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    Event 2: Traffic Display Misjudgement: Conclusions

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    Léa Mercier

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    Event 2: Traffic Display Misjudgement: Conclusions

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    Event 2: Traffic Display Misjudgement: Conclusions

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    Léa Mercier

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    Event 1b: Vertical rate instruction not followed

    continued

    When the A321 and A320 are 9.8 NM apart and passing through FL374 and FL356 respectively, they
    both get TAs. Soon after, the A321 crew reports that they have reduced their rate of descent due to
    the TA and ask for traffic information, which the controller provides.

    After 26 seconds, when the A321 passes FL369 and A320 FL362, the aircraft pass each other at a
    distance of 5.9 NM, and the TAs terminate. Subsequently, the A321 resumes its descent as instructed
    and there is no loss of separation with the two other aircraft further north on the crossing tracks.

    Conclusions: This event illustrates the importance of following ATC instructions since they are issued
    taking into account all surrounding traffic, including those aircraft which may be on another frequency
    or still some distance away. In this case the vertical speed reduction by the A321 had no significant
    negative consequences as both the crossing aircraft were still some distance away and separation
    recovery was possible. However, there was no justification for the reduction of the ATC instructed
    vertical rate because of a TA. In this geometry no RA would have been triggered.

    Learning points:
    • Pilots: Always comply with vertical rates and headings instructed by ATC. Controllers use them to
    achieve separation. Controllers anticipate delays in reaching the assigned rate and a level off
    manoeuvre and apply some margin when calculating the required rate.
    • Air traffic controllers base their actions on the complete traffic picture to provide safe and
    expeditious flow of aircraft.
    • Controllers: If workload and frequency occupancy permit, provide pilots with traffic information,
    so the reasons for heading/vertical speed instructions are known to flight crews.
    •

    Event 2: Traffic display misjudgement


    A westbound Boeing 737-800 is at FL340 at the top of descent. To
    facilitate its descent the controller instructs the crew to turn left 10°
    and clears them to FL260 with the rate of 2000 ft/min. The vertical
    speed instruction is meant to bring the B737 below a stream of north-
    south traffic several miles away in the adjacent sector while the left
    turn is to provide horizontal separation with an Airbus 330 which is
    climbing to FL370 in the opposite direction. Both aircraft are “locked”
    on headings and expected to pass more than 5 NM apart.

    The B737 starts to descend and as the aircraft get closer the B737 crew
    observe the A330 on their TCAS traffic display and determine they are
    in conflict as the A330 appears to be on their 12 o’clock position. Soon
    after, they get a TA against the A330 and reduce their descent rate to
    200 ft/min. At the time when the TA is issued the aircraft are separated
    by 10.1 NM and 2500 feet. The TA terminates after 16 seconds and
    after another 20 seconds the aircraft pass with the horizontal
    separation of 5.5 NM and vertical separation of 1500 feet.

    Conclusions: The B737 crew reduced the vertical speed contrary to


    the ATC instruction as they determined (based on the TCAS traffic
    display) that the A330 was on a collision course. In fact, the A330 was
    on an almost parallel opposite direction track. Their assessment of the
    A330 position was incorrect as sufficient horizontal spacing with the
    A330 was provided by ATC.

    Learning points:
    • TCAS Traffic Display must not be used for self-separation as it can be misinterpreted. It has limited bearing accuracy (±30°) and
    it is based upon a moving reference. As the trajectory and intentions of other aircraft are not known, avoidance manoeuvres
    based solely on a TA may create a problem or cause a situation to deteriorate.
    • Nominally, TCAS surveillance range is to 30 NM and 10,000 feet; however, in high-density airspace the TCAS surveillance
    range might be reduced to as little as 5 NM to reduce undesired interference with other systems (without compromising the
    collision avoidance capability). Consequently, not all aircraft in the vicinity will necessarily be shown on the traffic display.

    ACAS II Bulletin November 2017


    3
    Event 3: Descent reversed due to traffic below
    A Boeing 787 is maintaining FL360 above an Embraer 190 at FL300. Both aircraft are
    proceeding to the same destination. When the B787 asks for descent it is cleared to
    FL310.

    When the B787 is approaching FL320 at the rate of 3000 ft/min., the crew asks the
    controller about the traffic below. The controller provides traffic information and confirms
    that B787 has been cleared 1000 feet above the aircraft below. The B787 crew confirms
    the clearance to FL310 but at the same time they stop the descent and start to climb until
    the aircraft levels off at FL324.

    Subsequently, the B787 crew reports that the reason for their climb was “information
    about traffic below”. After brief level off, the B787 continues its descent to FL310.

    Conclusions: A post incident analysis showed that the crew started to climb soon after
    receiving a TA against the EMB190 below. As no RA has been issued there was no
    justification for a manoeuvre contrary to ATC instruction.

    Vertical rate reductions prior to level-off


    Most pilots are aware that excessive vertical rates, especially close to their cleared level, may lead to an unwanted RA with an
    aircraft at the adjacent flight level.
    To limit the occurrences of these unwanted RAs, ICAO recommends (see the green box below) a reduction of the vertical rate to
    no more than 1500 ft/min. throughout the last 1000 feet of climb or descent (when the pilot knows of another aircraft at the
    adjacent level) unless otherwise instructed by ATC. A TA does not authorise pilots to deviate from the ATC vertical rate
    instruction. Air traffic controllers use vertical rate instructions to ensure that all aircraft remain separated while traffic is flowing
    efficiently.
    If pilots are unable to comply with the ATC vertical rate instruction for aircraft performance reasons, they should notify ATC as
    soon as possible.

    ICAO Annex 6 (4.4.10):


    Aeroplane operating procedures for rates of climb and descent
    Recommendation.— Unless otherwise specified in an air traffic control instruction, to avoid unnecessary airborne collision
    avoidance system (ACAS II) resolution advisories in aircraft at or approaching adjacent altitudes or flight levels, operators should
    specify procedures by which an aeroplane climbing or descending to an assigned altitude or flight level, especially with an
    autopilot engaged, may do so at a rate less than 8 m/sec or 1 500 ft/min (depending on the instrumentation available)
    throughout the last 300 m (1 000 ft) of climb or descent to the assigned level when the pilot is made aware of another aircraft at
    or approaching an adjacent altitude or flight level.

    Key learning points this issue:


    • Pilots must comply with ATC vertical rate instruction and heading instructions. Controllers use them to provide
    separation from all nearby controlled traffic.
    • Any deviation from ATC instructions can result in a loss of separation. If pilots are unable to comply with the
    instructions, ATC must be informed as soon as possible.
    • Pilots must not respond to TCAS Traffic Advisories. A TA is an indication that an aircraft is in the vicinity and a conflict may
    develop.
    • A deviation from ATC clearance is authorised only in a response to Resolution Advisories. All RAs must be followed
    promptly as indicated.
    • Pilots must not manoeuvre or make self-separation decisions solely based on traffic display indications (due to its
    limited accuracy).
    • If controllers use heading/vertical speed instructions for separation, they should strive to provide traffic
    information, so pilots are aware of the reasons for these instructions. This will help to prevent unexpected manoeuvres.

    © November 2017 - European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation (EUROCONTROL)
    This document is published by EUROCONTROL for information purposes. It may be copied in Contact
    whole or in part provided that EUROCONTROL is mentioned as a source and to the extent Email: acas@eurocontrol.int
    justified by the non-commercial use (not for sale). The information in this document may not be
    modified without prior written permission from EUROCONTROL. The use of this document is at
    user’s sole risk and responsibility. EUROCONTROL expressly disclaims any and all warranties with www.eurocontrol.int/acas
    respect to the document, expressed or implied. Additionally, the disclaimer available under
    www.eurocontrol.int/acas applies to the information contained in this bulletin.

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