C&C Vol 1

CULTURE AND COSMOS
Vol. 1 No. 1 Spring/Summer 1997 ISSN 1368-6534
Editorial
Astronomy is more than the science of the stars. It is intimately connected

to our ideas of our selves, our purpose and place in the universe.
Currently it is fueling myths, beliefs and ideologies as much as at any
time in its history. We have the neo-paganism based on such sites as
Stonehenge and Avebury. There is the belief in UFOs, borne out of
modern science and science fiction, which in the last decade has exploded
in ever more detailed doctrines of alien visitation and abduction. On a
more sober level we have the manipulation of the space race to provide
propaganda for the cold war. In the post 1989 world the USA continues
to use its space programme to reinforce images of the American dream;
space has become the new frontier, and 1997’s Mars Rover mission was
designed to touch down on 4 July, the anniversary of the declaration of
independence. Then there is the social impact of the new science,
explored in terms of quantum physics by Danah Zohar and Ian Marshall.2
If the political impact of Copernicus and Newton is now well established,
then we have hardly begun to question what effect Einstein may have had
on twentieth century politics.
Then there is the question of belief in astrology which, in the modern
world, is perhaps as strong as it ever has been. Its popularity strikes many
people as something of a historical problem: how in a modern rational,
scientific world could such an irrational, unscientific belief flourish?
Given that such words as rational and scientific are highly problematic
and open to differing interpretations, astrology’s contemporary revival
does require study and explanation.
The significance of astrology to the history of ideas, religion and
science is no longer in question. Lynn Thorndike’s epic History of Magic
and Experimental Science has made the argument convincingly. A select
group of other scholars have examined its role in specific periods and
cultures, notably in the ancient near east, the classical world and in
medieval and Renaissance Europe. Yet while papers on the subject find
their place in specialist academic journals, it is felt that the time has come
for a journal which focuses specifically on its past and development, as
well as on its social, political and religious functions.
2
Astrology can be defined as the use of celestial phenomena to interpret

and predict events on earth. However, in order to flourish it requires a
philosophical context based on a general belief that movements and
changes in the heavens are significant for humanity, without the specific
rules, technicalities and procedures necessary for astrological
interpretation. This may be defined as cultural astronomy: the use of
astronomical knowledge, beliefs or theories to inspire, inform or
influence social forms and ideologies, or any aspect of human behaviour.
Cultural astronomy also includes the modern disciplines of
ethnoastronomy and archaeoastronomy.
The problem of definitions was dealt with by Michael Hoskin in his
1996 review of Astronomies and Cultures.1 He posed the question “What
astronomy is not an astronomy in a culture?” This is a valid point, and
one may take a narrow or broad definition of the term cultural astronomy.
In part the solution is one of emphasis. Culture and Cosmos will
emphasise the cultural aspects of astronomy rather than the strict history
of mathematical and technical astronomy, areas ably catered for
elsewhere.
Culture and Cosmos will cover a broad spectrum of ideas: any and all
of the ways in which human beings manipulate, exploit, analyse and
interpret the heavens in order to understand, regulate and predict their
individual concerns and collective lives. We may not be able to answer
all questions, but at least we can ask them.
References
1. Hoskin, Michael, review of Astronomies and Cultures, ed. Clive L. N. Ruggles and
Nicholas J. Saunders (University of Colorado Press, Niwot, Col., 1993),
Archaeoastronomy, number 21, supplement to the Journal for the History of Astronomy,
vol. 27, 1996, p 885-7.
2. Danah Zohar and Ian Marshall, The Quantum Society, (Bloomsbury Publishing,
London 1993).
Culture and Cosmos

An Astronomical Basis for the Myth of the
Solar Hero
Robin Heath*
Introduction
Our increasing knowledge of the megalithic culture of the British Isles in
the 2nd and 3rd millennia BCE tends to confirm the proposition that
megalithic astronomers measured celestial positions with considerable
accuracy. The evidence indicates that they understood the 18.6 year nodal
period and the moon’s nine minute declination wobble.1 They also had
sufficient geometrical ability to re-proportion spacings between lines,
divide circles into whole number polygons and divide lines into equal
integer spacings.2 We should therefore ask whether there is evidence of
such early astronomy in the numbers which recur in certain myths. The
following should be viewed as preliminary arguments.
The Thirty-Three Year Cycle

If our interest is megalithic astronomy then we should search for relevant
evidence in the myths of the British Isles. One of the most recurrent
numbers in the stories of the Tuatha de Danaan who, according to
tradition, inhabited Ireland before 1,500 BCE, is thirty-three.3 We are
told, for example, that the first battle of Mag Tuired was fought by the
saviour-hero Lug and thirty-two other leaders. In the same vein, Nemed,
another hero, reached Ireland with only one ship, while thirty-three were
lost on the way; Cuchulainn slays thirty-three of the Labriads in the Bru
battle whilst a late account of the second battle of Mag Tuired names
thirty-three leaders of the Fomorii, thirty-two plus their highest king.4
This material contains one clear and obvious common theme.
Repeatedly, it reinforces an originally oral message which told the
knowing listener to look to the number thirty-three as something relevant
to a hero, a saviour. In his analysis of the Welsh White Book of
Rhydderch, N.L.Thomas writes that ‘Both three and eleven were equally
symbolic, the multiplicand thirty-three particularly so. It has frequently
been used to imply supra-human attributes, regal authority and
deification.’5
* Megalithic Tours, Cwm Degwel, St.Dogmael’s, Cardigan, SA43 3JF, UK.

4 A Possible Astronomical Basis for the Myth of the Solar Hero
We find evidence of the astronomical and mythical significance of the

thirty three year cycle in other cultures. Perhaps the best known example
is found in the tradition that Christ began his ministry at age thirty and
was crucified at age thirty three.6 The solar tradition in early Christianity
is well-recorded, with the widespread identification of Christ with Helios
and the fixing of Christmas to coincide with the festival of Sol Invictus, a
few days after the winter solstice, and Easter close to the spring equinox.7
It is partly on the basis of such evidence, together with the argument that
epic myths such as those of Gilgamesh and Hercules represent solar
cycles, that modern comparative mythology has produced the notion of
the solar hero.8 I am arguing that the numerical evidence in the Celtic
tales provides astronomical evidence that they too could be considered
solar heroes.
Megalithic Astronomy and the Solar Cycle

Many megalithic standing stones have been shown to relate to extreme
Sun and Moon rising and setting azimuths against the local horizon.
While the link at some sites is tenuous it is beyond doubt in others, as for
example at Stonehenge.9 The practical solar year is 365 days long. I say
practical because most reference books claim that there are 365 and a
quarter days in the year, a confusion with the Earth’s orbital period
around the Sun. Every fourth year an extra day slips in to make it 366
days. In four years there are thus 1461 days. It is fairly easy to observe
the Sun's behaviour and thereby measure this number.
An equinoctial Sunrise marker, of which many still exist in the British
uplands will, each year, deliver the vernal equinox sunrise from a slightly
different position on the horizon. The ‘quarter day effect’ means that the
Sun, each year, is displaced about a quarter of a degree from the marker
stone. During three years of observation, the Sun appears to be slipping
every more away from the alignment until, at the fourth year, two
remarkable and very observable things happen simultaneously: the Sun
rises once more very close to the marker stone, whence the day count -
the tally - for the year is found to be 366 and not 365 days. Observation
does not stop there, and a good human eye can detect much more
minuscule angular changes than a quarter of a degree from watching
sunrises.10 The truth about solar year measurements carried out at the
equinox is that the result is always 365 days unless sustained
observations are conducted over many years. In that case the result is
365.25 days, a figure which, under optimum conditions could be reached
after four years (see Figure 1).11 This figure is within eleven minutes of
Culture and Cosmos

Robin Heath 5
time of that for the tropical year (365.24219 mean solar days) and is
almost identical to that for the civil, calendar, year (365.2425 mean solar
days).
Figure 1
For longer time periods something else happens. Every once in a whole
number of years the chance arises to measure the year with even greater
precision. This can be achieved by observing certain key years when,
once again, the Sun rises precisely behind the foresight - be this a stone
marker or a distant mountain peak - in other words, a perfect repeat solar
cycle.
What we may assume, courtesy of their enduring architecture, is that
the megalithic astronomers could have readily evaluated the length of the
solar year to two decimal places. They could accomplish this by marking
1461 equal lengths on a rope - the tally count of days in four years - and
then folding it in half twice to obtain 365.25. The 1461 day tally is a
Culture and Cosmos

given, gleaned from simple observation and tally counting over four
years.
After thirty-three years one can observe an exact repeat of the original
equinoctial rising behind the marker stone (See Table 1, Figure 2). To a
megalithic astronomer, this same phenomenon would have translated as
an exact repeat rising (or setting) behind a marker, whilst a modern
astronomer would note that the Sun's declination will be identical on the
same calendar date thirty-three years after the value read from a book of
tables today; thirty three years is a true solar cycle. If we can assume that
the megalithic astronomers made exact angular observations over many
years, as the current evidence suggests,12 then this phenomenon would
have been a familiar one to them.
The vertical axis indicates the error from 364.242 days plotted on a logarithmic
scale. The base line, 2.5, represents the minimum deviation. The horizontal axis
indicates years from 0 to 100. This clearly indicates the thirty three year pattern.
Diagram courtesy of Nick Kollerstrom.
However one interprets the data, this presents a possible astronomical

source to the use of the number thirty three in heroic myths. Thus when
Christ’s resurrection occurs at age thirty-three, witnessed as it was at
Culture and Cosmos

Robin Heath 7
sunrise, we may be faced with a sophisticated astronomical/calendar

metaphor. Even the rolling away of the stone to reveal the resurrected
saviour may plausibly be argued to represent the emergence of the Sun
from behind a stone marker, inaugurating another thirty three year
cycle.13
Conclusion
Contemporary archaeology has established the astronomical
sophistication of the megalith builders to a previously unsuspected level.
So far the arguments, naturally enough, have rested primarily on the
archaeological record. However, a second line of argument may be
derived from the mythical record, even though we have to account for the
problem that the written sources are necessarily of a much later date than
the stone remains. It is clear that myth may provide evidence of ancient
astronomical knowledge, while astronomy may also provide an additional
view of ancient myths.
Postscript: The Dresden Codex

Interestingly, we can find the solar cycle of thirty-three years within other
cultures, such as the Mayan. I draw attention to this as additional
evidence that thirty three-year cycles may have been apparent to early
astronomers. The Dresden Codex, a collection of divinatory almanacs
mostly tied to the 260 day divinatory cycle, contains eclipse timings
compiled by the Maya and runs for almost 33 years.14 This tabular codex
abruptly finishes after 32 years and 270 days and the reason for its length
is understood to be connected with the fact that 46 sacred periods of 260
days tally with this period.15 However, it is also evident that after this
time frame, which corresponds to 405 lunations, the Sun will meet the
lunar node axis and produce an eclipse. In other words, 405 lunations is
an eclipse cycle; after 32 years and 270 days, the nodes will have made
one and three quarter revolutions whilst the Sun has made 32 and three
quarter revolutions of the ecliptic, the result being that the Sun meets one
of the nodes, resulting in an eclipse.16 As the Dresden Codex is in part a
document about eclipses, there was thus no real need to continue the
tabulation to 33 years in order to complete the niceties of the evidently
known solar cycle of thirty-three years, 405 lunations is the last eclipse
possible within this cycle. It is therefore reasonable to infer that the codex
recognises the importance of the 33 year solar cycle and that the Maya
were familiar with it.
Culture and Cosmos

Table 1.
Important Solar Returns behind a horizon alignment
Number Days Time Difference Angular error from original

of years from whole number solar observation
4 1,460.968 45 minutes 1 min. 30 sec.
21 7,670.086 124 minutes 3 min. 42 sec.
33 12,052.992 10.7 minutes 0 min. 18 sec.
62 22,645.016 23.53 minutes 0 min. 36 sec.
The Tropical Solar Year is 365.242199 days in length. Multiply this by whole
numbers (of years) and look for products where the fractional part of the result
tends towards zero or one. There are several contenders, shown above.
Consecutive years contain an angular error of one quarter (15 minutes) of a
degree. The Daily angular sunrise change along the horizon in Southern Britain
at the equinox is over 0.7 degree. This is considerably more than one solar disc
diameter (about 0.6 degree).
References
1. Alexander Thom, Megalithic Sites in Britain, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1967,
pp 59, 165. Thom reckoned that good observation can detect angular changes as small as
2.5 minutes of arc (correspondence from Archie Thom to the author, 1994). John
E.Wood, Sun, Moon and Standing Stones, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1980) wrote
that ‘the Temple Wood observatory shows inherent accuracies of declination
measurement to around one hundredth of a degree’.
2. Wood, Sun, Moon, pp 36-56
3 The best source for the early myths is the Royal Irish Academy’s edition of The Book of
Leinster, 1880, a facsimile of the Leabar na Nuachonghbhala (also sometimes known as
The book of Glendalough). This contains the earliest known version of the Leabhar
Gabhala, the ‘book of invasions’, the primary source for the stories of the Tuatha de
Danaan.. The most reliable version of this work is Lebor Gabala Erenn: Book of the
Taking of Ireland, ed. R.A.S.MacAlister, Irish Text Society, 5 vols, 1938, 1939, 1940,
1941, 1954.
4. N.L.Thomas, Irish Symbols of 3,500 BC (Mercia Press, Cork, 1988), p 83.
5. Thomas, Irish Symbols, p 76. For The White Book of Rhydderch see Llyfr Gwyn
Rhydderch (The White Book of Rhydderch), with an introduction by T.M.Jones,
(University of Wales Press, Cardiff, 1973, reprint of the 1907 edition edited by
J.Gwenogvryn Evans) The original manuscript is National Library of Wales MSS
Peniarth 4. Also see Rees, Alwyn and Brinley, Celtic Heritage (Thames and Hudson,
London, 1961), pp 200 f., 318 ff., 338. Although The White Book of Rhydderch is dated to
1300-25, like other similar texts, it is widely believed to represent the written account of a
much earlier oral tradition.
Culture and Cosmos

Robin Heath 9
6. Luke 3.23, Acts 2, record that Christ’s ministry began at age thirty.
7. The earliest reference to the celebration of Christmas on Sol Invictus, December 25, is
the Philocalian Calendar of 336. There are different formulae establishing the celebration
of Easter. The standard has become the Roman version: Easter Sunday is the first Sunday
after the full moon following the spring equinox. See also Henry Chadwick, The Early
Church, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, for discussion of Christian reverence for the sun in
the 1st-3rd centuries.
8. The concept of the solar hero has been particularly popularized by the Jungians. Jung
wrote that ‘It is not enough for the primitive to see the sun rise and set; this external
observation must at the same time be a psychic happening: the sun in its course must
represent the fate of a god or hero who, in the last analysis, dwells nowhere except in the
soul of man’; C.G.Jung, ‘Archetypes of the Collective Unconscious’, Collected Works,
Vol. 9, part 1, p 6, trans F.R.C.Hull (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1959).
9. For Stonehenge see Hugh Thurston, Early Astronomy (New York 1994), pp 45-55.
10. Thom, Megalithic Sites, p 108
11. Norman Lockyer argued that simple observation was sufficient to establish these
figures: ‘Had ignorance led to the establishment of a year of 360 days, yet experience
would have led to its rejection in a few years...If observations of the Sun at solstice or
equinox had been alone made use of, the true length of the year would have been
determined in a few years’. Norman Lockyer, The Dawn of Astronomy, (Cambridge
University Press, 1894) pp 245-6, reprint MSI, 1964.
12. At Loughcrew, in Ireland, Cairn F, Stone C1, there are a set of 62 inscribed markers,
whilst nearby, at Fourknocks Passage, one may count three columns of eleven chevrons,
totalling 33, picked onto a stone. See N.L.Thomas, Irish Symbols, p 73.
13. Matthew 28:1, ‘as it began to dawn, towards the first day of the week’. In first century
Greek astrology the first day of the week , and the first hour of the first day, were ruled by
the Sun. If we can interpret the astronomical features of the resurrection story as an
allegory of the solar cycle, then Mary, as the mother, represents the origin of the process,
in other words the first measurement or alignment with the stone marker thirty three years
previously. To extend the allegory, the stone blocking the tomb, the entrance to the
underworld, rolls away revealing the resurrected form and his entrance back into the
visible world.
14. See Floyd Lounsbury’s paper in the Dictionary of Scientific Biography, Vol 15,
supplement 1, Charles Gillespie general editor (Charles Scribener’s Sons, New York)
15. Evan Hadingham, Early Man and the Cosmos, William Heinemann (London 1983), p
223. See also Anthony Aveni, Skywatchers of Ancient Mexico, (University of Texas,
1980).
16. See Thurston, Early Astronomy, p 201.
Culture and Cosmos

Early Greek Cosmology: A Historiographical
Review
Norriss S. Hetherington*
Introduction
Early Greek cosmology has attracted much attention from classicists,
historians, philosophers, and scientists, with each group bringing to the
subject its own interests and biases. Purportedly authoritative
reconstructions and analyses of ancient Greek cosmology exist in
abundance, even though no philosophical writings of the Presocratic
period, circa 600 to 400 BC, have survived. The Greeks’ attempt to
explain celestial phenomena in natural terms and to avoid supernatural or
divine intervention is a common theme linking many otherwise disparate
scholarly studies. A frequent point of dispute involves the degree to
which ancient ideas are to be judged in the context of modern science.
From scientist-historians, by which I mean scientists who have become
historians, we have, in the words of Victor Thoren, ‘modern
commentaries, written fairly uniformly over the last 150 years by men
uniformly possessed of more astronomical ingenuity than historical
perspective or critical sense. The result is a corpus of secondary material
replete with literally incredible claims, many of them mutually (and some
of them self-) contradictory.’1 At the other end of the scholarly spectrum
reside classicists, producing philological rather than philosophical or
historical books. As William Stahlman wrote, ‘The trees are here and
accurately labelled, but we never see the forest.’2
Between these two extremes lie a few studies of ancient Greek
cosmology in its cultural context, most often focusing on the Ionian
school, or Milesians, chiefly Thales (c.600 BC), Anaximander (c.610-545
BC), Anaximenes (c.546 BC) and Heraclitus (c.540-c.480 BC), and
Pythagoras (b.c.570/580 BC) and the Pythagoreans.3 It is these who
chiefly concern me here. However, neither most of the accounts of the
Milesians nor the Pythagoreans adequately cover all the varieties of
Presocratic cosmological thought, and historians are open to the charge of
over-simplification, that ‘for long enough we have thought of early Greek
philosophy as a tennis match between Ionians and Italians, with all the
Greeks in the middle gaping dumbly up as the ball flew to and fro above
their heads’.4
Sources
* University of California, Berkeley,

Norriss S. Hetherington 11
One of the most useful and convenient collections of the raw materials
for reconstructions and analyses is contained in The Presocratic
Philosophers by Kirk, Raven, and Schofield. Their work includes extant
fragments, mainly a few quotations from Presocratic works that have
survived in books written after 400 BC, with the Greek original and
English translation, and commentaries. Their principal sources are
testimonia, comments in the writings, such as have survived, of Plato,
Aristotle, and Theophrastus, written shortly after the Presocratic period;
and the doxographical tradition, consisting of summaries of the works of
Plato, Aristotle, and Theophrastus, and summaries of summaries, the
primary source for the summarizers being the multi-volume history of
early philosophy by Theophrastus.5
Yet none of the surviving sources is above question. The fragments
probably are the most reliable, or least unreliable, but there is no
surviving original against which to check them. The testimonia have an
additional uncertainty. Aristotle gives serious attention to the earlier
philosophers, but his judgment and his corresponding analysis and
description of earlier philosophy may well have been distorted by his
own belief in the importance of the material nature of the world. He
desired ‘to find predictions of his own conclusions in the works of his
predecessors’.6 Plato, in contrast, offers only casual remarks on his
predecessors. Just how little has survived is illustrated by the example of
Theophrastus. Of the approximately eighteen books he wrote, at most a
handful have survived, and the doxographical tradition consists primarily
of summaries of his books and summaries of summaries.
Classicists are virtually unanimous in doubting the reliability of the
surviving sources, though with differing degrees of forcefulness. In Early
Greek Astronomy to Aristotle, D. R. Dicks’ argumentative scepticism left
readers with a decidedly negative aftertaste.7 He was even more
polemical and irritating in journal articles and in 1966 he wrote that ‘The
literature is now full of references to the scientific achievements (so-
called) of the Presocratics, and the earlier the figure (and consequently
the less information of reliable authenticity we have of him) the more
enthusiastically do scholars enlarge his scientific knowledge’...8 Thales is
the earliest such figure and Dicks considered that ‘Inevitably there
accumulated round the name of Thales, as that of Pythagoras (the two
often being confused), a number of anecdotes of varying degrees of
plausibility and of no historical worth whatsoever’.9
Speculation or Science?
Culture and Cosmos 11

12 Early Greek Cosmology: A Historiographical Review
Having dispensed with modern scholars, Dicks turned on their ancient

subject, the Presocratics. He argued that ‘Greek astronomy was still in the
pre-scientific stage. Observations of astronomical phenomena...were
rough-and-ready observations, unsystematically recorded and imperfectly
understood, of practical men...whose main concern was to have some sort
of guide for the regular business of everyday life...Ionian speculation
seems to have taken very little note of such observation (some of its
wilder flights of fancy might have been avoided, if it had taken
more)...Not until Ionian speculation had played itself out and it was
becoming increasingly obvious that such presumptive theorising bore
little or no relation to the gradually accumulating stock of observational
data, did mathematical astronomy even begin to develop’.10
In response to Dicks’ characterisation of Ionian philosophy as a
speculative enterprise without a scientific future and a philosophic
sideline with no impact on the development of observational science or
mathematical astronomy, one critic charged that what he offered was
‘essentially a Baconian or neo-Baconian view of science which admits
mathematical computation together with empirical observation as the
necessary characteristics of science, but which denies any role to
speculative hypotheses of a strongly theoretical nature’.11 A classicist
limiting himself to Greek and Roman subjects, Dicks did not look ahead
to the influence of Pythagorean number mysticism on modern science
and he gave short shrift to the cosmological fantasies of the Presocratics,
rejecting sweeping statements from other scholars about supposed
striking similarities between patterns of thought in ancient Greek and
modern science. He did, though, concede that the Pythagoreans were
beginning to move away from speculative thinking. Other scholars have
seen in emerging Ionian rationalism the removal almost at a single stroke
of the entire mythological scaffolding of earlier, pre-scientific thought.12
Ionian Rationalism
Focusing on the method rather than substance of Presocratic thought
avoids the difficulty that most Presocratic theories are known to be false.
To put it bluntly, as Jonathan Barnes did, ‘none of the Milesian theories
is true: the Milesians do not compose a Greek Royal Society; and their
Transactions would not make any contribution to the sum of scientific
knowledge’. Further, by focusing on the rational, philosophical element
within Presocratic methodology rather than the mathematical,
quantifiable element, historians can avoid the difficulty that ‘none of the
Milesians aspired to the sort of precision we require in a scientific theory:
12 Culture and Cosmos

their views are incurably vague; and underlying this vagueness is a

complete innocence of the delights of measurement and quantification’.13
An emphasis on rationalism as a key characteristic of Presocratic
cosmology also fits nicely with the ‘Greek miracle’ view of ancient
history. Simply stated this holds that in the beginning there were
‘charming but childish Egyptians and Sumerians with their weird and
fantastic notions about the cow-goddess in the sky, the sweet waters
under the earth, and so on, and then along came the Greeks who were
adult rational people like ourselves’.14
Francis Cornford, a historian of ancient philosophy, did much to
establish the belief in the miracle of Presocratic rationalism. In From
Religion to Philosophy, first published in 1912 but still popular, he
commented on the absence from Milesian philosophy of astrological
superstition, magical powers, and mythical cosmogony. Less noted by
readers is his conclusion that the advent of the new rational spirit was not
a sudden and complete breach with the old, and that there remained a
thread of continuity from science back to the supernatural world of the
gods.15
Cornford's thesis has not been superseded, even if part of it, no doubt
compatible with prevailing theories of race in England early in the
twentieth century, now risks being found less than perfectly politically
correct. ‘The scientific tendency is Ionian in origin: it takes its rise among
that race which had shaped Homeric theology, and it is the characteristic
product of the same racial temperament.’16 Cornford's Presocratics also
aspired to be modern scientists. ‘The aim of science...triumphantly
achieved...succeeded in reducing physics to a perfectly clear, conceptual
model, such as science desires...’17 But the Presocratics could not have
known what lay in the future. ‘They were not trying to give a scientific
system, since no one yet had told them what “science” ought to be.’18
By the 1930s Cornford had forged general agreement on the
proposition that with Thales what we call western science first appeared
in the world. He wrote that ‘The intelligence became disinterested and
now felt free to voyage on seas of thought strange to minds bent on
immediate problems of action. Reason sought and found truth that was
universal, but might, or might not, be useful for the exigencies of
life...Science begins when it is understood that the universe is a natural
whole, with unchanging ways of its own - ways that may be ascertainable
by human reason, but are beyond the control of human action’.19 With the
rise of science, he thought, there occurred a corresponding demise of

magic and mythology, themselves pre-scientific practices designed to

bring supernatural forces under some measure of control.
Later, Cornford had second thoughts. All his life he was a dissenter,
and ultimately he dissented against the proposition he had done so much
to establish, that Ionian natural philosophers were scientific. Now he
noted that their dogmatic pronouncements easily could have been upset
by careful observation or the simplest experiment, but they had no
empirical theory of knowledge to govern their speculations.20 Published
only posthumously, Cornford's second thoughts still have not entirely
overtaken his first. A new generation of historians is more sensitive to the
unscientific nature of Presocratic science, but some writers still single out
rationalism, seemingly unaware both that they are echoing Cornford and
that he has retracted much of the foundation upon which their derivative
accounts are constructed. It is not inconsistent, however, to maintain that
the Presocratics had a scientific world-view even though they lacked the
experimental method.21
Benjamin Farrington was prominent amongst those who emphasised
the rational in Presocractic cosmology. In his Science in Antiquity, he
traced the development of ancient science in close relation to the history
of philosophy. For the Milesians, he argued that Thales’ importance lay
in his being the first person known to have offered a general explanation
of nature without invoking the aid of any outside power. He concluded
that Anaximander's brilliant advance was toward a more abstract
conception of nature; no longer was the underlying substance of the
material world a visible, tangible state of matter, such as water, but the
lowest common denominator of all sensible things arrived at by a process
of abstraction.
Farrington placed the Pythagoreans, on the other hand, in a context of
a spiritual revival brought about by the menace of the Persian advance,
arguing that Pythagorean mathematics was primarily a religious
exercise.22 Here he was followed by other scholars, such as June
Goodfield and Stephen Toulmin, who argued that ‘Pythagoras, it is clear,
was not so much the leader of a scientific research team, or the principal
of an educational establishment, as (in modern terms) the guru of an
Indian ashram’.23 Earlier Bertrand Russell had found modern parallels for
Pythagoras when he described him as ‘a combination of Einstein and
Mrs. Eddy’.24
Science and Society

Farrington forged a very different thesis in Greek Science, exploring

connections with practical life, with techniques, and with the economic
basis and productivity of Greek society. A Marxist, he was interested in
the effect of class interests in determining early Greek philosophical
opinion. Egyptian and Babylonian cosmogonies, known to Thales, had
embodied the idea of water in the beginning, probably because the land in
both countries had been won in a desperate struggle with nature by
draining swamps. Thales, leaving out only the god who had let dry land
be, still formed everything out of water. Farrington seemingly chose to
ignore Aristotle's speculation that Thales may have arrived at his
supposition from seeing the nurture of all things to be moist. Continuing
his emphasis on the practical, Farrington speculated that Heraclitus chose
fire as the first principle perhaps because it was the active agent which
produced change in so many technical and natural processes. In marked
contrast was Pythagorean society, in which contempt for manual labour
kept pace with the growth of slavery and technical processes of
production became more shameful, fit only for slaves. How fortunate and
acceptable that the secret constitution of things was revealed not to those
who manipulated nature but to the thinkers. This, Farrington speculated,
marked the separation of philosophy from the techniques of production.25
The possible links between Presocratic cosmology and its social setting
are not limited to Farrington's imagination. Jean Pierre Vernant set out to
explain the change from arithmetical Babylonian astronomy to
geometrical Greek cosmology by arguing from the general premise that
social change preceded philosophical. Thus the rationalisation of science
and cosmology followed the secularisation and rationalisation of political
administration. He related this process to the reorganisation of social
space within the city and the appearance of the open central public space,
the agora, in Ionian and Greek cities. Consequently, he argued that
cosmological space was reorganised when Anaximander placed the earth
in the centre of the universe.26 Such speculation seems to have quickly
exhausted the few facts we think we know regarding the Presocratics.
While Farrington, the Marxist, argued that science and cosmology are
derived from social structures and needs, others have searched for ways
in which science and cosmology influenced society. The historian of
science, Richard Olson, for instance, has sought out instances of the
extension and application of scientific attitudes and modes of thought
beyond the domain of natural phenomena to a wide range of cultural
issues that involve human interactions and value structures. He concludes
that the rise of Presocratic science and the intrusion of its ‘attitudes and

ideas into a collapsing intellectual structure accelerated the downfall of

traditional beliefs, and was decisive in shaping and forming the religious,
ideological, and moral traditions that replaced those grounded in
Homer’.27 The general thesis seems plausible enough, especially for
modern times in which science and technology play an increasingly
larger role in our lives, but a detailed and convincing articulation of the
theme for the Presocratic period remains to be done.
Koestler’s Sleepwalkers
Another innovative approach to Presocratic science flowed from the pen
of the novelist Arthur Koestler into his book The Sleepwalkers: A History
of Man's Changing Vision of the Universe. Koestler was interested in the
psychological process of discovery and in the process that initially blinds
a person towards truth which, once perceived, is regarded as
heartbreakingly obvious.28 He examined the unconscious biases and
philosophical and political prejudices of astronomers and scientists more
than a decade before the physicist and historian of science Gerald Holton
coined the term themata to describe the underlying beliefs, values, and
world views that lie behind the quasi-aesthetic choices that scientists
make and which guide their leaps across the chasm between experience
and basic principle.29 No branch of science, Koestler asserted, whether
ancient or modern, could claim freedom from metaphysical bias of one
kind or another. Although the progress of science generally was regarded
as a clean, rational advance along a straight, ascending line, in fact it
zigged and zagged, so Koestler argued, nearly two decades before
Thomas Kuhn questioned the common notion of scientific progress.30 He
saw that the history of cosmic theories, in particular, was a history of
collective obsessions and controlled schizophrenias, more of a
sleepwalker's performance than of an electronic brain.
Then, in Kepler’s unfolding story, came Pythagoras, whose influence
on the ideas of the human race was all-encompassing, uniting religion
and science, mathematics and music. He took the first steps toward the
mathematisation of human experience, the beginning of science. His
emphasis was on form, proportion, and pattern, on the relation rather than
on the relata. The Pythagorean dream that musical harmony governed the
motion of the stars, though, more a dream dreamt through a mystic's ear
than a working hypothesis, more a poetic conceit than a scientific
concept, retained its mysterious impact, reverberating through the
centuries and calling forth responses from the depth of the unconscious
mind. In the sixteenth century Kepler, enamoured of the Pythagorean

dream, used its foundation of fantasy to build, by equally unsound

reasoning, the solid edifice of modern astronomy.
Scientific Highlights
Koestler attracted few followers, and interest in Presocratic cosmology
moved back to the ideas themselves and to the argument that they
represented increasing rationality on the road to modern science.
Marshall Clagett, one of the first professional historians of science
emerging from university studies in the United States after World War II,
insisted in his Greek Science in Antiquity that the tone of much of
Presocratic philosophy was rational, critical, often secular, and non-
mythological. He argued that the critical spirit that emerged from this
period was of great significance for the subsequent growth of science,
especially the emergence of a theoretical and abstract science, in which
sets of empirical rules were replaced by more generalised ones. Clagett
did admit that the schemes of Thales and his successors originated in
analogies and patently insufficient observational data. The Pythagoreans,
on the other hand, used mathematics to deepen the ties between their
theoretical explanation of nature on the one hand and their experience of
nature on the other.31 Clagett showed enthusiasm, sympathy, and
understanding, and his book has yet to be displaced. It has, though, been
characterised as the last of the old-style general handbooks, concentrating
on science separately from its philosophical background, as a history of
scientific highlights, rather than an attempt to understand both ancient
science and the society that produced it.32
Source books constitute another category of scholarly text, and for
Presocratic science there is A Source Book in Greek Science. The editors,
Morris Cohen and I. E. Drabkin, a philosopher and a classicist, realised
that it was an error to study the past exclusively from the point of view of
current conceptions, judging ancient science according to modern criteria,
but they also were concerned to discriminate between genuine science
and folklore.33 The resulting book has been criticised for looking at
ancient science through modern quantitative spectacles, concentrating on
only the highest and most successful examples, which happen to be
mathematics, astronomy, and mathematical geography. The editors
included only what they regarded as scientific material and omitted any
reference to philosophical speculation. In any future source book more
attention should be given to the intellectual background and how the
ancients organised and systematised their own thinking about nature. The
case that this should be so has already been convincingly made.34

Cohen and Drabkin’s failure to consider the broader context of the

development of quantifiable science is hardly new, and is characteristic of
many previous histories. Thomas Kuhn, a critic of such work, described
its methods. He wrote that it sought ‘to clarify and deepen an
understanding of contemporary scientific methods or concepts by
displaying their evolution. Committed to such goals, the historian
characteristically chose a single established science or branch of science -
one whose status as sound knowledge could scarcely be doubted - and
described when, where, and how the elements that in his day constituted
its subject matter and presumptive method had come into being.
Observations, laws, or theories which contemporary science had set aside
as error or irrelevancy were seldom considered unless they pointed a
methodological moral or explained a prolonged period of apparent
sterility’. In Kuhn’s words the scientist-historian viewed ‘the
development of science as a quasi-mechanical march of the intellect, the
successive surrender of nature's secrets to sound methods skilfully
deployed’. Only gradually have historians of science come ‘to see their
subject matter as something different from a chronology of accumulating
positive achievement in a technical specialty defined by hindsight’.35
Precursor to Modern Science

One of the most positive appraisals of Milesian philosophy vis-à-vis
modern science was written in the 1950s by S.Sambursky, a physicist. In
The Physical World of the Greeks he purported to find striking
similarities between patterns of thought in ancient Greek and modern
science, and he presented ‘noteworthy examples of the scientific
approach that in the sixth century opened up a new era in the history of
systematic thought...the teaching of the Milesian philosophers, which is
remarkable for its rationalism’.36 Sambursky was less enthusiastic about
the Pythagoreans, though he did concede that their application of
mathematics to basic physical phenomena conformed with correct
modern method. Despite the similarity of formal scientific approach,
however, Sambursky claimed an essential difference: the Pythagoreans
extrapolated humanity into the cosmos, while modern science attempts to
project mathematical and physical laws into man.37
Sambursky came to his study with a background in science and
emphasised the emergence of modern science. Jacob Bronowski, on the
other hand, came as a mathematician and, not surprisingly, focused his
attention and his film ‘The Music of the Spheres’ (in The Ascent of Man
series) on Pythagoras’s search for a basic relation between mathematics

and phenomena of nature. In his view progress in astronomy and physics

followed from their amenability to mathematical treatment, and the laws
of nature have been made of numbers since Pythagoras said number was
the language of nature.38
Even more positive regarding the Pythagorean contribution to human
advance were Olaf Pedersen, a historian of science, and his co-author
Mogens Pihl, a physicist. In Early Physics and Astronomy: A Historical
Introduction, they wrote that ‘there is a mathematical structure behind the
visible universe; the description of nature must therefore be expressed in
terms of mathematics. From now on [after Pythagoras], this connection
between physics and mathematics takes a progressively stronger hold
upon the minds of natural philosophers, and must be thought of as the
most important contribution to the advancement of science made by the
Pythagoreans. It retained its fascination, and its inspiration to scientists
persisted even after the specific Pythagorean doctrines had been
abandoned as naïve or as obscure manifestations of an arbitrary number
mysticism’.39 This book was intended as an introductory textbook, and
certain choices had to be made. Still, as one reviewer asked: ‘Is it best to
present the many physical concepts in a manner that is readily intelligible
to the modern reader even if it means mathematising what was often
rendered verbally and wrenching out of context ideas that may have been
submerged in philosophical, metaphysical, and even theological
discussion? And is it justifiable to concentrate on those aspects of ancient
and medieval physical thought that adumbrated or heralded ideas and
concepts that would prove significant in the scientific revolution, while
ignoring by far the largest portion of early physical thought which might
strike the modern reader as crude and irrelevant?’40
Rational Debate
Enthusiasm was expressed for the Milesians by the classicist
G.E.R.Lloyd, though not because of any purported similarities with
modern science. In Early Greek Science: Thales to Aristotle, Lloyd finds
two major achievements of Milesian philosophy: the rejection of
supernatural explanations of natural phenomena and the institution of the
practice of rational criticism and debate. He saw that dogmatic though
Presocratic philosophers were in presenting their answers, still they
tackled the same problems, investigated the same natural phenomena, and
were aware of the need to examine and assess their opponents' theories.
Lloyd attributes this practice of debate to political conditions in Greece

and an extension of the customs of political debate to scientific inquiry.41

‘But’, he wrote, ‘while philosophy and science did not involve a different
mentality or a new logic, they may be represented as originating from the
exceptional exposure, criticism and rejection of deep-seated beliefs...So
far as an additional distinctively Greek factor is concerned, our most
promising clue (to put it no more strongly) lies in the development of a
particular social and political situation in ancient Greece, especially the
experience of radical debate and confrontation in small-scale, face-to-face
societies...(and) those who deployed evidence and argument were at an
advantage...’42
Jonathan Barnes, too, in The Presocratic Philosophers emphasises the
role of open debate in the development of cosmology and considers that
‘What is significant is not that theology yielded to science or gods to
natural forces, but rather that unargued fables were replaced by argued
theory, that dogma gave way to reason...Few Presocratic opinions are
true; fewer still are well grounded. For all that, they are, in a mild but
significant sense, rational: they are characteristically supported by
argument, buttressed by reasons, established upon evidence’.43 Farrington
earlier had argued from a different position in Science and Politics in the
Ancient World. Far from political debate fostering science, he argued that
scientific activity had declined in the ancient world when the struggle
between science and obscurantism ultimately became a political struggle.
He thought that scientific schools did save the Greeks from hierarchic
petrification, but only temporarily. He drew attention to the threat Ionian
philosophy posed to the institution of the state cult, and the Ionian
philosopher Anaxagoras’ (c.500 - c.428 BC) expulsion from Athens after
his new theory of universal order posed a threat to the popular belief that
celestial phenomena were controlled by the gods.44 Actually, Anaxagoras
was indicted both for impiety and for corresponding with agents of
Persia, whose subject he formerly had been.45 Some historians choose to
believe that the jury which judged him responded at least in part to the
avowed charges of impiety, while other scholars elect ‘to emphasise
immediate political reasons for the persecution and downplay the claimed
science-impiety association as an incidental rationale, unimportant in
itself’.46
Ludwig Edelstein, a classicist, medical historian, and philosopher, was
not convinced that Farrington had sufficient evidence to uphold his
argument on the interaction between science and politics. ‘In every
respect, then,’ he wrote, ‘Farrington's explanation of the development of
ancient science seems to be untenable. His books have done much to

arouse interest in the subject. The thesis which they advocate is vitiated
however by what, in my opinion, is the basic error in many of the recent
evaluations of ancient science, namely, the misapplication of historical
analogies. Conditions in antiquity are seen in the light of subsequent
events. The conflict between science and religion, which characterised
later ages, is injected into the ancient world. Progress and decay of Greek
and Roman science are judged by the standards of modern science.’47
Whatever the merits of this criticism, which Farrington had invited upon
himself by citing examples from modern times to support his contention
that interaction between science and politics does take place, Farrington's
interpretations of ancient science have failed to attract a significant
following.
Many historians are open to the charge of overemphasising in the past
problems of the present. Indeed, as Richard Olson has written, there
exists ‘near paranoia about the whiggishness of the history of science as a
discipline. We seem to agree on almost nothing but the need to avoid
imposing inappropriate modern categories upon historical activities, and
the need to otherwise avoid reading the present into the past. Thus, we are
almost apologetic about speaking of Greek science at all...’48
The Pythagoreans
Lloyd, while relatively enthusiastic about the Milesians, is only
lukewarm when it comes to the Pythagoreans. The two philosophies were
distinguished by their religious beliefs and cosmological theories.
Granted, the Pythagoreans were the first to give knowledge of nature a
quantitative, mathematical foundation, and hence could be considered
scientific. Yet they held not only that phenomena are expressible in
numbers, but also that things are made of numbers, this defying most
modern conceptions of science. Furthermore, Lloyd concludes, ‘many of
the resemblances that the Pythagoreans claimed to find between things
and numbers were quite fantastic and arbitrary’.49 The Pythagoreans
attracted few followers in ancient times, and Lloyd, who writes only
about ancient science, rightly accords them scant attention. Those who
look ahead to the Renaissance, and particularly to Kepler, though they
need not attribute to the original Pythagoreans all the importance later
followers achieved, cannot ignore the Pythagorean emphasis on number.
At least, most cannot. James Coleman, a scientist-historian, was so
distressed, however, with incorrect opinions, that when he reached Kepler
in his Early Theories of the Universe, he could not bring himself to
mention Pythagoras by name. ‘Kepler, too,’ he wrote, ‘was a victim of

the fallacious reasoning of his predecessors, but even though Kepler was
often forced to many years of fruitless labour because of convictions and
philosophies about the universe which he inherited, he was quick to
renounce not only the erroneous arguments of predecessors but his own
follies as well when this path was indicated. The clearing away of the
debris enabled Kepler, with his prodigious persistence, finally to be led to
the first correct description of the seemingly haphazard motions of the
planets.’50
This perception of Kepler, fighting free of evil Pythagorean influence
rather than beneficently guided by it, along with the author's focus on
correctness, enabled him to see that the Pythagoreans’ main contribution
lay not in using mathematics to increase ties between theoretical
explanation of nature on the one hand, and experience of nature on the
other, as have most writers on Presocratic science, but instead in their
discovery that the earth is round. Also, Coleman repeatedly found it
necessary to remind his readers that the Milesians' ideas were not correct:
‘That Thales was incorrect’ he wrote ‘is obvious in the light of the
relatively vast knowledge of today...Its importance lay not in the model
itself, which today is known to be incorrect, but in the fact that
Anaximander was the first person to reduce the workings of the universe
to a mechanical system...The “model” itself was incorrect in the light of
today's knowledge, but before the facts could be established a long chain
of progressively correct interpretation of astronomical discoveries had to
be established.’51
In contrast to those scientist-historians who are perhaps more
enthusiastic than erudite, Thomas L.Heath is a respected scholar whose
pioneering work on Greek science remains a valuable source. In terms of
emphasis and interpretation, however, his major book on early Greek
astronomy falls among the older histories of science since castigated by
Kuhn as chronologies of accumulating positive achievement seldom
considering observations, laws, and theories which contemporary science
has set aside as erroneous or irrelevant.52 Heath set himself the stated task
of ‘tracing every step in the progress toward the true Copernican theory’
and showing ‘that Aristarchus [not Heraclides of Pontus, as Giovanni
Schiaparelli had asserted] was the real originator of the Copernican
hypothesis’.53 He looked primarily at those discoveries and observations
validated as scientific by modern standards: ‘Thales' claim to a place in
the history of scientific astronomy depends almost entirely on one
achievement attributed to him, that of predicting an eclipse of the sun,’54
while ‘Anaximander boldly maintained that the earth is in the centre of

the universe...’55 The first sentence of his chapter on Anaximenes began:

‘For Anaximenes of Miletus...the earth is still flat...’,56 while he described
Anaxagoras as ‘A great man of science (who) enriched astronomy by one
epoch-making discovery. This was nothing less than the discovery of the
fact that the moon does not shine by its own light but receives its light
from the sun. As a result, he was able to give (though not without an
admixture of error) the true explanation of eclipses.’57 Pythagoras is
credited with his eponymous theorem, with inventing the science of
acoustics, his discovery regarding musical tones, and a spherical earth,
but there is not even a hint that he had anything to do with some mystical
philosophy regarding a relationship between mathematics and phenomena
of nature. The remarkable development by later Pythagoreans, in Heath's
opinion, was their abandonment of the geocentric hypothesis.58
Thales’ Eclipse Prediction

Thales' purported eclipse prediction marks for many scientist-historians
the beginning of Western astronomical science. Retrospective
astronomical calculations showing a total solar eclipse on 28 May 584
BC in Northern Turkey, help confirm Herodotus' report that ‘In the sixth
year of the war, which they [the Medes and the Lydians] had carried on
with equal fortunes, an engagement took place in which it turned out that
when the battle was in progress the day suddenly became night. This
alteration of the day Thales the Milesian foretold to the Ionians, setting as
its limit this year in which the change actually occurred’.59 Presumably
the warring parties either took the eclipse of the sun as a sign to cease
fighting, or they were eager for any reason to cease and found the eclipse
a convenient excuse. Most historical discussion has centred not on the
credibility of the tradition itself, but on what methods Thales could have
used to predict the solar eclipse. Willy Hartner has argued that Thales
could have predicted an eclipse before the end of 583 BC from a study of
the periodic recurrence of solar eclipses, and then taken credit for a
different eclipse occurring slightly earlier.60
Thales’ prediction of the solar eclipse of 584 BC may, however, be
more myth than historic truth and as Alden Mosshammer has pointed out,
‘As modern research in the history of ancient science and mathematics
has advanced, confidence in Thales’ ability to predict a solar eclipse has
receded’.61 Weighing in with the most caustic damnation of the credulity
of his naive colleagues is Dicks, who found their conclusions ‘totally at
variance with the available evidence...of Thales’ alleged prediction of a
solar eclipse. In a desperate attempt to vindicate the historicity of this

prediction, [the scholar] spins a web of inferential reasoning, based on

wholly improbable suppositions...presupposing not only accurate
observations, but also the concept of the ecliptic...the assumption that
such comparatively advanced astronomical knowledge was possible in
the sixth century BC is ludicrous; as we have seen, all the indications
are...that such a stage was not reached until at least 150 years later’.62
Fresh Views
Providing a welcome contrast to the older-type histories is Stephen
Toulmin and June Goodfield’s The Fabric of the Heavens. He was
trained as a physicist but later became a historian of science, and she was
trained by him as a historian of science. In a series of books on the
development of scientific thought, they set out ‘to illustrate and document
the manner in which our chief scientific ideas have been formed’.63 This
beginning could all too easily have led to yet another chronology of
accumulating positive achievement, but they realised that ‘to understand
fully the scientific traditions which we have inherited, it is not enough to
discover what our predecessors believed and leave it at that: we must try
to see the world through their untutored eyes, recognize the problems
which faced them, and so find out for ourselves why it was that their
ideas were so different from our own...Different situations gave rise in
earlier times to different practical demands; different practical demands
posed different intellectual problems; and the solution of these problems
called for systems of ideas which in some respects are not even
comparable with our own’.64 In other words the Presocratics did have
some ideas which are now judged correct, but they did not elaborate, test
them, or prove them. The union of theory and practice characteristic of
modern science came later. Presocratic science was purely an intellectual
enterprise undertaken with no technological end in view. For wild
generalisation or unsound theorising or incautious analogy there was no
potential penalty to pay in bridges collapsed or lives lost, and hence also
no shackles on originality and imagination.65 On the Pythagoreans,
Toulmin and Goodfield argued that ‘the most grandiose ambition they
conceived was to explain all the properties of nature in arithmetical terms
alone’, and their ‘belief that the distances of the planets from the centre of
their orbits fit a simple “harmonious” mathematical law was the life-long
conviction of Kepler, two thousand years later, and inspired the whole
course of his astronomical researches’.66
The intellectual nature of Presocratic science and the separation of
theory from practice are also themes in a joint appraisal of the

Pythagoreans by Bernard R.Goldstein and Alan C.Bowen, a historian of

science and a classicist. They wrote that ‘The Pythagoreans regarded the
explanation of the heavenly motions in terms of these ratios as
knowledge of the speeds, risings, and settings of the celestial bodies; and
Plato called it astronomy. But, though such speculation did relate celestial
movement and number, it would be wrong to see in this any attempt at
precise measurement of what is observed. The explanandum in these
theories is not so much a physical phenomenon as the ethical and
aesthetic order it supposedly exhibits.’67
A possible explanation of the Presocratic attitude toward theories,
especially the apparent lack of interest in testing them, focuses on their
emphasis on problems of cosmogony (how the world came into being)
rather than of cosmology (the current structure and future evolution of the
world), and the consequent direction of their scientific efforts to the past
than to the present and the future. ‘As might have been expected in an age
whose central problem was cosmogony, i.e., a set of unobservable and
unrepeatable phenomena, and which, moreover, lacked all magnifying
devices, the need for increased factual knowledge and for testing
assumptions by experience was hardly felt. The facts to be explained
were supposed to be matters of common knowledge, and any endeavour
to account for them was essentially like the effort to solve a riddle. A
scientific hypothesis was a (more or less fortunate) guess and the only
criterion of its validity was its intrinsic plausibility.’68 Lloyd, too, makes
the point that much of the Presocratics’ speculative effort was
concentrated on astronomy, and though there might be attempts to verify
theories with future observations, astronomy, strictly speaking, is not an
experimental science, as it was impossible to vary or govern conditions of
the objects under observation; direct experimentation was therefore
impossible.69
Popper’s Philosophy
The Presocratics may not have tested their theories, but did they discuss
them? The matter of a tradition of critical discussion has been raised in a
philosophical context by the philosopher of science Karl Popper. He
asked wherein does the much discussed ‘rationality’ of the Presocratics
lie? Not in any empiricism, because the Presocratics were critical and
speculative rather than empirical. Yet when Popper wrote this, in the late
1950s, both traditional empiricist epistemology and traditional
historiography of science were still, according to him, deeply influenced
by the Baconian myth that science starts from observation and then

slowly and cautiously proceeds to theories.70 Science, according to this

myth, began only when the speculative method was replaced by the
observational method, when deduction was replaced by induction. For
Popper, however, observations and experiments do not lead to an
expansion of conjectural or hypothetical knowledge. Instead,
observations and experiments play only the role of critical arguments, and
their significance lies entirely in how they may be used to criticise
theories.71 From this theory of knowledge, it was but a short step for
Popper to identify the modern rationalist tradition with the ancient Greek
tradition of critical discussion. He identified the element of rationality in
the Presocratics’ thought in their attempt to know the world as the critical
self-examination of their theories. Knowledge, Popper argued, proceeds
by way of conjecture and refutation, and Presocratic philosophy
developed through the clash of ideas in a critical debate.72
While pursuing his discussion of scientific methodology Popper
somewhat inadvertently criticised Kirk's interpretation of Heraclitus. Kirk
felt compelled to reply, upholding his interpretation of Heraclitus and
also attempting to chip away at Popper's view of science.73 Lloyd
dismisses much of the squabble between Popper and Kirk as more of a
difference between academic specialities than a disagreement over
content. He also shows persuasively that broadening the question of
scientific methodology to other fields of early Greek science produces
different answers and rightly considers it a minor scandal that the debate
initiated by Popper fizzled out so quickly.74
Following Popper, Lloyd further emphasised debate among the
Presocratics in an article a few years later. ‘Greek cosmology is nothing if
not dialectical. And this is not an accidental or contingent feature of
Greek cosmology, but of the essence of the Greek contribution.’75 Greek
cosmologists were in competition with each other for the best
explanation, for the most adequate theory, and had ‘an awareness of the
need to examine and assess theories in the light of the grounds adduced
for them...The history of early Greek cosmology is one of argument and
counter-argument with a paucity of references to empirical data, and
those mostly familiar ones’.76
Conclusion
Popper's philosophical emphasis has not won over classicists. Indeed,
much of the disagreement over the nature of Presocratic cosmology can
be understood in terms of the interests of different academic specialities
and different assumptions about the nature of science. As Holton has

observed: ‘The search for answers in the history of science is itself

imbued with themata...we must be prepared for the criticisms of those
who are afflicted, not with our themata, but with their antithemata.’77 And
from Lloyd: ‘whether or not historians make explicit their views on the
philosophy of science, the history they write will inevitably incorporate
judgements, on the nature of science itself, on what demarcates it from
other inquiries, on scientific methodology.’78
With a limited amount of raw material, each new thesis quickly
exhausts inherent possibilities. Interpretations of Pythagorean and
Milesian cosmology and culture have little chance of becoming
paradigms for the practice of what we might term ‘normal’ history, in
analogy to Thomas Kuhn's normal science, which finds practitioners in
agreement upon certain basic problems and techniques and industriously
expanding and elaborating an initial idea. Here, Lloyd's work may turn
out to be a happy exception to the general absence of sustainable
intellectual themes in studies of early Greek cosmology. Also, Lloyd
avoids the extremes of both scientist-historian and classicist; he offers
historical perspective tempered by critical sense, and shows the forest as
well as the trees. It is no easier to imagine means for testing speculations
about Presocratic cosmology and culture than it was for the Presocratics
to test their own speculations. Caught up in an intellectual speculative
fever, we must be cautious lest we become so entranced that we lose our
footing.
References
1. Victor E. Thoren, review of D. R. Dicks, Early Greek Astronomy to Aristotle, (Ithaca,

New York: Cornell University Press, 1970), in Isis, 61 (1970), 541-2.
2. William D. Stahlman, review of G. S. Kirk, ed., Heraclitus, the Cosmic Fragments
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1954), in Isis, 45 (1954), 308-9. For
disagreement among the trees, see Gregory Vlastos, ‘On Heraclitus’, American Journal of
Philology, 76 (1955), 337-68; reprinted in David J. Furley and R. E. Allen, eds., Studies
in Presocratic Philosophy. Vol. 1, The Beginnings of Philosophy (London: Routledge &
Kegan Paul, 1970), pp. 413-29.
3. A very brief characterisation of the two philosophies has the Milesians driven by
intellectual curiosity and dissatisfaction with the old mythological models to create a
systematic natural explanation for physical and celestial phenomena, but their theories
tended to be untestable and dogmatic, and if evidence clashed with dogma they preferred
the dogma. The Pythagoreans were more concerned with metaphysical explanations and
driven more by religious imperatives than scientific ones. The Pythagoreans were
characterized by Aristotle: ‘the Pythagoreans, as they are called, devoted themselves to
mathematics; they were the first to advance this study, and having been brought up in it
they thought its principles were the principles of all things...things seemed in their whole

nature to be modelled after numbers, and numbers seemed to be the first things in the
whole of nature, they supposed the elements of numbers to be the elements of all things,
and the whole heaven to be a musical scale and a number.’ (Metaphysics I 5, 985b23-
986a3) And Aristotle on the Milesians: ‘Most of the first philosophers thought that
principles in the form of matter were the only principles of all things: for the original
source of all existing things, that from which a thing first comes-into-being and into
which it is finally destroyed, the substance persisting but changing in its qualities, this
they declare is the element and first principle of existing things, and for this reason they
consider that there is no absolute coming-to-be or passing away, on the ground that such a
nature is always preserved...for there must be some natural substance, either one or more
than one, from which the other things come-into-being, while it is preserved. Over the
number, however, and the form of this kind of principle they do not all agree; but Thales,
the founder of this type of philosophy, says that it is water (and therefore declared that the
earth is on water), perhaps taking this supposition from seeing the nurture of all things to
be moist, and the warm itself coming-to-be from this and living by this (that from which
they come-to-be being the principle of all things) - taking the supposition both from this
and from the seeds of all things having a moist nature, water being the natural principle of
moist things’(Metaphysics I 1, 983b6-27). An important book on Pythagoreanism is
Walter Burkert’s Lore and Science in Ancient Pythagoreanism (Harvard UP), 1972),
which has a long section on astronomy. Also of note are the long chapter on astronomy in
C.A.Huffman, Philolaus of Croton (Cambridge UP, 1993) and Maria Papathanassiou,
‘The Influence of Pythagorean Philosophy on the Development of Mathematical
Astronomy’, in K.I.Boudouris (ed.), Pythagorean Philosophy (Athens, 1992). A good
overall study is D.J.Furley, The Greek Cosmologists, Cambridge UP, 1987.
4. M. L. West, ‘Alcman and Pythagoras’, Classical Quarterly, 61 (new series 17), (1967),
1-15.
5. G. S. Kirk, J. E. Raven, and M. Schofield, The Presocratic Philosophers: A Critical
History with a Selection of Texts, 2nd. ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1983). Astronomical and cosmological material from this volume has been abstracted in
Norriss S. Hetherington, Ancient Astronomy and Civilization (Tucson, Arizona: Pachart,
1987); see also ‘Early Greek Cosmology’, in Hetherington, ed., Encyclopedia of
Cosmology: Historical, Philosophical, and Scientific Foundations of Modern Cosmology
(New York: Garland, 1993), pp. 183-8, and ‘The Presocratics’, in Hetherington, ed.,
Cosmology: Historical, Literary, Philosophical, Religious, and Scientific Perspectives
(New York: Garland, 1993), pp. 53-66. For entry into the voluminous literature on the
Presocratics, see the introduction to bibliographic tools in the editor's supplement (pp.
xvii-xxvii) and selective bibliographies to 1974 (pp. 527-542) and from 1973 to 1993 (pp.
xxix-xlvii) in Alexander P. D. Mourelatos, The Pre-Socratics: A Collection of Critical
Essays, revised ed. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993), and Luis E.
Navia, The Presocratic Philosophers: An Annotated Bibliography (New York: Garland,
1993). The major bibliography is L. Paquet, M. Roussel, and Y. Lafrance, Les
Présocratiques: Bibliographie analytique (1879-1980), 2 vols. (Montreal: Bellarmin,
1988-89). Also see R.D.McKirahan, Philosophy Before Socrates, Hackett, 1994.
6. Kirk, Heraclitus (ref. 2), p. 30. See especially H. F. Cherniss, Aristotle's Criticism of
Presocratic Philosophy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1935); summarized
in ‘The Characteristics and Effects of Presocratic Philosophy’, Journal of the History of
Ideas, 12 (1951), 319-45; reprinted in Furley and Allen, Studies in Presocratic Philosophy
(ref. 2), pp. 1-28. Cherniss' thesis is criticized not as incorrect, but perhaps as going rather
too far, in W. K. C. Guthrie, ‘Aristotle as a Historian: Some Preliminaries’, Journal of

Hellenic Studies, 77 (1957), 35-41; reprinted as ‘Aristotle as a Historian’, in Furley and

Allen, ibid., pp. 239-54. For a criticism, in turn, of Guthrie's article, see J. G. Stevenson,
‘Aristotle as a Historian of Philosophy’, Journal of Hellenic Studies, 94, (1974), 138-43.
See also J. B. McDiarmid, ‘Theophrastus on the Presocratic Causes’, Harvard Studies in
Classical Philology, 61 (1953), 85-156; reprinted, with abridgments, in Furley and Allen,
ibid., pp. 178-238. An important new work, taking a fresh look at the Aristotelian view of
the Presocratics, is Peter Kingsley, Ancient Philosophy, Mystery and Magic, Oxford UP,
1995.
7. Thoren, review of Dicks, Early Greek Astronomy to Aristotle (ref. 1).
8. D. R. Dicks, ‘Solstices, Equinoxes, & the Presocratics’, Journal of Hellenic Studies, 86
(1966), 26-40.
9. D. R. Dicks, ‘Thales’, Classical Quarterly, 53 (new series 9), (1959), 294-309.
10. Dicks, ‘Solstices, Equinoxes, & the Presocratics’, (ref 8).
11. Charles H. Kahn, ‘On Early Greek Astronomy’, Journal of Hellenic Studies, 90
(1970), 99-116. See also ‘Some Remarks on the Origins of Greek Science and
Philosophy’, in Alan C. Bowen, ed., Science and Philosophy in Classical Greece (New
York: Garland, 1991), pp. 1-10.
12. Jonathan Barnes, The Presocratic Philosophers, rev. ed. (London: Routledge & Kegan
Paul, 1981), pp. 47-8; Heinrich Gomperz, ‘Problems and Methods in Early Greek
Science’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 4 (1943), 61-76; reprinted in Daniel S.
Robinson, ed., Philosophical Studies by Heinrich Gomperz (Boston: Christopher, 1953),
pp. 72-87, and in Philip P. Wiener and Aaron Noland, eds, Roots of Scientific Thought: A
Cultural Perspective (New York: Basic Books, 1957), pp. 23-38.
13. Barnes, ibid., p. 48.
14. G. E. R. Lloyd, ‘Greek Cosmologies’, in Carmen Blacker and Michael Loewe,
Ancient Cosmologies (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1975), pp. 198-224. Reprinted,
with an introduction assessing scholarly debate on the topic and Lloyd's modifications and
developments in his own position since the original publication of the article, in Lloyd,
Methods and Problems in Greek Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991),
pp. 141-63.
15. Francis Macdonald Cornford, From Religion to Philosophy: A Study in the Origins of
Western Speculation, 2nd ed. (Sussex: Harvester Press, 1983), pp. v-vii. Original edition,
London: Edward Arnold, 1912.
16. Ibid., p. 143.
17. Ibid., p. 144.
18. Giorgio de Santillana, The Origins of Scientific Thought: from Anaximander to
Proclus 600 B.C.-500 A.D. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961), p. 21.
19. Francis Macdonald Cornford, Before and After Socrates (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1932), pp. 5, 7-8.
20. F. M. Cornford, ‘Was the Ionian Philosophy Scientific?’ Journal of Hellenic Studies,
62 (1942), 1-7; reprinted in Furley and Allen, Studies in Presocratic Philosophy (ref. 2),
pp. 29-41. See also Cornford, Principium Sapientiae: The Origins of Greek Philosophical
Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1952).
21. Gregory Vlastos, ‘Cornford's Principium Sapientiae’, Gnomon, 27 (1955), 65-76;
reprinted in Furley and Allen, Studies in Presocratic Philosophy (ref. 2), pp. 42-55. Also
see W.A.Heidel, The Heroic Age of Science (Baltimore, 1933) and Robin Waterfield,
Before Eureka, The Presocratics and their Science, Bristol Press, 1989, Ch. 9
22. Benjamin Farrington, Science in Antiquity, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1969), pp. 20-1, 27-8.

23. Stephen Toulmin and June Goodfield, The Fabric of the Heavens (London:
Hutchinson, 1961), p. 64.
24. Bertrand Russell, A History of Western Philosophy and Its Connections with Political
and Social Circumstances from the Earliest Times to the Present Day (New York: Simon
and Schuster, 1945), p. 31.
25. Benjamin Farrington, Greek Science (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1953), pp. 36-
40, 48-9.
26. Jean Pierre Vernant, Mythe et pensee chez les Grecs (Paris: Libraire Francois
Maspere, 1965); translated as Myth and Thought among the Greeks (London: Routledge
& Kegan Paul, 1983), pp. 181-6, 190.
27. Richard Olson, Science Deified & Science Defied: The Historical Significance of
Science in Western Culture. vol 1. From the Bronze Age to the Beginnings of the Modern
Era ca. 3500 B.C. to ca A.D. 1640 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), pp.
62, 72.
28. Arthur Koestler, The Sleepwalkers: A History of Man's Changing Vision of the
Universe (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1959), p. 14.
29. Gerald Holton, ‘Themata in Scientific Thought’, in The Scientific Imagination: Case
Studies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), pp. 3-24. An earlier version of
this essay, followed by commentary, appeared in Holton, ‘Themata in Scientific
Thought’, Science, 188 (1975), 328-34, and Robert K. Merton, ‘Thematic Analysis in
Science: Notes on Holton's Concept’, ibid., 335-8. On thematic analysis see also Holton,
Thematic Origins of Scientific Thought: Kepler to Einstein (Cambridge, Massachusetts:
Harvard University Press, 1973).
30. Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd ed., enlarged (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1970).
31. Marshall Clagett, Greek Science in Antiquity (London: Abelard-Schuman, 1955), pp.
34-35, 42, 43.
32. J. T. Vallance, ‘Marshall Clagett's Greek Science in Antiquity: Thirty-five Years
Later’, Isis, 81 (1990), 713-21.
33. Morris R. Cohen and I. E. Drabkin, eds., A Source Book in Greek Science, 2nd ed.
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1958), p. vii. See also Cohen, A
Dream's Journey: The Autobiography of Morris Raphael Cohen (Boston: Beacon Press,
1949), p. 193.
34. Vallance, ‘Marshall Clagett's Greek Science in Antiquity ’, (ref. 32).
35. Thomas S. Kuhn, ‘The History of Science’, in International Encyclopedia of the
Social Sciences, vol. 14 (New York: Crowell Collier and Macmillan, 1968), pp. 74-83;
reprinted in Kuhn, The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and
Change (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), pp. 105-26.
36. S. Sambursky, The Physical World of the Greeks (London: Routledge and Kegan
Paul, 1956), pp. 4-5. Translated by Merton Dagut from the Hebrew edition, Kosmos shel
ha-Yevanim (Jerusalem: Bialik Institute, 1954).
37. Ibid., pp. 40, 42.
38. Jacob Bronowski, ‘Music of the Spheres’, 52-minute color film in The Ascent of Man
series, no. 5 (BBC-TV and Time-Life Films, 1973, 16 mm. and videotape). See also
Bronowski, The Ascent of Man (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1973), p. 187.
39. Olaf Pedersen and Mogens Pihl, Early Physics and Astronomy: A Historical
Introduction, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 17, 20.
40. Edward Grant, ‘Physical Sciences before the Renaissance’, Journal for the History of
Astronomy, 7 (1976), 201-204. Grant’s review was of the 1st edition of Pederson and Pihl.

41. G. E. R. Lloyd, Early Greek Science: Thales to Aristotle (London: Chatto & Windus,
1970), pp. 13-4.
42. G. E. R. Lloyd, Magic, Reason, and Experience: Studies in the Origin and
Development of Greek Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 265-
6.
43. Barnes, The Presocratic Philosophers (ref. 12), p. 45.
44. Benjamin Farrington, Science and Politics in the Ancient World (London: George
Allen & Unwin, 1939), pp, 70-1, 74-6.
45. T. W. Africa, Science and the State in Greece and Rome (New York: John Wiley &
Sons, 1968), p. 39.
46. Richard Olson, ‘Science, Scientism and Anti-Science in Hellenic Athens: A New
Whig Interpretation’, History of Science, 14 (1978), 179-99; Olson, Science Deified &
Science Defied (ref. 27), pp. 79-82.
47. Ludwig Edelstein, ‘Recent Trends in the Interpretation of Ancient Science’, Journal
of the History of Ideas, 1952, 13:573-604; reprinted in Wiener and Noland, eds., Roots of
Scientific Thought (ref. 12), pp. 90-121, and in Owsei Temkin and C. Lilian Temkin, eds.,
Ancient Medicine: Selected Papers of Ludwig Edelstein (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press,
1967), pp. 401-39.
48. Richard Olson, ‘Science, Scientism and Anti-Science’, p 179-199. On whiggism,
priggism, presentism, contextualism, and anti-antiwhiggism, see Stephen G. Brush,
‘Scientists as Historians’, Osiris, 10 (1995), 215-231.
49. Lloyd, Early Greek Science (ref. 41), pp. 24-6.
50. James A. Coleman, Early Theories of the Universe (New York: New American
Library, 1967), p. 106.
51. Ibid., pp. 18, 21, 22.
52. Kuhn, ‘The History of Science’, (ref. 35).
53. Thomas Heath, Aristarchus of Samos: The Ancient Copernicus. A History of Greek
Astronomy to Aristarchus together with Aristarchus's Treatise on the Sizes and Distances
of the Sun and Moon. A New Greek Text with Translation and Notes (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1913), p. iv. See also Heath, Greek Astronomy (London: J. M. Dent & Sons, 1932).
54. Heath, Aristarchus of Samos, p. 13.
55. Ibid., p. 24.
56. Ibid., p. 40.
57. Ibid., p. 78.
58. Ibid., pp. 46, 48, 94.
59. Herodotus, I, 74. See Kirk, Raven, and Schofield, The Presocratic Philosophers (ref.
5), pp. 81-2.
60. Willy Hartner, ‘Eclipse Periods and Thales' Prediction of a Solar Eclipse - Historic
Truth and Modern Myth’, Centaurus, 14 (1969), 60-71.
61. Alden A. Mosshammer, ‘Thales' Eclipse’, Transactions of the American Philological
Association, 111 (1981), 145-55. See also Otto Neugebauer, Exact Sciences in Antiquity,
2nd ed. (Providence, Rhode Island: Brown University Press, 1957), pp. 142-3.
62. Dicks, Early Greek Astronomy (ref. 1), p. 174.
63. Toulmin and Goodfield, The Fabric of the Heavens (ref. 23), p. 15.
64. Ibid., p. 16.
65. Ibid., pp. 68-9.
66. Ibid., pp. 79, 82.

67. Bernard R. Goldstein and Alan C. Bowen, ‘A New View of Early Greek Astronomy’,
Isis, 74 (1983), 330-40; reprinted in Goldstein, Theory and Observation in Ancient and
Medieval Astronomy (London: Variorum Reprints, 1985), pp. 1-11.
68. Gomperz, ‘Problems and Methods in Early Greek Science’, (ref. 12), pp. 31-2.
69. G. E. R. Lloyd, ‘Experiment in Early Greek Philosophy and Medicine’, Proceedings
of the Cambridge Philological Society, 190 (new series 10), (1964), 50-72; reprinted, with
an introduction assessing scholarly debate on the topic and Lloyd's modifications and
Methods and Problems in Greek Science (ref. 44), pp. 70-99.
70. Karl R. Popper, ‘Back to the Presocratics’, Procedings of the Aristotelian Society, 59
(1958-1959), 1-24; reprinted, with additions, in Popper, Conjectures and Refutations: The
Growth of Scientific Knowledge (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963), pp. 136-65,
and in Furley and Allen, Studies in Presocratic Philosophy (ref. 2), pp. 130-153.
71. Ibid., on p. 151.
72. Ibid., on pp. 148-152.
73. G. S. Kirk, ‘Popper on Science and the Presocratics’, Mind, 69 (1960), 318-39;
reprinted in Furley and Allen, Studies in Presocratic Philosophy, (ref. 2), pp. 154-77.
74. G. E. R. Lloyd, ‘Popper versus Kirk: a Controversy in the Interpretation of Greek
Science’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 18 (19670, 21-38; reprinted, with
an introduction assessing scholarly debate on the topic and Lloyd's modifications and
Methods and Problems in Greek Science (ref. 14), pp. 100-20, esp, p 105.
75. Lloyd, ‘Greek Cosmologies’, (ref. 14).
76. Ibid., pp. 209, 218-9.
77. Holton, ‘Themata in Scientific Thought’, (ref. 29).
78. Lloyd, ‘Popper versus Kirk’, (ref. 74), p. 100.

Changes in Celestial Journey Literature:
1400-1650
Alan S.Weber*
Introduction
This study investigates an important historical phase in the curiously

hybrid genre of the celestial journey narrative which has produced not
only important scientific texts, such as Macrobius's Somnium Scipionis,
but also some of Western Europe's finest poems, including Dante's Divine
Comedy. I would like to compare Christine de Pizan's Chemin de Long
Estude of 1403, which describes the author's celestial journey through the
heavenly spheres, to another milestone in celestial voyage literature,
Francis Godwin's English work The Man in the Moone of 1638. These
two literary and historical endpoints illustrate the changes in European
technical astronomy which occurred between 1400 and 1650, and also
reveal the shift which occurred in the very nature of the celestial voyage
genre. I will also briefly review other closely related early modern
celestial voyage narratives written by Johannes Kepler and Bishop John
Wilkins.
The True History of Lucian of Samosata (born circa 117 C.E.), the
satirical story of the author's trip to the moon, is often cited as a seminal
text in the tradition of celestial journey literature because it contains one
central element common to all narratives of this type: expansiveness. I
mean here expansiveness in all its senses; Lucian undertakes the ultimate
journey, past the pillars of Heracles, the limit of the known classical
world, and this breaking of boundaries allows him to overstep other
restrictions on etiquette, mores, and good taste. This expansiveness also
allows him to satirize Homer, Socrates, Heracles, Aristophanes, and
Dionysus with impunity.
Similarly, the breadth of the genre allowed an early medieval textbook
writer, Macrobius (circa late fourth century C.E.) to use his celestial
wanderings through the planetary spheres as the pretext for a journey into
the secrets of Pythagorean number symbolism and the cosmology of
Plato's Timaeus. One of the great poems of celestial journeying, Dante's
Divine Comedy, closely resembles both Lucian and Macrobius in its use
of the movement metaphor to explore, magnify, and expatiate upon
unknown physical and epistemological territory. As he physically
Culture and Cosmos, Vol 1 no 1, Spring/Summer 1997

Alan S.Weber 35
encompassed vast spaces, Dante also explored great ethical, spiritual,

scientific, and theological truths, presenting his poem as an encyclopedia
of both theology and cosmology. Dante was the direct inspiration for
Christine de Pizan's celestial voyage in the Chemin de Long Estude; she
certainly drew her encyclopedic purpose from him. Her poem therefore
represents an excellent mirror of the cosmological thought of her day as
she interpreted it within a tradition well known to her.
Christine de Pizan’s Cosmology

The life and works of Christine de Pizan (1364-c.1430) have recently
received renewed attention as evidenced by the numerous translations and
critical studies of her works as well as the international conferences held
in her honor during the last ten years. Christine was born in Venice in
1364, the daughter of Thomas of Pizan, who later became court
astrologer to Charles V of France. Thomas of Pizan [or Bologna] taught
astrology at Bologna from 1345 to 1356. He is well known for the
magical charm he used to expel the invading English armies from French
soil by burying wax images of the English commanders at various
locations throughout the French kingdom.
Christine grew up in the learned atmosphere of the court of the French
King Charles V. She began to write extensively in the 1390s after the
death of her husband Etienne de Castel. Along with a biography of King
Charles V, she produced a large corpus of short lyrics, longer narrative
poems, and a series of didactic works on the position of women in 14th
Century society. She became well known to her contemporaries through
her debate with Jean de Montreuil, Gonthier Col, and Jean Gerson over
the alleged obscenity and misogyny of Jean de Meun's popular poem Le
Roman de la Rose.
The recent recovery of one of Christine de Pizan's neglected works, Le
Livre du Chemin de Long Estude (1403), has involved the steady critical
appreciation of a dream vision dismissed in the last century by Gaston
Paris as a mediocre text, with some potential value, however, for the
history of ideas.1 The poem opens with Christine's ruminations on her
recently deceased husband and the vicissitudes of Fortuna. She then
ponders the sources of evil and change in the world, attributing mutation
to the battle of the elements: ‘fire and water hate each other/ And one
desires to destroy the other’.2 This is probably an example of the type of
passage which Gaston Paris believed important for the history of ideas.
From her descriptions of the heavens in the opening sections of the poem,
it is abundantly clear that Christine endorses the standard Aristotelian-
Culture and Cosmos

36 Changes in Celestial Journey Literature 1400-1650
Ptolemaic model of the universe, so called because of its fusion of the

fundamental principles of Aristotelian physics with Ptolemy's system of
epicycles and geometrical determination of planetary orbits. Although the
Aristotelian-Ptolemaic model remained the standard orthodoxy in western
European universities during Christine's day, there were serious
challenges to it throughout the Middle Ages, including such works as
Bernardus de Silvestris's Cosmographia, which drew on Stoic, Hermetic,
and Platonic thought.3 It would be too simplistic, however, to divide
medieval cosmology into Aristotelian and non-Aristotelian camps. Even
astrology, which has often been portrayed in modern historiography as
the antithesis of both Aristotelian cosmology and modern mathematical
astronomy, was firmly rooted in the physical principles expounded in
Aristotle's De Caelo, De Generatione et Corruptione, and the
Meteorologica. As Richard Lemay observes, ‘there can be little doubt
that [Aristotle's works] supplied the scientific background of astrology
during 2000 years after him’.4 As we shall soon see, the European
cosmology of Christine's age also eclectically adopted Stoic and Platonic
ideas enriched by Arabic interpretations of Greek astronomy. Thus,
European cosmology of the early modern period should not be
characterized as slavish scholastic repetition of Aristotelian science, but
by a richness of perspective, and Christine's interpretation of celestial
science, which defines astronomy as a medium or bridge between divine
and human knowledge, should not be lightly dismissed.
The greatest challenge to Aristotle's cosmological system ironically
came from scholastic Christian theology itself, as evidenced by Bishop
Etienne Tempier's condemnation in 1277 of 219 scholastic theses about
the universe. Christine, however, does not mention any of the serious
cosmological incompatibilities and tensions between Christianity and
Aristotle, such as the question of the eternity of the world or the debate
over the plurality of worlds.5 Christine ‘never ceases to consider Aristotle
as the prince of philosophers’ and liberally quotes extracts from Thomas
Aquinas's commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics in Le Livre des Fais et
Bonnes Meurs du Sage Roy Charles V. 6 The Metaphysics also informs a
large part of book two of L'Avision Christine, which may represent, as
Glenda McLeod suggests, the first known vernacular commentary on
Aristotle's Metaphysics.7
To return to Christine's narrative, she falls asleep during her reading
and is visited by Sebille (Sybil) who announces that she will tell Christine
the secrets of the universe because Christine is ready to conceive great
knowledge (‘apprestee a concevoir’).8 The double-entendre implicit in
Culture and Cosmos

Alan S.Weber 37
conceiving knowledge points to an important aspect of Christine's

conception of science: she conceives of knowledge not as a body of facts
brought from the outside world into the mind, but as an internal process
of spiritualization, a birth of inward light.
Sebille next leads Christine to the fountain of Sapience, where all the
great philosophers have drunk, including Socrates, the Cynics, Plato,
Hermes, Seneca and her father Thomas of Pizan. From the fountain they
proceed to the road of long study, a path well known to Christine. After
whisking Christine around the various kingdoms of the world, Sebille
leads her upwards to a high mountain, where she hears a clamour of
Greek voices, no doubt the arguments of Stoics, Epicureans, Platonists,
Skeptics, and Peripatetic philosophers all advancing their specific world
views. Sebille next invites Christine to mount a subtle ladder extending
from the heavens:
Light it was and portable

As if one could twist it around
And carry it without labour
Everywhere, if you wanted.
You would never be hindered or bothered by it.
It was not made of rope
Nor any kind of cord or wood.
I could not determine the material
But it was long, strong, and light.9
Sebille calls the curious and resplendent device ‘l'eschiele de

Speculacion’ - the ladder of speculation - a shining entranceway into the
heavens ordained for those, who like Christine, love subtlety and
learning. Now begins her ascent into the celestial spheres offering her the
occasion to detail the structure of the heavens for the reader.
Christine and Sebille first pass through the first heaven (‘premier
ciel’), which is made out of air. From there, they pass into the second
heaven, the ‘ether’, characterized by its shining brilliance and clarity.
Instead of the common Aristotelian definition of the ether as the fifth
element (quinta essentia) comprising the stars and existing only beyond
the sphere of the moon, Christine accepts the Stoic conception of the
ether as the purer part of the upper air. They next continue on into the
third heaven or the sphere of fire, traditionally located under the sphere of
the moon in Aristotelian cosmology. They continue on into the fourth
heaven, called ‘Olimpe’, meant to recall Mount Olympus, the seat of the
Culture and Cosmos

pagan gods and a general epithet in Old French for sky or heaven.
Christine's ladder finally ends within the fifth heaven, ‘le firmament’, a
place of pervasive and blinding light.
It is here, in the fifth heaven, that Christine receives a lesson in both
astronomy, the science of the movements of the fixed and wandering
stars (planets), and in astrology, the knowledge of the powers and
influences exerted by those celestial bodies:10
[Sebille] showed me everything, and told me the names and powers of

the planets, and she made every effort to teach me the courses of the
moving stars, both the fixed and the wandering. And she told me the
properties, the effects, the contraries, the powers and the influences,
and their various arrangements.11
After her description of the physical structure of the heavens, Christine

curiously admits her inability to provide the reader with any further
details, because she had not learned astrology at school.12 Undoubtedly
she knew of the technical treatises in the library of her astrologer father
Thomas of Pizan, who must have possessed a collection of astrological
texts as well as instruments, but how far she proceeded in her studies
cannot be determined with any accuracy.
Both Edgar Laird and Charity Cannon Willard have demonstrated how
astrology formed one of the central concerns of the learned court, which
included Thomas, assembled by le Sage Roy Charles V.13 The court of
Charles V was very much a centre of scientific learning, especially of
Aristotelianism. Charles had commissioned Nicole Oresme to translate
the works of Aristotle into the vernacular. Oresme (c.1320 - 1382) was a
Professor of Theology at the College of Navarre in Paris. He made great
contributions to mathematics and physical science, and wrote several
cosmological works on astronomy (De l'Espere), divination (Livre de
Divinacions), and astrology (Tractatus Contra Judicarios Astronomos).
The King was also a great patron of astrologers and founded the ‘Collège
de Maître Gervais’ at the University of Paris for the study of astrology.
Lynn Thorndike remarks about the court of Charles V: ‘at this period
wisdom and astrology were considered almost synonymous’,14 a
viewpoint that constantly surfaces in Christine's works.
One source of Christine's astrological learning may have been one of
the texts which went by the name of On the Sphere, such as Nicole
Oresme's De l'Espere (late 14th Century).15 Christine's description of the
heavens echoes De l'Espere in several respects: both authors characterize
Culture and Cosmos

Alan S.Weber 39
the earth as a round ball as viewed from the moon. Both Christine and
Oresme divide the heavens into five regions (in Oresme, three regions of
the air, the sphere of fire, and the heavens). Oresme also mentions that
Mount Olympus reaches into the upper air and Christine names one of
her heavens ‘Olimpe’ in the Chemin de Long Estude.
Christine also makes reference in her poem to a wide variety of
eclectic cosmological doctrines such as the planetary houses, the music of
the spheres, and cosmic plenitude. She observes on her journey the
houses of the planets (‘les maisions que planetes ont’), and in which
houses they are exalted (‘quelles ont exaltacion’).16 She also describes the
music of the spheres, the ordered movements of the heavens comprising
‘l’armonie et belle chancon’, a Platonic and Pythagorean idea widely
disseminated in medieval literature despite Aristotle's skeptical rejection
of the doctrine.17 Her descriptions of the great number of heavenly bodies
- ‘la grant quantité pleniere/ Qui y est’18 - reinforces the Aristotelian,
Stoic, and later Christian idea of the plenitude of the cosmos. Scholastic
Christian theology generally endorsed the idea of the Aristotelian and
Stoic plenum, the absence of any empty space in the universe, in response
to the inane or kenon (void space) of Epicurean physics which had denied
divine providence and ordered causality. Void space implied a location
where God was not, an affront to the creator's omnipresence. It is
Christine's wonder at the plenitude of created nature which invites her to
make her explorations through the celestial spheres.
Christine, however, finds that she cannot enter the Crystalline Heavens
to see the nine orders of angels because of the present state of her
corporeal body.19 Sebille and Christine therefore descend to the sphere of
the air, near the ethereal layer. There she meets the servants (‘maigniee’)
of the ‘intelligences haultaines,’ the followers of the planets, sun, moon
and other intelligences who are called Influences and Destinies. These
Influences and Destinies are beings attached to every planet, intelligence,
star, and heaven who serve them like household retainers.20 Although she
does not describe these beings at any length, they obviously act as
mediums, messengers, and conduits between the divine powers of the
heavenly bodies and material bodies on earth. In this section Christine
seems to argue for complete astrological determinism, that our fates have
been predestined by heavenly confluence. Yet she does remind her
readers that God still rules the destinies from above:
...as soon as a man or a woman is born, however great, the destinies

control their lives and assign them their proper end, good or evil,
Culture and Cosmos

according to the domain of the course of the planets at the hour when
the infant is born. But nevertheless God, who has given them this
power, reigns above and takes care of what pleases Him.21
Among the Destinies, Christine sees the rebellions, treasons, destroyed

towns, and tempests of the evil fortunes about to be rained down on earth
by the Influences. She even boasts of some prophetic knowledge: she
says she now knows what the effects of the 1401 comet will be; but these
effects, which she refuses to reveal to the reader, will not unfold for
another 20 years.22 The latter part of the Chemin de Long Estude consists
of a court held by Queen Reason in which the four estates (Sagesse,
Richesse, Chivalrie, and Noblesse) debate the proper virtues pertaining to
the prince. Although to modern readers the second part of the poem may
seem like a mirror for magistrates, or a conduct book such as Christine's
Treasure of the City of Ladies, tacked on to an exposition of natural
philosophy, I will argue later, after a description of Francis Godwin's
work, for the essential unity of the poem. The jugement genre, highly
developed by Machaut,23 in which a central question is debated in a real
or mock court by learned advocates, dovetails perfectly with Christine's
encyclopedic introductory section of the Chemin de Long Estude since
the jugement allows for the airing of diverse opinions, just as the tradition
of commentary on Aristotle weighed and synthesized conflicting
propositions on the nature of the cosmos. As Barbara K. Altmann aptly
puts it: ‘what more suitable forum for intricate argument than a court-
room scene, where a minimum of plot could supply a certain amount of
tension as to outcome and where characters of allegorical or human
nature could quite justifiably defend conflicting opinions at length?’24
Godwin, Kepler and Wilkins

Separated in culture and time by over 200 years, Francis Godwin's Man
in the Moone25 (published 1638) nevertheless stands in direct line with
Christine's Chemin de Long Estude; both works form part of the larger
tradition of celestial journeys established by Lucian, Macrobius, and
Dante.26 Bishop Francis Godwin is best known for his Catalogue of the
Bishops of England since the first planting of Christian Religion in the
Island, etc., for which he was awarded the bishopric of Llandaff by
Queen Elizabeth.27 He was one of a growing number of English
clergymen, including Bishop John Wilkins, who took a serious interest in
scientific matters and who attempted to reconcile astronomical
advancements with divine writ. Godwin was writing after the detailed
Culture and Cosmos

Alan S.Weber 41
observational work of Tycho Brahe, later published by Johannes Kepler,

and the De Revolutionibus (1543) of Copernicus, which had proposed a
heliocentric universe and rotating earth while retaining the fundamental
Ptolemaic principles of circular motion and epicycles. After Tycho's
parallax measurements of the 1577 comet had situated this extraordinary
cosmic event well beyond the lunar sphere - in other words a decaying,
changing object had appeared in Aristotle’s alleged realm of perfection -
Aristotelian cosmology, already damaged by Copernicanism, began
seriously to unravel.28 Godwin was also writing after the telescopic
discoveries of Galileo reported in the Siderius Nuncius (1611).
In Godwin’s work Domingo Gonsales, a Spanish Hidalgo, narrates his
remarkable life story. After killing a man in a duel, Gonsales departs on a
series of sea voyages which finally land him on the island of St. Helena.
He discovers huge geese there - gansas - which he trains to carry heavy
loads. He invents a flying machine by tying the gansas together,
eventually flies off the island and is picked up by a Spanish ship. He
convinces the captain to take the birds aboard, and soon after, the Spanish
fleet is defeated by the English navy. Gonsales escapes with his gansas
who inexplicably fly straight upwards into the atmosphere towards the
moon. On his lunar voyage he encounters pleasing shapes floating in the
air who bring him delicious foods. When he reaches the moon, on
September 21, 1599, he finds that the food given to him by the aerial
beings has turned to ‘a mingle mangle of dry leaves, of Goats haire,
Sheepe, or Goats-dung, Mosse, and such like trash’.29 He has been
deceived by wicked spirits.
As Gonsales arrives on the moon, we begin to see Godwin's somewhat
transparent purpose in writing this narrative - he uses Gonsales to
advance contemporary cosmological doctrines. In a similar fashion,
Christine's journey had allowed her to provide an eyewitness account of
the true order of the heavens. First, Gonsales refutes the existence of the
Culture and Cosmos

Gonsales en route to the Moon,

from Godwin’s The Man in the Moone (1638)
Culture and Cosmos

Alan S.Weber 43
Aristotelian sphere of fire, a ring of elemental fire attached to the upper

air. Gonsales discovers that the upper air is of the same temperature as
that below: ‘Who is there that hath not hitherto believed the uppermost
Region of the Ayre to be extreme hot, as being next forsooth unto the
naturall place of the Element of Fire. O Vanities, fansies, Dreames!’30
We remember in Christine's poem how she fears the increasing heat as
she mounts the ladder of speculation towards the Aristotelian sphere of
fire.31 She recalls the arrogance of Icarus who flew too high and
presumptuously into the fiery heavens. Godwin, on the other hand,
following common practice among professional astronomers of his age,
has rejected the existence of the sphere of fire.32 By the beginning of the
seventeenth century, Stoic and Hermetic monism (universally operating
physical law) began to supersede Platonic and Aristotelian dualism in
physics (separate physical laws for heaven and earth), a development
which challenged the doctrine of the elemental spheres.
Godwin also questions the Aristotelian idea of the natural place of the
elements which made the centre of the earth the point towards which the
heavier elements earth and water were attracted. In Godwin's
cosmological system, magnetic force, an idea previously outlined in
William Gilbert's widely read De Magnete (1600), replaces the natural
place of the earth as a centre of attraction. This modification allows for
the moon to possess a centre of attraction,33 which Gonsales discovers as
he walks on the moon. The lesser magnetic force of the moon allows him
to bound high into the air.
Most importantly, Gonsales watches the earth turning on its axis from
his position on the moon. He must therefore conclude along with the
Copernicans that the earth spins on its axis every twenty four hours from
west to east. We are very far away from Christine's fixed earth which she
sees from above, sitting ‘like a little, round ball’.34 Gonsales now realizes
the blindness of the philosophers who posit two contrary motions for the
heavens and the planets:
Philosophers and Mathematicians I would should now confesse the

wilfulnesse of their own blindnesse. They have made the world
believe hitherto, that the Earth hath no motion. And to make that
good, they are fain to attribute unto all and every of the celestiall
bodies two motions, quite contrary each to other; whereof one is from
the East to the West, to be performed in 24 hours; (that they imagine
to be forced, per raptum primi Mobilis) the other from the West to the
East in severall proportions.35
Culture and Cosmos

Godwin and Gonsales, however, do not fully accept the Copernican

hypothesis. Gonsales states:
I will not go so far as Copernicus, that maketh the Sunne the Center
of the Earth, and unmoveable, neither will I define any thing one way
or other. Only this I say, allow the Earth his motion (which these eyes
of mine can testifie to be his due) and these absurdities are quite taken
away, every one having his single and proper Motion onely.36
Godwin's work has many affinities with Johannes Kepler's Somnium, a

work on lunar astronomy published in 1634. With the aid of his mother,
Kepler, who appears in the work as the character Duracotus, summons a
demon who explains life on his home planet of Levania (the moon).
Kepler uses this fiction, based on Lucian's True History, much in the
same way as Godwin - to explicate lunar astronomy by shifting
observational reference points from the earth to the moon. Thus, in his
highly technical notes to the Somnium, Kepler explains eclipses, solstices,
and lunar and terrestrial rotation as measured from the moon as a central
reference point. Just as Godwin employed the fiction of the celestial
journey to argue for terrestrial rotation, so Kepler states in his notes:
‘here is the thesis of the whole Dream; that is, an argument in favour of
the motion of the earth or rather a refutation of the argument, based on
sense perception, against the motion of the earth’.37
John Wilkins' The Discovery of A World in the Moone was published
in 1638, the same years as Godwin’s Man in the Moone and four years
after Kepler’s Somnium. Wilkins was instrumental in founding the Royal
Society and encouraged the study of astronomy at Oxford and London.38
Unlike Godwin, Wilkins includes a full-blown assault on Aristotelianism.
The Discovery clearly shows in what direction the genre of the celestial
journey has travelled since the writing of Christine's Chemin de Long
Estude. Wilkins altogether dispenses with the fictional narrative and
presents a series of propositions about lunar and cosmic science. From
the literary narrative revelatory of scientia, of which Christine de Pizan's
work is a prime example, we have moved to the precursor of the scientific
paper. As Marjorie Hope Nicolson points out: ‘[Wilkins’s] Discovery is
one of the first important books of modern “popular science”, a work
written by a man who knew the technicalities of science.’39 Wilkins
clearly sees himself working within the literary tradition of Lucian,
Plutarch, Kepler, and Godwin and draws on these works, as well as
Culture and Cosmos

Alan S.Weber 45
Galileo's Siderius Nuncius, for his lunar science. Yet Wilkins also
concludes that a list of numbered propositions supported by evidence, in
contrast to literary narrative, can best convey scientific knowledge to a
literate audience.
Wilkins fully accepts the Copernican hypothesis (heliocentrism and
terrestrial rotation) and also refutes some fundamental tenets of
Aristotelian physics. First, Wilkins entertains the possibility of the
plurality of worlds rejected by Aristotle, an idea according to Wilkins,
that ‘doth not contradict any principle of reason’.40 Along with Godwin,
he rejects the orb of elemental fire.41 Proposition number three, which
clearly demonstrates his break with Aristotelianism, boldly states: ‘that
the heavens doe not consist of any such pure matter which can priveledge
them from the like change and corruption, as these inferiour bodies are
liable unto’.42 Wilkins has swept aside the barrier of elemental matter,
which Aristotle had located at the sphere of the moon. The heavens for
him can no longer consist of incorruptible, immaterial ether, but must be
made of something more readily accessible to reason and experimentum.
Not only do we see a shift in specific astronomical doctrines in
European cosmology from the time of Christine de Pizan to the work of
Godwin and Wilkins, but also a profound difference in how the cosmos
was perceived. Many of the technical changes in cosmology can be
summed up simply as the growing rejection of Aristotelian physics. The
book of Genesis and the Hexameral treatises (works combining
theological and physical speculation on the first six days of creation)
stood at the heart of early medieval cosmology before the Latin
translations of Arabic and Greek astronomical texts entered the West.
One book, the Bible, provided a coherent theology, physics, and
cosmogony. By Wilkins's day, however, theology and biblical exegesis
were becoming increasingly irrelevant to both astronomy and astrology,
as practitioners of these sciences, especially in astronomy, were focussing
their work more on practical computation, geometry, and mathematics
than on origins, causes, and metaphysical powers of the Deity. As
Wilkins points out regarding extrapolating the nature of the world from
divine writ: ‘such...absurdities [about nature] have followed, when men
looke for the grounds of Philosophie in the words of Scripture’.43
Conclusion
For Christine de Pizan, astrology and astronomy were merely subsciences
of theology - astrology represented that speculative ladder which mounts
into the stars and reveals the high majesty. Theology in Christine's Livre
Culture and Cosmos

de la Mutacion de Fortune is ‘that supercelestial science which comprises

all other knowledge’.44 The study of Aristotelian metaphysics is likewise
only a stepping stone - or ladder - to divine knowledge. We see similar
statements regarding the proper place of astronomical and astrological
learning within French culture in the work of Christine's contemporary
Nicole Oresme. Oresme writes:
...astrology has three very noble ends. The first is to have knowledge
of such great matters, for to this, according to the philosophers, is
human nature naturally inclined....The second end, and the chief, is
that it gives great aid in the knowledge of God the Creator....The third
end of astrology and the least important is to ascertain certain
dispositions of this lower and corruptible nature, whether present or to
come, and nothing beyond that.... [Coopland's translation].45
Oresme, like Christine, defines knowledge of God as the summum bonum

of the natural philosopher. Both Wilkins and Godwin have made a
complete separation of themselves from nature. Flying to the moon, an
imaginative or ecstatic act in the world of Lucian, Macrobius, Dante and
Christine de Pizan, in seventeenth-century writers becomes a possible
material reality, the possibility of transporting physical bodies from point
to point. In Godwin's day, schemes for flying to the moon were being
seriously advanced by scientific thinkers. The 1640 edition of Wilkins's
The Discovery of a World in the Moone, for example, contained an
additional chapter outlining a device for such a lunar voyage.46 Wilkins's
1648 work Mathematical Magick: or, the Wonders that may be
performed by Mechanical Geometry also contains a description of a
flying chariot.
Christine's journey, on the other hand, does not simply involve a
movement from one physical locus to another. Christine's flight of
speculation culminates in the knowledge of virtue: she undertakes an
inward theological and spiritual journey. Stéphane Gompertz alerts us to
the integrating and unifying function of Christine's epistemological
journey in Le Chemin de Long Estude: ‘the voyage [through the spheres]
not only links the different regions of the universe, but also differing
realms of knowledge; in this resides the journey's totalizing power’.47
Elevated by her knowledge of the proper ethics of the prince, which she
has heard debated in the Court of Reason, Christine undergoes both an
inner and outer spiritualization in her travels to the heavenly spheres.
Christine writes in the Chemin de Long Estude: ‘through knowledge, the
Culture and Cosmos

Alan S.Weber 47
great treasure of the Understanding, better than gold, is engendered in our

breasts; the fruit of such knowledge heals all wounds. Knowledge is the
sun whose light illuminates the shadows of our thoughts with its
fullness’.48 The growth of inward knowledge involves building the bright,
ethereal ladder of speculation in the mind's eye. Sebille suggests that
Christine serve as a messenger to earth to report the debates in the court
of Reason: Christine therefore truly becomes an ‘influence’, a
spiritualized daemon or angel, transformed into the intermediate aetherial
or pneumatic substance possessing the moral understanding that she will
breathe into (‘influer’) the ears of earthly princes. Illuminated by ethical
knowledge, she may also be likened to astrological rays transporting the
heavenly influences to the terrestrial realm.
In Christine's conception of heaven, a strong link exists between divine
knower and the known world; both are described as light and clear in her
frequently employed Platonic light-as-knowledge metaphor. In the case
of spiritual knowledge, the knower and the known are not distinct
epistemological positions. Astronomy or astrology would not have to be
studied in the heavens, since study implies a knowledge outside the
individual; this separation could not occur in union with God. In heaven,
the shining glorified bodies united to their souls in Christine's poem La
Prison de la Vie Humaine, ‘will find that they have all forms of
knowledge, know all things perfectly, feel the infinite goodness of
God’.49
In Christine's theory of knowledge, the long road of study requires
moral and abstract thought, which then bridges the spatial and
epistemological distance between the soul and heaven, the soul's final
destination. As the two realms interrelate spiritually, there is no real
concept of space or locus in Christine: distance between objects may be
physical, but not spiritual, or vice versa. For Godwin and Wilkins,
representing the triumph of the new physical, materialist astronomy in
their celestial voyage narratives, the material universe is now distinct
from the human soul.
Culture and Cosmos

References
1. Gaston de Paris, ‘Chronique’, Romania 10 (1881) 318: ‘un ouvrage dont la valeur
poétique est médiocre et qui n'a d'intérêt que pour l'histoire des idées et de l'instruction au
XVe siècle’. Unless noted, all translations are my own.
2. Christine de Pizan, Le Livre du Chemin de Long Estude, ed. Robert Püschel (Paris
1887) 413-414: ‘le feu et l'iave s'entreheent,/ A destruire l'un l'autre beent.’
3. See Edward Grant, Planets, Stars and Orbs: The Medieval Cosmos, 1200-1687
(Cambridge 1994) 59: ‘Medieval society's concept of the origin, structure, and operation
of the world was drawn almost exclusively from the Aristotelian-Ptolemaic astronomical
and cosmological tradition.’ Bernardus Silvestris’s Cosmographia has been translated by
Winthrop Wetherbee, The Cosmographia of Bernardus Silvestris: A Translation With
Introduction and Notes (New York 1973).
4. Richard Lemay, ‘The True Place of Astrology in Medieval Science and Philosophy:
Towards a Definition’, Astrology, Science and Society: Historical Essays, ed. Patrick
Curry (Woodbridge, Suffolk 1987) 57-78.
5. Both of these questions are intimately related to Aristotelianism. Aristotle had clearly
stated the world was eternal and non-created, while the book of Genesis forced Christian
theologians to argue for creation ex nihilo. Aristotle also denied the possibility of other
worlds, arguing from his theory of the natural place of the elements. The heaviest
element, earth, naturally falls towards the centre of the universe, i.e. the sphere of the
earth, while light elements such as fire escape towards the heavens. Multiple worlds
entailed multiple centers of attraction, in which case elements would be flying around the
cosmos helter skelter. But denying the possibility of multiple created worlds placed a
fundamental restriction on an omnipotent being. See Stephen J. Dick, The Plurality of
Worlds (Cambridge 1982) and Pierre Duhem, Medieval Cosmology: Theories of Infinity,
Place, Time, Void, and the Plurality of Worlds, ed. and trans. Roger Ariew (Chicago
1985) 431-510.
6. Marie-Josèphe Pinet, Christine de Pizan 1364-1430: Étude Biographique et Littéraire
(Paris 1927) 423: ‘Christine ne cesse de considérer Aristote comme le prince des
philosophes.’
7. Christine de Pizan, Christine's Vision, trans. Glenda K. Mcleod, Garland Library of
Medieval Literature, vol. 68, series B (New York 1993) 93 n.24.
8. Chemin 636-37. Jane Chance explores the question of female knowledge and its
metaphors in ‘Christine de Pizan as Literary Mother. Women's Authority and Subjectivity
in “The Floure and the Leafe” and “The Assembly of Ladies”’, The City of Scholars: New
Approaches to Christine de Pizan, ed. Margarete Zimmermann and Dina De Rentiis
(Berlin 1994) 245-259.
9. Chemin 1602-1610: ‘Legiere estoit et portative/ Si qu'on la peust ertortillier/ Et porter
sanz soy travaillier/ Par tout le monde, qui voulsist,/ Que ja n'empeschast ne nuisist,/ Non
mie que de corde fust/ Ne d'autre file ne de fust;/ Ne je n'en congnois la matiere,/ Mais
longue estoit, fort et legiere.’
10. Christine, following the practice of many medieval and Renaissance writers uses the
terms 'astronomie' and 'astrologie' interchangeably. More precise writers followed
Ptolemy's division in the Tetrabiblos, which circulated in the west in a widely read Latin
translation entitled the Quadripartitum. Ptolemy clearly distinguished two cosmological
sciences: the first part of the science of the stars consisted of the study of the appearance
and movements of the celestial bodies with respect to the earth (what today we would call
Culture and Cosmos

Alan S.Weber 49
astronomy); the second part considered the effects of the heavenly bodies on terrestrial
events and human actions (what we would call astrology).
11. Chemin 1824-32: ‘[Sebille] tout me monstroit, et devisoit/ Des planetes les noms, la
force,/ Et de moy enseignier s'efforce/ Les cours des estoilles mouvables/ Et des estans et
des errables./ Si m'en dist les proprietez,/ L'effect, les contrarietez,/ Leurs forces et leurs
influences/ Et leurs diverses ordenances.’
12. Chemin 1848-9: ‘Car sience d'astrologie/ N'ay je pas a l'escole aprise.’
13. Charity Cannon Willard, ‘Christine de Pizan: The Astrologer's Daughter’ in Mélanges
à la Mémoire de Franco Simone, vol. 1 (Genève 1980) 95-111; Charity Cannon Willard,
Christine de Pizan: Her Life and Works (New York 1984) 17, 19-22, 97, 104; Edgar
Laird, ‘Astrology in the Court of Charles V of France, As Reflected in Oxford, St. John's
College, MS 164’ Manuscripta 34 (1990) 167-176.
14. Lynn Thorndike, A History of Magic and Experimental Science, 8 vols. (New York
1923 - 58) 3.585.
15. I am working from G.W. Coopland's paraphrase of Oresme's De l'Espere in Nicole
Oresme and the Astrologers: A Study of His Livre de Divinacions (Liverpool 1952) 17-
20.
16. Chemin 1934, 1943.
17. Chemin 1994. For an introduction to the history of this idea, along with excerpts from
original texts, see Joscelyn Godwin's Harmony of the Spheres: A Sourcebook of the
Pythagorean Tradition in Music (Rochester 1993).
18. Chemin 2010-11.
19. Chemin 2030-34.
20. Chemin 2095.
21. Chemin 2109-2118: ‘....aussi tost que l'omme naist/ Ou la femme, ja si grant n'est,/
Ceulx [les destinees] yci de sa vie ordenent/ Et sa droite fin lui assenent,/ Bonne ou male,
selon les cours/ Ou les planetes ont leurs cours/A l'eure que l'enfant est né./ Mais toutefois
Dieux, qui donne/ Leur a ce povoir, dessus est,/ Qui bien garde ce qui lui plaist.’
22. Chemin 2175-84.
23. For example, Le Jugement du Roy de Behaigne and Le Jugement du Roy de Navarre.
24. Barbara K. Altmann, ‘Reopening the Case: Machaut's Jugement Poems as a Source in
Christine de Pizan’, Reinterpreting Christine de Pizan, ed. Earl Jeffrey Richards, Joan
Williamson, Nadia Margolis, and Christine Reno (Athens 1992) p 137.
25. The Man in the Moone: or a discourse of a Voyage thither by Domingo Gonsales The
Speedy Messenger (London 1638). All references to The Man in the Moone will be from
the 2nd edition of 1657.
26. Lucian, The True History; Plutarch, De Facie in Orbe Lunae; Macrobius, Somnium
Scipionis; Dante, Divina Commedia. Marjorie Hope Nicolson surveys some of this
literature in A World in the Moon: A Study of the Changing Attitude Toward the Moon in
the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, Smith College Studies in Modern Languages,
vol. 17, no. 2 (Northampton, MA 1936).
27. Dictionary of National Biography, ed. Sir Leslie Stephen and Sir Sidney Lee, vol. 8
(Oxford 1917) 56 - 58.
28. Planetary Astronomy from the Renaissance to the rise of Astrophysics, The General
History of Astronomy, ed. René Taton and Curtis Wilson, vol. 2, Part A: Tycho Brahe to
Newton (Cambridge 1989) 5-7. See also J. L. E. Dryer, A History of Astronomy from
Thales to Kepler, rev. W. H. Stahl, ed. 2 (New York 1953) 365-71 and Clarisse Doris
Hellman, The Comet of 1577: Its Place in the History of Astronomy (New York 1971).
Culture and Cosmos

29. Godwin 68.

30. Godwin 65.
31. Chemin 1703-22.
32. See Thorndike 6.1-2, 83, 384.
33. H.W. Lawton, ‘Bishop Godwin's Man in the Moone’, Review of English Studies 7, no.
25 (1931) 41.
34. Chemin 1699-1700: ‘comme une petite pelote,/ Aussi ronde q'une balote.’
35. Godwin 58-59.
36. Godwin 60.
37. Kepler's Somnium: The Dream, or Posthumous Work on Lunar Astronomy, trans.
Edward Rosen (Madison 1967) 82 n.96.
38. Dictionary of National Biography, 21.264 -7.
39. Marjorie Hope Nicolson, Voyages to the Moon (New York 1948) 93.
40. John Wilkins, The Discovery of a World in the Moone (1638), A Facsimile
Reproduction with an Introduction by Barbara Shapiro (Delmar 1973) 25.
41. Wilkins 54.
42. Wilkins 44.
43. Wilkins 40.
44. Christine de Pizan, Le Livre de la Mutacion de Fortune, ed. Suzanne Solente, t. 2
(Paris 1957) 7309-14: ‘la superceleste/ Science...Ou est compris science entiere.’ See also
Christine de Pizan, Le Livre des Fais et Bonnes Meurs du Sage Roy Charles V, ed.
Suzanne Solente, vol. 2 (Paris 1936) 18, ‘comme l'entencion finale de sapience ou de
methaphisique soit pervenir à cognoistre le gouvernement de la cause premiere, c'est Dieu
le glorieux, la cognoissance de l'ordre des esperes celestes, auxquelles cognoiscences
impossible est venir, senon après astrologie; et toutefois à astrologie nul ne puit parvenir
s'ançois n'est philosophe, geomettre et arismetien; par quoy, comme il appert qu'en l'ordre
des sciences astrologie et methaphisique sont tres haultes’.
45. Nicole Oresme, Livre de Divinacions in Coopland 113: ‘la science du ciel a trois tres
nobles fins. La premiere est avoir congnoissance de si tres belles choses car a ce est
naturellement humain lignage enclin selon les philosophes.....La seconde fin et la plus
principale d'astrologie est ce que elle donne grant aide a la congnoissance de Dieu le
createur....La tierce fin d'astrologie et la moins principal est congnoistre aucunes
disposicions de ceste basse nature corruptible presentes ou avenir et tant et nomplus....’.
46. Barbara Shapiro, ‘Introduction,’ Wilkins vi.
47. Stéphane Gompertz, ‘La voyage allégorique chez Christine de Pisan’, in Voyage,
Quete, Pelerinage Dans la Literature et la Civilization Medievales, Senefiance No. 2,
Cahiers du CUER MA (Paris 1976) 200: ‘le voyage ne met pas seulement en contact les
régions de l'univers mais aussi les domaines de la connaissance: c'est là que réside sa
vertu totalisante.’
48. Chemin 5215-21: ‘Par la quelle [la science]le grant tresor/ De conscience, meilleur
que or,/ Est conceu en nostre courage,/ Dont le fruit tous maux assouage./ C'est le souleil
par quel lumiere/ Ajourne o sa lueur pleniere/ Es tenebres de la pensee.’
49. The Epistle of the Prison of Human Life 60-61: ‘ilz se trouveront avoir parfaite
sapience, sachans toutes sciences, congnoissans toutes choses parfaitement, sentir l'infinie
bonté de Dieu.’
Culture and Cosmos

Kepler’s Tertius Interveniens
Ken Negus
Tertius Interveniens, written in 1610, is one of Kepler's most powerful

and passionate treatises on astrology, written as a defence of the subject
against extremists on both sides, on the one hand those who would
condemn astrology altogether, and on the other those who accepted
everything said and done in its name, no matter how preposterous. Hence
he is the ‘third party intervening’, as indicated by the title.
The following extract is near the centre of the book, and is otherwise
‘central’ as an expression of the main tenets of Kepler's thought on
astrology. In this short passage, he comments incisively on the following
topics: the non-material, ‘spiritual’ nature of astrology; geometry as the
all-embracing archetype through which the messages of the sky are
communicated to earth; the horoscope as indelible ‘imprint’ on the soul
of the infant being born; astrology as ‘music’; the rationale of
progressions and directions (symbolic measures used in prediction);
astrological genetics; transits and mundane (political and historical)
astrology.
Not to be forgotten when reading Kepler’s arguments concerning
astrology is his major role in the history of science. Although he is
remembered primarily as an astronomer he also had much to say about
biology, geology, meteorology, medicine and many other areas. His
philosophical thinking also suggests much that is far ahead of his time,
including prefigurations of Jungian psychology (archetypes and the
collective unconscious). But let him, in slightly abridged form, speak for
himself:1
Thesis 64. All powers coming down from above are ruled according to
Aristotle's teaching: namely, that inside this lower world or earthly sphere
there is a spiritual nature, capable of expression through geometry. This
nature is enlivened by geometrical and harmonic connections with the
celestial lights, out of an inner drive of the Creator, not guided by reason,
and itself is stimulated and driven for the use of their powers. Whether all
plants and animals, as well as the Earth's sphere, possess this faculty, I
________________________________________________________________
Negus, Ken, 'Kepler's Tertius Interveniens, Culture and Cosmos, Spring/Summer

1997, Vol. 1 no 1, pp. 51-4.
52
cannot say. It is not an unbelievable thing, for they have various faculties
of this kind: in that the form in every plant knows how to put forth its
adornment, gives the flower its colour, not materially, but formally, and
also has a certain number of petals; nor [is it unbelievable] that the
womb, and the seed that falls into it, has such a marvellous power to
prepare all the body parts in appropriate form....The human being,
however, with his soul and its lower powers has such an affinity with the
heavens, as does the surface of the Earth, and this has been tested and
proven in many ways, of which each is a noble pearl of astrology, and is
not to be rejected along with [all of] astrology, but to be diligently
preserved and interpreted.
Thesis 65. Above all, I might in truth flatter myself with having
experienced this observation: that the human being, in the first igniting of
his life, when he now lives independently for the first time, and can no
longer live in the womb, receives the character and formation of the sky's
whole stellar configuration, or the form of the conflux of radii on earth,
and maintains it unto his grave. Afterwards this can be perceived in the
formation of the face and the remaining bodily structure, as well as in the
person’s behaviour, habits and gestures, so that he might create, with his
bodily form, corresponding attraction and charm for himself in the eyes
of other people, and with his actions bring forth corresponding fortune.
Then thereby (as well as from the mother’s fantasies before the birth and
from the rearing of the child thereafter), a great difference from other
people is created, so that one person is brave, cheerful, joyful, self-
confident; and another lethargic, lazy, neglectful, shy, forgetful, hesitant,
and whatever other general characteristics there may be, which can be
compared with configurations that are pleasant and exact, or complex and
awkward, or also with the colours and motions of the planets. This
character is not received into the body - for it is much too ungainly for
that - but into the nature of the soul itself, which behaves like a point, so
that she [the soul] might be transformed in points of the conflux of radii;
and not only do these points impart reason to her, from which we human
beings might be called reasonable above all other creatures, but she is to
grasp in the first moment another kind of implanted reason - geometry -
in the radii as well as in musical sounds [i.e. ‘voices,’ in the technical
musical sense], without a lengthy learning process.
Thesis 66. Second, so it is with every plant, that it is on schedule when it

is to ripen or blossom. This time is prescribed to it at its creation, and by
Culture and Cosmos

Ken Negus 53
external warmth and other means it is lengthened or shortened, but can

never be totally altered. In like manner the human being's nature, upon
entry into life, receives not only an instantaneous image of the sky, but
also its movement, as it appears down here on earth for several days in a
row, and in certain years derives from this moment the manner of
outpouring this or that humour; these years are precisely and sharply
indicated, based on the projection of the first few days [of life]. This is a
truly marvellous thing, and is like an image or outflowing of the natural
proportion of a day to a year. Thus this short time or ‘tempus typicum’ in
human nature with all its parts is multiplied by 365; and all of natural life,
out of this multiplication, remaining rigidly in its memory, is deducted
and unwound as from a ball of yarn, so that then the whole future life,
insofar as it deals with natural matters, in the course of a quarter-year is
wound up and stored in a little bundle. Such a causality and natural
proportion cannot, however, be applied to the profections,2 for not the
Ascendant and not the Sun, but Jupiter makes its revolution in 12 years,
as the Moon does in 28 days, and accordingly the best of the profections
should be assigned to the transits; the rest is useless noise. I have often
harboured the thoughts that there is nothing to directions because we
must reach out so far for their causality, and one cannot accommodate
them any differently. But I must confess that nonetheless the causality
resembles nature, because it requires a natural proportion; and that our
experience is so clear, that they are not to be denied as true for the
astrologers.
Thesis 67. Third: this is a curious thing that the nature [of the human
being], which receives this character [of the sky], also favours its
relatives by some similarities in the celestial constellations. When the
mother is great with child and her time has come, then nature seeks out a
day and hour for the birth that is comparable celestially with that of the
mother's father or her brother.
Thesis 68. Fourth, every [human] nature knows not only its celestial
character, but also every day's configurations and motions in the sky so
well, that as often as a transiting planet comes into its character's
Ascendant or other prominent place, especially into radical points, it [the
nature] accepts it and is thereby variously affected and stimulated.
Thesis 69. Fifth, there is also the experience that every strong
conjunction, by itself, without considering the relationship to a particular
Culture and Cosmos

54
person, stimulates people in general (where a nation lives together in an

ordered society), and makes them capable of acting as a community that
is unified just as the stars then shine together. This was discussed in detail
in my book De stella serpentarii. Thus I have seen many examples of
epidemics in which the humours are stirred up more when strong stellar
configurations are present (that is to say, the human natures are
stimulated to drive out the humours). In like manner all these points - and
many more could be cited, being from the same cause - and the
possibility of one coming from the other could be proven and defended.
References
1. Translation by Ken Negus, 1997.

2. A forecasting technique in which the houses of the horoscope represent the
years of life, beginning with the first house and the first year of life.
Culture and Cosmos

Belief in Astrology:
a social-psychological analysis
Martin Bauer1 and John Durant2
Abstract
Social scientists have suggested several different hypotheses to account for
the prevalence of belief in astrology among certain sections of the public in
modern times. It has been proposed: (1) that as an elaborate and systematic
belief system, astrology is attractive to people with intermediate levels of
scientific knowledge [the superficial knowledge hypothesis]; (2) that belief
in astrology reflects a kind of ‘metaphysical unrest’ that is to be found
amongst those with a religious orientation but little or no integration into the
structures of organized religion, perhaps as a result of ‘social disintegration’
consequent upon the collapse of community or upon social mobility [the
metaphysical unrest hypothesis]; and (3) that belief in astrology is prevalent
amongst those with an ‘authoritarian character’ [authoritarian personality
hypothesis].
The paper tests these hypotheses against the results of British survey data
from 1988. The evidence appears to support variants of hypotheses (1) and
(2), but not hypothesis (3). It is proposed that serious interest or involvement
in astrology is not primarily the result of a lack of scientific knowledge or
understanding; rather, it is a compensatory activity with considerable
attractions to segments of the population whose social world is labile or
transitional; belief in astrology may be an indicator of the disintegration of
community and its concomitant uncertainties and anxieties. Paradoxical as it
may appear, astrology may be part and parcel of late modernity.
1. Introduction
Across the industrialized world, astrology has attractions for large numbers
of people. Horoscopes are read by millions; astrologers are personally
1
London School of Economics, Department of Social Psychology
2
Science Museum and Imperial College, London
56 Belief in Astrology: a social-psychological analysis
consulted by tens or hundreds of thousands; rumour has it that the London

City is a booming place for astrological consultancy; even the wives of
Presidents1, it appears, may consult with astrologers before advising their
husbands on how to conduct affairs of state. In all these situations astrology
seems to offer a degree of certainty where uncertainty prevails. To many
scientists and science educators who are concerned about the public
understanding of science, the enduring popularity of astrology is an affront.
How can it be, they ask, that in the last decade of the 20th century so many
people are still prepared to embrace pre-scientific and even frankly
superstitious belief systems?
Faced with the task of accounting for the enduring popularity of
astrology, it is tempting to invoke the phenomenon of ‘anti-science’ - that is,
active resistance to the principles and practises of science. In this context, it
may be significant that the first of a series of US-Soviet conferences on the
social and political dimensions of science and technology, which was held at
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in May 1991, was devoted to
‘Anti-Science Trends in the United States and the Soviet Union’.
Significantly, the two parallel keynote addresses to this conference - by
Gerald Holton, of Harvard University, and Sergei Kapitza, of the Institute
for Physical Problems (Moscow) - pointed to the need for a critical
understanding of the phenomenon of anti-science. According to Holton anti-
science in the US is symptomatic of a long-standing struggle over the
legitimacy of the authority of conventional science;2 while for Kapitza, anti-
science in the east is part and parcel of the wider social and political
transformation of the former Soviet Union.3
In a recent BBC radio programme prominent representatives of churches,
science, and the arts discussed the apparent popularity of astrology and
parasciences in Britain under the label ‘pre-millennium tension’ [PMT].4
Ironically, on the issue of astrology and parasciences, the traditionally
polarised positions of science and religion converged. It seems that present
day astrology claims the territory which makes the Church and Science
equally nervous. Albeit, the nervousness may have different sources.
In this paper, we investigate the phenomenon of popular belief in
astrology in Britain in the late 20th century. Our evidence concerning the
place of astrology in British culture is derived from the results of a 1988
national random sample survey designed to estimate levels of public interest
in, understanding of and attitudes towards science and technology. In the
course of this survey several questions were asked about astrology5. The
results of these items enable us to explore three different sociological
hypotheses which have been advanced to account for the prevalence of
Culture and Cosmos

Martin Bauer and John Durant 57
belief in astrology amongst certain sections of the public: first, that astrology
is attractive to people with intermediate levels of scientific knowledge
[superficial knowledge hypothesis]; second, that astrology is attractive to
people who possess what has been termed ‘metaphysical unrest’ without
integration into a Church; their unrest could therefore be considered free-
floating [metaphysical unrest hypothesis]; and third, that belief in astrology
is prevalent amongst people with authoritarian personality characteristics
[authoritarian personality hypothesis].
Astrology must be considered the “grandmother” of modern science in at
least two aspects: its concern with regularities in the universe, and its attempt
to deal with these regularities numerically. Keith Thomas observed that ‘at
the beginning of the 16th century astrological doctrines were part of the
educated man's picture of the universe and its workings’; London was a
booming centre of astrological divinations for a mainly elite clientele of
Court, nobility and Church until its decline in the mid-17th century.6 In one
sense it is not surprising that in a country that prides itself on tradition and
continuity we find residuals or even revivals of such activities in the late
20th century. In this paper we try to locate contemporary belief in astrology
in order to understand its social and psychological functions; while
temporarily abstaining from evaluations of the belief itself.
We begin by defining our measures of public belief in astrology, and then
proceed to use these measures to explore the three hypotheses.
2. Measuring Popular Belief in Astrology
The British survey was conducted in the early summer of 1988. The sample
of 2009 respondents was designed to be representative of the adult
population of Britain over the age of eighteen. The survey was conducted by
means of face-to-face interviews lasting between forty minutes and one
hour. The questionnaire covered a wide variety of topics in the general field
of science and technology. In particular, it developed a multi-item scalar
measure of scientific understanding. Further details of the survey
methodology and the results on public understanding of science have been
published elsewhere.7,8,9,10
So far as the present study is concerned, the following items from this
national survey are of particular interest. First, respondents were asked ‘Do
you sometimes read a horoscope or a personal astrology report?’. Those
Culture and Cosmos

who responded positively were then asked (a) how often they read a
horoscope or personal astrology report [frequency] and (b) how seriously
they took what these reports said [seriousness]. 73% of respondents claimed
to read a horoscope or personal astrology report. 21% said that they would
read it ‘often’, 23% ‘fairly often’, 29% ‘not often’, and 27% did not read it
‘at all’. Hence, 44% claimed to do so often or fairly often. However, a rather
smaller number of respondents (6%) claimed to take what horoscopes or
personal astrology reports said either ‘seriously’ or ‘fairly seriously’. 67%
took it not very seriously, and 27% took it not at all seriously. This result
points immediately to the problematic status of astrology in the minds of
many of those who take at least some personal interest in it.
Figure 1: the combined percentages of respondents for two questions: ‘how

frequently do you read astrology columns?’ and ‘how seriously do you take it?’
Culture and Cosmos

In order to accommodate these results in a useful way, we have combined

them into a single scalar measure. Figure 1 brings together the results on
readership and seriousness, which we combined into a 5 point-scale of belief
in astrology. The scale is derived from the readership and seriousness results
in the following way: those who reported that they read horoscopes often or
fairly often and that they took them seriously or fairly seriously are ranked 5
(serious believers 5%); those who reported that they read horoscopes often
and that they took them not very seriously are ranked 4 (non-serious
believers, 18%); those who reported that they read horoscopes fairly often
believers, 21%); those who reported that they read horoscopes not very often
believers, 29%); and those who reported that they did not read horoscopes at
all are ranked 1 (non-believers, 27%).11 With around 5% of the population or
2.5-3 million, the constituency of serious believers in astrology is a small
minority compared to the constituency adhering to basic religious creeds
such as ‘God’, a ‘life after death’ or ‘miracles’, which includes half or more
of the British population.12 For much of the following analysis the 5-point
scale is reduced by pooling 1+2, 3, and 4+5 into a 3-point scale.
Another item in the survey invited respondents to estimate the scientific
status of astrology (which was defined as ‘the study of horoscopes’) on a 5
point-scale, from ‘not at all scientific’ to ‘very scientific’. 32% of
respondents stated that astrology was not at all scientific (scale point 1),
while 13% stated that it was very scientific (scale point 5); 18% said it was
in between (scale point 3); a further 17% tended towards ‘not scientific’
(scale point 2), and 14% tended towards 'scientific' (scale point 4); 5% did
not know.
Our survey incorporated two standard measures concerning religious
belief and religious integration. Religious belief was constructed as a scalar
measure on the basis of responses to the following agree/disagree items:
‘spiritual values taught by religion are important’; ‘there is no such thing as a
God’; ‘people should rely more on the power of prayer’; and ‘Adam and Eve
never really existed’.13 Religious affiliation was constructed as a scalar
measure on the basis on the following items: ‘Do you regard yourself as
belonging to any particular religion?’; and (if yes), ‘Apart from such special
occasions as weddings, funerals and baptisms, how often nowadays do you
attend services or meetings connected with your religion?’.14
Finally, the survey comprised two standard scales on ‘authoritarianism-
egalitarianism’ and ‘social efficacy’. Authoritarianism is indicated by
consistently agreeing with statements such as ‘censorship of film and
Culture and Cosmos

magazines is necessary to uphold morality’ or ‘school should always teach

children to obey authority’. Social efficacy is indicated by disagreeing with
statements such as ‘I feel it's very difficult to have any real influence on what
other people do or think’ or agreeing with ‘people like me can influence the
government by taking an active part in politics’.
3. Exploring the Basis of Popular Belief in Astrology
Equipped with the measures that have been described above, we can begin
to explore the basis of popular belief in astrology. We shall do this by
considering in turn three different hypotheses that have been advanced to
account for this phenomenon.
i. Superficial Knowledge
It has been claimed that belief in astrology is the product of a relatively

slight or superficial acquaintance with the stock of modern scientific
knowledge. On this view, people with what might be termed an intermediate
level of scientific understanding may be attracted by astrology because it
possesses many of the ‘trappings’ of orthodox science (systematic structure,
predictive power, numeracy etc.); but they may be insufficiently well
equipped to see that these things really are the ‘trappings’ rather than the
substance of genuine science. Thus, in his classic paper of 1957 on the Los
Angeles Times Astrology Column as an example of ‘secondary
superstition’, Theodor Adorno wrote as follows:
While the naive persons who take more or less for granted what
happens hardly ask the questions astrology pretends to answer and
while really educated and intellectually fully developed persons
would look through the fallacy of astrology, it is an ideal stimulus
for those who have started to reflect, who are dissatisfied with the
veneer of mere existence and who are looking for a ‘key’, but who
are at the same time incapable of the sustained intellectual effort
required by theoretical insight and also lack the critical training
without which it would be utterly futile to attempt to understand
what is happening.15
We may pass over what seem by today’s standards the somewhat elitist and
patronising tones of Adorno's analysis. What concerns us here is whether the
basic prediction - that astrology is attractive to people with intermediate
Culture and Cosmos

levels of scientific understanding - is fulfilled. If that were the case, we

would expect belief in astrology to be positively correlated with knowledge
of science up to a certain level of scientific knowledge, beyond which this
correlation becomes negative. In other words, we would expect a non-linear
inverted U-shape relationship shown between scientific knowledge and the
status of astrology.
This issue may be addressed by comparing the results of our question on
the scientific status of astrology with the results of our multi-item scalar
measure of scientific understanding. Figure 2 shows these results, compared
with those for a similar item on the scientific status of physics. While there is
a linear relationship between scientific understanding and the perceived
scientific status of physics, there is a curvilinear relationship between
scientific understanding and the perceived scientific status of astrology. In
other words, our data do indeed bear out Adorno's hypothesis.
It should be noted that Figure 2 gives the proportions of respondents who
ranked astrology and physics as ‘very scientific’. We can learn a little more
by comparing these results with those for other available options concerning
the scientific status of astrology. Figure 3 shows the results for three groups
of respondents: those who stated that astrology is not scientific (responses 1
+ 2); those who stated that astrology is neither scientific nor unscientific, or
who said they didn't know (neither + don't know); and those who stated that
astrology is scientific (responses 4 + 5). Those with low levels of
understanding have a strong tendency to avoid a definite judgement about
astrology; while those with high levels of understanding have a strong
tendency to state that astrology is unscientific. Amongst those with
intermediate levels of understanding, there is less obvious consensus: some
think astrology is scientific, some think it is not, and some don't know.
So much for the perceived scientific status of astrology. What, we may
ask, about belief? Figure 4 compares belief in astrology with scientific
understanding measured by a 28-item knowledge quiz.16 As we might expect
overall there is a negative correlation between scientific understanding and
belief in astrology (r = -.21). However, on closer inspection it emerges that
this negative correlation applies only to the
Culture and Cosmos

Figure 2: the scientific status attributed to physics and astrology in relation to the
level of understanding of science; percentage of respondents saying 'scientific' or
'very scientific' combined.
Culture and Cosmos

Figure 3 shows the percentage of respondents saying that ‘astrology is not

scientific’, ‘don't know’ or ‘astrology is scientific’ in relation to levels of
understanding of science.
upper half of the understanding scale. We may wish to ignore the sudden
jump of belief in astrology at the very top of the knowledge scale, which is
based on a too few observations to be significant. However, within the 50%
of the general public whose relative scientific understanding is below
average, there is no correlation at all between levels of understanding and
belief in astrology. This is a pointer to a potential problem with measures of
scientific literacy that incorporate questions on the scientific status of
astrology.17 Empirically, astrology and science are not mutually
incompatible at least at lower levels of scientific enculturation. To use
astrology as a threshold measure for ‘scientific literacy’ may be justifiable
on normative grounds, but it ignors the social phenomenon of compatibility
or incompatibility between these two forms of knowledge, which is itself a
significant cultural variable. We expect the correlation to differ across
cultural contexts.18
Culture and Cosmos

Figure 4 shows the average intensity of belief in astrology in relation to the level of
scientific understanding.
ii. ‘Metaphysical Unrest’
It has been claimed that astrology has particular attractions for people who
are alive to religion but who are poorly integrated into the institutional
structures of a religious community. In this category are, for example, those
who have been brought up in a particular religion and retain a religious
outlook on life, but who for one reason or another (including social mobility
or the collapse of community) have ceased to be closely tied to the particular
church in which they were raised. Thus, Maitre and Boy & Michelat have
observed in France of the 1960s and 1980s and Schmidtchen in Germany of
the 1950s that astrology tends to be less popular amongst those who are
closely integrated into the institutions of organized religion. The French
characterize astrology as a petit-bourgeois phenomenon of social
uncertainty, social isolation and individualisation.19 According to Valadier,
this result is consistent with the hypothesis that astrology feeds
Culture and Cosmos

upon a free-floating ‘metaphysical unrest’, or a desire to recover a sense of

the sacred and a sense of unity on the part of people whose life world no
longer provides for these experiences; Pollack sees it as one among many
forms of religiosity-outside-the-church in the context of the collapse of old
certainties in Eastern Germany.20 Based on these previous observations, we
would expect to find serious inclinations towards astrology most prevalent
among religious believers with little or no religious integration.
We may put this hypothesis to the test in the context of our British data.
Our data show that there is a very slight tendency for belief in astrology to
be greater amongst those with higher levels of religious belief (r = 0.10).
However, inclination towards astrology is highest amongst those with
intermediate levels of integration into the institutions of organized religion.
Putting these results together, Figure 5 shows average belief in astrology in
relation to both religious belief (1 = low; 3 = high) and religious integration
(1 = low; 3 = high).
Figure 5: the average intensity of belief in astrology in relation to religious belief

and religious integration
Culture and Cosmos

We see that belief in astrology is highest amongst those who combine strong
religious belief and intermediate or low religious integration. The fact that an
intermediary level of integration is associated with highest level of belief in
astrology is perhaps unexpected. On the other hand, it may be that having
one foot in the Church and the other outside it may be the very situation of
social uncertainty which Valadier takes as diagnostic for present-day belief
in astrology. To this extent, therefore, we are able to confirm Valadier's
hypothesis and Schmidtchen, Maitre and Boy & Michelat's results
suggesting that astrology has particular attractions for those who may be
experiencing free-floating metaphysical unrest. Needless to say, our data do
not permit us to explore the sources of such unrest in the lives of our
respondents. This is an area where qualitative and biographical research may
be more revealing.
iii. The Authoritarian Personality
The third and last hypothesis that we shall consider takes us back to the work
of Theodor W Adorno. In the course of his analysis of astrology, Adorno
noted that in general terms the astrological ideology resembles, in all its
major characteristics, the mentality of the ‘high scorers’ of The Authoritarian
Personality’. In addition to what he believed to be the narcissism, self-
absorption, naive empiricism and fatalism of astrology, Adorno pointed to its
tendency to attribute everything negative in life to external, mostly physical
circumstances. In these and other ways, he suggested, astrology had
affinities with the authoritarian personality.21
Once again, our data may be used to test this hypothesis since the survey
contained a standard battery of psychological items designed to provide
measures of authoritarianism-egalitarianism and ‘social efficacy’, defined as
personal sense of control over the social world. The data shows that in our
study there is no significant tendency for belief in astrology to be greater
amongst those who score higher on the authoritarianism scale. We find,
however, that belief in astrology is stronger amongst those who score low on
social efficacy (r = -.21). Astrology, it would seem, is indeed particularly
attractive to persons with certain characteristics, namely those who have
little sense of control over their lives. Thus, Adorno's hypothesis is not
supported by our data, while the fatalism element was confirmed. Given that
this famous authoritarian personality syndrome is more complex than our
crude measure suggests, we suggest that further work is needed on this
subject.
Culture and Cosmos

4. Characterizing the Believers in Astrology
According to our results, the field in which the believers in astrology are
generally to be found is one in which people possess intermediate levels of
scientific understanding, high levels of religiosity, and low levels of
religious integration. But what sorts of people are actually to be found within
this field? In addition to what has already been said about personality, our
data suggest that women are more likely to believe in astrology than men.
Among the believers in astrology [scale 4+5] 77% are women; among the
declared sceptics 73% are men [scale 1+2]. With the exception of clerks (a
high proportion of whom are, of course, women) self-employed, skilled and
semi-skilled workers are in that order more likely to believe in astrology
than people in professional and managerial occupations. It is interesting to
note here that according to Boy & Michelat, different social strata are
associated with different sorts of ‘para-interests’: in France astrology is the
pursuit of the less educated, while para-science is the pursuit of the highly
educated. Our data do not allow us to compare this result with the situation
in Britain.
These simple correlations are difficult to interpret because of the
notorious problem of confounding variables. In other words, it may be that
we find a correlation between belief in astrology and social class only
because both in turn are related to some third factor (such as education, or
social efficacy). To reduce the ambiguity of our results, we have subjected
our data on belief in astrology to a form of statistical analysis (Logit
modelling) which is designed to analyse differences between two unequally
distributed groups.22 In this case, we wish to analyse the contributions to
differences in astrological belief of each of a series of independent variables.
Each independent variable is assessed individually, whilst possible effects
from all other variables are controlled. This analysis ranks independent
variables in order of importance, and it excludes variables which are found
to make no statistically significant contributions.
We used a Logit model in which differences between sub-sets of the
sample with respect to belief in astrology were analysed with the following
independent variables: interest in science; understanding of science;
religious belief; religious integration; authoritarianism; social efficacy; age;
gender; marital status; social class; educational level; and nature of work (i.e.
full/part-time). Comparing the extreme groups of serious astrology believers
(ranked 5) with non-believers (ranked 1 + 2) in this way, we obtain the
following results. The variables which are relevant for the model
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are in order of importance: (1) gender, (2) religious belief, (3) living alone or
in partnership, (4) age, (5) religious integration, and (6) the attributed
scientific status of astrology. All other variables are irrelevant in explaining
the difference between serious believers and sceptics. Note that the religious
variables remain important, while personality and scientific understanding
fall out of the equation. This indicates that the ‘metaphysical unrest’
hypothesis may be the strongest of the three hypotheses.
Comparing the category of playful, non-serious believers in astrology
(ranked 4) with the sceptics (ranked 1 + 2), we obtain slightly different
results. Again in order of importance the following variables are relevant: (1)
gender; (2) marital status; (3) social efficacy; (4) educational level; and (5)
attributed scientific status of astrology. In distinguishing between the playful
and curious approach to astrology and the sceptics we lose the religious
variable from the equation and gain education and efficacy.
At least as significant as the list of items that appear in these analyses is
the list of items that do not. From these results, it would appear that interest
in science and scientific understanding are not significant contributors to
variations in belief in astrology. This, in turn, casts serious doubt on the
advisability of employing measures of belief in astrology as constituent
items in larger constructs concerned with scientific understanding or
scientific literacy.
On the basis of these results, we can risk a caricature of believers in
astrology. Serious believers in astrology tend to be: female rather than male;
single rather than living with partners; younger rather than older; and
religiously motivated rather than indifferent; and inclined to attribute
scientific status to astrology. The non-serious and playful astrology
consumer also tends to be female and to live alone, to be less educated, less
in control of their affairs, and to consider astrology to be more scientific than
the sceptics allow.
5. Conclusion
We began by citing recent concerns at the rise of astrology as an anti-science

phenomenon, East and West. Kapitza suggests that in part the rise of anti-
science in the (former) Soviet Union may be explicable in terms of the
ideological collapse of the Soviet empire. Such a collapse may be expected
to have left an intellectual and spiritual vacuum, and this in turn will have
helped to bring about a certain amount of social disintegration. Similarly,
Holton proposes that the anti-science phenomenon in the United States
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should be understood as part of a deeper opposition both to the authority of

science and to a certain conception of modernity. Both of these analyses
invite us to consider popular belief in astrology as a great deal more than the
passive result of mere ignorance.
In general, we suggest that there are three different ways of approaching
the problem of popular belief in astrology. First, it may be regarded
positivistically, as an anachronistic survival of a pre-scientific world-view.
In this context, popular belief in astrology is seen as an atavistic
phenomenon. Second, it may be regarded anthropologically, as an
alternative world-view deserving of attention and respect in its own right. In
this context, we are required to make no value-judgements about the
respective merits of non-scientific and scientific positions. Third, it may be
regarded sociologically, as one among a number of potential compensatory
activity that may be attractive to individuals who are struggling to come to
terms with the uncertainties of life in late modernity.
In this paper, we have inclined towards the last of these approaches.
Belief in astrology is rather a matter of the moral fabric of modern society
than of scientific literacy. It seems that in Britain, as in Germany or France,
belief in astrology is prevalent among particular social groups; groups
which, as we have indicated, may be experiencing difficulty in
accommodating their religious feelings to life in an uncertain post-industrial
culture. Paradoxical as it may seem, therefore, we conclude that popular
belief in astrology may be part and parcel of late modernity itself.
References
1. An earlier version of this paper was given to the Annual Meeting of the American
Association for the Advancement of Science in Chicago, 9 February 1992; at the time it was
common currency that Nancy Reagan, the wife of former President Reagan, was consulting
with astrologers on matters of US state affairs.
3. Kapitza S (1991) ‘Anti-science trends in the USSR’, Scientific American, 265, 2, August,
18-24.
4. 'Moral Maze', 14 November 1996, BBC4, 9.00-10.00; moderated by Melvin Bragg. This
term is a slightly sexist pun on the medically controversial 'pre-menstrual tension'.
5. Acknowledgement: The 1988 British national survey of public understanding of science is

a joint Science Museum/University of Oxford and Community Planning Research (SCPR)
project funded by the Economic and Social Research Council, grant numbers: A 09250013
and A 418254007.
Culture and Cosmos

6. Thomas K (1971) Religion and the Decline of Magic. Studies in popular Beliefs in the 16th
and 17th Century, London, Penguin, 337ff.
7. Durant J R, Evans G A and Thomas G P (1989) ‘The public understanding of science’,

Nature, 340, 11-14.
8. Evans G A & J R Durant (1989) Understanding of Science in Britain and the USA, British
Social Attitudes: Special international report, edited by R Jowell et al., Aldershot, Gower,
105-119.
9. Durant J R , G A Evans and Thomas G P (1992) ‘Public Understanding of science in

Britain: the role of medicine in the popular representation of science’, Public Understanding
of Science, 1, 2, 161-183.
10. Evans G and J Durant (1995) ‘The relationship between knowledge and attitudes in the
public understanding of science in Britain’, Public Understanding of Science, 4, 1, 57-74.
11. To measure the internal consistency of the 'belief in astrology' scale we use Cronbach
Alpha's Reliability Coefficient: 0.92. Alpha is a measure for the covariance among all the
items in the scale; Cronbach L J (1951) Coefficient alpha and the internal consistency of tests,
Psychmetrica, 16, 297-334.
12. Greeley A (1992) ‘Religion in Britain’, Ireland and the USA, in: R Jowell, L Brook, B
Prior, B Taylor (eds) British Social Attitudes, the 9th report, Altershot, Dartmouth, 51-70.
13. Internal consistency of the religious belief measure: Cronbach Alpha's reliability
coefficient = 0.70.
14. Internal consistency of religious integration: Cronbach Alpha reliability coefficient = 0.73.
15. Adorno T W (1957) ‘The stars down to earth, the Los Angeles Times astrology column, a
study in secondary superstition’, Jahrbuch fuer Amerikastudien, Heidelberg, 2, 19-88,
reprinted in R.Adorno, The stars down to earthand other essays on the irrational in culture,
edited Stephen Crook (Routledge, London and New York, 1994).
16. See Durant, Evans, and Thomas (1989) op.cit.
17. Miller J D (1983) ‘Scientific literacy: a conceptual and empirical review’, Daedalus, 112,
3, 29-48; Miller J D (1991) ‘The public understanding of science and technology in the United
States’, 1990, A report to the National Science Foundation, Dekalb, Illinois, February 1991.
18. We do recall from the Chicago meeting in 1992 that in the discussion an Indian theoretical
physicist was quite irritated and outspoken about the tacit assumption in much of the
discussion according to which science and astrology were incompatible. He made reference to
the Indian context where Brahmanic knowledge traditions seem to have no problem of
compatibility between modern science and astrology.
Culture and Cosmos

19. Maitre J (1966) ‘La consommation d'astrologie dans la societe contemporaine’, Diogenes,
53, 92-109; Boy D & G Michelat (1986) ‘Croyance aux parasciences: dimensions sociales et
culturelles’, Revue Francaise de Sociologie, 27, 2, 175-204; Schmidtchen G (1957)
‘Soziologisches ueber die Astrologie’, Zeitschrift fuer Parapsychologie und Grenzgebiete der
Psychologie, 1, 47-72.
20. Valadier P (1987) L'eglise en proces. Catholicism et societe modern, Paris, Flammarion;
Pollack D (1990) ‘Vom Tischrucken zur Psychodynamik. Formen ausserkirchlicher
Religiositaet in Deutschland’, Schweizerische Zeitschrift fuer Soziologie, 1, 107-134.
21. Adorno T W , Frenkel-Brunswik E, Levinson D J and Sanford R N (1950) The

Authoritarian Personality, New York, Harper.
22. Aldrich J H and F D Nelson (1989) Linear probability, logit and probit models, New Bury
Park, Sage.
Culture and Cosmos

BOOK REVIBW
Visionsof theFuture:Almanacs,Time,and Cultural Change,Maureen

Perkins,Oxford:Clarendon Press,1996,270pp.;hardback;f,40;ISBN:
0-r9-8r2r78-4
This is a brilliant book, combiningthorough scholarshipwith original
insight.It should deepenour understanding of a remarkablenumber of
subjects. Essentially, it concerns a key part of the process of
rationalisationthat has been so instrumentalin producing what we now
recognizeas modernity.
Perkins has much to tell us about astrological almanacs,to whose
importanceKeith Thomas first alerted usl in this capacity,she builds on
and extends the excellent work of Bernard Capp. There is also
fascinatingmaterial here on comic almanacsand Australian almanacs-
the latter including an exampleof cultural influence by a colony (in the
personof JamesRoss)on metropolitandiscourse.
But more important is her use of almanacsto gain accessto the world
of popularbelief, and the tensiorrsin its relationshipswith elite opinion.
Here the pioneer was Peter Burke's Popular Culture in Early Modern
Europe and Perkins' book easily holds its owr-r with subsequent
scholarshipby David Vincent and others.(l can't help feeling it a pity,
however, that she passedover E. P. Thornpson'sapt refinement of
'popular'as'plebeian'.)
At the heart of her account is the campaign by the Society for the
Diffusion of Useful Knowledge in tlre third decade of the nineteenth
century against the Stationers' Conrpany, monopolist publisher of
almanacs.Led by Lord Brougham and Charles Knight, the SDUK
targetedsuch long-standingannualtitles as Poor Robin, Partridge's and
especially Vox Stellarum, popularly known as Moore's, with its
mysterioushieroglyphicand astrologicalprophecy.ln 1800.a minimum
of one person in every sevenin Englandbought an almanac- wliich was
read,of course,by severalmore - and far and away the most popular was
Moore s. In 1838,its bestyear,il sold over half a million copies,netting
the Companyof Stationersf,6,414.
Significantly, the editorial voice of Moore s was unirnpeachably
Whig, comprising a set of convictiorts shared by the SDUK. But the
latter had correctly identified the former as a major site and source of
'the superstitionsof the vulgar' (in the characteristic
tenns of the
BookReviews 73
Athenaeum,in 1828)and, as such,resistance to its desireto advancethe

scientific managementand rationalisationof society.The goal, as Perkins
puts it, was nothing less than 'a transforrnationof consciousness,from
one which was connected to a pre-Enlightenment world of
correspondences and hurnoursperpetuatedby popular almanacs,to .one
in which empirical observation and rational enquiry were the
standard....[and]in which the natural world could be placed without
recourseto 'irrational' concepts.'(p. 58)
Of course, the SDUK's empirico-rationalismwas far from neutral,
proceeding by a series of conflations linking 'useful', 'rational',
'scientific'and'real'. ln other words, this was a hegemonicstruggle
to
replace one particular social construalof reality witl-ranother.(I should
add, however,that Perkins is no wild-eyed studentof cultural studies,
however; a more sober and thoroughly documentedaccount would be
hard to imagine.)In this context,the dividirig line befweenrationality
and 'superstition' was bitterly contested.In a fascinating chapter on
weather, Perkins tells the sad story of Admiral Robert Fitzroy, who
pioneeredefforts to take its prediction out of the hands of countrymen,
astrologersand amateurs.In 1865,harriedmercilesslyby the pressas a
covert weather-prophet(and by astrologerson his other flank), Fitzroy
took his own life.
Predictably,the overall resultsof the SDUK campaignwere uneven
's
and complex. In 1872,Moore finally droppedthe astrology,only to be
severelypunishedby readers:salesdroppedsteadilyto only 50,000 in
1895. It was farmed out to another publisher in the early twentieth
century who re-introduced 'the voice of the stars', and still appears
annually, though witl-r nothing like its former circulation or influence.
Meanwhile, in the 1830s, judicial astrology re-appearedin the
metropolitan heartland, courtesy the new almanacs of Zadkiel and
Raphael. These had a rniddle-class readership, and Perkins
underestimatesthe significance of their success, which astounded
CharlesKnight; she could have made more use of them in graspingthe
complexity of mid-nineteenth-century middle-classdiscourse.She also
succumbsto the temptation (which seems nigh-well irresistible to
historiansin this field) to perceivethe 'deathof popularastrology',this
time in 1869-70(p. 119); the evidenceto the contrary in every daily
tabloid newspaper,and even somebroadsheets(to the disgustof others).
True, Sun-signcolumnsaren't preciselyearly rnodernlnoon- and star-
Culture and Cosmos

'74 BookReviews
lore; but they are much closer to it tharrto the highly individual analyses
ofjudicial astrology.
bverall. however, Perkins is right to hand the palm to the reformers.
Their relative victory was apparentin the new breedof almanacssuch as
-
Whittaker's,advancinga conceptof tirne - arrdthis is central that was
algorhy'thmic,quantitative and clock-based.Banished to the social and
-
intettettuat maigins - where it still survives was the old communal,
qualitative time incorporating planetary and lunar cycles, and their
corollariesin the annualseasons.
'post-modern'suspicion of
This raises the question of whether a
science, ecological crisis in our relations with nature, and a post-
NeMonian quantum physics signal the imminenceof a new popular
senseof tim", on" that may have significant continuitieswith premodern
cycles and qualities.Whateverthe outcome,future historianswill have to
consultPerkinsbefore settingout.
Patrick Curry
Culture and Cosmos

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CULTURE AND COSMOS

Vol. 1 No. 1 Spring/Summer 1997 ISSN 1368-6534

Astronomy is more than the science of the stars. It is intimately connected

Astrology can be defined as the use of celestial phenomena to interpret

Culture and Cosmos

The Thirty-Three Year Cycle

* Megalithic Tours, Cwm Degwel, St.Dogmael’s, Cardigan, SA43 3JF, UK.

We find evidence of the astronomical and mythical significance of the

Megalithic Astronomy and the Solar Cycle

Culture and Cosmos

Culture and Cosmos

However one interprets the data, this presents a possible astronomical

Culture and Cosmos

sunrise, we may be faced with a sophisticated astronomical/calendar

Postscript: The Dresden Codex

Culture and Cosmos

Important Solar Returns behind a horizon alignment

Number Days Time Difference Angular error from original

Culture and Cosmos

Culture and Cosmos

* University of California, Berkeley,

Culture and Cosmos 11

Having dispensed with modern scholars, Dicks turned on their ancient

12 Culture and Cosmos

their views are incurably vague; and underlying this vagueness is a

Culture and Cosmos 13

magic and mythology, themselves pre-scientific practices designed to

Science and Society

14 Culture and Cosmos

Farrington forged a very different thesis in Greek Science, exploring

Culture and Cosmos 15

ideas into a collapsing intellectual structure accelerated the downfall of

16 Culture and Cosmos

dream, used its foundation of fantasy to build, by equally unsound

Culture and Cosmos 17

Cohen and Drabkin’s failure to consider the broader context of the

Precursor to Modern Science

18 Culture and Cosmos

and phenomena of nature. In his view progress in astronomy and physics

Culture and Cosmos 19

and an extension of the customs of political debate to scientific inquiry.41

20 Culture and Cosmos

Culture and Cosmos 21

22 Culture and Cosmos

the universe...’55 The first sentence of his chapter on Anaximenes began:

Thales’ Eclipse Prediction

Culture and Cosmos 23

prediction, [the scholar] spins a web of inferential reasoning, based on

24 Culture and Cosmos

Pythagoreans by Bernard R.Goldstein and Alan C.Bowen, a historian of

Culture and Cosmos 25

slowly and cautiously proceeds to theories.70 Science, according to this

26 Culture and Cosmos

observed: ‘The search for answers in the history of science is itself

1. Victor E. Thoren, review of D. R. Dicks, Early Greek Astronomy to Aristotle, (Ithaca,

Culture and Cosmos 27

28 Culture and Cosmos

Hellenic Studies, 77 (1957), 35-41; reprinted as ‘Aristotle as a Historian’, in Furley and

Culture and Cosmos 29