ISID InfectionGuide Chapter24
ISID InfectionGuide Chapter24
ISID InfectionGuide Chapter24
Chapter Editor
Gonzalo Bearman MD, MPH, FACP, FSHEA, FIDSA
Topic Outline
Key Issues
Known Facts
Controversial Issues
Suggested Practice
Suggested Practice in Under-Resourced Settings
Summary
References
KNOWN FACTS
• Universal precautions are promoted by the US Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention because when patients initially present seeking
medical care, it is often not known if their blood may contain hepatitis B
or C viruses, human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), or other pathogens.
All blood should be considered potentially contaminated, and efforts
should be made to avoid direct contact, mucous membrane exposure,
and sharp injuries.
• In addition, respiratory protection is prudent when caring for patients
with suspected or confirmed tuberculosis or other highly contagious
airborne infections (e.g., SARS)
Controversial Issues
• With respect to isolation, there are limited data comparing the cost and
efficacy of different methods (provider face masks, negative pressure
rooms, etc.). The type of isolation used is based on the mode of disease
transmission. Overall, the costs associated with initiating basic isolation
precautions are usually low and the benefits far outweigh the expense.
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• The benefit of ventilation measures in the hospital on tuberculin
conversion in healthcare providers is still under investigation. Higher
tuberculin conversion rates have been reported among personnel who
work in non-isolation patient rooms or rooms with fewer than 2 air
exchanges per hour. Guidelines for the prevention of nosocomial
transmission of tuberculosis recommend minimum air change rates of 2
to 15 per hour.
• There are scarce data on the ability of healthcare workers to identify
patients at risk for transmitting infections. Patients with active
pulmonary tuberculosis are often missed at emergency triage. In
retrospect, some of these patients may have presented with typical
symptoms and risk factors that are easily overlooked in a busy triage
environment. Each emergency department should evaluate its process
to see if opportunities for earlier diagnosis of tuberculosis exist.
SUGGESTED PRACTICE
• Provide patient educational materials about hand and respiratory
hygiene/cough etiquette in emergency receiving and waiting areas.
• Mandatory careful hand hygiene, preferably with alcohol based hand
sanitizer, before and after each patient encounter.
• Gloves and isolation gowns should be worn when contact with blood
and body fluids is likely.
• Goggles or face masks should be worn when splashing of blood or body
fluids is anticipated.
• Appropriately sized face masks should be worn in cases of suspected
airborne infection (e.g., tuberculosis, SARS)
• Triage personnel should be trained to identify high-risk patients with
potential communicable infections.
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• Patients who appear unusually ill, especially with cough, should be
isolated (>3 feet (1 m) distance) or provided a mask to limit risk to
healthcare personnel and other patients.
• Patients who may have had a chemical exposure from a bioterror attack
should be isolated and decontaminated as soon as possible.
• Efforts should be made to minimize staff flow between isolated and
non-isolated patients.
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• Surveillance mechanisms should be implemented for evaluation of
infection control measures
SUMMARY
• The adoption of reasonable healthcare safety precautions, as listed
above, can minimize transmission of most contact-related infections in
the emergency department. All personnel handling blood, body fluids, or
sharps should be vaccinated against hepatitis B. Providing and using
sharp containers reduces the risk of bloodborne infections.
• Risk of airborne infections can be minimized through use of rooms with
exhaust fans or adequate ventilation.
• Occupational exposure to blood or droplets should be reported. Post-
exposure counselling and therapy, if necessary, should be offered to all
clinical personnel.
REFERENCES
1. CDC. Updated U.S. Public Health Service Guidelines for the
Management of Occupational Exposures to HBV, HCV, and HIV and
Recommendations for Postexposure Prophylaxis. MMWR 2001;
50(RR-ll): 1–52; available at
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/rr5011a1.htm.
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3. Menzies D, Fanning A, Yuan L, et al. Hospital Ventilation and Risk for
Tuberculous Infection in Canadian Healthcare Workers. Canadian
Collaborative Group in Nosocomial Transmission of TB. Ann Intern
Med 2000; 133(10): 779–89.