Manual of Social Psychology - Chapter X

CHAPTER X
ATTITUDES: DEFINITION AND MEASUREMENT

COMPONENTS OF ATTITUDE. MODEL OF REASONED ACTION AND
PLANNED ACTION
Silvia Ubillos
Sonia Mayordomo
Dario Paez
Definition of Attitude
A classic definition of attitude is that established by Allport, who considered it 'a
state of mental and nervous disposition, organized through experience, which exerts a
dynamic directive influence on the response of the individual to all kinds of objects and
situations' (Allport, 1935, in Martín-Baró, 1988).
This definition already raises some central characteristics of attitude (Vallerand,
1994): a) it is a construct or variable that is not directly observable; b) implies an
organization, that is, a relationship between cognitive, affective and conative aspects; c) it
has a motivational role of impulsiveness and orientation towards action - although it should
not be confused with it - and also influences perception and thinking; d) it is learned; e) is
enduring; and, f) it has a simple evaluation or affectivity component of like-dislike.
Furthermore, two other aspects that are usually integrated into attitudinal phenomena
are: a) their defining nature of the subject's identity; and, b) being evaluative judgments,
accessible and stored in long-term memory (Zimbardo and Leippe, 1991).
Classic Theories of Attitude Formation

Classic theories of attitude formation postulated that attitudes were learned in the
same way as other learned responses. Attitudinal responses were considered to be reinforced
by classical and instrumental conditioning processes.
The Classic Conditioning of Attitudes

Classical conditioning states that a neutral stimulus not capable of eliciting a certain
response, acquires this capacity thanks to its association, repeatedly, with a stimulus that
provokes said response.
Different authors have considered that the formation of attitudes could occur through
a process of classical conditioning and that these could affect subsequent behavioral
responses. Staats and Staats (1958), presenting students with the name of certain
nationalities accompanied by positive, negative or neutral adjectives, found that those that
had been paired with positive adjectives were evaluated more favorably than those paired
with negative adjectives. According to classical conditioning, the attitudinal response is due
to the mere association between the conditioned and unconditioned stimuli.
However, this approach has been criticized since it does not explain the processes
that mediate the association of evaluative responses with unconditioned stimuli.
Likewise, some researchers (Insko and Oakes, 1966) criticized this
conceptualization, alleging an explanation in terms of demand characteristics. That is, it was
suggested that the subjects were aware of the relationship between the names of the
nationalities and the evaluative words and responded according to the experimenter's
expectations. However, this criticism has also been refuted by another series of authors
(Krosnick, Betz, Jussim and Lynn, 1992) who demonstrated through a series of experiments
that the results in attitude formation could not be explained in the terms mentioned above. .
In short, research from the perspective of classical conditioning suggests that our
attitudes can be unintentionally 'colored' by the context in which an object has been
experienced, being a quite functional process when the relationship between the stimulus
and the context is stable ( Stroebe and Jonas, 1996).
The Instrumental Conditioning of Attitudes

According to the instrumental conditioning paradigm, a response that is part of the
subject's behavioral repertoire can be reinforced. Thus, those responses that are
accompanied by positive consequences for the subject will tend to be repeated to a greater
extent than those that elicit negative consequences (Stroebe and Jonas, 1996).
A classic study is that of Verplanck (1955) who found that verbal reinforcement
through differential recognition of subjects' opinions produced a greater frequency of
opinion statements when they were positively reinforced.
Likewise, another series of authors (Hildum and Brown, 1965; Insko, 1965)
demonstrated that attitudes could be modified through differential reinforcement. For
example, Insko (1965) interviewed a series of students about a topic of interest. Half of
them were reinforced through favorable attitudinal verbal responses and the other half with
unfavorable attitudinal responses. Subsequently, a questionnaire was given to the subjects to
assess their attitude regarding the issue resulting from the interview and it was found that, a
week later, the groups - differentially reinforced - differed in their attitude.
However, although it is accepted that verbal reinforcement can provoke a change in
attitude, a criticism of this paradigm is that it does not explain whether these effects occur
automatically or if, on the contrary, there are different cognitive processes that mediate the
relationship. In this sense, Cialdini and Insko (1969) propose that verbal reinforcement has
two functions: a) it is an indicator of the attitudinal position of the interviewer; and, b)
establishes an interviewer-interviewee relationship.
Comparison between Attitudes and other Representational Constructs
Attitudes and Values . In its most consensual conception, we can consider attitude as
the evaluation of a social object. In this sense, both attitudes and values imply stable general
evaluations of a positive-negative type. Despite this, both constructs should not be confused.
Values, unlike attitudes, are global and abstract objectives that are positively valued and do
not have concrete references or objects. Values serve as decision and judgment points from
which the subject develops specific attitudes and beliefs. Values would be, in some way,
generalized attitudes (Garzón and Garcés, 1989).
Attitudes and opinions . There is a certain similarity between these two constructs if
their cognitive aspect is taken into account. Opinions are verbalizations of attitudes or direct
expressions of agreement-disagreement on topics, which do not necessarily have to be
associated with already developed attitudes. Furthermore, opinions are specific and specific
responses, while attitudes are more generic.
Attitudes and beliefs . Beliefs are cognitions, knowledge or information that subjects
have about an attitudinal object. The difference between belief and attitude lies in the fact
that, although both share a cognitive dimension, attitudes are essentially affective
phenomena.
2 Social Psychology, Culture and

Education
Attitudes and habits. Both attitudes and habits are learned and stable phenomena.
Habits are generally unconscious, routinized patterns of behavior. However, attitudes are
generally conscious action orientations. Furthermore, attitude is a declarative type of
knowledge, that is, that the subject can verbalize, which hardly happens with habit, which is
a procedural type of knowledge (Perloff, 1993; Zimbardo and Leippe, 1991; McGuire,
1985).
Measuring Attitudes: Types of Measurements

Among the various existing procedures to measure attitudes, we can highlight self-
reports, observation of behaviors, reactions to structured stimuli, the objective performance
of the subject and physiological responses. However, the dominant measures are self-reports
and, within these, the following scales should be noted:
1) The Thurstone Scale . This is usually made up of about 20 statements that attempt to
represent the attitudinal dimension at equal intervals. The following table exemplifies a
Thurstone scale:
Table 1. Thurstone Sexual Role Scale

Worth
less
TO Women should only worry about being good wives and mothers. 1.0
favorable
b It is okay for a woman to pursue a career, as long as she does not abandon her 2.5
husband and family.
c A woman has as much right as a man to a professional career. 4.0
d Given that society has denied women job opportunities for many years, they should 5.5
More
be compensated by adopting measures that give privileged treatment to the
favorable
qualified female workforce.
Source : Páez, 1995
The process of construction and evaluation of the results would be as follows: a)
once the statements related to the study attitude have been gathered, different judges are
asked to place each statement in a response category - from least to most favorable; b) those
in which there is dispersion of opinion between judges are eliminated; c) the convergent
responses are used to determine the value of the statement - the median obtained is used for
this purpose; d) items that are in an equal interval throughout the attitude are selected; e) the
statements are presented to the subjects randomly; f) they choose the statements with which
they agree; and, g) the estimate of the attitude of each subject is obtained from the median
of the statements chosen by them.
2) The Guttman scale . Although its preparation is simple, it is usually of limited use and
usefulness. The aim is to obtain a scale with an explicit order. Thus, this scale is based on
the percentage of acceptance of a response from type A to E. For example, subjects are
asked to evaluate whether they would accept members of different ethnic groups to varying
degrees: A) expel them from the country; B) visitors from your country; C) immigrants or
citizens of their country; D) co-workers; and, E) neighbors. In this case, it is assumed that
the subjects who accept option A -expel them- would not accept option B -visitors-.
Therefore, the distribution of acceptance in a traditional society should follow a percentage
scale: 80% would accept option B, 60% C and 40% D. Taking this into account, cases in
which subjects accepted options C and D without accepting option B would be considered
errors.
3) The Likert scale. Unlike the Thurstone scale, the Likert scale does not assume that there
is an equal interval between response levels. Subjects are simply asked to indicate their
degree of agreement-disagreement with a series of statements that cover the entire spectrum
Chapter 10: Attitudes: Definition, Measurement and Models of Reasoned and Planned Action 3
of attitude - e.g. e., on a 5-point scale, where 1 is total disagreement and 5 is total
agreement. These scales presuppose that each statement on the scale is a linear function of
the same attitudinal dimension, that is, that all the items that make up the scale must be
correlated with each other and that there will be a positive correlation between each item
and the total score of the scale. scale (Perloff, 1993). Therefore, all the scores for each
statement are added to form the total score. Below is an example of this type of scale:
Table 2. Likert Scale to Evaluate Attitude towards Condoms
Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following statements about condoms. Please the
indicate your opinion taking into account that: 1= Totally disagree; 2 = Some disagreement; 3 in
=Neither agreement nor disagreement; 4= Somewhat agree; and, 5 = Totally agree.
1. They are cumbersome, uncomfortable, complicated to use. 1 2 3 4 5

2. They calm and give security in the relationship. 1 2 3 4 5
3. People who use condoms in their relationships are responsible. 1 2 3 4 5
4. Its placement is another erotic game. 1 2 3 4 5
5. They interrupt the sexual act. 1 2 3 4 5
Items 1 and 5, being formulated in a 'negative' way, must be 'recoded' in order to add the score of all the
items and thus obtain a global indicator of the attitude. Thus, a high score (close to 25) will reflect a very
positive attitude towards the condom and a low score (close to 5) a negative attitude.
Source: Own adaptation of the Ubillos scale (1995)
In the practices located at the end of this chapter, three Likert scales are presented;
one on Protestant Work Ethic, another on Competitive Attitude or Competitiveness and
another on Just World.
4) The Semantic Differential . Osgood's semantic differential has been applied to the
measurement of the affective or evaluative dimension of attitude. This consists of a series of
bipolar scales that are defined by different antonymous adjectives (Clemente and Fernández,
1992). At one end of the scale is one of the adjectives -p. e., good-, while in the other is its
antonym adjective -p. e., bad-. Subjects must evaluate the attitude object in question
according to a scale of, normally, 5 or 7 positions for each pair of adjectives (Igartua, 1996).
Osgood et al. (1957) found that people mainly use three semantic dimensions when
evaluating concepts: 'evaluation', 'potency' and 'activity'. Furthermore, they stated that these
dimensions were universal and that the most important was the evaluative one. In Spanish,
the bipolar adjectives with the greatest weight in the three dimensions of the semantic
differential are the following: a) Evaluation: good-bad, kind-hateful, admirable-despicable,
nice-unfriendly; b) Power: giant-dwarf, major-minor, large-small, immense-tiny; and, c)
Activity: fun-boring, active-passive, fast-slow, young-old (Bechini, 1986).
Functions of Attitudes and Methodology

It has classically been proposed that attitudes fulfill functions, that is, they fill
psychological needs. In this sense, five functions have been identified - as explained in the
introductory chapter on the object of Social Psychology - (Katz, 1960; Lippa, 1994;
Oskamp, 1991; Perloff, 1993; Pratkanis and Greenwald, 1989 ; Stahlberg and Frey, 1990;
a) Knowledge function . Through attitudes, subjects order and categorize the world in a
coherent manner, thus satisfying the need to have a clear and meaningful image of the
world. Attitudes help the subject to organize, understand and assimilate information that
may be complex, ambiguous and unpredictable;
b) instrumental function. Attitudes allow you to maximize rewards and minimize

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punishments, satisfying a hedonic need. Thus, attitudes help people achieve desired goals
and avoid those that are not desired;
c) Ego-defensive function . The attitude allows you to face negative emotions towards
yourself, externalizing certain attributes or denying them. Attitudes help protect self-esteem
and avoid internal conflicts - insecurity, anxiety, guilt;
d) Value-expressive function or expression of values. Attitudes allow us to express values
important to identity or self-concept. Through their attitudes, people can express tendencies,
ideals and normative systems; and,
e) Adaptation or social adjustment function . Attitudes allow one to integrate into certain
groups and receive social approval. Attitudes can help cement relationships with people or
groups that are considered important, that is, they allow the subject to be adapted to their
social environment - to be well seen, accepted, etc. -.
Each attitude does not always fulfill a single function. Furthermore, sometimes an
attitude may be fulfilling several functions and/or different people may adopt a similar
attitude based on different functionalities. Let's take an example. A very negative attitude
towards AIDS: a) could serve to categorize AIDS as a serious disease that must be avoided -
function of knowledge-; b) the expression of rejection of AIDS would allow it to be
accepted by a politically and religiously conservative environment -social adjustment
function-; c) it could enhance the performance of preventive behavior to minimize the
possibility of being personally infected -instrumental function-; d) this rejection could also
serve to express adherence to moral religious values related to monogamy, heterosexual
sexuality and sexual self-control - value-expressive function; and, e) the projection of the
risk of contagion onto the promiscuous and the deviant would allow them to confront and
deny anxiety by not perceiving themselves in such a way - ego-defensive function.
Currently, different methodological procedures are used to verify the functions of
attitudes. Among them, the following stand out: a) contrast individual differences , since it
is assumed that different types of subjects can privilege one function more than others. In
this sense, it has been found that, for example, subjects with low self-monitoring or self-
surveillance (see the chapter on Identity) present attitudes with a function of expressing
values, while subjects with high self-monitoring manifest in greater extent attitudes seeking
social adjustment (Snyder, in Kristiansen and Zanna, 1988); b) use different attitudinal
objects . Thus, for example, one can have some certainty that luxury products - e.g. e., a
perfume - fundamentally fulfill a function of expressing social identity, while utilitarian
products - e.g. e., coffee- they fulfill instrumental functions to a greater extent; c) compare
different types of situations . For example, in a novel and uncertain situation the need for
certainty would be activated and the knowledge function would be predominant (Manstead,
1995); and, d) ask the subjects to directly indicate the objectives of their attitude towards a
certain attitudinal object or, alternatively, examine the argumentation that the subjects
develop in favor of or against a topic, object or social group . In this sense, Herek (1987),
examining the arguments written by students about their favorable or unfavorable attitudes
towards homosexuals, found that they fundamentally showed three functions: 1) value-
expressive; 2) ego-defensive; and, 3) a combination of knowledge and instrumental function
based on their experience with homosexuals.
Structure of Attitudes: Attitude Models
Three-dimensional, two-dimensional and one-dimensional models

According to the three-dimensional model, every attitude includes three
components: a) the cognitive; b) the affective; and, c) the conative-behavioral (McGuire,
1968, 1985; Breckler, 1984; Judd and Johnson, 1984; Chaiken and Stangor, 1987).
The cognitive component refers to the way in which the attitude object is perceived
(McGuire, 1968), that is, to the set of beliefs and opinions that the subject has about the
attitude object and the information one has about it (Hollander, 1978).
The affective component could be defined as 'feelings of like or dislike towards the
object' (McGuire, 1968).
The conative component refers to behavioral tendencies, dispositions or intentions
toward the attitude object (Rosenberg, 1960; Breckler, 1984).
The Consistency theories that dominated the study of attitude in the 1970s
(Festinger, 1957; Festinger and Carlsmith, 1959; Rosenberg, 1960; Zajonc, 1968)
emphasized the high relationship and agreement between these attitudinal components. A
change in one of them would mean changes in the others, with the degree of congruence
between one's own beliefs - or between the beliefs and the affectivity aroused - towards the
attitudinal object being an important motivational element for the subject. However, field
research on cognitive dissonance has shown that people do not particularly focus on
discovering inconsistencies between beliefs, that they are not usually aware of them, and
that they do not spend much time trying to discover them.
Currently, it is criticized for presupposing the existence of a relationship between
beliefs, affectivity and behavior, since this implies that the definition of attitude at the same
time raises the explanation of the phenomenon. Furthermore, some authors have criticized
the fact that behavior is integrated as a component of attitude since, sometimes, behavior
can turn out to be an attitudinal object - e.g. e., my attitude regarding crossing a zebra
crossing with the pedestrian light on red.
Thus, an underlying position insists on a two-dimensional view of attitude.
According to the two-dimensional model, attitude would consist of an affective component
and a cognitive component. However, it is the three- and unidimensional models that have
received the most attention (Stahlberg and Frey, 1990).
Finally, the unidimensional approach emphasizes the evaluative nature of the
attitude. In this sense, the attitude will be synonymous with feelings of sympathy-antipathy,
approach-rejection towards the attitudinal object. For Petty and Cacioppo (1981; 1986a, b),
attitude is understood as a general and enduring evaluation of a positive or negative nature
about some attitude object. According to Fishbein and Ajzen (1975; Ajzen and Fishbein,
1980), the three components of the three-dimensional model are separate entities, which
may or may not be related depending on the object in question. Attitude is defined as a
learned predisposition to consistently respond in a favorable or unfavorable manner with
respect to a given object. For this reason, defenders of the unidimensional model distinguish
the concept of attitude from belief and behavioral intention. Belief would refer to opinions
about the attitude object. Attitudes would be the affective evaluations made regarding the
object. Behavioral intentions would refer to the predisposition to perform a certain behavior
in relation to the object (Igartua, 1996) (see below).
The empirical evidence supporting each of these models is somewhat contradictory.
Breckler (1984) suggests that, depending on the object studied, the dimensionality of the
attitude is susceptible to variation. In this regard, it is contemplated that an attitudinal object
can be evaluated through an affective response when the beliefs towards said object are
simple, small in number and do not contradict each other. However, in the event that the
beliefs are numerous, complex and somewhat contradictory, an affective response will not
be able to represent the complete structure of the attitude (Igartua, 1996). Furthermore,
various investigations have shown that the direct experience that the subject has with the

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attitude object is of great importance. In this sense, it has been observed that initially when
an attitude is formed, the greater the direct experience one has with the attitudinal object, the
greater the relationship between the affective attitude and manifest behavior. However, after
a longer experience and the greater the complexity of the attitude, the relationship between
affectivity and behavior decreases and the relationship between the latter and the level of
beliefs increases.
Finally, currently an emerging position combines the conceptions of the three- and
one-dimensional models, proposing the following definition of attitude: 'Attitude is a
global evaluative disposition based on cognitive, affective and behavioral information
that, at the same time, can influence cognitions, affective responses, behavioral intention
and the behavior itself' (Zanna and Rempel, 1988).
Classic and Current One-Dimensional Models
The Socio-cognitive Model

According to conceptions inspired by theories of social cognition, attitude is the
categorization of the object on an evaluative dimension stored in long-term memory.
Attitude is a schema or structure of knowledge that is formed by association and whose
activation is governed by memory networks and nodes. Attitude is a structured set of
beliefs, affective responses, behavioral intentions and remembered behaviors around an
affective-evaluative node. Some of these structures are unipolar since they only have
beliefs, affective responses, etc. favorable to the attitudinal object -p. e., the attitude
towards sports. Other memory structures are bipolar, particularly when it comes to
attitudes with a symbolic load and associated with public controversies - e.g. e., a person
with a favorable attitude towards abortion will probably have both positive and negative
beliefs regarding abortion in their knowledge structure.
The Model of Reasoned Action

The perspective of the Reasoned Action Model (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980)
postulates a unidimensional conception of attitude, as an affective phenomenon, but
determined by beliefs about the object. This model applies the logic of utility or expected
value (see graph 1) taking into account the positive and negative attributes that have been
associated with the behavior. Thus, the Theory of Reasoned Action states that behavior is
influenced by behavioral intention, and this in turn is influenced by attitude and subjective
norm. The person is supposed to make decisions based on how they value the results of
their behavior and the expectations they have about that behavior with respect to
achieving those results. In addition to this instrumental rationality, the model integrates
cultural or normative rationality through a measure of the favorable/unfavorable opinion
of significant others regarding the specific behavior and the motivation to follow this
opinion (Boyd and Wandersman, 1991).
Figure 1. Representation of the Theory of Reasoned Action (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980)
Various meta-analytic reviews carried out in order to contrast the validity of the
Reasoned Action Model, such as that of Sheppard, Hartwick and Warshaw (1988) and that
of van den Putte (1991), found statistically significant relationships between the intention
to conduct and actual conduct1 , and between the attitude and the subjective norm with the
behavioral intention2 . Furthermore, van de Putte (1991) reported that the relationship
between intention and attitude was stronger than the relationship between intention and
subjective norm. However, a point made by Sheppard et al. (1988) was that, although the
relationship between behavioral intention and actual behavior was high when the latter
was considered controllable by people, the relationship decreased when the behavior was
an objective, that is, when it was not under the control. control of the subjects, it required
skills and the collaboration of others, there were obstacles or it was a goal to achieve. This
assessment would reflect that behavior is determined by processes not contemplated by
this model since: a) it applies only to behaviors that are under the control of the subjects;
and, b) intention is a weaker predictor of behavior when it is not under one's control.
Finally, several studies have found that the Reasoned Action Model explains
approximately between 30-40% of the variance in behavioral intention and between 25
and 35% of the variance in actual behavior (Pagel and Davidson, 1984). ; Boyd and
Wandersman, 1991;
The Planned Action Model

In order to alleviate the explanatory deficiencies of the Reasoned Action Model in
terms of the differentiation between controllable behavior and/or objective behavior,
Ajzen (1988) expanded this model by adding a component of the perception of
controllability of the behavior (see graph 2 ). Thus, the Planned Action Model attempts to
predict both voluntary behaviors and those that are not under one's exhaustive control. It
has been postulated that the perception of control of the behavior to be performed is a
central element in its prediction.
Graph 2. Representation of the Planned Action Model proposed by Ajzen (1988)
1 Sheppard et al., (1988) r = 0.53; van den Putte (1991) r = 0.62.

2 Sheppard et al., (1988) r = 0.66; van den Putte (1991) r = 0.68.

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Perceived control refers to the perception of internal obstacles - lack of skills,
competencies - and external or situational obstacles - poor accessibility, lack of
collaboration from others. This variable has been shown to have indirect effects on
behavior through behavioral intention. However, its direct effect is less r3 . That is, it
seems that perceived control influences subsequent behavior through its planning. In
general, the inclusion of perceived control has been found to add greater explanatory
power to the model (Chaiken and Stangor, 1987; Tesser and Shaffer, 1990).
Ajzen (1991), reviewing different studies, found relationships between behavior,
intentions and perceived control4 . Behavior prediction was increased by including
perceived control in most studies (Beale & Manstead, 1991; Borgida, Conner, &
Manteufel, 1992; DeVillis, Blalock, & Sandler, 1990; Netemeyer & Burton, 1990). Basen-
Engquist and Parcel (1992) conducted research on the Theory of Reasoned Action
including the self-efficacy variable and found that it contributed specifically to the
prediction of intentions as well as behaviors. The study by Sutton et al. (1999) found that
while attitude, subjective norm, and risk perception significantly predicted behavioral
intention, neither perceived control nor self-efficacy did.
On the other hand, with respect to the perception of control, there is a phenomenon
associated with false uniqueness bias that is quite widespread among people called the
illusion of control . This consists of the tendency to have an optimistic view of the ability
to control reality. From this point of view, the perception of control can be positively
biased and can have a complex relationship with behavior.
Choice Between Behavioral Alternatives

Another relevant development that has been proposed is that the predictive
capacity of the Reasoned Action Model increases if attitudes are measured not only
towards the behavior in question, but also towards the possible alternatives of existing
behavior - performing a certain behavior versus not performing it. or perform others.
Although not all, several investigations confirm this aspect (Tesser and Shaffer, 1990).
Research by Davidson and Morrison (1983) compared the predictive ability of cognitive
and affective measures, behavioral intention, and attitudes regarding contraception. He
carried out an intersubject comparison with respect to a contraceptive method and another
within subjects in relation to the condom, the IUD, the diaphragm and the pill - in the first
comparison, different subjects evaluated different methods and in the second, the same
3 For example, average correlation between perceived control and behavioral intention r = 0.45 (beta = 0.17)
and average correlation between perceived control and behavior r = 0.25 (beta = 0.01) (Albarracín et al.,
2001).
4 Correlations located between 0.20 and 0.78 with an average of 0.51.
people evaluated each method. Contraceptive behavior was measured one year later. The
predictive capacity of attitude was better in the intrasubject comparison than in the
intersubject comparison. The behavioral intention dimension was the best predictor,
followed by the affective and cognitive measures.
Previous Experience and Behavioral Change

Fishbein and Ajzen's attitude model stated that attitudes would not affect behavior
but through intention. Furthermore, he considered that the subjective norm, that is, the
social norm of the reference group, influenced the behavioral intention and not the actual
behavior.
Bentler and Speckart (1979, 1981) modified the Fishbein and Ajzen model in two
fundamental points (see Figure 3): 1) on the one hand, they postulated that previous
behavior affects both current behavioral intentions and future behavior. 5; and, 2) on the
other hand, that attitudes can directly influence behavior, in addition to influencing it
indirectly through behavioral intentions. 6. It is proposed that the inclusion of previous
experience increases the explanatory capacity of the model. These authors demonstrated
these points in their work on alcohol and drug ingestion and, subsequently, it has been
used successfully in various areas.
However, other results demonstrating that experience directly influences both
behavioral intentions and subsequent behavior have not found a significant direct
influence of attitude toward future behavior (Fredricks and Dossett, 1983). The role of
previous experience as a predictor of behavior is currently accepted (Fredricks and
Dossett, 1983; Budd and Spencer, 1985; Davidson et al., 1985; Chaiken and Stangor,
1987; Tesser and Shaffer, 1990; Sutton, McVey and Glanz, 1999). In this sense, Sheeran
et al. (1999) showed that the previous performance of a behavior maintains a positive
average relationship with the current and future performance of the behavior.
Graph 3. Representation of the Attitude-Behavior Model (Bentler and Speckart, 1981)
Attitude, Subjective Norm and Descriptive Norm

A social norm is a way of generally thinking, feeling, or acting that people in a
5 For example, average correlation between previous experience and behavioral intention r = 0.57 (beta =
0.36) and average correlation between previous experience and behavior r = 0.34 (beta = 0.11) (Albarracín
et al., 2001).
6 For example, average correlation between attitude and behavior r = 0.38 (beta = 0.21) and average
correlation between attitude and behavioral intention r = 0.58 (beta = 0.31) (Albarracín et al., 2001).

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group agree on and confirm as right and correct (Thibault and Kelley, 1959). Social norm
is similar to attitude since both are cognitive representations of appropriate ways of
thinking, feeling, and acting in response to social objects and events. But, while attitudes
represent an individual's positive or negative evaluations, norms reflect the group's
evaluations of what is appropriate or inappropriate. Social norm refers to a process of
communication and interaction in a group in which a certain perceived or real
homogeneity of behaviors occurs and is reflected in (Miller and Prentice, 1996):
a) The perceived uniformity of behaviors . This component is usually measured by open
frequency estimates - e.g. e., in percentages - in questions such as 'how often do your
friends drive drunk on weekends?'. Both the perceived and actual frequency, obtained
through the average or proportion of people who directly say they perform the behavior -
p. e., 40% say 'driving drunk' - if they are in the majority they indicate the potential
existence of a social norm. The perceived frequency of behaviors is an indicator of so-
called descriptive norms - which is what people similar to me do - and tend to predict
behavior more strongly than prescriptive social norms - what is 'valid' or 'real', what what
is there to do-;
b) The perceived attitude of group members toward the behavior . This component is
measured through Likert scales using questions such as 'what is your friends' attitude
towards drunk driving?'. An attitude perceived homogeneously and clearly in one
direction -p. e., against drunk driving-, is another component of the regulatory process;
c) The prescriptive or subjective norm . This refers to the perception of social pressure
towards adopting or not adopting a behavior. This component is measured by questions
such as 'most of my friends or people I care about believe that I should not drive drunk' -1
= do not agree at all; 7 = strongly agree. The favorable opinion of significant others
predicts actual behavior, although less strongly than the descriptive norm, since it shows
influence through explicit approval or disapproval of the reference group; and,
d) The personal attitude . This is the favorable or unfavorable opinion of the person in
question regarding the given behavior. For example, 'I think I should not drive drunk' -1 =
not agree at all; 7 = strongly agree.
In general, research has shown that attitude is a more important component than
subjective norm in predicting certain behaviors. Furthermore, it appears that the belief that
the group performs a certain behavior and positive attitudes toward it are more strongly
associated with the actual behavior than perceived social pressure to perform the behavior.7 .
Norms and Socio-Cognitive Processes: False Consensus and Pluralistic Ignorance

There are a series of cognitive processes that will allow the functioning of dominant
contextual and cultural norms. These processes are the phenomena of False Consensus and
Pluralistic Ignorance.
False Consensus Bias: My Attitudes are the Norm

False Consensus is related to the tendency to project one's own opinions, beliefs and
behaviors onto others. That is, assuming that other people share our points of view or
preferences to a greater degree than, in fact, actually happens. In other words, others are
assumed to be more like us than they really are. According to the phenomenon of False
7 For example, average longitudinal correlation between preventive behavior and attitude r = 0.33;
longitudinal average correlation between preventive behavior and subjective norm r = 0.16; and, longitudinal
mean correlation between preventive behavior and descriptive norm r = 0.33 (Sheeran et al., 1999).
Consensus, the group that shares or possesses an attribute - its actions, opinions and
emotions - tends to overestimate its frequency or prevalence with respect to the group that
does not possess it, that is, to overestimate the consensus regarding to the given attribute.
This trend has been observed in many different contexts (Sherman, Presson, & Chassin,
1984; Suls, Wan, & Sanders, 1988). For example, people who have anti-gypsy attitudes,
compared to people who do not have them, tend to overestimate the proportion of people
who display those racist attitudes. Furthermore, this tendency is stronger among people who
have minority positions and in the case of behaviors that deviate from the prevailing social
norm (Miller and Prentice, 1996).
The explanatory factors that have been attributed to the existence of this False
Consensus phenomenon are:
a) Accessibility and contact with similar people. We tend to overestimate the frequency of
our actions -p. e., having anti-gypsy attitudes - because we usually interact with people
similar to us, who act as we do - e.g. e., our friends tend to express this type of
discriminatory attitudes more - and, therefore, these behaviors would be more accessible in
memory;
b) Salience and focus of attention. Our acts are more salient and vivid than unchosen acts,
we focus more attention on them, so we overestimate their real frequency;
c) Attribution of causality. The more we attribute behavior to situational or external causes,
the greater the tendency to believe that behavior is typical or shared. Due to the actor-
observer effect, we tend to explain our behaviors by the context and, as a consequence, we
perceive that both we and other people act in a similar way; and,
d) Motivational. False Consensus allows one to defend self-esteem by projecting behavior
onto the majority and making the person feel normal and not deviant or strange. Most
people want to believe that others agree with them because this intensifies their confidence
in their own judgments, actions, or lifestyles (Marks & Miller, 1987). Furthermore, the
greater the severity of the behavior, the greater the False Consensus, with the tendency
being stronger among people who have minority or deviant positions. However, on the other
hand, a relationship has not been found between low self-esteem and tendency towards
False Consensus, as would be expected from the motivational explanation, which assumes
that people with lower self-esteem will tend to show False Consensus more to defend it
(Whitley, 1998). Furthermore, for more desirable attributes, the person may be motivated to
perceive themselves as unique (Suls and Wan, 1987). Under these circumstances, the False
Consensus effect does not appear (Campbell, 1986).
The last three explanations, that is, those that refer to the salience and focus of
attention, the attribution of causality and motivation , apparently, are more linked to False
Consensus effects in opinions, beliefs and attitudes, rather than in behaviors. Although
Mullen and Hu (1988) conclude from their meta-analysis that the explanations with the
greatest empirical support are those of salience and the focus of attention, other authors
suggest that motivational factors are more important (Spears, 1995).
Social comparison, social influence and false consensus

To measure the False Consensus bias, the comparison of the subjective estimate of
the frequency that the respondent says they have about an attitude or behavior, and the
subjective estimate of the frequency of said attitude or behavior that the respondent thinks
they have - or they don't have- the others. This allows us to verify whether this
overestimation occurs or not (Miller and Prentice, 1996). For example, a group that
expressed anti-gypsy attitudes estimated that 48% of the subjects were racist. The other

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group, which did not have this type of attitudes, estimated that 30% of the subjects were
anti-gypsies. The difference between the two (48–30=18%) is an estimate of this bias.
On the other hand, the processes of comparison and social influence, phenomena
that reveal the importance of social norms, have focused the attention of researchers who
have tried to determine if these can contribute to people's decisions when embarking or not
in carrying out a certain behavior. For example, Graham, Marks, and Hansen (1991) suggest
that social factors are one of the most important determinants of adolescent substance use,
and more specifically for alcohol and tobacco use (Brown, Classen, and Eicher , 1986;
Dielman, Campanelli, Shope and Butchart, 1987).
Intimate Behavior Questionnaire (Ubillos et al., 2003)
1.0. How often do you compare yourself to other people to see how well things are going for
you (personally, socially)?
I don't compare myself at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 I compare myself a lot
1.1 How likely do you think your parents' attitudes and beliefs influence your sexual
behavior?
Not important Moderately Very important
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1.2 How likely do you think your friends' attitudes and beliefs influence your sexual
behavior?
Not important Moderately Very important
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1.3 How likely do you think the following experiences are for a person similar to you (age,
sex, education, place of residence, income, religious and political attitudes)? Indicates the
probability from 1 to 100. That is, it indicates the percentage of people similar to you who have
had that experience.
2.0.- Coital experience before age 16: __________%

2.1. - Coital experience before age 18: _________%
2.2. - Casual sexual relationship with someone they did not know well without using
contraceptives: _______%
3. Indicate how many of your closest friends live or have lived the following experiences.
Enter the number of close people who have experienced it and the total. Q. e., if you consider 7
people to be close and 1 of them has had sexual experience before the age of 18, you would put
1/7.
3 .0.- Coital experience before age 16: /

3.1. - Coital experience before age 18: /
3.2. - Casual sexual relationship with someone they did not know well without using protection
or condoms: /
4 Please tell us what is the attitude or evaluation that you perceive or believe that people in
your study environment (Faculty) make about the following activities:
4.0. Coital experience before age 16.
Very Negative Negative Neutral Positive Very
Positive 1 2 3 4 5
Very Negative Negative Neutral Positive Very
Positive 1 2 3 4 5

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5 .2. Casual sexual intercourse with someone they did not know well without using protection or
condoms.
Very Negative Negative Neutral Positive Very Positive
Definition of Attitude...............................................................................................................1
Classic Theories of Attitude Formation...................................................................................1
The Classic Conditioning of Attitudes.................................................................................1
The Instrumental Conditioning of Attitudes........................................................................2
Comparison between Attitudes and other Representational Constructs..................................2
Measuring Attitudes: Types of Measurements........................................................................3
Functions of Attitudes and Methodology................................................................................4
Structure of Attitudes: Attitude Models...................................................................................5
Three-dimensional, two-dimensional and one-dimensional models....................................5
Classic and Current One-Dimensional Models........................................................................7
The Socio-cognitive Model..................................................................................................7
The Model of Reasoned Action...........................................................................................7
The Planned Action Model..................................................................................................8
Choice Between Behavioral Alternatives............................................................................9
Previous Experience and Behavioral Change....................................................................10
Attitude, Subjective Norm and Descriptive Norm.................................................................10
Norms and Socio-Cognitive Processes: False Consensus and Pluralistic Ignorance............11
False Consensus Bias: My Attitudes are the Norm............................................................11
Social comparison, social influence and false consensus..................................................12
Pluralistic Ignorance Bias: The Perceived and Undisputed Norm is different from My
Attitude (and is not the Actual Privately Dominant Attitude)...........................................20
Culture, False Consensus, and Perception of Ingroup Homogeneity....................................22
Ingroup Homogeneity............................................................................................................24
Psychosocial Correlates.........................................................................................................29
Attitudes about Justice in the World......................................................................................32
The Notion of Justice.........................................................................................................32
Belief in a Just World.........................................................................................................33
Social correlates of the Just World.....................................................................................35
5.

1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
5.2. Casual sexual relationship with Someone who they didn't much unused
know
protection or condoms.
1 2 3 4 5
Definition of Attitude...............................................................................................................1
Classic Theories of Attitude Formation...................................................................................1
The Classic Conditioning of Attitudes.................................................................................1
The Instrumental Conditioning of Attitudes........................................................................2
Comparison between Attitudes and other Representational Constructs..................................2
Measuring Attitudes: Types of Measurements........................................................................3
Functions of Attitudes and Methodology................................................................................4
Structure of Attitudes: Attitude Models...................................................................................5
Three-dimensional, two-dimensional and one-dimensional models....................................5
Classic and Current One-Dimensional Models........................................................................7
The Socio-cognitive Model..................................................................................................7
The Model of Reasoned Action...........................................................................................7
The Planned Action Model..................................................................................................8
Choice Between Behavioral Alternatives............................................................................9
Previous Experience and Behavioral Change....................................................................10
Attitude, Subjective Norm and Descriptive Norm.................................................................10
Norms and Socio-Cognitive Processes: False Consensus and Pluralistic Ignorance............11
False Consensus Bias: My Attitudes are the Norm............................................................11
Social comparison, social influence and false consensus..................................................12
Attitude (and is not the Actual Privately Dominant Attitude)...........................................20
Culture, False Consensus, and Perception of Ingroup Homogeneity....................................22
Ingroup Homogeneity............................................................................................................24
Psychosocial Correlates.........................................................................................................29
Attitudes about Justice in the World......................................................................................32
The Notion of Justice.........................................................................................................32
Belief in a Just World.........................................................................................................33
Social correlates of the Just World.....................................................................................35
6.1.
The following
practice will allow you
to illustrate the
phenomena described.
The following

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graph shows the average scores obtained in a sample of students in the question referring to
social comparison. Compare your score (question 1.0) with the average presented in the
graph. For example, if you scored 6 or higher on this question, you consider that you
compare yourself more with others to know how well things are going for you, than the
comparison sample.
■ Men
Women
■ Total
Below, we present the mean scores of the comparison sample regarding the social
influence of parents and friends. Compare your score on parental influence (question 1.1)
with the mean of the sample of students. For example, if you are a man and you score 2 or
more (for women, 3 or more), you perceive that your parents' attitudes and beliefs influence
your sexual behavior more than it does. Now, answer question 1.1 thinking about when you
were 16 years old and compare your answer. For example, if you scored 5 or more, you
consider that, when you were 16 years old, your parents' influence on sexual matters was
greater than that of the sample of students. The average scores in question 1.1 and its
retrospective (16 years) indicate that paternal influence in sexual matters is more important
at an early age 8. Compare your score on both questions and see if the same is true in your
case.
Perform the same operations taking into account the influence of friends (question
1.2 and its retrospective). Like parental influence, peer influence is more salient at an early
age9 . See if your score on question 1.2 in its retrospective version is higher than the one
obtained when you answered the same question based on your current situation and age.
Table 1. Social Influence of Friends and Parents

Men Women General
Mean (Sd) Mean (Sd) Mean (Sd) F Q
Social influence of parents 1,85 (0,93) 2,93 (1,44) 2,40 (1,32) 10,47 p<.002
(question 1.1)
Social influence of parents 4,40 (0,89) 5,06 (1,80) 4,91 (1,65) 0,61 p>.10
(retrospective: 16 years)
Social influence friends 2,24 (1,30) 2,96 (1,68) 2,62 (1,54) 2,99 p<.10
(question 1.2)
Social influence friends 4,80 (0,84) 4,89 (1,37) 4,87 (1,25) 0,02 p>.10
(retrospective: 16 years)
In the following exercise, you are going to check the degree of underestimation or
overestimation that you have made regarding sexual experience before the age of 18. To do
this you must compare yourself with the scores that we present in the following table.
Graph 5. Actual and Estimated Percentage of Coital Experience before the age of■
18 Men
Women
■ General
As can be seen in graph 5, the real percentage of the sample that has had coital
sexual relations before the age of 18 is 27.2% (29.2% in men and 25.1% in women). In a
8 t = – 6.70, p < .0001

9 t= – 6.70, p < .0001

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research carried out with 1,500 young people from Guipúzcoa, it was found that the
percentage of adolescents who had had coital sexual experience before the age of 18 was
lower (5.2%) (Ubillos, 1994). However, it is observed that the young people in the
comparison sample estimate that an average of approximately 49% of people similar to
them have had coital sexual relations before the age of 18, with no significant differences
between men and women.
On the other hand, in the table presented below you can see the differences based on
coital sexual experience prior to age 18 . These differences will serve to exemplify the
presence of the False Consensus bias.
The False Consensus is obtained by subtracting the estimates made by the group that
has coital sexual experience before the age of 18 with those made by the group that does not
have this type of experience. In this case, the False Consensus of the men in the comparison
sample is 66.2–43.6=22.6 and that of the women is 63.2–41.9=21.3.
Table 2. False Consensus regarding Coital Experience before the age of 18

Differences based on Experience
With experience Without experience
Men Women Men Women
Mean (Sd) Mean (Sd) Mean (Sd) Mean (Sd) F Q
% estimated people
66,2% (22,8) 63,2% (21,7) 43,6% (26,0) 41,9% (25,9) 72,8 p<.0001
similar to you
Estimated proportion of 63% (26) 60% (25) 31% (25) 25% (23) 171,5 p<.0001
friends
Environment attitude 3,9 (0,8) 3,6 (0,9) 3,4 (0,9) 3,3 (0,8) 19,61 P<.0001
Personal attitude 3,9 (1,0) 3,6 (0,9) 3,3 (1,0) 3,0 (0,9) 33,1 p<.0001
Young people who have had coital sexual experience before the age of 18 estimate
that the percentage of people who have had this type of relationship is higher compared to
young people who have not had it. These results show that people tend to perceive their own
experience as majority.
Furthermore, as shown in the table above, men who have not had sexual relations
before the age of 18 indicate that 31% of their friends have had this experience. In the case
of women, this percentage is 25%. These estimates are quite close to the real percentage of
young people who have had this experience. However, men and women who have had coital
sexual experience before the age of 18 indicate that an average of 63% and 60% of their
friends have had this experience. Therefore, people who have had the experience are
projecting their friends' experience onto the general population.
In general, the sample perceives that the people around them have a neutral to
positive attitude towards coital relations before the age of 18. However, if we compare
people who have not had coital experience before the age of 18 with those who have had it,
we can observe that the latter perceive that their environment has a somewhat more
favorable attitude towards this type of relationships. Something similar happens in the case
of personal attitude. While men and women10 Those who have not had coital experience
before the age of 18 present a rather neutral attitude, people who have had it show a more
positive attitude.11 . Furthermore, we can observe that in both cases - environmental and
personal attitude - men in general have somewhat more favorable scores than women,
10 Men's average = 3.3; Average women = 3.

11 Mean = 3.9 men; Mean = 3.6 women.
whether the experience has been lived or not.
Therefore, it can be concluded that people who have carried out a practice
overestimate the percentage of people who have also done it, have greater accessibility of
information or friends who have done it, perceive that their environment has a more
favorable attitude and their personal attitude is also more flattering. That is, the accessibility
and motivational explanations are partly illustrated. In general, people believe that there is a
general pro-sexual attitude or norm that is stronger than the real one. If you look at the table,
the attitude of the people who have not performed the behavior is somewhat less favorable
or neutral.12 that the general attitude perceived by these people 13 . This less favorable
personal attitude toward a behavior than the general attitude is a key fact for Pluralistic
Ignorance.
Attitude (and is not the Actual Privately Dominant Attitude)
Pluralistic Ignorance is the situation in which people mistakenly believe that a social
norm that they personally reject is dominant, although the majority privately also rejects
said norm. People sometimes falsely attribute a majority attitude since they, privately,
answer the opposite. Hence the name Pluralistic Ignorance: everyone pluralistically shares a
false vision of reality, wrongly attributing an attitude to the group, which allows privately
abandoned attitudes and behaviors to continue to subsist (Prentice and Miller, 1996). In a
situation of Pluralistic Ignorance, most people wrongly perceive that a given attitude
dominates the social environment - e.g. e., anti-gypsy racism - when in reality only a
minority shares that position.
A classic example of this phenomenon was demonstrated in a survey carried out
during a 1971 strike in England in which privately the majority of workers were in favor of
abandoning the strike. However, this majority thought it was a minority, that is, it perceived
that the majority was in favor of the strike. Almost all of them felt incapable of facing the
moral disapproval and social pressure of the supposed majority by proposing a return to
work. In fact, the strike was carried out to the end, despite the private opinion of the strikers
and the fact that the unions were against it. This case exemplifies Pluralistic Ignorance:
public support for a standard of conduct in the absence of private support; taking an attitude
in public that does not correspond to the private attitude; People mistakenly believe that the
majority supports the attitude, norm, or behavior (Mann, 1978).
This fact occurs in moments of cultural change, such as when in the 1950s in
developed countries the majority of young people began to have premarital relations, while
an attitude of rejection of premarital sex publicly dominated. It also happens when an active
minority with a great capacity for public discourse imposes as the majority an attitude that is
not actually shared by the majority. The predominance of a progressive ideology among
students in Europe and the US in the 1960s is a good example since, although only a
minority was active in the pacifist and political protest movement, the impression
dominated that the generation of '68 was progressive. This bias also occurs when an elite
imposes its criteria on the population.
Sometimes, active and talkative minorities impose as supposedly frequent behaviors
that are not. Then, people express an opinion based on perceived social support and the
phenomenon of 'the spiral of silence' occurs: those who believe they have a minority
opinion do not speak, reinforcing the perception that the majority approves of a behavior
even if it is not true. . A common phenomenon in marginal groups is that while the members
12 Mean = 3.0 girls; Average = 3.3 boys.
13 Mean = 3.3 girls; Average = 3.4 boys.

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of these groups show anxiety and concern about aggressive or risky behavior, their public
acceptance without comment generates the impression that no one is worried and everyone
agrees with the negative behavior.
The sequence of Pluralistic Ignorance would be as follows: a) a person claims to
have carried out a negative behavior (p. e., discriminatory behavior towards gypsies); b) the
majority does not speak and does not give its opinion; c) everyone infers that the majority
approves the behavior because they share a favorable attitude – and not because they feel
inhibited; and, d) a falsely favorable social climate or subjective norm is created towards
discriminatory behavior (Prentice and Miller, 1993).
The Effects of Pluralistic Ignorance are essentially two:
- An effect of estrangement or feeling of cultural deviation, product of the perception of
the difference between the subject's behavior and attitude and that of the majority. In this
case, extreme deviant behavior is common. For example, when divorce was legalized and
the situation of marriage improved in the 1950s in China, there was an increase in patricides
- since men who had entered into a marriage arranged and paid for by the wife, considered
themselves deceived and offended. when they wanted to divorce and proceeded to murder
them. Similar processes have occurred in Spain in the 80s after the approval of the Divorce
Law (see chapter on Aggression); and,
- The maintenance of collective behaviors, at least public, associated with norms that have
already been surpassed or the predominance of certain collective behaviors based on norms
that are only shared by an active minority. In this way, the perception of the frequency of an
attitude or behavior -p. e., frequency of discriminatory behavior - is more strongly
associated than the prescriptive or subjective norm - the average opinion or attitude
perceived towards Roma - with the behavior - anti-gypsy behaviour.
- The effects of Pluralistic Ignorance are mediated by the fear of negative evaluation by
others. The research of Prentice and Miller (1996) found that subjects with a greater fear of
the negative evaluation of others and who perceive a majority attitude contradictory to their
private attitude will inhibit their protest behavior more and show greater conformity.
- The cognitive processes that can explain Pluralistic Ignorance are:
a) The attribution of stable internal causality to explain inhibition behaviors in the face of
certain events. For example, if no one openly criticizes racist attitudes, it is believed that
they are normative, and this non-critical reaction is attributed to the fact that people share a
favorable attitude or internal disposition towards discriminatory behaviors, the more there
will be a tendency to suffer from Pluralistic Ignorance;
b) The homogeneous perception that most people have of a certain attitude also tends to
reinforce Pluralistic Ignorance. The more one thinks that the majority of people agree
without variation that anti-gypsy attitudes must be held, the more one tends to think that the
majority falsely share this attitude; and,
c) The False Uniqueness or Illusion of Control. That is, the greater the perception of
control and overestimation of capabilities, the greater the tendency to think that others carry
out behaviors that disagree with one's personal attitude (Ugarte et al., 1998).
To contrast the Pluralistic Ignorance bias, the comparison between the actual mean
of the attitude and the mean of the attitudes attributed to others is used. In relation to the
previous examples, the aim is to find the difference between the assessment of the perceived
attitudes of people in the immediate environment and the personal attitude towards Gypsies.
Let's do an example with the questions from the intimate behaviors questionnaire.
Table 3. Pluralistic Ignorance
COITAL EXPERIENCE BEFORE AGE 16
Men Women General
Environment attitude 3,2 (0,9) 2,8 (0,8) 3,0 (0,9) 3,19 p<.1
Personal attitude 3,1 (0,9) 2,7 (1,0) 2,9 (1,0) 3,11 p<.1
Pluralistic Ignorance 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,125 p>.1
COITAL EXPERIENCE BEFORE AGE 18
Men Women General
Environment attitude 3,6 (0,9) 3,4 (0,9) 3,5 (0,9) 7,08 p< .01
Personal attitude 3,5 (1,0) 3,1 (0,9) 3,3 (1,0) 17,99 p< .001
Pluralistic Ignorance 0,1 0,3 0,2 5,43 p< .05
UNPROTECTED OCCASIONAL SEXUAL RELATIONSHIP
Men Women General
Environment attitude 2,1 (1,0) 1,7 (0,8) 1,9 (0,9) 16,21 p< .001
Personal attitude 1,8 (1,0) 1,4 (0,7) 1,6 (0,9) 32,89 p< .001
Pluralistic Ignorance 0,3 0,3 0,3 2.69 p>.1
The personal attitude score is subtracted from the score given to the perceived
attitude of the person in the immediate environment. In this way, three groups can be
obtained: a) people who present the bias, that is, who obtain positive scores - they believe
that the average attitude is less unfavorable than the personal one; b) those that do not
present the bias, giving equal scores to their personal attitude and that of the average person,
that is, with a difference of 0; and, c) those that obtain scores less than 0, presenting the bias
of cultural estrangement. In other words, these people report a more favorable personal
attitude than the average person.
Perform the operation detailed in the previous point - environmental attitude minus
personal attitude - for each of the situations presented in table 5 and verify whether or not
the Pluralistic Ignorance bias exists in your case. Also compare your scores with those of
the comparison sample.
If we observe the averages obtained in the previous table, we can see that the sample
of students presents the Pluralistic Ignorance bias in each and every one of the situations of
sexual relationship raised (before 16 years = 0.1; before 18 years = 0.2; unprotected casual
relationships = 0.3), the presence of this bias being more evident in the case of unprotected
casual relationships. Furthermore, in the case of sexual relations before the age of 18,
women significantly present a higher degree of Pluralistic Ignorance.
Culture, False Consensus, and Perception of Ingroup Homogeneity

One of the aspects that characterize collectivist cultures is the importance given to
group norms. Furthermore, consensus with the majority of the ingroup would be more
important to collectivistic people because if they value group harmony and agreement, they
will expect their own choices to be shared by the majority of their group. This way they will
be satisfied with their choices and will not need to change or suppress them (Yamaguchi,
1994). In a sample of Japanese students, Yamaguchi (1994) confirmed that collectivist
attitudes were associated with a lower need for uniqueness, as well as a higher estimate of

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the percentage of peers who would share the subject's decisions. In other words, collectivist
subjects showed less Uniqueness Bias and greater Consensus Bias.
However, it has been found that the effect of False Consensus for deviant behaviors
is stronger in individualistic cultures, which put more pressure on people to have a positive
image of themselves and, therefore, they must validate or project more their behaviors that
potentially threaten self-esteem are measured as normal. This is the case of what was found
in the study by Gibbons, et al. (1995) where it was found that students from an
individualistic country such as the USA overestimated the prevalence of risk behaviors
more than Danish students – a less individualistic culture – 14. Furthermore, in this same
study it was found that the processes of social comparison and social influence of peers
were more salient among US students, while Danish students were more influenced by
parental figures (see chapter Perception and explanation of social behavior).
On the other hand, people from dominated and collectivist groups will perceive their
groups as more similar and homogeneous, that is, they will perceive a greater consensus of
attitude, opinion, etc., while dominant and individualist groups will perceive the members of
the group as people. different and heterogeneous (Lorenzi-Cioldi and Clemence, 2001). The
greater power and status of individualistic groups and cultures would explain why their
members perceive themselves as different. The assessment of the autonomous person would
go in the same direction. The opposite would occur in collectivist cultures, with fewer
resources, less individual power, and that value harmony and similarity.
14 Americans estimate = 31.3%; Danish estimate = 13.5%.

___________________________________________________________________
Correction Keys
Once you have answered the Lee and Otatti scale on your national reference group,
reverse the score you obtained in question 2 according to the following specification: 1=5;
2=4; 3=3; 4=2 and 5=1. That is, if your score is 1, count it as a 5, if it is a 2, count it as 4,
etc. Next, add all your answers on the scale. If you score 21 or more, you perceive that
your group is heterogeneous, as do more individualistic cultures. If you score 16 or less,
you perceive your group as more homogeneous, just as relatively more collectivist cultures
do.
Ingroup Homogeneity
Answer the following questions regarding the national group with which you feel most
identified:
Homogeneity Scale (Lee and Otatti, 1993)
1-The more I get to know the [reference group], the more similar they seem to me.
Very similar 1 2 3 4 5 Very different
2-The majority of the people of [reference nation] are conformist.

Nothing conformist 1 2 3 4 5 Very conformist
3-The [reference group] are independent and individualistic.

Not independent/ 1 2 3 4 5 Very independent/
individualists individualists
4-The [reference group] vary little in their way of dressing.

They vary little 1 2 3 4 5 They vary a lot
5-In [reference nation] people tend to behave in a similar way.

Very similar 1 2 3 4 5 Very different
6-In [reference nation] all people have a similar appearance.

same look 1 2 3 4 5 Different look

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Graph 6. Mean scores on Perceived Ingroup Heterogeneity
■ Ch
ina
" USES
■ Argentina
Portugal
Source : China and USA (Lee and Ottati, 1993), Argentina and Portugal (Own
Samples)
Lee and Otatti (1993) asked mainland Chinese and Americans to estimate how
heterogeneous people from their culture and another culture were. For example, that the
Chinese evaluated the homogeneity-heterogeneity of Chinese and US culture, that they
indicated how many contacts they had with people from other cultures, as well as their
valuation. The Chinese, unlike the Americans, perceived the outgroup as heterogeneous and
the ingroup as homogeneous. This trend is contrary to that confirmed in Mullen's meta-
analysis, which observed a persistent bias to perceive the ingroup as differentiated and
heterogeneous, and the outgroup as similar and homogeneous. Indeed, US students
perceived Chinese as more homogeneous and Americans as more heterogeneous.
An explanation for the perception of greater heterogeneity of the ingroup refers to
the fact that one has more contact, more memorized information, and a more complex and
differentiated image of one's group, based on this intensive knowledge. This explanation is
not valid for the self-perception of the Chinese. However, the greater the direct knowledge
of Americans, the more the Chinese tended to perceive them as heterogeneous. The greater
direct contact with the Chinese did not increase the perception of their heterogeneity by the
Americans. Furthermore, the explanation of homogeneity due to low contact did not work in
the case of the self-perception of the Chinese or in the case of the heteroperception of the
Americans. The authors allude to the greater 'objective' racial and cultural similarity of the
Chinese -90% of the Han ethnic group, speak Mandarin, ancient Confucian culture,
collectivist political regime, etc.-. However, it must be said that collectivism is associated
with greater ethnic diversity, while individualism is associated with ethnic homogeneity, so
this explanation does not allow us to generalize to all collectivists and individualists.
Another explanation for the perception of heterogeneity refers to the positive
evaluation of the group. Indeed, the Americans who evaluated the Chinese better, perceived
them more as heterogeneous, while among the Chinese, the positive evaluation of the
Americans was not associated with greater perceived heterogeneity among them. This is
understandable considering that Chinese culture values consensus more and does not value
individual differences as strongly.
The data indicate that the samples from both Portugal - slightly collectivist, although
less than China - and Argentina - slightly individualistic - have results more similar to
China, that is, the ingroup is perceived as more homogeneous than the US - more
individualistic-. Now, the range of individualism-collectivism and the perception of
homogeneity is not perfect, which suggests that other sociocultural variables play an
important role.
CULTURE AND ATTITUDES LINKED TO PROTESTANT ETHICS,
TO THE COMPETITION AND THE BELIEF IN A JUST WORLD
Roberto Mendoza
Among the factors that contributed to the constitution of modern capitalism are the
predominant values at the time of its socio-economic formation. These values refer to the
Protestant work ethic (Weber, 1985).
This ethic was characterized by replacing in the mentality of the people and in the
spirit of the time the devaluation of manual work and commerce, which was considered a
dishonor for the aristocracy, with the over-valuation of productive work, rational calculation
and of the entrepreneurial spirit of individuals to produce profits. The idea of self-
subsistence is replaced by that of accumulation and commercial exchange. The motive of
accumulating, of acquiring, becomes a new moral order, where the rationality of profit and
instrumental rationality are transformed into a vocation of the individual to perform his duty
with God here on earth.
Status and prestige are earned by working and making money to provide for the
family, as a moral obligation. Usury and credit, commerce, savings and honesty are
legitimized through these new ethical-religious values. The duty and obligation to work as
opposed to the temptation of lust. This mentality is directly opposed to the ethics of the
Catholic religion of that time, which valued respect, resignation and love for God above all
things. The complete happiness of the individual would be possible only in the other world.
Work was a burden and a divine punishment for original sin - 'you will earn your bread by
the sweat of your brow'. Practical work was considered unworthy and a 'Tripalium', that is,
torture.
Several psychosocial studies have analyzed this issue. In 1971, Mirels and Garret
built a Protestant work ethic scale -EPT- (PWE, in English) and studied the relationships
between it and personality variables. They find a significant relationship between said scale
-EPT- and the locus of control 15, and the Californi 'F' personality scale to16 , as well as a
positive relationship with the moral awareness of guilt.
Spence and Helmreich (1983, cited in Hofstede, 1998) constructed a
competitiveness scale. With it, it was found that instrumental individualism was associated
with a competitive attitude and that developed and capitalist cultures were perceived as
much more competitive than traditional ones. A study with student samples from 37 nations
found a positive relationship between a Protestant work ethic scale and the Spence and
Helmreic competitiveness scale.17 , suggesting that both sets of beliefs were associated.
Furthermore, a competitive attitude was associated with a greater valuation of money,
suggesting that competition and valuation of material goods make up a set of beliefs
(Furnham and Heaven, 1999).
15 EFA and Locus of control correlation: r = - 0.30

16 EPT correlation and 'F' scale: r = 0.51
17 Correlation between Protestant ethics scale and Spence and Helmeich scale: r = 0.27

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Protestant Work Ethics Questionnaire -EPT- (Mirels and Garrett, 1971)
Below we present a series of questions related to the Protestant work ethic. Answer each of them
taking into account that 1 = totally disagree; 4 = more or less and 7 = totally agree.
1- Most people spend too much time on unprofitable
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
entertainment.
2- There would be fewer problems in our society if people
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
had less free time.
3- Easily earned money (gambling, speculation, etc.) is
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
usually spent unconsciously.
4- There are few satisfactions comparable to a job well
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
done.
5- The most difficult and expensive jobs usually turn out to
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
be the most rewarding.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
6- People who do not succeed in life are usually quite lazy.
7- The self-made man is probably more ethical than the
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
one who was born with everything given.
8- I frequently feel that I would be more successful if I
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
sacrificed some pleasures.
9- People should have more leisure time to dedicate to
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
relaxing.
10-Any person who has ability and also works hard, has a
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
high probability of success.
11-People who fail at a task usually have not worked hard
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
enough on it.
12- Life would have little meaning if we never suffered. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
13- Hard work offers few guarantees of success. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
14- The bank letter of credit is something that facilitates
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
careless spending.
15-Life would have more meaning if we had less leisure
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
time.
16- The man who can face an unpleasant task with
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
enthusiasm is the one who triumphs.
17- If a person tries hard enough, they are likely to earn a
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
good living.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
18- I feel anxious when I have little work to do.
19- Dislike of hard work usually reflects a weakness of
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
character.
________________________________________________________________________________________________
Competitiveness Questionnaire -OCI- by Spence and Helmreich (1983)

Below we present the Spence and Helmreich competitiveness scale. Answer each of the questions
taking into account that 1 = strongly disagree and 5 = strongly agree.
1. I like to work in competitive situations with others. 1 2 3 4 5
2.It is important for me to perform or do better than others at a 1 2 3 4 5

task or job.
3.I think winning is important at work and in games. 1 2 3 4 5
4.It bothers me when other people work or perform better than 1 2 3 4 5
me.
5.- I try a lot when I compete with other people. 1 2 3 4 5
Correction Keys
The EFA Scale is a questionnaire that has been used to study the relationships between work
ethic and personality variables. This has been designed to evaluate the degree of adherence to work
ethics in today's society and is made up of 19 items. To find the total score on this scale, you must
first invert the scores obtained in items 9, 13 and 15 as follows: 1=7, 2=6, 3=5, 4=4, 5=3, 6=2,
7=1. Answer the 19 questions and - after reversing the scores on items 9, 13 and 15 - add the
scores of all the answers on the scale.
Those people who score a maximum of 75 have a tendency to believe little or share to a
lesser extent a Protestant work ethic. This low score is associated with countries with a high human
development index (HDI), with low power distance (PD) and individualism.
Those people who score 86 or higher have a tendency to believe more or share a Protestant
work ethic to a greater extent. This high score is associated with countries with a low human
development index (HDI), high power distance (PD), and collectivist countries.
The Spence and Helmreich competitiveness scale -OCI- is a subscale that is part of a global
attitude questionnaire that includes other dimensions of mastery or control of the world and
Protestant work ethic. The five statements that make up this scale are positive. Answer the OCI
Scale and then add the scores for all the responses on the scale.
Those who score a maximum of 11 have a tendency to believe little or share a competitive
attitude to a lesser extent. This low score is associated with countries with a high human
development index (HDI), with low power distance (PD) and individualism.
Those who score 13 or more have a tendency to believe more or share a competitive attitude
to a greater extent. This high score is associated with countries with a low human development
index (HDI), high power distance (PD), and collectivist countries.
Below are the national averages for a number of countries on the EFA and OCI
scales. Agreement with EPT was associated with hierarchical distance 18 and collectivism
or19 by Hofstede (2001). An explanation for this would be that countries with more
traditional cultures reinforce the tendency to agree with statements, regardless of their
content, since this tendency to acquiescence would be a manifestation of obedience to the
beliefs of authority figures. . Another explanation for the greater agreement with EPT in
cultures with high hierarchical distance and collectivist, which we believe to be the most
18 EPT and DP correlation: r = 0.91

19 EPT and IDV correlation: r = – 0.57

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correct, refers to the more conservative nature of these cultures. In fact, conservatism is
generally associated with EFA. Finally, given the scarce resources and the legitimacy of
reward differences in these societies, people tend to value work and effort more -
particularly members of the elite of these societies and university students. Something
similar happens in the case of competitiveness. Students from less developed countries,
more collectivist and hierarchical, being part of an elite, gave more importance to money
and savings and, at the same time, showed more competitive attitudes - although the
average was in a neutral position, students from developed and individualistic countries
tended to disagree with the competitive attitude.
Table 4. Mean scores of the OCI and EPT scales in different countries
COUNTRY OIC EPT COUNTRY OIC EPT
Germany 9,1 66,44 America 12,8 79,44

Argentina 8,6 Australia 11,4 79,95
Bangladesh 14.3 Belgium 10,8
Brazil 11,2 Bulgaria 12,3
Canada 12 Chili 11,6
China 12,4 Black South Africa 89,50
Colombia 13 Korea 13,7
Egypt 15,7 United Arab Emirates 14,4
Spain 10,5 France 10,2
Britain 10,6 76,90 Greece 13,8 83,68
Hong Kong 12,3 79,77 India 14,5 102,88
West Indies (English West Indies) 76,3 Iraq 14.1
Ireland 11 Iceland 13
Israel 11,6 70,25 Japan 12,2
Jordan 14,8 Mexico 13,8
Norway 9,6 New Zealand 11,2 73,80
Poland 12 Portugal 11,9
Romania 13,7 Singapore 11,4
Syria 14,1 South Africa 12,5 80,93
Sweden 9,1 Swiss 9
Türkiye 12,8 Venezuela 11
Yugoslavia 11,2 Zimbabwe 86,67
Source: Hofstede (1998)
Psychosocial Correlates
Several studies corroborated a positive relationship between EFA and agreement
with punitive measures to resolve unemployment, as well as between EFA and attributing
the causes of poverty to its victims. People who believe in the Protestant work ethic
perceive unemployed people on benefits as lazy and dishonest. Likewise, it is found that
there is greater agreement with the Protestant work ethic among whites -compared to
blacks- and also among those identified with conservative policies -compared to liberals
and leftists- (Furnham and Heaven, 1999).
The Protestant work ethic is also associated with the belief in a just world. At
least 4 studies confirm that people who believe in hard work, savings and perseverance
also believe in a just world. Since effort and success are a sign of salvation, it seems
consistent that people who believe in EPT also attribute the victims' misfortunes to their
own faults and sins. On the other hand, the competitive attitude is associated with a greater
motivation for achievement, a greater interest in money and a greater concern for savings.
This competitive attitude characterizes to a greater extent collectivist, hierarchical cultures
with less social development (Hofstede, 1998). Finally, in a study carried out with a
sample of students from 42 nations - surveyed in the 90s of the last century - no
association was found between the set of variables mentioned above and economic growth.
Societies with better social development - greater education, life expectancy and income -
were more cooperative. It may be that the attitudes of hard work, competition, valuing
money and saving have been effective in the past in driving economic development -
although the historical evidence is limited (see the chapter on Cultural Individualism). The
development of wealth, quality of life and well-being allows for the greater development
of leisure, the need for personal development and a 'soft' expressive individualism
associated with valuing cooperation (Furnham et al., 1993). _________________________
Belief in the Just World Scale -EMJ- (Rubin and Peplau, 1973 )
Below we present a series of statements that refer to the beliefs that people have about justice in the world. Please, we
ask you to self-evaluate your belief. For each question, you will have to circle whether you totally disagree (1), more or
less (3), or totally agree (6).
1- The world is basically a fair place. 1 2 3 4 5 6
2- The political candidate who fights for his principles rarely gets elected. 11 2 3 4 5 6
3-I have found that a person rarely deserves the reputation they have. 1 2 3 4 5 6
4-The person who has "lucky breaks in life" is usually because they have earned their good 1 2 3 4 5 6
fortune.
5-It is a common fact that the guilty person is freed in the courts of your country. 1 2 3 4 5 6
6-Films or movies in which good triumphs over evil are unreal. 11 2 3 4 5 6
7-Students almost always deserve the grade they receive at school. 1 2 3 4 5 6
8- Crime or delinquency is not beneficial in the long run. 11 2 3 4 5 6
9-When parents punish their children, it is generally always for good reasons. 1 2 3 4 5 6
10- Although there may be some exceptions, often good and decent people have lives of 1 2 3 4 5 6
suffering.
11-It is practically impossible for a person to receive a fair trial in your country. 1 2 3 4 5 6
12-In almost all professions and businesses, people who do their jobs well reach the top.
1 2 3 4 5 6
13-Even if an evil person gains political power for a moment, in the general course of history 1 2 3 4 5 6
good will win.
14-In general, people receive what they deserve. 11 2 3 4 5 6
15-Parents tend to overlook the things they most admire in their children. 1 2 3 4 5 6
16- It is rare for an innocent person to be sent to jail for a mistake . 1 2 3 4 5 6

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Correction keys
The Belief in a Just World Scale -EMJ- is a questionnaire that emerged from the
study of a series of individual attributes. This scale is composed of 16 items (according
to the version of Rubin and Peplau, 1973) that cover areas related to health, family,
politics and criminal justice.
Within the EMJ, there are nine items that are oriented in the direction of the just
world -MJ- (1, 4, 7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 14 and 16). The remaining seven items would be
indicators of unjust world beliefs -MI- (2, 3, 5, 6, 10, 11 and 15).
Answer the EMJ scale and find your score. To do this, you must add your
responses to the just world subscale -MJ- (the nine items) and the subscale unjust world
scale -MI- (the seven items). Subsequently subtract both subtotals.
Those people who score 12 or more have a tendency to believe that the world is
more fair than unfair. This high score is associated with countries with a high human
development index (HDI) and low power distance (PD).
Those who score 9 or less have a tendency to believe that the world is more unfair
than fair. This low score is associated with countries with a low human development
index (HDI) and high power distance (PD).
Below are the scores for a number of countries on Rubin and Peplau's (1973) EMJ
scale.
Table 5. Average of 12 Populations in the two EMJ Measurements -MJ and MI -20
Country Just World (MJ) Unfair World (IM) MJ – MI
Germany 34,41 23,23 11,18
America 37,83 22,95 14,88
Australia 36,11 23,55 12,56
Britain 32,73 24,24 8,49
Greece 36,81 27,61 9,2
Hong Kong 34,87 25,34 9,5
India 44,20 31,27 12,93
West Indies (English West Indies) 34,04 29,58 4,56
Israel 32,65 22,66 10,1
New Zealand 34,62 23,17 11,46
South Africa 41,19 27,80 13,39
Zimbabwe 37,50 25,79 11,71
Source : Furnham and Heaven, 1999
20
Collectivist countries in bold. Unjust world scores of 28 or more, typical of collectivist countries, with
high hierarchical distance and lower HDI. Scores of 26 or less are typical of individualistic countries, with
low power distance and higher HDI or social development.
Table 6. Hofsted Human Development Index and Cultural Dimensions e21
Hofstede dimensions

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Country IDH-99 EMJ (MJ-MI) DP IDV
Germany 906 11,18 35 67
America 927 14,88 40 91
Australia 922 12,56 36 90
Britain 932 8,49 35 89
Greece 827 9,2 60 35
Hong Kong 880 9,5 68 25
India 545 12,93 77 48
West Indies (English West Indies) 855 4,56 47 16
Israel 883 10,1 13 54
New Zealand 901 11,46 22 79
South Africa 695 13,39 49 65
Zimbabwe 560 11,71 77 39
Source : Furnham and Heaven, 1999; Hofstede, 2001
Attitudes about Justice in the World
The Notion of Justice

According to the contemporary dictionary of languages, justice can be defined as:
'[...]moral virtue that inspires respect for the rights of others and that makes each person
give what belongs to him'[... ] 'Give to each one what is due to him; punish or reward as
appropriate' [...] 'be fair, in accordance with justice, equity, reason, law[...]' .
This concept of justice as a cognitive process has been a source of reflection and
study since the 1960s. The most studied concepts of justice have been those of equitable,
egalitarian and necessity justice.
Equal justice as a cognitive process was fundamentally studied by Adams (1965),
Walter (1975) and Lerner (1975). It was analyzed mainly in interpersonal relationships,
such as the exchange of material or emotional goods involved in a given situation. For
these authors, a situation of equity would occur when the benefits obtained are
proportional to the investment made. The forms of evaluation can be intrapersonal or
interpersonal. In the first case, the subject compares the effort made with the result
obtained. In the second case, the evaluation is carried out between two or more people in
the same situation in which one receives a benefit equal to or greater than the other for the
same effort. If any element is not proportional to the other, if the benefits are considered
unequal, this situation - individually or collectively - will be perceived as inequitable.
The concept of equal justice emerged as a theoretical-practical problem with the
English and French revolutions of the 18th century. Rousseau was one of the philosophers
who most defended this conception. For this author, human beings could only be
21
West Indies: HDI and cultural indicators of Trinidad. Score of 12 or more, poor countries with high PD
and collectivists. Score of 11 or less, rich countries with low PD and individualistic.
free if they were equal (Rousseau, 1980). On the contrary, for liberals, equality would kill
freedom.
The notion of equality as a cognitive process was mainly analyzed by Sampson.
According to him, the only necessary and sufficient condition for someone to deserve the
equal distribution of resources is that they be valued mainly in their quality as a subject, as

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a human being (Sampson, 1976). However, some authors argue that this is not enough to
do deeper justice.
For Marx, justice of necessity would be the only one that in a future society could
serve all members of the community. He was the one who most clearly established a
relationship between freedom, equality and equity. In a just society of the future, everyone
would contribute according to their ability and everyone would receive according to their
need (Marx, 1981).
From the cognitive point of view, there have been several authors who have
studied this type of justice of necessity (Lerner, 1975, 1976; Schwartz, 1975). Necessity
justice seems to be related to a caring and altruistic attitude. According to Lerner, this is
totally independent of economic interest and reciprocity and would occur when there is a
high identification between the members of a group. Primary groups would be the most
typical example, where members help and collaborate according to each other's needs.
Belief in a Just World

Lerner (1980) introduces a motivational concept called 'Belief in the Just World'.
According to him, people believe in the existence of a basically just world, where they
receive what they deserve. To maintain this belief, individuals modify affects and
cognitions to the extent that these psychological changes help preserve those beliefs. A
just world is perceived as one in which '[...]there is an adequate correspondence between
the destinies of people and the destiny that they deserve as a consequence of their actions
or the intrinsic value of each one' (Lerner, 1980) .
Reinforcements and punishments should be more or less balanced, logical and not
chaotic or random. For this author, people organize their cognitions in such a way that they
maintain the belief that they receive what they deserve or, on the contrary, deserve what
they receive. He says: '[...]people who are educated in Western society internalize the
values of justice and desert' (Lerner, 1976).
Thus, individuals tend to generally believe that good subjects are rewarded and bad
subjects are punished. However, people also have experience that discrepant and
contradictory situations frequently arise with the belief in a just world. Every day we see
honest people without work and without money, or responsible workers suffering serious
accidents, or healthy people unjustly contaminated, or competent professionals being
poorly paid, or groups suffering some type of discrimination, etc. One might wonder how
it is possible then that people manage to maintain the belief in a just world. How, for
example, do political-economic elites achieve some type of consensus from the
population?
Lerner (1975) considers that in a situation of injustice, of suffering of others,
people can present two types of attitudes: 1) in the event that an adequate opportunity is
given, subjects can compensate or alleviate the suffering of others; and, 2) in the event that
there is no opportunity to offer help to the other, cognitive distortions occur that lead to
perceiving the victims as deserving of suffering. That is to say, the ideological-cultural
contents serve as a basis so that, through cognitive distortions, people tend to blame the
innocent victim, attributing responsibility for what happens to them and thus maintaining
the belief in a just world. Various studies demonstrate these cognitive distortions,
especially those related to the psychology of war, torture, genocide, etc.
Similar results were found not only for those directly responsible for the suffering
of others, but also for observers who did not directly participate in the events. Opton
(1971) cites the example of the American reaction to the atrocities committed in the
Vietnam War. In general, many people said that these atrocities either had not occurred, or
that if they had occurred, the Vietnamese surely deserved them. The same could be said of
the atrocities of the Yugoslav war or, more recently, the war in Afghanistan.
Lerner (1975) concludes that three conditions must be met for the observer, using
cognitive distortion mechanisms, to maintain his belief in the just world: a) the victim
must be clearly perceived as innocent. Rejection and devaluation will be the result of the
observer's need to maintain his belief in the just world; b) the observer must believe that
the victim's suffering is not an isolated event in his life, but rather that it is prolonged; and,
c) the observer must feel powerless to help the victim.
Although widespread in our culture, the belief in a just world should be considered
as an attitude that assumes values that range from extreme acceptance to total rejection,
with different levels of adherence to this belief.
Rubin and Peplau (1975) considered that in addition to situational determinants,
there are personal attributes related to less or greater adherence to said belief. Those
individual attributes were analyzed and then transformed into a Just World Scale. This
scale covers areas related to health, family, politics and criminal justice.
The social implications of these beliefs have also been studied. Various research
shows that the perception of social and political violence was also affected by this belief.
Police violence was perceived as less violent by those people who had a high score on the
just world belief scale (Camino and Troccoli, 1981). Likewise, it has been proven that
political participation is lower in those people with a high belief in a just world (Mendoza,
1988). These results are consistent with those of Rubin and Peplau, who found a negative
relationship between political activism and belief in a just world (Rubin and Peplau, 1975).
Attributing the fate of the poor and disadvantaged to internal and personal causes,
as well as the devaluation of their identity and behavior, allows us to exonerate institutions
and the social order from social problems, affirming that the order is just. In fact, people
who believe in a just world tend to blame the poor for their condition and reject feminists.
The belief in a just world leads to rationalizing inequalities, reacting with distance and
little empathy towards people in disadvantaged positions and, therefore, devaluing the
victims of injustice (Dalbert and Yamaguchi, 1994).
People who believe in a just world tend toward conservative political positions and,
in addition, reject extra-institutional activism, in five studies. If we consider that people
who believe in a just world rationalize injustices, trust others - including institutions and
politicians - and attribute the failures of the 'underprivileged' to their responsibilities rather
than to social causes or institutions, we do not care. It will be strange that they find little
motivation to participate in social movements (Furnham and Procter, 1989).
People who believe in a just world tend to trust others more and develop altruistic
behavior to a greater extent (if this is possible, it does not go against their norms and is
endorsed by authority) - these results are confirmed in four studies.
In other words, the belief in an unjust world is associated with less conservative
political attitudes, with a less positivist, 'naive' and non-conformist vision of the world
(Furnham and Heaven, 1999). Therefore, we can assume that the belief in an unjust world
will be associated with an identity and a reinforced social mobilization.
Finally, beliefs about immanent justice and those referring to ultimate justice must
be differentiated. Immanent justice is associated with the belief in a just world and affirms
that what happens in social life is fair payment for previous actions. Justice ultimately
suggests that injustices will be redressed by the actions of future justices. Early beliefs are
based on normal cognitive development and the experience of primary control of the

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environment. The latter are more ideological and are associated with eschatological
secular and religious beliefs that emphasize consolation in the future, whether in this world
or the next -p. e., orthodox Catholicism- (Bégue, 2002). Probably, the former will be
questioned by traumatic events, which will cause the social world to be perceived as less
controllable, meaningless, more threatening and unfair, while the latter beliefs will play a
motivating role for both mobilization and social conformism.
Social correlates of the Just World

Belief in a just world was greater in societies with strong social differences or high
power distance cultures - e.g. e., Guatemala- and in dominant social groups -higher
income-, than in more egalitarian societies and in dominated groups -minorities and lower
income-, suggesting that this belief fulfills functions of justification of the social order.
Although, the belief in an unjust world was also lower in more developed countries,
suggesting that this belief implies a kernel of truth (Furnham, 1985; 1993; Calhoun and
Cann, 1994).
On the other hand, the belief in a just world is associated with:
a) Authoritarianism -in 3 of 4 investigations 20- . Authoritarians tend to believe that the
powerful are good and deserve their positions of responsibility, while they perceive the
weak in the opposite way. Now, while authoritarians tend to reject all outgroups - e.g. e.,
not Canadians in general - people who believe in the just world tend to reject only
unprivileged outgroups - e.g. e., mestizos and Indians of the USA - (Furnham and Procter,
1989);
b) Religiosity , particularly the intensity of church attendance and belief in an active God,
suggesting that a belief in a just world need not rely on the ideology that society is
internally controllable. However, the personal importance given to religion does not have a
clear association. It is reasonable to think that religious beliefs, both for their justificatory
component - 'to Caesar what is Caesar's' - and compensatory - 'the kingdom of heaven will
belong to the poor' - reinforce the idea that 'in the long term justice is and will be done in
this world';
c) The belief in internal control of the world. Seven studies have confirmed that people
who believe in a just world tend to perceive that they control their lives. It seems
consistent that people who have the expectation that they can determine their rewards and
punishments, and that they are not at the mercy of external forces and luck, also believe -
to maintain this expectation - that those who have been successful do so because they have
put in the effort. and those who have failed have deserved it for their lack of effort or their
mistakes;
d) Belief in the Protestant Work Ethic . At least 4 studies confirm that people who
believe in hard work, savings and perseverance also believe in a just world. Since effort
and success are a sign of salvation, it seems consistent that people who believe in EPT also
attribute the victims' misfortunes to their own faults and sins; and,
e) People also believe, in three studies (Bégue, 2002), that their personal world is fairer
than that of other people in general, which is associated - like other cognitive illusions of
false uniqueness - with subjective well-being. _________________________________
Summary
20 median r = 0.32
^ Attitude is the evaluation of a social object.
^ Values are generalized attitudes.
^ Opinions are verbalizations of attitudes.
^ Beliefs are information about an attitudinal object.
^ Habits are generally unconscious routinized patterns of behavior.
^ Attitudes are generally conscious action orientations.
^ Attitudes serve functions, but they do not always serve a single function.
^ Attitude is a global evaluative disposition based on cognitive, affective, and
behavioral information that, at the same time, can influence cognitions, affective
responses, behavioral intention, and behavior itself.
^ Behavior is influenced by behavioral intention.
^ Behavioral intention is influenced by attitude (valuation of behavioral outcomes and
expectations) and subjective norm (favorable/unfavorable opinion of significant
others).
^ Perceived control refers to the perception of internal and external obstacles, and has
effects on behavior through behavioral intention.
______________________________________________________________________
^ Prior behavior affects both behavioral intentions and behavior.
^ Attitudes can directly influence behavior.
^ Norms reflect the group's evaluations of what is appropriate or inappropriate.
^ Attitude is a more important component than subjective norm in predicting certain
behaviors.
^ False Consensus is related to the tendency to project one's own attitudes onto others.
^ Our actions are more salient and vivid, we focus more attention on them and
overestimate them.
^ People who have carried out a practice overestimate the percentage of people who
have also done it, they have greater accessibility of information or friends who have
done it, they perceive that their environment has a more favorable attitude and their
personal attitude is also more favorable .
^ People mistakenly believe that a social norm that they personally reject is dominant,
even though the majority privately reject that norm as well.
^ Although members of marginal groups show anxiety and concern about aggressive or
risky behavior, their acceptance without comment creates the impression that no one
is worried and everyone agrees with the negative behavior.
^ Sequence of Pluralistic Ignorance: a) a negative behavior is carried out; b) the
majority does not speak and does not give its opinion; c) it is inferred that the
majority approves the behavior; and, d) a favorable subjective norm is created.
^ Effects of Pluralistic Ignorance: a) effect of estrangement or feeling of cultural
deviation; and, b) maintenance of collective behaviors, at least public, associated
with norms that have already been surpassed or predominance of certain collective
behaviors based on norms of an active minority.

Education
^ Main explanatory processes of Pluralistic Ignorance: a) attribution of stable internal
causality; and, b) homogeneous perception of the majority.
^ Collectivist attitudes are associated with a lower need for uniqueness and a higher
estimate of the percentage of peers who share the subject's decisions.
^ False Consensus for deviant behaviors is stronger in individualistic cultures, which
put more pressure on people to have a positive self-image.
^ People from dominated and collectivist groups perceive their groups as more similar
and homogeneous.
^ Dominant and individualistic groups perceive the group as more heterogeneous.
^ There is a persistent bias to perceive the ingroup as differentiated and heterogeneous,
and the outgroup as similar and homogeneous.
^ Explanations for the perception of ingroup heterogeneity: a) greater contact - not
valid for the self-perception of collectivist cultures and threatened minorities-; and,
b) positive evaluation of the group.
^ The Protestant Ethic involves the valuation of productive work, rational calculation
and the entrepreneurial spirit of individuals to produce benefits.
^ Mirels and Garret build a Protestant work ethic scale –EPT–.
^ With the Spence and Helmreich Competitiveness scale it is found that instrumental
individualism is associated with a competitive attitude and this with a greater
valuation of money.
^ EFA is associated with high power distance and collectivist cultures, which are more
conservative (conservatism is associated with EFA). Their scarce resources and the
legitimacy of the differences in rewards make the members of the elite value work
and effort more.
^ People believe in the existence of a basically just world, where they receive what
they deserve.
^ In a situation of injustice, if there is an adequate opportunity, the suffering of others
can be compensated or alleviated. If there is no such opportunity, victims may be
perceived as deserving.
^ Belief in a just world is greater in societies with strong social differences or high
power distance and in dominant social groups. This belief serves to justify the social
order.
^ The belief in an unjust world is lower in more developed countries. This belief
implies a kernel of truth.

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CHAPTER X

ATTITUDES: DEFINITION AND MEASUREMENT

Classic Theories of Attitude Formation

The Classic Conditioning of Attitudes

The Instrumental Conditioning of Attitudes

2 Social Psychology, Culture and

Measuring Attitudes: Types of Measurements

Table 1. Thurstone Sexual Role Scale

Table 2. Likert Scale to Evaluate Attitude towards Condoms

1. They are cumbersome, uncomfortable, complicated to use. 1 2 3 4 5

Functions of Attitudes and Methodology

4 Social Psychology, Culture and

Structure of Attitudes: Attitude Models

Three-dimensional, two-dimensional and one-dimensional models

6 Social Psychology, Culture and

Classic and Current One-Dimensional Models

The Socio-cognitive Model

The Model of Reasoned Action

The Planned Action Model

Graph 2. Representation of the Planned Action Model proposed by Ajzen (1988)

1 Sheppard et al., (1988) r = 0.53; van den Putte (1991) r = 0.62.

8 Social Psychology, Culture and

Choice Between Behavioral Alternatives

Previous Experience and Behavioral Change

Attitude, Subjective Norm and Descriptive Norm

10 Social Psychology, Culture and

Norms and Socio-Cognitive Processes: False Consensus and Pluralistic Ignorance

False Consensus Bias: My Attitudes are the Norm

Social comparison, social influence and false consensus

12 Social Psychology, Culture and

2.0.- Coital experience before age 16: __________%

3 .0.- Coital experience before age 16: /

14 Social Psychology, Culture and

5.0. Coital experience before age 16.

16 Social Psychology, Culture and

Table 1. Social Influence of Friends and Parents

8 t = – 6.70, p < .0001

18 Social Psychology, Culture and

Table 2. False Consensus regarding Coital Experience before the age of 18

10 Men's average = 3.3; Average women = 3.

20 Social Psychology, Culture and

Culture, False Consensus, and Perception of Ingroup Homogeneity

22 Social Psychology, Culture and

14 Americans estimate = 31.3%; Danish estimate = 13.5%.

Homogeneity Scale (Lee and Otatti, 1993)

2-The majority of the people of [reference nation] are conformist.

3-The [reference group] are independent and individualistic.

4-The [reference group] vary little in their way of dressing.

5-In [reference nation] people tend to behave in a similar way.

6-In [reference nation] all people have a similar appearance.

24 Social Psychology, Culture and

CULTURE AND ATTITUDES LINKED TO PROTESTANT ETHICS,

15 EFA and Locus of control correlation: r = - 0.30

26 Social Psychology, Culture and

Competitiveness Questionnaire -OCI- by Spence and Helmreich (1983)

2.It is important for me to perform or do better than others at a 1 2 3 4 5

18 EPT and DP correlation: r = 0.91

28 Social Psychology, Culture and

Germany 9,1 66,44 America 12,8 79,44

30 Social Psychology, Culture and