Deconding Modality

(De)coding Modality : The Case of Must, May, Måste and Kan
Wärnsby, Anna
2006
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Wärnsby, A. (2006). (De)coding Modality : The Case of Must, May, Måste and Kan. [Doctoral Thesis
(monograph), English Studies]. English Studies.
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LUNDUNI
VERSI
TY
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(DE)CODING MODALITY
THE CASE OF MUST, MAY, MÅSTE, AND KAN
LUND STUDIES IN ENGLISH 113
Editors
Marianne Thormählen and Beatrice Warren
LUND STUDIES IN ENGLISH

was founded by Eilert Ekwall in 1933. Published by the De-
partment of English, Centre for Languages and Literature,
Lund University, the series consists of books on the English
language and on literature in English.
(DE)CODING MODALITY
THE CASE OF MUST, MAY, MÅSTE AND KAN
Anna Wärnsby

(DE)CODING MODALITY
THE CASE OF MUST, MAY, MÅSTE, AND KAN
Anna Wärnsby
LUND STUDIES IN ENGLISH 113

ISBN 91-975158-2-5
ISSN 0076-1451
Publisher
Department of English
Centre for Languages and Literature
Lund University
P.O. Box 201
SE-221 00 LUND Sweden
Distribution and sales

Almqvist & Wiksell International
P.O. Box 7634
SE-103 94 STOCKHOLM Sweden
© Anna Wärnsby 2006
Typesetting Ilgot Liljedahl

Printed by print@soc
Lund 2006
Contents
Acknowledgements 8
List of abbreviations 9
1 Prolegomena 10
Abstract 10
1.1 Modality 10
1.1.1 Epistemic modality 14
1.1.2 Non-epistemic modalities 17
1.1.2.1 Deontic modality 18
1.1.2.2 Dynamic modality 20
1.1.2.3 Existential modality 21
1.2 Modal verbs 21
1.2.1 Criteria for identifying modal verbs in English 22
1.2.2 Criteria for identifying modal verbs in Swedish 23
1.2.3 Modal verbs and their interpretations 25
1.2.3.1 The epistemic scale 25
1.2.3.2 The deontic scale 32
1.2.3.3 Dynamic modals 37
1.2.3.4 Choosing the modals for this investigation 38
1.3 Corpus studies in linguistics 39
1.3.1 Using corpora 39
1.3.2 The English-Swedish Parallel Corpus 41
1.4 The aims and structure of the study 44
Summary 46
2 Modal contexts 48
Abstract 48
2.1 Coates (1983) 48
2.1.1 Features associated with epistemic modality 49
2.1.2 Features associated with non-epistemic modalities 52
2.2 Papafragou’s criticism of Coates 53

Summary 59
3 Modals in context 60
Abstract 60
3.1 English modals 60
3.1.1 Must 60
3.1.1.1 Perfect and progressive aspect 61
3.1.1.2 Introductory subject 64
3.1.1.3 State verb 65
3.1.1.4 Inanimate subject 65
3.1.2 May 67
3.1.2.1 Perfect and progressive aspect 68
3.2 Swedish modals 75
3.2.1 Måste 75
3.2.1.1 Perfect aspect 75
3.2.2 Kan 85
3.2.2.1 Perfect aspect 86
3.3 Indeterminate examples 93
3.3.1 Ambiguity 97
3.3.2 Merger 99
3.3.3 Gradience 107
Summary 110
4 Context revisited 113
Abstract 113
4.1 Controllability 113
4.1.1 Subject 119
4.1.2 States vs. events 125
4.1.3 Time reference 126
4.1.4 Explicit and implicit condition 132
4.1.5 Situation type 134
4.1.6 Summary 136

4.2 Additional features 137
4.2.1 Epistemic adverbials and modal particles 137
4.2.2 Utterance type 139
4.2.2.1 Negation 140
4.3 Controllability and Transitivity 142
Summary 148
5 Mining the modals 150
Abstract 150
5.1 Data Mining 150
5.1.1 What is Data Mining? 151
5.1.1.1 What can Data Mining do? 152
5.1.2 The use of DM techniques in the present investigation 155
5.1.2.1 J48 learning algorithm 157
5.1.2.2 Interpreting results 157
5.2 (De)coding confident inference and obligation 161
5.2.1 The must file 162
5.2.1.1 The decision tree for must 163
5.2.2 The måste file 169
5.2.2.1 The decision tree for måste 169
5.2.3 Must and måste combined 178
5.3 (De)coding possible conclusion and permission: may 180
5.3.1 The may file 180
5.3.1.1 The decision tree for may 181
5.4 (De)coding possible conclusion and permission: kan 186
5.4.1 The kan file 187
5.4.1.1 The decision tree for kan 188
5.4.1.2 Why do may and kan differ? 202
Summary 205
6 Final remarks 208
Abstract 208
6.1 On the universality of the interpretation patterns 208
6.2 Summing up 212
References 216
Appendix I-V 223
Index of names 233
Subject index 235

Acknowledgements
I would like to thank The Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation who

made my work on this book possible. Lars-Gunnar Andersson and Mats
Rolén deserve particular praise for leading and administrating the Research
School for Modern Languages.
Many thanks to Beatrice Warren for your wisdom and unfailing kind-
ness, and for letting me grow in my own pace. To Kristin Eide for teaching
me that nothing is impossible. Meeting you was one of the turning points
in my life. To Verner Egerland for invaluable comments on one of the latest
versions of my text. To Carita Paradis for always being there when I needed
advice or encouragement. To Inger Rosengren for showing me that there is
no limit to hard work. To Lars Jönsson, Outpost Design, who helped me to
design and carry out the Data Mining project. To Joost van de Weijer who
honestly tried to rescue me from statistical illiteracy. To Viktorija
Todorovska who proofread the final version of the text, improving it great-
ly (all the remaining errors are of course mine). To the members of the lin-
guistic seminar for providing a stimulating research environment. To my
teachers for demonstrating the wonders of linguistics to me, particularly
Carita Paradis, Marie Källkvist, Lars Hermerén, Elisabeth Engdahl,
Christer Platzack, and Gisela Håkansson.
My infinite gratitude goes to my friend and colleague Fabian Beijer for
being who you are, and for letting me be who I am. To Hannele Diehl for
unwavering support and friendship, and all the girly stuff that is so fun to
do together. To Robert Ryan for providing healthy competition. To Vesna
Brankovic for having patience with me when I was not there. To Ann-
Charlotte Hamilton for inspiring me to look beyond my books, some-
times. To Malin Hult-Lehecka, Åsa Persson, and Mia Andersson for shar-
ing all the countless lattes. To Karina Sverdlov and Vlada Gurkov for for-
seeing my future.
To my Grandfather, Zichrono Levracha, for all the time you spent with
me reading over your great cup of scalding tea, and for teaching me to read
by myself. To Mama and Ba on whom I can always count. To Vera for be-
lieving in me. To Mikael for being proud of me. And to Esther for teaching
me what is really important.
Lund, September 2006
Anna Wärnsby

List of abbreviations
ACC Accusative
DEF Definite article
DM Data Mining
ESPC English-Swedish Parallel Corpus
FUT Future time marker
INF Infinitive
MOD Modal element
N Noun
NEG Negation
OE Old English
PART Participle
PASS Passive
PAST Past (tense)
PDE Present Day English
PDS Present Day Swedish
PL Plural
POSS Genitive
PRES Present (tense)
PROG Progressive
REFL Reflexive
SG Singular

1 Prolegomena
Abstract
In this chapter, I briefly review some previous work on modality, focusing on mo-
dality as a semantic phenomenon, and discuss the different types of modality pre-
sented in the literature. I also discuss modal verbs in English and Swedish and pro-
pose a systematic way of analysing them using epistemic and deontic scales that
represent the range of modal interpretations. I further provide an explanation for
why the present study is limited to two pairs of modals: must and måste, and may
and kan. Moreover, I address some methodological issues related to using corpora
in linguistic investigations, since the present study falls within the general field of
corpus linguistics. In addition, the English-Swedish Parallel Corpus is introduced
as the primary source of data for this study. The last section presents the aims and
structure of the present study.
1.1 Modality
It has been notoriously difficult to delimit the field of modality, and modal
research to just a few topics. As Nuyts (2005) eloquently put it:
‘Modality’ is one of the ‘golden oldies’ among the basic notions in the seman-
tic analysis of language. But, in spite of this, it also remains one of the most
problematic and controversial notions: there is no consensus on how to de-
fine and characterise it, let alone on how to apply definitions in the empirical
analysis of data. (Nuyts 2005: 5)
What follows is an account of some of the issues, controversies, definitions,

and approaches to studies of modality within what can be generally de-
scribed as functionally-oriented theories of language.
Modal logic, a branch of the philosophy of language, which deals with
notions such as possibility and necessity, has greatly influenced linguists’

(De)coding modality Anna Wärnsby
understanding of modality. According to von Wright (1951: 1-2), modal

logic is concerned with four modes: alethic (the mode of truth), epistemic
(the mode of knowledge), deontic (the mode of obligation), and existential
(the mode of existence). von Wright also suggests a fifth mode, dynamic
(the mode of ability).
Looking at modality from a semantic point of view, it is obvious that
some researchers (e.g. Palmer 1990) follow this modal logical classification
closely. Others concentrate on such aspects of modality as speaker/address-
ee involvement in the situation described by the modally modified propo-
sition (e.g. Bybee and Fleischman 1995, Quirk et al. 1985). That is to say,
modality is considered to be a semantic phenomenon, and is seen as the
addition of a special kind of meaning to the neutral value of a proposition
in an utterance. This can be illustrated by examples (1) and (2).
(1) Jane reads (a lot).
(2) Jane can read.
In (1), the proposition is expressed by the main predicate reads, referring

to the factual situation of Jane reading (a lot). In (2), the proposition is
modified by the modal can so that it no longer simply refers to Jane reading
a lot, but to Jane being able to read. Another possible interpretation of (2)
is, of course, that Jane is allowed to read.
Additional meanings, such as imposing obligation, giving permission,
or expressing judgement about the truth of the proposition, are often con-
veyed in interactive discourse, i.e. in face-to-face conversation (Bybee and
Fleischman 1995: 3-8). Speaker-specific features, as well as the situational
context, should, therefore, be taken into consideration when analysing
modality, which has been reflected in many modal classifications.
For instance, Quirk et al. (1985: 219-220) claim that modality can be
defined as “the manner in which the meaning of a clause is qualified so as
to reflect the speaker’s judgement of the likelihood of the proposition it ex-
presses being true”. They also distinguish between intrinsic and extrinsic
modality. This distinction involves the notion of control on behalf of the
speaker/addressee over the situation described by the proposition. Thus, in
intrinsic modalities expressing permission, obligation, and volition, the
speaker and the addressee control the situation. In extrinsic modalities, ex-
pressing notions such as possibility and prediction, the speaker and the ad-
dressee do not normally have control over the situation described in the
proposition. This distinction is also incorporated in Hermerén’s (1978) ac-
count of modality.

Chapter 1 Prolegomena
The notion of control is, however, notoriously difficult to define for-

mally. One such attempt is made by Runde (1997), who argues that to ac-
count for the subjective dimension of what is described as intrinsic modal-
ity in Quirk et al., the researcher has to take into consideration the illocu-
tionary force of a modal utterance, the circumstances, and context of the
utterance, including the speaker’s and the addressee’s intentions, assump-
tions, expectations, as well as the psychological and social reality in which
the speaker and the addressee participate (Runde 1997: 215).
The notion of the speaker’s and addressee’s involvement is also impor-
tant in the classification of modality as epistemic, agent-oriented, and
speaker-oriented (Bybee, Perkins and Pagliuca 1994). While agent-oriented
modality “reports the existence of internal and external conditions on an
agent with respect to the completion of the action expressed by the main
predicate” (as in ability readings: Jane can read), “speaker-oriented modality
does not report the existence of conditions on an agent, but rather allows
the speaker to impose such conditions on the addressee” (as in deontic read-
ings: You must read this passage aloud) (Bybee, Perkins and Pagliuca 1994:
177-188). Moreover, there is a tendency for agent-oriented modality – ob-
ligation, necessity, and volition – to be expressed by lexical or free grammat-
ical morphemes. Speaker-oriented modality, as in the grammatical category
of mood (for example, the imperative mood), is usually expressed by inflec-
tions. Bybee and Fleischman (1995: 7) claim that this represents a “quasi-
universal tendency for agent-oriented modality to be expressed by verbs,
auxiliaries and non-bound particles, whereas the remaining two types [i.e.
speaker-oriented and epistemic modalities] are often expressed inflectional-
ly”. A further universal tendency in languages seems to be that agent-ori-
ented modalities develop over time into speaker-oriented and epistemic
modalities.
Bybee, Perkins and Pagliuca (1994) also postulate the existence of a
cross-linguistic pattern for the diachronic development of modal mean-
ings. Thus, epistemic senses generally develop from lexical verbs that ini-
tially denote mental or physical ability. These verbs gradually come to ex-
press dynamic modality, and, finally, weak epistemic possibility.1 What
causes these changes is still an open question. Lightfoot (1982) argues that
the diachronic development of the (grammatical) class of modal verbs in
English is the result of grammatical reanalysis, which, in turn, leads to a
series of semantic changes. Bybee and Pagluica (1985), on the other hand,
claim that it is the semantic change in modals that leads to the develop-
1 See detailed definitions in 1.1.1 and 1.1.2.

ment of grammatical meaning. Still others argue that shifts in meaning, at

least in the initial stages of grammaticalization, are pragmatically motiva-
ted (Hopper and Traugott 1993). This last claim is further developed in
Traugott and Dasher (2002) and Krug (2000). Traugott (1982), inspired
by Halliday (1970, 1976, 1979, etc.), suggests a functional-semantic mod-
el of language change, involving three components: (i) the propositional
level, using language to convey meaning; (ii) the textual level, producing a
cohesive discourse; and (iii) the expressive level, expressing a speaker’s per-
sonal attitude towards discourse. Change is considered to proceed from the
propositional through the textual to the expressive level, or from “less sub-
jective” to “more subjective”, i.e. bound to the context of the speech act
(Traugott 1982: 247-248). In her later work, Traugott (1996) also points
out that the shift in meaning from less subjective to more subjective is not
necessarily tied to the shift from dynamic/deontic to epistemic meanings,
but can also occur within these domains.2 A similar view is expressed in van
der Auwera (1999) and van der Auwera and Plungian (1998), who focus
on the participants of the modal utterances, and not on the function mo-
dal utterances perform in discourse, as Traugott does. In their view, modal
meaning develops from lexical meaning through participant-internal pos-
sibility and necessity, and from there to participant-external possibility and
necessity, and deontic possibility and necessity. The next stage is epistemic
meaning, and, finally, postmodal uses: conditional and optative.
A different view of the grammaticalization of modal meanings involves
the notion of metaphor. Hopper and Traugott (1993: 79), offering one
possible explanation for the semantic change in modals, claim that the de-
velopment of meanings related to obligation into meanings related to pos-
sibility and probability can be considered a metaphorical process. Support
for this view can be found in Bybee and Pagliuca (1985: 73), who suggest
inter alia that “the epistemic sense [of must] is the metaphorical extension
of obligation to apply to the truth of the proposition”. A slightly different
approach is presented in Sweetser (1990), where modal meanings are ana-
lysed in terms of “sociophysical concepts of forces and barriers”. Sweetser
claims that epistemic meanings derive “from the tendency to experience
the physical, social, and epistemic worlds in partially similar ways”. This,
2 Note, however, that there is some dispute about this hypothesis on the unidirectionality of gram-
maticalization. See Dahl (2000a) for a range of empirically supported objections. As Dahl (2000a)
points out “[w]hat we have to conclude […] in order to maintain the unidirectionality thesis, is that it
has to be seen as operating on a fairly high level of abstraction. We cannot exclude the courses of events
that look exactly like the reversal of some grammaticalization process sometimes takes place. However,
we should still be able to do without such reversed processes as independent constructs in our theory”
(Dahl 2000a: 12).

in turn, allows metaphorical mapping of sociophysical potentiality to the

world of reasoning, or the mapping of potential barriers to the conversa-
tional world (Sweetser 1990: 52). In these approaches, the development of
meaning in modals is seen as a result of metaphorical processes, not gram-
matical ones as in Lightfoot (1982).
However, most researchers focus on the semantics of modality rather
than on the historical development of modal meanings or the categoriza-
tion of modal domains. Since modality is not a homogeneous category, dif-
ferent researchers distinguish between different modal meanings, depend-
ing partly on their theoretical framework. However, one of the principal
divisions is that between epistemic and non-epistemic modality. The fol-
lowing sections present a brief account of the range of interpretations cov-
ered by these two types of modality.
1.1.1 Epistemic modality

Most researchers agree that epistemic modality can be defined as modality
expressing the speaker’s attitude towards the truth and the degree of au-
thenticity of what is said. Epistemic modality can also be considered “the
modality of propositions” in the sense that it modifies the entire proposi-
tion, not only the act denoted by the main verb (Palmer 1990: 50-51). For
instance, in (3), the speaker is expressing a judgement about the possibility
of the proposition as a whole, and not only Jane’s ability to leave. In the
paraphrase in (4), the proposition is presented in a that-clause, and the
speaker’s judgement is expressed in the main clause.
(3) Jane can be leaving now. Epistemic
(4) It is possible that Jane is leaving now.
Thus, epistemic modality indicates the degree of speaker commitment to

the truth of the proposition, and can range from certainty to uncertainty.
If the neutral/unmarked case in (1), Jane reads, is seen to indicate the
speaker’s complete commitment to the truth of the proposition, anything
marked by epistemic modality indicates something less than complete
commitment on the part of the speaker (Bybee and Fleischman 1995: 177-
180). Bybee and Fleischman suggest a scale of speaker commitment, con-
sisting of the following notions: (i) expressions of possibility, indicating the
lowest commitment on the part of the speaker that the proposition may be
true, as in (5); (ii) expressions of probability, indicating greater commit-

ment on the part of the speaker, as in (6); and (iii) expressions of inferred
certainty, strongly implying that the speaker has reasons to suggest the
proposition is true, as in (7).
(5) Jane can be leaving. [possibility]
(6) Jane may be leaving. [probability]
(7) Jane must be leaving. [inferred certainty]
This scale corresponds closely to that of Givón (1982: 42), who distin-
guishes between the following degrees of epistemic modality: (i) lowest cer-
tainty, i.e. the utterances are doubtful hypotheses, and cannot be chal-
lenged; (ii) medium certainty, i.e. the utterances are open to challenge,
and, thus, require some supporting evidence; and (iii) high certainty, i.e.
the utterances are taken for granted, presupposed, and are above challenge.
A somewhat different type of scale is proposed in Leech (1987: 81-82),
who also claims that there are different degrees of epistemic possibility. In
Leech’s terminology, (8) refers to factual possibility, i.e. that the window
may in fact be broken, or is in the state of being broken at the time of the
utterance, while (9) refers to the theoretical possibility of breaking the win-
dow. Factual possibility, usually expressed by may in English, is stronger
than theoretical possibility, usually expressed by can.
(8) The window may be broken. [factual possibility]
‘It is possible that the window is broken.’3
(9) The window can be broken. [theoretical possibility]
‘It is possible for the window to be broken.’
i.e. ‘It is possible to break the window.’
In Leech’s words, can “merely postulates the theoretical possibility” of the

window being broken, whereas may “envisages the event [the window be-
ing broken] actually happening”. This is indicated by the different para-
phrases for (8) and (9). The use of different modals results in different im-
plicatures of the utterance. In addition to the interpretation indicated in
the paraphrase, (8) implies that it is possible to break the window. Thus, if
3 Unless specified otherwise, what is included in the single quotation marks is the intended interpre-
tation. This applies to the Swedish examples as well, where the verbatim translation is provided in the
gloss.

it is possible that X performs Y, then it is possible for X to Y, but not vice

versa, i.e. factual possibility includes theoretical possibility in its scope.
Support for this view can be found in Hermerén (1978), who considers
all instances of possibility to be epistemic in English. He distinguishes be-
tween factual and theoretical possibility in a way similar to Leech (1987:
81-82). Factual possibility involves the speaker’s judgement “of the likeli-
hood of an event occurring or having occurred”. Theoretical possibility, on
the other hand, “indicates that there is (ungraded) possibility of the occur-
rence of the event or the existence of a state”, which is “often based on the
previous occurrence of the event, i.e. the event has been known to occur at
least once before” (Hermerén 1978: 110-111).4 An interesting conse-
quence of defining factual and theoretical possibility in this way is that ut-
terances with simultaneous or anterior time references for the proposition
fall under the scope of factual possibility, whereas utterances with posterior
reference for the proposition fall under the scope of theoretical possibility
(see also 4.1.3).
Although there seems to be general agreement on the definition of epis-
temic modality, there is no such agreement regarding its scope in the pos-
sibility domain. Coates (1983, 1995), for example, restricts epistemic pos-
sibility to instances of the above-mentioned factual possibility, and consid-
ers theoretical possibility, as defined in Hermerén (1978), root possibility.
Root possibility may be defined, as in Bybee, Perkins and Pagliuca (1994:
190-194), as the “existence of the internal and external conditions on an
agent as to the completion of the proposition”. This distinction between
root and epistemic possibility is embraced by many researchers working
within widely different theoretical frameworks: Cinque (1999), and Beijer
(2005), who differentiate between epistemic modality and general possi-
bility, and Teleman et al. (1999), who distinguish between epistemic pos-
sibility, and the so-called potential modality, denoting inter alia a latent
possibility for something to happen (Teleman et al., 1999: 288).
The claim that we should distinguish between different degrees of epis-
temic possibility, rather than between different possibilities, i.e. root and
4 A parallel can be drawn to some extent between Hermerén’s definition of theoretical possibility and
Brennan’s (1997) account of quantificational modals. The latter claims that sometimes (in combination
with indefinite subjects) modals allow quantificational readings. In An elephant will be small, for exam-
ple, such a reading suggests that ‘Elephants in general are small, i.e. in all possible worlds,’ whereas in
An elephant can be small the interpretation is ‘Some elephants are small, i.e. they are small in some pos-
sible worlds,’ or ‘Being an elephant and being small are compatible properties’. However, Brennan also
claims that “quantificational readings of modals, on the one hand, and root and epistemic readings, on
the other, are mutually exclusive” (Brennan 1997: 5). For an account of the term root see 1.1.2.

epistemic, finds support not only in Leech (1987) and Hermerén (1978),
but also in the work of McCallum-Bayliss (1988), who argues that:
It has been suggested (as far back as Aristotle) that there is not just one con-
cept or possibility, but in fact two […]. I will argue, however, that can and
may both correspond to the same notion of ‘possible’ and that they differ on
another dimension, that of the quality of speaker knowledge. That is, both
can and may contain the same truth condition, ‘(at least) possible’, but can
has an additional truth condition, ‘grounds exist for the possibility of the
proposition’s being the case’. (McCallum-Bayliss 1988: 11)
In this study, I follow the broad definition of epistemic possibility pro-

posed by Hermerén (1978), Leech (1987), and McCallum-Bayliss (1988).
However, the epistemic interpretation of theoretical possibility is some-
times difficult to distinguish from ability readings. Sentence (10), for ex-
ample, may be regarded as a case of either epistemic possibility, or non-
epistemic ability. It is also possible for both interpretations to be present
simultaneously (Perkins 1983: 35). Thus, the interpretation of can in sen-
tences such as (10) appears to be ambiguous.
(10) Cigarettes can seriously damage your health. (Perkins 1983: 35)
In this study, examples analogous to (10) are considered cases of weak epis-
temic possibility. Whereas strong epistemic possibility, which expresses the
speaker’s judgement about the possibility of the proposition being true, is
associated with the notion of probability, weak epistemic possibility ap-
pears to be closely associated with ability/potentiality readings. This differ-
ence is reflected in the different paraphrases for the interpretations (‘It is
possible that…’ for strong epistemic possibility, and ‘It is possible for…’
for weak epistemic possibility, cf. the paraphrases in (8) and (9)). Another
difference between strong and weak epistemic possibility is that the former
indicates the speaker’s beliefs, and can be verified at the time of the utter-
ance. The latter, on the other hand, not only indicates the speaker’s beliefs,
but also makes reference to non-linguistic circumstances that can only be
verified after the time of the utterance.
1.1.2 Non-epistemic modalities

According to Coates (1995: 148-149), the distinction between epistemic
and non-epistemic, or root, modality lies in the subjectivity of the speaker’s
commitment to the truth of the proposition. However, non-epistemic mo-

dality is not a homogenous category, but it is seen by many as a cover term

for a variety of modalities. Cinque (1999), for instance, distinguishes be-
tween epistemic modality, and such non-epistemic modalities as necessity,
possibility, volition, obligation, and ability/permission. This corresponds
to the classification suggested by Palmer (1988, 1990), who distinguishes
between one epistemic, and three non-epistemic modalities, according to
their semantic-pragmatic functions. Other researchers, such as Bybee, Per-
kins and Pagliuca (1994), take into account not only the semantic-prag-
matic function of the different modalities, but also the universal tendency
for different modalities to be expressed by different means (modal verbs or
grammatical moods), as well as the universal direction for the development
of different modalities.
The definition of non-epistemic modality adopted in this study follows
closely von Wrigt’s (1951) and Palmer’s (1988, 1990) classification into de-
ontic, dynamic, and existential modalities. There is one addition, however:
following Eide (2002), a distinction is made between directed and non-di-
rected deontic modality.
1.1.2.1 Deontic modality

Deontic modality is described as performative: deontic modals are used to
“impos[e] obligation”, “giv[e] permission”, or “mak[e] a promise” or in
some other way influence or direct the behaviour of the addressee (Palmer
1988: 96-98 and 1990: 69-72). Thus, the event modified by the modal is
immediate to the act of speech. Deontic modality, like epistemic modality,
is discourse-oriented. As mentioned above, in epistemic utterances, the
speaker expresses her commitment to the truth of the proposition. In de-
ontic utterances, on the other hand, the speaker grants or asks for permis-
sion to act out the proposition of the utterance.
(11) Jane can leave now. Deontic
(12) ‘I permit Jane to leave now.’
(13) ‘Jane is allowed to leave now.’
In (11), it is the speaker who grants the permission, and the subject of the
sentence, Jane, is to perform the action expressed by the main predicate
leave. Sentences (12) and (13) are possible paraphrases for (11).
Some linguists, however, claim that this account of deontic modality is
not complete. There are cases where the deontic force of an utterance does

not originate in the speaker, and is not directed at the subject (which is co-
referential with the intended agent).
(14) If the ratepayers should be consulted, so too must the council tenants.
(Palmer 1990: 113)
Palmer (1990) considers the use of must in (14) a case of dynamic necessity.
Dynamic necessity is often expressed “in assertion, [where] there is little or
no indication of the involvement of the speaker” (Palmer 1990: 113). It
should be noted that, contrary to the analysis proposed in Palmer’s works,
in this study examples such as (14) are not considered dynamic, since these
sentences have much more in common with deontic modality than with
dynamic modality, discussed in 1.1.2.2. This similarity between deontic
modality and the modality expressed in (14) is captured in Feldman
(1986), who claims that
Sometimes, instead of saying that a certain person ought to do a certain

thing, we may say that a certain state of affairs ought to be, or ought to occur
[…]. The ought-to-do involves a relation between an agent and a state of af-
fairs. The ought-to-be involves a property of a state of affairs. (Feldman 1986:
179)
Thus, in the ‘ought-to-be’ statements, the focus is shifted from the Agent
who is to carry out the proposition to the general Source (not necessarily
the speaker) interested in the carrying out of the proposition. That modal-
ity can be seen from different points of view is illustrated in Calbert (1975:
24):
[…] each modality can be expressed from the point of view of the Source [X
in [(i)]] or from the point of the Goal [Y in [(ii)]]. These alternatives may be
called Source-oriented and Goal-oriented modalities respectively […]:
(i) X wants Y to…
(ii) Y has to…
Eide (2002) proposes another distinction, that between two kinds of de-
ontic modality: directed and non-directed. She considers the latter non-di-
rected deontic, “since the obligation or permission is not directed towards
the subject referent”, i.e. “it is not the subject who has an obligation or per-
mission to do something” (Eide 2002: 20). The opposite condition needs
to be fulfilled for the interpretation to be considered directed deontic, i.e.
the obligation or permission has to be directed towards the subject refer-

ent.5 Following Eide, this study distinguishes between directed and non-
directed deontic modality. However, unlike Eide, I focus on the Source of
modality rather than its Goal (see Calbert above). Thus, my definition of
directed deontic modality corresponds closely to Palmer’s definition of de-
ontic modality in that the deontic force originates from the speaker, and is
directed towards the subject referent. I define non-directed deontic modal-
ity as a modality where the deontic force expressed in the utterance is not
necessarily directed towards the subject referent. Also, the deontic force in
such utterances originates in the relevant circumstances, and not with the
speaker. This distinction is consistent with Verstraete’s (2001) subjective
and objective functions of deontic modality. Subjective uses of deontic mo-
dality “serve to encode the speaker’s commitment to the necessity/permis-
sibility of an action”, whereas objective uses of deontic modality “predicate
[…] the existence of some necessity without actually committing the
speaker to it” (Verstraete 2001: 1525).
1.1.2.2 Dynamic modality

Dynamic modality has to do with the ability of the (canonically animate)
subject to perform the action stated in the proposition of the utterance. It
is, therefore, subject-oriented. In this respect, it differs from the discourse-
oriented modalities mentioned above, i.e. modalities that involve both the
speaker and the addressee (Palmer 1990: 7, 83-88 and 1988: 96-98). In
other words, as Huddleston and Pullum (2002) put it, “[d]ynamic modal-
ity is less central to modality than deontic permission in that it does not
involve the speaker’s attitude to the factuality or actualization of situation”,
which they consider to be central to modal meaning (Huddleston and Pul-
lum 2002: 179). Another concern for them is that dynamic modality “does
not apply as generally to the modal auxiliaries as do deontic and epistemic
modality” (Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 179).
In (15), the modal can refers to Jane’s ability to play chess.
(15) Jane can play chess. Dynamic
The paraphrase for this sentence is:

5 In defining non-directed deontic modality, Eide relies on Barbiers (1995), who provides the fol-
lowing definitions of directed and non-directed deontic interpretations: “the directed deontic interpre-
tation denotes an obligation or permission which has an external source directed towards the subject
(which means that the subject has this obligation or permission); the non-directed deontic interpreta-
tion also denotes permission, obligation or requirement, but one that is not directed to the subject of
the sentence (i.e. the situation is required or permitted, but independent of the subject’s actions or at-
titudes)” (Barbiers 1995: 145).

(16) ‘Jane is able to play chess.’
The paraphrase in (16) appropriately reflects the salient sense of ability of

the subject to perform the action stated in the proposition, namely to play
chess.
1.1.2.3 Existential modality

According to von Wright’s model, the existential mode or the mode of ex-
istence refers to the phenomena existing in the world under some or any
circumstances (‘there is a possibility…’). Existential modality, like existen-
tial mode in modal logic, is closely associated with dynamic modality
(Palmer 1990: 7, 107). Unlike dynamic modality, however, it is not sub-
ject-oriented.6 Indeed, this association is suggested by the paraphrase of
(17).
(17) Lions can be dangerous. (Leech 1969: 223) Existential
(18) ‘It is sometimes possible for lions to be dangerous.’
(19) ‘Lions are sometimes dangerous.’
In (18), the paraphrase for existential modality is modified by sometimes to

indicate that the phenomenon described in the proposition, i.e. ‘lions are
dangerous’, occurs under certain circumstances.7 The paraphrase in (19)
reflects perhaps this special sense of can more precisely, since it does not in-
dicate any ability of the subject to perform the action of the proposition.
1.2 Modal verbs

At this point, it should be repeated that modality in language can be ex-
pressed by various means. Two of the ways of expressing modality, mood
and modal verbs, have already been mentioned. Investigations of modality
in Western European languages have been dominated by the study of mo-
dal verbs, since these languages contain a more or less easily identified
group of modal verbs (see, for example, the summaries in Lampert and
Lampert (2000) and Nyuts (2000) for comments on this restriction).
6 Cf. also the discussion of (10), on the relation between weak epistemic and dynamic interpreta-
tions.
7 Although sometimes is a temporal or quantificational adverb, it implies reason or, perhaps, condi-
tion. Thus, lions are sometimes dangerous, if threatened, for example.

Many other ways to express modality are available, depending on the lan-
guage under investigation: modal adjectives (possible, certain, etc.), adverbs
(perhaps, probably, etc.), nouns (need, necessity, etc.), lexical verbs (think, be-
lieve, etc.), hedges (you know, well, like, etc.), and others. These means of
expressing modality tend to be more difficult to identify and classify than
the formal category of modal auxiliaries.
Since the two languages investigated here, English and Swedish, lack an
elaborate mood system, but have an abundance of modal verbs, the present
investigation focuses primarily on modal verbs. Modal verbs can be clearly
identified in both languages using a number of syntactic and morphologi-
cal criteria, as well as by the range of possible interpretations, discussed in
the sections to follow.
1.2.1 Criteria for identifying modal verbs in English

In English, modal verbs can be distinguished from other auxiliaries and the
so-called modal idioms (had better, would rather, etc.) on the basis of cer-
tain morpho-syntactic criteria suggested in Quirk et al. (1985).8 Firstly, all
auxiliaries in English share the so-called NICE properties, namely Nega-
tion, Inversion, Code (and Emphasis):
(i) Auxiliaries are followed by the negative particle not without the need
for do-support, whereas main verbs cannot:
(20) John cannot play the piano.
(21) *John plays not the piano.
(ii) Auxiliaries are inverted with the subject in interrogative sentences,

and in declarative sentences starting with a negative adverbial taking scope
over the whole sentence, whereas main verbs require do-support:
(22) Can John play the piano?
(23) *Plays John the piano?
(iii) Auxiliaries, but not main verbs, encode the proposition in various
elliptic constructions:
(24) John can play the piano, and so can Mary.
8 A more detailed summary is offered in Warner (1993: 3-9).

(25) *John eats bananas, and so eats Mary.
Modal verbs can further be distinguished from other auxiliary verbs by the
following four criteria:
(iv) Unlike other auxiliaries and main verbs, modal verbs can only be
followed by bare infinitives:
(26) John can (*to) play the piano.
(v) Unlike other auxiliaries and main verbs, modal verbs have only finite
forms:
(27) *John has musted play the piano.
(vi) Unlike other auxiliaries and main verbs, modal verbs do not inflect
for 3rd person singular:
(28) *John cans play the piano.
(vii) Both the past and present forms of modals,9 formally preterite and
present, can be used in utterances with present, past, and future time ref-
erence:
(29) John could give his concert tomorrow, if he is asked.
By using these criteria for modal auxiliarihood proposed in Quirk et al.

(1985), it is possible to distinguish the following modal verbs in English:
can, could, may, might, will, would, shall, should, must. The range of possible
interpretations of these modals is discussed in 1.2.3.
1.2.2 Criteria for identifying modal verbs in Swedish

In Swedish, the morpho-syntactic distinction between main verbs and aux-
iliaries is much less clear than in English. Therefore, unlike English auxil-
iaries, classified primarily on the basis of morpho-syntactic criteria, Swed-
ish auxiliaries are divided into different groups primarily based on meaning
(Teleman et al. 1999: 536-537).10 It is possible to distinguish five groups
9 In this study, I distinguish between the form and the interpretation of modals: the terms past and
present are used to refer to the form, as in (29), whereas anterior and simultaneous are used to refer to
interpretation.
10 Teleman et al. (1999) build their argument on the assumption that modals are polysemous.

of auxiliaries in Swedish: (i) temporal (ha ‘have’, skola ‘shall, will’, kommer
‘shall, will’); (ii) modal (måste ‘must, have (got) to’, kunna ‘may, be able to,
can’, etc.); (iii) passive (bliva ‘become’, vara ‘be’); (iv) actional (börja ‘be-
gin’, bruka ‘use, used to’, tendera ‘tend’, etc.); and (v) causal (e.g. låta ‘let’).
Again, there seems to be no systematic way of distinguishing between these
groups of auxiliaries other than on the basis of their interpretations.
Nevertheless, Swedish auxiliary verbs are characterized by certain mor-
pho-syntactic behaviours not present in main verbs. According to Teleman
et al. (1999: 536-537), most typical auxiliaries in Swedish can only be fol-
lowed by a bound subordinate infinitive verb phrase, as in (30). This sub-
ordinate infinitive phrase has only a few (if any) nominal characteristics,
i.e. it cannot be replaced by a noun phrase, as shown by the ungrammati-
cality of (31).
(30) Peter lär behöva paraply idag.

Peter MOD need-INF umbrella today
‘Peter should need an umbrella today.’
(31) *Peter lär behov av paraply idag.

Peter MOD need-N of umbrella today
Secondly, a typical auxiliary in Swedish cannot be an antecedent of göra

(det), ‘do (it)’, as shown in (32).
(32) Måste Peter ta paraply med sig idag? – Ja, det måste/*gör han.
MOD Peter take-INF umbrella with REFL today Yes it MOD/*do-PRES he
‘Must Peter take an umbrella with him today? – Yes, he must/*does.’
A typical auxiliary is also “subject-autonomous”, i.e. the subject referent

has no semantic role in the action described by the auxiliary.11 Lastly, typ-
ical auxiliaries have defective or irregular inflectional paradigms.
In this study, I focus on modal auxiliary verbs that comply with all of
these morpho-syntactic criteria for Swedish auxiliaries. Thus, the list of
modals comprises the following verbs: skola ‘shall, should, will, would, be
to’, lär ‘is known to, should’, torde ‘will, will probably’, bör, borde ‘should’,
11 This, however, is true mostly of epistemic modals, since they take the whole proposition in their
scope. Deontic modals, on the other hand, are often vague with respect to the subject orientation, i.e.
it is more or less understood whether the duty, obligation or permission is associated with the subject
referent (in directed deontic interpretation) or with the proposition as a whole (in non-directed deontic
interpretation). Both potential and intentional modals are almost always subject-oriented (see Teleman
et al. 1999: 282-284).

måste ‘must, have to’, kunna ‘can, may, be able to’, få ‘be allowed to’, må
‘let, may, must’.
1.2.3 Modal verbs and their interpretations

In both English and Swedish, each modal has a range of epistemic and
non-epistemic interpretations. These interpretations can be positioned on
epistemic and non-epistemic scales according to the strength of the speak-
er’s commitment to the truth of the proposition or the speaker’s authority
over the addressee in the utterance. Such scalar organization of modal in-
terpretations is not only well-attested by data in the two languages under
investigation, but it also seems necessary, “if one accepts the position that
a linguistic analysis ought to be cognitively (and functionally) plausible”
(Nuyts 2005: 11). In the sections that follow, I propose a way of organizing
modals on the epistemic and non-epistemic scales, and discuss the range of
possible interpretations for each modal.
1.2.3.1 The epistemic scale

Epistemic modals indicate various degrees of speaker commitment to the
truth of the proposition expressed in an utterance, from certainty to pos-
sibility. English modals can be organized as in Figure 1. The absence of ver-
tical lines in Figure 1 and all the subsequent figures indicates that it may
be difficult to clearly distinguish between different interpretations.12 Each
modal is a continuum whose edges are difficult to distinguish from the
neighbouring categories. The centre represents the most canonical inter-
pretation.
CONFIDENT REASONABLE TENTATIVE POSSIBLE

INFERENCE INFERENCE INFERENCE CONCLUSION
must will should may might can
could
Figure 1. The scalar organization of English epistemic modals
Must expresses both epistemic and non-epistemic necessity, or, more accu-
rately, epistemic certainty and non-epistemic, deontic obligation.
(33) The guests all suffer from stomach pains. The food at the reception must have been
spoilt. Epistemic
12 For a comprehensive discussion of indeterminacy, see Coates (1983), Leech and Coates (1979),
and also 3.3 of the present study.

‘On the basis of the available evidence, I (the speaker) confidently infer that the food
at the reception was spoilt.’
(34) Roses must be watered regularly. Deontic
‘It is necessary for roses to be watered regularly.’
In (33), must is interpreted as indicating a certainty on the part of the

speaker that what she is saying is true, and also that this certainty is based
on the evidence at hand. In (34), on the other hand, must is interpreted as
indicating either objective necessity for the roses to be watered regularly
(non-directed deontic), or, in some contexts, a directed deontic statement,
which can be paraphrased roughly as ‘I, the speaker, order you, the address-
ee to water roses regularly’. With epistemic, as well as non-directed deontic
interpretations, neither the speaker nor the addressee has control over the
situation described in the proposition. Despite the similarities regarding
speaker control, (33) is interpreted as epistemic, while (34) is not. Thus, it
is only the must in (33) that is considered in Figure 1.
Quirk et al. (1985: 228-229) observe that will is similar in its epistemic
interpretation to epistemic must, and also that it is relatively rare in this
sense.
(35) A: Somebody is coming.
B: Oh, that will be the postman. Epistemic
‘On the basis of evidence at hand (e.g. that the postman usually comes at this time),
I (the speaker) reasonably predict that it is the postman who is coming.’
According to Coates (1983: 177), however, the difference between will and
must lies in the fact that, in the case of will, the speaker’s confidence in the
truth of the proposition “is not based on a process of logical inference, [...]
it is based on common sense, or on repeated experience”. In (35), it is re-
peated experience that allows the speaker to make a reasonable inference.
Thus, whereas must is associated with deductive epistemic modality, will is
associated with assumptive epistemic modality (Palmer 2001: 24-25).
Tentative inference is expressed in English by should (in addition to oth-
er means outside of the scope of the present investigation). In its epistemic
interpretation, should indicates that, on the basis of the evidence at hand,
the speaker makes a tentative inference about the truth of the proposition,
as in (36).
(36) He should be home by now. Epistemic

‘On the basis of the evidence available to me (the speaker), I tentatively conclude
that he is at home now.’
According to Quirk et al. (1985: 227), the difference between should and
must lies not only in the strength of the speaker’s conviction in the truth of
the proposition, but also in the fact that should connotes the desirability of
the realization of the proposition expressed in an utterance. Another dif-
ference between the two modals is the fact that epistemic should “typically
refer[s] to the future”, whereas must typically refers to the present (Coates
1983: 65).
Epistemic may is in the category of speculative epistemic modality, in-
dicating a possible conclusion (Palmer 2001: 24-25). According to Coates
(1983: 133-134), may allows the speaker to avoid commitment to the
truth of the proposition. Thus, may is interpreted epistemically in cases
where the speaker makes a tentative conclusion regarding the possibility of
the proposition being true. This conclusion is based on “defective” or in-
conclusive evidence, and the inference is much weaker than in cases with
epistemic must and should.
(37) He may be home by now. Epistemic
‘It is possible that he is at home now.’
May can also be interpreted as weak epistemic, as in (38).13
(38) Although the noise may detract from some people’s enjoyment, it certainly seems to
do little to upset the birds who carry on feeding regardless. (SUG) 14
Weak epistemic
‘…On the basis of prior experience, I (the speaker) make a tentative conclusion that
it is possible for the noise to detract from some people’s enjoyment.’
In (38), reference is made not only to the epistemic conclusion made by

the speaker at the time of the utterance, but also to some additional non-
linguistic circumstances such as, for example, experience or general world
knowledge of the fact that noise is usually perceived as a nuisance. In this
sense, weak epistemic may can be related to the epistemic interpretations
of will and can, which are also based on world knowledge and experience.
13 This is in contrast to Leech (1987), who suggests a “division of labour” between may and can, such
that only can allows the interpretation of theoretical possibility, here called weak epistemic possibility.
14 The example is taken from the English-Swedish parallel corpus, the ESPC. The abbreviation in pa-
renthesis at the end of the example indicates the source text.

Might is usually interpreted as expressing epistemic possibility similar to

may. The general view seems to be that might is a more tentative version of
may (e.g. Quirk et al. 1985). This view, however, is not shared by Coates
(1983), who finds no support for this claim in her data, and, consequently,
suggests that epistemic may and might are usually interchangeable (Coates
1983: 146-147). Might with epistemic interpretation is used more often
than may, and is considered by many researchers to be the typical token of
epistemic possibility (Coates 1983, Quirk et al. 1985: 223-224).
With regard to could, Coates (1983: 165) argues that it expresses tenta-
tive possibility. This is consistent with the later findings in Quirk et al.
(1985). She further suggests, however, that could replaces might as “the new
exponent of tentative [e]pistemic possibility” (Coates 1983: 167). Thus,
(39) should be interpreted as expressing less speaker commitment to the
truth of the proposition than (40).
(39) He could be at home. Epistemic
(40) He might be at home. Epistemic
Palmer (1990) does not include could in his account of epistemic modals
in English, following the traditional view that can and could are exponents
of dynamic modality, and only rarely appear with epistemic interpreta-
tions. I agree with Quirk et al. (1985), however, who argue that could can
be interpreted epistemically. This argument is supported not only by the
data, but also by the scalar definition of epistemic modality adopted in this
study. Regarding the difference between could and might in the degree of
speaker commitment suggested in Coates (1983), further investigation
seems to be in order.
Most researchers analysing modal verbs in English agree that can can
only be interpreted epistemically (possibility) in non-assertive contexts
(negated declaratives and interrogatives) (see, for instance, Quirk et al.
1985, Coates 1983, 1995, Palmer 1990). Coates (1995), however, suggests
that can may in time develop into a fully epistemic modal. In my analysis,
can, and possibly could, in declarative sentences can express at least weak
epistemic possibility as in (10), repeated here as (41).
(41) Cigarettes can seriously damage your health. (Perkins 1983: 35) Weak epistemic
As is the case with weak epistemic may, the interpretation of weak epistem-
ic can involves not only the speaker’s beliefs about the truth of the propo-
sition and the evidence at hand, but also general world knowledge and ex-

perience. Thus, weak epistemic interpretations seem to be similar to rea-

sonable inference usually expressed by will.
The organization of Swedish modals on the epistemic scale15 is quite
different from that of English modals, as Figure 2 shows. Firstly, unlike
English, Swedish possesses the grammaticalized means to express evidenti-
ality, as in hear-say and shared beliefs. Secondly, there is no single modal
that can be interpreted exclusively as expressing reasonable conclusion,
similar to English will. Also, the number of modals with different interpre-
tations is different in English and Swedish.
CONFIDENT REASONABLE TENTATIVE POSSIBLE HEAR- SHARED

INFERENCE INFERENCE INFERENCE CONCLUSION SAY BELIEF
måste bör bör borde må kan kunde lär torde
lär torde måtte ska
Figure 2. The scalar organization of Swedish epistemic modals16
According to Teleman et al. (1999: 308-311), epistemic måste indicates the

strongest speaker commitment, i.e. the proposition expressed in an utter-
ance is necessarily true on the basis of the evidence available to the speaker.
Usually, måste indicates such commitment in the present, but can also in-
dicate past commitment in indirect speech. In its epistemic interpretation,
måste is similar to epistemic must. In addition, måste, similarly to must, al-
lows for both directed and non-directed deontic interpretations.
(42) Han måste vara hemma nu. Epistemic

he MOD be-INF home now
‘On the basis of the available evidence, I (the speaker) confidently infer that he is at
home now.’
(43) Han måste vara hemma vid 9-tiden. Deontic

he MOD be-INF home at 9-time-DEF
‘He is obliged to be home by 9 o’clock.’
(44) Rosor måste vattnas ofta. Deontic

roses MOD water-INF-PASS often
‘It is necessary for roses to be watered often.’
15 I assume here, in a general Saussurian and cognitive spirit, that although language systems may dif-
fer, they share underlying cognitive structures.
16 In this and subsequent figures, I place in shaded boxes the modals that arguably should not be in-
cluded in the epistemic scale proper or that, for reasons discussed later, are not pertinent to the present
investigation.

As illustrated in (42), an utterance containing the modal måste can express

the speaker’s certainty about the truth of the proposition. In (43), on the
other hand, måste lends itself to a deontic interpretation. (44) is interpret-
ed as non-directed deontic. It is possible to conclude that the epistemic and
deontic uses of måste correspond closely to the epistemic and deontic uses
of must.
Reasonable inference can be expressed by two modals: epistemic bör and
evidential lär. The difference between reasonable and tentative inference
expressed by bör is vague for many speakers. Thus, under certain circum-
stances, (45) can be interpreted as expressing both reasonable and tentative
inference. Lär, on the other hand, should arguably not be included in the
epistemic scale. In general, it is unclear whether lär, and other Swedish ev-
identials such as ska and torde, should be located on the epistemic scale at
all, despite Teleman et al.’s claim (1999: 284-286, 305, 312-313) that these
modals have epistemic interpretations. Palmer (2001: 24-52), for example,
argues that evidential and epistemic modalities are two different kinds of
propositional modality, which may suggest that evidentials do not belong
on the epistemic scale.
Although excluded from the present investigation, the evidentials in
Figure 2 are organized according to the same principle as epistemic modals:
from left to right, the commitment on the part of the speaker with respect
to the truth of the proposition decreases. Thus, the modals lär and ska in-
dicate first- or second-hand evidence, i.e. the speaker “claims to have heard
of the situation described” either from a direct witness or from a third par-
ty (Palmer 2001: 40). Torde, on the other hand, indicates that the speaker
relies on evidence from folklore, “the speaker claims that the situation de-
scribed is part of established oral history”, or on quotative evidence “the
speaker regards what he has said to be something that everyone knows”
(Palmer 2001: 40-41).
Epistemic bör expresses tentative inference, i.e. based on the evidence at
hand, the speaker makes a tentative conclusion about the truth of the
proposition, as in (45).
(45) Persson bör vinna valet. Epistemic

Persson MOD win-INF election-DEF
‘On the basis of the available evidence, I (the speaker) tentatively conclude that
Persson will win the elections.’
The relationship between måste and bör with respect to the strength of the
speaker’s commitment seems to be the same as that between must and

should, i.e. the second modal in each pair indicates weaker commitment to
the truth of the proposition on the part of the speaker. Bör does not direct-
ly correspond to English should, however, since in Swedish tentative infer-
ence is expressed by two modals. The second modal borde indicates a more
tentative conclusion than bör. In addition, it is unclear whether bör/borde
share connotations of desirability with epistemic should.
Tentative conclusion can also be expressed by evidential torde, indicat-
ing that the speaker distances herself from the proposition to a greater de-
gree than when using borde. Torde, however, is not considered part of the
epistemic scale, because it is stylistically, and, possibly, dialectally marked.
Also, as already mentioned, evidentials as such should probably not be in-
cluded in the scale.
Tentative conclusion can also be expressed by må and måtte. They indi-
cate that the inference is made on the basis of circumstantial evidence, i.e.
by using these modals epistemically, the speaker indicates that there are
some circumstances that suggest that the proposition is true. However,
these modals are said to be stylistically marked (Teleman et al. 1999: 305-
309), and it is reasonable to conclude that they appear in atypical contexts.
Since this study is concerned with the typical relationship between context
and interpretation (see 1.4), these modals are not part of it.
Possible conclusion can be expressed in Swedish by two modals, kan and
kunde, both indicating a tentative conclusion about the possibility of the
proposition being true. Although Teleman et al. (1999) consider kunde
more tentative than kan, many speakers interpret kunde as counterfactu-
al.17 Usually both modals are said to have present time reference, since
epistemic judgements are simultaneous with the time of the utterance, and
thus refer to the present. However, kunde can also indicate past judgement
such as in indirect speech (Teleman et al. 1999: 299-300).
(46) Han kan ha ljugit. Epistemic

he MOD have-INF lie-PART
‘It is possible that he lied.’
(47) Han kunde ha ljugit. Epistemic

he MOD have-INF lie-PART
‘It is possible that he lied (but he didn’t).’
17 This is consistent with Verstraete’s (2006) observation that, at least in Australian languages, epis-
temic and deontic past modal forms trigger an implicature of counterfactuality. Note also that the past
forms of the modals in English, and in many cases in Swedish, do not carry anterior time reference,
and can be used to express counterfactuality.

According to Teleman et al. (1999), the difference between (46) and (47)
lies in the degree of speaker commitment to the truth of the proposition.
However, (47) is interpreted by some speakers to have the connotation of
a hypothetical or unreal statement. This is consistent with the claim that
kunde can also signal a suggestion on the part of the speaker that the pos-
sibility indicated by the modal is dependent on some improbable or non-
factual circumstances (Teleman et al. 1999: 303-304). The fact that kunde
seems no longer to express possible conclusion for some speakers, in par-
ticular younger ones, may be due to a change in usage.
Since possible conclusion seems to be expressed in Swedish mainly by
kan (kunde should be excluded for the reasons given above), this modal can
be assumed to cover the possible interpretations of four English modals:
may, might, can, and possibly could. Certain parallels may be drawn be-
tween may and can, on the one hand, and kan, on the other, since these
modals can express both strong and weak epistemic possibility. Likewise,
kunde can be considered similar to might and could, since for some speakers
these modals express more tentative conclusion than may and can.
1.2.3.2 The deontic scale

Modals allowing for deontic interpretation can express obligation (it is
necessary or recommendable that the proposition be carried out), permis-
sion (the addressee is allowed to carry out the proposition), and, particu-
larly when it comes to Swedish modals, volition (the speaker or subject sees
it as desirable that the proposition be carried out) (Teleman et al. 1999:
286-288). Similarly to epistemic modals, deontic modals can be organized
on a scale according to the strength of the speaker’s authority over the ad-
dressee.18 Figure 3 represents the deontic scale for English modals: from
left to right, the speaker’s authority decreases. The broken line indicates
that it is difficult to clearly distinguish between the different interpreta-
tions.
OBLIGATION RECOMMENDATION PERMISSION

must should can could
may might
Figure 3. The scalar organization of English deontic modals
18 Note, however, that Verstraete (2005) argues for the inclusion of another dimension, the willing-
ness of a modal agent to perform the action described in the proposition. This and related notions are
discussed in Chapter 4.

Must, indicating the strongest authority of the speaker over the addressee,
or, as in the case of non-directed deontic modality, the strongest pressure
executed by some circumstances on a sometimes unspecified agent, is in-
terpreted deontically as imposing an obligation on the addressee, as in
(48).
(48) You must go to the dentist now! Deontic
‘I (the speaker) urge you to go to the dentist.’
In this interpretation, the speaker clearly exerts control over the situation,
and exercises authority over the addressee.
As Figures 1 and 3 show, must with both deontic and epistemic inter-
pretations is at the extreme left of the scales. On the epistemic scale, must
expresses certainty or strong inference, on the non-epistemic scale necessity
and strong obligation.
The non-epistemic interpretation of should is similar to the deontic in-
terpretation of must, i.e. that of obligation (Quirk et al. 1985: 277). How-
ever, the speaker’s authority over the addressee is not exercised to the same
degree as in utterances containing deontic must. Thus, the obligation the
speaker imposes on the addressee is weaker, and can be seen as a (strong)
recommendation rather than an order, as illustrated in (49).
(49) You should go to the dentist. Deontic
‘I (the speaker) (strongly) recommend you to go to the dentist.’
Clearly, the speaker of (49) exerts much less pressure on the addressee than
the speaker of (48), or finds the action described in the proposition less
necessary.
Can, may and could indicate that the speaker is giving permission to the
addressee to carry out the proposition expressed in the utterance.
(50) You may go to bed later than usual tonight. Deontic
‘I (the speaker) allow you to go to bed later tonight.’
(51) You can go to bed later than usual tonight. Deontic
(52) You could go to bed later than usual tonight. Deontic
In (50) through (52), the notion expressed is virtually the same. The dif-
ference between (50) and (51) lies only in the degree of formality: may is

considered in most contexts to be more formal than can (cf. Quirk et al.
1985, Palmer 1988, 1990, Coates 1983). Could, on the other hand, by vir-
tue of being the past, or preterite, form of the modal can, is conventionally
interpreted as being more polite.
According to Quirk et al. (1985: 223-224), might can also express per-
mission. This use, however, is rare and archaic, and is thus excluded from
the above scale.19
Swedish modals can also be positioned on a deontic scale, with virtually
the same notions of obligation, recommendation, permission, and, addi-
tionally, volition.
OBLIGATION RECOMMENDATION PERMISSION VOLITION

måste ska bör borde få kunna må
måtte
Figure 4. The scalar organization of Swedish deontic modals
Obligation can be expressed in Swedish by two modals, måste and ska. De-
ontic måste indicates that the addressee is subjected to an absolute demand.
According to Teleman et al. (1999: 308-311), the source of such a demand
can be rules, custom, or general practicality. More often than not, måste
with this interpretation is subject-oriented, i.e. it is the (animate) subject
that is usually expected to comply with the demand expressed in an utter-
ance. In other words, the utterance is interpreted as directed deontic.
(53) Du måste gå till tandläkaren en gång om året. Deontic

you MOD go-INF to dentist-DEF one time about year-DEF
‘I (the speaker) urge you to go to the dentist once a year.’
In (53), the speaker has authority over the addressee, and the addressee is
in control of the action described in the proposition. This, however, does
not rule out non-directed deontic interpretations in certain contexts.
The second modal, ska, indicates that the proposition is in accordance
with some norm or is willed by someone (Teleman et al. 1999: 312-313).
This interpretation of ska is similar to the modals expressing recommenda-
tion, bör and borde. The only difference is that ska indicates a more cate-
gorical demand than bör and borde.
19 The collocation might as well is often used in this sense. However, it is not considered in the present
investigation, since, as is the case with other modal idioms, it does not comply with the strict morpho-
syntactic criteria used to identify modal verbs in this chapter.

(54) Du ska gå till tandläkaren en gång om året. Deontic

(55) Du bör gå till tandläkaren en gång om året. Deontic

(56) Du borde gå till tandläkaren en gång om året. Deontic

Thus, (54) is more authoritative than either (55) or (56).

The modal of recommendation, bör, indicates that the proposition
complies with social norms or general practicality. Since norms usually
deal with how one is to behave in a situation, the lexical verb is normally
agentive, and refers to the future (Teleman et al. 1999: 292-294), as in (55)
and (56). Also, an utterance containing the present form bör is often un-
derstood as a rather strict, moralising recommendation, which the speaker
expects will be carried out. Borde, on the other hand, indicates a softer, less
moralising recommendation the speaker does not necessarily believe will
be carried out. In addition, borde may have a hypothetical, unreal, or non-
factual interpretation, i.e. “the speaker is aware of the fact that the reality
is contrary to the norm” (Teleman et al. 1999: 301), as in (57).
(57) Rosorna borde vattnas oftare. Deontic

rose-PL-DEF MOD water-INF-PASS more-often
‘It is (tentatively) recommended that the roses be watered more often (this
recommendation, however, is not carried out).’
Another interpretation is available for the present form bör (and sometimes
borde), namely a non-directed deontic interpretation, as in (58).
(58) Rosor bör vattnas ofta. Deontic

rose-PL MOD water-INF-PASS often
‘It is recommended that roses be watered often.’
As in epistemic utterances, the speaker in (58) does not control the situa-
tion. The utterance, however, is to be interpreted as expressing objective or
circumstantial necessity. This non-directed deontic interpretation seems to
be available not only for English must, as discussed above, but also for
Swedish måste, especially with inanimate subjects. In that case, non-direct-
ed deontic måste expresses a more urgent necessity than deontic bör.

Permission can be expressed in Swedish by two modals: få, and kunna.

According to Teleman et al. (1999: 294-297), the modal få (‘be allowed’)
is similar to the lexical verb få (‘receive’). Like the lexical verb, which indi-
cates that somebody receives something, this modal indicates that some-
body receives permission, or is given the option to act on a proposition.
(59) Du får lägga dig senare ikväll.

you MOD lie-INF you-ACC later tonight
‘I (the speaker) allow you to go to bed later tonight.’
As illustrated by (59), the main verb normally describes an action that

complies with a certain social or functional norm, and is often something
for which a person or an institution can give permission (Teleman et al.
1999: 294). Deontic få is the only Swedish modal that has no epistemic
counterpart.20
Deontic kunna is used to give permission, as well as to indicate that the
utterance should be pragmatically understood as a polite request (Teleman
et al. 1999: 300-301). Thus, the difference between få and kunna is said to
be that the speaker is less visible in utterances with kunna, since these ut-
terances mark that the speaker exerts less authority over the addressee than
in utterances containing få, as demonstrated in (60).
(60) Du kan lägga dig senare ikväll.

you MOD lie-INF you-ACC later tonight
‘I (the speaker) controlling the situation say that it is possible for you to go to bed
later tonight if you want to.’
When utterances with kunna are pragmatically understood as polite re-

quests, instead of using an imperative the speaker can use an interrogative
sentence with kunna, formally asking the addressee whether he is capable
of carrying out the proposition.
(61) Kan du öppna fönstret?

MOD you open-INF window-DEF
‘Can you open the window?’
(62) Kunde du öppna fönstret?

MOD you open-INF window-DEF
20 It is doubtful that sentences like Då får det beslutas på nästa möte (‘Then it should be decided on
the next meeting’) can be interpreted epistemically.

‘Could you open the window?’
Similarly to English past modals, Swedish past modals are interpreted

pragmatically as more tentative or polite. Thus, the difference between
(61) and (62) is in the degree of politeness: (62) is understood as being a
more polite request than (61).
Deontic interpretation is also available for the modals må and måtte.
These modals can be used to express permission in place of få and kan, re-
spectively. The difference between the deontic and the epistemic interpre-
tations of these modals is somewhat unclear (Teleman et al. 1999: 305-
308). Additionally, these two modals can be interpreted as expressing the
speaker’s will or desire that the proposition be carried out. In those cases,
the speaker is even less authoritative than in utterances with kunna. How-
ever, as mentioned above, these modals are stylistically marked, and even
archaic, and are likely to appear in atypical contexts, a fact that may not
allow for the generalisations aimed at in this study. They are, therefore, not
considered in the present investigation.
1.2.3.3 Dynamic modals

Dynamic possibility is expressed primarily by can and could in English, and
kan and kunde in Swedish. It can be considered a special case of possibility,
“one in which the possibility of an action is due to some skill or capability
on the part of the subject” (Quirk et al. 1985: 221-223).
(63) Tom can play the piano.
‘Tom is able to play the piano.’
(64) Tom could play the piano (but, since he did not practice for a long time, he lost his ability).
‘Tom was able to play the piano.’
(65) Tom kan spela piano.

Tom MOD play-INF piano
‘Tom is able to play the piano.’
(66) Tom kunde spela piano

Tom MOD play-INF piano
‘Tom was able to play the piano

(but, since he had not practiced for a long while, he lost his ability).’

The present forms of the modals indicate present ability, and the past ones
past ability. All four modals can be interpreted in at least three different
ways: epistemically (both weak and strong), deontically, and dynamically.
It may be difficult to distinguish between these interpretations. Teleman et
al. (1999: 298), for example, point out that with kunna the distinctions are
often unclear.
1.2.3.4 Choosing the modals for this investigation

We can now conclude that must and måste occupy the leftmost position on
both the epistemic and the deontic scales, since they indicate the strongest
speaker commitment to the truth of the proposition, and the strongest
speaker authority over the addressee. Therefore, these modals can be con-
sidered to correspond to each other.
On the opposite end of the scales are: may, might, can, could and kan,
kunde. This makes it difficult to decide which modals in English corre-
spond to which ones in Swedish.
Only one of the English modals is considered to have both epistemic
and non-epistemic interpretations. Thus, although can is used to express
permission, it cannot be said to have an epistemic interpretation (it can
only be interpreted as weak epistemic in assertive utterances). Might, on
the other hand, is considered by many to be the typical exponent of epis-
temic modality. However, it is archaic in its deontic use. Linguists also
seem to disagree about whether could can be interpreted epistemically. As
mentioned earlier, only may has both epistemic and deontic interpreta-
tions in most contexts, although it is considered formal in its deontic use.
However, formality seems to play no role in establishing the possible inter-
pretations of may, and can be disregarded for the purposes of the present
investigation (see 1.4).
Both kan and kunde have epistemic and deontic interpretations, accord-
ing to Teleman et al. (1999). Kunde, however, has additional unreal and
pragmatic connotations which seem to dominate for some speakers. It can
thus be considered outside the scope of the present investigation, since it
is likely to be restricted to special contexts. Through elimination, kan is
chosen as the object of the investigation. The multiple available interpre-
tations of kan should be carefully considered, however, since they may
render the analysis of the data more complicated.
This leaves us with four modals: must, may, måste and kan. These four
modals are the subject of the present investigation.

1.3 Corpus studies in linguistics

Corpora have proven useful in linguistic studies as they provide insight
into issues that are difficult or impossible to elucidate by using any other
method, such as native speaker intuitions or elicitation techniques. How-
ever, many corpus-based studies have been criticised because of their lack
of focus, and the presentation of vacuous statistics. The divide between lin-
guists who use corpora and those who criticise their use can, to a certain
degree, be ascribed to the theoretical framework chosen by the linguist,
and the nature of the problem under investigation. This section addresses
some of the issues related to using corpora in linguistic investigations. The
focus is on describing the English-Swedish Parallel Corpus, and the design
of the corpus investigation that underlies this study.
1.3.1 Using corpora

Since their emergence, machine-readable corpora have enabled researchers
to study actual language use in different modalities (written or spoken),
different genres (fiction or academic prose), different types of discourse,
etc. Whatever the focus of investigation, a “corpus-based approach […]
provides a means of handling large amounts of language and keeping track
of many contextual factors at the same time” (Biber, Conrad & Reppen
1998: 3). The use of computerized, machine-readable corpora also enables
the researcher to handle the collected data with greater accuracy than is
possible when doing the same work manually. However, “[c]orpus linguis-
tics is not an end in itself, but is one source of evidence for improving de-
scriptions of the structure and use of language” (Kennedy 1998: 1).
When using corpora, we should keep in mind the distinction between
language structure and language use, which is of great relevance to linguis-
tic studies (cf. langue vs. parole, competence vs. performance). Language
structure, seen as the representation of linguistic knowledge in the human
mind, can at the present stage only be studied through actual performance,
the use of language in production and comprehension. Language use can,
of course, never be a mirror representation of the linguistic knowledge in
the mind, since it is per definition influenced by such non-linguistic fac-
tors as memory span, the physical and emotional condition of the speaker/
hearer, noise, etc. For linguists studying certain topics this can pose a prob-
lem, since the effort required to reconstruct the mental representations of
certain aspects of language with evidence from a corpus can yield little in-

formation. In such cases, it may be more useful to resort to introspection

or elicitation techniques. Other linguists, on the other hand, adhere to the
view of grammar expressed in Bybee (2005):
While all linguists are likely to agree that grammar is the cognitive organiza-
tion of language, a usage-based theorist would make the more specific pro-
posal that grammar is the cognitive organization of one’s experience with
language. […] certain facets of linguistic experience, such as the frequency of
use of particular instances of constructions has an impact on representation
that we can see evidenced in various ways, for instance, in speakers’ recogni-
tion of what is conventionalized and what is not, and even more strikingly in
the nature of language change. (Bybee 2005: 2)
In these cases, a corpus investigation is indispensable, since only in the col-

lective use of language is it possible to find information about the frequen-
cy of the occurrence of certain constructions, the salience of certain fea-
tures, and other issues of relevance.
As McEnery and Wilson (1996) point out, however, “[a] corpus and an
introspection-based approach to linguistics are not mutually exclusive”,
and “[i]n a very real sense they can be gainfully viewed as being comple-
mentary” (McEnery and Wilson 1996: 16). The combination of these ap-
proaches is not only useful, but also highly desirable, since “[a]ny scientific
enterprise must be empirical in the sense that it has to be supported or fal-
sified on evidence and, in the final analysis, statements about language
have to stand up to the evidence of language use” (Kennedy 1998: 8).
However great the advantages of using corpora in linguistic research, we
should also be aware that the quantitative results obtained in such investi-
gations can sometimes give a false air of scholarliness. Most corpus lin-
guists are unanimous in their belief that quantitative investigations should
be based on or lead to qualitative research. For example, Kennedy claims
that “[t]he most important skill […] is to be able to ask insightful ques-
tions which address real issues and problems in theoretical, descriptive and
applied language studies” (Kennedy 1998: 3). This view finds support in
Biber, Conrad and Reppen, who suggest that “[t]he goal of corpus-based
studies is not simply to report quantitative findings, but to explore the im-
portance of these findings for learning about the patterns of language use”
(Biber, Conrad & Reppen 1996: 5).21
Corpora can, of course, be used in a variety of ways. This section also
provides examples of using corpora in semantic research. Concordance tests,
for instance, enable researchers to establish typical contexts for an item.
21 Note here that Biber, Conrad & Reppen focus on language use, not language structure.

Studies using different theoretical frameworks, from general semantic to

cognitive, and seeking answers to different questions have benefited a great
deal from this approach: Aijmer (1986), Altenberg (1991), Paradis (2003),
Warren (1984), Wärnsby (1999).
Corpora can also be used as sources of data in studies of idioms or fixed
collocations. Two such studies, Granger (1996) and Wiktorsson (2003),
searched through learner corpora to find out how successful learners are in
producing the so-called prefabricated items in comparison to native speak-
ers. Both studies employed methods other than concordance tests to re-
trieve the data.
Corpora can also aid the researcher in broader semantic investigations
where the focus is not on a particular item and its immediate lexical co-
text, or on the frequency of a certain item in a corpus, but on what ele-
ments constitute the semantic context for a chosen item. McEnery and
Wilson, citing Mindt (1991), point out that “semantic distinctions are as-
sociated in texts with characteristic observable contexts – syntactic, mor-
phological, and prosodic – and thus by considering the environments of
the linguistic entities an empirical objective indicator for a particular se-
mantic distinction can be arrived at” (McEnery &Wilson 1996: 96). Sim-
ilar observations form the basis for Coates’s (1983) investigation of the se-
mantics of modal auxiliaries in English, and Wärnsby’s (2004) search for
contextual regularities with respect to the different modal interpretations
in English and Swedish. Corpus data were considered significant as they
provided the statistical foundation for a discussion of the correlation of dif-
ferent features with certain interpretations. This approach is also used in
the present study.
1.3.2 The English-Swedish Parallel Corpus

Parallel corpora have been praised for allowing researchers to address a va-
riety of questions. Some of the more obvious research areas where parallel
corpora can be used are translation and contrastive studies. The present in-
vestigation falls under the general category of contrastive studies, since it
contrasts the use and interpretation of four modals in English and Swedish.
Therefore, it benefits from a reliable source of contrastive data. The prima-
ry source of data is the English-Swedish Parallel Corpus (henceforth the
ESPC).
The ESPC is a bi-directional translation corpus of a considerable size
(approximately 2.8 million words).22 It is a collection of comparable writ-

ten texts in English and Swedish, as well as their translations. The texts be-
long to a number of genres, fiction and non-fiction, and match closely in
terms of subject matter, type of intended audience, and register. Most text
samples contain between 10,000 and 15,000 words. More details on the
composition of the corpus can be found in Table 1.
Table 1. Size and composition of the ESPC
English Swedish Swedish English Total

originals transl. originals transl.
Fiction Text samples 25 25 25 25 100
No. of words 340,745 346,649 308,160 333,375 1,328,929
Non-fiction Text samples 39 39 47 47 172
No. of words 364,648 344,131 353,303 413,500 1,475,582
Total Text samples 64 64 72 72 272
No. of words 705,393 690,780 661,463 746,875 2,804,511
The design of the corpus encourages flexibility of use, as can be seen in Fig-
ure 5. The ESPC consists of two corpora of originals (one in each lan-
guage), and two corpora of translations. The translations and the originals
are aligned sentence by sentence. This allows the researcher to compare
data from different parts of the corpus, as indicated by the bi-directional
arrows in the figure. Thus, the ESPC can be used as a translation corpus,
comparing the originals with their translations, as illustrated by the hori-
zontal arrows. The researcher can also compare the originals with the trans-
lations in the same language, as indicated by the diagonal arrows. Transla-
tions in the two languages can be compared as well, as indicated by the ver-
tical arrow on the right-hand. Alternatively, the corpus can simply be used,
as in the present study, as a corpus of comparable texts, as indicated by the
vertical arrow on the left hand side.
The ESPC is particularly appropriate for the present study. Firstly, since
it is computerized, it allows a variety of searches: the amount of co-text re-
trieved can be modified, and data from certain texts can be excluded. Sec-
ondly, the ESPC was compiled with the intention of generating a collec-
tion of comparable texts, which allows the researcher to control for many
of the factors discussed in 1.3.1. Also, since the ESPC is a collection of
written texts, it is possible to search for different features that may be of rel-
22 The information about the design of the corpus is taken from the following sites: http://www.
englund.lu.se/research/corpus/index.html and http://www.englund.lu.se/research/corpus/corpus/
espc.html.

evance, i.e. direct speech vs. the main narrative, or the author’s comments
vs. quotes from other sources.
English Swedish
orginals orginals
Swedish English
orginals orginals
Figure 5. The design of the ESPC
This study uses examples of must, may, måste, and kan taken from the Eng-
lish and Swedish originals, since the research questions do not concern
translation-related issues (see 1.4). This is indicated by the bold frames sur-
rounding two of the boxes on the left-hand side of Figure 5. The English
translation corpus was also used to provide literary translations of the
Swedish examples (in addition to the word-for-word glosses). This is indi-
cated by the broken line in the figure.
The examples were extracted from both fiction and non-fiction texts.
The co-text of five sentences preceding and following each example was in-
cluded to ensure a reliable interpretation. Approximately 3,000 examples
were extracted and analysed. Table 2 provides details on the distribution of
the examples used.23
Table 2. The composition of the excerpted sub-corpora for the four modals
The number of excerpted modals Total number of

Fiction Non-fiction excerpted individ-
ual modals
must 215 246 461
may 86 220 306
måste 531 482 1,013
kan 302 699 1,001
TOTAL 1134 1647 2,781
All occurrences of the English modals must and may were excerpted from
the corpus, but only about 1,000 randomly selected examples of each of
23 Many thanks to Mats Eeg-Olofsson for helping me to collect the data from the ESPC.

the Swedish modals were used. The Swedish modals appear more often in
the ESPC than the English ones, even though the texts in the two languag-
es are comparable in size, contents, style, etc. One possible explanation for
this discrepancy is the fact that the English modals are not used to express
past modality other than, possibly, in the sequence of tenses or indirect
speech, while for the Swedish modals this option is often available (see, for
example, the discussion of måste in section 1.2.3.2).
All of the examples were initially evaluated for the modality expressed:
epistemic, deontic, dynamic or indeterminate. Each example was subse-
quently analysed for the presence of a number of contextual features. The
information obtained was stored in a database, and used for the manual
analysis (Chapter 3), as well as for the Data Mining investigation (Chapter
5).
1.4 The aims and structure of the study

When listeners encounter modal utterances in their native language, espe-
cially utterances that contain a modal verb, they are usually able to inter-
pret these expressions immediately as being either epistemic or non-epis-
temic.24 What is it that enables listeners to interpret modal utterances cor-
rectly? As Klinge (1996) points out, “[i]n actual communication the
meanings traditionally assigned to the modals are arrived at on the basis of
the whole complex of the modals, their sentential environment, and a con-
text of utterance, and yet the impact of context of modal meaning is rarely
explicitly and systematically pursued in the literature on modality” (Klinge
1996: 35). To account for the fact that different modal meanings are read-
ily recognized as such, one should consider a variety of factors important
for the interpretation: the syntactic environment, the semantic contribu-
tion of the parts in the propositional context of the utterance, and the
pragmatic, or situational, context of the utterance. In this study, I am
mostly interested in what allows us to express and interpret modally mod-
ified utterances so that the communicative goals are achieved. Therefore, I
investigate what semantic, syntactic or pragmatic features in the context of
a modally modified utterance promote or demote epistemic or non-epis-
temic interpretations.
24 This is of course a simplification, since many of the occurrences of modals are indeterminate (see
Leech and Coates (1979), and 3.3 of this study for a discussion of this phenomenon).

To achieve this goal, I begin by replicating Coates’s (1983) study on the

data extracted from the ESPC. To anticipate the discussion in Chapter 2,
Coates (1983), after analysing a large amount of corpus data containing all
of the English modals, concluded that certain contextual features are asso-
ciated with certain types of modality. I focus on two pairs of modals, one
English and one Swedish, and study the contexts in which they appear in
great detail. The data sample used for this investigation is considerably
larger than that of Coates, and allows for contrastive observations. I begin
by investigating the English modals, and then test the results of this anal-
ysis on the Swedish data. This methodological decision is motivated firstly
by the fact that I initially modelled my investigation on that of Coates
(1983), who tested the influence of context in modally modified utterances
in English. Also, this is primarily an English linguistics study.
Chapter 2 presents a general discussion of Coates’s (1983) findings re-
garding the modal contexts associated with epistemic and non-epistemic
modalities. I also address some of the recent criticism of Coates and others
who consider the syntactic or semantic features present in the context crit-
ical for the interpretation (Papafragou 1998a, 2000). I maintain that re-
gardless of the theoretical framework one adheres to, it is important to pay
attention to different contextual features such as the ones discussed in
Coates (1983).
In Chapter 3, I discuss the data used in the study. With Coates’s study
as my point of departure, I demonstrate how the features she discussed are
distributed in utterances containing each of the selected modals. I also
show that the features in Chapter 2 are not sufficient to determine the cor-
rect interpretation of an utterance. I also take up indeterminate cases, and
analyse them in terms of the inconclusive arrangement of contextual fea-
tures.
In Chapter 4, I argue that also features other than those mentioned in
Coates play an important role in the interpretation of modal utterances in
the two languages, and that those features are related to each other through
the notion of Controllability. I also suggest that these features are involved
in the overall organization of discourse.
In the second part of the study, I test my findings for inter alia statistical
relevance with the help of a relatively new method in linguistics, namely
Data Mining. The results are presented in Chapter 5.
In Chapter 6 I offer final remarks about the nature and consequences of
the present investigation and the general summary of the findings.

Summary
In this chapter, I briefly reviewed a number of mostly functionally-oriented ap-
proaches to the study of modality. I also discussed the definitions of epistemic and
non-epistemic modality. The focus of the chapter was the description of the sys-
tem of modal verbs in English and Swedish. Moreover, I chose four modals as the
subject of the present investigation, introduced the data and the general metho-
dology of this study, formulated the research question, and briefly presented the
structure of the study.

2 Modal contexts
Abstract
In this chapter, I first discuss the seminal work of Coates (1983), who established
that certain contextual features are associated with either epistemic or non-epis-
temic interpretations. Recently, her claims about the influence of context on the
interpretation have become somewhat controversial, and I thus address some of
the criticism, focusing on Papafragou (1998a, 2000). This criticism notwithstand-
ing, I claim that it is possible, and even necessary, to rely on contextual clues to
arrive at the intended interpretation.
2.1 Coates (1983)

Coates’s investigation of the meanings of English modals and the contexts
in which those meanings appear tried to “interpret the data, not to impose
some neat, preconceived system upon it” (Coates 1985: 247). The study is
based on data from the Lancaster corpus and the Survey of English Lan-
guage. Approximately 200 examples containing each of the modals must,
should, ought (to), may, might, can, could, would, will, shall were selected
from 109 texts or 545,000 words (Coates 1983: 2). The analysis was com-
plemented by a discussion of the “quasi-modals” have to, be going to, be able
to, and be bound to. Informant tests were used “to check problematic areas,
in particular cases of indeterminacy, and, on a more general level, to inves-
tigate the patterns of similarity and dissimilarities which native speakers
perceive in the modals” (Coates 1983: 2).
Based on her initial findings, Coates modifies the traditional polysemic
approach to modal meaning by postulating, rather convincingly, that the
meaning of modals is indeterminate. This leads to an innovative theoreti-
cal model of modal meaning – the fuzzy set model (see Zadeh 1972).

Chapter 2 Modal context
Coates points out that this model accounts best for the indeterminacy
found in her data: the most typical meanings, those acquired first by a
child, constitute the core, and the less typical meanings are found on the
periphery, or the skirt (Coates 1983: 11-13). She then proceeds to discuss
the different types of indeterminacy attested in her data: gradience, ambi-
guity, and merger (see 3.3 of the present study for a detailed discussion of
these issues).
Coates also draws a map of the modal meanings found in her data, and
concludes that there are four distinct clusters which “can be associated with
semantic concepts such as Obligation/Necessity, Intention/Prediction/Fu-
turity, Possibility1/Ability/Permission and Epistemic Possibility” (Coates
1983: 27). She provides a systematic analysis of the contexts in which these
meanings appear in order to prove that the clusters, in addition to semantic
content, also share syntactic and prosodic characteristics (Coates 1983:
27). Her overall aim is to prove, on the basis of her data, the existence of
the Epistemic/Root distinction so often assumed in modals studies. In the
sections that follow, I discuss her findings, focusing on the modals under
investigation in the present study – must and may.2
2.1.1 Features associated with epistemic modality

There are six features, considered syntactic by Coates,3 associated with
epistemic modality in her data:
(i) Perfect aspect (as a past time marker),

(ii) Progressive aspect,
(iii) Existential subject,
(iv) State verb,
(v) Co-occurrence with a quasi-modal,4 and
(vi) Inanimate subject (Coates 1983: 244-245)
1 Note that Coates distinguishes between two different types of possibility, epistemic and non-epis-
temic, whereas in the present study I distinguish between degrees of epistemic possibility – strong vs.
weak (see 1.1.1 for definitions).
2 For a more general review, see Hermerén (1984).
3 In this study, these features are not considered syntactic. The focus in this and the subsequent chap-
ters is instead on their semantic and pragmatic content.
4 In my analysis of the modal contexts in Chapters 3 and 5, this feature is not considered on its own
but is subsumed under the analysis of the other five features. Further, I do not discuss its syntactic im-
port on the interpretation, but the semantic one.

Coates uses the terms ‘association’ and ‘associated’ when there is a statistical
correlation between the occurrence of a certain feature and an epistemic or
deontic interpretation.
All the examples containing must and perfect aspect are epistemic: there
is a 100 per cent correlation between this feature and an epistemic inter-
pretation in Coates’s data.
(1) Ooh Jesus – well how would the people of the other faith have received Germans
from the sea – you must have thought about that (S.1.14B.7)5 (Coates 1983: 45)
There is also a 100 per cent correlation between progressive aspect and an
epistemic interpretation of must. Coates (1983: 44) provides two examples
that illustrate that.
(2) You must be running your brain in neutral. (S.2.11B.13)
(3) He must have been dishing up the same lectures for 30 years at a gradually slower
and slower speed. (S.1.6.117) 6
Existential subject7 co-occurs with an epistemic interpretation of must in 86

per cent of the utterances, as illustrated in (4).
(4) I mean there must have been an awful lot of hit and misses, mustn’t there? (S.2.10-
182)
In this example, two contextual features, existential subject and perfect as-
pect, co-occur. Coates, however, does not address the fact that the features
co-occur in many of her examples.
Epistemic interpretation is also shown to be prevalent in utterances con-
taining a state verb and must: 86 per cent of the utterances with this con-
textual make-up were epistemic. Consider, for instance, (5) in which a
state verb co-occurs with the modal.
(5) His teeth were still chattering but his forehead, when I felt it, was hot and clammy.
He said, “I must have a temperature.” (Lanc1-1675) (Coates 1983: 41)
5 The notation indicates the location of the example in Coates’s corpus data.
6 In the present study, examples such as (3) are not analysed under ‘Progressive aspect’, but under
‘Perfect aspect’. The combination of these two features in similar examples is duly noted, however.
7 I use the term ‘introductory subject’ to cover both there- and it-subjects, since in my data these two
types of subjects influenced the interpretation in the same way. Also, in Swedish, it was impossible to
differentiate between the two types on formal grounds, since both are expressed by the impersonal det
‘it’.

In 73 per cent of the cases, an inanimate subject co-occurred with an epis-

temic interpretation: (6), from Coates (1983: 44), illustrates this pattern.
(6) This must be one of the finest views on the whole processional route (T.10.5.49)
May exhibits very similar patterns of co-occurrence with the above features
(see Coates 1983: 137): there is a 100 per cent correlation between both
perfect and progressive aspect and an epistemic interpretation of may.
(7) I may have put it there out of the way (S.7.1A.10) 8
(8) They may be reading something by Shakespeare. (S.5.10.38)
There is also a 100 per cent correlation between the epistemic interpreta-
tion of may and the feature existential subject, as in (9).
(9) January I suppose, there may be an interview round about January. (S.1.1.16)
Also, all the cases where may appeared with a quasi-modal were interpreted
as epistemic, as in (10).
(10) I may be able to leave here and still owe them my notice. (S.7.3F.10) (Coates 1983:
137)
There is also an absolute correlation between an epistemic interpretation

of may and the feature negation, a feature which on Coates’s analysis sub-
sumes both sentences containing sentence negation and those containing
negative adverbs.
(11) They say he may never work again because he’s got schizophrenia. (S.1.13.20)
The feature state verb, on the other hand, co-occurs with an epistemic in-
terpretation of may in 95 per cent of the cases.
(12) I think he may be a very violent man. (V.5.1B.12)
Thus, in Coates’s data, both must and may exhibit strong, statistically at-
tested correlation patterns between the contextual features identified and
epistemic interpretations.
8 The original prosodic notation is omitted in all spoken examples.

2.1.2 Features associated with non-epistemic modalities

Coates also found that non-epistemic, Root meaning is typically associated
with the following syntactic features:
(i) Negation,9
(ii) Agentive verb, and
(iii) Passive voice (Coates 1983: 245)
Coates claims that “Root modals can also be negatively defined” (Coates
1983:246), i.e. utterances that do not contain the features typically associ-
ated with epistemic modality are non-epistemic.10
With Root must, a correlation between Root meaning and negation was
found in 100 per cent of all examples.
(13) You mustn’t put words into my mouth, Mr Williams. (T.5.3.49)
Must was also interpreted as Root in all the utterances containing passive
voice.
(14) “If you commit murder, Charlotte, you must be punished.” (Lanc1-1851)
Root must also appears in 91 per cent of the utterances with an agentive
verb.
(15) “You must play this ten times over”, Miss Jarrova would say, pointing with relentless
fingers to a jumble of crotchets and quavers. (Lanc1-G332)
In 87 per cent of the cases, the feature 2nd person subject co-occurred with
Root must, as in (15). Note again that Coates does not address the fact that
the features she investigates combine with each other. In many cases, Root
must also combines with the feature 1st person subject, as in (16).
(16) We must take no risk. (Lanc1-51)
Thus, Root must exhibits strong statistical patterns of co-occurrence with

a number of readily definable features.
9 In Coates’s data, however, may never appears in negated utterances with non-epistemic interpreta-
tion (see (11)).
10 Since Coates’s definition of epistemic modality on these terms is seen as being primary, I start my
investigation of the contexts of modal utterances in Chapter 3 by discussing the typical epistemic con-
texts as described in 2.1.1.

Root may was found to be strongly associated with the feature interrog-
ative: there is a 100 per cent correlation between the Root meaning of may,
expressing permission, and its appearance in interrogative sentences
(Coates 1983: 139-143). Other syntactic features co-occurred with Root
meanings of may, but not to a degree where a statistical association could
be established. Coates explains the fact that may does not exhibit associa-
tion patterns as strong as must by claiming that it is considered formal and
is rarely used in the Root sense, in which sense it is often replaced by can.11
2.2 Papafragou’s criticism of Coates

One of the most influential criticisms of Coates’s treatment of modality
can be found in recent works by Papafragou (1998a, 2000). The first ob-
jection to the indeterminacy thesis formulated by Coates (1983) is that in
this view “the English modals come out as a set of multiply ambiguous
items; what is more, their candidate meanings seem to proliferate almost
freely towards increasingly fine-grained categories” (Papafragou 1998a:
238). To account for the diversity of meanings found in the natural lan-
guage data, Coates is forced to postulate the existence of different meaning
clusters to which modals tend to belong. She also claims that all these
meanings are gradient in terms of the relative strength of the modality ex-
pressed and the degree of subjectivity. One of the drawbacks of this ap-
proach, according to Papafragou, is that it can be difficult in some cases to
justify the existence of some categories of meaning. Also, as Papafragou
(2000: 25) points out, experimental psycholinguistic studies have found
no support for Coates’s analysis of gradience and merger.
Papafragou's second objection is that, although statistically well attested
in the data, the difference in the contextual make-up of epistemic and non-
epistemic utterances is nothing more than a tendency. In her 1998 article,
Papafragou systematically shows that there are counterexamples to almost
every claim about the correlation of certain features with epistemic or root
interpretations. She then suggests that “we are dealing with a pragmatic,
rather than a semantic phenomenon” (Papafragou 1998a: 260). She also
points out that “although the fundamental point of ambiguity-based ap-
proach is the rigid distinction between the epistemic and various non-epis-
temic ‘meanings’ of the modals, […] Coates [is] forced to recognise a wide
11 See 1.2.3.2 for similar observations.

range of intermediate cases, where for a variety of reasons the proposed se-
mantic distinctions prove inert, indistinguishable or insufficient” (Papafra-
gou 2000: 25).
Papafragou’s own claims about English modal verbs are rooted in Rele-
vance theory (see Sperber & Wilson 1995). The main goal of her study is
to “separate the contribution made by linguistically encoded information
and inferential processes in the derivation of contextually attested interpre-
tations of lexical forms” (Papafragou 2000: 8). She therefore adopts the rel-
evance-theoretic view that “pragmatics uses as a basis the information pro-
vided by the grammar to arrive at the endpoint of the interpretation pro-
cess (retrieving in the process a variety of communicated assumptions
other than ‘what the speaker said’, e.g. intended implications)” (Papafra-
gou 2000: 13). This view of pragmatics seems similar to that of Stalnaker
(1999). Consider the two tasks he posits to be solved by pragmatic re-
search:
There are two major types of problems to be solved within pragmatics: first,
to define interesting types of speech acts and speech products; second, to
characterize the features of the speech content which help determine which
proposition is expressed by a given utterance. (Stalnaker 1999: 34)
It is the second problem that Papafragou aims to address by suggesting an

alternative treatment of modals. Firstly, in her proposal, modals are mon-
osemous.12 One of the reasons this approach is appealing is that “it cap-
tures our intuitions relating to various interpretations of modal verbs by at-
tributing them to the existence of an underlying basic meaning” (Papafra-
gou 1998a: 244). Elaborating on Kratzer (1977, 1991) and Groefsema
(1995), Papafragou suggests that modal meaning can be captured by the
general tripartite structure in (17).
(17) R(D,p)
(17) is then a schematic representation of a statement that a certain prop-

osition p bears a certain logical relation R to a set of propositions in a do-
12 See also Atlas (1989), who advocates a similar view on monosemy:

My question has been: In interpreting utterances are we selecting from the linguistically
given readings of a syntactically or lexically ambiguous sentence, or are we constructing
from a meaningful but radically sense-general sentence a contextually determined inter-
pretation of an utterance, an interpretation whose content is far more specific than the
literal meaning of the sentence?
My answer has been: In interpreting utterances we are, more often than philosophers
and even linguists have recognized, doing the latter. (Atlas 1989: 28-29)

main D (Papafragou 2000: 40). With modals, R is “the logical relation of

entailment or compatibility,” and D plays the role of a restrictor “respon-
sible for the different types of modal concepts which a modal expression is
capable of expressing in different contexts” (Papafragou 2000: 40). The re-
strictor can be either linguistically indicated, as in (18), or pragmatically
inferred, as in (19).
(18) If you want to get good grades, you must study hard.
(19) You must study hard.
Following the relevance-theoretical framework, an important assumption

about the nature of the domains that serve as restrictors in modal utteranc-
es is that human memory is organised in terms of domains, i.e. proposi-
tions are stored in memory as belonging to different domains. Papafragou
names a few examples: the factual domain to which all factual propositions
belong, the regulatory domain which includes rules and regulations, etc.
(Papafragou 2000: 42).
The semantics of may and must, proposed by Papafragou (2000: 43) is
presented in (20).
(20) Must: p is entailed by Dunspecified
May: p is compatible with Dunspecified
A proposition p is either entailed or compatible with a set of propositions

belonging to an unspecified domain D. The fact that the restrictor in these
modals is unspecified indicates that they are quite general in meaning and
therefore require elaborate pragmatic mechanisms to arrive at their inter-
pretation. As Papafragou (2000: 49) points out “[t]he exact content and re-
covery of the modal restrictor pose the most interesting problems for the
pragmatics of modality.” She describes this process as follows:
Generally, the intended (sub)domain for the comprehension of the modal

has to contribute to an interpretation of the utterance which is accessible
enough for the hearer, and capable of achieving adequate cognitive effects in
a way compatible with the speaker’s abilities and preferences (i.e. an optimal-
ly relevant interpretation); furthermore the resulting interpretation should be
one that the speaker could reasonably have intended to be optimally relevant
for the addressee. In recovering the restrictor for a modal expression, the
hearer, therefore, typically makes use of assumptions which are easily acces-
sible from the encyclopaedic entries of the concepts in the complement prop-
osition and other assumptions which are contextually available. Moreover,

since communication raises specific expectations of relevance, the hearer aims

at reconstructing the type of background propositions the speaker has in
mind. (Papafragou 2000: 49)
This applies to both root and epistemic interpretations of modals, the only
difference being that with epistemic utterances p is a “representation of an
abstract hypothesis, which is considered to be compatible with/entailed by
the speaker’s set of beliefs” (Papafragou 2000: 70). In epistemic utterances,
the relevant domain, which serves as the modal restrictor, consists of a set
of propositions representing the speaker’s beliefs.
Although generally recognised as innovative and original,13 Papafragou’s
treatment of modality has been criticised on a number of points. One of
the principal objections was raised by Traugott (2003), who argues inter
alia that Papafragou’s synchronic treatment of English modals as monose-
mous is “unexplanatory because it does not account for the retention of as-
pects of older meanings as newer ones arise” (Traugott 2003: 664). How-
ever, it is not necessarily the case that a theory that concerns itself mainly
with the synchronic system of modality should be attacked on these
grounds. As de Saussure, who argued for a strict division between syn-
chronic and diachronic linguistics, eloquently put it, “[s]ynchronic truth
seems to be in denial of diachronic truth, and one who has a superficial
view of things imagines that a choice must be made; this is really unneces-
sary; one truth does not exclude the other” (de Saussure 1966: 96). If a
polysemy account illuminates the historical development of English mo-
dals, and a monosemy account better relates the story of the synchronic
system of the modals in English, there is no reason to discard the latter only
because it may be inadequate for diachronic observations. These two ap-
proaches, according to de Saussure, do not have to compete.14
Another objection concerns an issue of a more theory-specific kind –
the assumptions about how human memory storage is organized. Klinge
(2002) points out that “if we accept the supposition that we organise our
mental inventory of propositions in domains, the number of potential do-
mains, sub-domains and cross-domains is no doubt going to be quite sub-
stantial, far exceeding the domains vaguely proposed by [Paparfragou],
who is of course biased towards the few domains relevant in her context of
13 See Klinge (2002) and Salkie (2002), for example.

14 Support fot this claim can also be found in Paradis (2005, 2006) who, although she does not adhere
to the monosemy view, discusses lexical meaning in terms of the use potential of lexical items, i.e.
“[m]eanings are […] not inherent in the lexical items as such, but they are evoked by lexical items”
(Paradis 2005: 544). She further distinguishes between what she terms “synchronic flexibility” and di-
achronic change.

inquiry” (Klinge 2002: 802). This is an important observation, since, ac-

cording to Papafragou, complex modal notions are expressed by items with
very general semantics. This shifts the burden, carried in polysemous ap-
proaches by the assumed elaborate semantic mechanisms, to some elabo-
rate, albeit abstract pragmatic operation of recovering the so-called restric-
tor, a relevant domain to which the proposition in question is to be related.
No suggestions are made about the possible constraints on the number and
kind of potentially relevant domains, which may render the proposal as a
whole not psychologically viable.
Traugott also mentions that “in essence Relevance Theory is a theory of
processing” and that “[s]peaker’s choices are assumed, and hearer’s work is
privileged” (Traugott 2003: 658-660). This is unfortunate since the coding
of modal expressions, and the particular contextual features with which the
speaker chooses to relate her message, is exactly what allows the hearer to
decode modal utterances in the intended way, or in Papafragou’s view “to
make use of assumptions which are easily accessible from the encyclopae-
dic entries of the concepts in the complement proposition and other as-
sumptions which are contextually available” (Papafragou 2000: 49). De-
spite the fact that throughout her work Papafragou argues that modals are
context-dependent expressions, she does not provide a satisfactory account
of how the context of a modal utterance contributes to the interpretation
of the modal. This detracts a great deal from her analysis, since the process
of decoding modal utterances remains something of an abstract mystery.
In her eagerness to promote her own thesis, Papafragou reduces the evi-
dence from previous research about what choices speakers tend to make
when coding modal utterances to mere “grammatical reflexes” (Papafragou
2000: 8), when in fact, it is exactly those “grammatical reflexes” that can
provide further support to her argument. This also seems to oppose Stal-
naker (1999), who draws our attention to inter alia “the features of the
speech content which help determine which proposition is expressed by a
given utterance” (Stalnaker 1999: 34). These features are not only to be
understood in terms of pragmatic context, as in Papafragou’s account, but
also in terms of the linguistic features encoding the utterance. Further, in
my interpretation, Papafragou’s (2000) “grammatical reflexes” are referred
to, among other things, as “collateral information” in Atlas’s account: “In
interpreting the utterances of sense-general sentences, we are not selecting
from the readings of an ambiguous sentence; we are CONSTRUCTING from
the definite but general sense and from collateral information a specific
content” (Atlas 1989: 31). If we accept Papafragou’s claims about the
meaning of English modals, these come out as sense-general expressions.

Thus, in interpreting modals, we cannot afford to disregard the contextual

information available.15
Regardless of what theoretical basis one chooses for one’s research, be it
a polysemy or a monosemy approach to modality, a thorough investigation
of the contexts of modal utterances – wide in Papafragou’s sense and nar-
row in Coates’s sense – is necessary. It is through these contexts that we
may discover how the speaker’s choices for coding modal utterances affect
the way an utterance is decoded by the addressee. I tend to agree with
Klinge (1996), who claims that “the epistemic vs. non-epistemic opposi-
tion does not reside in the modal, […] it is to be described as a result of
contextualization” (37). Accordingly, in the chapters that follow, I argue
that the role of narrow context disregarded by Papafragou is crucial for the
interpretation of modal expressions.
Many researchers, including Coates (1983), have tried to explain how
contextual features influence our understanding of an utterance or a modal
as epistemic or non-epistemic. As I just mentioned, the significance of con-
text should not be underestimated irrespective of the theoretical frame-
work within which the researcher works. The working definition of con-
text that I adopt in this study follows closely that of Klinge (1996), who
also explains its importance in the process of decoding:
Context is understood as the set of assumptions available to and employed by

an addressee to interpret an utterance of a sentence. Context is utterance spe-
cific. One sub-part of context is the meaning encoded in the propositional
content of a sentence, which is distinct from, but in the scope of, a modal.
The propositional content of a sentence is independent of a given utterance,
but in an utterance of the sentence it triggers some of the assumptions em-
ployed by the addressee to make sense of the utterance, and it follows that the
propositional content of a sentence plays an important role in interpreting
meaning. (Klinge 1996: 37-38)
In the following chapters I will try to illuminate the role of propositional

context in the interpretation of the modals must, may, måste and kan in my
data, starting with the features assumed by Coates (1983) to be associated
with epistemic modality.
15 See also Gumperz (1992) who argues that “[c]ontextualization relies on cues”, and that these can
be found “at different levels of speech production: (i) prosody, (ii) paralinguistic signs, (iii) code choice,
and (iv) choice of lexical forms or formulaic expressions” [my emphasis] (Gumperz 1992: 231).

Summary
In this chapter, I first presented the findings of Coates (1983), who demonstrated
that certain contextual features are associated with epistemic and non-epistemic
modalities. I acknowledge, however, that in doing so Coates does not offer an ex-
planation of why these features are of importance for modal interpretations,
whether they are related in any way, and whether their co-occurrence in modal ut-
terances further affects the interpretation.
Secondly, I address some of the criticism of Coates presented in Papafragou
(1998a) and (2000), whose own explanation of the mechanics of interpretation is
based in Relevance theory. Although claiming that modals are context-dependent
expressions, Papafragou does not offer a comprehensive account of the contribu-
tion of propositional context to modal interpretation. I consider this one of the
major drawbacks of her approach. I further argue that it is not only possible but
necessary to explicitly investigate the effect of context on the interpretation of a
modal utterance.

3 Modals in context
Abstract
This chapter presents the analysis of the data extracted from the ESPC. One of the
aims of this chapter is to test the validity of Coates’s (1983) claims as to the asso-
ciation of certain features with different modalities on a more extensive set of data
for the selected modals in English and Swedish. Thus, initially, I focus on the fea-
tures discussed by Coates and their association with modal interpretations in my
data. However, it soon becomes apparent that this list of features is incomplete for
both the English and the Swedish data. Thus, a secondary goal of this chapter is
to introduce other features that influence modal interpretations. Also, I argue that
the difficulty of interpreting indeterminate utterances arises due to the inconclu-
sive or conflicting arrangement of the contextual features discussed in the chapter.
In 3.1, I describe the contexts in which the English modals are found in the
ESPC, and 3.2 provides the same information about the Swedish modals. In 3.3,
a number of indeterminate examples are examined with respect to the presence of
the relevant contextual features.
3.1 English modals

In the sections that follow, I discuss the English modals under investiga-
tion, must and may, and the contexts in which they appear in the corpus,
focusing on the features mentioned in 2.1.1.
3.1.1 Must
As Table 1 shows, the study of must paints an intriguing picture. Firstly, the
association between Coates’s features and epistemic interpretations is not
absolute. Secondly, in the case of inanimate subject, an association barely

Chapter 3 Modals in context
exists. Thirdly, since the total number of epistemic examples in the corpus
is smaller than the number of epistemic examples involving each of the fea-
tures, we can conclude that often in epistemic utterances more than one
feature is present in the propositional context (the features appear 191
times in the 162 epistemic examples).
Table 1. Must and the contexts in which it appears in the ESPC
Frequency Frequency
(N of examples=461) (epistemic examples only)
(N of epistemic examples=162)
Perfect aspect 91 91
Progressive aspect 7 7
Introductory subject 36 25
State verb 180 111
Inanimate subject 151 57
TOTAL: 465 191
In the sections that follow, I will discuss each of the features in detail.
3.1.1.1 Perfect and progressive aspect

As Table 1 demonstrates, all of the utterances with perfect aspect are also
interpreted epistemically. Consider the following:
(1) “Simon, that must have been an awfully strong drink”, said Maria. (RDA)1
Epistemic
(2) He even said to her that they must have read the same book. (RR) Epistemic
Sentences (1) and (2) contain different types of predicates: (1) contains the
copula be, and (2) an event verb, read. This difference, however, does not
seem to influence the epistemic interpretation in any way. It is the presence
of the aspectual modification in combination with an anterior time refer-
ence for the proposition that promotes an epistemic interpretation (see
4.1.3 for a discussion of this phenomenon).
The absence of non-epistemic utterances modified by the perfect aspect
can be explained by the nature of the non-epistemic modality expressed by
must (in the sense of obligation): it is performative (cf. the description of
1 Here, and in the subsequent examples the abbreviation in parenthesis is the notation
used in the ESPC to indicate the source text. For a list of texts in the ESPC see http://
www.englund.lu.se/corpus/corpus/webtexts.html.

De)coding modality Anna Wärnsby
directed deontic modality in 1.1.2.1), and thus immediate to the time of

the utterance. Furthermore, in such utterances the action described by the
main verb is not actualised until the addressee chooses to act in accordance
with, or in defiance of, the permission, prohibition, or command given by
the speaker; this makes it quite impossible to express these notions in an
aspectually modified utterance with anterior or even simultaneous time
reference for the proposition.
(3) You must go to the party. Command
(4) You must have gone to the party. *Command
(5) You must be going to the party. *Command2
In (3), the speaker orders the addressee to go to the party. The speaker is
perceived to have some authority over the addressee, and the proposition
is to be carried out subsequent to the time of the utterance. These features
allow us to interpret (3) as a typical command. In (4) and (5), the time ref-
erence for the proposition is anterior or simultaneous to the time of mo-
dality,3 respectively,4 and the action cannot be controlled by the agent.
Consequently, posterior time reference for the proposition seems to be cru-
cial for the utterance to be interpreted as a command.5
That posterior reference is crucial for non-epistemic interpretation is
demonstrated by (6) and (7).
(6) You must have finished your paper, since you are busy watching football.
Epistemic
(7) You must have finished your paper by tomorrow. Deontic

(Papafragou 2000: 102)
2 See however, the discussion of (11), where an utterance modified by the progressive aspect can, in
certain circumstances, receive a non-epistemic interpretation, albeit not as a direct command.
3 It is, of course, possible to interpret (5) as having posterior time reference for the proposition. This
interpretation is not taken into account in the present discussion. See, however, the discussion of (7).
4 It is sometimes possible, however, to find non-epistemic utterances modified by the progressive as-
pect in, for example, recipes (e.g. The water must be boiling when you add sugar) (Eide, pc). Firstly, it is
debatable whether the time reference for the proposition is posterior in these cases. Secondly, there is
always an implicit or explicit condition present in the propositional or situational context of such ut-
terances, i.e. ‘the fulfilment of the instruction expressed in the utterance is necessary for the successful
completion of the dish’. The presence of an implicit or explicit condition in the context is crucial for
non-epistemic interpretations of utterances containing must, as argued in 4.1.4.
5 Cf. Lyons’s (1977: 843) remark on this point: “John may come yesterday construed as a permission-
granting utterance is semantically anomalous for the same reason that Come yesterday, John! is anoma-
lous”.

As predicted, (6) is interpreted as epistemic, while (7) is not.6 The only dif-
ference between (6) and (7) is the time adverbial by tomorrow, which coerc-
es a posterior reference for the proposition in (7). Since the action de-
scribed by the proposition is situated in the immediate future, and all the
features, except the perfect form, are consistent with our understanding of
directed deontic modality, (7) is interpreted as deontic. Thus, it is possible
to paraphrase (7) as ‘It is necessary that the action described in the propo-
sition (writing a paper) is completed by tomorrow’.
All examples found in the corpus modified by the progressive aspect are
interpreted as epistemic.
(8) “You must be missing your country in this weather, no? – you always have sunshine
don’t you?” (BR) Epistemic
(9) You only have to drive through the West Midlands to see that if we are in the Super-
League of top industrial nations, somebody must be moving the goalposts. (DL)
Epistemic
The fact that the progressive aspect often promotes an epistemic interpre-
tation does not necessarily prove the initial hypothesis that aspectual modi-
fication per se is associated with epistemic modality. Consider, for example,
the utterance in (10).
(10) We must be leaving soon. (Papafragou 2000: 102)
Papafragou claims that this example is non-epistemic. However, in certain

contexts, it can be interpreted as either epistemic or deontic: (11) is epis-
temic, and (12) deontic.
(11) I see that my husband has started packing, so we must be leaving soon. Epistemic
(12) We must be leaving soon, if we are to catch the 9 o’clock train. Deontic
Both (11) and (12) have posterior time reference for the proposition. This
indicates the impossibility of distinguishing between epistemic and non-
epistemic utterances modified by progressive aspect on the basis of poste-
rior time reference alone. In (11), for example, the speaker expresses a con-
fident judgement on the basis of the evidence at hand. (12), on the other
hand, is a conditional statement (see 4.1.4 for a detailed discussion). It
6 Although examples such as (7) are not found in the ESPC, they are perfectly grammatical, albeit
infrequent, utterances in English.

contains an explicit condition. However, such a condition does not have

to be expressed explicitly. It can also be left implicit, and be inferred from
the situational context.
3.1.1.2 Introductory subject

Introductory subject is a feature strongly associated with epistemic inter-
pretations in the ESPC, which supports Coates’s findings. However, some
of the examples containing an introductory subject are interpreted as non-
epistemic.
(13) There must have been something much more personal in it. (BR) Epistemic
(14) I mean, there must be dozens of ways out. (RR) Epistemic
(15) There must be a wider approach to fisheries which includes transparency,

cooperation and harmonization of data and administrative documents. (EHUD)
Deontic
The utterance in (13) is aspectually modified utterance, and contains an

introductory subject. Since the proposition involves a stative situation (see
3.1.1.3) with an anterior time reference, the utterance is interpreted as
epistemic, analogous to other perfect utterances. The presence of an intro-
ductory subject does not seem to be the primary cause for the epistemic
interpretation, but may be a supporting feature in this case.
In (14), there is an introductory subject, and the time reference for the
proposition is simultaneous with the modality expressed in the utterance,
i.e. the proposition is situated in the present. This is consistent with an
epistemic interpretation. The presence of the hedge I mean also supports
an epistemic interpretation in this case.
Example (15), on the other hand, is interpreted as non-epistemic, de-
spite the fact that it contains an introductory subject. The context of this
utterance is that the European Union should strive for the normalization
of the fishing standards for its members. To begin with, the proposition is
situated in the (immediate) future, i.e. a wider approach to fisheries was
not a reality at the time the speech was written. Also, such an approach to
fisheries is needed to fulfil the overall implicit condition, namely the suc-
cessful achievement of common fishing standards for the member states. It
is these two features, the posterior time reference and the presence of an
implicit condition, that indicate inter alia that there is some source in-

terested in the proposition being carried out. This promotes a non-epis-

temic interpretation.
3.1.1.3 State verb

A strong association exists between the occurrence of a state verb in an ut-
terance and an epistemic interpretation.
(16) Even so, it7 must be all balls, a mirage massaged from statistics. (DL) Epistemic
(17) Well, it all goes to show that I must have been mad to try to pretend
that the sexes were much the same. (MD) Epistemic
(18) And to make it work, we must both be fulfilled people. (AH) Deontic
The utterance in (16), containing a state verb (the copula be) and a prop-
osition with simultaneous time reference, is interpreted as epistemic. (17),
on the other hand, has anterior time reference. Nevertheless, it is also in-
terpreted epistemically, similarly to other aspectually modified examples
with past time reference for the proposition. In (18), the time reference for
the proposition is posterior. The utterance also contains an explicit condi-
tion. These two features promote a non-epistemic interpretation.
It is, of course, necessary to consider here the semantic implications of
the occurrence of a state verb in an utterance (see 4.1.2). It is not state verbs
themselves that promote epistemic interpretation, but the fact that they
denote states, as opposed to event verbs, which denote events or processes.
A state is normally not controlled by the subject or the speaker, whereas
events and processes can often be directed. Thus, in this study, the discus-
sion of state verbs focuses primarily on their semantic implications, i.e. the
fact that normally a state cannot be controlled (see 4.1.2).
3.1.1.4 Inanimate subject

It is reasonable to assume that inanimate subjects usually do not constitute
suitable agents in deontic utterances, since at least directed deontic modal-
ity usually involves notions such as speaker authority, volitionality, and in-
tent, normally associated with animate, conscious subjects (cf. Coates
1995). This prediction is borne out in Coates’s (1983) study. In my data,
however, a much weaker association exists between this feature and epis-
7 It is referential here, referring to the claim that Britain has become an industrial super-power again.

temic interpretation. In Chapter 4, I offer an explanation for this discrep-

ancy, based on different combinations of contextual features.
A large number of utterances with inanimate subjects in the data are in-
terpreted as deontic. In (19), the inanimate subject every position is com-
bined with a passive form of an event verb (held).8
(19) He told his troops, in the famous order of the day, on 11 April, “Every position
must be held to the last man: there must be no retirement. With our backs to the
wall,andbelievinginthejusticeofourcause,eachoneofusmustfighttotheend”.(CAOG)
Deontic
(20) The final package must perforce reflect Parliament’s priorities. (EMCC) Deontic
The deontic interpretation arises partly from the fact that the British com-
mander-in-chief, Field-Marshal Haig, to whom this quote is attributed, is
assumed to have the authority to give such an order. A deontic interpreta-
tion is also promoted by the fact that an implicit condition can be derived
from the context, i.e. the fulfilment of this order was necessary for the Al-
lied victory over the Germans in the First World War. An implicit condi-
tion can also be derived from the context in (20), i.e. in order to achieve a
democratic legitimacy for a certain European programme, Agenda 2000,
the final version of this document must reflect the priorities of the Euro-
pean Parliament. The presence of these conditions promotes a deontic in-
terpretation in the above utterances.
There are also a number of epistemic utterances containing an inani-
mate subject. In the epistemic (21), the inanimate subject Greville’s affairs
is combined with a state verb, the copula be. In (22), also interpreted epis-
temically, the inanimate subject those thick lenses is combined with the per-
fect form of an event verb distort.
(21) Greville’s affairs, I thought with a smile, must be amazingly healthy. (DF)
Epistemic
(22) Imagine how those thick lenses must have distorted the world. (BR) Epistemic
It seems that it is the combination of an inanimate subject and a state verb

that promotes the epistemic interpretation of (21). If we replace the state
8 Note that in the same context a different modal leads to an ambiguous utterance (e.g. Every position
may be held to the last man), where the interpretation is either epistemic or deontic (permission). This
corresponds to the semantics of modals discussed in Papafragou (2000: 40) in terms of the entailment
and compatibility relations between the propositions containing these modals and the restrictor do-
main (see also 2.2), and, thus, reflects the individual contributions of modals to the interpretation.

verb with an event one, the utterance becomes ambiguous between an epis-
temic and a non-directed deontic interpretation (Greville’s affairs must be-
come healthier). The substitution of the inanimate subject with an animate
one does not seem to have the same impact: the utterance is still interpret-
ed as epistemic (He must be amazingly healthy). Another feature contribut-
ing to the epistemic interpretation of (21) is, of course, the presence of an
amplifying adverb amazingly,9 which serves to make the speaker’s involve-
ment evident. If we manipulate the utterance by excluding the adverb from
the immediate context, the utterance Greville’s affairs must be healthy may,
in some environments, be ambiguous between epistemic and deontic in-
terpretations. Thus, the presence of an inanimate subject cannot be con-
sidered the only feature promoting an epistemic interpretation in this case.
In (22), on the other hand, the presence of the inanimate subject seems
to provide a strong motivation for the epistemic interpretation: if we ex-
clude the aspectual modification from the propositional context of this ut-
terance, the epistemic interpretation still stands (Imagine how those thick
lenses must distort the world). The effect of the inanimate subject on the in-
terpretation is greatly reduced, however, if we rewrite the exclamation into
an ordinary declarative sentence (These thick lenses must distort the world).
This results in a sentence like the modified (21), ambiguous between epis-
temic and deontic interpretations. Again, it seems that the combination of
anterior time reference for the proposition (implied by the use of perfect
aspect), the exclamation, and the inanimate subject promotes epistemic in-
terpretation.
3.1.2 May
As can be seen in Table 2, may seems to be a much more ‘typical’ epistemic
modal than must, since it has an epistemic interpretation in the majority
of examples (275 epistemic examples out of a total of 306).
Note also that the features discussed in Coates (1983) are an almost per-
fect match for the environments in which may is found in the corpus. As
with must, the features under investigation combine with each other (all of
the features appear 396 times in the 275 epistemic examples).
9 Quirk et al. (1985: 445-446) suggest that an adverb modifying (gradable) adjectives is usually “a
scaling device called intensifier”. Amazingly is in the category of intensifiers, which have amplifying
function: “amplifiers scale upwards from an assumed norm”.

Table 2. May and the contexts in which it appears in the ESPC
Frequency Frequency
Perfect aspect 34 34
Progressive aspect 12 12
State verb 175 171
TOTAL: 404 396
The distribution of these features is discussed in detail in the following sec-

tions.
3.1.2.1 Perfect and progressive aspect

There is an absolute correlation between the occurrence of perfect aspect
and epistemic interpretation. Consider the following examples:
(23) It was not, Kate recalls, a very pleasant community anyway, and her mother may
have had good reasons for spurning it, but that did not make life any more agreeable.
(MD) Epistemic
(24) It is unlikely that Stalin was ever, as has been suggested, an Okhrana agent, though
the Okhrana may well have tried to recruit him. (CAOG) Epistemic
Examples (23) and (24) are both interpreted as epistemic, since the time
reference for the proposition is anterior. The fact that there is a state verb
in (23), whereas the main predicate in (24) is an event, does not seem to
make a difference in these examples.
All instances modified by the perfect aspect in the ESPC have anterior
time reference for the proposition with respect to the time of the modality
expressed. This is not an indication, however, that aspectually modified ut-
terances with may cannot have posterior reference. Consider the following:
(25) Your students may have handed in their assignments by next Friday
(they are all so diligent). Epistemic
10 Examples with both epistemic and weak epistemic interpretations are included in this column (for
definitions of these terms see 1.1.1).

In (25), the time reference for the proposition is posterior. However, unlike
must, may does not normally allow a non-epistemic interpretation in these
cases. According to Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 182), “[e]pistemic
may, […], occurs freely in future situations where its deontic use is much
less frequent than that of must”. There is no deontic force in such an utter-
ance, and it is interpreted as any other epistemic statement about the fu-
ture. The difference may lie in the fact that must expressing confident in-
ference/obligation/necessity is somewhat odd in epistemic utterances with
posterior reference; normally, we cannot felicitously make statements
about the future that will necessarily hold true. On the other hand, all
things being equal, must easily allows deontic interpretation in utterances
with posterior reference for the proposition, thus demoting epistemic in-
terpretation.11 Being located on the opposite end of the epistemic scale,
may allows a possibility interpretation, and is therefore suitable in epistem-
ic utterances with posterior time references, i.e. utterances denoting some
future state of affairs, even when they are aspectually modified. This is con-
sistent with the semantic input of the individual modals discussed in Pa-
pafragou (2000) (see 2.2).
An interesting discrepancy arises if we consider utterances with posteri-
or reference that are not aspectually modified, as (26) through (31) show.
(26) We were at mass and the Donnellys were behind us and Father Moloney said, - You
may be seated. (RDO) Deontic
(27) “May we open the windows, Mr Baker?” asked the Queen. (ST) Deontic
(28) “Don’t take nothin’ from the likes of him. That’s your first mistake. Comin’ round
this place may be the next”. (SG) Epistemic
(29) When his collections have been examined, it may emerge that he was a more
significant figure in the art world than is at present understood. (RDA) Epistemic
(30) One thing I can do is write a book which some people may enjoy. (BR) Epistemic
11 Admittedly, there are epistemic utterances with this particular contextual make-up: John didn’t
show up today, I guess he must be arriving tomorrow. In such utterances, the epistemic interpretation is
triggered by a combination of features: the presence of a hedge, aspectual modification, etc. Indeed,
the epistemic interpretation of an utterance containing must in combination with posterior reference
for the proposition is possible in some specific contexts. Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 182) cite one
such context, where must appears in an utterance with posterior time reference for the proposition in
conjunction with a modal adverbial surely: It must surely rain soon. Note that here the subject, the non-
referential it, also contributes to an epistemic interpretation.

(31) “I already like it”, he said on their first day; “I may even get to love it”. (AH)
Epistemic
Sentences (26) and (27) are examples of assertive and non-assertive direct-
ed deontic utterances, respectively. In (26), the speaker, having authority
over his audience, gives them permission to sit down, an action which is to
be carried out after receiving the permission. In (27), the speaker asks for
permission to carry out the action of the main predicate, i.e. opening the
windows. This action is supposed to take place after receiving the permis-
sion. In both cases, there is a responsible agent to carry out the action in
question, as well as someone interested in the proposition being carried
out. Moreover, there is an asymmetric relationship between Father Molo-
ney and his audience in (26) and Mr Baker and the Queen12 in (28), i.e.
the former has authority over the latter, and thus is able to give the permis-
sion to the latter to carry out the action described in the proposition.
This is not the case in (28) through (31), which (despite having poste-
rior reference) are all interpreted as epistemic. (28) and (29) both have in-
animate subjects, comin’ round this place and introductory it, neither of
which is suitable for the role of a responsible agent, or the role of a person
authorized to give permission.13 Moreover, in both utterances the main
predicates are state verbs. In (30) and (31), on the other hand, we do have
potentially responsible agents. Here, the epistemic interpretation is pro-
moted by the semantics of the main predicates. In (30), the main predicate
is a state verb enjoy, which normally denotes an involuntary state. Note that
this verb does not assign the role of Agent to its subject but that of Expe-
riencer. In (31), the main predicate is a catenative event verb indicating an
involuntary change of state, get to love it. Thus, both predicates denote
something the subjects, although in principle being responsible agents,
have no control over, and can therefore not be ordered to carry out. Thus,
posterior reference alone cannot be considered a crucial feature for the de-
ontic interpretation of may, as was the case with must. Other features, such
as animacy of the subject, and, in particular, that the subject has some con-
trol over the action described in the proposition, promote a deontic inter-
pretation of may.
All examples in the corpus modified by progressive aspect are epistemic.
That no deontic examples were found is possibly due to the fact that pro-
12 From the context we learn that Mr Baker is the Queen’s keeper.
13 Naturally, it is not often the case that the person authorized to give permission in some specific case
is also the subject of a deontic utterance. This, however, is possible in utterances containing 1st person
subjects, in which the speaker is at the same time the one who urges for a certain course of actions, and
the one who is to carry out these actions: I have to go to the dentist to have my teeth polished.

gressive aspect usually indicates that the action or state described in the
proposition is on-going. This effectively demotes the deontic interpreta-
tion, since it is infelicitous to permit or order something that is already
happening, i.e. such situations are removed from the agent’s control. How-
ever, as we observed in (11), utterances modified by the progressive aspect
can obtain a posterior time reference for the proposition.
All the relevant progressive utterances found in the corpus seem to have
at least one thing in common besides the epistemic interpretation.
(32) Whatever happens at any given moment may have been lying dormant in the blood
for years. (BR) Epistemic
(33) But nobody seems to suspect that I may be losing confidence in myself. (BR)
Epistemic
(34) There is a growing fear among development planners, both North and South, that
development is not only not happening, but that many of our official development
aid organizations and policies may be doing more harm than good, both to humans
and to the land. (LT) Epistemic
(35) He had replied, “Deforestation may be being financed with our money, but it is very
much against our philosophy”. (LT) Epistemic
In (32), there is an inanimate subject, the proposition has anterior time ref-
erence, and the main predicate is stative. In (33), the time reference is si-
multaneous, the subject is animate, and the main predicate is an event
verb. In (34), we have a metonymic subject in combination with an event
verb, and in (35) there is an inanimate subject and a state verb. Despite
these surface differences, the one thing these examples have in common is
that all of the propositions denote an action or state that is involuntary,
and that the subject is not in control of the situations described in these
propositions. The subject of (32) has no control over its ‘actions’. In (33),
even if the subject is perfectly capable of controlling his actions, the pred-
icate denotes a psychological change over which few have control. Like-
wise, it is hard to imagine that doing harm is a conscious choice for devel-
opment aid organizations in (34), and that the situation is undesirable is
clearly indicated by the use of the concessive in (35). It is therefore difficult
to evaluate the exact contribution of the progressive aspect for the interpre-
tation in these examples, since other features are present in these utterances
that may contribute to an epistemic interpretation.


All of the examples in the corpus with introductory subjects and the modal
may are interpreted as epistemic, corroborating Coates’s assumptions.
(36) When his collections have been examined it may emerge that he was a more
significant figure in the art world of his time than is at present understood. (RDA)
Epistemic
(37) There may be an appearance of order and reason at the Intercontinental, where the
bell captain still appears while there is rioting and rebellion round the corner, but
the real truths lie beyond the hotel lobby. (AS) Epistemic
(38) It may well have been that Thera’s elders felt that here at last was a straightforward
job for this somewhat troublesome cleric, far off the main roads, where he would
settle down and avoid controversy and where his eccentricities would go unnoticed.
(LT) Epistemic
The presence of an introductory subject in an utterance indicates not only

that the utterance necessarily describes a stative situation, and is thus re-
moved from the agent’s control, but also that there is no suitable agent in
the context of the utterance. Other features shown to be of importance for
the interpretation elsewhere contribute to the impact of the introductory
subject.14 For instance, in (36), first mentioned as (29), the time reference
is posterior to the time of the utterance. In (37), it is simultaneous with the
time of the utterance, and in (38) it is anterior to the time of the utterance.
This, however, does not seem to influence the interpretation of these ex-
amples, despite the fact that time reference may influence the interpreta-
tion in contexts that do not contain an introductory subject.
3.1.2.3 State verb

As can be seen in Table 2, there is also a strong correlation between epis-
temic interpretation and the presence of a state verb. The utterances con-
taining state predicates in my data vary in terms of the time reference for
the propositions they express.
(39) She may be at the nursing station. (AH) Epistemic
(40) What we share, Jon and I, may be a lot like a traffic accident, but we do share it.
(MA) Epistemic
14 See, however, the discussion of (57) and (58).

Sentences (39) and (40) both have simultaneous time references. However,
while (39) has an animate subject she, (40) has an inanimate subject what
we share. This does not seem to affect the interpretation: the subject, re-
gardless of type, is not an intended agent as there is no deontic force ex-
pressed in these utterances. The fact that the time reference for the propo-
sition is simultaneous with the time of the modality expressed is also con-
sistent with an epistemic interpretation.
In (41) and (42), which also contain an introductory subject, the time
reference for the proposition is anterior to the time of the modality ex-
pressed. Both utterances are also modified by perfect aspect. One of the
differences between these utterances is that the subject in (41) is animate
(they), whereas in (42) the notional subject is inanimate (that I had grown
tired of coming and going). Once again, the difference in the type of subject
does not seem to affect the interpretation.
(41) They at first assumed that his oddities sprang from an excess of intelligence, as most
such parents might fondly assume, and of course they may have been right, though
by now it is too late to say. (MD) Epistemic
(42) It may simply have been that I had grown tired of coming and going. (BO)
Epistemic
Examples (43) and (44) both have a posterior time reference for the prop-
osition, but different subjects: animate future generations, and inanimate
what seems a coincidence at the time. In (44), an epistemic interpretation is
also supported by the epistemic adverbial well (see further 4.2.1).
(43) On the contrary, this stability will involve the rational use of renewable resources,
keeping options open for future generations who may have a clearer understanding
and appreciation than we do today of the value of such resources. (LT) Epistemic
(44) But what seems a coincidence at the time may well look different later, link upon
link. (BR) Epistemic
It is thus possible to conclude that state verbs in utterances with posterior

reference for the proposition demote deontic interpretation, since, all
things being equal, states cannot be controlled by an external agent. The
other two features, time reference and subject type, do not seem in my data
to be able to ‘override’ the interpretation imposed by the presence of a state
verb. There are two special examples in the corpus that contain a state verb
and that are interpreted epistemically: both are the so-called formulaic sub-

junctives or concessives (see Quirk et al. 1985: 157-158 and Palmer 1990:
52, 111), as in (45).
(45) Be that as it may, he was dead by fifty-five and his wife died of throat cancer soon
after. (FW1) Epistemic
According to Quirk et al. (1985: 157-158), formulaic subjunctives are

used in set expressions, are formal, and convey expressions of will. Howev-
er, (45) expresses admission or concession on the part of the speaker. Also,
there is no deontic force expressed in this utterance. Palmer (1990: 52)
seems to agree with this interpretation, claiming that concessives are “con-
cerned with the consideration of possible propositions”.

The last feature mentioned by Coates as associated with epistemic modal-
ity is the type of subject. Whether the subject is animate or inanimate,
however, can have different consequences depending on what other fea-
tures are present in the context. In utterances with posterior reference that
are not aspectually modified, the presence of an inanimate subject contrib-
utes to an epistemic interpretation, as in (28) and (29). In both of these
sentences the main predicate is a state verb, which is also important for the
interpretation (cf. discussion of (39-44)). In the utterances modified by
progressive aspect in my data, the presence of an inanimate subject
strengthens the impression that the action described by the proposition is
involuntary or out of the subject’s control. It is possible to argue that, all
things being equal, the presence of an inanimate subject in an utterance
may contribute to its epistemic interpretation, since a subject of this kind
is obviously unable to carry out a command or fulfil an obligation usually
expressed in deontic utterances. It is only in this sense that we can claim
that inanimate subjects are associated with epistemic interpretations. In
certain contexts, however, inanimate subjects do not demote a deontic in-
terpretation (cf. (12) in 4.1.1).

3.2 Swedish modals

In the sections that follow, I investigate the Swedish modals måste and kan
in the environments mentioned in Coates as being associated with epis-
temic modality in English.
3.2.1 Måste
As can be seen from Table 3, måste, like must, is not used primarily to ex-
press epistemic modality: only 151 out of the 1013 examples in the corpus
are epistemic.
Table 3. Måste and the contexts in which it appears in the ESPC
Frequency Frequency
Perfect aspecti 68 68
State verb 234 90
TOTAL: 841 253
i) Since Swedish has no grammaticalised progressive aspect, this feature was omitted in the analysis.
The features under investigation also combine with each other in epistemic
examples: the relevant features occur 253 times in the 151 epistemic exam-
ples.
3.2.1.1 Perfect aspect

There is an absolute correlation between perfect aspect and epistemic in-
terpretation: all 68 aspectually modified examples are interpreted as epis-
temic.
(46) Med hans kunskaper om hav måste han ha haft något

with his knowledge about sea MOD he have-INF have-PART something
med sjön att göra. (BL) Epistemic

with sea-DEF to do-INF
‘As he seemed to know so much about sailing, he must surely have had something
to do with the sea and ships.’15

(47) Klockan måste ha varit närmare ett på natten när jag

clock-DEF MOD have-INF be-PART nearer one on night-DEF when I
hörde ljudet från en knattrande utombordsmotor. (BL) Epistemic

hear-PAST sound-DEF from a clattering outboard-motor
‘It must have been nearly one o’clock when I heard the sound from a clattering
outboard-motor.’
(48) Han tänkte hastigt att hon måste ha burit den med sig
he think-PAST fast that she MOD have-INF carry-PART it with REFL
hela tiden. (HM) Epistemic

all time-DEF
‘He had a fleeting thought that she must have been carrying it the whole time.’
(49) Den måste ha ramlat ur bokhyllan av sig själv. (MG) Epistemic

It MOD have-INF fall-PART out bookshelf of REFL self
‘It must have tumbled from the bookcase by itself.’
All these utterances are interpreted epistemically. Besides the aspectual

modification (and in the absence of a temporal adverbial specifying that
the time reference for the proposition is posterior to the time reference of
the modality expressed), there are other features present in these utteranc-
es. In (46) and (47), state verbs (ha(va) ‘have’ and vara ‘be’) are combined
with an animate (han ‘he’) and an inanimate subject (klockan ‘clock’), re-
spectively. In (48) and (49), event verbs (bära ‘carry’ and ramla ‘fall’) are
combined with an animate (hon ‘she’) and an inanimate subject (den ‘it’),
respectively. Combining state and event verbs with different subject does
not seem to ‘override’ the impact of the perfect in combination with an an-
terior time reference in these utterances.
As with the English modals, the feature that often co-occurs with the
perfect is anterior time reference for the proposition. All of the Swedish ex-
amples modified by the perfect aspect found in the corpus have anterior
time reference for the proposition. However, as was the case with must, this
should not be considered an absolute association. As with must, examples
with posterior reference for the proposition modified by the perfect aspect
can easily be constructed.
15 All Swedish data found in the corpus are accompanied by translations from the ESPC (see also 1.3),
whereas translations for constructed examples are provided by me. This is true also for the cases where
the translation is missing.

(50) Du måste ha avslutat dina uppgifter imorgon. Deontic

you MOD have-INF finish-PART your assignments tomorrow
‘You must have finished your assignments by tomorrow (since it is the date of the
deadline).’
With måste, similarly to must, for the proposition in aspectually modified

utterances promotes a deontic interpretation by cancelling the assumption
that the situation described by the proposition is immutable, and as such
cannot be controlled by an agent.
In (51), where the time reference for the proposition is anterior to the
modality expressed, the interpretation is epistemic.
(51) Du måste ha avslutat dina uppgifter vid det här laget. Epistemic
you MOD have-INF finish-PART your assignments at this time
‘You must have finished your assignments by now (since you have worked with
them for such a long time).’
There were no examples in the corpus that were not aspectually modified,
and where the time reference for the proposition was simultaneous to the
time of the utterance. However, of the 468 examples with posterior time
reference for the proposition, only 10 are interpreted as epistemic. This
shows that although posterior reference for the proposition is a rather
strong indication that the interpretation of utterances containing måste is
deontic, there are examples where, despite the posterior reference, the de-
ontic interpretation is demoted by the presence of other contextual fea-
tures, as in (52) through (55). In these examples, the features are combined
in such a way as to neutralize the effects of the posterior time reference and
promote an epistemic interpretation (see also fn. 11 for a similar phenom-
enon in English).
(52) Snart måste väl förklaringen komma. (BL) Epistemic

soon MOD MOD explanation-DEF come-INF
‘The explanation must come soon.’
(53) Även med perfekt skötsel måste det någon gång inträffa en kalamitet. (PCJ)
even with perfect care MOD it some time happen-INF a calamity
‘Even with perfect care a calamity must occur someday.’ Epistemic
(54) Den saken var något Torsten måste nog finna ut på

this thing-DEF be-PAST something Torsten MOD MOD find-INF out on

egen hand. (LG) Epistemic

own hand
‘That was something Torsten would obviously have to find out for himself.’
(55) Om hon inte finns där så måste nån förr eller senare
if she not exist-PRES there then MOD somebody before or later
börja sakna henne. (HM) Epistemic

start-INF miss-INF her
‘If she’s not on that list, someone is going to miss her sooner or later.’
In (52), an inanimate subject (förklaringen ‘the explanation’) and the epis-

temic particle nog ‘probably’ combine with an event verb (komma ‘come’).
The situation is out of the subject’s control, since the subject is inanimate.
It is understood that someone else is to provide an explanation in order to
fulfil the speaker’s prediction, which normally will not preclude deontic in-
terpretation (see e.g. (12) in 4.1.1 and (93) in the present chapter). Epis-
temic adverbials or particles affect the interpretation of an utterance con-
taining a modal verb, as will be discussed in greater detail in 4.2.1. Indeed,
the presence of an epistemic adverbial or particle in an utterance (both in
harmonic and non-harmonic combinations) takes precedence over all oth-
er features: these adverbials are sentential, and thus take scope over the ut-
terance as a whole. If the particle nog ‘probably’ were omitted, (52) would
be ambiguous between a deontic and an epistemic interpretation, at least
without additional contextual information. That such an adverbial or par-
ticle is crucial for the interpretation can be seen in (54): the utterance
would be interpreted as deontic if not for the epistemic particle nog ‘prob-
ably’, since in this case the animate subject Torsten is in control of his ac-
tions. There seem to be no other features, such as, for example, a state verb,
that would demote a deontic interpretation.16
In (53), there is no particle present. The subject of (53), however, is in-
troductory, and combines with an event verb (inträffa ‘happen’). Accord-
ing to this verb’s semantics, nobody controls the change of state indicated
by it. Additionally, the choice of the notional subject kalamitet ‘calamity’
indicates that nobody is interested in the proposition being carried out.
The fact that the proposition describes an involuntary event that is not
16 Note, however, that (54) may be interpreted by some speakers as ambiguous. In these cases, the
speakers do not perceive the particle as necessarily epistemic, but see it as a face-saving device used in
order to diminish the deontic force of an utterance (see Jucker 1993).

controlled by an agent is considered the reason for the epistemic interpre-

tation.
Example (55) also contains a catenative verb indicating a change of state
(börja sakna ‘start missing’), something we normally do not have control
over. Even if the subject of this sentence, being animate, is a potentially re-
sponsible agent, the change of state described in the proposition is invol-
untary due to the semantics of the verb. In accordance with the arguments
that will be put forward in Chapter 4, and the data analysis presented so
far in this chapter, I claim that this particular combination of features de-
motes a deontic interpretation and promotes an epistemic one instead.
That ‘involuntariness of an action’ and ‘absence of subject control’ are fea-
tures to consider was also an important point in the discussion of (32)
through (35).
In all of the above examples, the presence of epistemic adverbials, or ad-
verbial clauses indicating the speaker’s assumptions and expectations about
the nature of the relevant state of affairs is important: väl in (52), Även med
perfekt skötsel in (53), nog in (54), and Om hon inte finns där in (55).

There is a strong correlation between the presence of an introductory sub-
ject in an utterance and epistemic interpretation.
(56) Det måste finnas ett Uganda också för mig. (HM) Epistemic
it MOD exist-PRES an Uganda also for me
‘There must be a Uganda for me somewhere.’
In (56), the influence of the introductory subject is quite clear. The time
reference for the proposition is simultaneous with the time of the utter-
ance, and, as is usually the case in utterances containing an introductory
subject, the situation described by the proposition is stative. This combi-
nation of features promotes epistemic interpretation.17
17 Admittedly, it is marginally possible to construe contexts in which this statement does not apply.
Consider, for example, Det måste finnas filt och kudde i alla sängar ‘There must be a blanket and a pil-
low in every bed’. This example is ambiguous: given the appropriate context, this sentence can be in-
terpreted as either epistemic (‘I am certain this is the case since most beds I have seen before are like
that’) or deontic (‘It must necessarily be the case, if we are to be comfortable’, or even ‘I (implicitly)
order you to put blankets and pillows in every bed’). See also the discussion of (57)-(58) in this chapter,
and (12) in 4.1.1.

However, not all of the examples containing an introductory subject

were interpreted as epistemic: of 65 examples containing an introductory
subject, 25 were interpreted as non-directed deontic.
(57) För att miljökriser skall kunna förebyggas, måste det finnas
for that environment-crises FUT be-able-INF prevent-PASS MOD there exist
infrastruktur, organisation och ökade resurser. (ETHE) Deontic

infrastructure organization and increased resources
‘Prevention of environmental crises requires infrastructure, organization and

increased resources.’
(58) Nu måste det vara stora enheter. (SC) Deontic

now MOD there be-INF big units
‘Now you have to have large units.’
In (57), an introductory subject is combined with a state verb (finnas ‘ex-

ist’). This example is therefore structurally similar to the epistemic (56).
The only – and in my opinion crucial – difference is the presence of an ex-
plicit condition in (57). It is this feature that without exception promotes
deontic interpretations in both the Swedish and the English data with must
and måste. Such a condition does not have to be explicit but can be inferred
from the situational context, as in (58), where the author discusses the fi-
nancial difficulties that farmers with small-scale establishments experience.
It is thus implied that to achieve economic success, farmers should work
with large-scale establishments. In both utterances, the writer indicates
that the necessity to act in a certain way arises from specific circumstances
presented in the conditions stated. Thus, the presence of either an explicit
or an implicit condition in the propositional or situational contexts of an
utterance promotes a non-epistemic interpretation in both languages.
3.2.1.3 State verb

The data in Table 3 show that the presence of a state predicate alone does
not promote an epistemic interpretation: of the 234 utterances containing
a state verb, only 90 are interpreted as epistemic. This is contrary to the
findings in the English data.
(59) Så är det hemma hos oss, man måste vara uppmärksam på det,
so be-PRES it at-home with us one MOD be-INF attentive on it

annars kan förfärliga saker inträffa. (AP) Deontic

otherwise MOD terrible things happen
‘That’s what it’s like at home and you have to pay attention to it, otherwise terrible
things may happen.’
(60) Han som tar emot samtal måste veta hur det ser ut. (HM)
he who take-PRES against calls MOD know-INF how it look-PRES out
‘The person taking the calls has to know what it looks like.’ Deontic
(61) Men ändå måste paketet innehålla något som inte fick
but still MOD package-DEF contain-INF something that not be-allowed-PAST
bli tillgängligt för myndigheterna eftersom jag hade fått

become-INF available for authority-PL-DEF because I have-PAST get-PART
det när de visade sig på kajen. (BL) Epistemic

it when they show-PAST REFL on quay-DEF
‘On the other hand, the package must contain something that was not to fall in the
hands of the authorities since it was handed to me when they appeared on the quay.’
In the deontic examples containing state verbs there is invariably either an

explicit or an implicit condition present. In (59), there is an explicit con-
dition: if one is not attentive, terrible things will happen. In (60), on the
other hand, the condition is implicit, i.e. the policeman who will be in
charge of the incoming calls should know what the necklace belonging to
the deceased looks like, in order to be able to identify the most valuable
tips.18 Because of these conditions, both examples receive deontic interpre-
tations. In (61), there is no such condition, but a state verb combined with
an inanimate subject. The presence of these two features demotes a deontic
interpretation and promotes an epistemic one instead. Thus, although ex-
amples containing state verbs are predominantly non-epistemic in the
Swedish data, this is not due to the fact that there is only a weak association
between this feature and epistemic interpretation, as was the case in the
English data. Another feature, explicit or implicit condition, overrides its
influence. That this is more apparent in the Swedish data could be a statis-
tical coincidence, since it is also the case that the presence of explicit or im-
18 In this case, the subject is also non-referential. This can be a feature contributing to the interpre-
tation, since it has been observed that non-referential subjects favour deontic interpretation (cf. Bar-
biers 1995). For example, in The applicant must be a fluent speaker of Swedish, the most plausible
interpretation is deontic, whereas in John must be a fluent speaker of Swedish both deontic and epistemic
interpretations are possible if no other contextual features are present to disambiguate this example.

plicit condition in the English examples containing must is as crucial for

promoting non-epistemic interpretations as it is in Swedish in utterances
containing måste.

Inanimate subjects do not seem to be crucial for an epistemic interpreta-
tion, as can be deduced from the data in Table 3: only 55 of the 474 exam-
ples containing an inanimate subject are epistemic. However, as men-
tioned earlier, inanimate subjects should be considered in combination
with other features.
(62) Det jag har upplevt i den riktningen måste vara som
it I have-PRES experience-PART in that direction-DEF MOD be-INF as
en vindfläkt i jämförelse med en stark blåst. (AP) Epistemic

a breeze in comparison with a strong wind
‘What I’ve experienced in that direction must be like a tiny breeze in comparison
with a howling wind.’
(63) Klockan måste ha varit närmare ett på natten när jag

clock-DEF MOD have-INF be-PART nearer one on night-DEF when I
hörde ljudet från en knattrande utombordsmotor. (BL) Epistemic

hear-PAST sound-DEF from a clattering outboard-motor
‘It must have been nearly one o’clock when I heard a clattering outboard-motor.’
(64) Det hade aldrig tidigare inträffat att jag varit ensam, men jag
it have-PAST never earlier happen-PART that I be-PART alone but I
hade flera gånger tänkt att det med mina restider måste
have-PAST many times think-PART that it with my travel-times MOD
hända förr eller senare. (BL) Epistemic

happen-INF before or later
‘It had never happened before that I have been alone, but it had sometimes occurred
to me that sooner or later I would be, considering the hours at which I travelled.’
In (62), the epistemic interpretation stems from the combination of an in-

animate subject (det jag har upplevt i den riktningen ‘what I have experi-
enced in this direction’) and a state verb (vara ‘be’). Neither an explicit nor
an implicit condition is found in the context of this utterance, which, as

we saw earlier, would have overridden the influence of these features and
promoted a deontic interpretation. In (63), originally presented as (47),
the inanimate subject klockan ‘the clock’ is also combined with the state
verb vara ‘be’. The utterance is further modified by perfect aspect, indicat-
ing that the time reference for the proposition is anterior, and the situation
described is stative. As mentioned earlier, the presence of aspectual modi-
fication in an utterance with anterior time reference effectively demotes de-
ontic interpretations (promoting epistemic ones). In this particular case,
however, it could be argued that there are multiple contributing factors,
such as the type of subject. Thus, in (63) the features that can demote de-
ontic interpretation by bringing about the assumption of the lack of agen-
tive control are combined in an optimal way to create this effect. In (64),
the inanimate subject det ‘it’ is combined with a change of state verb (hän-
da ‘happen’), and posterior time reference for the proposition with respect
to the modality expressed. In all these examples, irrespective of the time
reference for the proposition, the lack of control over the situation on the
part of the subjects, and the fact that no condition can be found in the sit-
uational contexts demote a deontic interpretation.
In the non-epistemic examples found in the data, deontic interpretation
is promoted by an explicit or implicit condition, and the lack of control on
the part of the intended agent, in addition to the presence of other features,
such as inanimate subject or passive verbs, as in (65) and (66).
(65) I detsamma tutade ett signalhorn bortom kröken, och runt en ekdunge
in the-same hoot-PAST a horn beyond curve-DEF and round a oak-grove
som hösten redan slagit brun kom Henrys

that autumn-DEF already beat-PART brown come-PAST Henry-POSS
Heldenleben-Hutschkrummler blank och gul – i alldeles för hög fart

H-H shiny and yellow in utterly too high speed
som vanligt – och måste gira tvärt för en ekorre som just sprang
as usual and MOD turn-INF steeply for a squirrel that just run-PAST
över vägen. (ARP) Deontic

over way-DEF
‘At that moment a horn tooted and round a clump of autumn-brown oaks came
Henry’s Heldenleben-Hutschkrummler, all shiny and yellow – and far too fast as
usual – so it had to brake hard and swerve to avoid a squirrel running across the
road.’

(66) Men för att få visshet måste berättelsen berättas. (BL) Deontic
but for to get-INF certainty MOD story-DEF tell-INF-PASS
‘But to gain certainty, there is no other way but to tell the story.’
In (65) and (66), the inanimate subjects (Henrys Heldenleben-Hutsch-

krummler ‘Henry’s Heldenleben-Hutschkrummler’ and berättelsen ‘the sto-
ry’) are combined with implicit or explicit conditions, respectively. Again,
the presence of either type of condition in the propositional or situational
context of an utterance promotes deontic interpretations. In (66), the
main predicate is also passivized. That the presence of this feature is impor-
tant for the non-epistemic interpretation is more evident in (67).
(67) Efter stor vånda och samtal med Gud, beslöt min mormor att
after big anguish and talks with God decide-PAST my grandmother that
indianen måste gravsättas i trädgården. (RJ) Deontic

indian-DEF MOD burry-INF-PASS in garden-DEF
‘After great pangs of anguish and a private chat with God, my gran decided that the
Indian must be buried in her garden.’
There is no condition present in the propositional or situational context of

(67). The interpretation is nevertheless deontic, more precisely non-direct-
ed deontic. The subject (indianen ‘the Indian’) is inanimate, since it refers
to what is presumed to be the mummified head of a dead Indian. This in-
animate subject is combined with a passivized event verb (gravsätta ‘bury’).
It is the combination of these two features, the necessity for the Indian to
be buried (it is customary to bury the dead in general) and that, naturally,
he has to be buried by somebody other than himself (he lacks control over
the event denoted in the proposition), that promotes the non-directed de-
ontic interpretation. As discussed in 4.1.3, for a passive utterance to be in-
terpreted deontically two conditions must be met. Firstly, the speaker must
have a specific agent in mind to carry out the proposition, and secondly –
and possibly more importantly – the time reference for the proposition
must be posterior to the time reference for the modality in order to leave
the option to act open to this agent. Both conditions are met in (67).
Another feature important for deontic interpretation, whether in com-
bination with an inanimate subject or not, is the past time reference for the

modality expressed in an utterance. Of the four modals investigated here,

only Swedish måste can be used in this way, as demonstrated in (68).19
(68) Men när man kom fram till spåret måste ekipaget hålla så
but when one come-PAST forward to track-DEF MOD equipage hold-INF so
att kusken fick lyssna efter annalkande tåg. (KE) Deontic

that driver-DEF be-allowed-PAST listen-INF after approaching train
‘But when they got to the tracks the coach had to stop for the driver to listen for
approaching trains.’
Here, the time reference for the modality expressed is past, i.e. some kind
of past necessity is indicated in (68), resulting in a non-directed deontic in-
terpretation. Note that even in this case the realization of the proposition
comes after the necessity arises.
The fourth type of deontic example with an inanimate subject is similar
to (69).
(69) Hans kontaktnät måste förbli intakt och det fick inte utsättas
his contact-net MOD remain intact and it be-allowed-PAST NEG expose-PASS
för påfrestningar. (KOB) Deontic

for strains
‘His network of contacts had to remain intact, and it must not be put under strain.’
Here, no condition can be found in the context. The utterance simply in-
troduces the two principles by which the spy in question works. The time
reference for the proposition is posterior. As mentioned earlier, all things
being equal, posterior reference for the proposition, even in combination
with an inanimate subject, may promote deontic interpretation in the case
of both måste and must.
3.2.2 Kan
As can be seen from Table 4, almost 50 percent of the examples involving
kan are epistemic. In addition, kan is interpreted as dynamic in 449 cases,
which leaves only 61 examples with deontic interpretation, and 17 inde-
19 Admittedly, in indirect speech, the English modals must and may can also occur in utterances with
past time reference for the modality expressed (both with epistemic and non-epistemic interpreta-
tions): He thought he must be mad. However, these cases are different from utterances as in (68).

terminate ones. Thus, although kan is said to express three kinds of modal-
ity, the present study suggests that it is primarily used to express epistemic
and dynamic modalities.
Table 4. Kan and the contexts in which it appears in the ESPC
Frequency Frequency
(N of epistemic examples=468i)
Perfect aspectii 15 15
State verb 167 131
TOTAL: 630 513
i) Most of the examples considered epistemic are actually weak epistemic: of the 468 epistemic ex-
amples 369 are weak epistemic.
ii) Since Swedish has no grammaticalised progressive aspect, this feature was omitted in the analysis.
Many of the examples classified here as epistemic are actually weak epis-
temic, and as such close to dynamic modality.20 It can therefore be predict-
ed that the boundary between epistemic and dynamic examples containing
kan is not clear-cut, unlike the boundaries between the epistemic and de-
ontic interpretations of the other modals under discussion. Another differ-
ence between kan and the other modals is that in the case of kan the fea-
tures under discussion do not ‘cooperate’ to the same degree; the features
occur only 512 times in the 468 examples. However, in the 99 strong epis-
temic examples found in the data, the features occur 149 times, while in
the 369 weak epistemic examples they occur only 363 times. Thus, strong
epistemic utterances containing kan exhibit similarity with other epistemic
utterances.
3.2.2.1 Perfect aspect

As expected, all of the examples modified by perfect aspect are epistemic.
In addition, all of them have anterior time reference, which, as we saw ear-
lier, effectively demotes deontic interpretation.
(70) Pyramiderna kan inte ha varit märkvärdigare när de

pyramids-DEF MOD NEG have-INF be-PART more-amazing when they
20 Cf. the discussion in section 1.1.1.

hittades i Egyptens sand. (AP) Epistemic

find-PAST-PASS in Egypt-POSS sand
‘The Pyramids can’t have been more amazing when they were found in the sands of
Egypt.’
(71) Hon kan såvitt jag förstår ha landat i den här åkern
she MOD as-far I understand-PRES have-INF land-PART in this here field-DEF
med fallskärm. (HM) Epistemic

with parachute
‘As far as I can tell, she landed in this field by parachute.’
In (70) and (71), modified by perfect aspect, the propositions have anterior
time reference. That this should always be the case cannot, however, be
concluded on the basis of the examples found, since examples with differ-
ent time reference for the proposition can easily be constructed.
(72) Han kan ha avslutat sitt arbete imorgon. Epistemic

he MOD have-INF finish-PART REFL work tomorrow
‘He may have finished his work by tomorrow.’
(73) Han kan ha avslutat sitt arbete vid det här laget.
he MOD have-INF finish-PART REFL work at DEF here point-DEF
‘He may have finished his work by this time.’ Epistemic
In (72), the time reference for the proposition is posterior. Kan in this case
is similar to may, which, as shown in (25), does not allow a deontic inter-
pretation in this context. As in (25), there is no deontic force in (72), and
it is interpreted as any other epistemic statement about the future. Thus,
kan, like may, being situated on the opposite end of the epistemic scale
from epistemic måste, allows for ‘possibility’ interpretations, and is suitable
in utterances with posterior reference also when aspectually modified. This
is consistent with the semantic distinction between must and may discussed
in Papafragou (2000) (see also 2.2.).
In (73), on the other hand, the time reference for the modality ex-
pressed is simultaneous with the time of the utterance due to the temporal
adverbial vid det här läget ‘at this point’. The time reference for the propo-
sition is, however, anterior, and the implicature the aspectual modification
sometimes brings about, i.e. that the situation described in the proposition
has occurred, is not cancelled. In accordance with our earlier observations

about utterances modified by perfect aspect, anterior time reference for the
proposition in these cases effectively demotes deontic interpretation, pro-
moting epistemic interpretation instead, i.e. the situation thus described is
immutable, and cannot be controlled by an agent.
While the above is true of modals that allow only deontic and epistemic
interpretations, a complication arises regarding an additional interpreta-
tion available for kan in Swedish, namely dynamic interpretation, as in
(74). Aspectually modified utterances such as (75), however, do not allow
a dynamic interpretation.
(74) Han kan spela piano.21 Dynamic

he MOD play-INF piano
‘He can play the piano.’
(75) a. Han kan ha spelat piano.22 *Dynamic

he MOD have-INF play-PART piano
‘He could have played the piano.’
b. *Han höll på att kunna spela piano.23 *Dynamic

he PROG MOD-INF play-INF piano
‘He was being able to play the piano.’
On a dynamic reading, the subject is described as having either an innate

ability or one that has been acquired. In either case, the ability is a long-
term quality of the subject (cf. Teleman et al. 1999: 302). Palmer (2001:
8) claims that “dynamic modality refer[s] to events that are not actualised,
events that have not taken place, but are merely potential”. Thus, if some-
one has the ability to play the piano, it is not necessarily the case that this
person is actually going to play the piano. Similarly, if someone had the
ability to play the piano in the past, it is not necessarily the case that the
person in question exercised his/her ability at any time in the past. Perfect
21 Of course, (74) can also be interpreted as deontic, provided that there is some deontic source in-
terested in the completion of the event.
22 Swedish, unlike English, allows sequences like the following: Han har kunnat spela piano ‘He had
been able to play the piano’, since many of the Swedish modals also have non-finite forms. In such
cases, however, the modal tends not to be interpreted epistemically (cf. e.g. Cinque’s (1999) hierarchy
of functional projections).
23 Some speakers may in informal contexts use the construction presented in (75b) in the sense of
‘almost’, i.e. ‘He could almost play the piano’. Since examples such as (75b) are ungrammatical in
Swedish in the indicated sense, this example was constructed for illustrative purposes.

aspect, on the other hand, indicates that the event described by the main
predicate has been actualised. It is exactly because one cannot combine the
notion of potentiality with the notion of actualization that the ability read-
ing is impossible in (75a). (75b) is simply ungrammatical in Swedish. The
non-grammaticalized progressive aspect, indicating that the event de-
scribed by the main predicate is a present state and is thus actualised, clash-
es with the notion of potentiality in the dynamic interpretation.
That posterior time reference, and not merely aspectual modification, is
important for epistemic interpretation can also be concluded on the basis
of the Swedish kommer att V ‘going to V’ construction, as in (76).
(76) Det lugnar mig under denna tid då jag anar att mycket
it calms-PRES I-ACC during this time when I suspect-PRES that much
oönskat kan komma att inträffa. (AP) Epistemic

unwanted MOD come INF happen-INF
‘It calms me during this time when I suspect that many undesirable things may
happen.’
This kind of construction is possible in Swedish due to the nature of kom-

ma att, which can be used both as a finite auxiliary on its own and as an
auxiliary infinitive in combination with a modal, as in (76). It may be ar-
gued that komma att has not achieved a full auxiliary status yet,24 and has
retained some of its original lexical meaning and syntactic behaviour,
which allows it to enter into constructions such as (76). The infinitive kom-
ma att is used only when the time of the event is not specified by the con-
text of the utterance. It is also mostly used as a complement to a discourse-
oriented verb (e.g. epistemic kan) (see Teleman et al. 1999: 252).
Thus I argue that the future marker komma att can be considered more
subjective25 than its variant, the future marker ska, in that it indicates more
speaker involvement or speaker intention.
(77) Han ska åka till Stockholm på söndag.

he FUT go-INF to Stockholm on Sunday
24 The recent development of komma att involves the loss of the infinitive marker att, so that con-
structions such as komma göra ‘will do’ instead of komma att göra have become more and more frequent
in both formal and informal Swedish discourse (see Teleman et al. 1999: 244). When this development
is completed, and komma att achieves full auxiliary status, constructions such as (76) may disappear
(cf. *may will do, *kan skall göra ‘may will do’).
25 The term ‘subjective’ is related here to the degree of speaker involvement (cf. Lyons (1977) on sub-
jective (epistemic) modality).

‘He is to go to Stockholm on Sunday.’
(78) Han kommer att åka till Stockholm på söndag.

he kommer att go-INF to Stockholm on Sunday
‘He will go to Stockholm on Sunday.’
According to Teleman et al., ska is a temporal verb indicating that the event
described by the main predicate is subsequent to the time of the utterance.
Ska also implies that this future event is planned, either by the subject or
by somebody else who has the authority to impose her will on the subject
(Teleman et al. 1999: 246). Thus, ska is not only more objective, in the
sense that there is no speaker involvement as such, but a parallel may be
drawn between the future and the deontic interpretation of ska. Komma
att, on the other hand, does not imply that the event described by the main
predicate is planned or intended; it does, however, indicate a more or less
competent prognosis on the part of the speaker. It also indicates that the
speaker relies on some external circumstances in her prognosis (Teleman et
al. 1999: 244). Thus, komma att may be seen as more subjective, and as
such related to epistemic modality. The subjectivity of komma att allows it
to combine with another subjective element, namely epistemic kan in (76).
This combination, however, is not well-formed with the objective and fully
grammaticalised ska (cf. *?… då jag anar att mycket oönskat kan skola in-
träffa ‘when I guess that a lot unwanted MOD MOD-INF happen’). This claim
is also supported by the fact that occurrences of kan komma att V are always
epistemic.

There is an absolute correlation in my data between introductory subjects
and epistemic interpretation.
(79) Det kan också vara chocken att upptäcka att hon lever. (BL) Epistemic
it MOD also be-INF shock-DEF INF realize-INF that she live-PRES
‘It can be the shock of discovering that she is alive.’
(80) Det kan väl hända att jag följer med till Stockholm i alla fall.
it MOD MOD happen-INF that I follow-PRES with to Stockholm in all cases
‘I may well come along in any case.’ (MG) Epistemic
(81) Det kan förstås också ha varit som med havet. (AP) Epistemic

it MOD MOD also have-INF be-PART as with sea-DEF
‘Of course it could have been as it was with the sea.’
As can be seen from the above examples, the time reference for the propo-
sition does not seem to influence the interpretation of a modal utterance
containing an introductory subject. In (79), the time reference is simulta-
neous, in (80) it is posterior, and in (81) anterior. Nevertheless, all these
examples are interpreted as epistemic. The most important contribution of
the feature introductory subject, however, is an implication that the involve-
ment of the subject as a possible agent in these utterances is explicitly in-
validated. The situation described in the proposition is also presented as
stative, which, as mentioned earlier, can promote epistemic interpretation.
A supporting feature for the interpretation of (79) through (81) is also the
presence of an epistemic adverbial in (80) (väl ‘well’) and (81) (förstås ‘of
course’).
3.2.2.3 State verb

Most of the examples with a state verb, 131 of 167, are interpreted as epis-
temic.
(82) Barn har svårt att förstå att deras mödrar kan
children have-PRES difficult INF understand-INF that their mothers MOD
ha nåt viktigare för sig än att åka direkt hem

have-INF something more-important for REFL than INF go-INF directly home
och laga den. (HM) Epistemic

and cook-INF it
‘Kids have a hard time understanding that their mothers might have something
more important to do than come straight home and fix it.’
(83) Det kan vara mögligt redan. (JMY) Epistemic

it MOD be-INF moldy already
‘It can already be moldy.’
(84) Redan en påringning kan vara nog för att säkerhetstjänsten

already one phone-call MOD be-INF enough for that security-service
skall reagera. (KOB) Epistemic

FUT react-INF

‘The mere fact of ringing a number can be enough to alert the security forces.’
(85) Flickan kan inte ha varit en vacker syn. (HM) Epistemic

girl-DEF MOD NEG have-INF be-PART a beautiful sight
‘The girl could not have been a pretty sight.’26
In addition to containing state verbs, (82) through (85) also share the in-
terpretation, i.e. they are all epistemic. The other features in these utter-
ances vary somewhat. Thus, (82) and (83) differ with respect to the type
of subject: (82) contains an animate and generic subject mödrar ‘mothers’,
whereas (83) contains an inanimate referential subject det ‘it’. Neither of
these subjects can normally be considered suitable agents by the speaker,
i.e. the speaker is unlikely to give permission to a generic or inanimate
agent to carry out the proposition. In both cases, the time reference for the
proposition is simultaneous with the time of the modality expressed. Also,
although the time reference for the proposition is posterior to the time of
modality in (84) and anterior in (85), neither has a subject that can be con-
sidered a potential agent.
The presence of a state verb in an utterance alone does not, however,
guarantee an epistemic interpretation. Some of the examples containing a
state verb in the corpus, for example, (86) and (87), are non-epistemic or,
more precisely, dynamic.
(86) Fortfarande undrar jag varför jag inte kan känna lugn och odelad
still wonder-PRES I why I NEG MOD feel-INF calm and undivided
glädje över att han sagt att mina ögon är rena. (MS) Dynamic
happiness over that he say-PART that my eyes be-PRES clean
‘And I’m still wondering why I can’t feel a quiet, unqualified pleasure in the fact that
he has said my eyes look clear.’
(87) Kan man inte älska, kan man i varje fall hata. (PCJ) Dynamic
MOD one NEG love-INF MOD one in every case hate-INF
‘If one cannot love, at least one can hate.’
All the dynamic examples containing state verbs have one thing in com-
mon: they have animate human subjects, and there is no indication of any
deontic source interested in the actualisation of the proposition. These ex-
amples are interpreted in such a way that the subjects have the ability to be
26 My translation.

in a state or experience it, since state verbs assign the role of Experiencer to
their subjects, not that of Agent.

The data in Table 4 strongly suggest that inanimate subjects are important
for the interpretation in utterances containing the modal kan. Although in
some cases the presence of an inanimate subject contributes to an epistem-
ic interpretation, its influence can be cancelled by other features typical of
deontic utterances. Based on (70), we may conclude that the presence of
an inanimate subject in an utterance supports epistemic interpretation,
provided the time reference for the proposition is anterior. Also, in (83)
and (84), the presence of an inanimate subject in combination with a state
verb contributes to an epistemic interpretation. However, based on the fact
that all of the non-epistemic examples in the corpus containing a state verb
have an animate subject, we can conclude that the presence of an inani-
mate subject in utterances like (83) and (84) can at least demote a dynamic
interpretation.
3.3 Indeterminate examples

Leech and Coates (1979) and Coates (1983) distinguish three types of in-
determinacy: ambiguity, gradience, and merger. Their view of indetermi-
nacy is based on the notion of polysemy, i.e. they assume that modals have
a number of predefined discrete meanings. The role of the context is to sig-
nal which of the meanings is intended. Sometimes, however, it is difficult
or impossible to distinguish between the different meanings in a given con-
text, which gives rise to indeterminacy. In this study, it is not assumed that
the modal interpretation of an utterance derives solely from the meaning
of the modal verb in the above-mentioned way (see Chapter 4 for more de-
tails). A particular interpretation is determined instead by an array of con-
textual clues. Sometimes, the contextual clues do not allow for a confident
and discrete interpretation of the modality expressed in an utterance, re-
sulting in indeterminacy. I thus adopt Atlas’s (1989: 28-29) view that in
interpreting utterances we are not “selecting from the linguistically given
readings of a syntactically or lexically ambiguous sentence”, but rather “con-
structing from a meaningful but radically sense-general sentence a contextu-
ally determined interpretation of an utterance”. Despite this difference in

approaches, I find it helpful to use the definitions of the three types of in-
determinacy in this study with one modification. I assume that the concept
of indeterminacy applies not to the modal itself but to the whole utterance.
Thus, we are dealing with indeterminate utterances, not indeterminate
modals. Also, indeterminacy arises when the addressee is presented with
conflicting or insufficient clues to arrive at the correct interpretation. For
the speaker, there is no indeterminacy as to what interpretation is intend-
ed. However, in some cases, the speaker may choose to encode her message
in such a way as to give rise to indeterminacy with the addressee.
As mentioned above, Leech and Coates (1979: 81-82) and Coates
(1983: 14-17) distinguish three types of indeterminacy: ambiguity, merger
and gradience.27 Ambiguity is allegedly the easiest type of indeterminacy
to spot in a text. Ambiguous cases are characterized by the following four
properties: (a) a given utterance can be interpreted in a number of ways,
and it is not clear from the context which of the interpretations is intend-
ed; (b) only one of the potential interpretations is possible at a time; (c) the
potential interpretations belong to different categories, i.e. epistemic and
non-epistemic; and (d) these categories are discrete.
(88) John may come to the lecture tomorrow. Ambiguous

a. John is allowed to come to the lecture tomorrow.
b. There is a possibility that John comes to the lecture tomorrow.
In writing, (88) is ambiguous, since in a given context (or the absence of

it), it can be interpreted as either deontic or epistemic, as in (88a) and
(88b); these interpretations, belonging to different scales, are obviously
discrete. Thus, ambiguity can be represented as in Figure 1: an utterance
U receives two discrete interpretations, I1 and I2. These interpretations
lead to different pragmatic implicatures, P1 and P2, i.e. the addressee may
choose different courses of action depending on his interpretation of the
utterance.
I1 P1
U
I2 P2
Figure 1. Ambiguity
27 The following definitions are adapted from the sources to fit the present framework.

In (88), the addressee may choose to object to the permission in (88a),

since, for example, in his opinion John is too rowdy to be allowed to attend
the lecture. Another possible course of actions for the addressee, if he ac-
cepts the interpretation in (88b), would be not to go to the lecture himself
in order to avoid meeting John.
Merger is sometimes considered a special case of ambiguity in which
properties (b) and (c) above do not apply. Contrary to standard ambiguous
cases, in merger the two potential interpretations are mutually compatible,
and it is not necessary to decide in favour of one or the other in a given
context. Cases of merger are difficult to identify in a text precisely because
of this. Leech and Coates suggest that paraphrases should be used as a di-
agnostic. Paraphrases that may be criterial for one or the other interpreta-
tion can be used to arrive at the interpretation. If both possible paraphrases
‘fit’ an utterance, we have a case of merger. If, on the other hand, neither
of the possible paraphrases is satisfactory, we have a case of gradience: (89)
demonstrates this phenomenon.
(89) Man kan inte smita. (JMY) Merger

man MOD NEG run-away
‘You can’t run away.’
The context is as follows: an adult is talking to a child about civic duty and
morality and the fact that, given its social position, the child is not allowed
to disregard these notions and is unable to do so. Two mutually exclusive
interpretations are neutralized in this context so that it is not relevant for
our understanding of the utterance which of the possible interpretations
we prefer. This is represented in Figure 2.
I1
U P
I2
Figure 2. Merger
An utterance U can receive two different interpretations: I1 and I2. How-

ever, there is only one possible pragmatic implicature, P. Thus, in (89), re-
gardless of how the utterance is interpreted, the child will realise that it
cannot escape civic duties.

The definition of gradience is based on the notion of core and periph-

eral meanings of modals: it can be exemplified by the gradience between
the core ability meaning of the English modal can and its peripheral mean-
ing of possibility (Coates 1983: 14-16). Since the primary object of the
present investigation is the range of possible interpretations of modals, I
find it difficult to use concepts such as core or peripheral, i.e. it is virtually
impossible to claim one interpretation to be more peripheral than the oth-
er unless perhaps one appeals to statistics. Instead, I consider utterances
containing the Swedish kan, where it is difficult to decide whether the in-
terpretation is weak epistemic or dynamic, to be examples of gradience,
since these interpretations are per definition related to each other (cf.
1.1.1). The paraphrase test suggested by Leech and Coates is not helpful
in such cases. Thus, the only difference between merger and gradience sup-
ported by my data is that the former involves interpretations stemming
from different scales, i.e. deontic and epistemic, and the latter involves in-
terpretations that are related to each other, i.e. weak epistemic and dynam-
ic.
(90) Där kan vi hejda dem med stora bullerstenar. (AL) Gradience
there MOD we hold-INF them with big noise-stones
‘We can hold them there by rolling rocks at them.’
The possible interpretations of (90) are that it is theoretically possible for

the domestic band of robbers to stop the intruders by rolling stones at
them, and that they will actually be able to do so. Thus, the utterance is
indeterminate between the weak epistemic and dynamic interpretations.
This is represented in Figure 3.
I1
U P
I2
Figure 3. Gradience
An utterance U receives an interpretation somewhere between two related

interpretations: I1 and I2. As in merger, however, there is only one prag-
matic implicature, P. The dynamic interpretation of (90) also implies the
weak epistemic interpretation, i.e. since the robbers are able to stop the in-
truders, it is possible for them to do so. In addition, rolling stones at the

intruders is the course of actions the robbers are likely to resort to in order
to achieve the desired result, i.e. stopping them.
As shown in Table 5, a number of examples found in the ESPC are con-
sistent with the above description of indeterminate utterances.
Table 5. The types of indeterminate examples in the ESPC
Must May Måste Kan TOTAL:

Ambiguity 0 1 1 3 5
Merger 3 3 1 7 14
Gradience 0 1 0 7 8
TOTAL: 3 5 2 17 27
The sections that follow discuss the indeterminate examples found in the
corpus.
3.3.1 Ambiguity
As suggested by Leech and Coates (1979), the five ambiguous examples
found in the corpus are easily recognized. In all these utterances, two dif-
ferent interpretations, epistemic and deontic, are possible, and neither
propositional nor situational context provide sufficient clues as to which
interpretation is preferable. Furthermore, the possible interpretations are
in an either/or relationship, i.e. only one of them is possible at a time.
(91) We find the text is confused and badly drafted and consequently it looks as if a
European Union directive may suddenly apply from high to quite minor plans and
programmes. (EJAC)
In (91), which contains the modal may, the two possible interpretations are
epistemic and deontic. The most important features are the presence of the
inanimate subject a European Union directive, the state verb apply, and the
posterior reference for the proposition. The combination of inanimate
subject and state verb usually promotes an epistemic interpretation. In this
case, the utterance may be interpreted as a tentative statement about a fu-
ture state of affairs, since posterior reference allows epistemic interpreta-
tions with the modal may. Posterior reference is also consistent with a di-
rected deontic interpretation. The presence of an inanimate subject and a
state verb will normally discourage this interpretation. However, it is un-
derstood from the context that the actual action of the application of the

directives will be taken by someone else, i.e. by civil servants who will pos-
sibly apply the directives too extensively. These hypothetical civil servants
will act as responsible agents, which promotes a directed deontic interpre-
tation. In this case, (91) may be paraphrased as follows: ‘A European Union
directive will be allowed to apply …’. It is impossible to deduce from the
situational context of this utterance which of the two possible interpreta-
tions is intended by the speaker.
(92) I denna debatt handlar det ju om vad vi i Europa kan göra för att
in this debate deal-PRES it MOD about what we in Europe can do for INF
underlätta den utvidgning som måste vara en hjärtefråga för oss alla. (EVIR)
facilitate-INF DEF expansion that MOD be a heart-issue for us all
‘[…] this debate is about what we in Europe can do to facilitate the enlargement
process, which must be a burning issue for us all.’
Example (92) exhibits a similar set of features: an inanimate subject (den

utvidgning ‘the expansion’), and a state verb (vara ‘be’). The time reference
for the proposition is, however, ambiguous between simultaneous and pos-
terior, since vara ‘be’ can be interpreted both as a state predicate and as a
change-of-state verb. These features allow both epistemic and non-directed
deontic interpretations (for example, recommendations, where the speaker
chooses not to expose herself as a source of deontic force). Thus, if (92) is
interpreted deontically, the necessity of the proposition being carried out
is not only simultaneous with the time of the utterance, but also applies in
the near future. The situational context does not disambiguate this utter-
ance either.
(93) Om de vill något kan de ju komma hit och snacka. (SW)

if they want-PRES something MOD they MOD come-INF here and talk-INF
‘If they want anything, they can come over here and talk.’
(94) -Det kan jag inte säga, sade han. (JMY)

this MOD I NEG say-INF say-PAST he
‘“I can’t tell you that”, he said.’
Both (93) and (94) contain the modal kan. The utterances also have simi-
lar sets of features: an animate subject (de ‘they’ and jag ‘I’), and an event
verb (komma ‘come’ and säga ‘tell’). The time reference for the proposition
is posterior in both utterances. Such combinations are typical of directed

deontic interpretations, i.e. the subject is a responsible agent, the action

described by the main verb is to take place subsequent to the time of the
utterance, and there is someone interested in the proposition being carried
out. The situational context does not provide us with any information on
the last issue: there is no one in the context that can be identified as such
an interested party, or, more precisely, as a source of deontic force. In (94),
the speaker can, of course, be the source of the deontic force, but this is not
clarified by the context. As we saw earlier, posterior time reference does not
demote epistemic interpretation with modals of possibility may and kan.
Thus, the utterances in (93) and (94) are ambiguous between weak epis-
temic and directed deontic interpretations.28 The presence of an epistemic
particle in (93) contributes to this ambiguity. Should the utterance be in-
terpreted as epistemic, the modal particle reinforces this reading. If the ut-
terance is interpreted as deontic, on the other hand, the modal particle acts
as a face-saving device used by the speaker to tone down her authority (see
Jucker 1993).
3.3.2 Merger
As Leech and Coates (1979) suggested, merger, unlike ambiguity, is rather
difficult to spot in a text. I located fourteen examples in the corpus. In
many cases, there are more than two possible interpretations, and the con-
text is such that these are ‘neutralized’, i.e. all of them fit the context and
are compatible, contrary to what we observed in the ambiguous examples.
Two of the examples containing the modal must, (95) and (96), offer a
rather typical range of interpretations, whereas the third, (97), displays
more unusual interpretations.
(95) Everyone knew that the Whistler must have a car. (PDJ)
In (95), the two possible interpretations are epistemic and non-directed

deontic. The Whistler, a murderer who has been terrorizing the neighbour-
hood lately, commits his murders in different places and is able to avoid
detection. Thus, the people involved base their conclusion (that the Whis-
tler necessarily has a car) on the basis of the fact that he moves rapidly from
place to place. This epistemic interpretation can be paraphrased as ‘It is
certain that he has a car, since he is able to move so rapidly’. The second
available interpretation is deontic, and can be paraphrased as ‘It is neces-
28 It is clear from the context of (94) that a dynamic interpretation would be infelicitous here.

sary for the Whistler to have a car in order to be able to move rapidly from
place to place’. The indeterminacy arises from the fact that the utterance
contains an animate subject and a state verb, combined with simultaneous
time reference for the proposition. As we saw earlier, animate subjects, be-
ing responsible agents, are normally in control of their actions. The pres-
ence of a state verb in an utterance, on the other hand, suggests that the
subject is subjected to, or experiences, some state over which he has no
control. In addition, simultaneous time reference for the proposition usu-
ally indicates that the situation described in the proposition is immutable.
This is not resolved by the presence of any other clarifying clues in the sit-
uational context.
(96) But you must. I mean there are verifiable facts. (RDA)
Similar circumstances apply in (96). This utterance is part of a conversa-

tion between three people, where the first two deny any knowledge of a
person who made the down payment, while the speaker insists that this is
not the case. The utterance lends itself to both epistemic and non-directed
deontic interpretations.29 In the first case, a possible paraphrase could be ‘I
am certain that you know who the person in question was, since one nor-
mally knows from where one receives the money’. In the second case, the
paraphrase could be ‘It is necessary for you to know him, since it is possible
to verify where you got the money from’. The indeterminacy arises because
of the presence of an animate subject and a state verb in combination with
simultaneous time reference for the proposition.
(97) But if humans can make new varieties of plants and animals, must not nature do so
also? (CSA)
The utterance in (97) can be interpreted as a recommendation of some

sort, where must is interpreted close to should (‘Should not nature do so al-
so?’). It is also possible to recognize some sense of ability or weak epistemic
possibility to parallel the ability expressed by can in the previous clause
(Cannot nature do so also? with the possible paraphrase ‘Is it not possible for
nature to do so also?’). This ability or weak epistemic possibility reading is,
however, not easily available for must. An inanimate subject (nature) is
combined with an event verb, possibly giving rise to the personification of
nature in this context. Further, the time reference for the proposition is un-
29 Since the main verb that can be recovered from the context of (92) is know, it is difficult to arrive
at a directed deontic interpretation.

clear: it can be simultaneous with the time of the modality expressed in the
utterance, or posterior to it, i.e. ‘…must not nature start doing so also’.
This is consistent with both dynamic and weak epistemic interpretations,
as well as with a (non-directed) deontic interpretation.
Interpretation is further obstructed by the presence of negation, and the
fact that it is a non-assertive rhetorical question. Usually, negated must is
understood in deontic utterances as indicating that there is obligation not
to act on the proposition, or that no permission has been given to the sub-
ject (Palmer 1990: 75-76). Also, must not normally negates the proposi-
tion, and not the modality, as seems to be the case in this example (Palmer
1990: 38-39). On the other hand, according to Palmer (1990: 41), in ne-
gated interrogative sentences, it is the modality that is negated, not the
proposition, which is consistent with our understanding of (97).
There are three examples involving the modal may that were interpreted
as cases of merger. In all three, the time reference for the proposition is pos-
terior to the time of the utterance. This is consistent with both epistemic
and deontic interpretations when may is involved.
(98) He is sufficient, yet his means are in supposition: he hath Argosy bound to Tripoli,
another to the Indies, I understand moreover upon the Rialto he hath a third at
Mexico, a fourth for England, and other ventures he hath squandered abroad… the
man is notwithstanding sufficient, three thousand ducats, I think I may take his
bond. (AS)
In (98), an animate subject (I) is combined with an event verb (take). This
utterance may be interpreted as partly an epistemic statement about the
speaker’s possible future course of actions, and partly a deontic statement,
where the speaker gives permission or indicates a recommendable course
of actions for himself. The context of this utterance is such that both inter-
pretations share the pragmatic implicature. Thus, the reader is not forced
to choose between the interpretations, as in ambiguous examples.
(99) Tell us what it is to be a woman so that we may know what it is to be a man. (TM)
In (99), an animate subject (we) is combined with a state verb (know). Giv-
en the posterior reference, the utterance may be interpreted as an epistemic
statement about some future state of affairs (‘So that it will be possible for
us to know…’), or as a deontic request (the speaker requests a missing
piece of information from somebody else and is thus the source of the de-
ontic force in the utterance).

(100) Participants have been granted seven-year options, which may be exercised from 15
July 2002. (STO)
In (100), an inanimate subject (options) is combined with a passive form

of an event verb (exercise). This allows for two interpretations: (i) ‘The par-
ticipants are permitted to exercise their options from 15 July 2002’; and
(ii) ‘It is possible that the participants will exercise their options from 15
July 2002’. There is nothing in the context of this utterance that provides
a clue about which of the interpretations is intended, and also nothing that
forces us to choose one of them. If we consider the strong cross-linguistic
pattern for the diachronic development of modal meanings suggested in
Bybee, Perkins and Pagliuca (1994), who claim that epistemic meaning
generally develops from the ability senses of modals, the fact that these in-
terpretations co-exist in the above example is not surprising.
In (101), måste is combined with an animate subject (Adele), and the
passive form of an event verb (räkna ‘count’). Furthermore, the time refer-
ence for the proposition is simultaneous with the time of the modality ex-
pressed.
(101) Jag har svårt att förstå mig på de vuxna, och Adele
I have-PRES difficult INF understand-INF me on DEF adults and Adele
måste räknas till dem. (AP)

MOD count-PASS-PRES to them
‘I find it difficult to understand adults, and Adele had (sic) to be reckoned as one.’30
The fact that the passive form of the verb räkna ‘count’ is used in this case
indicates the stative nature of the proposition. Given the time reference,
the utterance may be interpreted in two ways: (i) ‘I am certain that Adele
is reckoned as an adult due to e.g. Adele’s appearance’; and (ii) ‘I have to
consider Adele as an adult, because I am unable to understand her as I am
unable to understand other adults’. Thus, both an epistemic and a non-di-
rected deontic interpretation are available. The reader is, however, not
forced to choose between the interpretations, since they are compatible.
Examples of merger involving the modal kan can be divided into two
groups: those with posterior reference for the proposition, and those with
simultaneous reference. In (102) through (105), the time reference is pos-
terior. In (106) through (108) it is simultaneous. In (102) through (105),
30 The indeterminacy in the Swedish original is lost in the translation due to the translator’s choice
of the time reference for the proposition.

the subjects are responsible agents and are in control of their actions. Also,
all these examples contain an event verb.
(102) De kan väl åka ut till Marsvinsholm när de får tid? (HM)
they MOD MOD drive-INF out to Marsvinsholm when they get-PRES time
‘They can drive out to Marsvinsholm when they have time, can’t they?’
In (102), the speaker comments not only on the ability of the police offi-
cers to drive out to the scene of the crime, but also on whether they will
actually do that when they have time. The third possible interpretation,
that of suggestion or mild order, arises from the fact that the speaker, being
the chief inspector, is authorized to send the police officers to the scene of
a crime to investigate.31 This is also supported by the fact that formally
(102) is not an interrogative but a declarative sentence. A further contex-
tual feature to consider in this example is the presence of an epistemic par-
ticle väl (rendered by a tag question in the translation), which seems to be
in conflict with an otherwise typically non-epistemic arrangement of the
contextual features. In case the preferred interpretation is deontic, howev-
er, väl can be interpreted as a device employed by the speaker to soften the
order, and seemingly not use his authority over the addressee to the full.
Thus, in this case, kan shows the whole range of interpretations available.
(103) Vi kan lägga in kombinationen och se om vi får nåt svar. (HM)

we MOD lay in combination-DEF and see-INF if we get-PRES some answer
‘We can put in the combination and see if we get a match.’
In (103), the speaker is an investigating officer with special knowledge of

computers and computerized databases. Being an expert, the speaker part-
ly makes a suggestion to search for a certain combination of letters on the
internet, and partly comments on the fact that this is one of the possible
courses of action available to the investigation team.
(104) Jag är rädd men nu kan jag inte vända tillbaka. (BL)
I be-PRES afraid but nu MOD I NEG turn back
‘I am afraid, but now I cannot turn back.’
In (104), the speaker and the subject are co-referential (the subject is ex-
pressed by a 1st person pronoun jag ‘I’). This gives rise to a range of possible
31 See also (61) and (62) in 1.2.3.2 for similar examples.

interpretations: (i) the speaker may report on the order he received previ-
ously; (ii) the speaker prevents himself from turning back; (iii) the speaker
is at this point unable to turn back; and, if the time reference for the prop-
osition is simultaneous with the time of modality expressed, (iv) it is not
possible for the speaker to turn back (weak epistemic possibility). From the
context, we learn that we can eliminate the first interpretation, since the
speaker acts of his free will. The context, however, gives no clues as to
which of the other possible interpretations is intended.
(105) Jag heter Victor Udde och ni kan gratulera er som

I be-called-PRES Victor Udde and you MOD congratulate you-ACC that
fått mig som dirigent. (GT)

get-PAST me as conductor
‘My name is Victor Udde and you may congratulate yourselves on having me as your
conductor.’32
The last example with posterior time reference for the proposition, (105),
is somewhat odd. The utterance can be interpreted as (i) stating a possible
reaction on the part of the choir, since the conductor had previously exhib-
ited some extraordinary qualities; (ii) expressing the speaker’s opinion as to
the proper reaction that should be experienced by the members of the
choir, i.e. they should be happy about him being their conductor; or (iii)
the speaker (graciously) granting permission to the choir to feel happy
about him being appointed conductor. Again, the context does not offer
any additional information as to which of the interpretations is intended.
Interpretation (i) is epistemic, whereas (ii) and (iii) are deontic. This utter-
ance can therefore be considered both a case of merger, where it is impos-
sible or unnecessary to distinguish between two interpretations belonging
to different categories, and a case of gradience, where the indeterminacy
arises from the impossibility to pinpoint the exact location of the interpre-
tation on the deontic scale.
As for utterances with simultaneous time reference for the proposition,
they vary with regard to the type of the subject: (106) and (107), previous-
ly mentioned as (89), have animate subjects, and (108) and (109) have in-
animate subjects.
(106) Nu möter vi en andra reformation genom att medborgarna kan

now meet-PRES we a second reformation through that citizens MOD
32 My translation.

ta del av kunskap och information samt bli mer och mer

take part of knowledge and information and become-INF more and more
oberoende av myndigheter och stat. (ECED)

independent of authorities and states
‘Now we are facing the second reformation in that citizens are able to obtain
knowledge and information and become more and more independent of authorities
and states.’33
In (106), the paraphrases could be (i) ‘It is possible for the citizens to ob-
tain knowledge and information and become more independent’ (weak
epistemic or dynamic); or (ii) ‘The citizens are allowed to obtain knowl-
edge and information and become more independent’ (directed deontic).
The time reference for the proposition is also unclear, depending on which
interpretation is preferred: it is simultaneous with the time of modality on
interpretation (i), but posterior to it on interpretation (ii). The fact that the
subject is generic further obscures which of the interpretations is intended,
or preferred. The context does not provide any additional clues as to which
of the interpretations is intended. Furhtermore, it is not important for the
understanding of this utterance which of the interpretations the reader
prefers.
(107) Man kan inte smita. (JMY)

one MOD NEG get-away-PRES
‘You can’t run away’
The context of (107) is discussed earlier in relation to (89). The subject is

potentially generic, implying that the possible deontic interpretation has
some kind of universal coverage, i.e. people in similar situations are not al-
lowed to disregard notions such as civic duty and morality. In the case of a
dynamic interpretation, on the other hand, man ‘one’ is interpreted as also
including the addressee.
(108) Det anses vara en situation som inte kan nonchaleras och
it seen-PASS-PRES be-INF a situation that NEG MOD ignored-PASS-PRES and
som det inte är självklart eller omedelbart givet hur man ska
that it NEG be-PRES self-evident or immediately give-PART how one FUT
33 The indeterminacy of this example is not reflected in the translation.

ta sig ur. (BB)

take-INF REFL out
‘It is seen as a situation which cannot be ignored, and in which it is not obvious or
immediately given how to get out.’
The two possible interpretations of (108) are: deontic (‘It is not permitted
to ignore the situation’, or ‘The situation should not be ignored’), or
(weak) epistemic (‘It is not possible to ignore the situation’). The presence
of an inanimate subject and the use of the passive form of the event verb
nonchalera ‘ignore’ contribute to the confusion. In addition, it is not clear
whether the time reference for the proposition is simultaneous with the
time reference for the modality expressed or posterior to it. Note that de-
ontic interpretations may arise in passive utterances only when the propo-
sition has posterior time reference.34
(109) I Boverkets nybyggnadsregler

in National-Board-of-Housing-Building-and-Planning-DEF new-building-rules
är det föreskrivet att uteluftsflödet i kontor där rökning kan

be-PRES it provide-PART that out-air-flow-DEF in offices where smoking MOD
förekomma skall vara minst 10 l/s och person. (BJ)

occur-INF MOD be-INF at-least 10 l/s and person
‘The 1998 Regulations for New Construction laid down by the Swedish National
Board of Housing prescribe that the flow of outdoor air in offices in which smoking
is permitted must be at least 10 l/s and person.’ 35
In (109), we can observe merger between deontic and epistemic interpre-

tations: (i) ‘…in offices where it is permitted to smoke’ and (ii) ‘…in of-
fices where it is possible to smoke’. The combination of an inanimate sub-
ject (rökning ‘smoking’) and a state verb (förekomma ‘occur’) could be seen
as causing the merger of the two interpretations. Furthermore, the context
of this utterance indicates that what is discussed can be found in a text
comprising regulations, which makes the deontic interpretation plausible.
The fact that rökning is a deverbal noun also strengthens this assumption.
Thus, a logical relation between the two possible interpretations can be
claimed to exist: what is permitted is also possible.
34 See 4.1.3 for a detailed discussion.

35 The indeterminacy is lost in the translation through the translator’s choice of wording (is permit-
ted), which clearly indicates that the utterance is interpreted as deontic by the translator.

3.3.3 Gradience
Not surprisingly, most of the gradient examples involve the modal kan.
However, there is one example of a gradient utterance with may. In all cas-
es, the interpretation is gradient between weak epistemic and dynamic.
The gradient examples found in the corpus form two distinct groups: those
with posterior reference, and those with simultaneous reference. Examples
(111) through (113) all have posterior time reference for the proposition.
They also combine an animate subject (they, vi ‘we’, and vi ‘we’ respective-
ly), and an event verb (do, hejda ‘hold’, and klara ‘pull through’ respective-
ly). The only difference between these examples lies in the fact that in
(110) the modal may is present, whereas in the other two examples the mo-
dal kan is used.
(110) Yet even in this enlightened age, when so many parents are aware of the
psychological damage they may do to their children, surely there was one parent in
Castle Rock – or perhaps one grandmother – who quieted the kids by telling them
that Frank Dodd would get them if they didn’t watch out, if they weren’t good. (SK)
The utterance in (110) can be paraphrased as (i) ‘Many parents are aware
of the psychological damage that it is possible for them to do to their chil-
dren’; (ii) ‘Many parents are aware of the psychological damage it is possi-
ble for them to do to their children’; or even (iii) ‘Many parents are aware
of the psychological damage that they are able to do to their children’. Al-
though the last interpretation is not easily available for may, in this case the
interpretation is placed somewhere along the continuum between weak
epistemic and dynamic (possibly closer to the epistemic reading than to the
dynamic one). It is not necessary for the reader to pinpoint the exact loca-
tion to understand the utterance. Palmer (1990: 109-111) mentions exam-
ples where utterances containing may are interpreted dynamically as well
as epistemically.36 In these cases, may can easily be replaced by a dynamic
can or could with no observable change of meaning. One of the solutions
suggested by Palmer (1990: 111) is to consider may “the most neutral mo-
dal” to be used to express “non-factivity”.
(111) Där kan vi hejda dem med stora bullerstenar. (AL)

there MOD we hold-INF them with big noise-stones
36 Palmer (1990: 109-110) gives the following example: Where, in a secluded valley in the west, you
may find the neat little Norman church of Pennant Melangell (W.11.3.80-4) [my emphasis]. In this
study, however, such cases of “dynamic” may are usually interpreted as weak epistemic (see 1.1.1).

‘We can hold them there by rolling rocks at them.’
Also (111), formerly (90), is indeterminate between the related weak epis-
temic and dynamic interpretations.
(112) Inte ens han tror att vi kan klara oss. (BL)
NEG even he think-PRES that we MOD pull-through-INF REFL
‘Not even he thinks that we may pull through.’37
The context of (112) provides us with some information. There is a storm,

and two ships are trying to reach their destination. One of the ships, led
by a more experienced captain, gives up and turns back. The other is still
trying to reach shore safely. (112) is uttered by the captain of the second
ship, and the pessimistic person he refers to is the captain of the first ship.
This utterance may also be paraphrased in two ways: ‘… that it is possible
for us to pull through’, or ‘… that we will/are able to pull through’. In this
context, the possible interpretation lies somewhere between these two par-
aphrases. The utterance is, therefore, gradient between weak epistemic and
dynamic interpretations.
When the time reference is simultaneous with the time of the utterance,
we can distinguish between assertive and negated statements.
(113) “Den där vildoxen”, sa han, “den som ni skulle ta vid hornen
DEF there wild-bull-DEF say-PAST he DEF that you MOD take-INF at antlers
och vräka i Helvetesgapet, det blev väl en duns, kan jag

and throw in hell’s-gap it become-PAST MOD a thud MOD I
tro, så det dånade i hela Mattisborgen?” (AL)

think-INF so it rumble-PAST in whole Mattis-castle
‘“That wild bull”, he said, “the one you were going to take by the horns and heave
into Hell’s Gap – I suppose that was a crash that rumbled all around Matt’s fort?”’
(114) Men, sa Henry, jag har upprättat en lista över hans påhitt
but say-PAST Henry I have-PRES establish-PART a list over his tricks
och … tja, jag kan väl medge att det finns visst fog för
and well I MOD MOD admit-INF that it exist-PRES certain reason for
klagomålen. (APR)
complaints
37 My translation.

‘“But”, said Henry, “I’ve drawn up a list of his pranks and… well, I must admit some
of the complaints are, to some extent, justified”.’
In (113), the modal is part of an idiomatic parenthetical insertion. The

combination of an animate subject (jag ‘I’) and an event verb (tro ‘believe’)
can promote a dynamic interpretation, if the main predicate were not a
psychological verb, since it is normally hard to describe belief in terms of
ability. Thus, the interpretation lies somewhere between (weak) epistemic
and dynamic.
In (114), the modal is part of the utterance proper. In this case, an ani-
mate subject (jag ‘I’) is combined with an event verb (medge ‘admit’). The
utterance also contains a hedge (tja ‘well’), an epistemic modal particle
(väl), and a modal adjective (visst ‘certain, some’). This suggests that al-
though the speaker’s admission lies within the scope of his abilities, it is
made reluctantly. The possible paraphrases are: ‘It is possible for me to ad-
mit that…’, and ‘I am able to admit that…’, neither of which fully cap-
tures the meaning of the utterance.
The negated examples in (115) through (117) all combine an animate
subject with an event verb (påstå ‘assert’ or säga ‘say’). Only in special cir-
cumstances can we assume that the subjects lack the physical ability to per-
form the action denoted by the main predicate, i.e. when the subjects are,
for instance, dumb or dumb stricken. The contexts of these utterances do
not indicate the presence of such circumstances.
(115) Jag kan inte påstå att jag tyckte om att höra Siiri vräka
I MOD NEG claim-INF that I like-PAST about INF hear-INF Siiri blurt-INF
ur sig detta, men man får komma ihåg att hon var
out REFL this but one be-allowed-PRES remember-INF that she be-PAST
upprörd. (AP)
upset
‘I can’t say I liked hearing Siiri pouring all this out, but you must remember that she
was upset.’
(116) Jag kan inte säga att jag talar av egen kunskap. (AP)
I MOD NEG tell-INF that I speak-INF of own knowledge
‘I can’t say I speak from my own knowledge.’
(117) Man kan inte påstå att hon direkt pratade med någon. (AP)
one MOD NEG claim-INF that she directly speak-INF with someone

‘One can’t say that she really talked with anyone.’38
In all examples, the subjects have the physical ability to articulate what
they have to say. Also, being human, they are able to lie if necessary as well
as make false claims. The presence of negation in these cases seems to serve
the same purpose as the presence of so many modal elements in (114): to
indicate the reluctance on the part of the speaker to make a claim. The par-
aphrase ‘It is not possible for me to say/claim that…’ does not capture all
the nuances of meaning. It is more plausible to assume that these examples
are gradient between (weak) epistemic and dynamic interpretations.
Summary
The main focus of this chapter is the array of features associated with epistemic
modality in the corpus data. One of the questions this chapter aimed to address
was whether Coates’s claims about such associations can be verified on the basis of
a larger sample of corpus data involving two English modals, must and may. The
second question was whether it is possible to claim that similar associations exist
for the Swedish modals måste and kan. Since (i) the investigation involved the two
pairs of modals, belonging to the opposite ends of epistemic and deontic scales,
(ii) more data was put under scrutiny, and (iii) the analysis compared modal inter-
pretation mechanisms in the two languages, I provided a more nuanced picture.
The first, and not surprising, observation based on the analysis of the data is
that the association between many of the features and epistemic interpretation is
not absolute for all the modals. In my data, there is an absolute association be-
tween aspectual modification and epistemic interpretation, although it is possible
to construct non-epistemic aspectually modified examples. With introductory sub-
jects, the association is strong but not absolute. Features such as state verb and in-
animate subject seem neither to be associated with epistemic modality directly, nor
to influence the interpretation to an appreciable degree when not supported by
other contextual features.
Secondly, the features combine with each other in most examples in a way that
precludes indeterminacy as to whether the event described in the proposition is
controlled by the intended agent or not. For instance, in the 275 epistemic exam-
ples involving may, the features appear 396 times. With weak epistemic examples,
however, the features under investigation do not interact to the same degree: in the
369 weak epistemic examples containing kan, the features appear only 363 times.
38 My translation.

Thirdly, the modals under investigation – must and måste, and may and kan –
do not behave in the same way with respect to the features in question. A parallel
may be drawn between the modals located on the left-most end of the scales, must
and måste, and those located on the right-most end of the scales, may and kan. Not
all four modals exhibit the association between the features and the interpretation
to the same degree. The contexts in which must and måste appear support my ob-
servations about the weak association of certain features, such as inanimate subject
and state verb, with epistemic interpretation. The contexts for may and kan, on the
other hand, support Coates’s findings to a higher degree. Also, aspectually modi-
fied utterances with posterior time reference for the proposition containing must
and måste may be interpreted deontically, whereas this interpretation is not avail-
able for the corresponding utterances containing may and kan (except in indeter-
minate examples).
Finally, additional features such as the presence of an implicit or explicit condi-
tion, the time reference for the proposition and for the modality expressed in the ut-
terance, the presence of an epistemic adverbial or particle, situation type, as well as
the issue of agent control must be appealed to in order to account for the interpre-
tations. Anterior time reference for the proposition generally correlates with epis-
temic interpretation, whereas posterior time reference is associated with deontic
interpretation. The presence of an explicit or implicit condition in an utterance
seems to invariably promote deontic interpretation in utterances containing must
and måste, irrespective of other features that may be present in the context. Time
reference for the modality expressed simultaneous to the time of the utterance is
consistent with both epistemic and deontic interpretations. Past time reference for
the modality expressed is possible in Swedish in utterances containing måste,
which are usually interpreted deontically. Future time reference for the modality
occurs normally only in deontic utterances. Also of crucial importance is whether
the subject is a responsible agent, and whether it is in control of the situation de-
scribed in the proposition. Utterances where these conditions are not fulfilled tend
to have an epistemic interpretation. As mentioned above, however, there are dif-
ferences between the modals consistent with the differences in meaning suggested
in Papafragou (2000) (see 2.2).
All the features discussed affect the interpretation of modal utterances in a sys-
tematic way. However, they must be considered in relation to other contextual fea-
tures, since some influence the interpretation directly, while others do so only in
combination with other features.
A number of indeterminate examples were found in the corpus. These were an-
alysed according to a modified version of the tripartite system presented in Leech
and Coates (1979). Three types of indeterminacy were distinguished: ambiguity,
merger, and gradience. Neither the propositional context (in terms of the combi-
nation of the features under investigation), nor the situational context of the ut-
terances provides enough clues as to whether the situations described can be con-
trolled by an agent for the reader to be able to decide on one of the possible inter-

pretations with confidence. In some cases, this may be a conscious choice on the
part of the speaker. Contrary to what was observed in the epistemic and deontic
examples, in the indeterminate examples there was no apparent systematicity in
the co-occurrence patterns of the features discussed.

4 Context revisited
Abstract
As Klinge (1993: 318) points out, “[t]he recurring problem for linguistic analyses
of the modals has been the lack of a principled account of how we arrive at an ex-
plicit interpretation of a sentence containing a modal”. Since this as a well-found-
ed observation true of many modal studies, this chapter focuses on explicating
how and why the contextual features discussed in the previous chapter influence
the interpretation of modally modified utterances.
I argue that not only should different contextual features be accounted for
when interpreting modal expressions, but also that these features are in many cases
related to each other through the compositional notion of Controllability. Finally,
I link the features discussed here to the universal notion of Transitivity following
Hopper and Thompson (1980).
4.1 Controllability
In this section, I discuss the nature of the related notions of agentivity, con-
trol and power and also introduce the notion of Controllability, crucial to
our understanding of modal utterances.
Cruse (1973) reviews the research on agentivity in the 1960s. Discussing
Fillmore (1968), Gruber (1967), Lyons (1968), and Halliday (1967), he
concludes that there is no agreement on what agentivity is. Some define
agentivity in terms of agentive verbs, others in terms of agentive nouns, yet
others argue that agentivity is “a feature of clauses” (see Cruse 1973: 11).
Cruse (1973) considers agentivity to be a complex phenomenon defined
in terms of at least four features: (i) volitive, (ii) effective, (iii) initiative,
and (iv) agentive (Cruse 1973: 18).1 The first feature, volitive, is present
“when an act of will is stated or implied”. Thus, willing is regarded as “a
kind of doing, whether what is willed is a state, process, or action” (Cruse

1973: 18). In (1), for example, the proposition in the main clause refers to
an action not typically considered agentive. The interpretation of (1) as a
non-agentive sentence is, however, cancelled by the information provided
in the sub-clause, i.e. that the action described in the proposition was
willed by the subject of the main clause.
(1) John drifted two miles further down the river, so as to avoid landing in enemy territory.
(adapted from Cruse 1973: 18)
The second feature, effective, is present in a sentence referring to “some-

thing which exerts a force (literary or metaphorically), not by virtue of an
internal energy source, but because of its position, motion, etc.” (Cruse
1973: 19).
(2) These columns support the weight of the pediment. (Cruse 1973: 19)
The third feature, initiative, “can be roughly glossed as ‘initiation of action

by giving a command’” (Cruse 1973: 20). Cruse also points out that this
feature is not coded by any lexical item, but is recovered from the context,
as in (3).
(3) John galloped the horse around the field. (Cruse 1973: 20)
The fourth feature, agentive, is said to be present in an utterance “referring

to an action performed by an object which is regarded as using its own en-
ergy in carrying out the action” (Cruse 1973: 21). In (4), for example, this
feature is present, while in (5), where the subject the stone cannot be said
to have used its own energy to perform the action denoted by the propo-
sition, it is absent.
(4) John moved (himself) to avoid the falling stones. (Cruse 1973: 21)
(5) The stone flew through the air. (Cruse 1973: 21)
According to Cruse, this definition of agentivity need not be complete.

What is worth noticing, however, is the fact that he regards agentivity as a
complex notion expressed by a combination of features, some of which
may not be linguistically coded, but are instead retrieved from the context.
A more recent account, that of Runde (1997), investigates the notion of
control in utterances containing a sample of control verbs and their relation
1 The fact that the inclusion of the feature agentive in the account of agentivity may arguably give
rise to circular reasoning does not affect the present discussion.

Chapter 4 Context revisited
to deontic modality. Runde’s definition of control is restricted to the con-

text of control verbs. Thus, in her account control is “a referential relation
between two elements in a sentence” (Runde 1997: 211). She links her
sample of Norwegian control verbs – tvinge ‘force’, påby ‘impose, com-
mand’, be ‘ask’, and love ‘promise’ – to deontic modality by claiming that
“deontic aspect” is central to the meaning of these verbs. When uttering
sentences containing these verbs, the speaker creates a “deontic situation”
for the addressee, who is to react in a relevant way. She argues, clearly in-
fluenced by Searle, that in order to be able to describe “the subjective di-
mension of modality, we must […] map out the illocutionary force of the
utterance, and in order to map out the illocutionary force, we must find
out what the conditions are that specify the rules for how this utterance is
to be used”2 (Runde 1997: 215). What she means by these conditions be-
comes evident when we consider her example of background conditions
relevant for the verb be ‘ask’.
(6) A asks B to carry out X3

a. A says something (to B)
b. A thinks that B (perhaps) does not wish to carry out X
c. A’s utterance has a purpose of making B to carry out X
d. B has the ability to carry out X
e. B enjoys the freedom to choose to comply with the request or not
What is presented in (6) is a set of background assumptions the speaker

and the addressee may share upon the utterance of a request. It is doubtful
whether all of these assumptions are relevant, especially (b). It is equally
unclear on how these assumptions arise and whether they form part of the
meaning of the verb or are retrieved from contextual information. Even in
the limited context of control verbs, however, control is perceived as a
complex concept, involving both speaker’s and agent’s perspectives.
A more promising approach is outlined in Klinge (1996), who investi-
gates the impact of context on modal meanings in English and Danish. In
his analysis, context provides clues as to how an utterance should be inter-
preted. One of the central notions in his account of the interpretation of
modal utterances is agent control, defined as “the ability of an agent to
choose to bring about the referential situation represented by the proposi-
tions of the sentences” (Klinge 1996: 43). Consider the following examples
from Klinge (1996: 38):
2 My translation.
3 Participant A is the subject referent (speaker/sender), participant B is the object referent (receiver),
X is the action or situation described by the infinitive (Runde 1997: 216).

(7) You may lose all your money on the stock exchange. Epistemic
(8) You may invest all your money on the stock exchange. Deontic
(9) You may gamble all your money on the stock exchange. Ambiguous
The sentences in (7) through (9), although very similar in their contextual
make-up, give rise to different interpretations: (7) is clearly epistemic,
whereas (8) is understood in terms of deontic permission. If no further
context is provided, (9) is ambiguous between these two interpretations.
According to Klinge, one of the available contextual clues here is “the in-
ferential assignment of the feature ‘agent control’” (Klinge 1996: 39). In
(7), there is no agent control involved. Also, it is difficult to envision how
the action of losing one’s money on the stock exchange can be desired by
the subject referent.4 In (8), the agent is in control of his actions, i.e. after
receiving permission from the speaker, he is free to invest his money on the
stock exchange or refrain from doing so. The sentence in (9), however, is
ambiguous with respect to agent control. Contexts in which permission is
given to act on the proposition (deontic interpretation) are as possible as
ones where the speaker expresses her judgement of the likelihood of the
event described in the proposition (epistemic interpretation). Klinge fur-
ther argues that there are a number of contextual features that may be re-
lated to agent control. Indeed, he claims that “[i]f we have difficulty infer-
ring agent control, heavy contextualization is required before deontic mo-
dality becomes the preferred reading” (Klinge 1996: 44).
A different perspective is offered by Winter (1998), who argues that
“the power structure of a speech situation may be productively studied as
being coded by a fairly limited set of linguistic expressions” (Winter 1998:
89). He reanalyses the notions of agentivity and control in terms of social
power relations. Seeking to establish a cognitively real production model,
Winter distinguishes between four components:
4 Of course, it is possible to construct contexts in which the loss of money on the stock exchange is
not only a desired course of events, but a controlled and even planned one. I will, however, not consider
this type of context here. On the other hand, the feature agentivity clearly involves not only volition-
ality on the part of the speaker (see next section), but also intentionality: the subject, which is co-ref-
erential with the agent, must be interested in the proposition being carried out. Consider, for instance,
the following sentences, from Klinge (1993: 316-317):
(i) You must be very careful.
(ii) You must be very careless.
The first example receives a deontic interpretation, since it is in the interest of the intended agent, the
referent of you, to carry out the proposition (cf. discussion of implicit and explicit conditions in 4.1.4).
In the second example, however, such intention is not likely on any natural interpretation of this ut-
terance, which promotes an epistemic interpretation.

The central elements of the speaker’s and the listener’s mental representa-
tions are the social power relations that hold between various agents. The ob-
jects of power are actions […]. Another important factor of a speech situation
is the agents’ attitudes5 to the relevant actions. […] Apart from power rela-
tions, actions, and attitudes to actions, our semantic model also contains as
fundamental notions different kinds of expectations. For an analysis of mo-
dals, the most important expectations are those that concern the attitudes of
other agents towards the actions that are relevant in a speech situation. (Win-
ter 1998: 94)
These components are further formalised in order to account for the core
meanings of Swedish modals. Winter makes an important contribution by
introducing what he calls a third person, or a third power, which can be
“either a real person or an impersonal power” (Winter 1998: 99). 6 Further,
in his analysis, “epistemic use of the modals involves a special case of such
an impersonal power, namely, the power of evidence” (Winter 1998: 99).
Thus, Winter provides important insights into the nature of power asym-
metries in the context of modality, recognising both the importance of the
speaker’s and the addressee’s perspectives, and formalising the input of cir-
cumstantial evidence for both deontic and epistemic interpretations. Bas-
ing his assumptions on Gricean implicatures, relabelled as expectations in
his account, he does not, however, explicitly focus on the role of the lin-
guistic context of a modal utterance.
The question to pose at this time is why there is no agreement on what
agentivity and control designate. A possible answer, and the one advocated
here, is that the phenomenon under investigation is a compositional no-
tion, in which different presumably unrelated features convey different as-
pects of this very notion, much like Transitivity (Hopper and Thompson
1980).7 This is why researchers who concentrate only on certain aspects re-
lated to what I call Controllability may not be able to illuminate this no-
tion in a comprehensive manner. Consequently, the different approaches
are seemingly incongruent. On my proposal, the compositional nature of
Controllability is best accounted for if we consider all the relevant contex-
tual features the speaker may choose to encode in an utterance. Controlla-
bility is also considered a primarily pragmatic notion: many of the relevant
aspects are linguistically encoded, but some are inferred from the wider
context.
5 Note that Winter (1998) describes agents’ attitudes in terms of agents’ preferences.
6 Cf. the discussion of non-directed deontic modality in 1.1.2.1.
7 See 4.3 for a detailed account of Hopper and Thompson (1980) and the possible link between
Transitivity and Controllability.

The idea that modal utterances are to be considered holistically in order

to arrive at the intended interpretation has already been considered by a
number of linguists. Heine (1995), for example, suggested a number of se-
mantic criteria for distinguishing between epistemic and non-epistemic
modals in German. In a typical deontic utterance, there is (i) some force
interested in the proposition being carried out, (ii) some agent who is to
carry out the proposition, which (iii) denotes an event, and (iv) which will
be realised, if at all, later than the time of the utterance, and, finally, (v)
there is a certain degree of probability that the event denoted by the prop-
osition will occur. Coates (1995), investigating English modals, suggests
an additional pragmatic criterion for subjectivity, an addition that is said
to better distinguish epistemic utterances in English from non-epistemic
ones. These linguists, however, have not provided any underlying motiva-
tion for why these criteria are of importance for the interpretation. On my
proposal, the notion of Controllability is central to the interpretation of
modal utterances, since utterances in which propositions are encoded in
such a way as to indicate lack of agent control are interpreted epistemically.
In utterances where the relevant features indicate that the intended agent
is in control of the situation denoted by the proposition, on the other
hand, the preferred interpretation is deontic. For the purposes of this
study, I will adopt Klinge’s (1996) definition of agent control to roughly
cover what I mean by Controllability: “the ability of an agent to choose to
bring about the referential situation represented by the propositions of the
sentences” (Klinge 1996: 38).
The fact that different features may cluster is not unfamiliar in linguis-
tics. The linguists investigating agentivity and control cited here, for in-
stance, all agree that these are multi-faceted notions, best regarded in terms
of a number of component features. Transitivity, discussed in 4.3, is also a
compositional phenomenon, the coding of which involves an array of se-
mantic features. As de Saussure (1966) argued,
As a rule we do not communicate through signs but rather through groups of

signs, through organized masses that are themselves signs. In language every-
thing boils down to differences but also to groupings. The mechanism of lan-
guage, which consists of the interplay of successive terms, resembles the
operation of a machine in which the parts have a reciprocating function even
though they are arranged in a single dimension (de Saussure 1966: 128).
Support for relationships between the categories discussed in the present

study can also be found in Wallace (1982), who argues that “the traditional
conceptualization of verbal semantics into categories of tense, mode, as-

pect, voice, and transitivity fails to capture certain recurrent and apparent-
ly widespread interrelationships among the semantic domains to which
these categories refer: time, aspectuality, modality, and noun-verb rela-
tions” (Wallace 1982: 207).8
In what follows, I will focus on some of the features that express Con-
trollability in English and Swedish.9 The list of features presented here is
probably not complete (either in the two relevant languages or from a more
general typological perspective). Moreover, some of the features discussed
are central to the notion of Controllability, whereas others are more pe-
ripheral. The aim of the following sections is, therefore, merely to outline
the possibility of the existence of a universal notion of Controllability,
which plays an important role in the (de)coding of modality.
4.1.1 Subject
As we saw in 2.1.1, the feature type of subject was found to be associated
with epistemic interpretations in Coates (1983), which indicates its signif-
icance for the interpretation. Let us now consider some of the properties
of the subject that can be explicitly (i.e. linguistically) or implicitly (i.e. in-
ferentially) encoded in a sentence. Firstly, subjects are always categorised as
animate or inanimate. Secondly, subjects necessarily belong to one of the
three categories of person: 1st, 2nd, or 3rd. It is also possible to make a dis-
tinction between specific and non-specific, and generic and non-generic
subjects. I suggest that these properties of subjects play a role in the inter-
pretation of modal utterances. I find support for this in Durst-Andersen
(2005), who suggests that “[o]ne could in fact argue that not only should
verbal categories such as tense, aspect and voice be included in a holistic
analysis [of mood and modality systems in a language], but also nominal
categories such as case and definiteness because due to isomorphism nom-
inal categories may reproduce the grammatical function of verbal catego-
ries” (Durst-Andersen 2005: 215), and I would add, vice versa.
One of the more obvious consequences of the presence of an inanimate
subject in an utterance is that it normally precludes a directed deontic in-
8 See also Schlenker (2006), who, trying to explain what he terms “ontological symmetry” in lan-
guage, puts forward a hypothesis that although “the systems that underlie reference to individuals, and
to times/possible worlds/events/states are in fact synchronically distinct”, they “have a common evolu-
tionary origin” (Schlenker 2006: 527).
9 Unless deemed necessary from a contrastive point of view, the discussion of these features is based
on the English examples.

terpretation. The speaker will not issue an order, give permission, or rec-
ommend that an inanimate subject should perform the action specified by
the proposition. Inanimate subjects are not suitable agents, in that they
normally cannot act of their own accord, and thus do not exhibit any con-
trol over the situation. Consider, for example, (10).
(10) The stone may hit the window. Epistemic
It is not possible to imagine a situation in which the speaker would felici-

tously give the subject of (10), the stone, permission to carry out the prop-
osition. First of all, because its motion is caused by some external source,
the subject of (10) has to be set in motion by someone else in order to hit
the window, and thus has no freedom to choose its course of actions, i.e.
whether to act on the permission to carry out the proposition or not. These
are but a few inferences connected with the fact that the subject of (10) is
inanimate, and which promote an epistemic interpretation.
Some inanimate subjects, however, allow a directed deontic interpreta-
tion. Consider, for example, (11) and (12).
(11) You must come to the party. Deontic
(12) The engine must function properly. Ambiguous
As with other directed deontic utterances, the speaker in (11) expects the
addressee referred to by the animate subject, 2nd person you, to act on the
proposition. The expectation for the subject to act on the proposition is
also valid to some degree in (12). However, in this example, it is hardly
plausible that the inanimate subject is co-referential with the addressee, as
is the case in (11). Moreover, the subject of (12), the inanimate the engine,
lacks most of the properties of a typical agent. If we are to consider Dowty
(1991: 572), the properties of what he calls Proto-Agent are:
(13) (i) volitional involvement in the event or state

(ii) sentience (and/or perception)
(iii) causing an event or change of state in another participant
(iv) movement (relative to the position of another participant)
(v) exists independently of the event named by the verb
The subject of (11) exhibits all of the above properties, whereas the subject
of (12), the engine, strictly speaking exhibits none of them. Being inani-
mate, it cannot be volitionally involved in the action described by the
proposition. It is, of course, non-sentient. Since the engine in itself cannot

cause the event of its functioning properly, it must be assumed that a third,
animate party will see to it that the engine is switched on and functions
properly. There is also no other explicit participant in which the subject of
(12) may cause a change of state, or relative to which it may display move-
ment (if we do not consider the movement of the engine’s component
parts while it works as the relevant type of movement). Some linguists may
even question whether the engine exists independently of the event denoted
in the proposition in case it does not function properly, or does not func-
tion at all. The subject of (12) can thus not be considered a suitable agent,
which is reflected in the range of possible interpretations for this utterance.
It can be interpreted as an epistemic statement based on some evidence
available to the speaker (for instance, the fact that the addressee has arrived
on time despite previous problems with his car engine). It may also receive
a non-directed deontic interpretation, where the deontic force stems from
some external circumstances (‘It is necessary that the engine functions
properly if we are to drive to Spain’). A directed deontic interpretation is
also possible. On this interpretation, the speaker herself is the source of the
deontic force expressed in the utterance, which is directed towards the ad-
dressee who is not co-referential with the subject, but is held responsible
for bringing the proposition into existence. The fact that in this case the
speaker chooses not to explicitly direct the deontic force of the utterance
towards the addressee may be dictated, for instance, by issues of politeness,
or speaker authority.
What makes the 2nd person you in (11) a suitable agent, on the other
hand, is the fact that it exhibits all the typical properties of a Proto-Agent,
from being volitionally involved in the action described in the proposition
to existing independently from the event named by the verb. Furthermore,
according to Klinge (1996: 45) “[p]art of our communicative competence
is that we grant permission to and impose obligation on the addressee, i.e.
on the referent of ‘you’, more prototypically than we do to and on third
persons.” This claim finds further support in Dahl (2000b: 71), who ob-
serves that in conversational data “positions that are restricted to animate
reference – arguments representing agents, experiencers, and recipients –
also have a high incidence of egophoric reference.” By egophoric reference
he means “reference to speech act participants and generic reference” (Dahl
2000b: 39). The presence of this type of subject in (11) is what promotes
the directed deontic interpretation. Depending on the degree of asym-
metry in the relationship between the speaker and the addressee, the utter-
ance in (11) is interpreted as an order, recommendation, or request.

The asymmetry in the relationship between the speaker and the address-
ee is often defined in terms of speaker authority, some power relation, or
differences in social status. Consider, for example, McCallum-Bayliss’s
(1988: 70) argument on how the deontic interpretations of permission and
command may arise:
A difference in social status offers the opportunity to the person with a higher
status to make comments about another’s life and actually to create the shape
of another’s world. In doing so, a speaker (with higher status) chooses from
among various possibilities and chooses an appropriate course for the hearer.
This essentially means that no other possibilities are available to the hearer –
the complements have been eliminated. Since this is the only reasonable av-
enue available to him, the hearer, by virtue of the power relation, will follow
that course. If it is something the hearer wanted to do, it can be interpreted
as ‘permission’. If it is something the hearer did not particularly want to do,
the ‘created possibility’ may be interpreted as something stronger, like an or-
der.
Thus, the notion of speaker authority or higher status is an additional ex-

tra-linguistic feature for the interpreter to take into account in order to ar-
rive at the intended message. In the present study, however, one of the es-
sential components of agent control is assumed to be the element of free
will, or, in Dowty’s (1991) terms, volitionality. This allows the agent, who
is taken to be co-referential with the addressee, to choose to carry out the
proposition or decline to do so, and does not merely refer to his mechani-
cal ability to perform the action specified in the proposition. Thus, I do
not agree with McCallum-Bayliss (1988) that receiving permission or an
order eliminates the addressee’s option of choosing not to act in accordance
with it.
As mentioned earlier, for an utterance to be interpreted deontically,
there must be some deontic source interested in the completion of the
event described in the proposition (cf. 1.1.2.1 and Heine’s (1995) semantic
criteria in this section). The deontic force may originate from the speaker
on the directed deontic reading, or in the relevant circumstances on the
non-directed deontic interpretation. Yet another prerequisite of deontic in-
terpretation is that in giving an order or a permission to act out the prop-
osition, the speaker has some possible agent in mind, i.e. the deontic force
is directed towards an agent. This may be linguistically coded by the use of
a 2nd person subject or a proper noun. The contemplated agent, on the
other hand, can also be coded by a common noun phrase. Consider (14)
through (19).

(14) Somebody may enter the room. Epistemic
(15) A girl may enter the room. Ambiguous
(16) The girl may enter the room. Deontic
(17) Lions may hunt. Epistemic
(18) The lions may hunt. Deontic
(19) The lion may hunt. Ambiguous
In the epistemic (14), the subject is indefinite and non-specific. The speak-
er is unlikely to direct an order to such an agent, even if this somebody
happens to be perfectly capable of controlling his actions. The example in
(15) is ambiguous between an epistemic and a deontic interpretation. On
the epistemic reading, the speaker does not envisage a specific agent to
whom she might give the permission to enter the room: a girl refers gener-
ically to ‘any girl that exists’. The subject is coded by an indefinite, non-
specific noun phrase to indicate that it is not the type of subject towards
which deontic force is normally directed. This diminishes the possibility
that the example would be felicitously meant or interpreted as permission.
On a deontic interpretation, on the other hand, (15) can be interpreted as
‘A girl is permitted to enter a room, but a boy is not’, where the subject ref-
erent is clearly restricted to a limited set of entities, and thus constitutes not
only a more suitable agent, but also the type of agent towards which deon-
tic force may easily be directed. In (16), the subject is the intended agent
of the action described in the proposition, and as such receives permission
to act on the proposition. It is coded by a definite, specific noun phrase.
Although a context can be constructed that would force an epistemic in-
terpretation of this utterance, the natural interpretation, or in Klinge’s
terms, the “preferred” interpretation, is deontic. Also, on the deontic inter-
pretation of these examples, the subject referent is always egophoric: it is
already established as a speech act participant in previous discourse, which
further strengthens the assumptions about the influence of specificity on
the interpretation of deontic utterances.10
In (17), the use of an indefinite noun phrase in subject position gives
rise to a generic interpretation of the subject and promotes an epistemic
interpretation of the utterance: ‘It is possible that lions hunt’. As, for in-
10 See also Eide (2005) on specificity and particularly on the impact of what she calls “Source of mo-
dality” on the semantics of the modals.

stance, Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 406-407) point out, generic inter-
pretations denote “unlimited states,” states that “potentially hold for all
time (at least for as long as the entities which take part in them exist)”. If
the situation holds for all time, this means not only that it is stative, but
also that the time reference for the proposition is simultaneous, anterior
and posterior to the time of modality expressed. The significance of these
features, stative situation and time reference for the proposition, for the
modal interpretation will be discussed in 4.1.2 and 4.1.3, respectively. The
subject of (18), unlike the subject of (17), is coded by a definite noun
phrase, which is also interpreted as specific, promoting deontic interpreta-
tion: ‘The lions (at the nature reserve) are allowed to hunt’. Without fur-
ther context, (19) is ambiguous between the deontic and the epistemic in-
terpretations on the same grounds as (15). Although the subject in (19) is
coded by a definite noun phrase, it may have either a specific or a generic
referent, which leads to ‘limited’ and ‘unlimited state’ interpretations, re-
spectively. Here, I have demonstrated how definiteness and specificity in-
fluence modal interpretations. Although these notions coincide to a great
degree in the examples analysed, they are certainly not identical.
As seen from (14) through (19), English, unlike some other languages, 11
does not allow linguistic means for coding specificity, other than with ad-
jectives such as certain (see Enç 1991: 4). It cannot be claimed, for exam-
ple, that definite noun phrases are specific, whereas indefinite noun phrases
are non-specific, since the use of these expressions is limited to the fact that
“indefinites cannot have antecedents in the discourse, whereas definites
must” (Enç 1991: 7). However, these are clearly related notions, in view of
the fact that “[b]oth definites and specifics require that their discourse ref-
erents be linked to previously established discourse referents, and both in-
definites and non-specifics require that their discourse referents not be
linked to previously established discourse referents” (Enç 1991: 9). In my
analysis of the data, these features are considered individually, as well as in
relation to each other.
11 Specificity can be coded in Norwegian. Consider the following examples from Julien (2002: 283):
(i) Den kvit-e mann-(en) har alltid undertrykct andre kultur-ar.
DEF.SG white-W man-DEF-SG has always oppressed other culture-PL
‘The white man has always oppressed other cultures.’
(ii) Den kvit-e mann-*(en) åt ein is.
DEF.SG white-W man-DEF.SG ate an ice
‘The white man ate an ice-cream.’
In (i), the suffixed article is optional, which may signal that the intended interpretation is generic. In
(ii), where the only possible interpretation is specific, the omission of the article suffix results in an un-
grammatical sentence (see also Julien 2005).

4.1.2 States vs. events

The definition of states and events adopted here follows that of Michaelis
(1998), who argues that “[w]hile an event qualifies as an individual, a state
does not” (Michaelis 1998: 6). The notion of individuality is defined by
two other concepts: boundedness and indivisibility. Events are bounded,
i.e. occur over a defined period of time, and indivisible: an event is not fully
instantiated at any particular point of this defined time, except at the end-
point. States, on the other hand, are non-bounded, i.e. there is no specifi-
cation for time over which a state holds, since it is not necessary to indicate
the beginning or endpoint of a state. States are also divisible, i.e. at any par-
ticular point of time a state is equally fully instantiated.
Comrie (1976: 49) makes similar observations, arguing that “[w]ith a
state, unless something happens to that state, then the state will continue”.
States are not normally controlled, whereas “[w]ith a dynamic situation,
on the other hand, the situation will only continue if it is continually sub-
ject to a new input of energy”, i.e. controlled by some agent.12
In my analysis, I follow Comrie’s (1976) distinction between stative and
dynamic situations, in that I consider ‘change-of-state’ verbs to be event
verbs (cf. “[t]he start or end of a state is dynamic, since for a state to be
started or stopped something must come about to bring about the change
into or out of this state” (Comrie 1976: 50)).
That stative vs. eventive distinction plays a role in the interpretation of
modality can be easily demonstrated by (19) and (20).
(20) You must hate him. Epistemic
(21) You must leave. Deontic
In (20), the presence of the state verb hate demotes the non-epistemic in-
terpretation: it is impossible to order somebody to hate somebody or
something, since this emotion cannot normally be controlled by the ad-
dressee. Frawley (1992) argues, for example, that states, contrary to events,
are normally not controlled by some external agent: “[a]cts have internal
structure and may be executed; states are continuous and attributed rather
than executed” (Frawley 1992: 152). In contrast, (21), which contains an
event verb leave, receives a deontic interpretation (‘You are ordered to
leave’), provided that the addressee is in control of the situation, i.e. can
choose or refuse to bring about the situation described in the proposition,
12 See, however, the discussion in 4.1.3 for the modification of this view.

and possesses a physical ability to perform the action denoted by the main
verb.
4.1.3 Time reference

Discussing time reference in modal utterances in Danish and English,
Klinge (1996: 40) points out that “there are three main systems that can
provide semantic clues to temporal indexing: the closed systems of tense
(present vs. past) and phase (perfective vs. non-perfective), and the open
system of adverbials”. He also argues that “[i]n English the closed system
of aspect (progressive vs. non-progressive) can also provide clues”. These
features are considered important not only for determining the time refer-
ence of the utterance, but also for modal interpretations in English and
Swedish.
In this study, I differentiate between two types of time reference: time
reference for the modality expressed in the utterance, and time reference
for the proposition. Theoretically, the time reference for the modality ex-
pressed in the utterance can be past, present, and future. This feature does
not correspond to the morphological tense affixes on modals in the two
languages under investigation, but is recovered from the context of the ut-
terance.
Non-present time reference for modality is rarely found with deontic
and epistemic interpretations of the modals under investigation, since they
are usually simultaneous with the time of the utterance. Thus, this feature
may deviate from the default value, ‘simultaneous with the time of the ut-
terance’, to a very limited degree, and is often not decisive for the interpre-
tation. Indeed, all of the few epistemic English examples in the ESPC with
past time reference for the modality expressed were found only in sequence
of tenses, as in (22), or in sentences containing indirect speech.
(22) He kept his distance from me because he thought that he must smell of her arm and
shoulder pressed against his. (NG) Epistemic
In deontic utterances with past time reference for modality, the English
modals may and must are usually replaced by such modal expressions as be
allowed to and have to. However, as Palmer (2001: 76) suggests “[t]he re-
strictions on the past tense are […] essentially a feature of English.” Past
time reference for modality is much more frequent with Swedish måste
than with the English modals. Måste with past time referece can sometimes
also be found in the limited context of indirect speech sequences with epis-

temic interpretation. Unlike must, måste can also be used as a past form to
indicate some past necessity, as in (23). Usually, but not necessarily, in
these cases the interpretation is non-directed deontic, indicating that the
necessity to act out the proposition arose through the force of some, often
external, circumstances.
(23) Första gången var det svårt, då var hon rädd så att hon
first time be-PAST it difficult then be-PAST she afraid so that she
måste blunda. (AL) Deontic

MOD shut-her-eyes-INF
‘The first time it was difficult she was so frightened that she had to shut her eyes.’
The time reference for the modality in (24) is present: the speaker gives an
order to, or puts an obligation on the addressees to carry out the proposi-
tion at the time of the utterance. In (25), on the other hand, the time ref-
erence for the modality is not specified, which causes the utterance to be
ambiguous between an epistemic and a deontic interpretation. The speak-
er, who is a writer, contemplates the fate of his characters. If the utterance
is understood as an epistemic judgement about the likelihood of the prop-
osition becoming true, the time reference is present. If, on the other hand,
the speaker intends to convey the thought that, in some specified situation
that has not been realised yet, he may allow himself to let the characters
participate in his plot again, the time reference for the modality expressed
is future. Thus, in cases such as (25), the time reference for modality may
be important for the interpretation, despite the fact that at least in English
there is not much variation of this feature with utterances containing mo-
dal verbs (they tend to be replaced by other modal forms).
(24) “All of you must pay for the damages!” he screeched. (BO) Deontic
(25) If I am in the generous mood, or if I feel the characters deserve something better, I
may allow them out again. (BR) Ambiguous
The time reference for the proposition expressed in an utterance is a much

more influential feature than the time reference for modality. It can also
have three values: anterior, posterior, and simultaneous with the time of
the modality expressed. Generally, simultaneous and anterior time refer-
ences for the proposition coincide with epistemic interpretations, whereas
posterior time reference is typical in deontic utterances. This is reflected in
Figure 1 adopted from Eide (2003: 129). Note that Eide assumes in this

figure that the time reference for modality coincides with the time of the
utterance (S for the speech time in her terms).
Figure 1. Correlations of different interpretations and time reference for the proposition
The time reference for the proposition can be linguistically coded, as sug-
gested in Klinge (1996), either through aspectual modification13 or by
temporal adverbials.
(26) You must have drunk yourself under the table. Epistemic
(27) You must be joking. Epistemic
(28) You must leave tomorrow. Deontic
On this analysis, in (26), the aspectual modification14 signals that the

proposition is anterior to the time of the modality expressed. An interest-
ing proposal on the nature of the perfect aspect in English is presented in
ter Meulen (1995):
The perfect Jane has sighed describes th[e] state caused by the end of [Jane’s]
sighing. Such perfect states are atemporal in the sense that once they have be-
gun, they never end. […] The difference between the simple past and the per-
fect is hence aspectual in nature: The former describes events in a context-
13 I adhere to the standard definition in Comrie (1985) that a strict division between temporal and
aspectual modification should be maintained. Consider the following: “in many linguistic works, es-
pecially traditional grammars, the term tense is rather misleadingly used to cover both tense and as-
pect”, and also “it is crucial to maintain the conceptual distinction between tense and aspect, and to
have a terminology that is capable of maintaining this distinction” (Comrie 1985: 6-7). The definition
of tense adopted here follows that of Comrie (1985: 9): “tense is grammaticalised expression of location
in time”. Aspectual modification (including the perfect and the progressive aspect) is then taken to be
“different ways of viewing the internal temporal constituency of a situation” (Comrie 1976: 3).
14 Controversy notwithstanding, in this study I follow the classification of Quirk et al. (1986), who
distinguish between the perfect(ive) and the progressive aspect. Support for this view can be found in
Michaelis (1998: xv), who defines what she calls ‘phasal aspect’ (and what is here discussed as perfect
and progressive aspect) as “[a] set of aspectual distinctions involving relations between a background
situation (the reference situation) and a situation located relative to the reference situation (the denoted
situation)”.

dependent way, whereas the latter gives only stative information. (ter Meulen
1995: 5-6)
In this analysis, the perfect is strongly associated with state predicates, as

discussed in 4.1.2. Further, Eide (2002) argues that on ter Meulen’s analy-
sis “unlike most states, the perfect denotes not only a state, but the event
whose culmination caused the given state as well”15 (Eide 2002: 247). This
entails that “[t]he ‘relative past’ reading comes from a straightforward in-
ference, since if there exists a state described as commencing at the exact
time of culmination of the very event that caused the state, and the culmi-
nation of this event is an essential part of the description of the state, then
it follows that this event must already have taken place in order for the state
to hold at the time of the utterance” (Eide 2002: 247-248).16
In (27), the progressive aspect signals that the action described in the
proposition is simultaneous with the time of the modality.17 Following
Klinge (1996), it is possible to conclude that “situations that are located in
past time, […] and situations that are located at the time of the utterance,
[…] are immutable, and thus beyond agent control” (Klinge 1996: 40-41).
This is why both (26) and (27) receive epistemic interpretations: in (26),
the speaker expresses her judgement as to the likelihood of the proposition
having occurred, and in (27) she expresses her judgement about the likeli-
hood of a present situation. In both cases, a deontic interpretation is infe-
licitous, since the propositions do not denote actions that may be control-
led by the intended agent. This is so not only because of their temporal in-
dexing, but also, if we accept Eide’s (2002) and ter Muelen’s (1995)
analyses, because they are states.18
In (28), on the other hand, the time reference for the proposition is tak-
en to be posterior to the time of the modality expressed. That deontic mo-
dality is connected with posterior reference was noted as early as in Lyons
(1977) (cf. “there is an intrinsic connexion between deontic modality and
15 Cf. the “resultative” use of the perfect in Comrie (1976).

16 This analysis is consistent with the grammaticalization patterns suggested in Maslov (1988), who
maintains that in Indo-European languages the cyclic development of the perfect “can be summed up
in the formula: from denoting a state – to denoting an action that causes the state, and then – to simply
denoting an action, that is, to a degeneration of features peculiar to the perfect and, in some cases, to
their complete loss” (Maslov 1988: 70).
17 Contrary to Klinge (1996: 48), who claims that “the progressive indicates coincidence of the ref-
erential situation with the time of the utterance”, progressive forms may also indicate posterior time
reference. This phenomenon and its implications for modal interpretations were discussed in some de-
tail in 3.1.1.1.
18 See also Paradis (2005: 551), who discussing nominal meaning, maintains that processes and ac-
tivities are to be viewed as “state[s] of change” [my emphasis].

futurity” (Lyons 1977: 824)). This claim is echoed in Klinge (1996), who
argues that:
Future time situations can either be viewed as products of the ways of the
world, or as the ways of agents intentionally bringing situations about. The
subset of future time situations that lies within human ability is within pos-
sible agent control. […] So with propositions taken to describe a future time
situation we can have indeterminacy between epistemic and non-epistemic
where there is possible agent control. (Klinge 1996: 41)
Such indeterminacy can be observed, for example, in (29).
(29) They may start drilling tomorrow. Ambiguous
Since it must be assumed that the action denoted by the proposition is not
beyond the control of the intended agents, and given that the time refer-
ence for the proposition is posterior to the time of the modality expressed,
one of the possible interpretations is deontic. In certain contexts, however,
(29) may also be interpreted epistemically, as the speaker’s judgement of
the likelihood of the proposition occurring in the future.
This has also been noted by Coates, who summarises her findings as fol-
lows:
It is acknowledged in most studies of the modals that tense and modality

overlap where there is reference to the future, since the future, unlike the past,
is unknown. Reference to future events and states is a crucial aspect of the
meaning of the modals. […] In other words, commands, recommendations
and permission-granting utterances all refer to an action which will be carried
out at a time subsequent to the utterance. (Coates 1983: 233)
She also discusses the relationship between posterior time reference and
epistemic modality:
The relationship between Epistemic modality and futurity is less clear. The
Epistemic modals which express the speaker’s confidence in the proposition
normally have present reference. […] the Epistemic modals which express the
speaker’s lack of confidence in the event or state referred to in the proposi-
tion, however, normally have future reference. (Coates 1983: 234)
Although it is plausible that the speaker is more inclined to express confi-

dence in a proposition that can be verified at the time of the utterance than
in a proposition that has not yet occurred, the future reference can hardly
be claimed to stem from the modals in these cases. Coates herself argues
that “[e]pistemic MAY, MIGHT, and COULD can usually be paraphrased

‘it is possible that x will […]’” (Coates 1983: 234). However, I find this
difficult to accept as proof of future time reference for the modality in these
utterances. The time reference for the proposition is within the scope of
the modality as is the case in the paraphrases provided by Coates herself for
the modals may, might, and could. In general, the time reference for modal-
ity in epistemic utterances is present: the speaker expresses her judgement
at the time of the utterance. The presence or absence of confidence in a
proposition will then be coded by the simultaneous or posterior time ref-
erence for the proposition in the cases discussed by Coates (1983), and also
by different modals. Thus, it is important to consider the time reference
for the proposition and the time reference for the modality expressed as
two separate features contributing to modal interpretation.
A note is due on the passive, as it was one of the features found to be
associated with deontic modality in utterances containing the modal must
in Coates (1983) (see 2.1.2). Let us consider the implications of the pres-
ence of this feature in an utterance. Normally, the subject of a passive ut-
terance is not expected to act on the proposition, but is instead subjected
to the action described in the proposition. Thus, at first glance, there is no
apparent reason why this association ought to exist as in Coates (1983), at
least in directed deontic utterances. Consider, however, (30) and (31).
(30) These issues must be resolved as soon as possible. (EELL) Deontic
(31) She went trough the same internal questioning as I had, but assumed that butter
must be rationed! (JPM) Epistemic
These examples exhibit two possible interpretations for passive utterances.

In (30), the interpretation is either directed or non-directed deontic. The
former interpretation will arise if there is a specific person in the context of
this utterance whom the speaker intends to carry out the action described
in the proposition. The choice of passive voice in this case may be dictated
by a number of reasons: the speaker may not want to give an explicit order
to the addressee, or it is not important to specify which of the possible
agents is to carry out the order. In (31), on the other hand, the interpreta-
tion is epistemic. There is no intended agent in the context of this utter-
ance to whom an order to ration the butter may be addressed. What the
speaker wants to emphasize is the allegedly rationed state of the butter, not
that this state is to be actualised by a third party. This interpretation is ex-
plicitely triggered by the presence of assume in the main clause. Note also
that the time reference for the proposition is simultaneous with the modal-
ity expressed in (31) and posterior to the time of modality in (30). This is

an important difference, because, all things being equal, time reference sys-
tematically promotes or demotes deontic interpretation. In English and
Swedish, the time reference for the proposition is not linguistically coded
in passive utterances and has to be recovered from the context. In Danish,
on the other hand, the difference in time reference, and thus the difference
in interpretations, are coded by the systematic use of two different kinds of
passive: the blive-passives and the s-passives. According to Klinge (1996),
there is a “coincidence between the time of the utterance and the referential
situation” in blive-passives, which promotes an epistemic interpretation.
No such coincidence may be observed in the s-passives, which demotes the
epistemic interpretation and promotes the deontic one as in (32) and (33),
discussed in Klinge (1996: 50-51).
(32) Dyrene må blive fodret inden middag. Epistemic

animal-PL-DEF MOD become feed-PART before dinner
‘The animals must be fed before noon.’
(33) Dyrene må fodres inden middag. Deontic

animal-PL-DEF MOD feed-INF-PASS before dinner
‘The animals may be fed before noon.’
Thus, it is not only the presence of passive voice as such in an utterance

that promotes epistemic interpretation by indicating lack of control on the
part of the subject, but also the stativity of the described situation.19 The
time for the proposition also influences the interpretation of passive modal
utterances in a systematic way by providing further information about
whether the situation described in the proposition can be controlled by the
intended agent or not.
4.1.4 Explicit and implicit condition

As has been demonstrated, epistemic interpretations are promoted by cer-
tain contexts. There is, however, one feature that systematically makes the
influence of other features ineffective, what Wärnsby (2004) calls an im-
plicit or explicit condition. An explicit condition of the kind described here
is usually expressed by an adverbial of purpose (frequently a clause), as in
(34), where the explicit condition is to climb the tower. An implicit condi-
19 See further 4.1.5.

tion, on the other hand, is not linguistically coded, but is recovered from
the situational context of an utterance, as in (35), in which the speaker is
a prisoner and has to be brave in order to retain his dignity.
(34) To climb the tower you must be in a group, be aged over 11 and have a letter of
permission from your MP or embassy. (SUG1) Deontic
(35) I must be brave, I must maintain my own high standards. (ST1) Deontic
If there is a condition of this kind present in the context, utterances are in-
terpreted as non-epistemic: they are understood as ‘if-then’ statements,
where the interpretation is ‘if X, then necessarily Y’ (‘If you are to climb
the tower, then it is necessary that you be in a group, etc.’). The interpre-
tation ‘if X, then possibly Y’ is infelicitous. Only the modals of necessity,
must and måste, are used in these contexts, since, according to Papafragou
(2000), there is a relation of entailment between a proposition containing
one of these modals and the set of propositions belonging to the relevant
domain (see 2.2.).
This feature is important not only for the interpretation of modal utter-
ances in English and Swedish, but also in Norwegian (see Eide 2002,
2005). Consider, for example, the following sentences from Eide (2002:
238):
(36) Pasienten må ha blitt feilbehandlet. Epistemic

patient-DEF MOD have-INF be-PART wrong-treated
‘The patient must have been subject to malpractice.’
(37) Pasienten må ha blitt feilbehandlet for å få erstatning.

patient-DEF MOD have-INF be-PART wrong-treated for to get-INF compensation
‘The patient must have been subject to malpractice in order to get compensation.’
Deontic
Eide claims that the presence of an adverbial clause of purpose coerces tem-
poral difference between (36) and (37). Thus, (36) is interpreted epistem-
ically due to the fact that the time reference for the proposition is anterior
to the time reference of the modality expressed, and can therefore no long-
er be controlled by any agent. As in this study, epistemic interpretation in
such cases is considered default in Eide (2002), but is overridden when an
adverbial clause of purpose is present:

In this sentence [37], ‘receiving a compensation’ is temporally subsequent to

the action described as ‘being subject to malpractice’; i.e. the reading is that
‘being subject to malpractice’ must already have taken place by the point in
time when a compensation is received. The purposes described by the pur-
pose clauses [are] seen as a (potential) consequence of the action encoded by
the complement of the modal, hence the purpose must be subsequent in time
to this action. Knowing that causes must precede their consequences, this is
an effect of our knowledge of how the physical world actually works. Thus,
it is possible to argue that purpose clauses denote a point in future. (Eide
2002: 253)
As we saw earlier, posterior time reference for the proposition is consistent

with deontic interpretation. However, time reference alone is not critical,
since it is possible to find epistemic utterances, such as (38), with posterior
time reference for the proposition.
(38) He knows, she knows, it is not evasion, but the only answer possible; announcing,
perhaps, the beginning of a conversation which must inevitably continue through
months and years, leading to an inevitable conclusion (BR). Epistemic
What is important, is the fact that in these utterances some deontic source
is implied that is interested in the proposition being carried out, or as Hud-
dleston and Pullum (2002: 726) put it: “[t]he central cases of purpose im-
ply intention and design – usually on the part of the agent of the matrix
clause”. This does not exclude the possibility that a condition of this kind
may code speaker intentions instead. Therefore, the features implicit and
explicit conditions are considered to be related to Controllability.
4.1.5 Situation type

The type of situation is taken here to be instantiated as either telic or atelic.
Following standard definitions, a telic situation is taken to be bounded (it
has an endpoint), whereas an atelic situation is unbounded (it has no end-
point).20 In this study, the whole verb phrase is considered when deciding
whether a situation is telic or atelic. This is in accordance with Comrie’s
observation that “although aspect, and tense, and mood, are usually indi-
cated in the verbal morphology, they do not so much characterise the verb
itself as the whole of the sentence, including subjects and objects” (Comrie
20 Cf. Comrie’s definition: “a telic situation is one that involves a process that leads up to a well de-
fined terminal point, beyond which the process cannot continue” (Comrie 1976: 45). Note also that
telic/atelic opposition is taken to be aspectual on his account.

1976: 45 fn. 2). This seems to be common practice, since direct objects are
included in the classification of the situation types as early as in Vendler
(1967).21 Also, Verkyul (1972) suggests that the verb phrase in its entirety
should be investigated when deciding on the Aktionsart of the utterance.
Michaelis (1998) defines situation type, in her study referred to as situa-
tional aspect or Aktionsart, as “[t]he canonical categorization of a situation
as a state or event, independent of any particular presentation of that situ-
ation” (Michaelis 1998: xvi). We already established in 4.1.2 that the dis-
tinction between states and events is of importance for the interpretation
of modal utterances. Michaelis further argues that “aspectual categoriza-
tion [is] a product of the manner in which people, as producers and pro-
cessors of texts, construe scenes, rather than a reflection of the properties
which situations have ‘in the world’” (Michaelis 1998: 5). Thus, on her
analysis “[p]hasal aspects are […] seen as operators which map event prop-
ositions onto state propositions and vice versa” (Michaelis 1998: 4). There-
fore, type of situation is to be considered when analysing the aspectual
modifications and time references of modal utterances.
Of particular interest to the present study is Frawley’s (1992) cross-lin-
guistic observation on the correlation between telic situations, and perfect
aspect22 and passive voice (see also the discussion of these features in
4.1.3). He illustrates with various examples that the presence of perfect as-
pect or passive voice in an utterance imposes telic interpretations. He ar-
gues that “the perfect induces telic aspect because of its dual temporal na-
ture”, since it relates “two times – and, by implication, two events – the
perfect is functionally equivalent to the telic, which as we know, requires a
dual event structure” (Frawley 1992: 304). The correlation with the passive
is explained by the fact that “passive forms convey telicity because of their
intrinsic dual structure of both process and result”, or
The logic of the passive is to promote the recipient of the action to subject
position. In doing so, the passive focuses on the result of the process encoded
by the verb insofar as the recipient is the result of the action. […] The pres-
ence of and focus on the recipient provided by the passive produce the telic
interpretation. (Frawley 1992: 305)
Thus, we can establish a connection between telicity and state/event dis-

tinction on the one hand, and aspectual modification and passive voice on
the other. All these features are considered of major importance for modal
21 Vendler (1967) distinguishes between four situation types: (i) states (live, hate); (ii) activities (swim,
play); (iii) accomplishments (grow up, run a race); and (iv) achievements (arrive, die, win a race).
22 Frawley uses the term perfect tense.

interpretations, and are also related to the compositional notion of Con-

trollability.
4.1.6 Summary
To sum up, in English, Swedish, and – one might at this point speculate
with some confidence – in other languages, there is an array of contextual
features related to the notion of Controllability in modal utterances. In de-
ontic utterances, these features pattern so as to indicate that the intended
agent is in control of the situation described in the proposition. Typically,
in deontic utterances the subject is animate and thus capable of either car-
rying out the proposition or refusing to do so. The time reference for the
proposition is often posterior to the time of the utterance, allowing the
agent the possibility of action. The main predicate is usually an event verb
denoting an action that can be controlled by the agent. Furthermore, in
deontic utterances the presence of an explicit or implicit condition indi-
cates the source of the deontic force, i.e. the party interested in the propo-
sition being carried out, and also coerces posterior time reference for the
proposition.
In epistemic utterances, on the other hand, these features typically pat-
tern in such a way as to indicate lack of control on the part of an intended
agent over the situation. The subject may be inanimate, which usually dis-
qualifies it from being a suitable agent. Further, the main predicate is often
expressed by a state verb, which also tends to indicate lack of control on
the part of the agent. The proposition may also refer to an anterior or si-
multaneous situation, which is immutable and thus cannot be changed by
an agent.
My point here is that the ‘assumptions’ that in Papafragou’s treatment
allow the addressee to interpret modal utterances in the intended way are
triggered in particular by the manner the speaker chooses to encode Con-
trollability, i.e. the way the features discussed above are combined in an ut-
terance. Appealing to Controllability also explains the systematic associa-
tion of the features discussed with either epistemic or deontic interpreta-
tions.

4.2 Additional features

In this section, I consider some other features that are of importance for
the interpretation of modal utterances. They can be related to Controlla-
bility but are not central to this notion.
4.2.1 Epistemic adverbials and modal particles

In his extensive account of modality, Lyons (1977) hinted at the relation-
ship between modals and modal adverbials:
In most dialects of English not more than one modal verb can occur within
the same clause. But both a modal verb and a modal adverb may be com-
bined. When this happens a distinction is to be drawn between modally har-
monic and modally non-harmonic combinations. For example ‘possibly’ and
‘may’, if each is being used epistemically, are harmonic, in that they both ex-
press the same degree of modality, whereas ‘certainly’ and ‘may’ are, in this
sense, modally non-harmonic. It has been pointed out […] that the adverb
and the modal may, and normally do, “reinforce each other” in a modally
harmonic combination. […] [In cases when] the adverb and the modal verb
are non-harmonic they cannot but be independent; and one must be within
the scope of the other. (Lyons 1977: 807-808)
Later, the effect of an epistemic adverbial on the interpretation of an utter-

ance containing a modal verb is discussed by Quirk et al. (1985: 583-586),
Hoye (1997: 149-152), and Wärnsby (1999), who all argue that the pres-
ence of an epistemic modal adverbial such as possibly, perhaps, surely, etc.,
may neutralize, disambiguate, or reinforce the interpretation of the modal
in an utterance. Neutralization occurs when the utterance would be inter-
preted as non-epistemic had it not been for the adverbial, as in (39). Dis-
ambiguation takes place when the utterance would be ambiguous without
the modal adverbial (consider, for example, He may (probably) go there to-
morrow, which out of context and without the presence of an epistemic ad-
verbial would be ambiguous between epistemic and directed deontic inter-
pretations). Reinforcement of the modal meaning occurs in harmonic
combinations where the modal and the adverbial express the same kind of
modality (John may perhaps be ill). The presence of an epistemic adverbial
in an utterance (both in harmonic and non-harmonic combinations) is
considered to take precedence over other features, since these adverbials are
sentential and thus take scope over the utterance as a whole. Note also that,
according to Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 767), “[m]odal adjuncts,

[…] are predominately used for epistemic modality, where it is a matter of

the speaker’s assessment of the truth of the proposition expressed in the res-
idue or the nature of the speaker’s commitment to its truth”, and also,
“[m]odal adjuncts are not used to express deontic modality (obligation,
permission, etc.)”.
Wärnsby (2004: 175) mentions that in epistemic utterances, must, may,
måste, and kan appearing in otherwise typically deontic contexts, in com-
bination with event verbs without aspectual modification, exhibit a strong
tendency to co-occur with another epistemic element (modal adverbials or
modal particles).
(39) If an export manager sent out by his company cannot communicate on the business
and social level with the foreign customer, and has no respect for the different ways
of conducting business and behaving socially, the customer may well choose another
partner. (JPM1) Epistemic
(40) This must surely come under unanimity rule. (EJAC) Epistemic
The presence of an epistemic adverbial or particle, however, has no influ-

ence on the capacity of the agent to control the situation described in the
proposition. Thus, in (39) the subject, and the intended agent (the custom-
er), obviously controls the situation insofar as being able to choose another
business partner. Without the presence of the epistemic adverbial well,
there is nothing in the context of this utterance that precludes the deontic
interpretation of permission: the subject has control of the situation, the
main predicate is coded by an event verb, the time reference for the modal-
ity is simultaneous with the time of the utterance, and the time reference
for the proposition is posterior. Thus, (39) could be interpreted to mean
that the subject is free to choose to act upon the speaker’s permission or
decline to do so in some future situation specified in the if-clause. By
choosing to use well in the propositional context of this utterance, the au-
thor explicitly signals that the intended interpretation of (39) is epistemic.
Similar reasoning can be applied to (40). If the adverbial surely is omit-
ted from the context of (40), the utterance may become ambiguous be-
tween the deontic and the epistemic interpretations. It is possible to inter-
pret (40) as either the speaker’s reference to some set of regulations speci-
fying the necessity of the proposition being carried out, or as the expression
of her judgement about the likelihood of the proposition. The epistemic
adverbial surely disambiguates the speaker’s intentions. Thus, although not
part of Controllability on par, for instance, with time reference, epistemic

adverbials and particles are features that clearly facilitate intended interpre-
tations.
4.2.2 Utterance type

As will become apparent in what follows, I consider it of importance to in-
vestigate whether there is a systematic correlation between certain types of
utterances and modal interpretations. In this study, I distinguish between
assertive and non-assertive utterances, or statements, and interrogatives
and sentences containing negation (the latter are discussed in 4.2.3.1). As-
sertive utterances are further classified depending on whether they are ex-
clamative or not. In distinguishing assertions from non-assertions, I con-
sider primarily the function of these utterances. In deciding whether the
utterance is exclamative, on the other hand, I rely on the presence of the
exclamation mark in the data, since this, in addition to the special gram-
matical structure of some exclamatives, is the only means available in writ-
ing to indicate “the speaker’s strong emotional reaction or attitude to some
situation” (Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 922).23
Searle (1969) mentions that illocutionary force is context-dependent:
“[i]t is possible to perform the act without invoking an explicit illocution-
ary force-indicating device where the context and the utterance make it
clear that the essential condition24 is satisfied” (Searle 1969: 68). In written
texts, however, a natural assumption is that the authors strive to convey
their message so it is interpreted in the intended way. On this assumption,
there may be associations between direct and indirect speech acts and the
features important for the interpretation of modal utterances. Consider,
for example, how these features cooperate in (41) and (42).
(41) “Everyone must stay here!” the landlord said, screaming in the dark. (BO) Deontic
(42) How embarrassing it must be for Britain’s Labour Government to read the
McMahon report! (EJAC) Epistemic
23 Whereas I accept that the difference between assertive and non-assertive utterances usually corre-
sponds to that between declarative and interrogative utterances (see, for example, Huddleston and Pul-
lum (2002) for definitions), I do not follow their strict definition of exclamatives, namely that these
exhibit special grammatical structure. Also, imperative utterances are not considered here, since they
do not contain modals.
24 Essential conditions for requests and assertions are that they “[c]ount for an attempt to get H[earer]
to do A[ct]” and “[c]ount as an undertaking to the effect that p[roposition] represents an actual state
of affairs,” respectively (Searle 1969: 66).

Examples (41) and (42) are both exclamations on my analysis. In (41), the
exclamation can be seen as boosting the illocutionary force of the utterance
so it is understood not as a non-directed deontic statement, but as a direct
order emanating from the speaker and directed towards the addressees. A
similar effect is achieved by using an exclamative sentence structure in
(42): the epistemic interpretation is reinforced by the indication of the
speaker’s strong, subjective involvement in the situation.
(43) May I get you a glass of water? (SG) Deontic
(44) Det måste ju vara något som inte stämmer? (HM) Epistemic
it MOD MOD be-INF something that NEG match-PRES
‘There is got to be something odd about that.’
The fact that (43) and (44) are non-assertive possibly adds some gradation
to the interpretation. In (43), by choosing to express the proposal in ques-
tion form and with a formal may, the speaker indicates a high degree of po-
liteness. In (44), the speaker chooses to express his epistemic judgement
not as a statement but as a question (note though that structurally this is
not a question). By doing so, he further signals the uncertainty in his state-
ment, and, at the same time, asks for confirmation from the addressee.
Thus, although it is not central to the concept of Controllability, utterance
type can influence modal interpretations.
4.2.2.1 Negation
The type of negation considered here is sentential in scope. Two types of
scopal relations are generally observed between modality and negation: ei-
ther the modality or the proposition falls under the scope of negation in
an utterance. In English and Swedish, there is no structural way of distin-
guishing between these two types of negation involving not and inte ‘not’,
respectively. In English, however, different modals are used to express the
difference in the scope of negation, as in (45).
(45) John may be at the office.

a. John may not be at the office.
b. John can’t be at the office.
In (45a), it is the proposition that is negated (‘It is possible that John is not
at his office’), while in (45b) it is the modality that is negated (‘It is not
possible that John is at his office’). Palmer (2001) argues that “[t]he most

important relationship between modality and negation is the one that in-
volves possibility and necessity” (Palmer 2001: 106). Furthermore, univer-
sally, necessity tends to take scope over negation, whereas negation usually
takes scope over possibility (see also Cinque’s (1999) hierarchy of function-
al projections). In this study, it is important for the overall interpretation
of the utterance whether the speaker chooses to negate the modality or the
proposition.25
An additional point of relatedness between modals and negation can be
found in Frawley (1992), who claims that propositional negation in par-
ticular should be considered modality in its own right, since it signals irre-
alis. Proposing a scalar organisation of propositional negation, Frawley
suggests the following:
From the standpoint of modality as epistemic deixis, negation is the mis-

match of the expressed world and the reference world, so the strongest prop-
ositional negation should be induced by forms that encode the total
mismatch. Conversely, those forms that encode less mismatch between the
reference world and the expressed world should display fuzzy behaviour for
propositional negation. (Frawley 1992: 396)
He also argues that, in its capacity of being a scopal relation, negation will
necessarily influence and be influenced by other scopal elements, such as
modal verbs: “insofar as negation has scope, it necessarily comes into con-
tact with other scope-bearing items and thus has to compete for effect”
(Frawley 1992: 399). Consider, for instance, (46), discussed in more detail
in 3.3.2 as (97).
(46) But if humans can make new varieties of plants and animals, must not nature do so
also? (CSA)
Here, negation interacts both with the modality expressed and with the in-
terrogative utterance type. With must, negation usually scopes over the
proposition, indicating that there is necessity to carry out the proposition.
This does not seem to be the case in (46), however, which can be para-
phrased as ‘…, is it not necessary for nature to do so also?’, and not as ‘…,
is it necessary for nature not to do so also?’. This is consistent with Palmer’s
(1990: 41) observation that in negated interrogative sentences it is the mo-
dality that is negated, not the proposition.
25 See also Palmer (2003: 9-13) for further remarks on the relationship between possibility, necessity
and negation.

4.3 Controllability and Transitivity

As suggested in Wärnsby (2004), many of the features involved in the in-
terpretation of modal utterances, are also relevant in (de)coding what
Hopper and Thompson (1980) call Transitivity. Hopper and Thompson’s
analysis “has spawned intensive research on cross-linguistic manifestations
of the transitivity prototypes and the search for other grammatical proto-
types” (Croft 1990: 131). It certainly has influenced my arguments about
the nature of Controllability.
Hopper and Thompson define Transitivity as a composite notion only
partly concerned with the presence of an object in an utterance. Tradition-
ally, the notion of Transitivity is understood in terms of “an activity […]
‘carried-over’ or ‘transferred’ from an agent to a patient, and thus involves
an action which is typically EFFECTIVE in some way” (Hopper and
Thompson 1980: 251). This view is modified by the authors, who identify
several component parts of Transitivity, each of which implies a scale of
Low to High Transitivity for utterances in a language. Each of these com-
ponents is said to “involve […] a different facet of the effectiveness or in-
tensity with which the action is transferred from one participant to anoth-
er” (Hopper and Thompson 1980: 252). No component is sufficient on its
own but has to be combined with others for maximum effect. Croft (1990)
makes this stand even clearer:
No single property is a necessary characteristic of transitivity, but every prop-

erty contributes to the transitivity of the clause. This is true typologically, of
course: within a particular language, the grammar has conventionalized the
prototype so that some grammatical properties affect transitivity of a clause
and others do not. (Croft 1990: 134)
The components of Transitivity presented in Figure 1 are based on Hopper

and Thompson (1980: 252-255).26
Component A refers to the number of participants in the clause. Since an
action can only be said to have been transferred if there are at least two par-
ticipants, clauses containing an A(gent) and an O(bject) are generally con-
sidered more transitive than those containing only an A.27
26 See Ryan (2004) for further details.
27 Note, however, that since the notion of Transitivity is regarded as compositional and scalar, in some
cases a clause with no O can be considered higher in Transitivity than one containing both an A and
an O, as in (i) and (ii):
(i) Susan left. (+action, +telic, +punctual, +volitional)
(ii) Jerry likes beer. (+ two participants, -volitional)
For more details, see Hopper and Thompson (1980: 254).

Component B, Kinesis, reflects the fact that actions can be transferred

from A to O, whereas states cannot. Thus, in The boy kicked the ball, the
ball is likely to undergo some transition, for example, from being immo-
bile to being set in motion. In The boy hates ice-cream, on the other hand,
no change is imposed on the ice-cream.
HIGH LOW
A. PARTICIPANTS 2 or more participants, A 1 participant
and O
B. KINESIS action non-action
C. ASPECT telic atelic
D. PUNCTUALITY punctual non-punctual
E. VOLITIONALITY volitional non-volitional
F. AFFIRMATION affirmative negative
G. MODE realis irrealis
H. AGENCY A high in potency A low in potency
I. AFFECTEDNESS OF O O totally affected O not affected
J. INDIVIDUATION OF O O highly individuated, i.e. O non-individuated, i.e.
O is: proper, human, O is: common, inanimate,
animate, concrete, abstract, plural, mass,
singular, count, non-referential
referential, definite
Figure 1. Components of Transitivity (adopted from Hopper and Thompson 1980)
By making use of component C, Aspect, Hopper and Thompson are able

to consider an action in terms of telicity.28 Telic actions, which are high on
the Transitivity scale, are marked by past tense or perfect aspect, whereas
present tense and progressive aspect mark atelic actions, which are low in
Transitivity. In John ate the cake, the transfer of the action is completed,
while in John is eating the cake, it is not. Thus, the latter utterance is seen
as being lower in Transitivity than the former.
The inclusion of component D, Punctuality, reflects the fact that “ac-
tions carried out with no obvious transitional phase between inception and
completion have a more marked effect on their patients than actions which
are inherently on-going” (Hopper and Thompson 1980: 252). Thus,
clauses containing punctual verbs (break) are considered more transitive
than clauses incorporating non-punctual verbs (play).
28 This account of aspect and telicity refers to the external or grammatical phenomenon and should
not be confused with the internal or lexical telicity, a component of situational aspect (see Michaelis
1998). Situational aspect can be said to be roughly reflected by component D, Punctuality, in Hopper
and Thompson’s model (cf. Hopper and Thompson 1980: 271).

Component E, Volitionality, illustrates the fact that A can act purpose-

fully. I wrote your name (volitional) is therefore considered to be higher in
transitivity than I forgot your name (non-volitional) (Hopper and Thomp-
son 1980: 252).
Component F, Affirmation, indicates whether a clause is affirmative or
negative, the former being higher in Transitivity. The reason for this is that
in an affirmative statement it may be reported that an action was trans-
ferred onto O, whereas a negative statement would be used to report that
no such transfer took place.
Component G, Mode, indicates the mood of the clause: realis or irrealis.
Actions described by clauses in irrealis mood are considered less effective
than actions described by clauses in realis mood. The latter are higher in
Transitivity than the former.
Component H, Agency, indicates that As high in agency/potency29 are
able to transfer the action more effectively than those low in agency/poten-
cy. Thus, “the normal interpretation of George startled me is that of a per-
ceptible event with perceptible consequences; but that of The picture star-
tled me could be completely a matter of an internal state” (Hopper and
Thompson 1980: 252).
Component I, Affectedness of O, deals with the degree to which O is
affected by the action; component J, Individuation of O, deals with the de-
gree to which O is distinct from A, and the degree to which O is distinct
from its own background. In John peeled potatoes for two hours, O is less in-
dividuated (since potatoes is common, plural and inanimate) and not total-
ly affected (since there may be some potatoes left to peel). In John peeled
the potatoes in two hours, on the other hand, O is more individuated (since
the potatoes is concrete, count and definite), and it is also fully affected (be-
cause of the implicature that all of the relevant potatoes were peeled).
Hopper and Thompson provide extensive typological evidence that
Transitivity, as a compositional notion, is a central relationship in human
language. They ask why the morpho-semantic correlations they found rel-
evant to their notion of Transitivity are so regular cross-linguistically,
which moves them into the area of linguistic universals. Hopper and
29 The notion of agents high in potency is compatible with the properties of the Proto-Agent dis-
cussed by Dowty (1991: 572). Also consider the so called Agency Hierarchy (Silverstein 1976):
1st Person > 2nd Person > 3rd Person > Proper name > Human > Animate > Inanimate
This hierarchy is arranged so that As located at the left of the hierarchy are considered to be higher in
agency/potency than those located at the right of the hierarchy. Note, however, that some researchers
do not conceive of the Agency Hierarchy in this way. Dahl (2000b), for example, maintains that the
above hierarchy includes two types of scale: (i) an animacy scale (Human > Animate > Inanimate); and
(ii) an egophoricity scale (1st Person > 2nd Person > 3rd Person > Proper name) (Dahl 2000b: 40-41).

Thompson suggest that linguistic universals “originate in a general prag-

matic function, and that the universal is not explained until this function
has been isolated and related to the universal” (Hopper and Thompson
1980: 280). It appears that one major function Transitivity performs in
discourse is to distinguish between backgrounded and foregrounded infor-
mation: clauses high in Transitivity tend to be foregrounded, while clauses
low in Transitivity tend to provide background information. Hopper and
Thompson provide the following definition of backgrounded and fore-
grounded information:
That part of discourse which does not immediately and crucially contribute
to the speaker’s [communicative] goal, but merely assists, amplifies or com-
ments on it, is referred to as BACKGROUND. By contrast, the material which
supplies the main points of the discourse is known as FOREGROUND. (Hop-
per and Thompson 1980: 280)
The foregrounded/backgrounded distinction fundamental to the organisa-

tion of discourse is also said to be “a universal – having its origins in central
communicative and perhaps psychological functions” (Hopper and
Thompson 1980: 283). Whether information is foregrounded or back-
grounded is not marked by a single morphosyntactic feature. In English
and Swedish, for example, foregrounding is not marked in absolute terms.
Instead, it is indicated by encoding the foregrounded clause so it is high in
Transitivity, i.e. such a clause will typically have more high Transitivity fea-
tures, as defined above, than a backgrounded clause. Hopper and Thomp-
son’s investigation focuses on narrative texts, since “[n]arrative is a cultural
universal, and hence readily accessible in a variety of languages”. Other
studies, however, conducted on different discourse genres, conversation
and procedural discourse, have reportedly produced similar results (see
Hopper and Thompson 1980: 282).
There is a striking similarity between the features constituting Transi-
tivity in Hopper and Thompson’s account, and the features claimed to
constitute Controllability, indicating that Transitivity and Controllability
are overlapping notions. The distinction between action and non-action in
the Kinesis component of Transitivity reflects the distinction between state
and event predicates, for example. Furthermore, grammaticalized telicity
in the Aspect component is related to what has been called ‘aspectual mod-
ification’ in previous discussions. In addition, Punctuality, as well as Affect-
edness and Individuation of O, are some of the features of Aktionsart men-
tioned here in the discussion of situation type. Finally, Volitionality and
Agency relate to the distinction between types of subjects, issues of agent

control, desirability of an action, etc. Recall that Transitivity is defined by

Hopper and Thompson as the transfer of energy from an agent to a pa-
tient. Controllability, on the other hand, involves the ability of the agent
to choose to transfer the energy to a patient in order to carry out the action
specified in the proposition (of a modal utterance). Controllability is en-
coded in a way similar to Transitivity: no single feature discussed here is
sufficient to express Controllability, but each feature contributes to ex-
pressing Controllability in a modal utterance. The significance of this over-
lap is two-fold.
Firstly, the features discussed in 4.1 are important to the discourse dis-
tinction between foregrounding and backgrounding as well as to the no-
tion of Transitivity, which is unrelated to modality as such. The primary
function of Transitivity, according to Hopper and Thompson, is to mark
the distinction between foregrounded and backgrounded information in
discourse, distinction argued to be a universal. If we accept this argument,
it is possible to conclude that the features of Transitivity are cognitively sa-
lient, i.e. since the features constituting Hopper and Thompson’s Transi-
tivity, as well as the notion of Transitivity itself, are argued to be universal
in languages, it is natural to assume that speakers’ awareness of these fea-
tures is high.
Secondly, it is possible to analyse my data in terms of Transitivity, main-
taining the distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic interpreta-
tions as far as the degree of Transitivity and the discourse function are con-
cerned (see also Wärnsby 2004). One may assume that deontic utterances
are generally higher in Transitivity than epistemic ones. Fifty occurrences
of each modal (may, must, kan and måste) in epistemic utterances and fifty
occurrences of the modals in non-epistemic (deontic and dynamic) utter-
ances in main clauses30 were assessed in terms of the degree of Transitivity.
The results of this mini-investigation are presented in Table 1.
Table 1. Degree of Transitivity of epistemic and non-epistemic clauses
Degree of Transitivity in Degree of Transitivity in

epistemic utterances non-epistemic utterances
may 1.36 4.53
kan 0.87 3.77
must 2.42 3.54
måste 1.74 3.25
Average 1.6 3.8
30 The choice of main clauses as subjects of this investigation was dictated by the fact that only main
clauses have the potential to be foregrounded.

As expected, there is a strong statistical tendency for epistemic utterances

to have a lower degree of Transitivity than non-epistemic utterances. In
many corpus- and cognitively-oriented linguistic theories, frequency is
claimed to be a factor to which language speakers are sensitive. Leech and
Coates, for example, maintained the notion of quantitative prototype, “a
particular stereotype which is quantitatively and hence psychologically
predominant” (Leech and Coates 1979: 88). A more recent claim to this
point can be found in Warner (1993), who states that “in some circum-
stances an increase in frequency and salience of items or attributes may
make a category more coherent and distinct” (Warner 1993: 238).31 Bybee
and Hopper (2001) also point out that “[t]he frequency with which certain
items and strings of items are used has a profound influence on the way the
language is broken up into chunks in memory storage, the way such
chunks are related to other stored material and the ease with which they
are related” (Bybee and Hopper 2001: 3).32 Accordingly, we may assume
that speakers of English and Swedish are sensitive to the difference in the
degree of Transitivity between epistemic and non-epistemic modalities, i.e.
the speakers are able to recognise the statistical difference in the degree of
Transitivity between the two modalities. We may argue that modally mod-
ified utterances displaying a low degree of Transitivity will be first inter-
preted as epistemic on a probabilistic basis. This implies that Transitivity
effects may be important even in (de)coding modal utterances.
Surprisingly, however, epistemic utterances were not the only ones
found to be relatively low in Transitivity;33 non-epistemic utterances were
also low in Transitivity. This may be because both modalities express irre-
alis,34 i.e. modal verbs scope over propositions that have not yet been rea-
lised, or exist in some possible world different from the actual world. Epis-
temic and non-epistemic utterances provide some background informa-
tion in that they comment on the discourse (epistemic) or potentially
modify it (deontic). This is consistent with our understanding of epistemic
31 Cf. also Giora (1996), who, studying the interpretation mechanisms for metaphoric expressions
from a psycholinguistic perspective, suggests that “meanings are made salient through, e.g. convention-
ality, frequency, familiarity or context” (Giora 1996: 200).
32 See also Bybee (2005) for an elaboration of this view.
33 Consider, for example, the results of Hopper and Thompson’s findings that foregrounded clauses
average 8.0 points in the degree of Transitivity, whereas backgrounded clauses average 4.1 points (Hop-
per and Thompson 1980: 284).
34 The basic distinction between realis and irrealis is that “[t]he realis portrays situations as actualized,
as having occurred or actually occurring, knowable through direct perception”, whereas “[t]he irrealis
portrays situations as purely within the realm of thought, knowable only through imagination”
(Mithun 1999: 173).

modality as propositional, expressing notions such as speakers’ attitudes

towards the proposition and their degree of commitment to it, and non-
epistemic modalities as dynamic, referring to events that are merely poten-
tial (see Palmer 1990, 2001).
In their more recent article dealing with spoken data, Thompson and
Hopper point out that “[c]lauses of low Transitivity are far more useful in
the intersubjective interpersonal contexts that make up most of our talking
life” (Thompson and Hopper 2001: 52). This echoes the conclusions in
Scheibman (2001) and Krug (2001) that subjectifying elements are fre-
quent in discourse, particularly in spoken discourse. Modally modified ut-
terances can thus be seen as not only modifying one’s environment and cre-
ating common ground in a typically ‘modal’ way, but also participating in
the overall organization of discourse.
Summary
Using Coates’s study as my point of departure, I argued that the list of features as-
sociated with different modal interpretations in her study is not exhaustive. I sug-
gested that a number of features affect the interpretation, and that these features
are related to each other through the concept of Controllability. Controllability is
here taken to reflect the ability of an agent to choose to carry out the proposition.
It is argued that Controllability is a compositional concept, and can be coded by
a number of contextual features.
The first feature discussed here is subject type. Since the grammatical subject is
often also the agent who acts out the proposition, this feature is linked to Proto-
Agent and other related concepts. The fundamental distinction between events
and states is also considered to be involved in expressing Controllability: states are
often beyond an agent’s control, whereas events are not. Furthermore, features
such as aspectual modification, passive voice, and situation type (telic or atelic) are all
argued to facilitate the distinction between states and events. The time reference for
the modality expressed in the utterance and the time reference for the proposition are
also considered of relevance to Controllability. Anterior time reference for the
proposition, for instance, effectively places the proposition out of the agent’s con-
trol. Finally, the presence of an explicit or implicit condition in an utterance sug-
gests prominence of the deontic source, and also that the proposition can be con-
trolled by an intended agent, since it coerces posterior time reference for the prop-
osition.
A number of additional features, such as presence of a modal adverbial or par-
ticle, utterance type, and negation were also discussed. Although not central to the

notion of Controllability, they were shown to be of importance for the interpreta-

tion of modal utterances.
Thus, since Controllability is not encoded by a single feature in the discourse
but is a complex and compositional notion, we have to consider all of its consti-
tuent features in order to arrive at the intended interpretation. Coates's (1983) as-
sociations between certain features and the different interpretations are therefore
not direct, but are related to the notion of Controllability, which is in turn associ-
ated with the different interpretations. In other words, if an utterance is encoded
so as to indicate that the situation described in the proposition can be controlled
by an intended agent, it is likely to receive a deontic interpretation. Epistemic in-
terpretation, on the other hand, often arises in utterances indicating lack of con-
trol on the part of the agent.
Finally, I pointed out that Controllability is linked to the universal notion of
Transitivity, since there is considerable overlap of the features relevant for the no-
tion of Controllability and the features constituting Transitivity. This suggests that
Controllability, and the features related to it, are salient and easily recognised. Fur-
thermore, modal utterances were shown to be generally low in Transitivity, thus
conveying background information which is particularly important in intersubjec-
tive contexts. Finally, Transitivity and Controllability have overlapping functions:
encoding the effectiveness of transfer of energy from an agent to a patient, and en-
coding the suitability of an agent to perform this transfer of energy, respectively.
Both notions are also encoded in a similar way: every feature discussed contributes
to expressing these notions, but no feature alone is defining.

5 Mining the modals
Abstract
In the previous chapters, I demonstrated that the presence of certain features in-
fluences the interpretation of modal utterances in a systematic way: some contex-
tual features demote deontic interpretations, while others promote epistemic in-
terpretations. I also related these features to the notion of Controllability, which is
arguably crucial for the interpretation. A Data Mining analysis was undertaken in
order to uncover the exact, statistically significant patterning of features with re-
spect to interpretation, and to confirm the results obtained through qualitative
analysis in Chapter 3. The Data Mining analysis also served to establish in what
way the features related to Controllability combine with each other to ascertain
the intended interpretation.
The first section of this chapter is a short introduction to Data Mining. I fur-
ther demonstrate how this method can be used, and how it was used in this study.
In 5.1.2.1, I discuss how the results of the Data Mining analysis should be inter-
preted. The results take the form of decision trees, and are discussed in detail in
5.2, 5.3, and 5.4. Must and måste, which exhibit similar patterns of interpretation,
i.e. whose decision trees are similar with respect to the co-occurrence and the rank-
ing of the relevant features, are discussed together. The other two modals, may and
kan, are discussed separately, since they are distinct both from must and måste and
from each other with respect to the patterning of the features.
5.1 Data Mining

This section offers a brief introduction to Data Mining (henceforth DM)
and the Weka software1 used in this study. It draws heavily on Witten and
Frank (2000) and the extra material kindly provided by the authors. The
section also includes a demonstration of how DM works with a simple
1 The software can be downloaded free of charge from www.cs.waikato.ac.nz/ml/weka.

Chapter 5 Mining the modals
non-linguistic example, and provides details about the parts of the present
investigation where DM analysis was applied.
5.1.1 What is Data Mining?

One of the most general definitions of Data Mining is that it is “the extrac-
tion of implicit, previously unknown, and potentially useful information
from data” (Witten and Frank 2000: xix). This extraction is automated, i.e.
it is achieved with special computer programs and algorithms. DM pro-
duces structural descriptions that explicitly represent the patterns that have
emerged. These structural descriptions, in the form of diagrams and deci-
sion trees, can be used to gain insight into how the patterns were arrived at
and to predict the outcome in new situations.
The DM method used by the Weka software combines traditional sta-
tistical methods with machine learning methods. This enables not only il-
lustration and explanation, but also prediction in a way beneficial for the
researcher. Statistical tests are employed in machine learning algorithms
and in the evaluation of learning models (Witten and Frank 2000: 27).
As mentioned above, DM is based on machine learning techniques.
Witten and Frank provide an operational definition of machine learning:
“things learn when they change their behaviour in a way that makes them
perform better in the future” (Witten and Frank 2000: 6). In the present
context, this means that when put to the task of discovering patterns in the
data, the Weka software is able to improve on its performance, and pro-
duce a better description that can then be used for predictions about new
data.
This is achieved partly by means of tenfold cross-validation, illustrated
in Figure 1. Thus, the data is divided into ten equal parts, each of which is
further divided into ten parts. The computer program takes the first tenth
of the data (shaded portion of the left-hand column in Figure 1) and uses
nine tenths of it to learn (white portion of the right-hand column in Figure
1). After that, it tests its analysis on the remaining one tenth (shaded por-
tion of the right-hand column in Figure 1). The same procedure is repeated
for the remaining nine tenths of the data (left-hand column). The compu-
ter adjusts its analysis for each portion of the data it sifts through until it
cannot improve on its analysis any more. This guarantees accuracy of anal-
ysis even with relatively small data sets.

Figure 1. Tenfold cross-validation
The data sets to be analysed by Weka should be coded in a special format,

the ARFF format. One of the advantages of this format is its universality
and flexibility: one does not need to make different ARFF files for the same
data to solve different research problems. The output is the actual descrip-
tion of the patterns found in the data. The type of outcome description,
whether classification rules, association rules, or decision trees, is specified
by the researcher depending on the problem. The next section demon-
strates this principle on a simple non-linguistic example.
5.1.1.1 What can Data Mining do?

A classic example that illustrates what can be achieved with DM tech-
niques is the weather problem, a small, fictitious data set concerning con-
ditions for playing some underspecified outdoor game such as tennis or
football. The data set is represented in Table 1. Each row represents the
conditions present on a specific occasion, or instance, when the game in
question was or was not played. Each instance is characterized by a set of
features, or attributes: outlook, temperature, humidity, windy, and play.
These attributes have different values: outlook can be sunny, rainy, or over-
cast, for example. The outcome of every combination of attribute values is
whether to play or not. Any attribute or attribute value, however, can be
specified as an outcome by the researcher, depending on the focus of the
investigation. In this data set, all the attributes and their values are symbol-
ic, or nominal. DM algorithms can, of course, handle data with numeric
and mixed sets of attributes. Such attributes, however, will not be consid-
ered here, since the linguistic attributes of relevance to the present study
are nominal.

Table 1. The weather data set (adapted from Witten and Frank 2000: 9)
Outlook Temperature Humidity Windy Play

Sunny Hot High False No
Sunny Hot High True No
Overcast Hot High False Yes
Rainy Mild High False Yes
… … … … …
If one is interested in classifying instances on the basis of one attribute,

such as whether to play or not, the computer can provide lists of classifica-
tion rules. With classification rules “[t]he antecedent, or precondition, of a
rule is a series of tests […], while the consequent, or conclusion, gives the
class that applies to instances covered by this rule, or perhaps a probability
distribution over the classes” (Witten and Frank 2000: 59). The set of clas-
sification rules that apply to the weather data may look like the list in Table
2.
Table 2. Classification rules for weather data (adapted from Witten and Frank 2000: 9)
If outlook = sunny and humidity = high, then play = no

If outlook = rainy and windy = true, then play = no
If outlook = overcast, then play = yes
If humidity = normal, then play = yes
If none of the above, then play = yes
These rules are meant to be interpreted as an ordered set: the first one first,
and if it does not apply, the second, and so on. In isolation some rules may
provide a false classification. Nevertheless, since the structural description
provided by the computer is explicit, it can be used to predict the outcome
in new situations. It can also be used to explain how the decision in ques-
tion was reached.
Another possibility is to ask for the association rules, rules that specify
the associations and connections between any of the attributes and at-
tribute values. Unlike classification rules, association rules are not meant
to be interpreted as a set. They “express different regularities that underlie
the data set, and they generally predict different things” (Witten and Frank
2000: 63). The list of association rules for the weather data is illustrated in
Table 3.

Table 3. Association rules for the weather data

(adapted from Witten and Frank 2000: 10-11)
If temperature = cool, then humidity = normal

If humidity =normal and windy = false, then play = yes
If outlook = sunny and play = no, then humidity = high
If windy = false and play = no, then outlook = sunny and humidity = high
The Weka software also allows for cluster analysis of a more traditional
type. When the computer learns clustering patterns in the data, “the out-
come takes form of a diagram that shows how the instances fall into clus-
ters” (Witten and Frank 2000: 75). Unfortunately, the weather data set is
too small to demonstrate clustering satisfactorily.
The underlying patterns in the data can also be demonstrated by means
of decision trees. Decision trees are similar to classification rules: they dem-
onstrate the series of subsequent tests that the data undergo for the com-
puter to arrive at a classification. The decision tree for the weather data set
is given in Figure 2.
Figure 2. The decision tree for the weather data set

(adapted from Witten and Frank 2000: 92)
The tree in Figure 2 should be read as follows: if outlook is sunny and hu-
midity is high, the game is not played; if outlook is sunny and humidity is
normal, the game is played; if outlook is overcast, the game is played, etc.
In many cases, decision trees are a concise and illustrative way of repre-
sentation. Each node in a tree represents the test of a particular attribute
or attribute value. Leaves assign classification to the instances that comply
with the tests that lead to this classification. Any unknown instance is rout-
ed down the tree and goes through the series of tests specified in the layout

of the tree. Usually, when attributes have nominal values, as in the case of
the weather data, the number of branches that spring from a particular
node, testing a particular attribute, equals the number of possible values
for the attribute.
5.1.2 The use of DM techniques in the present investigation2

The main question this study strives to answer is what enables interlocu-
tors to (de)code a modal utterance so as to recover the intended interpre-
tation. In Chapter 4, I argued that the features related to the compositional
notion of Controllability provide reliable clues for interpretation. Combi-
nations of these features direct the interpreters to certain assumptions
about the nature of the agent, the source of the deontic force, the potential
immutability of the situation described. This, in turn, leads to the recovery
of the intended interpretation of a modal utterance. The exact nature of
these assumptions may be difficult to retrieve. This could be the reason for
the shortcomings of Papafragou’s (1998, 2000) analysis (see 2.2). As
Gumperz (1992) points out, “inferences are subconsciously made so that
[…] they are not readily accessible to recall. It is therefore difficult to elicit
information about the grounds upon which particular inferences are made
through direct questioning” (Gumperz 1992: 232). The use of DM is one
way of recovering the statistically significant patterns of interpretation. In
addition, the way the results are presented in this study may also reflect the
way Controllability is coded in English and Swedish, i.e. the decision
chains represent the possible combinations of the relevant features.
The use of DM does not preclude the use of traditional linguistic meth-
ods. In fact, to compile the ARFF files necessary for conducting a DM
analysis of the collected corpus data, a great deal of linguistic work had to
be done first. In this study, excerpted examples containing must, may,
måste, and kan were analysed in context as epistemic, weak epistemic, non-
epistemic (deontic, dynamic), or indeterminate. A database containing all
the examples and their contexts was compiled. This involved establishing
the occurrence of certain semantic features in each example (starting with
the ones presented in Coates 1983) and correlating these occurrences with
2 My sincere thanks to Jennifer Spenader, who first pointed out to me the potential usefulness of
the Weka software, and to Lars Jönsson, Outpost Design, Växjö, who kindly and patiently helped me
with the technical side of the DM analysis presented here.

the interpretation of each example in the corpus (see Wärnsby 2004 and
Chapter 3 of this study). The list of the relevant features is as follows: 3
• Interpretation: epistemic, weak epistemic, deontic, indeterminate

• Adverbial particle: yes, no
• Subject: animate, specific, generic, introductory
• Person: 1st, 2nd, 3rd
• Verb: event, state
• Aspect: simple, perfect, progressive
• Time reference for modality (with respect to the time of the utterance): past, present,
future
• Time reference for proposition (with respect to the modality expressed): anterior,
simultaneous, posterior
• Situation: telic, atelic
• Negation: of modality, of proposition
• Voice: passive
• Condition: explicit, implicit
• Type of utterance: assertive, non-assertive, exclamation
• Controllability
These features constituted the 20 nominal attributes encoded in the ARFF

files providing the basis for the DM analysis of the data.
One way of ensuring the correctness of the results of the DM analysis
was to go back to the data and try to find examples for each classification
made by the computer. Thus, in the discussion that follows, I only address
the attested classifications. To ensure that the results are not skewed by any
preconceived notions on my part, the attributes in the ARFF file were not
linked in any way. This is why some decision chains display not only com-
binations of features not attested in the data, but also combinations impos-
sible in normal language use. For instance, the feature no subject, which in-
dicates the presence of an introductory subject, sometimes appeared in the
same decision chain as the feature animate subject, since the computer
failed to realise that these features are mutually exclusive. Another recur-
ring error is the analysis of some utterances with no aspectual modification
as having anterior time reference for the proposition, an option not avail-
able for infinitival constructions in English and Swedish. These types of
faulty links are disregarded in the discussion. This should not be seen as a
weakness of the study, however, but as a result of trying to produce a model
as statistically accurate as possible. In an effort to achieve this goal, Con-
trollability was considered a feature on par with its constituent features, all
of which were attributed a value.
3 The reasons for the inclusion of these particular features are given in Chapter 4.

The sections that follow describe how this investigation was conducted
and explain the statistical terms used by Weka.
5.1.2.1 J48 learning algorithm

One of the learning algorithms available in Weka, the J48 learning algo-
rithm, was chosen for the analysis of the data. The outcome of this algo-
rithm is a decision tree, an increasingly popular DM technique considered
particularly suitable for the present study.
A decision tree is a simple, easily visualized representation of the pat-
terns in the data. It combines a description of the elicited patterns and a
potential prediction of the outcome on new data. Decision trees also indi-
cate the associations and combinations of attributes through the decision
chains leading to terminal leaves.
One of the great advantages of the decision tree model is that it provides
a ranking of the attributes used in a test. The attributes that by themselves
contribute to the statistical accuracy of the model are located close to the
root of the tree, while those that do so in combination with other attributes
appear further away; the distance depends on the length of the decision
tree.
Decision trees are the most common model used for classification, also
the task of the present investigation, which assigns a class, or an interpre-
tation, to examples exhibiting similar properties in terms of particular
combinations of pre-defined features. The resulting decision trees were
pruned, i.e. all the branches that did not improve on the statistical accuracy
of the model were automatically removed. Furthermore, the data files pro-
duced by the J48 learning algorithm were converted by the program
Graphviz into graphic representations of the decision trees (Figures 3-7).
5.1.2.2 Interpreting results

In addition to the decision trees, the computer also reported a number of
statistical measurements reflecting the success rate of the learning process:
Kappa statistic, True Positive (TP) rate, False Positive (FP) rate, Precision, and
F-measure.4 Short definitions of these terms are provided below based on
the results of the investigation of must.
The summary provided by the computer after the analysis was conclud-
ed (see Table 4) contains information that can be used to validate the re-
4 Many thanks to Joost van de Weijer for the enlightening discussion on these and other
statistical matters.

sults. The computer reports how many instances were correctly and incor-
rectly classified, both in numerical form and in percentages, as well as how
many instances were tested. There is other statistical information of which
the Kappa statistic is the most important one for classification tasks such as
the one undertaken here. The other measures displayed in Table 4 are used
mainly for numeric prediction and are not discussed here.
Table 4. Statistical measurements for must test, summary
=== Summary ===
Correctly Classified Instances 445 96.5293 %
Incorrectly Classified Instances 16 3.4707 %
Kappa statistic 0.9253
Mean absolute error 0.0329
Root mean squared error 0.1312
Relative absolute error 13.9446 %
Root relative squared error 38.2823 %
Total Number of Instances 461
A different way to display the results obtained by the computer is a confu-

sion matrix.
Table 5. Statistical measurements for must test, confusion matrix
=== Confusion Matrix ===
a b c d <-- classified as
157 0 5 0 | a = epistemic
1 0 1 0 | b = epistemicW
6 0 288 0 | c = deontic
1 0 2 0 | d = indeterminate

A confusion matrix illustrates how accurate the computer was in assigning

the instances to different classes relative to their true status, i.e. the class
previously assigned to them by the researcher. In a confusion matrix, each
class is assigned a row and a column: “each matrix element shows the
number of test examples for which the actual class is a row and the predicted
class is a column; good results correspond to large numbers down the main
diagonal5 and small, ideally zero, off-diagonal elements” (Witten and
Frank 2000: 138). The confusion matrix for the must data tells us that 157
instances of ‘a’ (epistemic) were correctly classified as ‘a’ (epistemic). Five
instances of ‘a’ (epistemic) were incorrectly classified as ‘c’ (deontic) and
one was analysed as ‘b’ (weak epistemic). One instance of ‘c’ (deontic) was
analysed as ‘b’ (weak epistemic). Also, 288 instances of ‘c’ (deontic) were
correctly classified as ‘c’ (deontic), while six were incorrectly classified as ‘a’
(epistemic). One instance of ‘a’ (epistemic) was analysed as ‘d’ (indetermi-
nate) as were two instances of ‘c’ (deontic). This should be interpreted as a
sign of successful analysis, according to Witten and Frank’s (2000) descrip-
tion of how confusion matrixes should be read. Other statistical measures,
the so-called agreement measures, of the computer’s success or failure can
also be derived from a confusion matrix: Kappa statistic measure, TP rate,
FP rate, Precision, Recall, and F-measure.
The Kappa statistic measure reports the agreement of the computer anal-
ysis with that of the researcher with respect to class (here the interpreta-
tion).6 There is agreement between the computer’s analysis and the re-
searcher in 445 instances (see the main diagonal in bold in Table 5). The
expected degree of agreement is calculated from the expected frequencies on
the diagonal, which are equal to the sum of the products of the row and
the column totals divided by the grand total. For instance, the expected
agreement for the first cell on the diagonal is (162x165) / 461=57.983.
The expected number for the second and forth cells is zero. For the third
cell on the diagonal, it is (296x294) / 461=188.772. The Kappa statistic is
then calculated as follows:
k = (sum observed – sum expected) / (grand total – sum expected)

k = (445-246.753) / (461-246.753) = 0.9253
An agreement measure of 1.0 indicates a perfect correlation between the

model and the actual values, whereas a measure of 0.0 indicates that the
model does not correlate to the actual values. Any measure above 0.7 is
5 In Table 5 the main diagonal is in bold.

6 More information is found in http://web.uccs.edu/lbeckser/SPSS/ctabk.htlm.

considered a good statistical correlation between the model and the actual
values. In the case of the must data, the Kappa statistic measures 0.9253.
This indicates that the model produced by the DM analysis is accurate to
a large extent.
Table 6. Statistical measurements for must test, detailed accuracy by class
=== Detailed Accuracy By Class ===
TP Rate FP Rate Precision Recall F-Measure Class
0.969 0.027 0.952 0.969 0.96 epistemic
0 0 0 0 0 epistemicW
0.98 0.048 0.973 0.98 0.976 deontic
0 0 0 0 0 indeterminate
The computer also provides details about the accuracy of the analysis with
respect to each class, as demonstrated in Table 6. True Positive (TP) rate in-
dicates the proportion of the instances analysed as belonging to class x and
all the instances that truly belong to class x. TP rate is equivalent to Recall
measure and is calculated as follows:
TP rate = the number of correctly classified instances / the total number of

instances within this class
TP rate = 157/162 = 0.969
In the must data, the proportion of the instances analysed as epistemic and
the instances that are truly epistemic is approximately 0.97. This indicates
that the computer is successful in its analysis of epistemic examples in my
data.
False Positive (FP) rate is a mirror measurement of TP rate: it indicates
the proportion of the instances falsely analysed as belonging to class x with
respect to all the instances that do not belong to class x.
FP rate = the number of incorrectly classified instances as x/the total number

of instances that are not x
FP rate = 9/291 = 0.027

The proportion of non-epistemic examples analysed by Weka as being

epistemic in relation to all the non-epistemic examples in the must data is
0.027. This indicates that the computer generally did not make mistakes
in identifying non-epistemic examples in my data.
Further information may be gathered from a Precision measure, which
indicates the number of instances that truly belong to class x relative to all
the instances classified as class x. This is a measure of how well the compu-
ter performed the task of classification. In the confusion matrix, for exam-
ple, the computer classified 165 instances as epistemic and 157 of those
were truly epistemic. Precision is calculated as follows:
Precision = the number of correctly classified instances of class x / the total

number of instances classified as x
Precision = 157/165 = 0.952
In the must data, Precision for epistemic examples measures 0.952: over 95
per cent of all epistemic examples were identified by the computer as such.
F-measure is a combined measure of Precision and Recall, and is useful
for specialists who wish to evaluate the performance of the computer pro-
gram or the algorithm used for the analysis. It is more or less an average 7
of the Precision and Recall measures. It is calculated according to the fol-
lowing formula:
F-measure = (2 x Precision x Recall) / ( Precision + Recall)

F-measure = (2 x 0.952 x 0.959) / (0.952 + 0.969) = 1.844 / 1.921 = 0.960
5.2 (De)coding confident inference and

obligation
As argued in 1.2.3, both must and måste are located on the far left of the
epistemic and deontic scales. Consequently, epistemic utterances contain-
ing these modals reflect confident inference on the part of the speaker that
a certain state of affairs holds. Deontic utterances, on the other hand, in-
dicate that the speaker recommends or imposes an obligation on the ad-
dressee to carry out the action specified in the proposition. Non-directed
deontic utterances indicate that the state of affairs specified in the propo-
7 This is a harmonic mean, a way of calculating mean values less sensitive to the value variations of
its components than the arithmetic mean ((x+y)/2).

sition necessarily holds true under certain circumstances. The similarities

between the possible range of interpretations of the two modals are seen as
a prerequisite for further investigation of the contexts in which they ap-
pear. Chapter 3 established a certain systematicity regarding the correla-
tion of epistemic and deontic interpretations and context. This section
seeks to reveal further correlation between certain features and the inter-
pretation of an utterance. It also seeks to illuminate the co-occurrence pat-
terns for the features in my data.
5.2.1 The must file

The must file run through Weka in order to produce the decision tree in
Figure 3, which contains the patterns underlying the data set, contains 461
examples. The decision tree produced by the computer is a good structural
representation of the patterns in the data: it accurately analyses 445 in-
stances, or 96.5 per cent of the data, and incorrectly predicts only 16 ex-
amples, or 3.5 per cent of the data.
Further, the Kappa statistic value is 0.9253,8 which indicates that the
model compiled with the help of the J48 learning algorithm is statistically
accurate, i.e. it corresponds to a high degree to the actual values initially
assigned to the data. The computer was equally successful in learning to
identify both deontic and epistemic utterances. The TP rate and the Preci-
sion measures for the epistemic examples are 0.969 and 0.952, respectively,
which indicates that over 90 per cent of all epistemic examples were iden-
tified as such. For deontic examples, the TP rate measures 0.98 and Preci-
sion is assessed at 0.973. Again, this indicates that over 90 per cent of all
deontic examples were analysed as such.
Of the 16 examples incorrectly analysed by Weka,9 two are weak epis-
temic and three are indeterminate: the computer completely failed to iden-
tify the few weak epistemic and indeterminate examples in my data. These
errors may indicate that the computer failed to learn how to analyse these
examples, since they are poorly attested in the data. This hypothesis is sup-
ported by the fact that of the 162 epistemic examples in my data, only five
were falsely identified as deontic. Also, of the 294 deontic examples, only
six were falsely identified as epistemic. Not surprisingly, in cases where the
computer had a relatively large set of examples to learn from, the success
rate is much higher.
8 The actual source of these figures is in Appendix I.
9 See confusion matrix in Appendix I for further detail.

5.2.1.1 The decision tree for must

As mentioned above, the decision tree for must is an accurate model of the
patterns underlying the data set. The features crucial for the computer’s
classification of an example as epistemic or deontic are: aspectual modifica-
tion, time reference for the proposition, type of main verb, presence of an expli-
cit condition, presence of an implicit condition, and generic subject (see Figure
3). Note that the features central to the notion of Controllability appear
closest to the root of the tree.10
Figure 3. The decision tree for must
The order of the appearance of the features in the decision tree reflects their
ranking in terms of statistical importance for the interpretation. The fea-
10 Note that the tree is upside-down, i.e. the root node is the topmost in the tree.

tures close to the root are decisive for the interpretation by themselves. The
features close to the top of the tree, on the other hand, are decisive only in
combination with other features. This is reflected in the varying length of
the decision chains prior to classification. The decision chains are formed
by the non-final nodes in the tree leading to the final classification. One of
the decision chains in the must tree is aspectual modification – time reference
– type of verb: the computer probes for aspectual modification and finds the
utterance not aspectually modified; next it examines the time reference for
the proposition and finds that it is simultaneous with the time of the ut-
terance; it then proceeds to study the type of main verb in the utterance
and finds it is an event verb. This chain of tests or decisions leads to the
classification of an utterance as deontic. In what follows, these decision
chains are discussed in more detail, and the reader is referred the decision
tree in Figure 3.
Aspectual modification seems to be decisive for interpretation. The
computer made no mistakes in assigning epistemic interpretation to the
examples modified by perfect and progressive aspect: 91 and 8 examples,
respectively, were correctly analysed as epistemic. However, as discussed in
Chapter 3, it is possible to construct aspectually modified utterances that
are not interpreted epistemically. The decisive feature in these cases is the
time reference for the proposition. Utterances modified by perfect aspect
with posterior time reference are not interpreted epistemically, unlike ut-
terances with anterior time reference, as illustrated by (1) and (2), respec-
tively.
(1) You must have cooked the stew by tonight, otherwise there will be no supper.
Deontic
(2) They must have been flesh and blood, even though they lived God knows how long
ago. (BR) Epistemic
Time reference for the proposition is also relevant in utterances with pro-
gressive aspect: simultaneous time reference normally demotes a deontic
interpretation and promotes an epistemic one.
(3) You must be making cookies for tonight, (you have flour all over your face).
Epistemic
This means that the model produced by the computer does not accurately
reflect the actual possible relationships between the interpretation, the
time reference for the proposition, and aspectual modification. This is the

result of the chosen method of investigation, the fact that the corpus data
reflect only language in use (see the discussion in 1.3.1). The model may
be skewed, because it is based on a relatively small language sample, which
happens not to contain examples of the relevant kind: there were no exam-
ples in the data modified by perfect aspect that also refer to a point in time
posterior to the time of modality. There are also no examples of sentences
containing must and progressive aspect that refer to a point in time not si-
multaneous with the time of modality.
The model should, therefore, be revised to consider the time reference
for the proposition a decisive feature, one that should be placed at the root
of the tree. This would better reflect language structure instead of simply a
language sample. Aspectual modification may not be considered of crucial
importance for the interpretation, or it may be shown to influence the in-
terpretation in combination with other features such as anterior time ref-
erence for the proposition. Further tests on other samples of language, in
which the examples are more proportionally distributed, are probably
needed to determine the exact positioning of these features in the decision
tree. The relevance of aspectual modification to the notion of Controlla-
bility cannot be disputed, however, since it relates both to the stativity of
the situation described by the proposition and the time reference for the
proposition so as to indicate lack of control on the part of an intended
agent.
Bearing this in mind, let us consider the results of the DM analysis re-
garding time reference. The majority of the examples with posterior time
reference for the proposition (and no aspectual modification), namely 212,
were correctly identified as deontic.
(4) First, I must stop thinking like a salesman and not do any kind of pushy selling. (AH)
Deontic
(5) “All of you must pay for the damages!” he screeched. (BO) Deontic
(6) She must reassemble herself in her own head as an ordinary, faithful wife to which
untoward events did not occur. (FW) Deontic
The deontic examples in (4) through (6) all exhibit posterior time refer-
ence in relation to the modality expressed, although they vary with respect
to the presence of other features. In (4), the subject/speaker is 1st person
singular and the time for modality is present, i.e. simultaneous with the
time of the utterance. The obligation not to act in a certain way stems from
the speaker himself, probably as a result of the pressure of external circum-

stances. In (5), on the other hand, it is the speaker who, during the mo-
ment of speech, imposes an obligation on the addressees to pay for the
damages. In (6), the source of the obligation is not made explicit, and the
subject is 3rd person singular. The time reference for modality, however, is
shifted towards the past in this example, since the whole narration is situ-
ated in the past and the events described by the author have already hap-
pened.11 Despite these differences in their contextual layout, (4)-(6) all
have deontic interpretations. As discussed earlier, I attribute this fact to the
combination of the posterior time reference and the modal force of must:
one is unlikely to make confident inferences about the future, or, in Papa-
fragou’s (2000) terms, it can be difficult to establish a relationship of en-
tailment between the proposition and the relevant domain.
Examples with anterior time reference for the proposition are identified
as epistemic.
(7) He told [Campsall] that I must be mistaken. (RL) Epistemic
In English, contrary to what we will later observe in the Swedish examples,

anterior time reference for the proposition without aspectual modification
is rare and appears mostly in fragments of indirect speech, as in (7): the
narrator was mistaken for some time before he was reported mistaken (and
was possibly not taken out of his delusion until some time after the report).
In this example, the lexical meaning of be mistaken demotes the deontic in-
terpretation regardless of all other contextual features, i.e. it is impossible
to force somebody to be mistaken. Moreover, logically, anterior time refer-
ence for the proposition demotes (directed) deontic interpretation, since it
is not felicitous to give an order about something that has already hap-
pened.
The same should be true of utterances that have simultaneous time ref-
erence for the proposition with respect to the modality expressed: it is in-
felicitous to give orders to carry out an action that is already in progress. 12
However, this is not supported by the data.
11 Normally, must, unlike Swedish måste, is not used to express past necessity and is usually replaced
by had to. Example (6) is to be understood in such a way that the necessity to reassemble herself […] as
a faithful wife […] may have existed also some time after the utterance. A similar reading is available
for (7).
12 It is, of course, possible to imagine a situation where the speaker wishes to save face and gives an
order for the addressee to carry out an action already in progress. Such utterances, however, cannot be
considered genuine orders or commands.

(8) They must take from the soil and the forest in order to live, but their taking does
not improve their lives; in areas such as the Ethiopian highlands it may not even
keep them alive. (LT) Deontic
In (8), the time reference for the proposition is simultaneous with the time
of modality. The utterance is interpreted deontically despite the fact that
the proposition is recurring at the point in time indicated by the utterance:
the indigenous people (they, the subject of this clause) continuously “take
from the soil and the forest”, which is also indicated by the second main
clause which describes the consequences of their taking. On closer exami-
nation, however, this utterance is non-directed deontic: no one gave an or-
der for this habitual action to take place. Instead, the action was actualized
under the pressure of external circumstances, indicated by the presence of
an explicit condition in order to live. Further, the main predicate is the
event verb take. It is the presence of an event predicate that, together with
the explicit condition in (8), promotes a deontic interpretation in utter-
ances with propositions that are simultaneous with the time of modality
and contain no aspectual modification. This is possible, since the presence
of an event verb does not prevent (even if it does not directly encourage)
the interpretation of the proposition as applicable both now, at the time of
the utterance and in the near future. If this is the case, such utterances are
similar to the ones with posterior time reference for the proposition dis-
cussed above.
For utterances with (i) simultaneous time reference for the proposition,
(ii) no aspectual modification, and (iii) a state verb, the computer indicated
that further tests are needed to establish the interpretation. The next fea-
ture the computer tests for is the presence of an explicit or implicit condi-
tion in the immediate or near context of the utterance. The importance of
this feature for the interpretation is discussed at length in 4.1.4.
(9) The most obvious clue to its presence is its movement, so in order for its camouflage
to work it must be prepared to remain very still for long periods of time, or at least
to alter its position very slowly and gently. (DM) Deontic
(10) The farmers concerned must have the skill and resources necessary for the
management of land and cattle. (LT) Deontic
Both (9) and (10) correspond to the description above: the time reference
is simultaneous, the main predicate is stative, and there is no aspectual
modification. Both also contain a condition. In (9), the condition is expli-
cit: if the animal’s camouflage is to work, it must necessarily be still. In
(10), the condition is implicit: the farmers must have certain skills and re-

sources to be able to run their farms in an environmentally friendly way. It

is the presence of the explicit and implicit conditions in (9) and (10), re-
spectively, that promotes deontic interpretation. These examples are both
non-directed deontic, i.e. the pressure of some external circumstances is in-
dicated in the consequent of the conditional statement. Note that, as dis-
cussed in 4.1.4, the time reference for the proposition in these examples
can also be considered posterior, since the conditions apply both at the
time of modality and in the future. The appearance of this feature in the
decision tree is therefore not surprising.
When a condition is not present in the propositional or situational con-
text of an utterance, the presence of a generic subject becomes important.
(11) A man must be able to hold his drink because drunkenness is sometimes necessary
in this difficult life. (BO) Deontic
All examples such as (11) contain a non-specific generic subject. The de-
ontic interpretation in such cases stems from a combination of the follow-
ing features: (i) simultaneous time reference for the proposition, (ii) no as-
pectual modification, (iii) state predicate, (iv) non-specific generic subject,
and (v) the modal force of must (see Papafragou’s (2000) account of the
meanings of must and may in 2.2). Although, for technical reasons, generic
examples have been analysed as having simultaneous time reference for the
proposition, this is not completely accurate (see the discussion in 4.1.1).
Utterances with a simultaneous time reference for the proposition and a
state predicate, as in (11), indicate an ongoing state of affairs. In this ex-
ample, however, a man’s ability to hold his drink is necessary both at the
time of the utterance and in some possible future situations. Because of the
generic reference, the utterance denotes what Huddleston and Pullum
(2002: 406-407) refer to as “unlimited state”, i.e. not only is the situation
described in the proposition considered stative, but it also has unlimited
duration. We also have to consider the possible interpretations of must: ei-
ther confident inference or obligation. The presence of a non-specific ge-
neric subject demotes epistemic interpretation in these cases simply be-
cause one is not likely to make a confident inference about this kind of sub-
ject. In combination with must, such generic statements are interpreted as
rules or regulations or simply states of affairs that necessarily exist. Also, the
modal force of must in combination with a non-specific generic subject in-
dicates that the state of affairs described in the proposition holds not only
at the time of the utterance, but also in future situations. This makes these

utterances similar to utterances with posterior time reference for the prop-
osition.
5.2.2 The måste file

The måste file run through Weka contains 1,017 examples. The decision
tree produced by the computer after running the J48 learning algorithm is
a good structural representation of the patterns underlying the data set: it
correctly analyses 958 examples, or 94.2 per cent of the data, and incor-
rectly predicts only 59 examples, or 5.8 per cent of the data (see Appendix
II).
Moreover, the Kappa statistic value, although slightly lower than for the
must file, still measures a satisfactory 0.7802. This indicates that the model
is statistically accurate: it corresponds to a high degree to the actual values
initially assigned to the data. The computer was also successful in identify-
ing deontic examples, with TP rate and Precision at 0.968 and 0.965, re-
spectively: over 90 per cent of all deontic examples in the data were cor-
rectly analysed. Epistemic examples were identified correctly in over 80 per
cent of the instances with TP rate and Precision measuring 0.826 and
0.8215, respectively. The relatively lower accuracy with epistemic examples
may relate to the fact that such examples are not well represented in the
data set (there are only 155 epistemic examples in the data and 857 deontic
ones). The accuracy of the analysis of epistemic examples may increase in
a data set where the interpretations are distributed more evenly.
Of the 59 examples incorrectly analysed by Weka, 27 are epistemic (out
of 155 epistemic instances), 27 are deontic (out of 857 deontic instances),
and five are indeterminate, i.e. none of the indeterminate examples in the
data were identified as such. The computer may have failed in its analysis
of the indeterminate examples because they are statistically poorly attested
in the data. As just mentioned, the relatively high number of incorrectly
identified epistemic examples may also be attributed to their statistical un-
derrepresentation in the data set.
5.2.2.1 The decision tree for måste

The features crucial for the computer’s classification of the examples as be-
ing epistemic or deontic are: aspectual modification, type of main verb, time
reference for the proposition, presence of an implicit condition, presence of an
explicit condition, specificity of the subject, time reference for modality, generic

subject, animacy of the subject and situation type (telic or atelic) (see Figure
4). As discussed in connection to must, not only are most features in the
tree central to Controllability, but the order of these features reflects their
ranking in terms of statistical importance for the interpretation. The fea-
tures close to the root are more important for the interpretation while the
features appearing further down in the tree influence the interpretation
only in combination with other features, which is reflected in the varying
length of the decision chains.
Figure 4. The decision tree for måste
In the discussion that follows, the reader is referred to the decision tree in
Figure 4.

Not surprisingly, aspectual modification is considered to be a decisive

feature in the decision tree for måste. However, as discussed in Chapter 3,
the fact that no examples of deontic utterances modified by perfect aspect
were found in the corpus is a coincidence, and no far-reaching conclusions
can be drawn on the basis of it. Utterances modified by the perfect aspect
with non-epistemic interpretation are fully grammatical. The difference
between these two types of utterances lies, as demonstrated in Chapter 3,
in the time reference for the proposition.
(12) Du måste ha lagat mat innan nio, annars blir vi hungriga.

you MOD have-INF cook-PART food before nine or become-PRES we hungry-PL
‘You must have cooked the food before nine, or we will be hungry.’ Deontic
(13) I så fall måste det ha varit vapen till IRA. (BL)

in so case MOD it have-INF be-PART weapon to IRA
‘In that case the weapons must have been meant for the IRA.’ Epistemic
In the non-epistemic (12), the time reference for the proposition is shifted
towards the future due to the presence of the time adverbial innan nio (‘be-
fore nine’). In the epistemic (13), on the other hand, the time reference for
the proposition is anterior to the time of the utterance. Thus, the time refer-
ence for the proposition is a feature of great importance in these utterances.
As we saw in 4.1, there are various ways to code time reference for the prop-
osition, from aspectual modification to explicit and implicit conditions. The
fact that the computer was unable to reflect this in its analysis must be attri-
buted to the fact that it was presented with a relatively small data sample. No
examples modified by perfect aspect in the data have a time reference other
than anterior. Once again, the exact positioning of these features in relation
to each other in a decision tree requires further tests.
Type of main predicate is a feature to consider in utterances not modi-
fied by perfect aspect in Swedish. Of the 719 utterances containing an
event verb only 20 were (falsely) analysed as epistemic.
(14) Själv måste jag gå ut i vedboden och utfodra dvärgarna. (APR) Deontic
self MOD I go out in woodshed-DEF and feed-INF dwarfs-DEF
‘I must go out to the woodshed and feed the dwarfs.’
(15) Om hon inte finns där så måste nån förr eller senare börja
If she NEG exist-PRES there so MOD somebody before or later begin-INF

sakna henne. (HM) Epistemic

miss-INF her
‘If she is not on that list, someone is going to miss her sooner or later.’
Example (14) is a typical deontic utterance. The subject is animate and

specific, in full control of his actions. The time reference for the proposi-
tion is posterior to the time of the utterance, whereas the time reference for
modality is simultaneous with the time of the utterance. The only ambi-
guity (due to the lack of context) is who or what constitutes the deontic
source in this utterance: whether it is the subject himself who finds it ne-
cessary to go and feed the dwarfs, whether he reports on the request or or-
der received from a third party, or whether the necessity is circumstantial
and arises from the subject’s general knowledge that dwarfs are, for exam-
ple, difficult to handle when hungry.
Example (15), on the other hand, although similar to (14) with respect
to the features present, is interpreted as epistemic. The contextual diffe-
rence that prompts this is the fact that the subject of (15), nån ‘somebody’,
is non-specific. This effectively demotes the deontic interpretation, since
one is unlikely to give an order without somebody specific to give the order
to.13 Another contributing factor is that the main predicate börja sakna
‘start missing’ denotes an involuntary action of which no subject, whether
specific or not, has control. When a person is missing, there is usually
somebody (a friend, a family member, or a neighbour) who will sooner or
later notice it. Therefore, the police officer in (15) makes a confident pre-
diction based on previous experience and general world knowledge. This
results in the utterance being interpreted epistemically. In all 20 epistemic
examples containing an event predicate, the context, whether linguistic or
situational, provides clues for the interpretation, clearly indicating lack of
agent control.
The second group of examples analysed as deontic are those in which
the verb is omitted. These utterances seem to be characteristic of Germanic
languages. Constructions of this type can be found in the Scandinavian
languages, contemporary German, and Dutch (Eide 2002: 27). Although
not available in Present Day English (PDE), utterances like these were fre-
quent in the Early Modern English and Modern English periods, and can
be found as early as the 14th century.
13 See also the discussion of the influence of this type of subjects on the interpretation in 4.1.1.

(16) Allas vnto the Barbre nacion I moste anon. (Chaucer Man of Law’s tale 282)14
alas into the Barbaric nation I MOD immediately
‘Alas, to the Barbaric nation I must depart immediately.’15
In Norwegian, these examples are invariably deontic. Eide (2002: 308)

suggests that examples like (17) are deontic because the bracketed non-ver-
bal complement is a mere proposition, not an assertion, since it lacks a
tense element. Further, she claims that only assertions have truth value and
can thus be qualified by an epistemic modal.
(17) Mariti skal [ti hjem]. Eide (2002: 308)

Marit shall home
‘Marit intends to go home.’
Examples like (17), containing either a directional adverbial or a particle

without a main verb, are also frequent in Swedish. The main verb is easily
recovered from the context and is usually a basic motion verb such as gå
(‘walk’), komma (‘come’), åka (‘ride, travel, go’), etc. Germanic languages
in general seem to have an elaborate system of encoding directionality by
using particles. In line with Slobin’s (1996) suggestion of “thinking for
speaking”, i.e. the way in which speakers are prompted to express linguis-
tically those aspects of events or states that are grammatically coded in their
native languages, I suggest that it is because of the salience of such direc-
tionality expressions that speakers are able to process utterances like (17)
and (18) without the verb being explicitly present.
(18) Nu måste hon hem, annars skulle Mattis bli från vettet, det
now MOD she home otherwise MOD Mattis become-INF from sense-DEF it
visste hon. (AL) Deontic

know-PAST she
‘Now she must go home, otherwise, she knew Matt would be out of his mind.’
Except for the formally missing verb, all these utterances exhibit an array
of features typical of deontic interpretation: (i) a specific, animate and re-
sponsible subject; (ii) posterior time reference for the proposition; (iii) a
predicate, easily recoverable from the context, denoting an action or event
14 Example is taken from The Oxford English Dictionary (http://dictionary.oed.com).

15 My translation.

that can be controlled; and (iv) simultaneous time reference for modality
with regard to the time of the utterance.
In utterances where the predicate denotes a state, the difference in time
reference for the proposition may result in different interpretations.
(19) Hon ville leva med deras sånger, om hon så måste leva i
she want-PAST live-INF with their songs if she so MOD live-INF in
underjorden livet ut. (AL) Deontic

underground life-DEF out
‘She wanted to live with their songs, even if it meant spending the rest of her life
underground.’
(20) Men han måste veta vem hon menade för han frågade inte om.(KE)
but he MOD know-INF who she mean-PAST because he ask-PAST NEG again
‘He said nothing, but the must have known whom she meant because he didn’t ask
again.’ Epistemic
The utterance in (19) is deontic: the subject is (typically) animate, specific,

and in control of her actions, and the time reference for the proposition is
posterior to the time of the utterance. These two features seem to override
the fact that the predicate denotes a state (and as such is unlikely in a de-
ontic utterance) and promote a deontic interpretation of (19).
Simultaneous time reference for the proposition promotes epistemic in-
terpretation in utterances with a state predicate and no aspectual modifi-
cation, such as (20). A contributing factor here is that the main predicate
veta ‘know’ denotes an involuntary state, which as such is not subjected to
orders.16 The subject is specific, animate, and responsible, but this seems
to be of no consequence to the interpretation. There is no condition
present in the propositional or situational context of this utterance. More-
over, the situation described in the proposition is atelic. As in the case of
other utterances with simultaneous time reference, deontic interpretation
is demoted by the fact that it is impossible to felicitously give an order to
act on a proposition that has already been realised.17 The only possible in-
terpretation for these utterances is epistemic: the speaker expresses her
judgement about the existence of some past event or state.
16 See, however, the discussion of (92) in 3.3.2.

17 An apparent contradiction to this observation can be found in Swedish examples with past time
reference for modality. For further discussion see (67).

Generally, however, in utterances with simultaneous time reference for

the proposition a series of further tests must be conducted to determine the
interpretation. Two of these tests search for the presence of an implicit or
explicit condition in an utterance: if such a condition is found, the utter-
ance is classified as non-epistemic. As we saw in Chapter 3 and also in the
discussion of the decision tree for must, the presence of an implicit or ex-
plicit condition in an utterance promotes deontic interpretation.
When no condition is found in the context, the specificity of the subject
becomes an important factor. As argued above, in the discussion of (9)-
(11), non-specific generic subjects in combination with the modal force of
must and the modal force of måste, tend to promote deontic interpreta-
tions: the utterances are understood as all-applicable rules or recommen-
dations. This is supported empirically, since all eight examples in the data
with this particular combination of features18 are interpreted deontically,
as in (21).
(21) Därför måste konsumenter ha möjlighet att göra val, få

therefore MOD consumers have-INF possibility to do-INF choices get-INF
information, få veta vilka produkter som finns och vilka krav

information get-INF know-INF what products that exist and what demands
som kan ställas. (LI) Deontic

that MOD put-INF-PASS
‘Therefore, consumers must have the opportunity to make choices, to get

information and find out what products exist and what demands can be made.’
A generic subject expressed by a definite noun phrase will have the same
impact on the interpretation as the non-specific generic subjects. The ut-
terance will be interpreted as a rule or recommendation, hence deontically,
as in (22), which exhibits the same combination of features as (21) except
for the type of subject.
(22) Svenskarna måste också få vara med och bestämma. (HL) Deontic
swedes-DEF MOD also get-INF be-INF with and deside-INF
‘Swedes should also have a say in matters in their own town.’
18 All these examples are utterances with no aspectual modification but a state predicate, simultane-
ous time reference for the proposition, no implicit or explicit condition, and a non-specific subject.

In (14) and (15), the specificity of the subject seems to play a role in deter-
mining the interpretation: a non-specific subject promotes epistemic inter-
pretation in utterances without aspectual modification containing an event
predicate. This is also the case in utterances containing a (i) state predicate;
(ii) simultaneous time reference for the proposition; (iii) no implicit or ex-
plicit condition; and a (iv) non-specific and (v) non-generic subject. In my
data, these utterances all contain introductory subjects, as in (23), which
indirectly supports Coates’s (1983) claim that there is an association be-
tween the feature introductory subject and epistemic interpretation (see
also Chapter 3).
(23) Det måste vara femton år mellan er. (KE) Epistemic

it MOD be-INF fifteen years between you
‘There must be fifteen years between you.’
With specific subjects, on the other hand, the time reference for modality
comes into play. Present time reference does not seem to preclude either
deontic or epistemic interpretations, since, as we saw earlier, both modali-
ties are usually immediate to the time of the utterance. The speaker either
imposes an obligation or expresses her judgement about the proposition at
the time the utterance is articulated. To resolve this, the computer tested
for the presence of another feature, situation type, which can be telic or
atelic. It is logical that telic utterances tend to be interpreted as deontic. In-
deed, a telic action is the type of situation you can easily give an order
about. The telic utterances in question contain state predicates, but they
are such that one can give an order to carry them out (see (24)). Atelic ut-
terances, on the other hand, tend to be interpreted epistemically. Usually
the speaker expresses her opinion about a state, rather then giving an order
to carry it out.
(24) Detta måste komma in i diskussionen om en europeisk

this MOD come-INF in in discussion-DEF about a European
försvarsindustri. (ETHE) Deontic

defence-industry
‘This should be an element in any discussion on the European defence industry.’
(25) Du måste vara ny. (LG) Epistemic

you MOD be-INF new
‘You must be new.’

The deontic utterance in (24) (i) is not aspectually modified; (ii) contains
a state predicate;19 (iii) has a time reference for the proposition simultane-
ous with the time of the utterance; (iv) has an implicit condition present
in the context in order for the discussion to be comprehensive; (v) has a specific
subject; (vi) has a present time reference for the modality expressed; and
(vii) describes a telic situation. This combination of features led the com-
puter to its interpretation. The source of the deontic force is either in the
general circumstances that elevate the importance of a certain issue, or in
the desire of a third party to always bring that issue into the discussion.
Example (25) has the same features as (24), except for the type of situ-
ation: as typical of states, the situation is atelic. The speaker utters a confi-
dent conclusion (based on some circumstances unknown to us) that the
addressee is a new person in the situation. There is nothing in this utter-
ance that precludes the computer from interpreting it as epistemic.
Epistemic and deontic utterances with past time reference for the mo-
dality expressed exist both in English and Swedish in fragments of indirect
speech. However, only in Swedish are deontic utterances containing måste
with past time reference for modality found in direct speech. The feature
that is important for the interpretation of these utterances is type of sub-
ject: animate or inanimate.
(26) Biskoparna, som alla var svenskar, måste vara godkända av påven i
bishops-DEF that all be-PAST Swedish MOD be-INF approve-PART by pope in
Rom. (HL) Deontic

Rome
‘The bishops, all of whom were Swedish, had to be accredited by Rome.’
(27) Samtidigt måste meddelandet innebära att han inte stod i

simultaneously MOD message-DEF mean-INF that he NEG stand-PAST in
någon omedelbar fara. (KOB) Epistemic

some immediate danger
19 The particle verb komma in (‘come in’) is an event verb. However, here it is not the case that some-
thing will actually move into a physical space (note that the subject is inanimate). Instead, there are
several metaphors present in this utterance that prompt us to view the predicate as stative and the entire
utterance as deontic. Firstly, the discussion of the European defence industry is presented as a meta-
phorical space in which the contributions of different participants are situated. Secondly, this space is
seen as a dynamic construction site, since different views and opinions are constantly added. Finally,
some issues are so important as to be actively entered by the participants in this discussion (i.e. komma
in). This results in a rather odd combination of an event verb understood as a state predicate from a
formal point of view (‘This should be a part of discussion’) in a telic situation.

‘At the same time, the message implied that he was in no immediate danger.’
In (26), the utterance describes a past state of affairs, when the Pope in
Catholic Rome could influence the appointment of bishops in Sweden.
The necessity indicated by måste does not exist any longer and was dictated
by political circumstances in the past, i.e. it is a ‘past’ necessity. English
does not allow this option and the translator was forced to use the semi-
modal expression had to to convey the same meaning.20
Example (27) exhibits the same set of contextual features as (26), except
that it has an inanimate subject. There is no one who is interested in inter-
preting the message in a certain way. Thus, no deontic source is indicated.
The utterance reports on a conclusion made in the past (since the whole
narrative is situated in the past) based on some past circumstances that may
no longer be relevant. There is nothing in the contextual make-up of this
utterance that prevents an epistemic interpretation.
5.2.3 Must and måste combined

The decision trees produced by the computer for must and måste are good
representations of the patterns in the data, as demonstrated in the previous
sections. There are, however, differences in the two trees with respect to the
order of the relevant features, the length of certain decision chains, and the
fact that additional features appear in the decision tree for måste. Although
the feature aspectual modification appears at the root in both trees, the fea-
ture type of verb is juxtaposed in the måste tree with the feature time refer-
ence for the proposition, as are the features explicit and implicit condition. At
the top of the måste tree, new features appear: specificity of the subject, time
reference for modality, animacy of the subject, and telicity of the situation. The
presence of these additional features at the top of the måste tree, as well as
the slight difference in the ranking of the features at the bottom of the
trees, may reflect language-specific variations in coding Controllability. To
test the significance of these differences, a unified analysis of the data for
both must and måste, was conducted. Figure 5 displays the resulting deci-
sion tree.
The set of data for both modals contains 1,461 examples. The decision
tree produced by the computer is a good structural representation of the
patterns underlying the data: it accurately analyses 1,388 instances, or 95
20 See, however, examples (6) and (7).

per cent of the data, and incorrectly predicts only 73 examples, or 4.9 per
cent of the data (see Appendix III).
Figure 5. The decision tree for must and måste, combined
The Kappa statistic value is 0.856, which indicates a good statistical corre-
lation between the computer analysis and the actual values assigned to the
data. Also, the computer was successful in identifying both epistemic and
deontic utterances correctly. The TP rate and the Precision measures for
the epistemic examples are 0.902 and 0.888, respectively: about 90 per
cent of the epistemic examples were analysed as such. The TP rate and the
Precision measures for the deontic examples are 0.972 and 0.968, respec-
tively: over 90 per cent of the deontic utterances in the data were analysed
as deontic by the computer.
Of the 317 epistemic examples in the data set, 31 were incorrectly ana-
lysed as deontic. However, in its analysis of the 1,134 deontic examples,
the computer was incorrect only 32 times. This indicates that it was more
successful in classifying deontic examples than epistemic ones, possibly be-

cause the latter were not as well exemplified in the data, so the computer
had fewer instances to learn from. This hypothesis is also supported by the
fact that, of the eight indeterminate examples, three were analysed as epis-
temic and the rest were considered deontic. This is also true of the two
weak epistemic examples: one was analysed as epistemic and the other as
deontic. Clearly, the computer is more successful when presented with
large sets of data to learn from.
5.3 (De)coding possible conclusion and

permission: may
I argued in 1.2.3 that epistemic utterances containing may express possible
conclusions drawn by the speaker on the basis of some evidence that the
actions or states conveyed in the proposition are, were, or will be realised.
Deontic utterances with this modal express the speaker’s permission to car-
ry out the proposition, indicating also that there are no obstacles to doing
so.
5.3.1 The may file

The may file run through Weka contains 361 examples. The decision tree
produced by the computer is a fairly good structural representation of the
patterns found in the data: it correctly predicts 280 examples, or 77.6 per
cent, and incorrectly analyses 81 examples, or 22.4 per cent (see Appendix
IV). The success rate with the may data is lower than with must and måste.
As discussed below, this can be attributed to the fact that the data is not
extensive enough with respect to the distribution of the possible interpre-
tations for the modal.
The Kappa statistic value, measuring 0.2699, indicates that the model
is not statistically valid and does not correspond to the actual values initial-
ly assigned to the data. Moreover, only epistemic utterances were correctly
identified in more than 95 per cent of the cases, with TP rate and Precision
values at 0.967 and 0.813. The program was much less successful in ana-
lysing deontic examples: only about 60 per cent were correctly predicted
(with the TP rate and Precision measuring 0.6 and 0.625, respectively). Al-

so, none of the weak epistemic and indeterminate examples were correctly
identified as such.
Of the 81 instances that were incorrectly predicted by the computer,
nine were epistemic examples (out of the total of 274 epistemic utterances
in the data set) analysed as deontic (three cases), indeterminate (five cases),
and weak epistemic (one case). Of the 25 deontic utterances, ten were in-
correctly identified as epistemic (six cases), weak epistemic (three cases),
and indeterminate (one case). None of the weak epistemic and ambiguous
examples were identified as such. The inferior results obtained for these ex-
amples may be due to the fact that these types of examples are poorly at-
tested in the data, so the computer had no chance to learn to classify them
properly. Also, as argued in Chapter 3, in some weak epistemic and inde-
terminate examples, contextual clues may provide inconclusive evidence
for interpretation, and the interpretation of these examples is dependent
on the co-text to a large degree. Thus, the computer was highly successful
in identifying epistemic examples containing may and highly unsuccessful
in predicting the examples poorly attested in the data, namely deontic,
weak epistemic, and indeterminate. Further research on a larger sample of
data may resolve this problem. In order to amend this misrepresentation
in the most efficient way, I will disregard the faulty classifications in the
may tree in my discussion and address only the classifications attested in
the data.
5.3.1.1 The decision tree for may

The features that were identified by the computer as central for the inter-
pretation of may are: Controllability, aspectual modification, type of main
predicate, type of person, time reference for the proposition, the presence of an
epistemic adverbial or particle, and subject type, i.e. generic and animate (see
Figure 6). Not only is controllability a decisive feature for interpreting may,
but all the other features implicated in the decision tree are features that
also encode Controllability. The order of the features and their position
with respect to the root of the tree reflect their ranking in terms of the im-
pact on the interpretation. In the discussion that follows, the decision
chains leading to final interpretation are illustrated with examples from the
corpus data. The reader is referred to Figure 6.

Figure 6. The decision tree for may
Controllability is the one feature crucial for interpretation. Utterances

where the subject is in no control of its actions, as in (28), tend to be in-
terpreted epistemically. More tests are needed to arrive at the interpretation
when the subject exercises control over the situation. Indeed, it is impossi-
ble to felicitously give an order to somebody who clearly lacks the ability
to carry out that order. In this category, even inanimate subjects, as in (29),
are included, which normally will not be acting on their own.
(28) You may be closer to the mark than you think. (BR) Epistemic
(29) This could be a crippling burden on the poorest countries, because food imports
may drain away precious foreign exchange that should be used to build up long-
term economic strength. (CS) Epistemic

In (28), the subject is an animate, responsible agent. The predicate, how-

ever, is stative, denoting an either/or state over which the subject has no
control. In (29), on the other hand, there is an inanimate subject that does
not control the situation.
In the case of may, aspectual modification is also seen as important for
the interpretation. However, as demonstrated in Chapter 3, unlike must
and måste, aspectual modification will automatically promote epistemic
interpretation in utterances containing may, irrespective of the time refer-
ence for the proposition.
(30) “Someone may have heard”, Wexford said. (RR) Epistemic
(31) But nobody seems to suspect that I may be losing confidence in myself. (BR)
Epistemic
In (30), the time reference for the proposition is anterior to the time of the
modality expressed. This normally demotes deontic and promotes epis-
temic interpretation. The time reference for the proposition is simultane-
ous with the time of the utterance in (31). Again, this usually demotes (di-
rected) deontic interpretation. The present data set appears, however, to
paint a somewhat misleading picture of the relationship between aspectual
modification and the time reference for the proposition: in all examples,
the time reference for the proposition is either simultaneous with the time
of the utterance (as in 31) or anterior (as in 30). This may not be of im-
portance for the ranking, since aspectually modified utterances with pos-
terior time reference containing may are interpreted epistemically as well
(see the discussion of (26) in Chapter 3 for more details).
With utterances that are not aspectually modified, the type of predicate
becomes a feature of importance. Thus, utterances containing a state pred-
icate are interpreted epistemically, as in (32). As for utterances containing
event verbs, further tests are required for the interpretation to take place.
(32) I am giving an advance notice that this is a matter subject to query and that we may
have to object to this item on the agenda. (ECHI) Epistemic
In (32), the main predicate denotes the state of necessity or obligation to

object to a certain issue being part of the agenda. The presence of this pred-
icate is considered decisive, despite the fact that this example contains both
an animate, responsible subject and posterior time reference for the prop-
osition, a combination that usually appears in deontic utterances.

In the case of utterances containing event predicates, the type of person

has to be considered as well. With 1st person subjects, the interpretation is
usually deontic. In fact, in non-aspectually modified utterances containing
an event verb and an animate 1st person subject in control of his actions,
deontic interpretation is normally promoted, i.e. the subject will ask for a
permission to act as in (33) and (34).
(33) “May I examine it?” he asked, and, taking it from me, he proceeded to examine it as
he had examined the geometrical shapes. (OS) Deontic
(34) Mr President, may I first of all welcome the Secretary of State and thank her for her
excellent overview and also, of course, thank Mr Rocard for his report. (EKIN)
Deontic
Many of the utterances containing event predicates are of the same type as
(34): both the modality and the time reference for the proposition are si-
multaneous to the time of the utterance. In (34), the speaker is not actually
awaiting permission from the President to welcome the Secretary of State,
or thank Mr Rocard for his report, although he formally indicates that
these are his intentions. The asking for permission and the realization of
the proposition are carried out almost at the same time. Such utterances
are generally known as indirect speech acts (Levinson 1983) or short-
circuited implicatures (Papafragou 2002a). They can be exemplified by po-
lite forms such as Can you pass me the salt? or hedged performatives, as in
(34). Papafragou, following the general discussion in Levinson (1983),
suggests that short-circuited implicatures are triggered by “[m]ultiple
probabilistic cues which take into account (i) local environments in which
turn-taking routines are standard […]; (ii) social relations between inter-
locutors […]; (iii) speaker’s intentions and goals” (Papafragou 2002a: 12).
She also finds that modals are appropriate triggers for short-circuited im-
plicatures due to their “frequency, simplicity and versatility” (Papafragou
2002a: 9). It can be argued that the act of asking for permission is merely
symbolic in (34): the speaker does not expect to be forbidden to carry out
the proposition, but still feels that a formal demonstration of respect for
authority is in order.
In utterances with 2nd person subjects, the time reference for the prop-
osition becomes relevant: utterances with posterior time reference to the
time of modality are interpreted deontically, as in (35).
(35) I must be mad, Ms Phelps told herself, but to Matilda she said, “Of course you may
try it”. (RD) Deontic

The utterance in (35) is a typical directed deontic utterance, where the

speaker gives permission, or in this case suggests, that the addressee should
try something. There is nothing in the context of this utterance that points
to lack of agent control, which would demote deontic interpretation.
Utterances containing may with no aspectual modification, simultane-
ous time reference to the time of the utterance, and an event predicate tend
to be interpreted epistemically, although no conclusive evidence can be
provided at this point. Consider example (36).
(36) And I am not going to argue for my sake, as you may think, but for yours, that you
may not sin against God by condemning me. (JH) Epistemic
The choice of the mental verb think as the main predicate may add to the
impact of the feature simultaneous time reference for the proposition in
that it is not possible to actually control people’s thoughts. Also, think can
possibly be interpreted here as ‘believe’, and is therefore not a good exam-
ple of an event predicate denoting an action. All of the other examples with
this contextual make-up also contain main predicates that are formally
event verbs but may be interpreted as state.
With 3rd person subjects, the presence of a modal adverbial or particle
becomes important for the interpretation. As argued in 4.2.1, the presence
of a modal adverbial or particle may reinforce, neutralize, or disambiguate
the interpretation of modality in an utterance. Not surprisingly, all five ex-
amples with this contextual make-up – a subject in control of his actions,
no aspectual modification, dynamic predicate, 3rd person subject, and a
modal adverbial or particle – are epistemic, as in (37).
(37) Except of course God may send his punishments retrospectively. (FW) Epistemic
Here, the adverbial merely reinforces the epistemic reading of the utter-
ance: if the adverbial is omitted, the epistemic interpretation still stands.
In utterances with 3rd person subjects and no modal adverbial or parti-
cle, one should consider whether the subject is generic or not. Unlike with
must and måste, generic subjects with may demote deontic and promote
epistemic interpretation. Consider (38).
(38) One may, of course, see Korsakov’s syndrome with other pathologies, as in Luria’s
patients with tumours. (OS) Epistemic
It is difficult to interpret this utterance as permission, even if the presence

of the epistemic adverbial is disregarded. Instead, the utterance is interpret-

ed as an assertion of the general possibility of the proposition being rea-

lised. This interpretation arises due to the fact that must and may do not
have the same meaning. If we consider Papafragou’s (2000) claim about the
meaning of these modals, they enter into different relations with the rele-
vant domains of interpretation, entailment and compatibility, respectively.
Thus, combinations of generic subjects with must result in an interpreta-
tion of the unlimited state21 being all-applicable or entailed. With may,
such interpretation is not possible. Utterances containing a generic subject
and may are interpreted so the unlimited state of affairs described is one of
the possible alternatives, compatible with the relevant domain of interpre-
tation.
To summarise, the principal distinction between the epistemic and non-
epistemic examples with may relates strongly to the issue of Controllability.
In fact, 241 of the 274 epistemic examples were correctly identified as epis-
temic on the basis of this feature alone. Classifications involving other fea-
tures (aspectual modification, type of the main predicate, person, time reference
for the proposition, presence of modal adverbials or particles, generic and ani-
mate subjects) cover a much smaller portion of the data with a much lower
success rate. What is important here, however, is not the actual analysis
provided by the computer, but the fact that the features related to Control-
lability are repeatedly found to be associated with epistemic and deontic
interpretations in the data.
5.4 (De)coding possible conclusion and

permission: kan
As argued in Chapter 1, utterances containing kan in Swedish can be in-
terpreted epistemically, expressing possible conclusion, and deontically, ex-
pressing permission, much like may in English. This similarity of interpre-
tation was deemed important and prompted further investigation of the
contexts in which kan and may appear. However, there are differences be-
tween the two modals with respect to the degree of formality and the range
of possible interpretations (see Chapter 1). This, among other things,
renders the modals less appropriate candidates for comparison than must
and måste.
21 See Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 406-407) and 4.1.1.

5.4.1 The kan file

The kan file contains 1,001 instances. The decision tree produced by the
computer is a somewhat less accurate representation of the patterns under-
lying the data than in the case of may: it correctly identifies only 662 ex-
amples, or 66.1 per cent of the data, and incorrectly predicts 339 examples,
or 33.9 per cent of the data (see Appendix V).
The Kappa statistic value, measuring 0.455, indicates that the analysis
provided by the computer corresponds to the actual values assigned to the
data slightly better than in the case of may. Additionally, the computer was
not equally successful in identifying the different interpretations available
for the modal. Weak epistemic examples were correctly predicted in ap-
proximately 70 per cent of the cases, with TP rate and Precision values at
0.727 and 0.616, respectively. The same success rate applies to dynamic ex-
amples, with TP rate and Precision at 0.768 and 0.721, respectively. Epis-
temic and deontic utterances were, on the other hand, identified correctly
in only about 30 per cent of the cases (TP rate and Precision at 0.267 and
0.54, and 0.371 and 0.59, respectively). Moreover, only about 8 per cent
of indeterminate examples were recognised as such, with TP rate and Pre-
cision measuring 0.083 and 0.667. Once again, there is a correlation be-
tween the correct analysis of an interpretation and its frequency in the data
set. Thus, weak epistemic interpretation is well attested (366 examples).
The same is true of dynamic examples of which there are 448 in this sub-
corpus. Epistemic examples, on the other hand, are relatively poorly attest-
ed: there are only 101 such examples in the data set. Also, there are only
62 deontic and 24 indeterminate examples. Clearly, the computer was
much more successful in learning to identify the interpretations statistical-
ly well attested in the data.
This is also reflected in the confusion matrix (see Appendix V). Of the
101 epistemic instances, only 27 were correctly identified; 61 instances
were incorrectly classified as weak epistemic and 13 were considered inde-
terminate. Of the 448 dynamic examples, 344 were classified as such by
the computer, while the rest were incorrectly identified as epistemic (one
case), weak epistemic (89 cases), deontic (13 cases), and indeterminate
(one case). The same tendency can be observed with the other examples.
In the discussion that follows, I focus on the types of classifications ac-
tually attested in the data and disregard the incorrect classifications present
in the decision tree for kan.

5.4.1.1 The decision tree for kan

The decision tree for kan differs considerably from those for the other mo-
dals, both with respect to the length of the decision chains and with respect
to the additional features appearing in different positions in the tree struc-
ture (see Figure 7). Another point of difference is that several of the fea-
tures reappear in different decision chains, while in all the other trees each
feature was only considered once by the program. The features that were
considered important for the interpretation in the kan tree are: (i) animacy
of the subject, (ii) aspectual modification, (iii) the presence of a modal adver-
bial or particle, (iv) passive voice, (v) introductory subject, (vi) type of situa-
tion, (vii) type of main predicate, (viii) negation of modality, (ix) type of per-
son, (x) time reference for the proposition, (xi) whether the utterance is assertive
or not, (xii) Controllability, (xiii) time reference for the modality expressed in
an utterance, and (xiv) specificity of the subject. At this point, it is impossible
to claim that these features are ranked in any particular way, since many of
them appear several times in different positions in the tree. However, we
can conclude that most of the features are those that arguably code Con-
trollablity.
The principal distinction the computer makes seems to lie in the type
of subject. Utterances with an inanimate subject are epistemic or weak
epistemic in the data set. Utterances containing an animate subject, on the
other hand, are mainly dynamic, although weak epistemic, deontic, and
indeterminate classifications were also made by the computer with various
degrees of success. The animacy of the subject is not a decisive feature on
its own, however. The computer tests further for aspectual modification.
Utterances containing an inanimate subject and modified by perfect aspect
were classified as epistemic.
(39) Det kan inte ha varit en slump. (PCJ) Epistemic

it MOD NEG have-INF be-PART a coincidence
‘That could not have been a coincidence.’
This classification is not surprising: even in the kan data set, all the aspec-
tually modified examples also have anterior time reference for the proposi-
tion, as in (39), a combination that promotes epistemic interpretation.
Time reference is not of high importance in combination with aspectual
modification in modals expressing possible conclusion and permission,
unlike with modals expressing confident inference and obligation. Thus,
aspectually modified utterances (with posterior time reference) are epis-

temic with the modals may and kan, but not with must and måste (see the
discussion of (1)-(3) in this chapter and (25), (72), and (73) in Chapter 3).
In utterances with an inanimate subject that are not aspectually modi-
fied, the computer tested further for the presence of a modal adverbial or
particle. When this feature was not present in the context, the utterance
was classified as weak epistemic, as in (40).
(40) Tänk på parkettgolvet - det kan bli märken om du faller

think on parquet-floor it MOD become-INF marks-DEF if you fall-PRES
omkull! (ARP) Epistemic

over
‘Think of the parquet floor – you’ll make marks on it if you fall over.’
In (40), the speaker expresses her opinion about the possibility, or poten-
tiality, of the proposition being realised, an opinion based on her knowl-
edge that parquet floors are easily damaged and prone to scratching if not
handled with care. The time reference for the proposition is posterior to
the time of the modality expressed, as is usually the case with weak epis-
temic utterances. This indicates that the truth value of the utterance can
only be verified after the proposition has been realised.
If a modal adverbial or particle is present in the utterance, the computer
tests for the presence of passive voice. If the utterance is passive, it is clas-
sified as weak epistemic.
(41) Det kan eventuellt övervägas att fastställa den högsta tillåtna
it MOD MOD consider-PRES-PASS to fix-INF DEF highest allowed
kvoten till noll. (ECAR) Epistemic

limit to zero
‘The possibility of a 0% lower limit could be envisaged.’
In (41), the passive voice is combined with posterior time reference, inan-
imate subject, and a modal adverbial eventuellt ‘possibly’. This combina-
tion of features demotes a deontic interpretation, promoting an epistemic,
or weak epistemic, interpretation instead. As was discussed earlier, modal
adverbials and particles may reinforce or neutralise the modality expressed
in an utterance, as in the present example.
In active utterances, the type of situation has to be considered. Not sur-
prisingly, atelic utterances, which often correspond to states, are interpret-
ed epistemically.

(42) Möjligen kan dessa i sin tur ha betydelse. (BJ) Epistemic

MOD MOD these in REFL turn have-INF meaning
‘These, in turn, may be of some significance.’
Many of the features discussed co-occur on a regular basis. Thus, atelic sit-
uation types co-occur not only with state predicates, but also with simul-
taneous time reference for the proposition. This combination of features
promotes epistemic interpretation, as in (42), which in addition has an in-
animate subject, which indicates lack of Controllability.
In telic utterances, on the other hand, introductory subject becomes im-
portant.
(43) Det kan väl aldrig bli samma sak. (SC) Epistemic
it MOD MOD never become-INF same thing
‘But of course it can never be the same.’
In all relevant utterances with introductory subjects, the main predicate

denotes a change of state, as bli ‘become’ in (43). The presence of an intro-
ductory subject effectively demotes deontic interpretation: it excludes the
possibility of, among other things, the subject carrying out the command
given by the addressee.
If there is no introductory subject in the context, but the subject is in-
animate, the utterance is interpreted as weak epistemic, as in (44).
(44) Ett studium av FNs barnfond UNICEFs stöd till

a study of UN’s child-foundation UNICEF’s support to
distriktsförvaltningar i samband med mödra- och barnavårdsinsatser kan

district-administrations in connection with mother- and child-care-work MOD
möjligen ge metoder. (CO) Epistemic

MOD give-INF methods
‘A study of UNICEF’s support of district administrations as part of the antenatal

and childcare projects may possibly provide us with methods.’
In (44), the speaker not only expresses her opinion about the possibility of
the realisation of the proposition, but also introduces her knowledge that
research can generally provide us with tools or methods to be used later.
The choice of an inanimate subject, although in combination with a telic
event verb, demotes a (directed) deontic interpretation and promotes an

epistemic interpretation instead. This interpretation is further reinforced

by the presence of the modal adverbial möjligen ‘possibly’ in the context of
the utterance.
To summarise, on the right-hand side of the decision tree all the final
classifications appear to be either epistemic or weak epistemic. The features
associated with these interpretations, by themselves or in different combi-
nations, are the ones that have repeatedly been implicated in this way in
the previous discussions: (i) inanimate subject, (ii) aspectual modification,
(iii) the presence of a modal adverbial or particle, (iv) passive voice,22 (v) type
of situation, and (vi) introductory subject.
On the left-hand side of the tree, most of the classifications are dynamic.
Considering the poor success rate in the analysis of deontic and indetermi-
nate examples, the features that appear in decision chains on the left-hand
side of the tree can thus be claimed to be associated mainly with dynamic
readings of kan.
In utterances containing animate subjects, aspectual modification be-
comes important. Similarly to other aspectually modified utterances in the
data, utterances with an animate subject and perfect aspect are analysed as
epistemic, as in (45).
(45) Du kan ha inbillat dig att hon var

you MOD have-INF imagine-PART you-ACC that she be-PAST
rädd. (HM) Epistemic

scared
‘You may have been imagining that she was frightened.’
When there is no aspectual modification, the computer tests for the main
predicate type. With state predicates, further tests are conducted. First, the
computer tests whether the modality is negated. If so, the utterance is clas-
sified as dynamic.
(46) Kan man inte älska, kan man i varje fall hata. (PCJ) Deontic
MOD one NEG love-INF MOD one in every case hate-INF
‘If one cannot love, at least one can hate.’
22 In most of the passive examples, the time reference for the proposition is anterior or simultaneous.
When the time reference for the proposition is posterior, other features signal lack of control on the
part of an intended agent.

The subject of (46) clearly lacks the ability to love, but is nonetheless able
to hate. All sentences where the modality is negated are analysed as non-
epistemic. This is in line with our general understanding that only in non-
epistemic utterances can either the proposition or the modality itself be ne-
gated. In epistemic utterances, negation takes scope over the proposition
only.23 One possible explanation for this is found in Cinque (1999), who
appeals to the order of the functional heads in the I-domain: the epistemic
modal phrase is situated higher in the hierarchy than the non-epistemic
ones, and the negation phrase, NegP, is located above the non-epistemic
phrase but below the epistemic one.
In utterances where the modality is not negated, further tests were con-
ducted. Different classifications were obtained for utterances containing (i)
an animate subject, (ii) no aspectual modification, (iii) a state predicate,
and (iv) no negation of the modality expressed, depending on the type of
person. In utterances with 1st person subjects, the computer considered
whether the utterance in question is assertive or not. Non-assertive utter-
ances were classified as dynamic, as in (47).
(47) Hur kan jag veta detta? (PCJ) Dynamic

how MOD I know-INF this
‘How can I know this?’
The subject of (47) is quite unusual. It is a brain, surgically removed from

the body it used to occupy and placed in a protective casing for scientists
to observe. The ability the brain wonders about is its peculiar awareness of
the things that will necessarily alter its condition for the worse or make it
comfortable in its present circumstances. The question here is addressed by
the speaker to the speaker, the brain itself.
In assertive sentences, the issue of the subject’s control over the situation
described in the proposition becomes of importance. When subjects ex-
hibit control of the situation, the interpretation is dynamic, as in (48).
These utterances are generally understood as statements about the subject’s
ability to carry out the proposition.
(48) Men eftersom jag redan kan stava, ligger jag istället och tänker på
but since I already MOD spell-INF lie-PRES I instead and think-PRES on
23 See, for example, Palmer (1995), who observes a cross-linguistic irregularity in the relation be-
tween negation and modals of possibility and necessity. See also Palmer (1997) for an overview of the
relationship between negation and modality in Germanic languages.

Emma. (PCJ) Dynamic

Emma
‘But since I can spell already, I prefer to lie there thinking of Emma.’
Utterances where the subjects have no control of the situation, on the other
hand, are considered epistemic. This is consistent with the results obtained
from the analysis of the may data, where the issue of the subject’s control
over the situation expressed in the proposition is crucial for the interpreta-
tion. Most of the utterances in which the subject displays no control of the
situation are interpreted epistemically. In the kan data, however, there are
no examples of this kind to support the computer’s classification. It is
therefore disregarded at present.
With 2nd person subjects, the time reference for the proposition comes
into play. No examples of utterances with a 2nd person subject and a pos-
terior time reference for the proposition are found in the data. The classi-
fication of these examples as epistemic is therefore disregarded here. As
mentioned earlier, however, in general, in utterances with this contextual
make-up (containing may and kan with posterior time reference for the
proposition) nothing precludes an epistemic interpretation.
Utterances containing all of the above features, but with simultaneous
time reference for the proposition are considered dynamic by the compu-
ter.
(49) Att du kan bo så här. (MR) Dynamic

that you MOD live-INF so here
‘Fancy living like this.’
In (49), for example, the speaker is amazed at the addressee’s, i.e. the sub-
ject’s, ability to put up with a noisy flat located on a very busy street in the
centre of the city.
With 3rd person subjects, the presence of a modal adverbial or particle
may distinguish between epistemic and non-epistemic interpretations. In
(50), the epistemic interpretation is reinforced by the presence of the epis-
temic adverbial möjligen ‘possibly’.
(50 Undis kan möjligen få lite tröst av den när hon blir
Undis MOD MOD get-INF little comfort of it when she become-PRES
änka. (AL) Epistemic

widow

‘Undis might get a bit of comfort from it when she becomes a widow.’
In utterances where the interpretation is not reinforced by such an adver-

bial or particle, epistemic interpretation is not discouraged, only weak-
ened, i.e. those utterances are interpreted as weak epistemic.
(51) Även poliser kan vara ojämna. (HM) Weak epistemic

even policemen MOD be-INF uneven
‘Cops can also be erratic.’
The utterance in (51) can be paraphrased as ‘It is possible even for police-
men to be erratic’. The interpretation is based on the intuition that there
is a general possibility for policemen to be erratic. This intuition is based
on past experiences with erratic policemen.
In utterances with event verbs, the presence or absence of a modal ad-
verbial or particle leads to a series of tests. If no adverbial or particle is
present in the utterance, the computer tests for the type of person again.
Assertive utterances with 1st person subjects are classified as dynamic.
(52) Det är inte alltid jag hänger med, fast jag gör så gott
it be-PRES NEG always I hang-PRES with although I do-PRES so good
jag kan. (ARP) Dynamic

I MOD
‘I can’t always keep up, though I do the best I can.’
Example (52) can be paraphrased as ‘…, although I act at the best of my

ability’. Nothing in the context of this utterance promotes deontic or epis-
temic interpretation. There is no deontic source interested in the subject
carrying out the proposition, the speaker does not express her judgement
about the truth of the proposition, and no features signal lack of control
on the part of an intended agent.
In non-assertive utterances, the time reference for the proposition once
more becomes important. Utterances with posterior time reference for the
proposition are generally identified as deontic, as in (53).
(53) När kan vi gå ut i åkern? frågade Wallander. (HM) Deontic

when MOD we go-INF out in field-DEF ask-PAST Wallander
‘“When can we go out in the field?” asked Wallander.’

The speaker in (53) makes an inquiry about the time the policemen will
be allowed to go out into the field and inspect he crime scene after the fo-
rensic team has processed it. In all utterances of this kind, speakers are ask-
ing some third party, usually the addressee, for permission to carry out the
proposition.
With 2nd person subjects, the issue of control becomes important. Con-
trary to intuition, utterances where the subject exhibits no control over the
situation described in the proposition are interpreted as dynamic. Indeed,
if someone has the ability to perform some action, this person will also be
able to control this ability. Consider (54) and (55), however.
(54) Du kan inte annat än sprattla. (JMY) Dynamic

you MOD NEG other than struggle
‘You can’t do anything but flounder.’
(55) Längre än så kan du inte komma. (SW) Dynamic

longer than so MOD you NEG come-INF
‘Further than that you can’t get.’
Both (54) and (55) are negated. More precisely, in both utterances it is the
dynamic modality that is negated. In (54), an adult pinning a child to the
floor gloats at the child’s inability to get free. In (55), the speaker conveys
to the addressee the fact that one is unable to get further than Smygehuk
on the Swedish coast, since it is the most southern point in Sweden. In
both utterances, the situation described in the propositions came into ex-
istence through some external circumstances of which the subjects have no
control, and the subjects are therefore unable to act on the proposition.
In utterances where the subject exhibits control over the situation, fur-
ther tests are conducted to arrive at the final classification. First, the time
reference for the modality expressed in an utterance is considered. If the
time reference is past, the computer concludes that the utterance is deon-
tic. No examples of this kind are found in the data, however, and this clas-
sification is therefore disregarded.
Utterances with future time reference for modality are also judged as dy-
namic.
(56) Mitt enda öga kan jag – med litet tur – få ut genom en av
my only eye MOD I with little luck get-INF out through one of

magfistlarna. (PCJ) Dynamic

stomach-fistulae
‘With a little luck I’ll be able to push my single eye through one of its fistulae.’
In (56), the subject, a disembodied brain, plans its escape by making a la-
boratory dog swallow it whole so it will be able to move around by con-
trolling the dog’s thoughts. Here, the subject clearly contemplates its fu-
ture ability to find an outlet for its eye so that it will be able to see even
when encapsulated in the dog’s stomach.
In utterances with present time reference for modality, the computer
tests further whether the modality expressed in an utterance is negated or
not. Instances where the modality is negated are classified as deontic. Con-
sider (57).
(57) Mamma, det drar, kan du inte stänga dörren. (MR) Deontic
mother it pull-PRES MOD you NEG close-INF door-DEF
‘There is a draught, Mother. Couldn’t you shut the door.’
In (57), the girl does not inquire into her mother’s ability to close the door,
but politely asks her to do so (cf. Papafragou 2002a on short-circuited im-
plicatures). The negation is not necessary from a grammatical or semantic
point of view, but is present to indicate the girl’s desire to soften her re-
quest, to make it sound more polite. This use of negation is quite common
(see, for example, Hoye (1997)).
If the modality is not negated, whether the utterance in question is as-
sertive or not becomes important. Assertive utterances containing (i) an
animate subject, (ii) no aspectual modification, (iii) an event predicate, (iv)
no modal adverbial or particle, (v) 2nd person subject, (vi) subject that con-
trols the situation described in the proposition, (vii) present time reference
for the modality, and (viii) no negation of the modality expressed in the
utterance are interpreted deontically, as in (58). Non-assertive utterances
displaying the same contextual features are interpreted as dynamic, as in
(59).
(58) Du kan ta så många bilder du vill, svarade Wallander. (HM)

you MOD take-INF so many pictures you want answered Wallander
‘“You can take as many pictures as you like”, replied Wallander.’ Deontic
(59) I övermorgon eftermiddag klockan tre vid Stavnäs brygga, kan du

in over-tomorrow afternoon clock-DEF three at Stavnäs wharf MOD you

komma? (JG) Dynamic

come
‘Day after tomorrow, tree p.m. at Stavnäs wharf – will you come?’
The utterance in (58) is a typical deontic utterance where the speaker gives
permission to the addressee to carry out the action specified in the propo-
sition by an event predicate. The permission is given at the time of the ut-
terance, hence present time reference for the modality expressed. The ad-
dressee, who is also the subject of the utterance, is animate and capable of
either carrying out the action as required or refusing to do so. There is also
an asymmetrical relationship between the speaker and the addressee: the
speaker, being a senior officer, has authority over the addressee. Example
(59), on the other hand, is primarily an inquiry about the subject’s ability
to fulfil the proposition. The subject asks whether there are any impeding
circumstances that would force the addressee not to be in a certain place at
a certain time. In certain contexts, an utterance like this may also be inter-
preted as deontic, a polite request to carry out the proposition, given the
imbalance of power between the speaker and the addressee, as in (57).
With 3rd person subjects, the passive voice is a significant feature for the
interpretation. Active utterances are interpreted as dynamic, as in (60),
whereas in passive utterances, the time reference for the proposition is con-
sidered.
(60) Om man ritar ett streck mellan de platser där vi hittade dom
if one draw-PRES a line between those places where we find-PAST them
kan man se att hon faktiskt hade ringat in sig. (HM) Dynamic
MOD one see-INF that she actually have-PAST circle-PART in REFL
‘If you draw a line through the spots where we found them, you can see that she had
actually surrounded herself.’
In (60), the speaker reflects on one’s ability to observe a certain fact of im-
portance for the police investigation at hand. There is nothing in the con-
text of this utterance that indicates a deontic source interested in the prop-
osition being carried out. There is also no indication that the speaker ex-
presses his judgement of the possibility of the proposition being true or the
agent having no control over the situation.
In passive utterances, the computer was unable to arrive at an interpre-
tation without considering the time reference for the proposition. Thus, as

discussed in 4.1.3, passive utterances with posterior time reference were

judged as epistemic, as in (61).
(61) För internationella företag kan Sydafrika, om landet

for international companies MOD South-Africa if country-DEF
bedöms som stabilt, komma att betraktas som

judge-PRES-PASS as stable come INF consider-INF-PASS as
inkörsporten till SADCC-regionen och kanske t o m till länderna

entrance-port to SADCC region and maybe even to countries-DEF
söder om Sahara. (CO) Epistemic

south about Sahara
‘For international companies South Africa may, provided it is considered stable, be

regarded as the entrance to the SADCC region and possibly even to the Sub-Saharan
Africa.’
The utterance in (61) is the only example of this kind found in the data.
It is therefore difficult to claim that it is the context of this utterance and
not the presence of the lexical item komma att that promotes epistemic in-
terpretation. As discussed in 3.2.2.1, the use of komma att does not imply
that the event described by the main predicate is planned or intended. In-
stead, it indicates a more or less competent prognosis on the part of the
speaker and the fact that the speaker relies on (external) features to make
such a prognosis. Also of importance is the fact that the proposition is sit-
uated in some indeterminate future.
Passive utterances with simultaneous time reference for the proposition
are classified by the computer as weak epistemic.
(62) Man kan lätt tjusas av prydliga diagram, abstrakta formler och
one MOD easy charm-INF-PASS by neat diagrams abstract formulae and
fullständigt logiska resonemang. (BB) Weak epistemic

completely logical argument
‘It is easy to be enchanted by carefully prepared diagrams, abstract formulae, and

completely logical discussions.’
In (62), the speaker does not reflect on one’s ability to be charmed by neat
diagrams and the like, but expresses a judgement about the general possi-
bility to be enchanted by these things. The judgement is based on the fact
that this has occurred at least once before.

In utterances that in addition to (i) animate subject, (ii) no aspectual

modification, and (iii) an event predicate, also contain (iv) a modal adver-
bial or particle, the computer tested further whether the modality ex-
pressed is negated. When this is the case, the utterances are classified as dy-
namic.
(63) Kan du inte simma kanske? undrade Bosse. (PP) Dynamic

MOD you NEG swim maybe wonder-PAST Bosse
‘You can’t swim, is that it? wondered Bobby.’
The speaker in (63) inquires whether the addressee lacks the ability to
swim. The fact that the modality is negated may be due to the speaker’s de-
sire to also indicate that the lack of such ability is not socially acceptable. 24
When the modality is not negated and the utterance contains a non-
specific subject, the issue of the subject’s control over the situation de-
scribed in the proposition becomes important. When the subject exhibits
control over the situation, the utterances are interpreted as epistemic. Con-
versely, when the subject lacks such control the interpretation is weak epis-
temic. Consider (64) and (65).
(64) Man kanske kan säga att det är resultat av en ständigt

one MOD MOD tell-INF that it be-PRES result of a constantly
pågående intern spaning, oss poliser emellan. (HM) Epistemic

ongoing internal investigation us police-PL between
‘You might call it the result of an ongoing internal investigation, among us cops.’
(65) Naturligtvis kan man få uppleva äkta flamenco under andra,

naturally MOD one get-INF experience-INF genuine flamenco under other
mindre idealiska förhållanden, men det är sällsynt. (BTC) Weak epistemic

less ideal circumstances but it is rare
‘Of course one can experience genuine flamenco under less ideal conditions, but it
is rare.’
In (64), the speaker expresses his subjective opinion on what an appropri-

ate course of actions would be in a specific situation. In (65), on the other
24 Consider, for example, when someone asks about your age. The appropriate question in this case
would be How old are you? Should the speaker choose the marked version of this question, How young
are you?, she indicates that she also considers the addressee to be (too) young. For further discussion on
issues of neutral and biased contexts see Bolinger (1977).

hand, the speaker expresses a judgement about the potentiality of an event

occurring, the judgement being based also on the fact that this event has
been known to occur before.
With specific subjects, also of significance is whether the subject is 1 st,
2 , or 3rd person. In utterances with 1st person subjects, time reference for
nd
the proposition is examined. Utterances with posterior time reference for

the proposition are classified as dynamic.
(66) Eftersom jag fortfarande har kvar loggboken kan jag skriva av den
because I still have-PRES left logbook-DEF MOD I write-INF of it
ordagrant. (BL) Dynamic

verbatim
‘Since I still have the logbook in my possession, I am able to copy it word for word.’
In (66), the speaker is about to describe some past event documented in a

logbook that happens to be in his possession. The fact that the speaker has
the logbook enables him to copy from it word for word.
There are, however, a few examples with simultaneous time reference
for the proposition expressed in an utterance, which are classified as weak
epistemic.
(67) När jag talar om en “utredare” kan jag alltså lika väl
when I speak about a investigator MOD I therefore equally well
mena en forskare eller en konsult. (BB) Weak epistemic

mean-INF a researcher or a consultant
‘When we talk about an “investigator”, we refer to a scientist or a consultant as well.’
Here, the speaker makes a clarification with regard to the terminology he

uses. He is not reporting on his ability to use a certain term in a certain
way, but on the range of possible applications of this term. Note also that
it is the speaker himself who has the freedom to decide how the term in
question should be used.
All instances of utterances with the above mentioned contextual back-
ground and 2nd person subjects are identified as deontic in the decision
tree.
(68) Och du kan lika väl hälla upp ett stort glas sherry när du
and you MOD equally well pour-INF up a big glass sherry when you

ändå håller på och fumlar. (APR) Deontic

anyhow insist-PRES on and fumble-PRES
‘And you might as well pour me out a large sherry if you’re going to fumble about
with the decanter anyhow.’
In (68), the speaker gives a mild order or makes a suggestion to the address-
ee to carry out the action specified in the proposition. The deontic force in
this case originates with the speaker. The addressee, the subject, is an ani-
mate responsible agent who is in control of his actions and may comply
with the speaker’s request or refuse to do so of his own free will. The time
reference for the modality expressed is simultaneous to the time of the ut-
terance, i.e. the command or suggestion is given at the moment of speech.
The time reference for the proposition, on the other hand, is posterior to
the time of the utterance. Thus, there is nothing in the context of this ut-
terance that demotes deontic interpretation.
In utterances with a 3rd person subject who is in control of the situation
described in the proposition, the interpretation is indeterminate. When
the subject exhibits no control of the situation, the interpretation is weak
epistemic. Consider (69) and (70).
(69) De kan väl åka ut till Marsvinsholm när de får

they MOD MOD drive-INF out to Marsvinsholm when they get-PRES
tid? (HM) Ambiguous

time
'They can drive out to Marsvinsholm when they have time, can’t they?'
In (69), also discussed as (102) in Chapter 3, the speaker comments not

only on the ability of the police officers in question to drive out to the
scene of the crime, but also on whether they will actually do that in the
near future. The third possible interpretation, i.e. that of suggestion or
mild order, arises from the fact that the speaker, being the chief inspector,
is authorized to send the police officers to the scene of the crime to inves-
tigate. This is also supported by the fact that formally (69) is not an inter-
rogative but a declarative sentence. Thus, kan shows the whole range of in-
terpretations available. However, one should keep in mind that out of the
17 indeterminate examples containing kan, the computer succeeded in
classifying only two (see the confusion matrix in Appendix V). With the
other modals, the computer failed completely to identify such examples as
indeterminate.

As mentioned above, utterances in which the subject has no control of

the situation described in the proposition are classified as weak epistemic.
(70) När den politiska situationen i Angola och Moòamique har

when the political situation-DEF in Angola and Mozambique have-PRES
“lösts” på ett för Washington acceptabelt sätt kan möjligen de nya

solve-PART on a for Washington acceptable way MOD possibly the new
regeringarna påräckna ett visst USA-stöd under en period… (CO)

Weak epistemic
governments-DEF count a certain USA support under a period
‘Once the political situation in Angola and Mozambique has been “resolved” in a
way that is acceptable to Washington the new governments of these countries may
possibly count on some USA assistance for a while…’
The speaker is not commenting on the ability of the newly assembled gov-
ernments to count on some political and economic support from other
countries. Instead, the utterance expresses the speaker’s judgement about
the potentiality of these governments receiving such support.
With regard to the decision tree for the kan data, it is possible to con-
clude that this modal appears in utterances with somewhat different con-
textual make-ups than the other modals. This may be due to the fact that
kan has a range of interpretations distinct from the other modals. Even
with kan, however, the features that influence the interpretation are: type
of subject, type of main predicate, time reference both for modality and the
proposition, aspectual modification, the presence of a modal adverbial or par-
ticle, and Controllability. The most obvious difference between the decision
tree for kan and the decision trees for the other modals lies in the fact that,
in the case of kan, the computer tested for the same features more than
once in the various parts of the tree. Chapter 1 suggested that may and kan
may be comparable, much like must and måste. This expectation, however,
is not supported by the results of the DM investigation, which has shown
the decision trees for may and kan to be different. The next section discus-
ses some of the reasons for this.
5.4.1.2 Why do may and kan differ?

Let us review some of the research on the diachronic development of mo-
dal verbs in general, and may and kan in particular.

The general view on the emergence of modal verbs is that there is a uni-
directional path of development from lexical items to modal auxiliaries,
where the syntax and the semantics of these items undergo a gradual
change over considerable periods of time.25 As mentioned in 1.1, some of
the hypotheses about the reasons for this change include inter alia appeals
to metaphorization and metonomization (Sweetser 1990), grammatical re-
analysis (Lightfoot 1982), and pragmatic inferencing (Krug 2000,
Traugott and Dasher 2002). Whatever the reason, the semantic develop-
ment of modals in English and Swedish seems to follow the strong cross-
linguistic pattern for the diachronic development of modal meanings sug-
gested in Bybee, Perkins, and Pagluica (1994): epistemic interpretations
tend to arise in contexts previously interpreted as indicating ability on the
part of the subject, as indicated in Figure 8.
Figure 8. The diachronic development of modal meanings.

(adapted from Bybee, Perkins, and Pagliuca 1994: 194, 199)
Deontic interpretations are generally said to develop from lexical verbs be-
longing to source semantic domains such as (i) future-oriented need and
desire; (ii) being or coming into being; (iii) possession including owing;
and (iv) positive evaluation (Traugott and Dasher 2002: 118-119).
May in PDE developed from an OE lexical verb maeg ‘be strong, have
power or influence’26 and followed the sense development path specified in
Figure 8 quite closely. Firstly, it gradually came to be used in contexts ex-
pressing general ability or power. Later, it developed permission senses and,
still later, weak and strong epistemic meanings. This semantic develop-
ment was accompanied by the gradual loss of verb-like properties. Al-
though auxiliaries in general, and modals in particular, shared “a range of
properties with verbs throughout Old and Middle English”, “an essentially
modern situation [i.e. PDE syntax of the modals, cf. the NICE-properties
briefly discussed in 1.2.1] was established by 1850” (Warner 1993: 102,
67). Accompanying the loss of verbal properties was the gradual loss of
25 See, however, Dahl (2000a) for an alternative view.

26 The following information is from the OED at http://dictionary.oed.com.

may’s ability interpretations, considered more verb-like by Warner. What

follows is development “into more distinctively modal epistemic and de-
ontic areas” (Warner 1993: 181). This development of may into a full-
fledged epistemic is traced in Kytö (1991) who claims that only 5 per cent
of all occurrences of maeg in Old and Middle English were epistemic, while
in modern corpora as much as 65 to 79 per cent of the occurrences of may
are epistemic (Kitö 1991: 91ff, 153). This claim is confirmed by the distri-
bution of the interpretations of may in this study: of the 361 examples, 274
were interpreted epistemically and 25 deontically.
Swedish kan, on the other hand, shows quite a different distribution of
interpretations. In the sample of 1,001 examples, 448 were interpreted as
dynamic (ability) and 366 as weak epistemic, whereas only 62 deontic and
101 epistemic utterances were found. This clearly indicates that, at least on
the basis of the data investigated here, kan cannot be claimed to have gram-
maticalized into an epistemic marker to the same degree as may. Whereas
may has not retained any verbal properties in PDE, kan in Present Day
Swedish (PDS) still frequently occurs as a main verb in sentences like
(71).27
(71) Kalle kan engelska väl.

Kalle know-PRES English well
‘Kalle speaks good English.’
In examples like this, kan exhibits the full range of verbal properties avail-
able in PDS and allows for the original interpretation ‘to know, to know
how’ found as early as Old Swedish.28
Because kan is still available as a main verb and because of the distribu-
tion of its modal interpretations, it is possible to conclude that kan has not
reached the same degree of grammaticalization as may. Support for this
view is found in Aijmer (1999), who investigating translations concludes
that “[w]hen kan is avoided in the translation, or needs support from co-
occurring adverbs or subjective hedges, this is a sign that the epistemic
meaning has not fully developed in these contexts” (Aijmer 1999: 317).
She also observes that “[t]he paucity of epistemic modality markers ex-
pressed by a modal verb in Swedish originals is in contrast with the fre-
quency of modal verbs in English. […] In particular, kan was less frequent
27 Note also that, as mentioned in 1.2.2, Swedish modals are not as easily identified on the basis of
morpho-syntactic criteria alone as their English counterparts.
28 This information is found in Svenska Akademiens Ordbok (SAOB) at http://g3.spraakdata.gu.se/
saob/index.html.

than may/might, which supports the conclusion that kan has not developed
into a prototypical exponent of Epistemic Possibility in Swedish” (Aijmer
1999: 318).
Thus, at this stage may and kan cannot be seen as equivalents, although
both are positioned on the left-most end of the epistemic scales proposed
in 1.2.3.1. In time, however, kan may undergo a similar development as
may and become a “prototypical exponent” of epistemic possibility.
Summary
In this chapter, I set out to illuminate the patterns of interpretation for the four
modals under investigation with the help of a data mining (DM) program. By
choosing to display the results in the form of decision trees consisting of decision
chains, I was able to illustrate the recurring combinations of the features under dis-
cussion, i.e. how Controllability is coded in my data.
Although no common analysis is possible for all four modals at this stage of the
investigation, must and måste were shown to pattern very similarly with respect to
the features discussed and the resulting interpretations. The the range of possible
interpretations for these modals, from confident inference to obligation, was
found very similar in the two languages. Thus, these two modals are good candi-
dates for comparison. A common pattern of interpretation in the form of a deci-
sion tree for these two modals was suggested in 5.1.3.
May and kan, on the other hand, do not pattern in the same way, either with
respect to the range of possible interpretations available or with respect to the rel-
ative order of the features important for the analysis. This discrepancy can be at-
tributed to the different degrees of grammaticalization displayed by these two mo-
dals.
At this stage of the investigation, however, it is not possible to claim that the
decision trees discussed throughout the chapter correspond to the way we inter-
pret modality. Firstly, the analysis was based on a limited sample of language,
namely only approximately 3,000 examples. Secondly, some of the interpretations
for the modals were not proportionally distributed in the data. Some combina-
tions of features were not present at all or were present only to a limited degree.
This produced somewhat skewed results, i.e. the computer was not equally suc-
cessful in learning to interpret all possible kinds of examples.
Although the decision trees obtained by the DM analysis cannot be taken at
face value, many of the features discussed are repeatedly implicated, through the
notion of Controllability, to play a role in the interpretation of utterances contain-
ing these modals. The features found to be of importance for the interpretation of
must and måste are: (i) aspectual modification, (ii) type of main predicate, (iii) time

reference for the proposition, (iv) implicit and (v) explicit condition, (vi) type of sub-
ject, whether generic and specific or not, and (vii) time reference for the modality ex-
pressed in the utterance. Aspectually modified utterances, as well as utterances
containing state verbs, tend to be interpreted epistemically, whereas utterances
with event predicates are likely to be interpreted deontically. Utterances with an-
terior time reference for the proposition are almost always epistemic, whereas ut-
terances with posterior time reference for the proposition tend to be deontic. Ut-
terances with an explicitly or implicitly specified condition in the propositional or
situational context are deontic. Non-specific generic subjects tend to demote epis-
temic interpretation. Present time reference for modality is often associated with
epistemic interpretations, whereas utterances with past or future time reference for
modality are often deontic. These observations, however, may not apply outside
the context of the decision chains (Figures 3-7) that indicate the specific combina-
tions of these features and their values leading the computer to its classification.
With may, the features that influence interpretation are: (i) Controllability, (ii)
aspectual modification, (iii) type of main predicate, (iv) type of person (for the sub-
ject), (v) time reference for the proposition, (vi) the presence of a modal adverbial or
particle, (vii) type of subject, whether generic and animate or not. The crucial dis-
tinction between epistemic and non-epistemic utterances is based on the issue of
Controllability, i.e. whether the subject/the addressee is in control of his actions
or not. Utterances where the subject cannot control the situation tend to be epis-
temic. With may, aspectual modification promotes epistemic interpretation in the
examples analysed. Utterances containing state predicates are usually epistemic as
well, whilst utterances with event predicates tend to be deontic. Posterior time ref-
erence for the proposition often coincides with deontic interpretation. Contrary
to what was observed with must and måste, utterances with generic subjects are
usually epistemic. The same is true of utterances containing an inanimate subject.
These observations are valid only if considered in the context of decision chains
specified by the computer (see Figure 6).
Kan exhibits much more complicated and somewhat irregular patterns of in-
terpretation. Also, the classifications of the kan data provided by the computer
were not as statistically robust as those for the other modals. One possible expla-
nation for this is that utterances containing kan were more often then not inter-
preted as weak epistemic. Since the features were shown to combine to a lesser de-
gree on this interpretation then in strong epistemic examples, the interpretation of
weak epistemic examples is much more dependent on situational context, which
was not made available to the computer. Nevertheless, the features that influence
the interpretation of utterances with this modal are (i) animacy of the subject, (ii)
aspectual modification, (iii) the presence of a modal adverbial or particle, (iv) passive
voice, (v) introductory subject, (vi) type of situation, (vii) type of main predicate, (viii)
negation of modality, (ix) type of person, (x) time reference for the proposition, (xi)
whether the utterance is assertive or not, (xii) Controllability, (xiii) time reference for
the modality expressed in an utterance, and (xiv) the specificity of the subject. The

observations as to the impact of aspectual modification, Controllability, the ani-

macy of the subject, the time reference for modality, the presence of a modal ad-
verbial or particle are born out similarly to the other modals. The appearance of
additional features in the decision tree (Figure 7) cannot be evaluated with certain-
ty at this point of research and on the basis of these data. Yet, the influence of these
features on the interpretation is quite obvious in the examples discussed here.

6 Final remarks
Abstract
This chapter consists of two parts: the first discusses the general implications of
the study and the second summarizes the findings. In the first section, I focus on
the universality of the interpretation patterns of modal utterances. This discussion
is highly warranted given the research question formulated in 1.4 – what is it that
enables speakers to encode modality in such a way that it can be correctly decoded
by the interlocutors? Although at this stage some aspects of this discussion may be
considered speculative, the facts appealed to in this section cannot be disputed, i.e.
the appealed to in this section cannot be disputed, i.e. the ample evidence from
language acquisition studies as to the sequence of acquisition of the different mo-
dalities, the sequence of diachronic change in modal verbs, and, indeed, the exist-
ence of a common modal function. Moreover, this study demonstrated that the
features discussed are essential for the interpretation of modal utterances and, ar-
guably, the overall organisation of discourse. In this last section, I sum up the con-
tent of the present study, concentrating on the major points of each chapter.
6.1 On the universality of the interpretation

patterns
At the beginning of this study, we asked what enables speakers to code mo-
dality so it can be correctly decoded by the interlocutors. The obvious an-
swer is that some salient semantic features in the context enable us to arrive
at the relevant interpretation. Many of the contextual features discussed
here were systematically associated with the interpretation through the no-
tion of Controllability. This is more than mere coincidence. Although at
this stage of research I am unable to provide firm conclusions, I assume
that when (de)coding a modal utterance, a language user is sensitive to the
features related to Controllability.

Chapter 6 Final remarks
Since Controllability is a compositional notion, and the features encod-

ing it are semantically complex, it may be too demanding on the language
user to go through such a mental exercise. However, indirect support for
the hypothesis can be found in Coates (1988), who observed that the sys-
tem of modal meanings of eight-year-olds is only rudimentary, and that
even by the age of twelve the child’s modal system is not yet isomorphic
with that of an adult. The fact that modality, and especially epistemic mo-
dality, is acquired at a later stage of language development suggests that it
requires considerable cognitive abilities and world knowledge on the part
of the speaker and the addressee as well as intimate understanding of the
semantic and pragmatic mechanisms involved.1 The hypothesis put for-
ward here is also supported by the fact that there is considerable overlap
between the features constituting Transitivity and those constituting Con-
trollability. Thus, speakers rely on the presence of contextual features,
which are salient, since they are used in the overall organisation of dis-
course, when (de)coding modally modified utterances.
It should also be noted that the function language users assign to modal
expressions, to influence their environment in some way, can be considered
a universal. Nuyts (2005) argues that categories such as modality “appear
[…] to be a basic functional part of our system for conceptualising the
world and, presumably, the basic elements of that system are the same in
humans anywhere on earth, as biologically given” (Nuyts 2005: 19). Thus,
it seems likely that a biologically given capacity to conceptualise the world
is also put to use in a similar way: modality is interpreted in different lan-
guages by means of similar mechanisms such as, for instance, the encoding
of Controllability. Nuyts’s claim is echoed in Lyons (1977), who focuses on
the possible origin of deontic modality:
The origin of deontic modality, it has often been suggested, is to be sought

in the desiderative and instrumental function of language: that is to say, in
the use of language, on the one hand, to express or indicate wants and desires
and, on the other, to get things done by imposing one’s will on other agents.
It seems clear that these two functions are ontogenetically basic, in the sense
that they are associated with language from the very earliest stage of its devel-
opment in the child. It is equally clear that they are closely connected. (Lyons
1977: 826)
1 Cf. also Papafragou (1998b) and (2002b), who, coaching her account in the general theory of
mind, comes to the conclusion that the stages of acquisition of modality parallel the stages of cognitive
development.

According to Huddleston and Pullum (2002), it is generally possible to

“regard deontic uses as more basic, with epistemic ones arising by exten-
sion to the domain of reasoning of concepts primarily applicable in the do-
main of human interaction” (Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 178). In di-
rected deontic modality, the speaker’s involvement is direct in that the
speaker actively strives to alter reality in accordance with her specifications
by giving or seeking permission. In this case, the speaker herself is the
source of the deontic force expressed in the utterance. There must be some
imbalance of power between the speaker and the addressee so that one of
them is in a position to give permission or put an obligation on the other
to carry out the action specified in the proposition. This also presupposes
that the one to realise the proposition is a responsible and capable agent.
In expressions of non-directed deontic modality, the speaker is usually a
mere reporter of the circumstances that facilitate the implementation of
some action. In such utterances, the deontic force does not originate with
the speaker, and the speaker and/or the addressee may or may not be the
ones to carry out the action specified in the proposition.
The urge to modify one’s surroundings in this way must have been
present in humans since time immemorial (cf. Lyons 1977). Therefore, it
is not surprising that, as various studies indicate, deontic modality, partic-
ularly that expressed by modal verbs, is acquired first in both first and sec-
ond languages (see Perkins 1983, Stephany 1986, 1993, Smoczynska
1993, Dittmar and Terborg 1991, Terborg 1993, Ramat 1992, Noveck,
Ho, and Sera 1996). This is paralleled by the diachronic development, for
example, of English modals, where deontic uses are established before epis-
temic ones (see Bybee, Perkins and Pagliuca 1994, Hopper and Traugott
1993, Traugott and Dasher 2002).
Epistemic expressions, on the other hand, may serve a variety of purpos-
es. Firstly, the speaker may want to qualify her assertion so that the address-
ee will understand that what is said is less than a fact, i.e. the speaker does
not commit herself to the truth of the proposition expressed in an utter-
ance. Epistemic utterances not only signal the speaker’s judgement about
the likelihood of an event or state occurring or having occurred, but also
indicate that such judgement is based on some evidence available to the
speaker (see Palmer 2001: 8-9 on the distinction between epistemic and
evidential modality). The general function of epistemic expressions is to
create common conceptual ground between the speaker and the addressee,
modifying their perception of reality in some way. This involves, among
other things, such complex notions as the ability to recognise the other as
an individual with his own experience of the world or a different model of

the same world, and the understanding of the necessity of a common con-
ceptual ground in a social community for its survival. It also involves the
concept of time: the speaker may not only want to achieve consensus on
some present or future events or states of affairs, but may also want to
modify the understanding of past events or states. Therefore, it is not sur-
prising that epistemic modality, particularly that expressed by modals, is
acquired at the later stages of both first and second language acquisition
(see Perkins 1983, Stephany 1986, as well as Dittmar and Terborg 1991,
Ramat 1992, Terborg 1993), since it requires mastering both complex con-
cepts and complex linguistic means of expression. Although mastered at a
later stage, epistemic expressions are of great importance to successful com-
munication. Ochs (1996) claims that epistemic and affective stances 2 are
“central meaning components of social acts and social identities and that
linguistic structures that index epistemic and affective stances are the basic
linguistic resources for constructing/realizing social acts and social identi-
ties” (Ochs 1996: 419-420). Not only does Ochs draw our attention to the
centrality of stance expressions for what is labelled “socializing humanity”,
but she also points to the significance of the linguistic material with which
these expressions are encoded.
The existence of a common function for modal expressions makes the
suggesttion that there are universal patterns for the interpretation of these
expressions more plausible: a common function may be (de)coded in com-
mon ways on the general principle of iconicity. The association established
in the present study between the features discussed and the notion of Con-
trollability, on the one hand, and modal interpretations, on the other, is
therefore not accidental. We can hypothesise that a broad cross-linguistic
investigation may support the idea that the mechanisms of (de)coding mo-
dal expressions involve the notion of Controllability and the features relat-
ed to it in various languages. At this stage, it is impossible to ascertain
whether the analysis provided by the data mining program mimics the
processes activated in the human mind when confronted with the task of
(de)coding modal expressions. There is also no reason to claim that Con-
trollability and the related features alone trigger an interpretation without
the involvement of any or pragmatic or other factors. What is of impor-
2 Ochs (1996: 410) provides the following definitions:

“[E]pistemic stance refers to knowledge or belief viv-à-vis some focus of concern, including
degrees of certainty of knowledge, degrees of commitment to truths of propositions, and
sources of knowledge, among other epistemic qualities.
[A]ffective stance refers to a mood, attitude, feeling, and disposition, as well as degrees of emo-
tional intensity vis-à-vis some focus of concern”.

tance, however, is the recognition of the features discussed in this study as

fundamental for comprehension, the manipulation of reality, and the or-
ganization and planning of discourse.
6.2 Summing up
In Chapter 1, I provided an overview of the research on modality, from
general functional to diachronic studies. I also defined some concepts cen-
tral to the present study such as epistemic and non-epistemic modalities. I
proceeded by examining the systems of modal verbs in English and Swed-
ish, starting with the delineation of the group of modal verbs according to
a number of strictly morphological criteria for English, and a number of
criteria of a more semantic nature for Swedish, as well as some morpholo-
gical ones. The main focus, however, was placed on the description of the
range of possible interpretations of the relevant modals. Thus, I claimed
that the interpretations available to the modals in question in the two lan-
guages can be organised on epistemic and deontic scales, according to
speaker commitment to the truth of the proposition and speaker authority,
respectively. For the purposes of this study, I excluded a number of modals
in English and Swedish from the scales either because they appear in
marked contexts, or because they do not facilitate the epistemic/non-epis-
temic distinction. I also excluded all Swedish evidentials from the scales,
presented in revised forms in Figures 1-4.

must will should may might can
could
Figure 1. The scalar organization of English epistemic modals

måste bör bör borde kan
Figure 2. The scalar organization of Swedish epistemic modals


must should can could
may
Figure 3. The scalar organization of English deontic modals

måste ska bör borde få kan
Figure 4. The scalar organization of Swedish deontic modals
On the basis of these scales, I chose two pairs of modals for this study: must
and måste, and may and kan, since, arguably, these modals are placed on
the left-most and right-most ends of the scales, respectively, and exhibit
similar range of interpretations. I also introduced the main source of data
for the present range of study, the English-Swedish Parallel Corpus, and
addressed some aspects of corpus studies in general. Finally, I discussed the
aims and organization of the study.
In Chapter 2, I presented Coates’s (1983) study dealing with the statis-
tic relationships between certain syntactic features, and epistemic and non-
epistemic modality. In my account of her study, I explicitely focused on the
two modals, must and may, and their association with the features central
to Coates’s analysis. In the second part of the chapter, I discussed some of
the recent criticism of Coates’s approach, voiced primarily in Papafragou
(1998a, 2000). Papafragou criticizes Coates’s study mainly on two points.
Firstly, the association between the features discussed and epistemic and
non-epistemic modality reflects a mere tendency and can be refuted with
counter-examples. Secondly, the general claim that English modals are
polysemous forces Coates to rely on the concept of indeterminacy, which
gives rise to too many different meanings and shades of meanings. I also
reviewed Papafragou’s own analysis of modality and modal meaning,
coached in the general framework of Relevance Theory. Firstly, in Papafra-
gou’s view, English modals are monosemous: they are considered sense-
general expressions enriched and clarified in context by a series of pragma-
tic operations. Despite her claims as to the importance of context for the
interpretation of modal utterances, Papafragou fails to provide an explicit
account of the way context influences interpretation. I perceive this as a
major drawback of her otherwise innovative study, and proceed to investi-
gate the role of context, particularly propositional context, in the interpre-
tation of modal utterances.

Consequently, in Chapter 3, I tested Coates’s assumptions about the as-

sociation between features such as perfect and progressive aspects, introduc-
tory subject, state verb, and inanimate subject, and epistemic and non-epis-
temic interpretations on my data. Not only was I able to confirm Coates’s
findings on a more extensive dataset in the two languages, but I also found
additional features associated with interpretation: implicit and explicit con-
dition, time reference for modality and for the proposition, situation type, epis-
temic adverbial or particle. Moreover, I demonstrated that there are indi-
vidual differences between the modals. Thus, the modals belonging to the
left-most end of the scales discussed in Chapter 1 and those belonging to
the right-most end of the scales exhibit distinct patterns of correlations be-
tween the features discussed and the different interpretations. I also estab-
lished that in most examples the features combine in such a way as to as-
certain the intended interpretation. Finally, I discussed a number of inde-
terminate examples, claiming that the indeterminacy is due to the
inconclusive or conflicting arrangements of the relevant features in these
utterances.
In Chapter 4, I argued for the notion of Controllability underlying the
features discussed previously. Reviewing some studies concerned with no-
tions such as agentivity and control revealed no consensus as to what these
notions designate. In this study, Controllability is concerned with the abil-
ity of an agent to control the event described in the proposition (of a modal
utterance). On my proposal, the compositional nature of Controllability is
best accounted for by appealing to the contextual features that may bring
about the assumptions as to whether the event described in the proposition
of a modal utterance can be controlled by an intended agent or not. Con-
trollability is central to the interpretation of modal utterances: utterances
in which propositions are encoded so as to indicate lack of agent control
are interpreted epistemically, whereas utterances where the relevant fea-
tures indicate that the intended agent is in control of the situation are de-
ontic. Type of subject, the distinction between states and events, time refer-
ence for modality and the proposition, explicit and implicit conditions, and sit-
uation type all facilitate the notion of Controllability in English and in
Swedish. A number of additional features, such as the presence of epistemic
adverbials or particles, utterance type and negation, although not central to
Controllability as such, were also discussed as being of importance for the
interpretation of modal utterances. Furthermore, Controllability was
linked to the notion of Transitivity as per Hopper and Thompson’s (1980)
article. I argued that these notions overlap. Transitivity is defined by Hop-
per and Thompson (1980) as the transfer of energy from an agent to a pa-

tient. Controllability involves, more specifically, the ability of the agent to

choose to transfer the energy to a patient in order to carry out the event
specified in the proposition (of a modal utterance). Controllability is also
coded in a way similar to Transitivity: no single feature is sufficient to ex-
press Controllability, but each feature contributes to it.
Chapter 5 reported the results of the data mining analysis undertaken
to uncover the statistically significant patterns of the features with respect
to the interpretation and to confirm the results of the qualitative analysis
in Chapter 3. It also served to establish how the features related to Con-
trollability combine to give rise to the intended interpretation. At this
stage, there are, however, some reservations as to the applicability of this
analysis and the conclusions drawn from it. Firstly, the possible interpreta-
tions were not distributed evenly in the set of data presented to the com-
puter, probably due to its size: some of the interpretations were not present
at all or were present to a very limited degree. This may be why the com-
puter was not equally successful in learning to classify all of the modals.
The analysis is further limited by the fact that it involves only two languag-
es, English and Swedish, and only two pairs of modals. Although the data
mining analysis should not be taken at face value, it demonstrates that the
features discussed in the present study as constituting Controllability are
repeatedly implicated to systematically play a role in the interpretation of
utterances containing must, måste, may, and kan. Furthermore, must and
måste, belonging to the left-most end of the above-mentioned scales, pat-
tern very similarly in the two languages with respect to the correlation of
the relevant features and the interpretations. May and kan, situated on the
right-most end of the scales, on the other hand, pattern differently not
only in relation to must and måste, but also in relation to each other. Argu-
ably, this difference is caused by the difference in the degree of grammati-
calization of may and kan.

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
APPENDIX I MUST-DATA
Test mode: 10-fold cross-validation

Scheme: weka.classifiers.trees.J48 -C 0.25 -M 2
Relation: Must
Instances: 461
Attributes: 20
interpretation
advPart
animateS
specS
introS
person
genericS
verb
aspect
timeMod
timeProp
passive
ImpCond
ExplCond
negMod
negProp
assertion
exclamation
control
situation
=== Summary ===



0.969 0.027 0.952 0.969 0.96 epistemic
0.98 0.048 0.973 0.98 0.976 deontic
0 0 0 0 0 ambiguous
6 0 288 0 | c = deontic
1 0 2 0 | d = ambiguous

APPENDIX II MÅSTE-DATA

Relation: Måste
Instances: 1017
Attributes: 20
interpretation
advPart
animateS
specS
introS
person
genericS
verb
aspect
timeMod
timeProp
passive
ImpCond
ExplCond
negMod
negProp
assertion
exclamation
control
situation
=== Summary ===



0.826 0.034 0.815 0.826 0.821 epistemic
0.968 0.188 0.965 0.968 0.967 deontic
0 0 0 0 0 ambiguous
a b c <-- classified as
128 27 0 | a = epistemic
27 830 0 | b = deontic
2 3 0 | c = ambiguous

APPENDIX III MUST/MÅSTE-DATA

Relation: Must and måste
Instances: 1461
Attributes: 20
interpretation
advPart
animateS
specS
introS
person
genericS
verb
aspect
timeMod
timeProp
passive
ImpCond
ExplCond
negMod
negProp
assertion
exclamation
control
situation
=== Summary ===



0.902 0.031 0.888 0.902 0.895 epistemic
0.972 0.113 0.968 0.972 0.97 deontic
0 0 0 0 0 ambiguous
286 0 31 0 | a = epistemic
32 0 1102 0 | c = deontic

APPENDIX IV MAY-DATA

Relation: May
Instances: 361
Attributes: 20
interpretation
advPart
animateS
specS
introS
person
genericS
verb
aspect
timeMod
timeProp
passive
ImpCond
ExplCond
negMod
negProp
assertion
exclamation
control
situation
=== Summary ===



0.967 0.701 0.813 0.967 0.883 epistemic
0 0.015 0 0 0 epistemicW
0.6 0.027 0.625 0.6 0.612 deontic
0 0.018 0 0 0 ambiguous
6 3 15 1 | c = deontic

APPENDIX V KAN-DATA

Relation: kan
Instances: 1001
Attributes: 20
interpretation
advPart
animateS
specS
introS
person
genericS
verb
aspect
timeMod
timeProp
passive
ImpCond
ExplCond
negMod
negProp
assertion
exclamation
control
situation
=== Summary ===



0.267 0.026 0.54 0.267 0.358 epistemic
0.727 0.261 0.616 0.727 0.667 epistemicW
0.371 0.017 0.59 0.371 0.455 deontic
0.768 0.241 0.721 0.768 0.744 dynamic
0.083 0.001 0.667 0.083 0.148 ambiguous
a b c d e <-- classified as
27 61 0 13 0 | a = epistemic
21 266 2 77 0 | b = epistemicW
0 12 23 27 0 | c = deontic
1 89 13 344 1 | d = dynamic
1 4 1 16 2 | e = ambiguous

Index of names
Aijmer 42, 94, 204, 205 Giora 147

Altenberg 42 Givon 16
Atlas 54, 57, 93 Granger 42
Groesfema 54
Barbiers 21, 81 Gruber 113
Beijer 17 Gumperz 58, 155
Biber, Conrad and Reppen 40, 41
Bolinger 199 Halliday 14, 113
Brennan 17 Heine 118, 122
Bybee 41, 147 Hermerén 12, 18, 49
Bybee and Fleischman 12, 13 Hopper and Thompson 117, 142,
Bybee and Hopper 147 143, 144, 145, 147, 214
Bybee and Pagliuca 13, 14 Hopper and Traugott 14, 210
Bybee, Perkins and Pagliuca 12, 17, Hoye 137
19, 102, 203, 210 Huddleston and Pullum 21, 69, 124,
134, 137, 139, 168, 186, 210
Calbert 20, 21
Cinque 17, 19, 88, 141, 192 Jucker 78, 99
Coates 17, 18, 26, 27, 28, 29, 35, 42, Julien 124
46, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 58, 59,
60, 65, 66, 67, 72, 74, 93, 94, 96, Kennedy 40, 41
110, 118, 119, 130, 147, 149 155, Klinge 45, 56, 58, 113, 115, 116,
176, 209, 213, 214 118, 121, 123, 126, 128, 129, 132
Comrie 125, 128, 129, 134 Kratzer 54
Croft 142 Krug 14, 148, 203
Cruse 113, 114 Kytö 204
Dahl 14, 121, 144, 203 Lampert and Lampert 22

Dittmar and Terborg 210, 211 Leech 16, 17, 18, 22, 28
Dowty 120, 122, 144 Leech and Coates 26, 45, 93, 94, 95,
Durst-Andersen 119 96, 97, 99, 111, 147
Levinson 184
Eide 19, 20, 21, 62, 123, 127, 129, Lightfoot 13, 17, 203
133, 134, 172, 173 Lyons 62, 89, 113, 130, 137, 209,
Enç 124 210
Feldman 20 Maslov 129

Fillmore 113 McCallum-Bayliss 18, 122
Frawley 125, 135, 141 McEnery and Wilson 41, 42

ter Meulen 128, 129 Thompson and Hopper 148

Michaelis 125, 128, 135 Traugott 14, 56
Mindt 42 Traugott and Dasher 14, 203, 210
Mithun 147
van der Auwera 14
Noveck, Ho and Sera 210 van der Auwera and Plungian 14
Nuyts 11, 22, 26, 209 Vendler 135
Verkuyl 135
Ochs 211 Verstraete 21, 32, 33
von Wright 12, 19, 22
Palmer 12, 19, 20, 22, 27, 28, 29, 31,
35, 72, 74, 88, 107, 126, 140, 141, Wallace 118, 119
148, 192, 210 Warner 23, 147, 203, 204
Papafragou 46, 48, 53, 54, 55, 56, Warren 42
57, 58, 59, 62, 63, 66, 69, 87, 111, Wiktorsson 42
133, 136, 155, 168, 184, 186, 209, Winter 116, 117
213 Witten and Frank 150, 151, 153,
Paradis 42, 56, 129 154, 159
Perkins 18, 29, 129, 210, 211 Wärnsby 42, 132, 137, 138, 142,
146, 156
Quirk et al 12, 24, 27, 28, 29, 34, 35,
38, 67, 74, 137 Zadeh 48
Ramat 210, 211

Runde 13, 114, 115
Ryan 142
Salkie 56
de Saussure 56, 118
Scheibman 148
Schlenker 119
Searle 115, 139
Silverstein 144
Slobin 173
Smoczynska 210
Sperber and Wilson 54
Stalnaker 57, 56
Stephany 210, 211
Sweetser 14, 203
Teleman et al 17, 24, 25, 30, 31, 32,

33, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 88, 89
Terborg 210, 211

Subject index
acquisition 208, 211 156, 163, 167, 169, 171, 175,

Agency Hierarchy 144 176, 177, 178, 205, 214
agent 20, 33, 34, 65, 70, 71, 72, 73, confusion matrix 158, 159, 187
77, 79, 84, 88, 91, 92, 98, 99, 100, context 13, 45, 57, 58, 62, 64, 66,
103, 110, 111, 115, 116, 117, 118, 79, 84, 93, 94, 95, 97, 98, 99, 100,
120, 121, 123, 125, 129, 130, 131, 104, 105, 106, 108, 111, 114, 115,
133, 136, 138, 141, 148, 155, 172, 125, 133, 172, 173, 206, 213, 214
183, 191, 194, 201, 210, 214 biased 199
ambiguity 49, 93, 94, 95, 99, 111, neutral 199
172 control 12, 27, 34, 70, 72, 74, 78,
ambiguous 54, 97, 98, 116, 123, 79, 83, 103, 111, 113, 114, 115,
124, 126 116, 118, 120, 125, 129, 130, 136,
animacy scale 144 138, 148, 172, 182, 184, 185, 191,
ARFF 152, 155, 156 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 201,
arithmetic mean 161 206, 214
aspect 128, 134 Controllability 113, 117, 118, 119,
phasal 128 134, 136, 138, 140, 145, 148, 149,
association rules 153 150, 155, 156, 163, 165, 178, 181,
assertive 108, 139, 156, 188, 194, 182, 186, 188, 190, 202, 205, 206,
196, 206 208, 209, 211, 214, 215
atelic 134, 148, 156, 170, 174, 176, competence 39
177, 190 counterfactual 32
couterfactuality 31
background 145, 147
boundedness 125 Data Mining 46, 150, 151, 205, 215
decision chain 155, 157, 164, 170,
classification rules 153 188, 191, 206
cluster analysis 154 decision tree 151, 154, 157, 162,
code 23 163, 169, 171, 178, 180, 187, 202,
concessive 74 205, 207
condition declarative 103, 139, 201
explicit 62, 63, 65, 79, 80, 83, 84, definite 123, 124
111, 116, 132, 136, 148, 156, definiteness 124
163, 167, 169, 170, 175, 176, deontic force 19, 21, 87, 99, 101,
178, 205, 214 121, 122, 123, 136, 155, 177, 201,
implicit 62, 64, 66, 79, 80, 83, 210
84, 111, 116, 132, 136, 148, deontic source 88, 92, 122, 148,
172, 194

desiderative function 209 indeterminacy 49, 53, 93, 100, 105,

diachronic 56, 102, 202, 203, 208, 106, 110, 111, 214
210, 212 indeterminate 48, 94, 111, 156, 159,
169, 180, 181, 187, 201, 214
egophoric reference 121, 123 indivisibility 125
egophoricity scale 144 inference
English-Swedish Parallel Corpus, the confident 26, 30, 212
42, 213 reasonable 26, 30, 212
event 125, 156 tentative 26, 30, 212
evidence instrumental function 209
first-hand 31 interpretation
second-hand 31 anterior 24
quotative 31 simultaneous 24
evidentiality 30 interrogative 37, 101, 103, 139, 144,
evidentials 31, 212 201
exclamation 155 introductory subject 50
exclamative 139, 140, 156 inversion 23
irrealis 147
False Positive (FP) Rate 157, 159,
160 Kappa statistic 157, 159, 162, 169,
F-measure 157, 159, 161 179, 180, 187
foreground 145
form language structure 40
past 24 language use 40
present 24 langue 40
formulaic subjunctive 73
fuzzy set model 48 machine learning 151
merger 49, 93, 94, 95, 96, 99, 101,
generic 92. 105, 106, 119, 121, 123, 102, 104, 106, 111
124, 156, 163, 168, 169, 175, 181, metaphor 14
185, 186, 206 metaphorical 14, 15, 177
gradience 49, 93, 94, 96, 104, 111 metaphorization 203
grammaticalization 14, 205, 215 metonymic 71
uniderectionality of 14 metonymization 203
modal logic 12
harmonic 69, 78, 137 modality
harmonic mean 161 agent-oriented 13
hear-say 30 assumptive 27
as semantic phenomenon 12
illocutionary force 13, 115, 139, 140 deductive 27
imperative 139 deontic 19
indefinite 123 directed deontic 20
discourse-oriented 19

Subject index
dynamic 21 theoretical 16, 17, 28

epistemic 15 weak epistemic 18, 49, 100, 203
evidential 31 pragmatics 54
existential 22 Precision 157, 161, 162, 169, 179,
extrinsic 12 180, 187
goal-oriented 20 Proto-Agent 120, 121, 144, 148
intrinsic 12
non-directed deontic 21 quantificational modals 17
propositional 31, 148 quantitative prototype 147
source-oriented 20
speaker-oriented 12 reanalysis 203
subject-oriented 14 Recall 159
monosemous 54, 213 recommendation 33, 35, 213
monosemy 56, 58 Relevance theory 54, 59, 213
negated 108, 109 sense-general 54, 94

negation 23, 101, 110, 139, 140, shared belief 30
148, 156, 188, 192, 196, 206, 214 short-circuited implicatures 184,
non-assertive 101, 139, 140, 156, 196
196 specific 119, 123, 124, 156, 172,
non-harmonic 78, 137 173, 174, 177, 206
non-specific 119, 123, 124, 172, specificity 123, 124, 169, 176, 178,
175, 206 206
speech act 139
objective 21, 90 stance
obligation 33, 35, 213 affective 211
epistemic 211
parallel corpora 42 state 125, 156
parole 40 subjective 13, 14, 21, 89
passive 83, 84, 102, 103, 106, 131, subjectivity 18, 118
132, 135, 148, 156, 188, 189, 190, synchronic 56
206
blive- 132 telic 134, 148, 156, 170, 176
s- 132 tense 128, 134
performance 40 theory of mind 209
permission 33, 35, 213 time reference 62, 111, 126, 131,
possible conclusion 26, 30, 212 148, 156, 163, 164, 165, 167, 169,
polysemic 48 171, 176, 177, 178, 181, 183, 186,
polysemy 56, 58, 93 188, 194, 195, 201, 202, 205, 206,
possibility 214
dynamic 38 anterior 62, 64, 65, 68, 71, 72,
factual 16, 17 73, 74, 76, 83, 86, 87, 91, 92, 93,
Root 17 111, 124, 127, 133, 136, 148,

156, 164, 165, 166, 171, 183,

188, 191
future 111, 126, 156, 195, 206
past 85, 111, 126, 156, 195, 206
posterior 62, 63, 68, 69, 72, 73,
76, 77, 83, 85, 87, 91, 92, 97, 98,
101, 102, 104, 105, 106, 107,
111, 124, 127, 129, 131, 136,
148, 156, 164, 165, 166, 167,
172, 173, 183, 189, 191, 193,
198, 206
present 126, 156, 176, 196, 197,
206
simultaneous 62, 64, 65, 71, 72,
73, 76, 77, 79, 87, 91, 92, 98, 99,
100, 101, 102, 104, 105, 106,
107, 108, 111, 124, 127, 129,
131, 136, 156, 164, 165, 167,
172, 174, 176, 177, 183, 184,
185, 190, 191, 193, 198
Transitivity 113, 117, 118, 142, 149,
209, 214, 215
True Positive (TP) Rate 157, 159,
160, 162, 169, 179, 180, 187
unlimited state 124, 168, 186
volition 35
Weka 150, 152, 162, 169, 180

Founded by Eilert Ekwall
Editors: Marianne Thormählen and Beatrice Warren
001 BERTIL WEMAN. 1933. Old English Semantic Analysis and Theory. With Spe-
cial Reference to Verbs Denoting Locomotion. 187 pp.
002 HILDING BÄCK. 1934. The Synonyms for child, boy, girl in Old English. An
Etymological-Semasiological Investigation. xvi + 273 pp.
003 GUSTAV FRANSSON. 1935. Middle English Surnames of Occupation. With an
Excursus on Toponymical Surnames. 217 pp.
004 GUSTAV HOFSTRAND. 1936. The Seege of Troye. A Study in the Intertextual
Relations of the Middle English Romance The Seege or Batayle of Troye. xv + 205
pp.
005 URBAN OHLANDER. 1936. Studies on Coordinate Expressions in Middle
English. 213 pp.
006 VIKTOR ENGBLOM. 1938. On the Origin and Early Development of the Aux-
iliary Do. 169 pp.
007 IVAR DAHL. 1938. Substantival Inflexion in Early Old English. Vocalic Stems.
xvi + 206 pp.
008 HILMER STRÖM. 1939. Old English Personal Names in Bede's History. An
Etymological-Phonological Investigation. xliii + 180 pp.
009 UNO PHILIPSON. 1941. Political Slang 1759-1850. xvi + 314 pp.
010 ARTHUR H. KING. 1941. The Language of Satirized Characters in Poëtaster. A
Socio-Stylistic Analysis 1579-1602. xxxiv + 258 pp.
011 MATTIAS T. LÖFVENBERG. 1942. Studies on Middle English Local Surnames.
xlv + 225 pp.
012 JOHANNES HEDBERG. 1945. The Syncope of the Old English Present End-
ings. A Dialect Criterion. 310 pp.
013 ALARIK RYNELL. 1948. The Rivalry of Scandinavian and Native Synonyms in
Middle English, especially taken and nimen. With an Excursus on nema and taka
in Old Scandinavian. 431 pp.
014 HENNING HALLQVIST. 1948. Studies in Old English Fractured ea. 167 pp.
015 GÖSTA FORSSTRÖM. 1948. The Verb to be in Middle English. A Survey of the
Forms. 236 pp. LUND STUDIES IN ENGLISH Founded by Eilert Ekwall. Edi-
tors: Marianne Thormählen and Beatrice Warren
016 BERTIL WIDÉN. 1949. Studies on the Dorset Dialect. 179 pp.
017 CLAES SCHAAR. 1949. Critical Studies in the Cynewulf Group. 337 pp.
018 BERTIL SUNDBY. 1950. The Dialect and Provenance of the Middle English
Poem The Owl and the Nightingale. A Linguistic Study. 218 pp.
019 BERTIL THURESSON. 1950. Middle English Occupational Terms. 285 pp.
020 KARL-GUNNAR LINDKVIST. 1950. Studies on the Local Sense of the Preposi-
tions in, at, on, and to, in Modern English. 429 pp.
021 SVEN RUBIN. 1951. The Phonology of the Middle English Dialect of Sussex.
235 pp.
022 BERTIL SUNDBY. 1953. Christopher Cooper's English Teacher (1687). cxvi +
10* + 123 pp.
023 BJÖRN WALLNER. 1954. An Exposition of Qui Habitat and Bonum Est in
English. lxxi + 122 pp.
024 RUDOLF MAGNUSSON. 1954. Studies in the Theory of the Parts of Speech.
viii + 120 pp.
025 CLAES SCHAAR. 1954. Some Types of Narrative in Chaucer's Poetry. 293 pp.
026 BÖRJE HOLMBERG. 1956. James Douglas on English Pronunciation c. 1740.
354 pp.
027 EILERT EKWALL. 1959. Etymological Notes on English Place-Names. 108 pp.
028 CLAES SCHAAR. 1960. An Elizabethan Sonnet Problem. Shakespeare's Sonnets,
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029 ELIS FRIDNER. 1961. An English Fourteenth Century Apocalypse Version with
a Prose Commentary. Edited from MS Harley 874 and Ten Other MSS. lviii + 290
pp.
030 The Published Writings of Eilert Ekwall. A Bibliography Compiled by Olof von
Feilitzen. 1961. 52 pp.
031 ULF JACOBSSON. 1962. Phonological Dialect Constituents in the Vocabulary
of Standard English. 335 pp.
032 CLAES SCHAAR. 1962. Elizabethan Sonnet Themes and the Dating of Shakes-
peare's Sonnets. 200 pp.
033 EILERT EKWALL. 1963. Selected Papers. 172 pp.
034 ARNE ZETTERSTEN. 1965. Studies in the Dialect and Vocabulary of the
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035 GILLIS KRISTENSSON. 1967. A Survey of Middle English Dialects 1290-1350.
The Six Northern Counties and Lincolnshire. xxii + 299 pp.
036 OLOF ARNGART. 1968. The Middle English Genesis and Exodus. Re-edited
from MS. C.C.C.C. 444 with Introduction, Notes and Glossary. 277 pp.
037 ARNE ZETTERSTEN. 1969. The English of Tristan da Cunha. 180 pp.
038 ELLEN ALWALL. 1970. The Religious Trend in Secular Scottish School-Books
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land in the Middle and Late 19th Century. 177 pp.
039 CLAES SCHAAR. 1971. Marino and Crashaw. Sospetto d'Herode. A Commen-
tary. 300 pp.
040 SVEN BÄCKMAN. 1971. This Singular Tale. A Study of The Vicar of Wakefield
and Its Literary Background. 281 pp.
041 CHRISTER PÅHLSSON. 1972. The Northumbrian Burr. A Sociolinguistic
Study. 309 pp.
042 KARL-GUSTAV EK. 1972. The Development of OE y and eo in South-Eastern
Middle English. 133 pp.
043 BO SELTÉN. 1972. The Anglo-Saxon Heritage in Middle English Personal
Names. East Anglia 1100 1399. 187 pp.
044 KERSTIN ASSARSSON-RIZZI. 1972. Friar Bacon and Friar Bungay. A Struc-
tural and Thematic Analysis of Robert Greene's Play. 164 pp.
045 ARNE ZETTERSTEN. 1974. A Critical Facsimile Edition of Thomas Batchelor,
An Orthoëpical Analysis of the English Language and An Orthoëpical Analysis of
the Dialect of Bedfordshire (1809). Part I. 260 pp.
046 ERIK INGVAR THURIN. 1974. The Universal Autobiography of Ralph Waldo
Emerson. xii + 288 pp.
047 HARRIET BJÖRK. 1974. The Language of Truth. Charlotte Brontë, the Woman
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048 ANDERS DALLBY. 1974. The Anatomy of Evil. A Study of John Webster's The
White Devil. 236 pp.
049 GILLIS KRISTENSSON. 1974. John Mirk's Instructions for Parish Priests.
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tion, Notes and Glossary. 287 pp.
050 STIG JOHANSSON. 1975. Papers in Contrastive Linguistics and Language Test-
ing. 179 pp.
051 BENGT ELLENBERGER. 1977. The Latin Element in the Vocabulary of the
Earlier Makars Henryson and Dunbar. 163 pp.
052 MARIANNE THORMÄHLEN. 1978. The Waste Land. A Fragmentary Whole-
ness. 248 pp.
053 LARS HERMERÉN. 1978. On Modality in English. A Study of the Semantics of
the Modals. 195 pp.
054 SVEN BÄCKMAN. 1979. Tradition Transformed. Studies in the Poetry of Wil-
fred Owen. 206 pp.
055 JAN JÖNSJÖ. 1979. Studies on Middle English Nicknames. I: Compounds. 227
pp.
056 JAN SVARTVIK & RANDOLPH QUIRK (eds). 1980. A Corpus of English
Conversation. 893 pp.
057 LARS-HÅKAN SVENSSON. 1980. Silent Art. Rhetorical and Thematic Patterns
in Samuel Daniel's Delia. 392 pp.
058 INGRID MÅRDH. 1980. Headlinese. On the Grammar of English Front Page
Headlines. 200 pp.
059 STIG JOHANSSON. 1980. Plural Attributive Nouns in Present-Day English. x +
136 pp.
060 CLAES SCHAAR. 1982. The Full Voic'd Quire Below. Vertical Context Systems
in Paradise Lost. 354 pp.
061 GUNILLA FLORBY. 1982. The Painful Passage to Virtue. A Study of George
Chapman's The Tragedy of Bussy D'Ambois and The Revenge of Bussy
D'Ambois. 266 pp.
062 BENGT ALTENBERG. 1982. The Genitive v. the of-Construction. A Study of
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063 JAN SVARTVIK, MATS EEG-OLOFSSON, OSCAR FORSHEDEN, BENGT
ORESTRÖM & CECILIA THAVENIUS. 1982. Survey of Spoken English.
Report on Research 1975-81. 112 pp.
064 CECILIA THAVENIUS. 1983. Referential Pronouns in English Conversation.
194 pp.
065 NILS WRANDER. 1983. English Place-Names in the Dative Plural. 172 pp.
066 BENGT ORESTRÖM. 1983. Turn-Taking in English Conversation. 195 pp.
067 EVA JARRING CORONES. 1983. The Portrayal of Women in the Fiction of
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068 ANNA-BRITA STENSTRÖM. 1984. Questions and Responses in English Con-
versation. x + 296 pp.
069 KARIN HANSSON. 1984. The Warped Universe. A Study of Imagery and Struc-
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070 MARIANNE THORMÄHLEN. 1984. Eliot's Animals. 197 pp.
071 EVERT ANDERSSON. 1985. On Verb Complementation in Written English.
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072 WIVECA SOTTO. 1985. The Rounded Rite. A Study of Wole Soyinka's Play
The Bacchae of Euripides. 187 pp.
073 ULLA THAGG FISHER. 1985. The Sweet Sound of Concord. A Study of Swed-
ish Learners' Concord Problems in English. xii + 212 pp.
074 MOIRA LINNARUD. 1986. Lexis in Composition. A Performance Analysis of
Swedish Learners' Written English. x + 136 pp.
075 LARS WOLLIN & HANS LINDQUIST (eds). 1986. Translation Studies in
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ory (SSOTT) II. 149 pp.
076 BENGT ALTENBERG. 1987. Prosodic Patterns in Spoken English. Studies in
the Correlation between Prosody and Grammar for Text-to-Speech Conversion.
229 pp.
077 ÖRJAN SVENSSON. 1987. Saxon Place-Names in East Cornwall. xii + 192 pp.
078 JØRN CARLSEN & BENGT STREIJFFERT (eds). 1988. Canada and the Nor-
dic Countries. 416 pp.
079 STIG CARLSSON. 1989. Studies on Middle English Local Bynames in East
Anglia. 193 pp.
080 HANS LINDQUIST. 1989. English Adverbials in Translation. A Corpus Study of
Swedish Renderings. 184 pp.
081 ERIK INGVAR THURIN. 1990. The Humanization of Willa Cather. Classicism
in an American Classic. 406 pp.
082 JAN SVARTVIK (ed). 1990. The London-Lund Corpus of Spoken English.
Description and Research. 350 pp.
083 KARIN HANSSON. 1991. Sheer Edge. Aspects of Identity in David Malouf 's
Writing. 170 pp.
084 BIRGITTA BERGLUND. 1993. Woman's Whole Existence. The House as an
Image in the Novels of Ann Radcliffe, Mary Wollstonecraft and Jane Austen. 244
pp.
085 NANCY D. HARGROVE. 1994. The Journey Toward Ariel. Sylvia Plath's Poems
of 1956-1959. 293 pp.
086 MARIANNE THORMÄHLEN (ed). 1994. T. S. Eliot at the Turn of the Century.
244 pp.
087 KARIN HANSSON. 1996. The Unstable Manifold. Janet Frame's Challenge to
Determinism. 149 pp.
088 KARIN AIJMER, BENGT ALTENBERG & MATS JOHANSSON (eds). 1996.
Languages in Contrast. Papers from a Symposium on Text-based Cross-linguistic
Studies Lund. 200 pp.
089 CECILIA BJÖRKÉN. 1996. Into the Isle of Self. Nietzschean Patterns and Con-
trasts in D. H. Lawrence's The Trespasser. 247 pp.
090 MARJA PALMER. 1996. Men and Women in T. S. Eliot's Early Poetry. 243 pp.
091 KEITH COMER. 1996. Strange Meetings. Walt Whitman, Wilfred Owen and
Poetry of War. 205 pp.
092 CARITA PARADIS. 1997. Degree Modifiers of Adjectives in Spoken British
English. 189 pp.
093 GUNILLA FLORBY. 1997. The Margin Speaks. A Study of Margaret Laurence
and Robert Kroetsch from a Post-Colonial Point of View. 252 pp.
094 JEAN HUDSON. 1998. Perspectives on fixedness: applied and theoretical. 177
pp.
095 MARIE KÄLLKVIST. 1998. Form-Class and Task-Type Effects in Learner
English: A Study of Advanced Swedish Learners. xii + 226 pp.
096 AGNETA LINDGREN. 1999. The Fallen World in Coleridge's Poetry. 264 pp.
097 BJÖRN SUNDMARK. 1999. Alice in the Oral-Literary Continuum. 224 pp.
098 STAFFAN KLINTBORG. 1999. The Transience of American Swedish. 171 pp.
099 LARS HERMERÉN. 1999. English for Sale. A Study of the Language of Advertis-
ing. 201 pp. + 53 reproductions.
100 CECILIA WADSÖ LECAROS. 2001. The Victorian Governess Novel. 308 pp.
Ill.
101 JANE MATTISSON. 2002. Knowledge and Survival in the Novels of Thomas
Hardy. 423 pp.
102 ROWENA JANSSON. 2001. Getting It Together. A genre analysis of the rhetori-
cal structure of Open University television programmes in science and technology.
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113 ANNA WÄRNSBY. (De)coding Modality: The Case of Must, May, Måste, and
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LUND STUDIES IN ENGLISH

LUND STUDIES IN ENGLISH

LUND STUDIES IN ENGLISH 113

Distribution and sales

© Anna Wärnsby 2006

Typesetting Ilgot Liljedahl

I would like to thank The Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation who

What follows is an account of some of the issues, controversies, definitions,

understanding of modality. According to von Wright (1951: 1-2), modal

(1) Jane reads (a lot).

(2) Jane can read.

In (1), the proposition is expressed by the main predicate reads, referring

The notion of control is, however, notoriously difficult to define for-

1 See detailed definitions in 1.1.1 and 1.1.2.

ment of grammatical meaning. Still others argue that shifts in meaning, at

in turn, allows metaphorical mapping of sociophysical potentiality to the

1.1.1 Epistemic modality

(3) Jane can be leaving now. Epistemic

(4) It is possible that Jane is leaving now.

Thus, epistemic modality indicates the degree of speaker commitment to

(5) Jane can be leaving. [possibility]

(6) Jane may be leaving. [probability]

(7) Jane must be leaving. [inferred certainty]

(8) The window may be broken. [factual possibility]

‘It is possible that the window is broken.’3

(9) The window can be broken. [theoretical possibility]

‘It is possible for the window to be broken.’

i.e. ‘It is possible to break the window.’

In Leech’s words, can “merely postulates the theoretical possibility” of the

it is possible that X performs Y, then it is possible for X to Y, but not vice

In this study, I follow the broad definition of epistemic possibility pro-

1.1.2 Non-epistemic modalities

dality is not a homogenous category, but it is seen by many as a cover term

1.1.2.1 Deontic modality

(11) Jane can leave now. Deontic

(12) ‘I permit Jane to leave now.’

(13) ‘Jane is allowed to leave now.’

Sometimes, instead of saying that a certain person ought to do a certain

1.1.2.2 Dynamic modality

(15) Jane can play chess. Dynamic

The paraphrase for this sentence is:

(16) ‘Jane is able to play chess.’

The paraphrase in (16) appropriately reflects the salient sense of ability of

1.1.2.3 Existential modality

(17) Lions can be dangerous. (Leech 1969: 223) Existential

(18) ‘It is sometimes possible for lions to be dangerous.’

(19) ‘Lions are sometimes dangerous.’

In (18), the paraphrase for existential modality is modified by sometimes to

1.2 Modal verbs

1.2.1 Criteria for identifying modal verbs in English

(20) John cannot play the piano.

(21) *John plays not the piano.

(ii) Auxiliaries are inverted with the subject in interrogative sentences,

(22) Can John play the piano?

(23) *Plays John the piano?

(24) John can play the piano, and so can Mary.