Acas Ii Bulletin - Ras With No Loss of Separation: September 2022 - N 28

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ACAS II Bulletin – RAs with no loss of separation

September 2022 | No 28
In the previous issue of the ACAS Bulletin (published
earlier this month), we described an event in which no ICAO Recommendation:
Resolution Advisories had been generated despite a loss Unless otherwise specified in an air traffic control
of ATC separation and aircraft proximity. In the current instruction, to avoid unnecessary airborne collision
ACAS Bulletin, we will discuss an opposite situation, a case avoidance system (ACAS II) resolution advisories in
in which RAs were generated when there was no loss of aircraft at or approaching adjacent altitudes or flight
separation. levels, operators should specify procedures by which
an aeroplane climbing or descending to an assigned
A westbound Embraer 190 (blue aircraft on the diagram altitude or flight level, especially with an autopilot
below) was climbing to FL330 with the rate of 1500 ft/min. engaged, may do so at a rate less than 8 m/sec or 1 500
In the almost opposite direction, a Boeing 747 had left its ft/min (depending on the instrumentation available)
cruising level and was descending to FL340, also at throughout the last 300 m (1 000 ft) of climb or
1500 ft/min. Both crews read back their clearances descent to the assigned level when the pilot is made
correctly, received traffic information and their Selected aware of another aircraft at or approaching an
Flight Level was set correctly, which was verified by the air adjacent altitude or flight level.
traffic controller who had the SFL available on the radar
screen via the Mode S downlink. The aircraft were Source: ICAO Annex 6, part I, 4.4.10
correctly separated and the crews were following ICAO’s
recommendation regarding the vertical rates before level
off.
When the aircraft were approximately 2100 ft apart, Traffic
Advisories were issued for both aircraft. Thirteen seconds
later, the two aircraft simultaneously receive RAs: the
climbing E190 a Descend RA and the descending B747
a Climb RA. At this point, the vertical separation was
1435 ft and horizontal 8 NM head on. Both crews
responded promptly to their RAs. Both RAs weakened to
Level Off after 10 seconds. Aircraft passed each other
25 seconds later separated by almost 1600 ft and RAs
terminated with Clear of Conflict messages.
It is clear that in this case there was no risk of collision and
the ATC separation minima were not going to be violated,
which naturally brings a question – why were the RAs
issued?
It happened because the TCAS II alerting criteria are time- Observing ICAO recommended vertical rates before level
based, not distance-based like ATC separation standards. off (1500 ft/min. in the last 1000 feet if aware of another
TCAS – using a set of altitude depended parameters – will aircraft, unless ATC instructed the aircraft to maintain
issue an RA when it calculates a risk of collision based on a specific vertical rate) will limit the possibility of RAs but
the closing speed and vertical rates. See EUROCONTROL it cannot entirely eliminate it. In the case described here,
ACAS Guide chapter 10 for more information. a relatively small horizontal miss distance (0.2 NM) at the
Closest Point of Approach was a contributing factor in the
An aircraft climbing or descending towards its cleared generation of the RAs. Had the spacing between aircraft
level, may cause the TCAS logic to predict a conflict with at CPA been 2 NM, no RAs would have been issued.
another aircraft even when appropriate ATC instructions
are being correctly followed by each crew. If two aircraft Without any doubt in this scenario, the RAs were
simultaneously approach adjacent flight levels, the operationally unnecessary (nuisance) as they were issued
combined vertical rates make RAs even more likely. This is where there was no risk of collision. It needs to be
because TCAS does not know aircraft intentions; autopilot emphasised that in real time pilots cannot and should not
or flight management system inputs are not taken into assess whether the RAs are in fact operationally required;
account, so TCAS II can remain an independent safety net. it can be done reliably in hindsight only through data
analysis. This is why all RAs – as it was in this case – must
be followed promptly and accurately.

Learning points:

 RAs can be generated before ATC separation minima are violated and even when ATC separation minima will not be
violated.

 RAs must be followed promptly and accurately, even though they may appear operationally unnecessary (unless doing
so would clearly jeopardise the safety of the aircraft).

 Limiting vertical speed to 1500 ft/min. or less in the last 1000 feet before the cleared level (as per ICAO recommendation)
will help to avoid unnecessary RAs. However, any ATC-given vertical speeds must be followed.

Further reading:

 EUROCONTROL ACAS Guide

 EUROCONTROL ACAS Bulletin no. 15 Not so fast

 EUROCONTROL ACAS Bulletin no. 17 “Level off, level off” RA

 A short animated video about a TCAS RA due to high vertical rates

© EUROCONTROL - September 2022


This document is published by EUROCONTROL for information purposes. It may be copied in whole or in part, Contact:
provided that EUROCONTROL is mentioned as the source and it is not used for commercial purposes (i.e. for acas@eurocontrol.int
financial gain). The information in this document may not be modified without prior written permission from
EUROCONTROL.

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