comment vivre ensemble. Barthes presumably (re)read both texts during the
winter of 1976 as he was preparing his lectures and readying the Fragments for
publication.
62 Watts, Way of Zen, pp. 16–17.
63 Lao Tzu, Tao Te Ching, trans. and intro. D.C. Lau (Harmondsworth: Penguin,
1980), p. 58.
64 See for example the figure of ‘Délicatesse’ in Le Neutre: Barthes discusses the
Japanese art of tea (chanoyu) as an example of ‘délicatesse’ (p. 59); he also uses
Suzuki’s explanation of sabi to define the principle (p. 65).
65 ‘Sagesse de l’Art’ was written for the catalogue of the Twombly exhibition at the
Whitney Museum of American Art, New York, April–June 1979 (OC, V,
688–702). ‘Cy Twombly ou “Non multa sed multum”’ (OC, V, 703–20) appears
in volume 6 of Yvon Lambert’s Cy Twombly: catalogue raisonné des œuvres sur
papier, 6 vols. (Milan: Multhipla, 1979).
66 The Freud text to which Barthes refers is Eine Kindheitserinnerung des Leonardo
da Vinci (1910) [Un Souvenir d’enfance de Léonard de Vinci, trans. Marie
Bonaparte (Paris: Gallimard, 1927)]. In Pour les Oiseaux (Paris: Belfond, 1976),
the French translation of his interviews with Daniel Charles, John Cage demon-
strates an attitude of simplicity and acceptance which Barthes admires, as his
mentions of this text in Le Neutre (p. 224) make clear. Barthes quotes Henri
Mongault’s translation of La Guerre et la Paix (Paris: Gallimard/Pléiade, 1947).
67 This is a belief which Taoism shares with Christian negative theology, as Barthes
is aware.
68 Hadot, Exercices spirituels, p. 27.
69 Rousseau, Les Rêveries du promeneur solitaire, ed. Jacques Voisine (Paris:
Garnier-Flammarion, 1964). See Hadot’s ‘Le Sage et le monde’ in Exercices
spirituels, pp. 343–60, especially p. 356.
71 A passage from Rousseau’s fifth promenade makes this beneficial loss even
clearer: ‘Le temps n’est plus rien pour [moi] […] le présent dure toujours sans
néanmoins marquer sa durée et sans aucune trace de succession, sans aucun autre
sentiment de privation ne de jouissance, de plaisir ni de peine, de désir ni de
crainte, que celui seul de notre existence’ (Rêveries, p. 102). Hadot comments
on this: ‘Le sentiment de l’existence, dont parl[e] Rousseau, c’est ce sentiment de
l’identité entre l’existence universelle et notre existence’ (Exercices spirituels, p.
358).
72 Watts, Way of Zen, p. 145. Barthes mentions Hakuin’s satori in Le Neutre (27
May, 220).
73 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, La Phénoménologie de la perception (Paris: Gallimard,
1945), p. xvi.
74 Comment, Roland Barthes, p. 188.
76 Michael Sheringham notes the importance of the weather as an ‘indirect mode
of utterance’ which Barthes uses in the rendering of his incidents, and reminds
us that there are discussions of ‘le temps qu’il fait’ in Barthes’s 1972 essay on
Pierre Loti’s Aziyadé and in the ‘Quotidien’ figure in Le Plaisir du texte.
Sheringham, Everyday Life, p. 200.
77 This is a very different ‘effet de réel’ to that analysed in Barthes’s 1968 essay,
‘L’Effet de réel’, which discusses the connotative effects of the ‘détail concret’ in
realist fiction. OC, III, 25–32 (p. 31).
80 Suzuki, Essays in Zen Buddhism (series 1), ed. Christmas Humphreys (London:
Rider, 1970), p. 12.
81 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p. 8.
82 N, 3 June, 232. The ‘Assis paisiblement’ poem appears in the following texts:
Incidents (written 1968–69) (OC, V, 974); Fragments d’un discours amoureux
(p. 287); Le Neutre, 3 June 1978 (p. 232); La Préparation du roman II, 8 Dec.
1979 (pp. 216–17); and the ‘Osons être paresseux’ interview, 10 December 1979
(OC, V, 763). It is also referred to obliquely in sketches three and four of Vita
Nova, August 1979 (OC, V, 1011, 1013). In the third Vita Nova sketch, the
conflation of the child with the poem itself is made explicit: ‘L’Enfant marocain
du Poème Zenrin’.
84 ‘Osons être paresseux’, interview with Jean-Paul Enthoven for Le Monde, 10
December 1979. OC, V, 760–70 (p. 763).
86 Rousseau, Rêveries, p. 49.
87 ‘D’eux à nous’, written for a dossier on Voltaire and Rousseau, Le Monde, 7
April 1978. OC, V, 454–55 (p. 455).
88 See Knight, Barthes and Utopia, pp. 93–96 for an exploration of the idea of idle-
ness and the ‘tas’ in the Vita Nova sketches.
89 The Urt diary is also quoted in Le Neutre, 1 April (135). ‘Délibération’ was
published in Tel Quel, Winter 1979. OC, V, 668–81.
90 ‘Sur les photographies de Daniel Boudinet’, Créatis, 1977. OC, V, 316–29.
91 The other is ‘la première photo’ by Niepce (1822), depicting a laid dinner-table.
5
La Préparation du roman:
The Novel and the Fragment
…et si Novalis n’a pas composé le texte de la ‘dissolution du poète’, ce n’est

pas seulement parce qu’il est mort, mais parce que cette œuvre, comme tous
ses plus grands projets, ne cessait de se perdre dans la multiplication de ses
propres semences. Ce qui pourrait peut-être vouloir dire que – dans le
fragment tout au moins – le geste le plus spécifique du romantisme […] serait
celui par lequel au sein même de la quête ou de la théorie de l’Œuvre il
abandonne ou retranche […] l’Œuvre même – et se mue de façon à peine
perceptible en ‘œuvre de l’absence de l’œuvre’…
Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, L’Absolu littéraire, 1978
Mid-way through his four-year tenure at the Collège de France, Barthes

seeks a new form for his writing. As we have seen, his sense that a trans-
formation of his writing is required is crystallised in a moment occurring
on 15 April 1978, which he characterises as a ‘sorte de Satori’ (PR, 32).
The new form of writing fantasised by Barthes involves a productive
tension between the aesthetic minimalism of the haiku and the maxi-
malism of the ‘grande œuvre’ as exemplified by À la Recherche du temps
perdu: ‘Proust et le haïku se croisent’ (PR, 99). As Kuki points out,
though the haiku is extremely condensed, ‘a very small thing contains the
infinite just as much as does a thing of great dimensions’.1 Thus the focus
in La Préparation du roman I on the haiku as the propaedeutic to the
writing of a ‘roman’ is in Barthes’s view entirely logical. He hopes that
the fantasised ‘roman’ would achieve the notational intensity of the
haiku, at greater length.2
This chapter will examine the search for a new form which Barthes
identifies at the opening of La Préparation du roman and in ‘Longtemps,
je me suis couché de bonne heure…’ as being central to the attainment
of a new lease of life as a writer. Instead of the encyclopedia, the idea of
the ‘roman’ is now central to Barthes’s pedagogy and his conception of
his writing. The starting-point of Barthes’s lectures on ‘la préparation du
roman’ is the atomisation (‘défection’, ‘émiettement’) of the novel, in
terms both of reading and of writing. However, this fragmentation coex-
ists with a totalising conception of the ‘roman’ as being immense,
heterogeneous, and multi-generic. This tension between fragmentation
163
and totalisation – between the haiku and the ‘grande œuvre’ – in La

Préparation du roman is similar to the oscillation between systematisa-
tion and anti-systematism that is embodied by Barthes’s use of the ‘geste
encyclopédique’ (CVE, 182) in Comment vivre ensemble and Le Neutre.
More specifically, Barthes’s view of literature at this point is firmly
Romantic: he portrays himself in La Préparation du roman as ‘un homme
qui raconte sa décision d’écrire à la manière “romantique”’ (8 December
1979, 206). His idealistic conception of the ‘roman’ closely resembles
that of the German Romantics of the Jena group. In the literary theory
of the Schlegel brothers and Novalis, writing in the late 1790s in the wake
of Kant, we find a fantasy of the novel strikingly similar to Barthes’s, as
well as a similar practice of fragmentation. As Claire de Obaldia puts it,
there is for these sceptical thinkers an important link between the ency-
clopedia and the novel as emblems of the future book: ‘In [Barthes’s]
work, the substitution of the encyclopedia for the novel anticipated by
Schlegel follows the Romantic usage of the encyclopedia as a “system in
fragments”’.3 The metaphysical and ontological implications of system-
atisation are rejected in these thinkers’ work, but the idea of totality is
also retained: no Hegelian dialectic here, but, perhaps, a Kantian
universal particular instead.
The ‘roman’ that Barthes imagines embodies these tensions. The
references to form generally, as well as specific generic forms referred to
and used in La Préparation du roman, ‘Longtemps…’, and contempo-
raneous texts, will be examined in an attempt to show that the fragment
as ‘idol’ of writing (Barthes’s term) is never overturned, despite Barthes’s
professed temptation to try to write more continuously. The short form
is retained as the ideal even during his period of desire for a ‘Grande
Œuvre’. Much of Barthes’s thinking on form and on the possibility of
creation is deeply indebted, especially in La Préparation du roman, to
Mallarmé’s letter on the forms of the ‘Album’ and the ‘Livre’, and to
Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy’s text on German Romanticism. It will be
seen that, partially due to the influence of these texts, much of Barthes’s
work from late 1978 is concerned with the planning and projection of a
work which is not intended to be written.
From Cerisy to ‘Longtemps, je me suis couché de bonne heure…’:

‘le romanesque’
By 1977, the status of Barthes’s writing was no longer considered to be

purely critical. His two last books, Roland Barthes and Fragments d’un
La Préparation du roman: The Novel and the Fragment 165
discours amoureux, were both imbued with what Barthes called

‘romanesque’ elements. As he had explained in the 1963 preface to Essais
critiques, Barthes believes that the critic must use ‘un langage indirect’
(EC, 17) in his combat against ideology. Techniques of the indirect must,
however, be practised in a covert manner, given that the critic must at
the same time fulfil his social and overtly critical role: ‘Ce qui marque le
critique, c’est donc une pratique secrète de l’indirect’ (EC, 21).
Indirectness is given freer licence in literature than it is within the field
of criticism. Therefore, were the critic to want to express himself ‘avec
exactitude’, he would need to partially transform himself into a novelist,
‘c’est-à-dire substitue[r] au faux direct dont il s’abrite, un indirect déclaré,
comme l’est celui de toutes les fictions’. Barthes declares here that the
novel is the ‘horizon’ for the critic, and that the critic thus resembles the
‘Narrateur proustien’ who exists in a state of anticipation: ‘le critique est
celui qui va écrire, et qui […] emplit cette attente d’une œuvre de surcroît’
(EC, 21).
Barthes retains during the 1970s this sense of criticism as a state of
tension and as a proleptic activity. ‘Le romanesque’ is conceived of as a
destabilising tactic which assumes anti-systematic potency when
employed within criticism. The critical essay is no longer generically pure;
both critical and novelistic elements are in play with each other, and the
‘horizon’ of the novel is present, but never reached. The fragmentary
romanesque cannot topple over into conventional narrative, for if it does,
its anti-systematic power is lost. In a 1977 text on Romantic song, he
likens the musical genre of the fantasia to the discontinuous
‘romanesque’:
Fantasieren: à la fois imaginer et improviser: […] produire du romanesque
sans construire un roman. Même les cycles de lieder ne racontent pas une
histoire d’amour, mais seulement un voyage: chaque moment de ce voyage
est […] aveugle, fermé à tout sens général, à toute idée de destin, à toute
transcendance spirituelle: en somme, une errance pure, un devenir sans
finalité. 4
This quotation makes clear that Barthes associates the ‘romanesque’ with
the sceptical and subjective emphasis on fantasy, which we have already
discussed in the context of Leçon. The ‘romanesque’ is explicitly opposed
to the teleological conception of the ‘roman’, retaining always a sense of
incompletion.
Barthes’s critics during the 1970s seemed to believe that the
‘romanesque’ in Barthes’s writing equated to preparatory exercises for
the ‘roman’ proper. This potential ‘novel’ became almost mythical, as
Claude Coste says: ‘Au Livre mallarméen, au chapitre perdu de la
Poétique d’Aristote, […] la France littéraire des années 70 ajoute un

nouveau monstre: le “roman” de Roland Barthes. “Barthes écrit-il un
roman? Va-t-il écrire un roman? A-t-il écrit un roman?”’5 Barthes’s own
allusions to the ‘romanesque’ appear to invalidate these questions.
However, at the Cerisy colloquium on his work in June 1977, he appears
to collude with the view that a ‘roman’ may after all be the desirable form
for his future writing. Here, Barthes mentions that he is often asked when
he is going to write a novel. He continues to provide matter for
speculation: ‘J’ai très envie de faire un roman, et chaque fois que je lis un
roman qui me plaît, j’ai envie d’en faire autant’ (C, 251). He points out,
though, that his own methods of writing actively prevent him from even
planning a novel, for he is not used to writing continuously, and has
moreover often borne witness to his distrust of the limitation of meaning
brought about by systematic and cumulative exposition of a theme: hence
the massive use of fragmented and aleatory structures in his work. Would
it be possible, he asks, to write a novel ‘par aphorismes, par fragments?
Sous quelles conditions?’ (C, 251–22). Would such a narrative be recog-
nisable as a work of fiction?
He returns to this problem towards the end of the colloquium, during
the discussion of Frédéric Berthet’s paper, ‘Idées sur le roman’.6 Barthes
responds to Berthet, saying that ‘[le] roman, effectivement, c’est ce qui
est devant moi’ (C, 366), and adding that this vision of himself as
someone who could write a novel (note the conditional) is deeply restora-
tive. He describes an evening at Cerisy, a few days previously, when,
during a state of utter fatigue, he became rejuvenated by the epiphanic
idea that he could enter, in a spirit of devotion, into the sphere of the
novel:
j’ai été soutenu d’une façon en quelque sorte miraculeuse, euphorique, par
l’idée que j’allais enfin écrire un roman, que j’allais enfin, toutes affaires
cessantes, déblayant tout le reste, entrer dans une sorte de grande ascèse
comme a pu le faire Proust […] – j’allais moi aussi entrer en roman, comme
on entre en religion. (C, 366–37)
This state, brought on by his rereading of Tolstoy’s War and Peace,

resembles in many respects the non-dualistic, neutral states of existence
examined in Chapter 4 above. The idea of writing a novel allows Barthes
to imagine a revivifying unification of his various professional activities.
Having made this clear, Barthes comments on Berthet’s quotation from
Sade’s preface to Crimes de l’Amour. According to Sade, man writes
novels in order to ‘peindre les êtres qu’il implorait, […et] pour célébrer
ceux qu’il aimait’ (C, 349). Barthes says that this line of Sade’s has made
him realise that his interest in the novel form is based on the desire to
represent those he loves. He has not accomplished this thus far in his
writing, and thus, ‘Si je veux peindre ces êtres que je dis aimer, eh bien,
je n’ai pas d’autre solution que de changer de genre […] et d’entrer dans
le roman’ (C, 367–68). Barthes reasserts his belief that the writing of the
affective narrative would demand an absolute break from his long-
standing use of parataxis:
Alors se pose d’une façon déchirante peut-être, mais en même temps très
excitante, le problème du fragment parce qu’il est très possible que je sois
alors obligé de rejeter l’idole présente de mon écriture, qui est le fragment.
Et ça aurait évidemment beaucoup de conséquences; […] j’entrerais
délibérément en décadence, ce qui […] est assez tentant. (C, 368, my
emphasis)
During these moments at Cerisy, Barthes articulates most of the key

features with which his major work thereafter will be preoccupied:
‘Longtemps, je me suis couché de bonne heure…’, La Préparation du
roman, ‘Délibération’, ‘On échoue toujours à parler de ce qu’on aime’,
La Chambre claire and Vita Nova all deal to varying extents with the
idea of the novel as the unificatory horizon of his writing; literature as a
devotional activity; the desire to ‘peindre [ce] qu’on aime’; and Tolstoy
and Proust as touchstones. Barthes’s account in Cerisy of his sudden
apprehending of the novel as the promise of a new life is reinforced by
the satori-like experience in Morocco on 15 April 1978. This moment is
described in the first lecture of La Préparation du roman I: L’Œuvre
comme volonté:
Quelque chose comme la conversion ‘littéraire’ – […] entrer en littérature,
en écriture; écrire, comme si je ne l’avais jamais fait. […] Puis, idée d’investir
le Cours et le Travail dans la même entreprise (littéraire), de faire cesser la
division du sujet, au profit d’un seul Projet, le Grand Projet: image de joie,
si je me donnais une tâche unique. (PR, 32)
The ‘tempting’ image of the great work or project which is always

ahead is poietically nourishing. This image, to which Barthes cleaves for
the rest of his life, binds together all the strands of his activity. The idea
of a literary work which would successfully express love constitutes the
motivation of all the late work, both written and pedagogical. However,
Barthes’s statement that ‘le roman est ce qui est devant moi’ should be
understood in the most absolute sense – it is something which, by design,
will always be ahead for Barthes, no matter how far he advances. As
Andrew Brown puts it, ‘Barthes’s projected novel is […] a pointer, from
theory to a real that would paradoxically be written as fiction. But, for
Barthes, the novel is yet to come and this emergence is interminable: the
novel becomes the Utopia of theory’.7 The image of the novel shimmers
at the horizon of La Préparation du roman and the Vita Nova sketches.

It is, and remains, a fantasy.
Even at the level of fantasy, moreover, Barthes never abandons the
‘idol’ of the fragment. A novel, understood as a conventional, contin-
uous, fictional narrative, while it is explored heuristically by Barthes, is
not empirically possible for him, given his poietic adherence to the frag-
ment, his admitted inability to fabulate or to invent names, and the
strongly felt affective imperative of rendering the ‘vérité’ of his emotions.
There is an endemic strain within the French reception of Barthes which
advocates categorising him as a novelist.8 While it is clear that certain
elements of La Chambre claire – often referred to as a ‘roman’9 – are
indeed novelistic, its innovation inheres precisely in its utilisation of
‘romanesque’ elements within theoretical and non-fictional discourse. As
McHoul and Wills put it in an exasperated article combating the canon-
isation of Barthes as novelist, ‘Barthes risks writing literature – […] there
is a deliberate […] demand made by the texts that they be permitted to
be recuperated by literary ideology. That risk is continually run and, to
display it as risk, the possibility of the non-literary […] must be contin-
ually run up against’.10 Their insistence that La Chambre claire’s central
achievement inheres in the formal tension between two discourses – theo-
retical and novelistic – is salutary. To recuperate La Chambre claire as a
novel, and to state that La Préparation du roman and Vita Nova could
have been novels had Barthes not died, misleadingly elides the specificity
of Barthes’s reflections on the difficulties of composition by wishfully
implying that these reflections are ultimately far less important than the
categorisation (as potential ‘romans’) of this writing. What deserves
attention is the reflections themselves, in their projective and deliberately
abortive status.
‘Longtemps, je me suis couché de bonne heure…’,

‘critique pathétique’ and ‘émiettement’
The Préparation du roman lectures began on 2 December, 1978.

However, the material of the first lecture had already been aired in
October, during the ‘Longtemps, je me suis couché de bonne heure…’
lecture at the Collège. Barthes’s own hesitation over the form of his
writing has come to a head, due to his sudden consciousness of his own
mortality. The work ahead of him is the last work he will do: ‘Il me faut,
impérieusement, loger mon travail dans une case aux contours incertains,
mais dont je sais (conscience nouvelle) qu’ils sont finis: la dernière case’
(‘Longtemps’, 466). Grief for his mother has engendered an ardent wish
to break with the kind of work he has previously done, and with the
frustrating maintenance and repetition it involves: ‘Je dois sortir de cet
état ténébreux, où me conduisent l’usure des travaux répétés et le deuil
¡ Cet ensablement, cet enfoncement immobile dans le sable mouvant
[…] cette mort lente du sur-place’ (PR, 28). As we saw in Chapter 2,
Barthes aligns his own dilemma with that of Proust, and shows that
Proust’s great breakthrough was his interweaving of both essay and
novel. The device facilitating this interweaving is ‘un principe provocant:
la désorganisation du Temps (de la chronologie)’ (463). Proust allows his
work to unfurl in accordance with the dictates of involuntary memory,
rendering it ‘hétérodoxe’.
Such a rupturing of linear organisation is, says Barthes, a quintes-
sentially modern tactic. He supports this assertion with a citation from
Nietzsche, drawn from Deleuze’s study Nietzsche et la philosophie: ‘Il
faut émietter l’univers, perdre le respect du tout’ (‘Longtemps’, 463).11
He also refers to John Cage, who shared Nietzsche’s belief in the prin-
ciple of atomising the creative act so that no unitary whole is formed.
Now the idea of fragmentation is applied to a reading of the novel.
Barthes explains that during his grief, two specific episodes from novels
struck him with an extraordinary affective impact: the death of the grand-
mother in À la Recherche du temps perdu, and the death of Prince
Bolkonsky in War and Peace. These passages have shown him that liter-
ature can conjure an astounding feeling of identification in the reader.
Barthes calls this a ‘moment de vérité’. Such a moment involves the
confluence of love and death: ‘Donc, Moment de vérité: Au plan du sujet:
arrachement émotif, cri viscéral. […] Dans le moment de vérité, le sujet
(lisant) touche à nu le “scandale” humain: que la mort et l’amour existent
en même temps’ (PR, 159).12 The power of these moments inheres in their
pathetic force – ‘not finite knowledge’, as Leslie Hill puts it, ‘but bound-
less feeling’.13
It is for the isolation of these moments that the mentions of Proust’s
temporal ‘disorganisation’ and Nietzsche’s ‘crumbling’ have prepared us.
For if we are properly to recognise the ‘pathos’ of such episodes, says
Barthes, we must be willing to pay them disproportionate attention,
thereby essentially disregarding the structure and logic of the surrounding
narrative. In a ‘pathetic’ reading, perceptions of the book’s significance
would shift away from its overall cohesiveness, towards the brief and
perhaps even disruptive passages of the most emotional impact. This
suggestion that the structure of the novel be broken down, is, as Barthes
realises, problematic: ‘Nous sommes encore loin d’une théorie ou d’une
histoire pathétique du Roman; car il faudrait, pour l’esquisser, accepter

d’émietter le “tout” de l’univers romanesque, ne plus placer l’essence du
livre dans sa structure’. Rather, he says, we would need to recognise that
reading involves a process of atomisation in which a dialectic of destruc-
tion and construction is at play:
Il faudrait […] reconnaître que l’œuvre émeut, vit, germe, à travers une
espèce de ‘délabrement’ qui ne laisse debout que certains moments, lesquels
en sont à proprement parler les sommets, la lecture vivante, concernée, ne
suivant en quelque sorte qu’une ligne de crête: les moments de vérité sont
comme les points de plus-value de l’anecdote. (‘Longtemps’, 468)
Barthes reprises this idea of crumbling or fragmentation as a vital process

in the final lecture of De la vie à l’œuvre.14 Here, he once again suggests
that it might be possible to outline a theory of reading ‘qui s’occuperait
ou partirait des moments de l’œuvre: moments forts, moments de vérité
ou, si l’on ne craint pas le mot, moments pathétiques’. If one could
practise such a ‘critique pathétique’, one could perhaps arrive at ‘une
discrimination des valeurs (de la valeur) de l’œuvre selon la force des
moments—ou d’un moment’ (PR, 160). These moments, he says, are the
‘justification absolue’ of the novel, and to give them their due recognition,
we would have to accept that we must ‘déprécier l’œuvre, ne pas en
respecter le Tout, abolir des parts de cette œuvre, la ruiner – pour la faire
vivre’ (PR, 161).15
On looking closely at the end of the ‘Longtemps’ lecture, we find that
the conception of the novel here is in no way limited to the ‘real novel,
the “great” novel’;16 the references to Proust and Tolstoy do not dictate
the form of the postulated work. The last two pages of this lecture involve
a curious mixture of deferring to, and dismissal of, a vaguely defined
version of the genre. Barthes misquotes the Sade line used by Berthet in
order to explain his a-generic understanding of the novel: ‘Sade, oui, Sade
disait que le roman consiste à peindre ceux qu’on aime’ (‘Longtemps’,
469). There is a sense of supplication in his hope that the novel will allow
him ‘la représentation d’un ordre affectif’ (469), sanctioning (‘me perme-
ttre’) the expression of affect to a greater extent than critical discourse
does. It is the perceived status of the discourse itself which is of interest;
Barthes is not concerned with the actual mechanics of the production of
novelistic discourse (the interrelation of the roles of author, narrator and
characters).
The final, and also most oft-quoted, point of the ‘Longtemps’ lecture
is the outlining of the method of simulation, introduced in the final para-
graph: ‘Ce Roman utopique, il m’importe de faire comme si je devais
l’écrire. […] Je postule un roman à faire, et de la sorte je peux espérer en
apprendre plus sur le roman qu’en le considérant seulement comme un

objet déjà fait par les autres’ (470).17 It is here, with the explanation that
a hypothetical novel will be used as a heuristic tool, that the respect for
the convenient enunciative ventriloquism of the novel cedes to what is
essentially a valedictory dismissal, though ostensibly an enlarging, of that
genre. Stating that he must act as if he was going to write a novel – and
provoking a ripple of amusement from the audience at the Préparation
du roman version of this lecture, as the recording attests – Barthes says
that the simulation to be worked towards may not even be a novel: ‘Je
ne sais s’il sera possible d’appeler encore “roman” l’œuvre que je désire
et dont j’attends qu’elle rompe avec la nature uniformément intellectuelle
de mes écrits passés’ (470). This is the first of several indications, given
at intervals throughout the Préparation du roman lectures, that the novel
per se is not, in fact, the desired goal. Its invocation is instrumental: it
serves as a vehicle for reflection on the possibility of affective, non-egotis-
tical expression in any other genre than that of the essay. Therefore, no
generic constraints apply. The novel is the guiding fantasy, then, but the
classic, realist version of it, which we might assume to be the objective
of Barthes’s endeavours, is swiftly abandoned as volume and mass, and
is retained only in the ideal of ‘moments de vérité’. The novel itself, as
we will see, vanishes under statements about the desired work as
embodying truth, the world; the desired work as ‘toute œuvre’ (PR, 203).
The novel is a convenient term for what might be any form at all.
Simulation as method involves an immediate loss – albeit a loss postu-
lated as beneficial – of the novel per se.
This loss is similar to that articulated in the final lines of Barthes’s
near-contemporaneous article on the diary form, ‘Délibération’, wherein
it becomes apparent that his reconsideration of the diary form has led to
its remodelling into something entirely different, or unfeasible.18 Barthes
writes here that he may be able to ‘save’ the diary form ‘à seule condition
de la travailler à mort, jusqu’au bout de l’extrême fatigue, comme un Texte
à peu près impossible: travail au terme duquel il est bien possible que le
Journal ainsi tenu ne ressemble plus du tout à un Journal’ (‘Délibération’,
681). We see here the same adieu to the diary form, understood restric-
tively, as we see in ‘Longtemps’ with the novel. The form is enlarged into
a pan-generic ideal, which, though it may seem vast in conception, is
founded upon an intensely subjective desire for the expression of affect.
Barthes’s literary idealism thus closely resembles that of the German
Romantics. For, as David Simpson has pointed out, the universalism of
Friedrich Schlegel, for example, is particular: ‘Readers of Schlegel […]
soon discover that what may look like a grand totality of everything is
actually an ironic reduction to the parameters of temporality and subjec-

tivity’.19 Schlegel’s idealistic, fragmentary, anti-systematic approach to
the novel thus anticipates Barthes’s similar approach.
De la vie à l’œuvre: The ‘roman poikilos’ and the Failure of the Fantasy
The loss of a purely generic understanding of the novel, however, cedes

to another understanding at the end of De la vie à l’œuvre. During the
1978–79 lectures, we witness an increasingly evident – and perhaps
increasingly impracticable – desire that the postulated work express the
truth of the world and represent ‘le Souverain Bien’ (PR, 40). At the same
time, there is a loosening of the concept of the form of this work.
Ultimately, Barthes arrives at a definition of the novel as constitutively
heterogeneous. This definition determines, before the event, his failure
to write one.
The opening of De la vie à l’œuvre reprises the material from
‘Longtemps’ concerning the fantasy of the new form and the urgent sense
of the need for a fundamental change in his writing which would posi-
tively change, also, his life. The change must be one of form, as a change
of ‘contenu, doctrine’ only is merely ‘banal’: ‘Pour qui a écrit, le champ
de la Vita Nuova, ce ne peut être que […] la découverte d’une nouvelle
pratique de l’écriture (PR, 29). Barthes tells us coyly in the second lecture
that the fantasised form is indeed that of the novel, but that, contrary to
rumour, he is not writing one. The fantasy is merely ‘un moteur qui met
en marche’. It is necessarily quite sketchy. In order to function as an
enabling tool, the fantasy ‘doit rester à même une image grossière, codée:
le Poème, le Roman ¡ ce n’est qu’en luttant avec le Réel […] que le
fantasme se perd comme fantasme et atteint le Subtil, l’Inouï’ (PR, 9
December 178, 36). For now, in the ‘preparation’ stage, the fantasy of
the ‘roman’ must remain at the level of being imagined only as a typical
example of its genre. However, shortly after asserting that the fantasy is,
perforce, generically coded, Barthes says that his fantasy has essentially
nothing to do with such a broad conception, but is concerned with some-
thing more unique: ‘Le fantasme saisit le “Roman pas comme les autres”’,
he says, ‘comme si l’essence non-scientifique du roman […] était cher-
chée dans un déni du genre “Roman”. C’est bien le cas pour La Recherche
du temps perdu, et même pour Guerre et paix’ (PR, 38–39).
While this statement is in line with what ‘Longtemps’ had already
established, the abandonment of the idea of the form telle quelle is
puzzling, when we have been told that the choice or change of a form is
the most vital part of the enterprise – it is the ‘Grand Projet’ of Barthes’s
life now, he has said. Why is the formal conceit (if such it ever was) being
left behind? Because it is ultimately less important than the ideas which
Barthes seeks to have represented. The idea of the novel is an extremely
amorphous one, we now realise, conceived in line with the non-dualistic
desire for the intraitable we have seen in the last chapter:
Les blessures du Désir peuvent être recueillies, transcendées par l’idée de
‘faire un Roman’, de dépasser les contingences de l’échec par une grande
tâche, un Désir Général dont l’objet est le monde entier. […] Roman:
apparaît comme Souverain Bien. […] Donc, en un sens, le Roman est
fantasmé comme ‘acte d’amour’. (PR, 39–40)
This expansive list of suggestions of the role and virtue of the fantasised
work makes it clear that a poietic ‘échec’ is subsidiary to the emotional
intention that informs the fantasy. The reader or listener may be frus-
trated as she realises that the form, presented initially as an imperative,
almost, in fact, as a matter of life or a Sisyphean death-in-life,20 is no
more than a provisional, all-embracing and therefore unfeasible outline
for emotions and their vast inspiration: love, the ‘whole world’, and ‘la
vie “contemporaine”, concomitante’ (PR, 45). We are returned to the
idea of the banal and the incomparable as discussed in Chapter 4: the
desired form would treat ‘l’intraitable réalité’ – a daunting task, and
one accomplished (in Barthes’s view) only in certain haikus, and in the
Tolstoy and Proust ‘moments de vérité’.
In the final moments of the last lecture of De la vie à l’œuvre, we
realise that the previous lectures have prepared us for a new conception
of the novel as a form-content mass, which is so voluminous as to be
deliberately impracticable. Immediately after a lengthy discussion of the
‘moment de vérité’ and a reiteration of the idea of a ‘critique pathétique’,
Barthes suddenly announces that the novel is not feasible for him, because
its diversity means that it cannot sustain the intensity of the ideal moment
of truth: ‘Le Roman […] dans sa grande et longue coulée, ne peut soutenir
la “vérité” (du moment): ce n’est pas sa fonction’ (PR, 10 March 1979,
161). He is unable to invent a narrative that might link these moments.
This inability to fabulate is presented as an inability to lie in the produc-
tive manner that the novel does. Not a technical problem, then, but a
deep-seated resistance to fabulation which is presented as an ethical
resistance. The final lines of the first Préparation series conclude with
this declaration:
Peut-être donc: parvenir à faire un roman […] c’est au fond accepter de
mentir, parvenir à mentir […] – mentir de ce mensonge second et pervers
qui consiste à mêler le vrai et le faux ¡ En définitive, alors, la résistance au
roman, l’impuissance au roman (à sa pratique) serait une résistance morale.

(PR, 161).
It is the infinite artifice of the novel which ‘causes’ Barthes’s inability to

write one: this view of the novel as necessarily heterogeneous and there-
fore unassailable is, perhaps, syllogistic. In any case, the novel at this
point is (again) thrown out of court as a realistic option. As Barthes
outlines his ‘moral’ impasse, he also gives us an image of the novel as
infinitely many-faceted – an image which builds on the previous
comments about the novel representing the whole world:
Je me le représente comme un tissu, […] une vaste et longue toile peinte
d’illusions, de leurres, de choses inventées, de ‘faux’, si l’on veut: toile
brillante, colorée, voile de la Maya, ponctuée, clairsemée de Moments de
vérité qui en sont la justification absolue […] Quand je produis des
Notations, <en vue du Roman> elles sont toutes ‘vraies’: je ne mens jamais
(je n’invente jamais), mais précisément, je n’accède pas au Roman; le roman
commencerait non au faux, mais quand on mêle sans prévenir le vrai et le
faux: […] ¡ le roman serait poikilos, bigarré, varié, tacheté, moucheté,
couvert de peintures, de tableaux, vêtement brodé, compliqué, complexe.
(PR, 161)21
This moment at the end of the first series of Préparation lectures paves
the way for the second, where the notion of the desired work as form or
as content is comprehensively overshadowed by the description of the
desire to write, and the material and mental arrangements which must
be made in order for the writing to begin. This is an example of a now
familiar prospective procedure, which prioritises exploration and
hypothesis over any outcome or end result. In the second lecture of the
second series, there is a section entitled ‘Indistinction/Poikilos’. Here
Barthes discusses the writing tendency and how, when the desire to write
is strong, ‘l’objet s’efface ou s’estompe au profit de [cette] Tendance’.
From that point on, the division of genres becomes entirely irrelevant: ‘Il
y a évidemment indifférence croissante à distinguer les objets de l’Écrire,
c’est-à-dire les “genres” de la littérature; la division des genres’ (PR, 8
December 1979, 201). Here, the idea of the importance of the ‘tendance,
dont l’objet importait moins que la richesse même du Tendre-vers’ (203)
is at the expense of the desired work as object, for now, he tells us, the
idea of the form of that work has been entirely extended. More than that:
it never existed. There was no cohesive form as such actually behind the
conception of the lectures, but rather, again, the idea of ‘l’écriture frag-
mentée et bariolée’ that prevented Barthes’s accession to the novel at the
end of the 1978–79 lectures. Barthes describes the kind of multifarious
writing he means, where many genres are mixed, as in the writings of
Nietzsche and in Plato’s dialogues. He concludes the section by saying:
C’est un peu à cette extension – ou défection – du Roman que je pensais, en

intitulant ce Cours: ‘La Préparation du Roman’: Roman doit peu à peu
s’entendre comme Roman Absolu, Roman Romantique, Roman poikilos,
Roman de l’Écrire-Tendance; autrement dit, toute œuvre, <tout texte>. (PR,
203)
But ‘every work’ is no work at all. Not only is the novel negated as genre,
but the postulated work itself disappears. The ideal of the ‘défection’ of
the novel into fragments (‘l’écriture fragmentée et bariolée’) shows that
the dream of the continuous work is truly a chimera, and that the frag-
ment is still at the forefront of Barthes’s thought. The first series of
lectures had concentrated unswervingly on the shortest possible form (the
haiku), with the ostensible aim of ultimately reaching the longer form of
which these fragments are the kernel. And yet its conclusion was that any
stringing-together of the ‘moments’ was simply untenable for Barthes.
Obliquely, the second series of lectures provides several indications that
the fragment is, after all, not abandoned. Even the question of the actual
writing itself seems to have become marginal. But there remains the
niggling question of the form of that chimerical work: the word ‘novel’
still exercises the tyrannical fascination that has led so many commenta-
tors to assert that Barthes can be seen as a novelist. The question should
not be whether Barthes would have written a novel (‘Quand allez-vous
sauter le pas?’): the Préparation makes it clear that that is neither the
most pertinent nor the most interesting question. Rather, the question
should be whether the ‘idol’ of the fragment is ever overcome, in the
fantasy, by the ‘decadence’ of a continuous, ‘roman’-like narrative. The
influence of German Romanticism seems to prove that the fragment
remains pre-eminent.
L’Œuvre comme volonté and Jena Romanticism
Barthes’s mention of the poikilos-writing he had in mind when thinking

of the title of his current lecture course is strikingly similar to the Jena
Romantics’ ideal of literature. They imagined a work which would
contain in a glorious synthesis all genres and the theory of all those
genres. The Jena Romantics were of great interest to Maurice Blanchot:
like Barthes, Blanchot is entranced by fragmentation and by the idea of
literature as being infinitely ahead of one.22 In L’Entretien infini (1969),
Blanchot writes enthusiastically about the goals of the Jena group – but
his criticism of them centres on the fact that wanting every form essen-
tially means guaranteeing that you end up with none:
L’une des tâches du romantisme […a été] d’être tout, mais sans contenu ou
avec des contenus presque indifférents et ainsi d’affirmer ensemble l’absolu
et le fragmentaire, la totalité, mais dans une forme qui, étant toutes formes,
c’est-à-dire à la limite n’étant aucune, ne réalise pas le tout, mais le signifie
en le suspendant, voire en le brisant.23
Precisely the same remark could be made regarding Barthes’s suggestion

that we see the novel as ‘Roman Absolu, Roman Romantique, Roman
poikilos; […] autrement dit, toute œuvre’ (PR, 203). In fact, most of
Blanchot’s ten-page discussion of the Jena Romantics in L’Entretien
infini is startlingly pertinent to the Barthes of L’Œuvre comme volonté.
The influence on these lectures of Jena Romanticism, as gleaned directly
from the pages of Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy’s just-
published L’Absolu littéraire, is considerable.24 Published in September
1978, Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy’s text made available for the first time
in French several key texts by the Jena group, such as the Critical
Fragments and Athenaeum Fragments.25 These were accompanied by
philosophical exegesis of the texts. Barthes had probably already written
his lecture notes for De la vie à l’œuvre when this text was published.
However, he had clearly internalised the main propositions of L’Absolu
littéraire by the time he came to write the notes for L’Œuvre comme
volonté as well as Vita Nova in summer 1979. Barthes tells us in the first
lecture that L’Œuvre comme volonté is partially premised on Jena
Romanticism, given its relevance to the discussion of the desire to write
as pure and intransitive (‘Désir d’écrire comme seul désir’). He points out
that ‘il faudrait ici relever, depuis le Romantisme, qui a posé l’Absolu
littéraire, les traits excessifs du désir d’écrire – ou qui font que ce désir
n’existe qu’excessivement’ (PR, 1 December 1979, 195–96). The
Romanticism described by Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy is taken as the
starting point for the course’s study of the fantasies, difficulties and prac-
tical problems undergone by those – including himself – who feel this
desire to write intensely. The lectures will quote liberally from the diaries
and correspondence of Kafka, Flaubert, Proust and Mallarmé, wherein
the writers bear witness to their writerly hopes and frustrations. Such is
the overall parcours of the lectures. Within this schema, there is another
timeline, also premised on the significance of the Jena moment: in intense
and telescoped fashion, Barthes provides a rapid historical explanation
and justification of his extension of the idea of the novel into ‘toute
œuvre’, and of the necessary priority of the fragment. This occurs in the
section entitled ‘Indistinction/Poikilos’, just before the statements
concerning the ‘défection’ of the novel – a ‘défection’ that is at the origin
of the course itself.
Having established that during the period of German Romanticism

the increasing strength of the writing tendency led to a growing indiffer-
ence to the separation of genres, Barthes goes on to say that ‘le champ
privilégié de cette [indifférenciation], c’est celui qui est tracé par l’éclate-
ment du Roman, ou du moins sa déformation’. He swiftly lists Proust’s
hesitation between forms; writers such as Nerval and Baudelaire who
wished to blend a few genres at a time; and finally the transcending of
the novel in Valéry, Breton, Bataille et al., where the canonical form of
the novel is abandoned, but appears ‘comme une figure en palimpseste’.
All this leads us inexorably to where we are now: ‘Tout cela se travaille
au profit d’un nouveau mot non point générique, mais désignant une
œuvre dont le genre est irrepérable: le Texte’ (PR, 201). He states that
the closest historical equivalent that we have to this era of ‘l’éclatement
du roman’26 is German Romantic theory of the novel, which prefigures
our theoretical age in demanding ‘le mélange, le “bariolage” des genres’.
Barthes quotes Novalis:
Roman (Novalis, Schlegel) = mélange des genres, en l’absence de toute
hiérarchie ou de tout découpage = Roman romantique ou Roman absolu.
Novalis (Encyclopédie, 6e section, 2e livre, fragments 1441 et 1447): ‘Art du
roman: le Roman ne devrait-il embrasser toutes les espèces de styles dans
une succession diversement liée à l’esprit commun?’ ‘L’art du roman exclue
toute continuité. Le roman doit être un édifice articulé dans chacune de ses
périodes. Chaque petit morceau doit être quelque chose de coupé – de limité
– un tout valant pour lui-même’. (PR, 202)
As Barthes points out, what Novalis provides is a ‘belle définition du

Fragment comme Roman’, such that ‘l’objet est fractionné, au profit
d’une moire d’énergies d’écriture’. In such a view of the literary object,
intention (or the ‘volonté’ in the title of Barthes’s lecture course) becomes
primary, with the actual writing itself featuring only ephemerally:
‘l’Écrire, comme tendance, veut dire que des objets d’écriture paraissent,
brillent, disparaissent; ce qu’il reste, au fond, c’est un champ de forces’
(PR, 202). It is for this reason, Barthes asserts, that the rupturing and
expansion of the novel genre prescribed in Romantic theory was the inspi-
ration for this course.
Jena is thereby placed at the heart of the matter. Not only did it
engender this course (and other work by Barthes; see below for a discus-
sion of the Romantic idea of the poikilos in the sixth and seventh Vita
Nova plans), but it is the birthplace of ‘our’ modern literature and the
precursor of contemporary literary theory and the integration of theory
into ‘primary’ texts. This view of the importance of Jena is drawn entirely
from Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy’s text; they state in their book that
‘L’Athenaeum est notre lieu de naissance’.27 In fact, a reading of the
blurb of their book alone reveals enough of their main thesis to repro-
duce it as Barthes does. The blurb posits that the Jena group’s ideas
inaugurate the main tenets of contemporary (poststructuralist) literary
theory, or what Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy call ‘notre demi-sommeil
théorique et nos rêveries d’écriture’:
Le romantisme est d’abord une théorie. Et l’invention de la littérature. Il
constitue même, très exactement, le moment inaugural de la littérature
comme production de sa propre théorie – et de la théorie se pensant comme
littérature. Par là, il ouvre l’âge critique auquel nous appartenons encore.
Within their text, Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy produce a filiation very

similar to Barthes’s tracing of the ‘éclatement du roman’ and the writing
‘tendency’, where they end up with Barthes himself as one of the logical
endpoints of Jena’s influence:
Si, dorénavant, l’auteur ne peut sans doute plus être auteur sans être aussi
critique, théoricien ou poéticien (Baudelaire, Mallarmé, Valéry), si le critique
doit être lui-même et comme tel auteur (Benjamin, Barthes, Genette), […]
c’est toujours au nom de cette identité même de la ‘poésie romantique’ du
fragment 116 de l’Athenaeum, qui ‘veut et doit tantôt mêler et tantôt fondre
ensemble poésie et prose, génialité et critique, etc.’28
Barthes reproduces Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy’s argument for the

current relevance of German Romantic writing, adding to it his own
understanding of Novalis’s theory of the novel in order to define the
heterogeneous work that is at the horizon of his own lectures. The
Romantic theory of the hybrid novel or what Friedrich Schlegel calls the
‘motley heap of ideas’29 is, along with the idea of Romantic irony, the
aspect of Jena Romanticism which is most often discussed in Anglo-
American reception of these writings. Most commentators agree that the
Romantics’ postulation of the perfect multi-generic Romantic novel is so
ambitious as to seem wilfully to exclude the possibility of its ever being
actually accomplished: the writing does not thus belong to any material
present. The same is true of Barthes. Ernst Behler describes what he sees
as the quintessentially modern ‘future-oriented thrust’ of Jena theory, and
points out that their overriding desire for a privileged relation to the infi-
nite means that ‘completion and totality in any realizable fashion are
questioned’, and ‘any type of closure’ is ‘reject[ed] and postpone[d] […]
to an unrealizable future’.30 Friedrich Schlegel’s Athenaeum fragment
116, which defines the essence of the many-faceted Romantic writing,
makes this desire for the infinite perfectly clear. Schlegel believes that
Romantic poetry represents the perfect admixture of all genres:
Romantic poetry is a progressive, universal poetry. Its aim isn’t merely to
reunite all the separate species of poetry and put poetry in touch with philos-
ophy and rhetoric. It tries to and should mix and fuse poetry and prose,
inspiration and criticism, the poetry of art and the poetry of nature; and
make poetry lively and sociable, and life and society poetical.
As a good aesthetic thinker, he also believes that, in its rejection of system-

atisation, Romantic poetry manages to encompass all of the aspects of
language and of life which are left out by that systematisation: ‘[Romantic
poetry] alone can become […] a mirror of the whole circumambient
world, an image of the age’.31 Writing only eight years after Kant’s
Critique of Judgment, which plays down the cognitive elements of art
and aesthetic judgment, Schlegel dramatically accords considerable
cognitive and epistemological power to the aesthetic. His idealisation of
Romantic poetry here resembles Barthes’s characterisation of literature
and literary semiology in Leçon: we saw in Chapter 2 how Barthes
defends literature as containing, in encyclopaedic fashion, ‘[tous] les
savoirs’ (L, 18). Barthes proposes that the use of ‘fantasme’ in semiology
leads to a universal particular. This affirmation of a subjectivity which
transmogrifies into a superior version of objectivity seems to be antici-
pated in Schlegel’s definition of Romantic poetry, which can ‘hover at
the midpoint between the portrayed and the portrayer, free of all real
and ideal self-interest, on the wings of poetic reflection, and can raise
that reflection again and again to a higher power, […] endless[ly]’. The
final section of fragment 116 is the most often quoted. Here Schlegel
focuses on the dynamic, system-eluding quality of Romantic poetry:
The romantic kind of poetry is still in the state of becoming; that, in fact, is
its real essence: that it should forever be becoming and never be perfected.
It can be exhausted by no theory and only a divinatory criticism would dare
to try to characterize its ideal. It alone is infinite, just as it alone is free.32
Within this logic, incompletion is imperative, for the completion of

a work would lead to a narrowing of the path to the infinite. Therefore
even Friedrich Schlegel’s novel Lucinde, the closest thing to a continous
work written by any of the Jena group, remains unfinished, because, one
supposes, it has to. Peter Firchow writes that Lucinde’s incompleteness
makes of it the embodiment of Romantic theory, ‘for since it is incom-
plete, Lucinde can never be a novel, but must forever be attempting to
become one’.33 Schlegel’s fragment 116 seeks to confer on itself, in
Blanchot’s words, ‘une joyeuse et temporelle éternité’.34 While Barthes
cannot be accused of having so overtly grandiose an aim, it is undeniable
that the inachèvement of La Préparation du roman and its concluding
‘suspension’ certainly confer upon it a version of the ‘infinity’ referred to
by Schlegel: at the end we are still waiting, as Barthes is, for the work:
‘Tout ce que je puis ajouter, c’est une certaine idée que j’ai de l’“attente”’
(PR, 23 February 1980, 383). Both Barthes and the Romantics, then, aim
for the universal, but they know that such totality neither can nor should
be reached. The suspension of teleology must engender a focus on indi-
vidual fragments.
Another significant link between the Romantics and Barthes is that
the postulation of an impossible new work is bound up with the possi-
bility of a new subjecthood – in Barthes’s phrase, a ‘vita nova’. In
L’Absolu littéraire, Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy emphasise that the Jena
project is concerned not only with the auto-production of literature, but
simultaneously with that of the subject: they speak of the ‘Sujet-Œuvre’
at the heart of the Romantic endeavour, ‘le centre poïétique de l’opéra-
tion, voire de l’opérativité de l’Œuvre’.35 The writing subject is conceived
dynamically as drawing the most important function of her life from the
writing she is in the process of conceiving. This is a ‘poïétique où le sujet
se confond avec sa propre production’.36 While this remains rather
oblique, the idea of the work and the writing subject being explored at
once is certainly relevant to La Préparation du roman.
As we saw above, Barthes is convinced that for a writer, a ‘vita nova’
can only be approached – if not attained – through the essaying of a
different form of writing. The new work would come about as the writer’s
desire for it altered his own subjectivity. The work and the writing subject
are thus in a symbiotic relationship. Interestingly, the American transla-
tors of Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy’s text link the idea of the
Subject-Work to the fragment and the Blanchotian ‘exigence fragmen-
taire’. The writer can only ever exist at the moment of ‘the task of
auto-production’ – i.e., the writer is limited by being in the present rather
than the postulated future. Therefore, his ‘disposition as the subject-work
[must be] fragmentary in nature; that is, it assumes and continually points
towards a perfection and completion that lie beyond it, yet also underlie
its self-productive activity’.37 Barnard and Lester go on to say that the
fragmentary work embodies all the possibilities inherent in poiesis, and
‘manifests the synthetic totality that lies behind or before each of its
particular manifestations’.38 This is essentially the same point as that
arrived at by Blanchot, Firchow and others, i.e. that the Romantic ideal
posits the infinite. The fragment has a privileged relationship to the infi-
nite, conjuring the absent whole. A poikilos work composed entirely of
fragments is thus related to the idea of the encyclopedia. Schlegel’s frag-
ments are designed to make us intuit what might be possible. Peter
Firchow states that Schlegel’s notebooks make it clear that he had
attempted to ‘build a system of literature which would put order into the
criticism and understanding of the classics’. Explaining that Schlegel was
unable to complete his system, and therefore simply put his jottings
together to make up the famous Fragments, Firchow concludes that
[the] fragments are not against systems. They are a substitute for one, a bril-
liant substitute, for unlike a fully formulated system they need exclude
nothing because it is contradictory, or even self-contradictory; they can and
do bring the entire noisy federation of literary and philosophical quarrels
under one roof.39
According to this astute assessment, Schlegel tries both to elude and to

improve upon systematisation. We have seen in Chapter 2 how Barthes’s
literary semiology proposes a similar correction to the systematisation of
previous versions of semiology. In addition, at the level of methodology
and poiesis, Barthes shares Schlegel’s hope that the fragments exceed their
immediate materiality by pointing towards the varied wholes which they
adumbrate. Accompanying this is a desire that literary genres become
undifferentiated, in the name of an overarching, ‘poikilitic’ conception
of literature. Hence Barthes’s focus on the ‘Tendance’, or intransitive
desire to write. If genres are ultimately to be conflated in a fragmentary
and encyclopaedic method, the object to be written then becomes
secondary to the mental exploration of the possibility of creation, and
the possibility of writing any or every work, ‘Roman de l’Écrire-
Tendance; autrement dit, toute œuvre’ (PR, 203).
L’Œuvre comme volonté constitutes the shift from the idea of writing
a work (this idea was still present in De la vie à l’œuvre, though it was
abandoned in the end) to the idea of simply writing: how and when is it
possible, how does it change you? In the first lecture of L’Œuvre comme
volonté, Barthes goes through the reasons why he writes. Many of the
reasons are related to a sense of duty. One writes ‘au service d’une Cause,
d’une finalité sociale, morale, instruire, édifier, militer ou distraire’. These
reasons, while they are significant, essentially constitute a sort of socially
acceptable mask for his ‘perverse’ desire to write – ‘perverse’ in the
Barthesian sense of the taste for activities such as literature which are
considered to have little social utility. So, instrumentalist justifications
for one’s desire to write ‘ne sont pas négligeables; mais je les vis un peu
comme des justifications, des alibis, dans la mesure où elles font dépendre
l’Écrire d’une demande sociale, ou morale (extérieure)’. In truth, he says,
‘autant que je puisse être lucide, je sais que j’écris pour contenter un désir’
(PR, 1 December 1979, 187). In the third lecture of the series, Barthes
characterises the whole course as ‘l’histoire intérieure d’un homme qui
veut écrire […] et délibère des moyens d’accomplir ce désir, ou cette
volonté’ (PR, 15 December 1979, 234). This shift towards the internal
corresponds exactly to the contribution of the Jena group, as Barthes and
others see it. Ernst Behler writes that

Adam Müller, a contemporary of the Schlegels, characterizes the essence of
the ‘literary revolution’ brought about by these brothers as having made […]
‘the tendency of a work of art’ the most important aspect in our dealing with
aesthetic phenomena.40
When the ‘tendency’ becomes central, then the ‘art object’ can no longer
be regarded as a closed space. Nor can it be slavishly imitated, for it
has become unpredictable. In this way, the Romantic ‘art object’ is an
open work. Representation and mimesis become secondary to ideas of
creation.
In L’Œuvre comme volonté, Barthes continually lays emphasis on the
fact that his methodology is one of simulation: ‘En cherchant à simuler
la préparation de l’œuvre, je me mets dans la situation de la produire […]
(je ne vais produire aucune œuvre – sinon le Cours lui-même)’ (PR, 15
December 1979, 233). Yet we know that he had in the months preceding
the delivery of these lectures planned a work provisionally entitled Vita
Nova. In fact, he had added a final plan to the Vita Nova sketches in
December 1979, after having delivered the first three lectures of the
course. How do we reconcile what seems to be a renunciation of the possi-
bility of writing a work with the planning of a work? And would that
work be the continuous work of the fantasy of Cerisy and De la vie à
l’œuvre, or would it be the fragmentary, poikilos, Romantic work
described as the origin of L’Œuvre comme volonté?
Vita Nova: The ‘Album’ versus the ‘Livre’
<un livre de fragments peut être le livre>

(L’Œuvre comme volonté, 5 January 1980)
Vita Nova, a red folder containing eight sketches for a work never begun,
was discovered after Barthes’s death and published for the first time in
the first edition of Barthes’s Œuvres Complètes in 1993.41 There is very
little discussion of Vita Nova in criticism of Barthes. Michel Contat, in
a review of the 1993 publication of the Œuvres Complètes for Le Monde,
discusses the Vita Nova plans in the belief that they would ultimately
have become a work had Barthes not died. According to Contat, these
plans for a text ‘que la mort […] a empêché au seuil de l’écriture’, would,
had circumstances been otherwise, have become a work of any size – who
knows: fifty, three hundred, a thousand pages or more.42 Claude Coste
shares this view that it was only Barthes’s death that prevented the writing
of a novel.43 Bernard Comment believes that Barthes was definitely plan-

ning a real work during the period of the Préparation du roman lectures,
but proposes that the only reason the project was not executed is that
Barthes felt he was not capable as a writer of achieving it.44
Antoine Compagnon suggests that for Barthes, ‘homme du frag-
ment’, the Vita Nova plans had no destiny beyond their planning, or in
other words were the plans of an ‘imaginary’ work.45 However,
Compagnon remains attached to the idea of Barthes as a novelist of sorts:
he consoles his readers by pointing out that, though there is no novel to
come, ‘le Roman avait en somme déjà eu lieu’:46 this statement is based
on Compagnon’s assessment of Roland Barthes, Fragments d’un discours
amoureux and La Chambre claire as versions of ‘le Roman du Roman’
or ‘le Roman de l’échec du Roman’.47
Of the scant body of criticism of Vita Nova, Diana Knight is the only
commentator to break with the topos of ‘Barthes romancier’ by focusing
on the ‘failure’ of the Vita Nova plans.48 She sets out her belief that
‘despite playing with the idea of a grand literary project, an experiment
which involved planning it in earnest, Barthes seems to […] imply, both
in the cours and elsewhere, that the possibility of failure was built into
the basic conception’.49 Knight includes a quotation from the radio
programmes about Proust made by Barthes and Jean Montalbetti in
November 1978: here, Barthes mentions his dream of rewriting Proust’s
novel (‘c’est un rêve’), and explains that it is not something he will actu-
ally do. Given that it is a fantasy, Barthes remarks, ‘peu importe l’échec
au fond’.50 If the Vita Nova plans can also be seen as a dream or fantasy,
then, Knight pointedly asks, ‘in what sense can a fantasy fail unless failure
is in some sense part of the fantasy?’51 Her conclusion is that the plans
may well be a fantasy ‘premissed on the idea that, once confronted with
the labour of writing, it would collapse into failure and impossibility’.52
Knight has linked the composition of Vita Nova to the contempora-
neous Soirées de Paris, a set of diary entries which seem sufficiently
‘worked’ to engender the belief that they may have been destined for
publication. Both Vita Nova and the Soirées, begun in late August 1979,
were written (with the exception of the eighth and final Vita Nova plan)
around the same time as ‘Délibération’, Barthes’s weighing-up of the
value of the diary form.53 ‘Délibération’ may have been partly spurred
by the notes he had been making since his mother’s death: these notes,
made from October 1977 to September 1979, were found after Barthes’s
death in a folder labelled ‘Journal de deuil’, and were published under
this title in March 2009.
‘Délibération’ introduces us to Mallarmé’s formal distinction
between the ‘Album’ and the ‘Livre’, which will be used by Barthes in
L’Œuvre comme volonté and his 1980 article on Stendhal, and will be
implicitly important in Vita Nova. The ‘deliberation’, as a genre in clas-
sical rhetoric, discusses the topic of ‘what is good’, socially and
pragmatically, with relation to the general public.54 Barthes reflects that
he cannot see whether the diary form really has any literary value. The
diary’s inferiority is signalled by the fact that it is ‘only’ an Album:
Le journal ne répond à aucune mission. […] Les œuvres de littérature […]
ont toujours eu […] une sorte de fin, sociale, théologique, mythique,
esthétique, morale, etc. Le livre, ‘architectural et prémédité’, est censé
reproduire un ordre du monde. […] Le Journal ne peut atteindre au Livre
(à l’Œuvre); il n’est qu’Album, pour reprendre la distinction mallarméenne.
(‘Déliberation’, 678)
Barthes’s view of the provisional quality of the diary is doubtless imbued

by his own writing practice: he wrote the Journal de deuil on the small
‘fiches’ he favoured: sparse, brief notes which could be shuffled. In
‘Délibération’, he writes that the Album’s value is precarious because
‘[l]’Album est collection de feuillets non seulement permutables […] mais
surtout suppressibles à l’infini’ (679). Thus its outlook seems bleak.
However, towards the end of the essay, Barthes suggests that it may just
be possible to save the disappointing and mission-less diary form –
though only postulatively, as we might expect – by working it ‘à mort,
jusqu’au bout de l’extrême fatigue, comme un Texte à peu près impossi-
ble’ (681). Thereby it would perhaps be transformed into something
unrecognisable, un-diarylike. Thus when Vita Nova includes the rubric
‘Journal de deuil’ (OC, V, 1018), we must assume that this part of the
postulated work would include a ‘reworking’ of those fiches. Knight
suggests that Soirées de Paris may be the attempt at ‘working’ the diary
form suggested at the close of ‘Délibération’, and that Vita Nova would
then be related to the attempt in being its far more ambitious masterplan,
corresponding to Mallarmé’s ‘Livre’, which can never be written. She
concludes with a quotation from the letter by Mallarmé to Verlaine where
the Livre/Album paradigm is suggested:
Ultimately, we might suspect Barthes of the wildest of literary ambitions,
one buried in the relationship he establishes between the parallel strands of
his project: on the one hand, the Vita Nova, ‘premeditated’, ‘architectural’
and impossible like Mallarmé’s Livre; on the other, its self-conscious
fragment, the Vaines Soirées (a Diary not at all like a Diary) […]: ‘Je réussirai
peut-être; non pas à faire cet ouvrage dans son ensemble (il faudrait être je
ne sais qui pour cela!) mais à en montrer un fragment d’exécuté, à en faire
scintiller par une place l’authenticité glorieuse, en indiquant le reste tout
entier auquel ne suffit pas une vie. Prouver par les portions faites que ce livre
existe, et que j’ai connu ce que je n’aurai pu accomplir’.55
For Barthes, the ‘portions faites’ underlining the impossibility of the total
work would be the Soirées de Paris – and perhaps also in due course the
Journal de deuil.
Knight’s contention that Vita Nova is premeditatedly impossible
seems incontrovertibly just, especially when one considers the morass of
postulation underpinning La Préparation du roman, with which much
of the content of Vita Nova is bound up. The projection of the idea of a
work, without the accompanying intention of writing the work, is the
same in La Préparation du roman and Vita Nova. This approach could
be shorthanded as the ‘comme si’ method introduced in ‘Longtemps’,
where the postulation is proposed as a heuristic method used to gain
knowledge about the conditions of writing a work. Barthes had returned
to this description of his method in the third lecture of De la vie à l’œuvre:
in an echo of the statement to Montalbetti that the failure of the dream
essentially does not matter, he points out that, in line with Tao thinking,
it is the walking of the path that is the important part of the process,
rather than any goal at the end of that path: ‘À peine sur le chemin, on
l’a parcouru. […] “Pas nécessaire d’espérer pour entreprendre, ni de
réussir pour persévérer”. […] Il se peut [donc] qu’un autre titre de ce
cours […] soit “Le Roman impossible”’ (PR, 16 December 1978, 49).
There is no need to hope for a material result in order to begin – and even
continue – an undertaking. The subtitle of the first two Vita Nova plans
appears to repeat this assurance: ‘Morale sans espoir d’application’ (OC,
V, 1008–1009). Whether the model is that of the Livre or of the Album,
though, is unclear.
In ‘Délibération’, it is made clear that the Album is inferior to the
Livre: as embodied by the diary, it is a throwaway, disappointing,
‘dépressif’ form. It is concerned only with the ‘inessentiel’. But the Livre,
conflated with ‘l’Œuvre’, is something in which the writer can deeply
involve himself, producing ultimately a worthwhile, ‘unique’ and ‘monu-
mentale’ piece of writing. Similarly, in ‘On échoue toujours à parler de
ce qu’on aime’ (written after both ‘Délibération’ and L’Œuvre comme
volonté), the Album is conceived as the form of Stendhal’s Italian jour-
nals, where Stendhal fails to express his love for Italy: the successful
expression of emotion and delight only comes about for Stendhal when
he makes the shift to the Livre, which involves myth, meaning, ‘le
mensonge romanesque’, and the ‘miracle’ of the suitable formulation of
his ‘passion italienne’. Barthes writes that meaning (‘un sens’), as
produced by the opposing action of two forces, is what the Livre has and
the Album lacks; the Livre is therefore bound to succeed where the Album
fails: ‘En s’abandonnant au Mythe, en se confiant au livre, Stendhal
retrouve avec gloire ce qu’il avait en quelque sorte raté dans ses albums:
l’expression d’un effet’.56
This denigration of the Album is entirely in line with Mallarmé’s own
views on the opposition of Album and Livre.57 For Mallarmé, the Album
is a ‘mot condemnatoire’, and its form is one he longs to leave behind by
realising the Livre: ‘J’ai toujours rêvé et tenté autre chose, avec une
patience d’alchimiste, prêt à y sacrificier toute vanité et toute satisfaction,
comme on brûlait jadis son mobilier et les poutres de son toit, pour
alimenter le fourneau du Grand Œuvre’. By the same token, however,
the Livre is figured as being so monolithic and mythical that it is unat-
tainable; it seems to be an archetype only:
Quoi? c’est difficile à dire: un livre, tout bonnement, en maints tomes, un
livre qui soit un livre, architectural et prémédité. J’irai plus loin, je dirai: le
Livre, persuadé qu’au fond il n’y en a qu’un, tenté à son insu par quiconque
a écrit, même les Génies.58
In L’Œuvre comme volonté, however, Barthes breaks from his own

and Mallarmé’s situating of the Album as the inferior pole of the para-
digm. In the fourth and fifth lectures (5 and 12 January 1980), he sets
up the opposition as an explanation of one of the would-be writer’s
dilemmas. In a section entitled ‘L’enjeu’, he explains that the writer must
choose, in advance of writing, whether his form will be that of the frag-
ment or of narrative – Album or Livre. This is a profound choice, because
the choosing of one term within this particular opposition, as conceived
by Barthes, entails the election of one’s entire worldview:
Par-dessus le ‘contenu’ dont il n’est pas tenu compte, autre chose que la
Forme est engagé, ou, si vous voulez, quelque chose qui est de l’ordre de
l’idéologie revient en spirale, à la place du contenu mais à un autre niveau:
la responsabilité de la forme; chaque forme, Livre ou Album, a son enjeu,
et c’est l’enjeu qu’il faut en définitive choisir.
The Livre is a representation of a monistic universe, ‘un univers Un,

structuré, hiérarchisé’.59 The Album, by contrast, represents ‘un univers
non-un, non hiérarchisé, éparpillé, pur tissu de contingences’. The
decision involves either refusing the ‘émiettement’ of the Album and
Diary, or choosing them: ‘vous ranger à la gloire de cet éparpillement, de
ce miroitement, refuser le mythe du profond opposé à l’apparent. […]
Vous pouvez sentir l’appel du rhapsodique comme l’appel d’une vérité
du monde’ (PR, 12 January 1980, 255–56). Thus the choice of the Livre
is figured negatively as the refusal of the real, contingent world, while to
ally oneself to the philosophy implied by the Album is ‘glorious’ and
involves a canny farsightedness which undoes the myth of shallowness
that the Livre seeks to confer on the Album. If we are still in doubt about
where Barthes’s preferences lie, we are given again the same quotations
from Nietzsche and Cage as those used in the ‘Longtemps’ lecture, where
they denoted the productive force of disorganisation in Proust’s work,
and, by extension, the necessity of the ‘émiettement’ of our reading of
the novel in order to recognise the ‘moment de vérité’. So the Album is
on the side of the atomisation of both reading and writing that we have
inferred from ‘Longtemps’. Finally, Barthes stresses again the link
between the choice of the form and one’s philosophy: whereas the Livre
implies a preference for ‘structure, hiérarchie [et] ratio’, the Album
implies all the systems of thought that we know Barthes prefers: ‘une
philosophie pluraliste, relativiste, sceptique, taoïste, etc.’ (PR, 256).
Immediately following this explanation of the stakes of the two forms
is a section entitled ‘Dialectique du Livre et de l’Album’. Anticipating his
listeners’ feeling that this opposition might be ‘un peu raide, un peu
forcée’, Barthes proposes that we view it differently, ‘non au niveau de
celui qui écrit, mais au niveau de l’histoire, du devenir des œuvres’. It is
here that the Album comes into its own: ‘On va voir que, s’il y a lutte
entre le Livre et l’Album, c’est finalement l’Album qui est le plus fort,
c’est lui qui reste’. The opposition is blurred by the symbiotic relation-
ship between its two terms along the chronological line, for each becomes
the future of the other. The Album can be prepared in view of the Livre
it will hopefully turn into ‘[l]’amas de notes, de pensées détachées, forme
un Album; mais cet amas peut être constitué en vue du Livre; l’avenir de
l’Album, c’est alors le Livre’, Barthes writes. And yet – in a prefiguration,
as one could see it, of his own Vita Nova folder of notes – he continues,
‘l’auteur peut mourir entre-temps: il reste l’Album, et cet Album, par son
dessein virtuel, est déjà le Livre’ (PR, 256). This was the case for Pascal,
he points out; Pascal planned ‘un Livre: l’Apologie (de la religion chréti-
enne), représentation dirigée de l’Homme, transcendance, hiérarchie,
“architecture”’, but upon his death only a mass of ‘pensées’ was found:
‘¡ L’Album a vaincu le Livre: la Mort l’a vaincu’ (PR, 257).
Having ‘proved’ here that the Album can easily take the place of the
intended Livre, Barthes builds on this assertion of the Album’s superior
strength in a second part of the argument which shows that, even if the
Livre is composed and finished, it is destined to return to the Album-state
anyway:
À l’autre bout du temps, le Livre fait redevient Album: l’avenir du Livre,
c’est l’Album, comme la ruine est l’avenir du monument ¡ Valéry: ‘C’est
étrange comme la suite des temps transforme toute œuvre – donc tout
homme – en fragments […]’. Le Livre en effet est voué au débris, aux ruines
erratiques; il est comme un morceau de sucre délité par l’eau: certaines
parties s’affaissent, d’autres restent debout, dressées, cristallines, pures et
brillantes. C’est ce qu’on appelle un relief karstique (en géographie). (PR,

257)
This image of the work as a disintegrating mass of sugar, with only certain
parts left untouched and gleaming, is strikingly similar to the image in
‘Longtemps’ of the ‘univers romanesque’ as a skyline where only the
‘sommets’ embodied by the ‘moments de vérité’ are left standing. The
difference is that, in the earlier lecture, the illustration is in the condi-
tional, and is proposed as a suggestion for how a ‘critique pathétique’
might proceed. Here the breakdown of the work is described, not only
as a fait accompli, but as an imperative, or at least as the inexorable fate
of all written production. One could perhaps extrapolate from both parts
of the exposition of the Album’s superiority that to produce an Album
is simply to anticipate the unavoidable crumbling effects of time and
death.
And yet the crumbling is not to be understood as facilitating the
triumph of death over human endeavour, as he explains:
Ce qui reste du Livre, c’est la citation […]: le fragment, le relief qui est
transporté ailleurs. La Divine Comédie, c’est: ‘Vous qui entrez ici, laissez
toute espérance’, etc. – La ruine, en effet, n’est pas du côté de la Mort: elle
est vivante comme Ruine, consommée comme telle, esthétiquement
constituée, germinative. (PR, 257)
The disintegration or unpiecing of the given work is seen as a life-giving

force. This is a vitalistic and picturesque interpretation of intertextuality:
‘Nous passons notre temps […] à créer des ruines, et à nous en alimenter;
à alimenter notre imagination, notre pensée’ (PR, 257). Indeed, all of
Barthes’s teaching at the Collège de France has been such an endeavour,
consisting as it has done of networks of quotations.
Barthes concludes his discussion of the Livre and Album forms using
an organic metaphor: ‘Ce qui vit en nous du Livre, c’est l’Album: l’Album
est le germen; le Livre, si grandiose soit-il, n’est que le soma’ (PR, 257).
The germ is that portion of an organism capable of developing into a new
one or part of one. The soma is the rest of the organism: it cannot repro-
duce. Barthes’s dismissal of the Livre as ‘only’ the soma is telling. It
unequivocally gives the fragmentary Album form technical, artistic and
historic precedence over the ‘hierarchised’ and architectural Livre. We
might say that Barthes here definitively joins the ranks of the Jena group;
certainly, his metaphor here, with its connotation, not just of growth,
but of infinite (re)generation, is redolent of the Romantic thinking set out
by Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy:
Le fragment est un germe, une semence; selon le dernier des Grains de pollen
de Novalis: ‘Des fragments de ce genre-ci sont des semences littéraires: il se
peut, certes, qu’il y ait dans leur nombre beaucoup de grains stériles, mais
qu’importe, s’il y en a seulement quelques-unes qui poussent!’ – La
fragmentation n’est donc pas une dissémination, mais la dispersion qui
convient à l’ensemencement et aux futures moissons. Le genre du fragment
est le genre de la génération.60
In Barthes’s fantasy, then, the Album is saved from its vacillation and
‘suppressibility’, becoming instead the form par excellence with which to
render the multifarious aspects of its author’s affective engagement with
the world. The Album becomes Barthes’s ‘forme tierce’, the horizon of
all his writing.
Vita Nova and the Fertile Fragment
Of the eight Vita Nova sketches, it is the sixth and seventh which are
closest to these issues regarding form as connected to the potential for
either ruin or generation, or both. It is these two that are influenced by
Barthes’s rereading of Pascal’s Pensées at the time of their composition.
Under the rubric ‘{lisant Pascal}Envie’, their proposals are directly linked
to the form of Pascal’s book, both as it was desired and as it actually is;
the grand Apologie which ended up only as ‘Fragments’ or ‘reliefs’ (OC,
V, 1015).61
Barthes began writing the Vita Nova sketches on 21 August 1979.
The first five plans are written between then and 26 August; the sixth and
seventh ‘Pascalian’ plans on 2 and 3 September; and a final and eighth
plan, thematically linked to the first five, on 12 December, after the
Œuvre comme volonté lectures have begun. As Knight has shown in her
article, the first five plans are related to, and partially written on the same
days as, the Soirées de Paris diary entries, whose sixteen entries were
written between 24 August and 17 September.62 Within the Soirées,
Barthes gives an account of his trip to Urt at the end of August. On his
return to Paris he reads the Pensées. The tone of the diary entries is from
here on more depressed than those preceding. He writes of reading Pascal
in the plane back from Biarritz: ‘J’ai lu un peu des Pensées de Pascal,
retrouvant sous “la misère de l’homme” toute ma tristesse, mon “cœur
gros” d’U[rt] sans mam. (Tout ceci vraiment impossible à écrire: quand
je pense à la sécheresse et à la tension de Pascal)’ (Soirées, 2 September
1979, OC, V, 984). In the penultimate L’Œuvre comme volonté lecture
he also refers to reading Pascal on the plane, this time on the outward
trip to Urt in August. He describes how, reading this book, he is
‘transporté par ce texte, sa vérité (la vérité d’un texte n’est pas la vérité
de ce qu’il dit; c’est – notion paradoxale <mais, je crois, important> – la

vérité de sa forme)’ (PR, 16 February 1980, 353). This vivid impression
of the force of Pascal’s form is carried through into the sixth and seventh
Vita Nova plans.
These two plans do not share the ideas of the other six (1–5 and 8),
which are linked by their allusions to grief, literary ‘guides’, the combat
between writing and idleness, and the epiphanic moment of literary
conversion on 15 April 1978.63 They seem, therefore, to constitute a
diversion or perhaps even a separate project within the overall project of
Vita Nova. Their content is less overtly linked to Barthes’s personal life,
and formal issues are much more to the fore. The sixth plan is titled
‘Apologie’, and its rubric is as follows: ‘Idée du Пοικιλος [poikilos], du
Roman Romantique, du Roman absolu. V[oir] Fiches à Cours 79–80’.
This main heading hints at the overarching ideal of the projection.
Everything that we inferred from the discussion of poikilos in the
Préparation is here: there is the idea of composition by fragments (after
Novalis, who gave us such a ‘belle définition du fragment comme roman’
(PR, 202)). Also present is the ‘magnifi[cation de] la Tendance’, and the
‘éclatement’ of the novel into an unrecognisable and probably unwritable
genre. The seventh plan takes up again the idea of the poikilos, and here
seems almost to suggest the writing of the ideal novel of fragments
suggested by Novalis: ‘Les Frgmts: réaliseraient la théorie du Пοικιλος,
du Roman romantique, du Roman absolu: la rédaction dense, voire
elliptique, toujours très “intelligente” (surveillance rigoureuse) ¡ Travail
lent, acharné – pas seulement de la Forme, mais aussi (nouveau pour moi)
de la Pensée’. There seems a closer engagement with the putative reality
of writing here than anywhere else in the eight plans. However, the condi-
tional tense, ‘réaliseraient’, is revealing, implying, again, a postulated
future in which the work would be written: simulation is again the
method here: ‘Faire comme si je devais écrire ma grande œuvre’ in the
seventh plan is the reprise, almost word for word, of the phrase from
‘Longtemps’: ‘Ce Roman utopique, il m’importe de faire comme si je
devais l’écrire’ (‘Longtemps’, 470).
In the sixth plan, under the main heading announcing the ‘idée’ of
the poikilos is the word ‘Formes’, followed by a list of (all or some of)
the possible formal conceits the poikilos work could use. First there is
‘Le Récit, la relation de quête (intellectuelle) cf Photo’. The allusion here
is probably to La Chambre claire, written earlier in the summer of 1979
(from April to June), and figured implicitly as a quest for the ‘noème’ of
photography and for the essence of Barthes’s mother in photographs of
her. Interestingly, Barthes figures L’Œuvre comme volonté as a ‘récit
intellectuel, aux articulations narratives lâches’, early on in the course.

He puts this formulation forward rather wryly in the belief that it may
be of very little interest to anyone: ‘[Ce récit] n’aura rien, hélas, d’un
thrilling, puisque ce sera l’histoire intérieure d’un homme qui veut écrire.
[…] S’agit donc d’une Délibération’ (PR, 234). Insofar as the second
Préparation course can be understood as the narrative of a man who
wants to write, it can be slotted into the sixth Vita Nova plan as the
accomplishment of one of the proposed forms.
The second form is ‘La Relation de soirée (vanité de la diachronie qui
s’étire)’. Here, as Knight points out, ‘if the Vaines Soirées might have
formed a distinct project in their own right, the Vita Nova plans appear
to subsume them into something more broadly conceived, both as
“content” in a particular narrative structure […], and as generic form’.
She concludes that ‘it might seem that an apparent failure of form (the
vanité of the diary) has been redeemed as failure by a specific literary
context’.64 It is not clear from the plan whether the Soirées are being recu-
perated after their inception as a form that could be used in the absolute
Romantic work, were it to be written, or whether they retain their status
as separate work. Barthes continued to write them after the sixth and
seventh Vita Nova plans, until 17 September, before announcing, in a
note of 22 September, that he is abandoning them.65 Similarly, the collec-
tion of ‘fiches’ entitled the Journal de deuil, mentioned by name in the
eighth plan, and having been compiled since 26 October 1977, is aban-
doned on 15 September 1979. Its final entries mention the trip to Urt,
Barthes’s despairing grief, and his reading of Pascal. Tellingly, in the diary
entry for 22 July, he implies that there is no possibility of any future work:
‘Tous les “sauvetages” du Projet échouent. Je me retrouve sans rien à
faire, sans aucune œuvre devant moi. […] Toute forme du Projet: molle,
non résistante. […] “À quoi bon?” – C’est comme si advenait maintenant
avec clarté […] le retentissement solonnel du deuil sur la possibilité de
faire une œuvre’ (JD, 248). The Journal, subsumed into the Vita Nova
plans as one element of it, is what permits the realisation that the whole
project is an impossibility.
The third postulated form in the sixth Vita Nova plan, which, in its
repeating of the title ‘Apologie’, seems to be the pre-eminent one,
concerns, implicitly, the forms of the Album and Livre and their sugges-
tion of ruins and leftovers: ‘Les Frgmts d’une “grande œuvre” (cf. Pensées
de Pascal) # observations, aphorismes[.] Frgmts: comme reliefs d’une
Apologie de qque chose’. This form, used in the poikilos work, would
assume the presence, elsewhere, of a whole. However, the whole has, for
Barthes, no content (it is just ‘qque chose’). Marty, writing about the
sixth and seventh plans in his preface to Œuvres complètes V, says that
‘la référence à Pascal, c’est d’abord et essentiellement le modèle d’une
œuvre saisie par le désordre, par l’indéchiffrable, par l’apparent échec.
C’est, en réalité, Les Pensées comme œuvre romantique qui attire Barthes,
comme “roman absolu”’.66 Marty here conflates the Pensées with the
motley ‘roman absolu’; this conflation elides the would-be status of the
Pensées (Livre) with the Album form which it became and which Barthes
outlines in these plans. The distinction between Livre and Album is of
great importance here, as the fragment or leftover is posited against the
‘grande œuvre’ or cohesive whole, which is situated, both temporally and
spatially, in an unknowable elsewhere. The hybrid collection of frag-
ments (or ‘roman absolu’) is all that remains of the œuvre of Pascal’s
conception.
In the 1979 interview for Lire (published several months before the
composition of Vita Nova), Barthes was asked by Pierre Boncenne about
the ‘ambiguity’ of writing by fragments, and whether the term ‘fragment’
gives the impression that these are only ‘petits morceaux d’un tout ou de
petits morceaux d’un édifice?’ Barthes responds:
l’écriture n’est jamais que le reste souvent assez pauvre et assez mince de
choses merveilleuses que tout le monde a en soi. Ce qui vient à l’écriture, ce
sont de petits blocs erratiques ou des ruines par rapport à un ensemble
compliqué et touffu. Et le problème de l’écriture, il est là: comment supporter
que ce flot qu’il y a en moi aboutisse dans le meilleur des cas à un filet
d’écriture? Personnellement, alors, je me débrouille mieux en n’ayant pas
l’air de construire une totalité et en laissant à découvert des résidus pluriels.
C’est ainsi que je justifie mes fragments. 67
This reply is in line with the invocation of fragments and ruins in the
sixth and seventh plans, as well as with Barthes’s own admission in the
Préparation that the ‘totalité’ or continuous work is something he is
unable to produce. At the time when this interview was given, Barthes’s
most recent and most celebrated book was Fragments d’un discours
amoureux. The preface of that book of fragments elaborated at length
on Barthes’s sense of the necessity of constructing the text from frag-
ments, so as not to produce a reductive linear ‘whole’. The title of the
book, however, indicates the eliciting of the kind of whole he refers to in
this interview, which can only be sampled in pieces when transformed
into writing.
The seventh Vita nova plan furthers this complex of references to an
unknown whole. It also reinforces the reference to Pascal:
{Lisant Pascal} Envie de: Faire comme si je devais écrire ma grande œuvre
(Somme) – mais Apologie de quoi? Là est la question! En tout cas pas de
‘moi’! – et qu’il n’en restât que des ruines ou linéaments, ou parties erratiques
(comme le pied peint par Porbus): des Fragments d’inégale longueur, (ni
aphorismes, ni dissertations).
Michel Contat, discussing the plans, guessed that the ‘Apologie’ might
be for literature: ‘Il se serait agi, en somme, pour Barthes de produire un
livre (une série de livres?) qui unisse et dépasse les ambitions de Pascal et
de Mallarmé, une apologie pour la littérature, faite de fragments’.68 This
is a tempting idea, and could be supported by the very frequent excuses
given for the use, in La Préparation du roman, of words that Barthes says
are regarded as ‘exécrables’, ‘démodés’, ‘mauvais’ etc.; ‘littérature’ is one
of them (2 December 1978; oral).69 However, it seems clear from a
reading of the plans that Barthes has no ideas regarding the content of
the ‘Apologie’ – ‘Apologie de quoi?’ In L’Œuvre comme volonté, Barthes
often reminds us that the fantasy of the work is the fantasy of a form.
‘Ce n’est […] aucun contenu, aucun thème qu’au départ je fantasme et
“visionne:” […] c’est une surface’ (PR, 5 January 1980, 241). He points
out that the cours is concerned with the material practice of writing, and
that within this remit, the question of content is peripheral: ‘Or le
“contenu” (le sujet, la quaestio) n’est sans doute pas, ou n’est pas d’abord
une catégorie poétique (poïétique: du “Faire”), c’est une catégorie
“Meta”: catégorie de critiques, de professeurs, de théoriciens’ (239). It
can be deduced from this that the question of what the Apologie (corre-
sponding to the Livre or whole) would be for is incidental. The focus is
on the fragments of it that are visible, ‘des ruines ou linéaments, ou parties
erratiques’.
The reference to Balzac’s short story, ‘Le Chef-d’œuvre inconnu’,
implies that the whole is dim and formless. Marty’s footnote to the
seventh Vita Nova plan corrects Barthes’s error in attributing the painted
foot to Porbus rather than to Frenhofer. Marty then reminds us that the
confused, meaningless ‘masterpiece’ produced by the deluded Frenhofer
was a ‘chaos’, an ‘espèce de brouillard sans forme’. It was only the foot
itself, ‘ce fragment échappé à une incroyable, à une lente et progressive
destruction’, which was recognisable – perfect, in fact: ‘un pied délicieux,
un pied vivant!’70 Interestingly, Barthes the amateur painter seems to
encounter some of the same problems as Frenhofer: a fragment entitled
‘Le cercle des fragments’ in Roland Barthes echoes the Balzac story in
referring to Barthes’s inability, in painting as well as in writing, to
produce anything other than fragments. Barthes describes his own
attempts to train himself into being a proper draughtsman in his painting:
‘N’ayant pratiqué en peinture que des barbouillages tachistes, je décide
de commencer un apprentissage régulier et patient du dessin; j’essaye de
copier une composition persane du XVIIe siècle (“Seigneur à la chasse”)’
(RB, 670). But as he continues, he finds that ‘irrésistiblement, au lieu de

chercher à représenter les proportions, l’organisation, la structure, je
copie et j’enchaîne naïvement détail par détail’, such that a bizarre picture
is constructed:
Des ‘arrivées’ inattendues: la jambe du cavalier se retrouve perchée tout en
haut du poitrail du cheval, etc. […] J’ai le goût préalable (premier) du détail,
du fragment, du rush, et l’inhabilité à le conduire vers une ‘composition’: je
ne sais pas reproduire ‘les masses’. (RB, 671)
Speaking in L’Œuvre comme volonté of how sometimes the fantasy

of the work can block the actual achievement of that work, Barthes refers
again to the Balzac story. The fantasy, he says, allows us to glimpse ‘des
aspects, des inflexions’ of the fantasised work – but these unreal visions
prevent us, perhaps due to the burden of disappointment they will entail
when reality does not match up to the fantasy, from attaining ‘une œuvre
réelle’. This was the case for Frenhofer:
<Dans la nouvelle de Balzac, Le Chef-d’œuvre inconnu, où du chef-d’œuvre
l’artiste qui le fait n’a pu produire que – alors parfaitement rendu, dessiné,
peint – le pied du personnage. Ça il n’a pu le produire. Mais [le pied] est
parfait. Mais il ne peut pas produire l’œuvre dans son entier, n’est-ce pas.
Et quand il essaie d’en rajouter, d’arriver toujours à une perfection tout
grande, qu’est-ce qu’il produit? – un entrelacs de, de lignes et de –
indéchiffrables – enfin, il produit, disons, un tableau abstrait>. (12 January
1980, oral; my emphasis)
The Barthes of La Préparation du roman and Vita Nova resembles

Frenhofer in certain respects. The theory of the poikilos or romantic work
adumbrated in the sixth and seventh Vita Nova sketches and cited as the
origin of the Préparation’s fantasy is manifestly unwritable. It relies for
its articulation on the positing of a suppositional whole towards which
it can gesture, just as the Album is defined against the Livre. It resembles
the Romantic and Nietzschean writing that Barthes admires, in that it is
always in the state of ‘becoming’. This is merely another way of saying
that it cannot be achieved, and was not intended to be. Within the Vita
Nova plans themselves exists the declaration of their abandonment. The
seventh plan concludes with the declaration that ‘[t]out ceci voudrait dire
qu’on abandonne l’enfantillage du Récit Vita Nova: ces efforts de
grenouille qui veut se faire aussi grosse…’ L’Œuvre comme volonté ends
with a ‘suspension’ (rather than a conclusion), and Barthes declaring that
‘[h]élas, en ce qui me concerne, […] je ne puis sortir aucune Œuvre de
mon chapeau, et de toute évidence sûrement pas ce Roman dont j’ai voulu
analyser la Préparation’ (PR, 23 February 1980, 377). As Knight puts it,
these declarations of abandonment ‘may well reflect the reality of Barthes

laying aside [the] projects, but […] may also, in some sense, belong inside
th[ose] project[s]’.71 There was never a ‘roman’ at stake in either La
Préparation du roman or Vita Nova. But this does not diminish the
importance, for Barthes or for his readers, of the postulation of that work
and of the heuristic reaching towards an elsewhere of writing that that
postulation involves. The question of whether Barthes would have ‘made
the leap’ into the work has become irrelevant. Instead, what is certain is
that the temptation of the continuous, felt by Barthes, is ultimately not
as strong as the fragment. Similarly, he feels that the Album is inevitably
more fertile and durable than the Livre: ‘C’est lui qui reste’ (PR, 12
January 1980, 256). The fragment is at the vanishing point, as it was for
the Jena group: ‘Écriture de vie = plus l’écriture et la vie se fragmentent
(ne cherchent pas à s’unifier abusivement), plus chaque fragment est
homogène; ainsi se retrouve à l’horizon le poikilos du Roman
Romantique’ (PR, 19 January 1980, 279). All the reasons that Barthes
cites in order to show that the ‘roman’ is unfeasible for him are
essentially ‘autant de manœuvres dilatoires’72 employed in order to illu-
minate and justify his anti-systematic method. This method is inherently
Romantic in its revelation of Barthes’s conception of literature as the site
of a privileged relationship to the infinite. In making this conception
central to the final two years of his lecturing, Barthes seeks on one level
to make his listeners privy to the difficulties he is undergoing in his search
after his mother’s death to attain a new form which could express the
‘vérité’ of his emotions. But more profoundly than this, Barthes wants
his listeners to understand, as Schlegel did, that interpretation can never
‘establish a final meaning that would close the book and relegate it to the
past’. Rather, interpretation and writing constitute an ‘infinite task of
deciphering that relates the text to the future of the world and keeps it
alive’.73
All of the issues discussed here concerning the postulation of a work,
the opposition of a totality to its realisable, atomised parts, the necessity
for ‘émiettement’ of both the world and of writing, and the final and
calculated non-completion of the project, are succinctly covered in
Blanchot’s summary of the Jena group’s thinking on the possibility of a
‘livre total’. For, as Blanchot shows, the Romantics, like Barthes, practise
an art ‘qui concentre la vérité créatrice dans la liberté du sujet’. Within
this apparent reduction, they form ‘l’ambition d’un livre total, sorte de
Bible en perpétuelle croissance’. This fantasised book is, of course, the
‘roman’, and it exists in no final form: ‘ce roman total, que la plupart des
romantiques se contenteront de rêver à la manière d’une fable […],
Novalis seul l’entreprendra’. Barthes, like Novalis, realises that ‘la seule
manière de l’accomplir eût été d’inventer un art nouveau, celui du
fragment’:
C’est là […] l’un des pressentiments les plus hardis du romantisme: la
recherche d’une forme nouvelle d’accomplissement qui mobilise – rende
mobile – le tout en l’interrompant et par les divers modes d’interruption.
Cette exigence d’une parole fragmentaire [ne veut pas] gêner la
communication, mais […] la rendre absolue.74
Thus Novalis, and Barthes, hit upon a tension which has the capacity to
be perpetually productive, and which embodies the protean and proces-
sual nature of communication itself.
Notes

2 Éric Marty has remarked that the haiku is ‘une sorte d’horizon
phénoménologique du roman’ for Barthes. Finkielkraut, ‘Barthes et le roman’,
p. 223.
3 De Obaldia, The Essayistic Spirit, p. 145.
4 ‘Le Chant romantique’ in Le Monde, 24 March 1977, OC, V, 303–10 (p. 307).
5 Claude Coste, ‘Vita Nova: notes pour un roman de Roland Barthes’, in Christine
Andreucci et al., eds., L’Œuvre inachevée: actes du Colloque de l’Université de
Pau, 12–14 novembre 1998 (Pau: Presses universitaires de Pau, 1999), pp.
113–23 (p. 113).
6 C, 347–69.
7 Andrew Brown, Roland Barthes: The Figures of Writing (Oxford: Clarendon,
1992), p. 284.
8 In their preface to the edited collection Barthes, au lieu du roman (Paris:
Desjonquères/Nota Bene, 2002), Marielle Macé and Alexandre Gefen describe
the collection as a possible extra chapter added to Barthes’s ‘roman théorique’
(p. 10), and refer to ‘Barthes romancier’ (p. 11).
9 Both French and Anglo-American critics refer to La Chambre claire as Barthes’s
‘roman’: see for example Lavers, Roland Barthes, p. 314, and Michel Contat,
‘Roland Barthes au seuil d’une vie nouvelle’, Le Monde, 24 November 1999, p.
iii.
10 Alec McHoul and David Wills, ‘Bar S B R H S Barthes the Late(r) Barthes
Constituting Fragmenting Subjects’, Boundary 2, 14.1/2 (1985–86): 261–78 (p.
275).
11 Deleuze, Nietzsche et la philosophie, p. 26.
12 Kris Pint discusses at length Barthes’s ideas regarding the reader’s identification
with the text in The Perverse Art of Reading.
13 Radical Indecision, p. 147.
14 There is certainly a sense in which the entirety of De la vie à l’œuvre can be
viewed as an exhaustive extension of the ‘Longtemps’ lecture. In L’Œuvre comme
volonté, Barthes describes the first course as being based on the desire, articu-
lated in ‘Longtemps’, to ‘rend[re] justice aux autres, […] créer l’Autre’ (PR, 226).
15 Cf. the section on names in Comment vivre ensemble: ‘L’appellation caritatique
apparaît comme une contre-nomination: je retire les noms de la généralité de la
langue. […] Je nie dans la langue tout ce qui n’est pas objet d’amour: je détruis
la langue, j’en fais une vaste ruine, où il ne reste debout que quelques noms
d’amour’ (23 March, 143).
16 Philippe Roger, ‘Caritas Incarnate: A Tale of Love and Loss’, in Back to Barthes:
Twenty Years After, special issue of Yale Journal of Criticism, 14.2 (2001):
527–33 (p. 530).
17 See the discussion in Ch. 2 above.
18 ‘Délibération’ was published in Winter 1979. OC, V, 668–81.
19 David Simpson, The Academic Postmodern and the Rule of Literature: A Report
on Half-Knowledge (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), pp. 136–37.
20 See PR, 27: the change of form is vital if he is not to stay permanently trapped
in the repetition of his former, successful work: ‘Quoi? Quand j’aurai fini ce
texte, ce cours, il n’y aura qu’à en recommencer un autre? – Non, Sisyphe n’est
pas heureux: il est aliéné…’.
21 Barthes explains the etymology of the Greek word poikilos: ‘racine pingo
[peindre], broder avec des fils différents, tatouer; cf. pigmentum > indo-européen
peik, orner, soit en écrivant, soit en étendant de la couleur ¡ le poikilos du roman
= un hétérogène, un hétérologique de Vrai et de Faux’ (PR, 161).
22 See Blanchot’s Le Livre à venir (Paris: Gallimard, 1959) and especially
L’Entretien infini (1969), in which he discusses, among other writers of the frag-
ment, René Char, Heraclitus and Nietzsche.
23 L’Entretien infini, p. 518. See also p. 523: ‘La poésie, en devenant tout, a donc
aussi tout perdu’.
24 Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy, L’Absolu littéraire: Théorie de
la littérature du romantisme allemand (Paris: Seuil, 1978).
25 The Athanaeum journal, run by Novalis and the Schlegel brothers, was published
from 1798 to 1800. Contributors included Friedrich Schleiermacher, Dorothea
Schlegel and Caroline Schelling (then Caroline Schlegel).
26 Cf. Barthes’s statement in a text for Libération on romantic small ads in 1979:
‘Les PA de Libé sont bien, dans la mesure où si on les lit justement comme ça
d’affilée […], on a l’impression de lire vraiment une sorte de roman éclaté et ça
c’est très moderne puisque, aujourd’hui, il y a un besoin de faire éclater le roman,
de faire éclater le genre, en touches, en départ d’incidents, en départ d’aventures’
(‘Mes petites annonces’, OC, V, 771).
27 L’Absolu littéraire, p. 17.
29 Friedrich Schlegel’s ‘Lucinde’ and the Fragments, trans. and intro. Peter Firchow
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1971), p. 154, §103.
30 Ernst Behler, German Romantic Literary Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1993), p. 153.
31 Schlegel, ‘Lucinde’ and the Fragments, p. 175.
32 ‘Lucinde’ and the Fragments, p. 175, my emphasis.
33 Firchow, Introduction to ‘Lucinde’ and the Fragments, p. 39.
34 L’Entretien infini, p. 522.
36 L’Absolu littéraire, sleevenotes.
37 Philip Barnard and Cheryl Lester, ‘Translators’ Introduction: The Presentation
of Romantic Literature’, in L’Absolu littéraire, pp. vii–xx (p. xii).
38 Barnard and Lester, ‘Translators’ Introduction’, p. xvi.
39 Introduction to ‘Lucinde’ and the Fragments, p. 18.
40 Behler, German Romantic Literary Theory, p. 300.
41 Since then, Vita Nova has been republished in the fifth volume of the new Œuvres
Complètes (2002), accompanied by additional editorial footnotes and discussed
in a new preface by Éric Marty. It has been reproduced in facsimile and trans-
lated in the English translation of La Préparation du roman, The Preparation of
the Novel: Lecture Courses and Seminars at the Collège de France 1978–1979
and 1979–1980), trans. Kate Briggs (New York: Columbia University Press,
2011), pp. 389–406.
42 Contat, ‘Roland Barthes au seuil d’une vie nouvelle’.
43 Coste, ‘Vita Nova: notes pour un roman de Roland Barthes’.
44 Comment, Roland Barthes, pp. 206–18. Comment uses Barthes’s own argu-
ments from the Cours regarding his incapacity to invent a narrative.
45 Antoine Compagnon, ‘Le Roman de Roland Barthes’, La Revue des sciences
humaines, 266–267 (2002): 203–31 (p. 220).
46 Compagnon, ‘Le Roman de Roland Barthes’, p. 231.
47 Compagnon, ‘Le Roman de Roland Barthes’, p. 206.
48 Diana Knight, ‘Idle Thoughts: Barthes’s Vita Nova’, in Roland Barthes, ed.
Diana Knight, special issue of Nottingham French Studies, 36.1 (1997): 88–98.
49 Knight, ‘Idle Thoughts’, p. 91.
50 Barthes and Jean Montalbetti, ‘Un Homme, une ville’, Cassettes Radio France,
3 episodes (Paris: 1978). Cited in Knight, ‘Idle Thoughts’, p. 91.
53 ‘Délibération’ (1979) uses diary entries made by Barthes at Urt and Paris in
summer 1977, plus one from April 1979, and bookends them with reflections
on the form. Soirées de Paris was published posthumously in Incidents (1987)
(OC, V, 977–93).
54 In section 3 of the first part of The Art of Rhetoric (ed. and trans. H.C. Lawson-
Tancred (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1991), pp. 83–103) Aristotle defines three
types of rhetoric: deliberative, forensic and epideictic. The goal of deliberative
rhetoric is to either persuade or dissuade the hearer, with relation to political
and/or ethical action. Deliberative rhetoric is geared towards future actions and
their outcomes, whether positive or negative.
55 Knight, ‘Idle Thoughts’, pp. 97–98. Mallarmé’s letter to Verlaine is entitled
‘Autobiographie’ and dates from 16 November 1885. In Mallarmé, Œuvres
complètes, ed. Henri Mondor and G. Jean-Aubry (Paris: Gallimard, 1945), pp.
661–65.
56 ‘On échoue toujours à parler de ce qu’on aime’, Tel Quel, Autumn 1980. OC,
V, 906–14 (p. 914).
57 Barthes’s understanding of Mallarmé and this issue is drawn from his reading of
Jacques Scherer’s Le ‘Livre’ de Mallarmé (Paris: Gallimard, 1957).
58 Mallarmé, ‘Autobiographie’, pp. 662–63.
59 Cf. ‘Délibération’: ‘Le livre, “architectural et prémédité”, est censé reproduire
un ordre du monde, il implique toujours, me semble-t-il, une philosophie
moniste’ (678).
60 Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, L’Absolu littéraire, p. 70.
61 All references to Vita Nova’s sixth and seventh plans will be to the facsimiles of
them as they appear on pages 1015 and 1016–17 respectively of OC, V. From
here on, no page references to these plans will be given. Indications will be given
as to which of the plans is under discussion.
62 Knight, ‘Idle Thoughts’, passim, especially p. 92.
63 See Knight, ‘Idle Thoughts’, pp. 92–97 for a sustained discussion of these themes.
64 ‘Idle Thoughts’, p. 92.
65 François Wahl included this note in a footnote to his preface to Incidents (Paris:
Seuil, 1987, p. 9): ‘Arrêté ici (22 sept. 79) les Vaines Soirées. 1) Pour ne pas
perdre de temps et liquider au plus vite la préparation des Cours. 2) Pour vérifier
mes notes – et désormais tout écrire sur des fiches’.

66 Marty, ‘Présentation’, in Barthes, OC, V, 9–22 (p. 21).
67 ‘Roland Barthes s’explique’, interview with Pierre Boncenne for Lire, April 1979.
OC, V, 744–57 (p. 750).
68 Contat, ‘Roland Barthes au seuil d’une vie nouvelle’.
69 See for example 10 March 1979, oral: <Une notion pour laquelle,
malheureusement, il n’y a qu’un mot absolument déjeté, mais c’est comme ça
dans nos civilisations – les choses importantes ne peuvent se dire que par des
mots démodés – finalement, je le crois de plus en plus – et ce mot, ça serait la
pitié. C’est un très mauvais mot – qui oserait aujourd’hui, notamment dans un
journal, parler de ‘pitié’?>
70 Honoré de Balzac, ‘Le Chef-d’Œuvre inconnu’, in Georges Didi-Huberman, La
Peinture incarnée, suivi de Le Chef-d’Œuvre inconnu par Honoré de Balzac
(Paris: Minuit, 1985), pp. 133–56 (p. 154).
71 ‘Idle Thoughts’, p. 93.
72 Philippe Roger, Roland Barthes, roman (Paris: Grasset, 1986), p. 338.
73 Behler, German Romantic Literary Theory, p. 282.
74 Blanchot, L’Entretien infini, p. 525.
Afterword
At the opening of L’Entretien infini, Maurice Blanchot points out that
Nietzsche’s fragmentary approach to writing is inconsistent with the
requirements of the academy, which demands that research be presented
in a continuous and developmental form. ‘Nietzsche […] fut professeur’,
writes Blanchot,
[mais] il dut renoncer à l’être et pour diverses raisons, dont l’une est
révélatrice: comment sa pensée voyageuse qui s’accomplit par fragments,
c’est-à-dire par affirmations séparées et exigeant la séparation, comment
Ainsi parlait Zarathoustra auraient-ils pu prendre place dans l’enseignement
et s’accorder avec les nécessités de la parole universitaire?1
The questions asked here of Nietzsche could equally be asked of Barthes.

Nietzsche is an archetypal figure for Barthes in terms of both philosophy
and poetics, because of his perspectivist approach to knowledge and his
anti-systematic employment of the fragment. But unlike Nietzsche,
Barthes ultimately enters into a successful negotiation with the academy.
Barthes’s ‘pensée voyageuse’ managed to furnish a fruitful pedagogy
without abandoning the ‘exigence fragmentaire’2 which for Barthes is not
only a formal but also an ethical issue.
Barthes’s lecturing style is inflected by the ethos of the Collège de
France, an institution which favours the teaching of ‘la science en voie
de se faire’. The process-based approach to knowledge implied by such
an ethos is used by Barthes as the basis for his own non-teleological
teaching. Added to this is Barthes’s self-definition, in his inaugural
lecture, as an essayist. Many of the essay’s attributes are embodied in
Barthes’s lectures: scepticism, an opposition to systems whether rhetor-
ical or ideological, and a conviction that the act of criticism cannot take
place without self-criticism. Barthes exploits his perception of the ‘uncer-
tainty’ of the essay form in order to propose a digressive and pan-generic
organisation of his material. The only sense of certainty comes from his
refusal of dogmatic, ‘certain’ ideological discourses. Thus Barthes’s
teaching unfurls, as he said that the text of La Chambre claire did, from
‘la seule chose sûre qui fût en moi (si naïve fût-elle): la résistance éperdue
à tout système réducteur’ (CC, 794).
200
Afterword 201
The fundamental preoccupation that links each of Barthes’s four

lecture courses at the Collège de France to each other and to Barthes’s
concurrent published work is the concern with fragmentation and diva-
gatory exposition. La Préparation du roman reveals, within a discourse
upon continuous, lengthy narrative forms, Barthes’s adherence to the
relativised ‘vérité’ of short and fragmentary forms. These lectures, in their
‘preparation’ for a novel that is not to be written, proceed through a
prospective method of endless deferral. Comment vivre ensemble and Le
Neutre also suspend any possible resolution to their exploration of social
and ethical ideals. Barthes views the method that he employs in those
lecture courses as constituting perhaps the most vital aspect of his
teaching: ‘Quoi que je choisisse comme “sujet” […], la pratique digres-
sive, le droit à la digression. […] L’indirect sera là, qui est d’ordre éthique’
(CVE, 184). Barthes’s lecturing methodology and the aesthetic fantasy
of the Préparation are extensions of the anti-dogmatic, anti-systematic
goals of his entire œuvre. The clearest rationale for Barthes’s ethics and
aesthetics of the fragment, both before and after his accession to the
Collège de France, is found in Leçon, where Barthes explains that he is
impelled to try to attenuate (‘alléger’) the power inherent in language: ‘je
me persuade de plus en plus, soit en écrivant, soit en enseignant, que
l’opération fondamentale de cette méthode de déprise, c’est, si l’on écrit,
la fragmentation, et, si l’on expose, la digression’ (L, 42).
As Montaigne did, Barthes opposes a discourse of personal experi-
ence and taste to authoritative and objective knowledge. His particularity
is set out tactically, in order to demonstrate that a ‘universal particular’
is attainable. Barthes accomplishes this to extraordinary effect in La
Chambre claire. The study of photography turns around the incompa-
rable, banal twin fulcrum of love and death – what everyone experiences,
and yet also what only I feel in relation to this (this death, this beloved
person, this sadness, this photograph; my own future death). Barthes can
only do justice to the grief evoked by photographs by combining ‘deux
voix: celle de la banalité (dire ce que tout le monde voit et sait) et celle
de la singularité (renflouer cette banalité de tout l’élan d’une émotion qui
n’appartenait qu’à moi)’ (CC, 851).
Thus the false generality of traditional, authoritarian criticism and
pedagogy is lost, but only to be refound again at another level – that of
the universal particular. Parataxis and fragmentation are pre-eminent for
Barthes, but he remains determined nonetheless to gesture towards the
possibility of a full, transcendent knowledge – even if that knowledge can
no longer be fully attained. This determination can be inferred from his
use of what he calls ‘le geste encyclopédique’ (CVE, 182) to inform the
methodology of Comment vivre ensemble and Le Neutre. In La

Préparation du roman, the relationship between the ‘Album’ and the
‘Livre’ embodies the same tension. The minimalism of the haiku is part
of the same problematic as the maximalist ‘grande œuvre’. The fanta-
sised ‘roman’ of La Préparation du roman is a fragmented, poikilos,
pan-generic work. This aesthetic ideal is an ideal of formal fusion, in
which the ‘œuvre’ oscillates (in conceptual terms) between simplicity and
complexity, between the ‘Album’ and the ‘Livre’, between aesthetic
discourse and critical discourse, between the fragment and totality. As
was the case for the German Romantics, this fantasy is unrealisable, but
potent in its revelation of the view of literature as a system of total repre-
sentation.
This is the crux of aesthetic discourse itself: the tension between
atomised individual significance, and the possibility of general meaning
or the sensus communis aestheticus. For Barthes as for Kant, the natural
world has an important role to play. How does one organise one’s sense
of being in the world, and how could the negative aspects of that world
be imagined otherwise? This is a central question in the Cours, especially
in Comment vivre ensemble and Le Neutre. As Pierre Hadot would put
it, this is a philosophical act which is situtated ‘pas seulement dans l’ordre
de la connaissance, mais dans l’ordre du “soi” et de l’être’.3 Barthes’s
interrogation of subjectivity using the device of the fantasme is a reflec-
tion on our capacities to think the world differently. This relates to our
own nature, and to our surroundings. Barthes’s interest in the infinite,
‘delicate’ detail of life grounds his fantasy of an existence anchored by
affective links but free of the coercion of discourse, and of language which
institutes barriers between us and our environment. Guided by Japanese
aesthetics, Barthes realises that satori is not the revelation of any mystical
truth. Rather it is a full acceptance of the unity of the subject with his or
her environment, and of the ‘intraitable’ of the world: ‘la brillance et la
souffrance du monde, ce qui, en lui, me séduit et m’indigne’ (‘Longtemps’,
470). Barthes provides an account of his own ‘sorte de Satori’ (PR, 32)
at the opening of La Préparation du roman I: the fantasy of fusion with
one’s environment is for Barthes linked to the creative fantasy of the unifi-
cation of his pedagogical and writerly goals.
Barthes’s fantasmes are expansive, dispersive, non-oppressive. In
their contingency we find our own. But they are regulated too, by delib-
eration, self-criticism, scepticism. In this double articulation is the
instructiveness of Barthes’s teaching – magisterial, in skill as in form, but
laced with interstices. There is space for reflection, for Barthes’s subjec-
tivity, for our own, and for uncertainty.
Afterword 203
The assessment of Barthes’s pedagogy presented in this study repre-

sents an early stage of what will undoubtedly become an ongoing
recalibration of Barthes’s legacy, given that material from a selection of
Barthes’s seminars at the École pratique des hautes études is also being
published. There is much work to be done in this area, and, though there
are statutory similarities between the EPHE and the Collège de France,
there are clearly some institutional and formal issues unique to the EPHE
which will deserve analysis. There is a crucial difference, however,
between the Collège de France publications and the existent and forth-
coming EPHE material. The ‘Sarrasine’ seminars, the ‘Roland Barthes’
seminars and the ‘discours amoureux’ seminars each fed into the
construction of a book by Barthes (S/Z, Roland Barthes par Roland
Barthes and Fragments d’un discours amoureux respectively). For this
reason, the material presented in the EPHE publications will primarily
be of interest to genetic critics. However, the Collège de France lectures
led ultimately to no book – and this is not merely because Barthes died
before such a textual transformation could be undertaken. The lectures
constitute an end in themselves, as the compagnon de route of his concur-
rent work and concerns. ‘Le Cours et le Travail’, as Barthes says at the
opening of La Préparation du roman I, are invested in ‘la même
entreprise’ in order to ‘faire cesser la division du sujet, au profit d’un seul
Projet, le Grand Projet: image de joie’ (PR, 32). We must recognise the
importance here of the term ‘projet’. At the Collège de France, Barthes
teaches a way of reading and a way of living, and imagines a way of
writing. Throughout, the most important focus is on activity rather than
on product. Critical, interpretive, poietic and affective activity – on
Barthes’s part and on his listeners’ – is ongoing, and by definition cannot
be completed. Barthes sees this endeavour as furnishing an instructive
‘mathesis singularis’ (CC, 795). On the uncertainty of this singularity is
founded the recognisability of this mathesis: ‘C’est ça!’ (CC, 876) we cry,
as we see the universal particular. This is Barthes’s achievement at the
Collège de France, where he unifies the goals of his teaching and his
writing, and the formal and ethical imperatives dictated to him by the
circumstances of his own life, into a hopeful project.
Notes

Appendix
List of Roland Barthes’s Seminars and
Lecture Courses at the École pratique
des hautes études and the Collège de France
École pratique des hautes études, VIe Section (Sciences économiques et
sociales). Roland Barthes, Directeur d’Études (Sociologie des signes,
symboles et représentations)
1963 Inventaire des systèmes contemporains de signification: systèmes

d’objets (vêtements, nourriture, logement)
1964 Inventaire des systèmes de signification contemporains
1965 Recherches sur la rhétorique
1966 Recherches sur la rhétorique (suite)
1967 Recherches sur le discours de l’Histoire
1968 Analyse structurale d’un texte narratif: ‘Sarrasine’ de Balzac
1969 Analyse structurale d’un texte narratif: ‘Sarrasine’ de Balzac
1971 La notion d’idiolecte: premières questions, premières recherches
1972 Dix ans de sémiologie (1961–1971). La théorie du texte
1973 Les problèmes de la thèse et de la recherche – La notion de
modernité – Analyse de ‘Rapport sur un cas de paranoïa allant à
l’encontre de la théorie psychanalytique’
1974 Etude des problèmes relatifs à la constitution d’un lexique
d’auteur (idiolecte) – Travail collectif sur la biographie – La voix
1975 Le discours amoureux
1976 Le discours amoureux (suite): les intimidations de langage
1977 Les problèmes d’interprétation dans l’opéra – Le problème des
ratures du texte écrit
205
Collège de France. Roland Barthes, Chaire de sémiologie littéraire
1977 Cours: Comment vivre ensemble: simulations romanesques de

quelques espaces quotidiens.
Séminaire: Qu’est-ce que tenir un discours? Recherche sur la
parole investie.
1978 Cours: Le Neutre.
1978–79 Cours: La Préparation du roman I: de la vie à l’œuvre.
Séminaire: La métaphore du labyrinthe: recherches
interdisciplinaires
1979–80 Cours: La Préparation du roman II: l’œuvre comme volonté.
Séminaire: Proust et la photographie: examen d’un fonds
d’archives photographiques mal connu
Bibliography
Works by Roland Barthes
Below are listed the works by Barthes that have been cited in this book: it is
not an exhaustive list. Texts are listed chronologically by date of first publi-
cation. Essays collected in longer texts have not been separately listed; details
and page extents for these can be found in the notes.
Le Degré zéro de l’écriture (Paris: Seuil, 1953)

Michelet (Paris: Seuil, 1954)
Mythologies (Paris: Seuil, 1957)
Sur Racine (Paris: Seuil, 1963)
Essais critiques (Paris: Seuil, 1964)
L’Empire des signes (Geneva: Skira, 1970)
S/Z (Paris: Seuil, 1970)
Sade, Fourier, Loyola (Paris: Seuil, 1971)
Le Plaisir du texte (Paris: Seuil, 1973)
Roland Barthes par Roland Barthes (Paris: Seuil, 1975)
Fragments d’un discours amoureux (Paris: Seuil, 1977)
Leçon (Paris: Seuil, 1978)
La Chambre claire: note sur la photographie (Paris: Gallimard/Seuil, 1980)
Le Bruissement de la langue: essais critiques IV, ed. François Wahl (Paris:
Seuil, 1984)
Incidents, ed. François Wahl (Paris: Seuil, 1987)
‘Travaux et projets’, in Nathalie Léger (ed.), Roland Barthes au Collège de
France 1977–1980 (Paris: IMEC, 2002), pp. 95–101
Comment vivre ensemble: simulations romanesques de quelques espaces
quotidiens. Notes de cours et de séminaires au Collège de France,
1976–77, ed. Claude Coste (Paris: Seuil/IMEC, 2002)
Comment vivre ensemble: simulations romanesques de quelques espaces
quotidiens. Cours au Collège de France, 1976–77. CD MP3 (Paris:
Sonopress/Seuil)
Le Neutre. Notes de cours au Collège de France 1977–1978, ed. Thomas
Clerc (Paris: Seuil/IMEC, 2002)
Le Neutre. Cours au Collège de France 1977–1978. CD MP3 (x 2) (Paris:
207
Sonopress/Seuil, 2002)
Œuvres complètes, ed. Éric Marty, 5 vols. (Paris: Seuil, 2002)
La Préparation du roman I et II. Notes de cours et de séminaires au Collège
de France 1978–1979 et 1979–1980, ed. Nathalie Léger (Paris:
Seuil/IMEC, 2003)
La Préparation du roman I et II. Cours au Collège de France 1978–1980.
CD MP3 (x 2) (Paris: Sonopress/Seuil, 2003)
L’Empire des signes (Paris: Seuil, 2005) [NB: this edition contains fewer
images than the Skira edition]
The Neutral: Lecture Course at the Collège de France (1977–1978), trans.
Rosalind E. Krauss and Denis Hollier (New York: Columbia University
Press, 2005)
Le discours amoureux: Séminaire à l’École pratique des hautes études
1974–1976 suivi de Fragments d’un discours amoureux: inédits, ed.
Claude Coste (Paris: Seuil, 2007)
Journal de deuil: 26 octobre 1977–15 septembre 1979, ed. Nathalie Léger
(Paris: Seuil/IMEC, 2009)
Carnets du voyage en chine, ed. Anne Herschberg Pierrot (Paris: Christian
Bourgois/IMEC, 2009
Le Lexique de l’auteur: Séminaire à l’École pratique des hautes études
1973–1974, Suivi de fragments inédits du Roland Barthes par Roland
Barthes, ed. Anne Herschberg Pierrot (Paris: Seuil, 2010)
The Preparation of the Novel: Lecture Courses and Seminars at the Collège
de France (1978–1979 and 1979–1980), trans. Kate Briggs (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2011)
Sarrasine de Balzac: Séminaires à l’École pratique des hautes études
1967–1968 et 1968–1969, ed. Claude Coste and Andy Stafford (Paris:
Seuil, 2011)
Other References
Adorno, Theodor W., Minima Moralia: Reflections from Damaged Life,

trans. E.F.N. Jephcott (London: Verso, 1978)
–––––– Negative Dialectics, trans. E.B. Ashton (London: Routledge, 1990)
–––––– ‘The Essay as Form’, in Notes to Literature: Volume One, ed. Rolf
Tiedemann, trans. Shierry Weber Nicholsen (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1991), pp. 3–23
Agamben, Giorgio, The Coming Community, trans. Michael Hardt
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993)
Alphant, Marianne, and Nathalie Léger, R/B: Exposition présentée au
Centre Pompidou, Galerie 2, 27 novembre 2002–10 mars 2003 (Paris:
Seuil/Centre Pompidou/IMEC, 2002)
Andreucci, Christine, et al., eds., L’Œuvre inachevée: Actes du Colloque de
Bibliography 209
l’Université de Pau 12–14 novembre 1998 (Pau: Presses universitaires de

Pau, 1999)
Antonioni, Michelangelo, China [Chung Kuo / Cina] (Radiotelevisiona
Italiana, 1972)
Aristotle, The Art of Rhetoric, ed. and trans. H.C. Lawson-Tancred
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1991)
Badir, Sémir and Dominique Ducard, eds., Roland Barthes en Cours
(1977–1980): Un style de vie (Dijon: Éditions universitaires de Dijon,
2009)
Balzac, Honoré de, ‘Le Chef-d’Œuvre inconnu’, in Georges Didi-Huberman,
La Peinture incarnée, suivi de Le Chef-d’Œuvre inconnu par Honoré de
Balzac (Paris: Minuit, 1985), pp. 133–56
Barnard, Philip, and Cheryl Lester, ‘Translators’ Introduction: The
Presentation of Romantic Literature’, in Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and
Jean-Luc Nancy, The Literary Absolute: The Theory of Literature in
German Romanticism (New York: State University of New York Press,
1988), pp. vii–xx
Behler, Ernst, German Romantic Literary Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1993)
Bellon, Guillaume, L’Inquiétude du discours: Barthes et Foucault au Collège
de France (Grenoble: ELLUG, 2012)
Bensmaïa, Réda, The Barthes Effect: The Essay as Reflective Text, trans. Pat
Fedkiew, foreword by Michèle Richman (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 1987)
Benveniste, Émile, ‘La notion de “rythme” dans son expression linguistique’,
in Problèmes de linguistique générale, 2 vols. (Paris: Gallimard,
1969–74), vol. I, pp. 327–35
–––––– Dernières leçons au Collège de France (1968–1969), ed. Jean-Claude
Coquet and Irène Fenoglio (Paris: EHESS/Gallimard/Seuil, 2012)
Bernstein, J.M., The Fate of Art: Aesthetic Alienation from Kant to Derrida
and Adorno (Oxford: Polity, 1992)
Bett, Richard, Pyrrho, his Antecendents, and his Legacy (Oxford: Oxford
Bident, Christophe, ‘R/M, 1953’, trans. Michael Holland, Paragraph 30.3
(2007): 67–83
Blanchot, Maurice, Le Livre à venir (Paris: Gallimard, 1959)
–––––– L’Entretien infini (Paris: Gallimard, 1969)
–––––– La Communauté inavouable (Paris: Minuit, 1983)
Bourdieu, Pierre, Leçon sur la leçon (Paris: Minuit, 1982)
–––––– Homo academicus (Paris: Minuit, 1984)
–––––– Homo academicus, trans. Peter Collier (Oxford: Polity, 1998)
–––––– Esquisse pour une auto-analyse (Paris: Raisons d’agir, 2004)
Jacques Bouveresse, Prodiges et vertiges de l’analogie: de l’abus des belles-
lettres dans la pensée (Paris: Raisons d’agir, 1999)
Bowie, Andrew, From Romanticism to Critical Theory: The Philosophy of

German Literary Theory (London: Routledge, 1997)
–––––– Aesthetics and Subjectivity: From Kant to Nietzsche (2nd edn)
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003)
Brown, Andrew, Roland Barthes: The Figures of Writing (Oxford:
Clarendon, 1992)
Burke, Peter, Vico (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985)
Burnier, Michel-Antoine, and Patrick Rambaud, Le Roland-Barthes sans
peine (Paris: Balland, 1978)
Cage, John, Pour les oiseaux: entretiens avec Daniel Charles (Paris: Belfond,
1976)
Calvet, Louis-Jean, Roland Barthes 1915–1980 (Paris: Flammarion, 1990)
Chapsal, Madeleine, and Michèle Manceaux, eds., Les Professeurs pour quoi
faire? (Paris: Seuil, 1970)
Charle, Christophe, ‘Le Collège de France’, in Les Lieux de mémoire, ed.
Pierre Nora, 3 vols. (Paris: Gallimard, 1986), vol. II, pp. 389–42
Christofferson, Michael, French Intellectuals Against the Left: The
Antitotalitarian Moment of the 1970s (New York: Berghahn, 2004)
Clark, Terry Nichols, Prophets and Patrons: The French University and the
Emergence of the Social Sciences (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1973)
Claudel, Paul, Œuvres en prose, ed. Jacques Petit and Charles Galpérine
(Paris: Gallimard/Pléiade, 1965)
Comment, Bernard, Roland Barthes, vers le neutre (Paris: Christian
Bourgois, 1991)
Compagnon, Antoine, ed., Prétexte: Roland Barthes: colloque de Cerisy
(Paris: Union générale d’éditions, 1978)
–––––– La Troisième république des lettres: de Flaubert à Proust (Paris: Seuil,
1983)
–––––– ‘Le Roman de Roland Barthes’, La Revue des sciences humaines
266–67 (2002): 203–31
–––––– Les Antimodernes: de Joseph de Maistre à Roland Barthes (Paris:
Gallimard, 2005)
Contat, Michel, ‘Roland Barthes au seuil d’une vie nouvelle’, Le Monde, 24
November 1993, p. iii
Coquio, Catherine, and Régis Salado, eds., Barthes après Barthes: une
actualité en questions: actes du colloque international de Pau, 22–24
novembre 1990 (Pau: Publications de l’Université de Pau, 1993)
Coste, Claude, ‘Vita Nova: notes pour un roman de Roland Barthes’, in
Andreucci et al., eds., pp. 113–23
–––––– ‘Comment vivre ensemble: simulations romanesques de quelques
espaces quotidiens’, in Léger, ed., pp. 35–59
Coyaud, Maurice, Fourmis sans ombre: le livre du haïku (Paris: Phébus,
1978)
Bibliography 211
Croiset, Alfred, ‘Le Collège de France’, in Émile Durkheim, ed., La Vie

universitaire à Paris (Paris: Colin, 1918), pp. 144–60
Critchley, Simon, Very Little…Almost Nothing: Death, Philosophy and
Literature, 2nd edn (London: Routledge, 2004)
Culler, Jonathan, Barthes (London: Fontana, 1983)
–––––– ‘Preparing the Novel: Spiralling Back’, in Pieters and Pint, eds., pp.
109–20
Davidson, Arnold I., ‘Spiritual Exercises and Ancient Philosophy: An
Introduction to Pierre Hadot’, Critical Inquiry 16.3 (1990): 475–82
–––––– ‘Ethics as ascetics’, in The Cambridge Companion to Foucault, ed.
Gary Gutting (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp.
115–40
–––––– ‘Introduction: Pierre Hadot and the Spiritual Phenomenon of Ancient
Philosophy’, in Pierre Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual
Exercises from Socrates to Foucault, trans. Michael Chase (Oxford:
Blackwell, 1995), pp. 1–45
Defoe, Daniel, Robinson Crusoe, ed. and intro. John Richetti (Harmonds-
worth: Penguin, 2001)
Deleuze, Gilles, Nietzsche et la philosophie (Paris: Presses Universitaires de
France, 1962)
Derrida, Jacques, ‘Jean-François Lyotard (1924–1998): Amitié à tout
rompre – Lyotard et nous’, in Chaque fois unique, la fin du monde (Paris:
Galilée, 2003), pp. 255–89
–––––– Séminaire: la bête et le souverain (2001–2003), 2 vols., ed. Michel
Lisse, Marie-Louise Mallet and Ginette Michaud (Paris: Galilée, 2008
and 2010)
de Obaldia, Claire, The Essayistic Spirit: Literature, Modern Criticism, and
the Essay (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995)
de Pourcq, Maarten, ‘“The paideia of the Greeks”: On the Methodology of
Roland Barthes’s Comment vivre ensemble’, in Pieters and Pint, eds., pp.
23–37
Dosse, François, Histoire du structuralisme, 2 vols. (Paris: La Découverte,
1992)
Drake, David, Intellectuals and Politics in Post-War France (Basingstoke:
Palgrave, 2002)
Dumontet, Fabienne, ‘Roland Barthes: fragments d’un discours’, Le Monde,
30 November 2002
Duras, Marguerite, La Maladie de la mort (Paris: Minuit, 1982)
Epictetus, Discourses and Selected Writings, trans. Robert Dobbin
Eribon, Didier, Michel Foucault (1926–1984) (Paris: Flammarion, 1991)
ffrench, Patrick, The Time of Theory: A History of Tel Quel 1960–1983
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1995)
–––––– ‘Michel Foucault: Life as a Work of Art’, in Michael Sheringham and
Johnnie Gratton, eds., The Art of the Project: Projects and Experiments
in Modern French Culture (New York: Berghahn, 2005), pp. 204–18
–––––– ‘How to Live with Roland Barthes’, SubStance 38.3 (2009): 113–24
Finkielkraut, Alain, ‘Barthes et le roman’, interview with Éric Marty and
Antoine Compagnon, in Ce que peut la littérature, ed. Alain Finkielkraut
(Paris: Stock/Panama, 2006), pp. 217–40
Forest, Philippe, Histoire de Tel Quel 1960–1982 (Paris: Seuil, 1995)
Forsdick, Charles, ‘(In)connaissance de l’Asie: Barthes and Bouvier, China
and Japan’, Modern and Contemporary France, 14.1 (2006): 63–77
Foucault, Michel, Les Mots et les choses (Paris: Gallimard, 1966)
–––––– Histoire de la sexualité III: le souci de soi (Paris: Gallimard, 1984)
–––––– ‘Il faut défendre la société’: cours au Collège de France (1975–1976),
ed. Mauro Bertani and Alessandro Fontana (Paris: Seuil/Gallimard,
1997)
–––––– L’Herméneutique du sujet: cours au Collège de France (1981–1982),
ed. Frédéric Gros (Paris: Seuil/Gallimard, 2001)
Freud, Sigmund, Un Souvenir d’enfance de Léonard de Vinci, trans. Marie
Bonaparte (Paris: Gallimard, 1927)
Gane, Mike, and Nicholas Gane, eds., Roland Barthes, 3 vols. (London:
Sage, 2004)
Genette, Gérard, Seuils (Paris: Seuil, 1987)
Gide, André, La Séquestrée de Poitiers (Paris: Gallimard, 1977)
Glucksmann, André, ‘Le Marxisme rend sourd’, Le Nouvel Observateur 484
(4 March 1974), 80
–––––– La Cuisinière et le mangeur d’hommes: essai sur les rapports entre
l’État, le marxisme et les camps de concentration (Paris: Seuil, 1975)
Good, Graham, The Observing Self: Rediscovering the Essay (London:
Routledge, 1988)
Grenier, Jean, L’Esprit du Tao (Paris: Flammarion, 1957)
Griolet, Pierre, ed., Palladius: les Moines du désert. Histoire lausiaque (Paris:
Desclée de Brouwer, 1986)
Ha, Marie-Paule, Figuring the East: Segalen, Malraux, Duras and Barthes
(New York: State University of New York Press, 2000)
Hadot, Pierre, Philosophy as a Way of Life, ed. and intro. Arnold I.
Davidson, trans. Michael Chase (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995)
–––––– Exercices spirituels et philosophie antique, 2nd edn (Paris: Albin
Michel, 2002)
–––––– La Philosophie comme manière de vivre: entretiens avec Jeannie
Carlier et Arnold I. Davidson (Paris: Livre de Poche, 2003)
–––––– Wittgenstein et les limites du langage (Paris: Vrin, 2004)
Hammermeister, Kai, The German Aesthetic Tradition (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2002)
Hayot, Eric, Chinese Dreams: Pound, Brecht, Tel Quel (Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press, 2004)
Bibliography 213
Heath, Stephen, Vertige du déplacement: lecture de Barthes (Paris: Fayard,

1974)
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Phenomenology of Mind, trans. J.B. Baillie
(London: Harper and Row, 1967)
Henric, Jacques, ‘Roland Barthes: cours et nouvelles œuvres complètes:
entretien avec Éric Marty’, Art Press 285 (2002): 48–54
Higgins, Lynn A., ‘Barthes’s Imaginary Voyages’, in Gane and Gane, eds.,
vol. III, pp. 147–61
Hill, Leslie, Radical Indecision: Barthes, Blanchot, Derrida, and the Future
of Criticism (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2010)
Hokenson, Jan Walsh, Japan, France, and East-West Aesthetics: French
Literature, 1867–2000 (Madison, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University
Press, 2004)
Holland, Michael, ‘Barthes, Orpheus’, in Roland Barthes I, special issue of
Paragraph, 11.2 (1988): 143–71
Hughes, Alex, ‘Bodily Encounters with China: On Tour with Tel Quel’,
Modern and Contemporary France 14.1 (2006): 49–62
Hume, Nancy (ed.), Japanese Aesthetics and Culture: A Reader (Albany:
State University of New York Press, 1995)
Hutton, Patrick H., ‘Vico’s Theory of History and the French Revolutionary
Tradition’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 37.2 (June 1976): 241–56
Isozaki, Arata, ‘Interview with Hans Ulrich Obrist for UnDo.net: Guide to
the Contemporary Art in Italy’, 29 November 2000, <http://www.undo.
net/cgi-bin/openframe.pl?x=/cgibin/undo/features/features.
pl%3Fa%3Di%26cod%3D22> [accessed 11 February 2012]
James, Ian, ‘The Narrow Margin’, in Blanchot romantique: A Collection of
Essays, ed. John McKeane and Hannes Opelz (Oxford: Peter Lang,
2010)
Jullien, François, Traité de l’efficacité (Paris: Grasset, 1996)
Kandiyoti, Dalia, ‘Roland Barthes Abroad’, in Rabaté, ed., pp. 228–42
Kant, Immanuel, Critique of Judgment, trans. James Creed Meredith
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986)
Kauppi, Niilo, The Making of an Avant-Garde: Tel Quel, trans. Anne R.
Epstein (Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 1994)
Keene, Donald, ‘Japanese Aesthetics’, in Hume, ed., pp. 27–41
Kenkō, Essays in Idleness: The Tsurezuregusa of Kenkō, trans. Donald Keene
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1998)
Khilnani, Sunil, Arguing Revolution: The Intellectual Left in Postwar France
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993)
Knight, Diana, ‘Roland Barthes: An Intertextual Figure’, in Michael Worton
and Judith Still, eds., Intertextuality: Theories and Practices
(Manchester: University of Manchester Press, 1990), pp. 92–107
–––––– Barthes and Utopia: Space, Travel, Writing (Oxford: Clarendon,
1997)
–––––– ‘Idle Thoughts: Barthes’s Vita Nova’, in Roland Barthes, ed. Diana
Knight, special issue of Nottingham French Studies, 36.1 (1997): 88–98
–––––– ed., Critical Essays on Roland Barthes (New York: Hall, 2000)
–––––– ‘“Except When Night Falls”: Together and Alone in Barthes’s
Comment vivre ensemble’, in Pieters and Pint, eds., pp. 50–60
Kopf, Gereon, ‘Zen in the Contemporary United States’, in The Encyclopedia
of Monasticism, ed. William M. Johnston, 2 vols. (Chicago: Fitzroy
Dearborn, 2000), vol. I, pp. 1424–25
Koshiro, Haga, ‘The Wabi Aesthetic Through the Ages’, in Hume, ed., pp.
245–78
Kristeva, Julia, ‘Comment parler à la littérature?’, in Polylogue (Paris: Seuil,
1977), pp. 23–54
–––––– ‘La voix de Barthes’, in Roland Barthes, special issue of
Communications, 36 (1982): 119–23
–––––– Les Samouraïs (Paris: Gallimard, 1992)
Kuki, Shūzō, ‘Considerations on Time: Two Essays Delivered at Pontigny
During the Décade of 8–18 August 1928’, in Light, ed., pp. 43–67
Lacarrière, Jacques, L’Été grec. Une Grèce quotidienne de 4000 ans (Paris:
Plon, 1976)
Lacoue-Labarthe, Philippe, and Jean-Luc Nancy, L’Absolu littéraire:
Théorie du romantisme allemand (Paris: Seuil, 1978)
Lambert, Yvon, Cy Twombly: Catalogue raisonné des œuvres sur papier, 6
vols. (Milan: Multhipla, 1979)
Lao Tzu, Tao Te Ching, trans. and intro. D.C. Lau (Harmondsworth:
Penguin, 1980)
Lavers, Annette, Roland Barthes: Structuralism and After (London:
Methuen, 1982)
Lefort, Claude, Un Homme en trop: essai sur l’archipel du goulag de
Soljénitsyne (Paris: Seuil, 1975)
Léger, Nathalie, ed., Roland Barthes au Collège de France 1977–1980 (Paris:
IMEC, 2002)
Le Goff, Jacques, ‘Barthes administrateur’, in Roland Barthes, special issue
of Communications, 36 (1982): 43–48
Legros, Alain, Essais sur poutres: peintures et inscriptions chez Montaigne
(Paris: Klincksieck, 2003)
Lévi-Strauss, Claude and Didier Eribon, De près et de loin (Paris: Odile
Jacob, 2001)
Lévy, Bernard-Henri, La Barbarie à visage humain (Paris: Grasset, 1977)
–––––– ed., special issue of La Règle du jeu, 5 (1991)
Light, Stephen, Shūzō Kuki and Jean-Paul Sartre: Influence and Counter-
Influence in the Early History of Existential Phenomenology
(Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1987)
Lombardo, Patrizia, The Three Paradoxes of Roland Barthes (Athens:
University of Georgia Press, 1989)
Bibliography 215
Lowe, Lisa, Critical Terrains: French and British Orientalisms (Ithaca:

Cornell University Press, 1991)
Lübecker, Nikolaj, Community, Myth and Recognition in Twentieth-
Century French Literature and Thought (London: Continuum, 2009)
Lyotard, Jean-François, Instructions païennes (Paris: Galilée, 1977)
–––––– La Condition postmoderne (Paris: Minuit, 1979)
–––––– Le Postmoderne expliqué aux enfants (Paris: Galilée, 1986)
Macciocchi, Maria Antonietta, De la Chine (Paris: Seuil, 1971)
Macé, Marielle, Le Temps de l’essai: histoire d’un genre en France au XXe
siècle (Paris: Belin, 2006)
Macé, Marielle, and Alexandre Gefen, eds., Barthes, au lieu du roman (Paris:
Desjonquères/Nota Bene, 2002)
Malcomson, Scott L., ‘The Pure Land Beyond the Seas: Barthes, Burch and
the Uses of Japan’, Screen, 26.3–4 (1985): 23–33
Mallarmé, Stéphane, ‘Autobiographie’, in Œuvres complètes, ed. Henri
Mondor and G. Jean-Aubry (Paris: Gallimard, 1945), pp. 661–65
Mann, Thomas, The Magic Mountain, trans. H.T. Lowe-Porter
Marty, Éric, Roland Barthes, le métier d’écrire (Paris: Seuil, 2006)
–––––– ‘Marcel Proust dans “la chambre claire”’, L’Esprit Créateur 46.4
(2006): 125–33
–––––– ‘Maurice Blanchot, Roland Barthes, une “ancienne conversation”’,
Les Temps modernes, 654 (2009): 74–89
–––––– Roland Barthes, la littérature et le droit à la mort (Paris: Seuil, 2010)
Mates, Benson, ‘On Refuting the Skeptic’, Proceedings and Addresses of the
American Philosophical Association, 58.1 (1984): 21–35
Mauriès, Patrick, Roland Barthes (Paris: Gallimard, 1992)
McHoul, Alec, and David Wills, ‘Bar S B R H S Barthes the Late(r) Barthes
Constituting Fragmenting Subjects’, Boundary 2, 14.1/2 (1985–86):
261–78
McLeod, Ian [writing as ‘I.S.M.’], ‘Powers Plural: Barthes’s “Lecture”’,
Oxford Literary Review, 4.1 (1979): 29–30
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, La Phénoménologie de la perception (Paris:
Gallimard, 1945)
–––––– Notes de cours au Collège de France: 1958–1959 et 1960–1961, ed.
Claude Lefort (Paris: Gallimard, 1996)
Miami Theory Collective, ed., Community at Loose Ends (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1991)
Michelet, Jules, Cours au Collège de France, ed. Paul Viallaneix, 2 vols.
(Paris: Gallimard, 1995)
Milner, Jean-Claude, Le Pas philosophique de Roland Barthes (Paris:
Verdier, 2003)
Minh-Ha, Trinh T., ‘The Plural Void: Barthes and Asia’ in Knight, ed., pp.
209–18
Monod, Gabriel, Portraits et souvenirs (Paris: Calman-Lévy, 1897)

Montaigne, Michel de, Essais, ed. Emmanuel Naya, Delphine Reguig-Naya
and Alexandre Tarrête, 3 vols. (Paris: Gallimard/Folio, 2009)
Montalbetti, Jean, with Roland Barthes, ‘Un Homme, une ville’, Cassettes
Radio France, 3 episodes (Paris: Radio France, 1978)
Nancy, Jean-Luc, La Communauté désœuvrée (Paris: Christian Bourgois,
1986)
–––––– La Communauté affrontée (Paris: Galilée, 2001)
Nietzsche, Friedrich, The Will to Power, trans. Walter Kaufman and R.J.
Hollingdale (New York: Vintage, 1967)
–––––– ‘On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense’, in The Nietzsche Reader,
ed. Keith Ansell Pearson and Duncan Large (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996),
pp. 114–23
–––––– On The Genealogy of Morals, trans. and intro. Douglas Smith
Odin, Steve, ‘Review of Postmodernism in Japan by H.D. Harootunian and
Miyoshi Masao’, Philosophy East and West, 40.3 (1990): 381–87
O’Meara, Lucy, ‘“L’Affaire Barthes” and Ownership of the Voice’, in
Transmissions: Essays in French Thought, Literature and Culture, ed.
Bradley Stephens and Isabelle McNeill (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2007), pp.
141–60
–––––– ‘“Not a Question but a Wound”: Adorno, Barthes and Aesthetic
Reflection’, Comparative Literature, Spring 2013 [article in press]
Ossola, Carlo, ‘Leçons de la Leçon’, in Léger, ed., pp. 17–33
Painter, George D., Marcel Proust: A Biography (Harmondsworth: Penguin,
1983)
Parkes, Graham, ‘Ways of Japanese Thinking’, in Hume, ed., pp. 77–108
Perrone-Moïses, Leyla, ‘Leçon: Testament and Prophecy’, in Back to
Barthes: Twenty Years After, special issue of Yale Journal of Criticism,
14.2 (2001): 463–68
Petitjean, Gérard, ‘Les Grands Prêtres de l’université française’, Le Nouvel
Observateur, 7 April 1975
Petronius Arbiter, The Satyricon, trans. and intro. P.G. Walsh (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1997)
Picard, Raymond, Nouvelle critique ou nouvelle imposture? (Paris: Pauvert,
1965)
Pieters, Jürgen, and Kris Pint, eds., Roland Barthes Retroactively: Reading
the Collège de France Lectures, special issue of Paragraph, 31.1 (2008)
Pilgrim, Richard B., ‘Intervals (“Ma”) in Space and Time: Foundations for
a Religio-Aesthetic Paradigm in Japan’, History of Religions, 25.3
(1986): 255–77
Pingaud, Bernard, ‘Jean-Paul Sartre répond’, in Sartre, special issue of L’Arc
30 (1966): 90–101
Pint, Kris, The Perverse Art of Reading: On the Phantasmatic Semiology in
Bibliography 217
Roland Barthes’s Cours au Collège de France, trans. Christopher M.

Gemerchak (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2010)
–––––– ‘How to Become What One Is: Roland Barthes’s Final Fantasy’, in
Pieters and Pint, eds., pp. 38–49
Pleynet, Marcelin, Le Voyage en Chine: chroniques du journal ordinaire 11
avril–3 mai 1974 – extraits (Paris: P.O.L., 1980)
Pollack, David, The Fracture of Meaning: Japan’s Synthesis of China from
the Eighth through the Eighteenth Centuries (Princeton: Princeton
Proust, Marcel, À la recherche du temps perdu, 3 vols. (Paris:
Gallimard/Pléiade, 1954)
–––––– Contre Sainte-Beuve (Paris: Gallimard, 1954)
–––––– Choix de lettres, ed. Philip Kolb (Paris: Plon, 1965)
Rabaté, Jean-Michel, ed., Writing the Image after Roland Barthes
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1997)
Revel, Jacques, and Nathan Wachtel, Une École pour les sciences sociales:
de la VIe section à l’École des hautes études en sciences sociales (Paris:
Cerf/L’École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, 1996)
Richard, Jean-Pierre, Roland Barthes, dernier paysage: essai (Paris: Verdier,
2006)
Rigoulot, Pierre, Les Paupières lourdes: les Français face au goulag,
aveuglements et indications (Paris: Presses universitaires, 1991)
Robbe-Grillet, Alain, ‘Le Parti de Roland Barthes’, in Le Voyageur (Paris:
Christian Bourgois, 1991), pp. 187–90
Roger, Philippe, Roland Barthes, roman (Paris: Grasset, 1986)
–––––– ‘Caritas Incarnate: A Tale of Love and Loss’, in Back to Barthes:
Twenty Years After, special issue of Yale Journal of Criticism, 14.2
(2001): 527–33
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, Les Rêveries du promeneur solitaire, ed. Jacques
Voisine (Paris: Garnier-Flammarion, 1964)
Rousseau, Philip, Pachomius: The Making of a Community in Fourth-
Century Egypt (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999).
Rylance, Rick, Roland Barthes (Hemel Hampstead: Harvester, 1994)
Said, Edward, Beginnings: Intention and Method (London: Granta, 1985)
–––––– Orientalism (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1991)
Scherer, Jacques, Le ‘Livre’ de Mallarmé (Paris: Gallimard, 1957)
Schlegel, Friedrich, Friedrich Schlegel’s ‘Lucinde’ and the Fragments, trans.
and intro. Peter Firchow (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
1971)
Schrift, Alan D., Nietzsche’s French Legacy: A Genealogy of Post-
structuralism (New York: Routledge, 1995)
Scott, David, Semiologies of Travel: From Gautier to Baudrillard
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004)
Sheringham, Michael, ‘Seminal Digressions’, review of Comment vivre
ensemble, Le Neutre and La Préparation du roman, Times Literary

Supplement, 17 March 2006, pp. 7–8
–––––– Everyday Life: Theories and Practices from Surrealism to the Present
Simpson, David, The Academic Postmodern and the Rule of Literature: A
Report on Half-Knowledge (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995)
Smith, Douglas, Transvaluations: Nietzsche in France, 1872–1972 (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1997)
Speake, Graham, Mount Athos: Renewal in Paradise (New Haven: Yale
Stafford, Andy, Roland Barthes, Phenomenon and Myth: An Intellectual
Biography (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1998)
–––––– ‘“Préparation du romanesque” in Barthes’s Reading of Sarrasine’, in
Pieters and Pint, eds., pp. 95–108
Starobinski, Jean, ‘The Body’s Moment’, trans. John A. Gallucci, in
Montaigne: Essays in Reading, special issue of Yale French Studies, 64
(1983): 273–305
Suvin, Darko, ‘The Soul and the Sense: Meditations on Roland Barthes in
Japan (À propos of L’Empire des signes)’, in Gane and Gane, eds., vol.
III, pp. 175–207 (first publ. in Canadian Review of Comparative
Literature, 18.4: 499–531)
Suzuki, Daisetz Teitaro, An Introduction to Zen Buddhism, ed. Christmas
Humphreys, foreword by C.G. Jung (London: Rider, 1969)
–––––– Essays in Zen Buddhism (series 1), ed. Christmas Humphreys
(London: Rider, 1970)
–––––– Zen and Japanese Culture (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1993)
Tolstoï, Léon, La Guerre et la Paix, trans. Henri Mongault, intro. Pierre
Pascal (Paris: Gallimard/Pléiade, 1947)
Toulmin, Stephen, Human Understanding: The Collective Use and
Evolution of Concepts (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972)
Ungar, Steven, Barthes: The Professor of Desire (Lincoln: University of
Nebraska Press, 1984)
Valéry, Paul, ‘Leçon inaugurale du cours de poétique au Collège de France’,
in Variétés V (Paris: Gallimard, 1945), pp. 297–322
Van de Pitte, Frederick, ‘The dating of Rule IV–B in Descartes’ Regulae ad
directionem ingenii’, Journal of the History of Philosophy, 29 (1991):
375–95
van Rysselberghe, Maria, Cahiers de la Petite Dame, Cahiers André Gide,
IV, 1945–1951 (Paris: Gallimard, 1977)
Verene, Donald Phillip, ‘Vico’, in The Johns Hopkins Guide to Literary
Theory and Criticism, ed. Michael Groden and Martin Kreiswirth,
<http://www.litguide.press.jhu.edu>. 2005. [accessed 18 April 2008]
Vico, Giambattista, The New Science of Giambattista Vico: Unabridged
Bibliography 219
Translation of the Third Edition (1744) with the addition of ‘Practic of

the New Science’, trans. Thomas Goddard Bergin and Max Harold Fisch
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004)
Vuarnet, Jean-Noël, Le Philosophe-Artiste (Paris: Léo Scheer, 2004)
Wahl, François, ‘Roland Barthes aurait été révolté’, interview with Grégoire
Leménager, Le Nouvel Observateur, 21 January 2009, <http://bibliobs.
nouvelobs.com/essais/20090121.BIB0811/roland-barthes-aurait-ete-
revolte.html> [accessed 22 January 2009]
Watts, Alan W., The Way of Zen (London: Thames and Hudson, 1957)
–––––– Psychotherapy East and West (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1961)
White, Carolinne, ed. and trans., The Rule of St Benedict (Harmondsworth:
Penguin, 2008)
Wilson, Edmund, To the Finland Station (London: Collins/Fontana, 1974)
Wiseman, Mary Bittner, The Ecstasies of Roland Barthes (London:
Routledge, 1989)
Yacavone, Kathrin, ‘Reading Through Photography: Roland Barthes’s Last
Seminar “Proust et la photographie”’, French Forum, 34.1 (2009):
97–112
Yasuda, Kenneth, ‘Approach to Haiku’ and ‘Basic Principles’, in Hume, ed.,
pp. 125–50
Zhuo, Yue, ‘The “Political” Barthes: From Theatre to Idiorrythmy’, French
Forum, 36.1 (2011): 55–74
Zola, Émile, Pot-Bouille (Paris: Gallimard, 1982)
Zuppinger, Renaud, ‘Notes étourdies écrites pendant un séminaire de
Roland Barthes’, in Barthes, special issue of L’Arc, 54 (1974): 87–90
Index
Adorno, Theodor 18–19, 24 n. 50, 25 147, 157 n. 3
n. 52, 52, 55, 150 Essais critiques 165
‘The Essay as Form’ 55, 57, 58, Fragments d’un discours amoureux
66, 68 7, 10, 44, 111, 125–26, 132,
Minima Moralia 99 164, 183, 192, 203
Negative Dialectics 150 Journal de deuil 5, 112, 183,
Agamben, Giorgio 105, 115 n. 42 184–85, 191
Althusser, Louis 100 Leçon (inaugural lecture) 2, 3, 4,
Antonioni, Michelangelo 11, 14, 17, 20, 27, 28–29, 33,
Barthes’s tribute to, 72–73, 38, 40, 41, 42, 46, 47, 53, 54,
137–38 56–67, 68, 69–71, 72, 73, 75,
filming of China 161 n. 57 78, 82, 83, 87, 111–12, 124,
Aristotle 198 n. 54 126, 127, 138, 139, 179, 200,
201
Balzac, Honoré de definition of ‘sémiologie
‘Le Chef-d’œuvre inconnu’ 193, littéraire’ 58, 59–60
194 ‘Longtemps, je me suis couché de
Barthes, Roland bonne heure…’ 12, 13, 52, 62,
election to Collège de France 27 69, 70, 73, 74–82, 83, 167,
influence of Jena Romanticism on 168–71, 172, 185, 187, 188,
175–81 202
professional posts 29, 48 n. 9 Mythologies 71, 72, 92, 113 n. 5
teaching at the Ecole pratique des Le Neutre 3, 4, 5, 11–12, 13, 17,
hautes études 38, 39, 42–43 18, 40, 45, 59, 62, 64, 66, 87,
views on teaching 39–42, 43 88, 90, 91–94, 96, 97–98, 100,
views on the Collège de France 101, 102, 103–4, 109–11, 129,
27–28, 33, 37, 45 131, 133, 134, 138, 140, 143,
views on the political 103 144–45, 146, 149, 150, 151,
Barthes, Roland: works 154, 201, 202
Carnets du voyage en Chine 5, 120 La Préparation du roman 3, 5, 7,
La Chambre claire 7, 19, 20, 46, 12–15, 23 n. 37, 47, 52, 69, 71,
47, 52, 53, 56, 62, 77, 111, 148, 74, 75, 78, 82, 90, 93, 111, 128,
149, 155–56, 167, 168, 183, 130, 135, 139, 142, 143–44,
190, 200, 201, 203 147–48, 149, 151, 163, 164,
Comment vivre ensemble 3, 5, 167–68, 171, 172–82, 185, 186,
7–11, 13, 16, 19, 44, 46, 61, 187–89, 190, 191, 192, 193–95,
63–64, 66, 68, 69, 87, 88–91, 201, 202, 203
94–97, 98, 99, 102–5, 106, Roland Barthes par Roland
109–11, 132, 134, 138, 139, Barthes 7, 10, 18, 33, 39, 88,
140, 164, 196 n. 15, 201, 202 113 n. 4, 164, 183, 193–94, 203
Le Degré zéro de l’écriture 15, 98 Sade, Fourier, Loyola 79
‘Délibération’ 101, 153, 171, Soirées de Paris183, 184, 185,
183–84, 185, 198 n. 53 189, 191
L’Empire des signes 119, 121–24, Sur Racine 82
125, 128, 131, 135, 136, 138, S/Z 43, 203
Index 221
Vita Nova 152, 167, 168, 176, China 5, 100, 118, 119–20, 139, 159
177, 182–85, 187, 189–95 n. 36, 161 n. 57
Barthes, Roland: terms Claudel, Paul 158 n. 15
‘délicatesse’ 9, 104, 109, 126, 134, Collège de France 1, 2, 4, 6, 17, 27–28,
138, 141, 142, 161 n. 63 29, 30–31, 37, 41, 42, 60, 83, 200
‘doxa’ 6, 91, 101 crowding of Barthes’s lectures at
‘effet de réel’ 148, 162 n. 76 44, 45
ego, egotism 77, 127, 131, 139, election procedures 27, 47 n. 1
147, 150, 151, 152, 155 foundation and history 30
‘existence minimale’ 12, 20, staffing and regulations 32, 33, 48
150–55, 157 n. 16
‘fantasme’ 4, 17, 20, 21, 40, 46, community 2, 8, 12, 87, 89, 90, 96–97,
62, 67–69, 71, 73, 78, 80, 81, 105–6, 115 n. 41
83, 87, 94–98, 106, 110, 111,
172, 179, 202 Dante Alighieri 77
‘l’intraitable’ 147–50 Defoe, Daniel
‘jouissance’ 17, 41, 64, 109, 113 n. Robinson Crusoe 111
4 Deleuze, Gilles
‘Ma’ [Japanese] 131–38 Nietzsche et la philosophie 7, 64
‘noème’ of photography 47, 190 Derrida, Jacques 2, 36, 133
‘paideia’ 53, 62, 64–66, 67, 70, 85 Chaque fois unique, la fin du
n. 23 monde 115 n. 37
‘satori’ 131, 135, 143–44, 145–46, Séminaire: la bête et le souverain 6
148–49, 151, 163, 167, 202 Descartes, René 61, 80, 126
‘stenochôria’ 141, 145 Duras, Marguerite 105
‘vita nova’ 77, 144, 180
‘xéniteia’ 96, 141, 145 École pratique des hautes études, 2, 5,
Baudelaire, Charles 12, 76, 91, 155, 28, 29, 33, 35, 36–38, 41, 43, 203
177, 178 foundation and history 30–31
Les Paradis artificiels 12, 135, foundation of École des hautes
147 études en sciences sociales 32
Benveniste, Émile 6, 94 VIe section 31–32
Blanchot, Maurice 180 encyclopedia, encyclopedic method
relationship of his work to 62–64, 65–66, 73, 119, 163, 164,
Barthes’s 23 n. 37 179, 180–81, 201
Le livre à venir 197 n. 2 Epictetus 92
L’Entretien infini 93, 175–76, 179, Foucault’s interest in 106
195–96, 197 n. 2, 200 eros 95
La Communauté inavouable 105
Boudinet, Daniel 136, 155 Foucault, Michel 28, 30, 33, 34, 36,
Bourdieu, Pierre 2, 16, 32 133, 160 n. 42
Esquisse pour une auto-analyse 34 and Collège de France 2, 4, 27
Homo academicus 28, 34–36, Histoire de la sexualité III: le souci
37–8 de soi 107
‘hérétiques consacrés’ 28, 33 late thought; influence of Pierre
Leçon sur la leçon (inaugural Hadot 106–9, 116 n. 61, n. 63,
lecture) 34 n. 64
sociology of intellectuals 28 Les Mots et les choses 84 n. 2, 119
views on Barthes 28, 34–36, 82, publication of lectures 6, 22 n. 19
83 teaching at Collège de France
Bouveresse, Jacques 35, 49 n. 31 106–7
fragments, fragmentation 2, 9, 10,
Cage, John 143, 169 13–14, 16, 19, 56, 63–64, 65, 70,
79, 88, 89, 163–64, 165, 166–67, Critique of Judgment 54–55, 179
168, 169–70, 174–76, 177, 179, Kristeva, Julia 40, 158 n. 9
180–81, 182, 186, 187–88, 189–96, on Barthes’s style 53–54
200, 201, 202 Les Samouraïs 49 n. 42
Freud, Sigmund 96, 100, 102, 117 n. Kuki, Shūzō 130–31, 156, 159 n. 3,
66, 143, 161 n. 65 163
Genette, Gérard 5, 22 n. 18, 32, 50 n. Lacan, Jacques 34, 47 n. 2, 50 n. 58

46 Lacarrière, Jacques
Gide, André 93, 97 L’Été grec 8, 89
La Séquestrée de Poitiers 90 Lacoue-Labarthe, Philippe, and Jean-
Maria van Rysselberghe, Cahiers Luc Nancy 164
de la Petite Dame 93, 97 L’Absolu littéraire 176, 177–78,
180, 188–89
Hadot, Pierre 107–10, 112, 145, 151, Lévi-Strauss, Claude 2, 27, 28, 30, 33,
161 n. 70, 202 34
Chair at Collège de France 107 on Collège de France 37
Exercices spirituels et philosophie Lévy, Bernard-Henri 4, 100, 101
antique 107–8, 112 La Barbarie à visage humain 101,
influence on Foucault 107, 108, 114 n. 26
116 n. 61 Lyotard, Jean-François 100, 102
La Philosophie comme manière de Derrida’s essay on Lyotard 115 n.
vivre: entretiens 116 n. 53 37
haiku 13, 14, 17, 118, 125, 126, Instructions païennes 102
128–31, 135, 136, 138, 146, Le Postmoderne expliqué aux
147–48, 150, 153, 154, 155, 156, enfants 102
163, 164, 173, 175, 196 n. 2, 202 similar interests to Barthes’s 102,
and individuation 78, 147 115 n. 37
Bashō 130, 149
Maurice Coyaud’s collection Ma (Japanese understanding of
Fourmis sans ombre 128 space/time) 131–38
Hegel, G.F. 18, 24 n. 51, 19, 25 n. 52, Macciocchi, Maria Antonietta 157 n. 8
80, 150 Mallarmé, Stéphane 14, 122, 158 n.
15, 164, 183–84, 186
idiorrythmie 8, 9, 11, 12, 23 n. 30, 69, Mann, Thomas, The Magic Mountain
87, 89, 90, 92, 94, 97, 111, 132 9, 90
source of term in Lacarrière 8 Mao, Maoism 100, 114 n. 27, n. 31,
Isozaki, Arata 133, 134 120, 157 n. 8, 161 n. 57
Marty, Éric 5, 23 n. 37, 44, 45, 158 n.
Japan 118, 119, 120, 121, 122–24, 18, 191
128, 133, 135, 136, 138, 139, 141, Marxism 100–1, 102
161 n. 58 mathesis 52, 84 n. 2, 54, 61–62, 203
Japanese aesthetics 121–31, 132, Foucault’s definition of 84 n. 2
133–34, 137, 146, 148, 153–54, May 1968 14, 24, 37, 38, 97, 104, 105
155, 156, 159 n. 32, 202 Merleau-Ponty, Maurice 1, 6, 146
Japanese language 128 Metz, Christian 32
Jena Romanticism 19, 164, 175–81, Michelet, Jules 13, 27, 67, 68, 85 n. 34
188, 195, 202 and Collège de France 30
Jullien, François 159 n. 36 Montaigne, Michel de 1, 3, 104, 201
Essais 3, 15–16
Kafka, Franz 14, 176 Mount Athos 8, 23 n. 30, 89, 90, 113
Kant, Immanuel 18–19, 20, 24 n. 50, n. 3
135, 138, 164, 202
Index 223
Nancy, Jean-Luc Rousseau, Jean-Jacques 17, 151–52,

La Communauté désœuvrée 105, 154–55
115 n. 41 Les Rêveries du promeneur soli-
neutral, the 91, 113 n. 4, 127, 131, taire 12, 93, 145–46, 161 n. 70
141–42
Barthes’s understanding of 11, 91 Sade, D.A.F. de 166–67, 170
Blanchot’s ‘le neutre-le fragmen- Said, Edward 111, 120
taire’ 23 n. 37 Sartre, Jean-Paul 78, 100, 102, 159 n. 3
neutral as active value 12, 97 commitment/engagement 102, 104
Niepce, Joseph Nicéphore 162 n. 90 Schlegel, Friedrich 18, 19, 24 n. 50,
Nietzsche, Friedrich 3, 7, 18–19, 21 n. 164, 171–72, 177, 178–79, 180–81,
5, 39, 52, 64–65, 70–71, 169, 200 182, 195, 197 n. 25
On the Genealogy of Morals Schönberg, Arnold 15
69–70, 85 n. 41 Skeptics, Skepticism 93
reception of his work in France 24 épochè 1, 93
n. 49 Socrates 117 n. 66
The Will to Power 21 n. 5 Sollers, Philippe 100, 101, 114 n. 30,
nouveaux philosophes 101 120, 157 n. 8
Novalis 163, 164, 177, 178, 188, 190, Solzhenitsyn, Aleksandr 100
196, 197 n. 25 Sophists 92
Stalin, Joseph 100
Pachomius 89, 110 St Benedict 89, 110, 113 n. 2
Pascal 187, 189, 190, 191–92 Stendhal 184, 185
Petronius Arbiter 84 n. 15 subjectivity 2, 4, 20, 46, 52, 53, 55–56,
photography, photographs 19, 46, 47, 58, 59, 60, 65, 67–68, 69, 72, 74,
52, 111, 119, 124, 148, 149–50, 78, 81, 92, 95, 106–7, 109, 118,
155, 156, 190, 201 125, 128, 132, 151, 152 156, 157,
Picard, Raymond 35 179, 180, 202
Nouvelle critique ou nouvelle subject’s relation to environment
imposture? 49 n. 32 122, 123–24, 126–27, 130, 131,
Proust, Marcel 94 135, 144, 146, 150, 152, 154,
Barthes’s identification with 202
74–75, 82 Suzuki, Daisetz Teitaro 118, 127, 139,
Barthes’s account of Proust’s 157 n.1
hesitation between essay and An Introduction to Zen Buddhism
novel 75–77, 177 127–28
Contre Sainte-Beuve 79 on the ‘Zen dialectic’ 149
presence in Barthes’s work 75, 86 Zen and Japanese Culture 129,
n. 50 159 n. 32
as exemplar of Barthes’s
‘moment de vérité’ 148, 170, Tao, Taoism 118, 127, 135, 139–41,
173 149, 161 n. 58, 185
A la recherche du temps perdu 90, Lao Tzu 93, 141, 144–45
163, 169 Tao te Ching 141, 142, 152
Du Côté de chez Swann 76 Tel Quel 49 n. 46, 100, 101, 114 n.
views on particularity and 27, 114 n. 31, 119, 157 n. 8
generality 78 Tel Quel delegation’s trip to China
Pyrrhonism 91, 93 114 n. 27, 120
Pyrrho’s student Eurylochus 12, 91 Tolstoy, Leo
psychoanalysis, psychoanalytic War and Peace 93, 135, 136,
discourse 21 n. 9, 45, 87, 91, 100 143–44, 145, 148, 151, 166,
167, 169, 170
Robbe-Grillet, Alain 27 Twombly, Cy 126, 142–43, 155
universal particular 4, 20, 54, 55, 78, Psychotherapy East and West 127,
95, 106, 164, 179, 201, 203 159 n. 24, 159 n. 37
The Way of Zen 140, 158 n. 19
Valéry, Paul 50 n. 70 wou-wei (wu-wei) 11, 104, 139–40,
Vico, Giambattista 68–69, 80, 81 143, 151, 152, 154
De Antequissima Italorum sapi-
entia 86 n. 59 Zen 12, 91, 97, 118, 125–26, 128,
The New Science 68, 85 n. 34, n, 131, 135, 139, 140, 146, 147,
35 148–49, 153, 156, 158 n. 12, 161 n.
58
Wahl, François 4, 5, 158 n. 9, 198 n. satori 127, 131, 145–47, 148–49,
65 151
Watts, Alan W. 118, 125, 127, 139, Zola, Émile
148, 150, 157 n. 1 Pot-Bouille 9

626377

Uploaded by

Document Informationclick to expand document information

Document Informationclick to expand document information

Copyright:

Available Formats

626377

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

626377

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Roland Barthes at the Collège de France

Contemporary French and Francophone Cultures 22

LIVERPOOL UNIVERSITY PRESS

Copyright © 2012 Lucy O’Meara

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication data

Typeset by XL Publishing Services

Appendix: List of Roland Barthes’s Seminars and Lecture 205

C Prétexte Roland Barthes: colloque de Cerisy

OC, III Œuvres complètes tome III. 1968–1971

Note on the use of the recordings of the lectures

Il essaye (ou il ne peut s’empêcher) de tenir un discours qui ne s’énonce pas

teaching at the Collège de France are the ‘signs’ of an intellectual project

lecture courses: Comment vivre ensemble, focusing on the problems of

Barthes, in his inaugural lecture at the Collège de France in 1977, declares

Salzedo subsequently deposed the archive of Barthes’s manuscripts with

These are strange texts in a quasi-archival mode. They share this

hand, despite their partly interlocutory character, are monologic, and

is linked to the space of the desert.31 Thomas Mann’s The Magic

rial is then delivered in the arbitrary alphabetical order, with no further

Ce que je viens de dire de la non-méthode laisse entendre qu’au fond le ‘sujet’

The following year’s lecture course, Le Neutre (February–June

Throughout the four series of lectures, Barthes focuses on imbuing his

and which does away with obfuscatory generic conventions: ‘il ne me

At the Collège de France, these ‘pensées-mots’ are the fantasmes

tion, imagination, and above all through metaphor. As a good post-

It is insofar as the concept is a reductive force that Barthes feels it imper-

importance of Romantic thought to Nietzsche’s conception of language.

teaching. Through an exploration of the lectures’ most insistent forms

1 Roland Barthes, La Préparation du roman I et II. Notes de cours et de séminaires

vivre ensemble session, of which only the first half exists.

photographie (Paris: Gallimard/Seuil, 1980).

On 14 March 1976, Roland Barthes was elected to the ‘chaire de sémi-

incontestable’.3 These contradictions are brought about by the Collège’s

In the recording of Barthes’s inaugural lecture at the Collège de France,

education without being trammelled by the curricula and bureaucracy of

lézardés de la vieille Sorbonne; en se développant, il les fera crouler’.17 In

untrammelled by disciplinary constraints. Greimas’s and Barthes’s semi-

were represented by, amongst others, Lévi-Strauss, Foucault, Raymond

Bourdieu: Essayism and the Heretics

The heretical scholars who are employed in the marginal institutions

essays in literary and cultural theory were published in affordable paper-

In Bourdieu’s lexis, essayism is a bad word. He made this clear in his

In Bourdieu’s view, it is in the nature of essayism to be mundane and

disciplinary purity, that he himself espouses.30 This is why he distanced

Bourdieu deliberately conflates Barthes with the institutions which

‘Les naufragés de l’université’

not measured in terms of students’ performance. Thus this teaching has

Because he is employed by institutions whose only stipulation is that

At the time of Bourdieu’s research, Barthes was still at the EPHE.

Calvet implies that the attraction of Barthes’s teaching inheres largely in

are conceived in spatial terms: ‘il faudrait substituer à l’espace magistral

(mais un texte se cherche)’. Instead, the models of ‘apprentissage’ and

The Form of Barthes’s Teaching:

Commencer, c’est toujours, à un étage du sujet: enchaîner […] J’enchaîne

In this interview, Barthes is trying to make it understood that, despite

nauté’.57 Insofar as it was possible, Barthes tried to import the diffusive

dialectique […] de la relation enseignante; selon cette dialectique, l’écoute