Falkner 2000

West European Politics
ISSN: 0140-2382 (Print) 1743-9655 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fwep20
Policy networks in a multi‐level system:

Convergence towards moderate diversity?
Gerda Falkner
To cite this article: Gerda Falkner (2000) Policy networks in a multi‐level system:
Convergence towards moderate diversity?, West European Politics, 23:4, 94-120, DOI:
10.1080/01402380008425402
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402380008425402
Published online: 03 Dec 2007.
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Policy Networks in a Multi-Level System:
Convergence Towards Moderate Diversity?
GERDA FALKNER
Does the European Union (EU) represent a case of transnational pluralism

which will trickle down through the European multi-level system? Or is it a
'statist pluralist' model, which impinges on both statist and corporatist
national polities? Or does the EU herald a completely new form of
governance, a problem-solving style of co-operation between public and
private actors, which will supersede hierarchy between public and private
actors and competition amongst interest groups in both the supranational
and the national spheres?
There are good arguments to support each of these hypotheses. If this is
the case, there must be an analytical key to open the doors between these
seemingly contradictory scenarios. The argument advanced here is that the
inclusion of the meso level in the analysis - that is, the systematic
examination of policy-specific and sector-specific characteristics in
European governance - will do the trick. In addition, it is necessary to
recognise different types of impact potentials of Euro-level patterns on the
national systems. Based on this analytical differentiation, a long-term effect
of European integration is expected to be 'moderate diversity'. The latter is
characterised by the co-existence of different types of policy networks
within the same political system. While intra-system diversity of
public-private interaction may even increase, this development is likely to
be accompanied by a trend towards inter-system convergence in specific
policy areas, as a consequence of Europeanisation. Since the effect of Euro-
politics is, in most cases, indirect, 'soft' and mediated by national
institutions (in the wider sense), no uniform (sub-)systems of interest
intermediation are likely to emerge, not even in the same policy field and in
the longer term.
The following discussion starts by reviewing the relevant literature and
identifies several analytical shortcomings. Against this background, a new
approach is set out. This new approach stresses, first, meso-level policy
POLICY NETWORKS IN A MULTI-LEVEL SYSTEM 95
networks as the typical settings of public-private interaction in policy-

making and outlines four simple ideal-types to characterise them at both the
EU and the national levels. Second, the approach distinguishes three
different mechanisms of a potential EU impact on national interest
intermediation. The conclusion then formulates some preliminary
hypotheses on future developments.
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND NATIONAL PUBLIC-PRIVATE

RELATIONS: DEFINITIONS, CLASSIFICATIONS AND EXPECTATIONS
VARY
In the EU, one finds quite diverse models of public-private interaction in

the making of public policies. At least at first glance, they may be
distinguished with reference to three classic political science paradigms.
Statism refers to a model in which private interests have no significant role
in public decision-making. In pluralist polities, there are many interest
groups that lobby individually, that is, they express their views in an effort
to influence the politicians who actually take the decisions. In corporatist
systems, a few privileged interest groups - usually the peak associations of
labour and industry - are incorporated in public decision-making as
decisive co-actors. But a closer look reveals that the precise definitions of
these concepts employed in the literature vary a great deal, especially as far
as corporatism and, albeit to a lesser extent, pluralism, are concerned.
Differing Definitions of 'Corporatism' and 'Pluralism'

At least in the academic mainstream, a specific type of interest group
system,1 combined with a particular form of co-operative policy-making,2
has been regarded as the hallmark of corporatism.3 This two-dimensional
definition of corporatism also informs the ideal-types presented below. But
corporatism has also variously been 'defined as an ideology, a variant of
political culture, a type of state, a form of economy, or even as a kind of
society'.4 Even in the most recent writing, for example in accounts of
public-private patterns and European integration, authors do not necessarily
refer to the same animal when they talk about 'corporatism'. Vivien
Schmidt, for instance, defines corporatism as a situation in which private
interests have privileged access to both decision-making and
implementation, whilst pluralism is characterised by a large set of interests
that are involved in decision-making, but have no influence in
implementation, since in this regard a regulatory approach prevails. Statism,
according to Schmidt, is marked by the exclusion of societal interests from
96 EUROPEANISED POLITICS?
decision-making, which are, however, accommodated during the policy

implementation phase.5 Beate Kohler-Koch, by contrast, develops another
definition of corporatism for the macro-level of political systems. Her
typology of 'modes of governance' is based on two categories: 'the
organising principle of political relations' (majority rule versus
consociation); and 'the constitutive logic of a polity' (politics as investment
in a common identity versus reconciliation of competing self-interests). In
her view, corporatist governance captures, first, the pursuit of a common
interest and, second, the search for consensus instead of majority voting.6
For their part, Svein Andersen and Kjell Eliassen have implicitly defined 'a
corporatist structure' as one in which bodies consisting of both interest
organisations and Community institutions are decisive.7
Such a definitional 'mess' is not a novel problem in political science;
after all, the older concept of pluralism, too, has presented its critics with a
moving target.8 In contrast to the previously dominant elite model,
'pluralists' originally assumed widespread, effective, political resources;
multiple centres of power; and optimum policy development through
competing interests. What seems unclear is whether these interests can
merely all make themselves heard at some consultative stage during the
decision-making process or whether all of them possess equal influence on
the decision-makers. Pluralism is typically associated with a clear
separation of state and society, with the state being an arbiter of the
competition amongst interest groups;9 this would seem a strong argument
against the presumption of equal influence for all groups. Nevertheless, the
latter is frequently assumed in contemporary writing that touches pluralist
thought, including scholars writing on European integration. For example,
Elizabeth Bomberg speaks of 'similar access and influence'.10 But when it
comes to detailed empirical studies, the assumption of equal influence for
all lobbies is shown to be highly unrealistic. Hence, the definition of the
pluralist form of policy network, that is, the issue network, discussed below,
does not assume such a characteristic."
Differing definitions are not only problematic for scholarly discourse;
they also make classifications of political systems partly inconsistent with
one another. This problem is aggravated by the lack of a single authoritative
classification of the EU member states as concerns their patterns of interest
politics. Moreover, even where the same classifications are employed,
comparative studies do not always draw the same conclusions.12 Thus,
recent contributions by Europeanists have regarded France, Italy and Spain
as statist polities, while Austria, Germany and the Netherlands are usually
considered corporatist - notwithstanding partly differing definitions.13 No
agreement exists for the case of the UK. Maria Green Cowles speaks of
pluralist government-business relations, while Schmidt takes the UK as a
statist example.14 It is interesting to note that pluralist systems in Europe are
scarcely explicitly discussed, but rather exist as a residual category; instead,
the US is chosen as the textbook example of pluralism, even when a
comparison of political systems with the EU is at stake."
Differing Models and Expectations Concerning the EU

Most of the commentators on Euro-politics and interest intermediation tend
to deduce effects on the national systems from one assumed cross-sectoral
ideal-typical style of EU governance; but their ideal-types and the expected
effects differ. In other words: the few available contributions16 that go
beyond individual case studies usually concentrate, as a first step, on
describing the EU as one particular type of state-society relations. In a
second step, they deduce from this general model of Euro-politics the likely
effects on the member states. The best known of such accounts by Wolfgang
Streeck and Philippe Schmitter - with the telling title 'From National
Corporatism to Transnational Pluralism' - analyses why the EU falls short
of centralised labour-industry-state relations. According to these authors,
the most likely scenario for the EU is 'an American-style pattern of
"disjointed pluralism" or "competitive federalism", organised over no less
than three levels - regions, nation-states, and "Brussels'".17
Not all scholars, however, agree on these specific characteristics
attributed to 'European Community (EC) governance'.18 While Streeck and
Schmitter describe a pluralist style similar to American patterns, Vivien
Schmidt detects important differences to the US model. She considers the
EC to be 'less "pluralistic" in interest group access, given that business is
the interest mainly represented in a majority of policy areas, and it contains
statist elements in its control of the process of interest representation and its
greater insulation from undue influence'.19 She even speaks of 'statist
pluralism' in policy formulation.20 Like Streeck and Schmitter, Schmidt also
infers impacts on national interest politics from her general ideal-type of
EU-level governance.21 Her conclusion is that 'statist polities have had a
harder time adjusting to EU-level policy formulation, a more difficult task
in implementing the policy changes engendered by the EU, and a greater
challenge in adapting their national governance patterns to the new
realities'. Conversely, 'the EU's quasi-pluralist process is in most ways
more charitable to systems characterized by corporatist processes ... because
the "fit" is greater in such areas as societal actors' interest organisation and
access and governing bodies' decision-making culture and adaptability'.22
Schmidt argues that European integration enhances the autonomy of

political leaders in pluralist or even corporatist states, but not in statist
France, where it has 'diminished the overall autonomy of the executive at
the formulation stage, while it has undermined its flexibility at the
implementation stage'.23
To give a further example, Beate Kohler-Koch's ideal-typical EC-style,
'network governance', refers to a quite different animal, characterised by
co-operation among all interested actors, instead of competition, and by
joint learning processes.24 In her account, hierarchy and subordination give
way to an interchange on a more equal footing aimed at joint problem-
solving25 that will spread in the multi-level system. This suggests a much
more co-operative process than self-interested lobbying of many individual
private groups according to the pluralist ideal-type. There are, thus,
divergent accounts of the basic characteristics of EC public-private
relations and, based on them, diverse predictions regarding the effects of
European integration on national interest intermediation.
Existing accounts need not, however, necessarily be contradictory.
Rather, they can be read as useful pieces in a larger jigsaw. Breaking down
the level of analysis to include the meso level - for both the EC/EU and its
member states - might allow one to integrate these analyses, with each
referring to different co-existing types of governance at the EU level and to
specific forms of impact on the national systems.26 The apparent current
confusion stems mainly from two sources. First, the lack of systematic
linkage of research on interest intermediation that points to considerable
meso-level differences in the member states, on the one hand, and in the
field of Euro-politics, on the other. And, second, the insufficient attention
given to the need for an analytical distinction of the different kinds of
potential effects that EU-level patterns may provoke in the member states.
The remainder of this article seeks to fill this gap.
A NEW APPROACH TO STUDYING THE IMPACT OF EUROPEAN

INTEGRATION ON NATIONAL INTEREST INTERMEDIATION
Varying Networks rather than '...isms' throughout the Multi-Level System

The approach developed here acknowledges differentiated governance sub-
systems at both the national and the EU levels. Instead of 'pluralism',
'corporatism' or 'stat/sm', it seems useful to speak about specific policy
networks with particular characteristics. Insights from the governance
literature can, thus, be imported into cross-nationally comparative political
science. The following discussion first summarises existing knowledge on

the importance of the meso level in interest politics at the national and
European levels. It then presents a scheme of ideal-types for both national
and European politics. On that basis, the pressures exerted by European
integration on particular policy networks at the national level can be
established more precisely than hitherto.
The National Level

From the beginning of the corporatism debate in the 1970s, it was evident
that corporatist patterns were much more frequent in some policy areas,
notably in social policy, than in others.27 A multitude of case studies on
patterns of interest intermediation in EU member states quickly uncovered
that even in non-corporatist political systems, corporatist 'arenas' did,
indeed, emerge at the level of industrial sectors, sub-national political
units and/or single policy arenas.28 Since then, changes at the economic
and the political levels have made it even more improbable that within
otherwise increasingly fragmented political systems, corporatism should
still cover all crucial issues of policy-making, as Lehmbruch's ideal-type
assumed.29
Even for the corporatist 'role model' of Austria, a strong trend towards
sectoralisation of interest politics has recently been acknowledged. In fact,
'social partnership' is much less uniformly characterised by interest group
co-decision in public policy-making than has often been assumed. In areas
such as judicial policy, education, research policy, consumer protection,
defence policy and telecommunications, the influence of the Austrian social
partners is, at best, marginal.30 Corporatist patterns are only prominent in a
few core areas, notably social, economic and agricultural policies, and even
there not in all relevant issue areas and, importantly, not in all specific
decision processes.
The Austrian case is by no means exceptional, since sectoralisation of
politics and a shift of industrial relations towards the sectoral level seem to
represent a broader trend.31 Compared to the 'classic' 1970s corporatism,
which was indeed often macro-corporatism with demand-side steering of
the economy, contemporary corporatist arrangements appear significantly
restricted in functional scope, as the policy-making process is broken down
and varies across policy subsystems.32 Nevertheless, meso-level diversity
has so far hardly been reflected in comparisons of the political systems of
the EU member states. Political scientists still tend to label whole countries
as pluralist, corporatist or statist, without referring to the important intra-
state differences identified in the state-specific literature, although single-
country studies now frequently prefer a refined heuristic approach based on

the policy networks typology proposed by British scholars.
The policy networks approach was developed with the explicit intention
to capture the sectoral constellations emerging as a response to the growing
dispersion of resources and capacities for political action among public and
private actors.33 In parallel with the scope of state intervention targets,
decentralisation and fragmentation of the state also increased over time and
were complemented by increased intervention and participation in decision-
making by a growing range of social and political actors. Policy networks
were, thus, characterised as 'integrated hybrid structures of political
governance' with the distinctive capacity for mixing different combinations
of bureaucracy, market, community or corporatist association as integrative
logics.34
While continental authors were more concerned with the characteristics
of 'network governance' in general,35 British political scientists tended to
concentrate on the development of policy network ideal-types. On the basis
of earlier work by authors such as Grant Jordan and Jeremy Richardson,
David Marsh and Rod Rhodes elaborated the dominant typology. They
distinguished closed and stable policy communities from loose and open
issue networks as the two polar ends of a multi-dimensional continuum
('policy network' is thus a generic term encompassing all types).36 The
characteristics of both groups focus on the dimensions of membership,37
integration,38 resources39 and power.40 Marsh and Rhodes stress that the
characteristics form an ideal-type to be compared with actual relationships
between governments and interests, since no policy area is likely to conform
exactly to either list of characteristics.41 These ideal-types cannot explain
politics within networks,42 but they may be heuristically useful, notably for
comparisons of national and EU-level networks that seek to determine the
potential impact of the latter on the former (see below).43
The EU Level
That the emergence of a supranational form of macro-corporatism
comparable to national patterns in the 1970s is unlikely has been underlined
by a number of studies on EC interest politics.44 At the same time, scholars
have increasingly pointed to fragmentation as a typical feature of the EU's
political system. Enormous cross-sectoral differences find a basis in the
European treaties, since the participation of the European Parliament and
the EC's Economic and Social Committee varies, as do voting procedures
in the Council and its subgroups. Such constitutionally fixed differences are,
however, merely the tip of the iceberg, as they have been further refined by
long-standing political practice. For example, different directorates-general

have very distinct styles of interaction with private interests, a fact that has
been highlighted by a new generation of meso-level studies that addresses
the question of EC governance at the area-specific and sector-specific
levels.45 This area-specific character of European integration is unlikely to
change. Treaty reforms continue to deepen constitutional cleavages, and the
large number of different actors from multiple levels could, in practice,
hardly co-operate outside clear functional boundaries, even if any new
central EU authority should ever try to harmonise the patterns of sectoral
governance. The diverse styles of public-private interaction found in
various EC policy networks include statist, pluralist and corporatist
patterns.46 To give just a few examples, private interest governments47 and
quasi-corporatist regimes have been detected in the regulation of
Pharmaceuticals,48 consumer electronics,49 steel production,50 health and
safety at work,51 technical standardisation52 and social policy.53 These
findings indicate that there is a plurality of sector-specific constellations
rather than a pluralist macro-system of Euro-politics.54
This insight has important consequences for the effects of European
integration on national public-private interaction styles. If Europeanisation
does not necessarily imply that a policy is decided according to one
particular pattern (for example, a pluralist one), assumptions about feedback
into national systems must also be adapted. It seems that the impact of Euro-
politics could be much more diverse, that is, differentiated between policy
areas, than has hitherto been expected.
A Typology Connecting Two Strands of Literature

What is needed, therefore, are models of public-private interaction in the
making of public policies that allow for the differentiation between varying
situations in distinct policy areas or economic sectors (for the sake of
stringency,55 the stage of implementation shall be excluded here). At the
same time, however, the well-established distinction between statist,
pluralist and corporatist patterns, which is still frequently used by scholars
working on Euro-politics, should not be discarded.56 Thus, it is suggested
that two strands of literature be combined by incorporating the corporatist
and statist ideal-types with the issue network/policy community
dichotomy.57 Since the catalogue of characteristics elaborated by Marsh and
Rhodes is, in fact, quite complex and may easily result in blurred empirical
types, only two decisive dimensions have been chosen and all other
characteristics mentioned by these authors are treated as empirical matters
to be established on the basis of case studies.58
FIGURE 1
FOUR SIMPLE IDEAL-TYPES FOR THE ANALYSIS OF MESO-LEVEL INTEREST
INTERMEDIATION
Statist Issue Traditional Corporatist

cluster network policy policy
community community
Membership _ Unstable: Rather stable: Extremely

of interest network is open network tends stable:
groups in for diverse to be closed exclusive
the network interests group of
members
Involvement Insignificant: Consultative: Participatory: Decisive:

of interest lobbies do lobbying is joint process of formal co-
groups not exist or common decision-shaping actors
are not heard in the making
of public
policies
The two suggested core dimensions are membership and involvement of

interest groups in the network. These two dimensions must not necessarily
correlate empirically in all cases. However, if a network is stable over time
- in the sense that it usually includes the same actors - the latter will more
easily develop the kind of mutual acquaintance and trust relationships that
favour giving a (co-)decisive role to participants other than state
institutions. Clearly, many issues of interest in the study of public-private
relationships in policy-making are outside the two basic dimensions of this
typology. To give some examples, the number and type of public actors in
the policy network, the number and type of interest groups involved, the
balance of power within these two actor groups, as well as potential state
influence on intra-group politics are not included in the typology itself, but
should be considered in empirical enquiries.
The typology proposed here thus includes four basic ideal-types of
policy networks, grouped along the continua of stability of interest group
membership and of the degree of these groups' involvement in decision-
making (see Figure 1). Accordingly, a statist cluster is a form of policy
network where interest groups either do not exist at all59 or are not paid any
attention, since there is no significant public-private interaction.
Empirically, this might be the rarest form, particularly at the EU level.60 In
an issue network, there is interaction between the state and, typically, a
plurality of societal actors, who may easily join or leave such networks; but
the interest groups' involvement is merely consultative, as the public actors
decide quite independently. Obviously, this form is close to the pluralist
paradigm. The traditional policy community, by contrast, is characterised by

a much more stable network membership. It is not easy, but still possible, for
a new interest group to be admitted. Private groups are incorporated into the
process of decision-shaping, although without actual veto powers and
without being formal co-actors. The qualifier 'traditional' is used to indicate
that this type basically corresponds to how the label policy community has
so far been used in the literature. Only in a corporatist policy community do
interest groups actually come to share state authority. In this extremely
exclusive form of policy network, a typically small number of privileged
groups make public policies with state actors in a co-decisive capacity. As
regards functionally oriented writing on policy networks and European
integration,61 it is important to mention that, in the understanding proposed
here, 'network governance' would apply to traditional policy communities as
well as to corporatist policy communities.62 In both, the participating public
and private actors co-operate in the search for consensual approaches.63
This typology allows us to distinguish between four basic types of policy
networks at all levels of the European multi-layered system and promises to
lead to new insights into the effects of European integration on the member
states. Such a differentiated approach allows, for example, for distinctive
effects of a specific European policy network on the functionally
corresponding but diverging networks in different member states.
Furthermore, this approach could show that a specific actor category, for
example labour, might be disadvantaged by Europeanisation in one policy
field, say transport, but not in another area, such as labour law.
The following section outlines in more detail what such a differentiated
approach suggests for the analysis of the potential impact of specific
European networks on their counterparts (see in particular Figure 2). When
networks of the same kind operate at the member state and EU levels, no
great pressures for change are to be expected. By contrast, an encounter of
adverse types heralds the highest degree of potential64 destabilisation, for
example, when a statist cluster at EU level co-exists with a corporatist
policy community in a member state, or vice versa.
TYPES OF POTENTIAL IMPACT ON NATIONAL INTEREST

INTERMEDIATION
This section, first, further specifies the variegated influence of different EU

decision patterns, as already briefly outlined above. It then considers two
further mechanisms by which European integration may influence national
public-private co-operation.
EU Decision Patterns
As noted above, commentators on the influence of Europeanisation on
national interest intermediation until recently used to describe one typical
form of interest politics for the EC and deduced from that an impact on the
national systems, each of which was, again, assumed to conform to a single
ideal-type. Accordingly, sectoral differences at both the EU and the national
levels tended to be overlooked. The mechanism by which the pattern of
public-private co-operation practised at the EU level affected the member
states did not usually attract much attention; instead, there was an implicit
assumption that the EC style would somehow trickle down into the national
systems over time.
There are at least three different ways in which EU policy networks can
make a difference domestically. First, since some or even many actors - both
public and private -within the national policy network will also participate in
European networks, their experiences 'in Europe' may lead to cognitive,
normative and strategic changes. New ideas about 'best practice', for example
on ways in which to engender consensus amongst actors in policy networks,
can be imported into the domestic environment. Second, different norms
regarding (non-)co-operative governance may be transferred by policy
network members who are active in various arenas. What has been practised
and accepted at the national level may look different if one knows various
cultures and their norms. Finally, strategic alliances between specific actors or
actor categories formed at the European level may have feedback effects in
the national environment. In all three cases, the time dimension is important,
since very short-term effects seem rather improbable.
In any case, if one acknowledges that EU-level public-private
interaction may be variegated, the repercussions of EC decision patterns in
the domestic context must be highly area-specific. An issue network at the
EU level will tend to trigger different reactions at the national level than, for
example, a corporatist policy community. Participation in an EC network of
the former type might encourage some interest groups to show lobbyist
behaviour also 'at home', at the expense of interest aggregation with other
actors. If at the EU level a corporatist policy community exists, national
social partnerships in the same field should have comparatively less to fear.
In Figure 2, a 'tendency towards lobbying' combines pressures to open the
network up for more diverse interests and to pay some attention to their
lobbying efforts. The 'tendency towards stability and involvement' stands
for the pressure to have more stable membership of interest groups in the
network and to give them a more decisive say in policy-making.
FIGURE 2
DIRECTION OF DOMESTIC IMPACT OF EC DECISION PATTERNS
Specific EC Decision Patterns
Statist Issue Traditional Corporatist

cluster network policy policy
community community
Statist confirmation tendency tendency towards tendency towards

J2 cluster and potentially towards stability and stability and
reinforcement lobbying involvement involvement
Z Issue tendency confirmation tendency towards tendency towards

u" network towards less and potentially stability and stability and
1
g Traditional
lobbying
tendency
reinforcement involvement
tendency towards confirmation

involvements
tendency towards
1 towards less less stability and potentially stability and
stability and and involvement reinforcement involvement
Z community involvement (example 2)
a
•a
tendency tendency towards tendency towards confirmation
c« Corporatist
towards less less stability less stability and and potentially
policy
stability and and involvement involvement reinforcement
community
involvement (example 1)
Based on the assumption that various 'cultures' of EU-level decision-

making can trickle down, Figure 2 suggests that corporatist patterns will
provoke effects that are quite different from those of a statist or pluralist
field of EU activity (if changes take place at all).65 To start with the left
column, a statist cluster66 will tend to confirm or even reinforce another
statist cluster at the national level. For example, in countries where
independent central banks have existed for a long time already, the role of
private interests in this field will not be hampered by a similar style at the
European level.67 If a statist cluster meets an issue network, a traditional
policy community or a corporatist policy community in a member state, the
potential effect should be to the detriment of the network stability and
relevance of involvement of private interests. A pluralist68 EC issue
network, in turn,69 will tend to promote more lobbying by interest groups in
a national statist cluster and will tend to reinforce another issue network.
When a member state features a traditional policy community in the field, a
possible impact will be in the direction of rather less stable and decisive
involvement of private interests. National corporatist policy communities,
too, will be pushed towards less stable public-private co-decision by an EC
issue network. If we pursue this logic, a traditional EC policy community (as

seems to exist in the automobile sector)70 will tend to influence both national
statist constellations and issue networks in the direction of increased
participation of societal actors. Only the groups in national corporatist
policy communities are likely to experience an impact that is detrimental to
their stable membership and co-decisive role. Finally, a corporatist policy
community (such as in EC social policy)71 can be expected to increase the
chances for stability in the network and for co-decision of interest groups in
national statist clusters, issue networks and policy communities.
Empirical research on Austrian EU-adaptation supports such an
approach. A recent study has revealed that corporatist patterns in the core
area of Austrian social partnership, that is, social policy and particularly
labour law,72 have not been significantly altered by EU membership.73 This
fits the above hypothesis neatly, since in the aftermath of the Maastricht
Treaty a corporatist policy community was established in the realm of EU
social policy, too.74 By contrast, environmental policy in Austria is not
regulated in a 'social partnership' pattern, but managed in a traditional
policy community without a crucial role for labour and industry.75 At the EU
level, an issue network exists in the environmental field, as described in
detail by Bomberg.76 Insofar as a shift in the Austrian network can already
be discerned,77 it is in the direction of more influence for the involved
ministries, but rather less for the interest groups, notably for the
environmentalists. These social and environmental policy cases in Austria
appear as examples numbered 1 and 2 in Figure 2.
These brief remarks suggest that breaking down European policy-
making patterns in meso-level constellations results in more realistic
assumptions about their possible effects on equally variegated national
public-private networks. Such expectations need to be tested through
comparative empirical studies with research designs that explicitly include
policy-specific and sector-specific patterns.78
While potential effects on the member states stemming from EU
decision patterns have already been discussed by various authors, very little
attention has so far been paid to the fact that the EU may also influence
national styles in a more direct manner.
Positive Integration Measures

During the past decades, the EU member states have been confronted with
an increasingly high incidence of European legislation, which affects, to
varying degrees, almost all issue areas. It is not only policies that may be
transmitted in this way, but also public-private interaction patterns. Partly
as a side-effect of some policy goal, but sometimes intentionally, the EU

fairly frequently impinges on national interest intermediation through acts
of secondary law. Some examples from social policy reveal efforts to
encourage corporatist patterns at the national level. In some cases,
derogations from common EC standards need to be negotiated or at least
discussed with the social partners in the member state concerned. Thus, the
Working Time Directive allows for derogations 'by way of collective
agreements or agreements concluded between the two sides of industry at
the appropriate collective level' (OJ 93/L 307/18, Art. 17.3). The Directive
on the posting of workers in the framework of the free provision of services
(OJ 97/L 18/1, Art. 3.3) states that 'Member States may, after consulting
employers and labour, in accordance with the traditions and practices of
each Member State, decide' not to grant equal minimum pay to posted
workers during the first month of their stay abroad. This means that even a
national government that has no interest at all in co-operating with labour
and industry on labour law matters must now consult these societal actors if
it wants to derogate from specific EC norms.
Contacts between public and private national actors in all member states
are also prompted by several recent EC social Directives, which prescribe
that in the national reports to the Commission on the practical
implementation of the respective Directive, the viewpoints 'of the two sides
of industry' must be indicated (see, for example, Art. 17.4 Directive on the
protection of young people at work, OJ 94/L 216/12). This is also common
practice in the field of health and safety at work (see, for example, rules
concerning chemical agents at work). In other cases, consultation or co-
decision of interest groups is not directly prescribed as a condition for
certain national actions or required to complete a national report on
implementation, but may still be encouraged and facilitated. For example,
the recent parental leave (OJ 98/L 14/9) and part-time work Directives (OJ
96/L 145/4) allow for one additional year of implementation delay if the EC
provisions are implemented by a collective agreement instead of legislation.
The recent part-time rules, which stem from a Euro-agreement between the
major interest groups of labour and employers that was incorporated in the
relevant Council Directive, also provide that 'Member States, following
consultations with the social partners in accordance with national law or
practice, should ... review obstacles ... which may limit the opportunities for
part-time work and ... eliminate them' (clause 5, emphasis added).79 The EC
standards, furthermore, do 'not prejudice the right of the social partners to
conclude, at the appropriate level ... agreements adapting and/or
complementing the provisions of this Agreement in a manner which will
take account of the specific needs of the social partners concerned' (clause
6.3). Finally, the provisions on implementation provide that 'Member States
and/or social partners may maintain or introduce more favourable
provisions' (clause 6.1 of part-time Agreement). Very similar passages are
to be found in the parental leave Directive and Agreement.
In environmental policy, too, several recent Directives could impact on
national public-private interaction, since they encourage more open
structures vis-a-vis private groups. 'The plurality of actors associated with
the different instruments will result in new complexity in territorial and
public-private terms, counter-acting old hierarchical chains of command'.80
However, such patterns are encouraged only in some Directives, while
others might have the opposite effect, so that it is 'doubtful whether EC
governance in the field of environmental policy is sufficiently
comprehensive, coherent and stable to trigger a decisive and uniform
response'.81 This points to the fact that potential 'positive integration
effects' as outlined here may well be contradictory. Only if the aggregate
impetus from the various EC Directives in a specific policy area exceeds
'zero' can such influence be expected to produce significant adaptational
pressure in a national policy network. But systematic and comparative
empirical studies on the influences on public-private co-operation in the
member states exerted by positive integration measures are still missing.
Competence Transfers
The third influence on the member states' public-private relations arising
from European integration results from shifts of various competences to the
EU level. The overall realm of national action capacity decreases parallel to
each issue area that is covered by EU policy. This 'size' effect on the
national interest intermediation systems exists regardless of any specific
actor constellation in the member state. However, it is possible that not all
public-private interaction patterns are affected by this development to the
same extent. More co-operative policy network types, which rely on log-
rolling and package-dealing, will be hampered, while types that know only
individual lobbying by diverse groups according to each new issue at stake
may not be affected. In particular, it seems reasonable to expect that cross-
sectoral corporatist systems, that is, macro-corporatism, would be affected
most adversely, since the number of issue areas available for corporatist
exchange between the state and national interest groups decreases. This line
of argument suggests that the impact of competence transfers would by now
impede old-style national macro-corporatism in the member states anyway,
even if sectoral differentiation had not already changed national patterns. At
the macro level, Streeck and Schmitter were thus certainly right in pointing
out that 'corporatism as a national-level accord between encompassingly
organized socio-economic classes and the state, by which an entire
economy is comprehensively governed, would seem to be a matter of the
past', not least due to European integration.82 However, this diagnosis is
only part of the story about effects of Europeanisation on national interest
intermediation - since at least at the meso level, EC decision patterns and
positive integration measures might also provoke countervailing impulses.
Even where 'only' negative integration83 prevails in Euro-policies - for
example, where positive integration measures are blocked in the Council -
there may be an effect on national interest politics, as the neo-liberal options
chosen at the EU level may pose restraints. In such cases, national networks
in the relevant area are restricted in their policy choices. De facto, this
affects the opportunity structure for national actors,84 often at the expense of
trade unions or consumer groups with an interest in state interventions that
are no longer legal under EC law. As Streeck and Schmitter pointed out,
mutual recognition in the internal market and the resulting inter-regime
competition tended to devalue the power resources and political strength of
organised labour.85 This indicates that there are also effects of European
integration on national policy networks that originate less in the lost
competences at the national level than in the specific kind of policies
decided at the supranational level. Once again, however, a meso-level
approach may produce new insights, because a more integrated and co-
operative public-private network at the national level may counterbalance
such influences to some extent, while issue networks will hardly be able to
do so.
The Role of Mediating Factors

As has already been mentioned, the present discussion centres on influences
that European integration might exert on national interest intermediation.
This is to say that the Euro-level side of the coin is the primary topic here,
notwithstanding the fact that the national processes of adaptation (or non-
adaptation) are another fascinating issue, which is not necessarily less
significant in terms of the final result of the overall process.86 To
demonstrate the potentially crucial role of national mediation of impacts,
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) may serve as a case in point. The
effects of the Maastricht convergence criteria for EMU membership on
public-private relations in various member states could scarcely have been
more divergent. They allowed (or forced) several governments to reform
their national budgets by cutting public spending at a speed and in a form
that would otherwise not have been acceptable to either employer or labour
associations, most notably in Austria.87 Euro-policies may thus increase the
opportunities for governments to 'cut slack' and to gain leverage vis-a-vis
the major national private players. At the same time, however, this EC
policy reinforced public-private co-operation in other member states, where
issue-specific88 and fixed-term tripartite pacts - usually labelled 'social
pacts' - were concluded with a view to reaching the convergence criteria.89
Although EMU certainly constitutes a very special case of supranational
steering of the national economies and polities, and EU influences on
national interest intermediation in traditional policy areas can be expected
to be somewhat less contingent, this example nevertheless indicates that
mitigation of EU impulses in the national networks does play a major role
in the field of interest intermediation.
Here, only a few hypotheses can be put forward concerning the potential
transmission mechanisms and the forms of policy networks as outlined
above. They suggest asking the following questions in future empirical
research:
• Do more direct types of EC influence favour effects on the national

level? It seems that a transfer of competences will often matter,
regardless of national action or reaction. For example, a positive
integration measure that allows a member state a derogation from EC
law only under the condition of approval by labour and industry will
involve national action, but still appears more likely to show effects than
a mere divergence between EU and national decision patterns would.
The latter has been much discussed in the existing literature, although it
seems, in fact, the least direct of the mechanisms described here.
• Is the impact of European integration weaker and slower if the specific
national policy network is more ingrained, as institutionalist
assumptions suggest?
• Do concurring competences within the same policy field promote
learning and adaptation processes? The impact of EU decision patterns,
when they are diverging from the relevant national ones, could in such
cases matter comparatively more, since there is more contact and, hence,
potential exchange between the two levels. As long as there is no full
Europeanisation, a higher EU share of activity in a policy field could
make the supranational network style comparatively more influential.
• Finally, are the more demanding forms of public-private co-operation
patterns in greater danger of being called into question by challenges
from outside? The fact that corporatist patterns seem more difficult to
establish than pluralist competition of societal actors suggests that they

might, in principle, be rather more vulnerable in the multi-level system.90
Statist clusters, too, might be less stable than issue networks or
traditional policy communities, since excluding all private interests from
the policy arena can easily lead to de-legitimisation of the output. It
might also prompt protest - in particular if more co-operative styles of
governance are well known from other venues in the multi-level system.
Moreover, the EU seems, in principle, rather open to lobbying,91 so
adaptive pressure from EC-level statist clusters might be less frequent
than from the more co-operative forms of governance.
CONCLUSION: CONVERGING TOWARDS 'MODERATE DIVERSITY'?

This study has advocated the inclusion of the meso level of policy networks
into the analysis of interest intermediation at both the European and the
national levels, and, in particular, with a view to determining possible
influences of the former on the latter. If the governance literature is right in
highlighting the differentiation of policy subsystems, comparative political
science could profit from adopting such a differentiated approach, which
promises more realistic assumptions concerning the impact of EC patterns
of public-private interaction on national policy networks. Some preliminary
results of empirical research presented above seem to bear out this point
(see Figure 2). While only empirical enquiries can authoritatively confirm
how much policy-specific patterns do matter in terms of domestic
Europeanisation, research designs that exclude the meso level cannot
address this question at all.
The second main argument advanced here is that there is more than one
type of EU impact on national interest intermediation. Thus far, the most
frequently discussed effect has been the 'trickling down' of EC decision
patterns. By contrast, the more direct impact of interest intermediation
patterns imposed - in one way or another - on the member states through
EC law have scarcely been studied as a relevant influence. Finally, the
effects of the transfer of various competences to the EU level must also be
taken into account. All three mechanisms have to be considered when it
comes to assessing the effect of Europeanisation on national interest
intermediation. At times, they may counteract each other.
One point that could not be discussed in detail in the present context is
that European integration influences national public-private interaction
patterns mostly in an indirect manner.92 This points to the crucial role of
mediating factors at the national or sectoral levels. These factors need to be
established through empirical studies, but it is possible to generate some
general assumptions from the conceptual approach suggested here, in the
form of preliminary hypotheses on future trends in European interest
intermediation.
First, a meso-level approach suggests that inter-sectoral diversity in
private-public interaction during the policy process will persist or even
increase. As outlined above, both the national and the European layers of
the multi-level system are characterised by highly diverse styles of interest
intermediation at the meso level. Since the EC is a particularly strongly
sectoralised system, inter-sectoral differences in patterns of public-private
interaction could be expected to increase even in unitary states.93 As policy
networks have recently been described as relevant meso-level constellations
in the European states anyway, the EU will probably reinforce an already
existing trend towards sectoral differentiation in the member states.
Second, the inter-systemic diversity - both amongst member states and
between the EU and the member states - of policy networks might in the
future be rather more moderate. As the EC patterns will influence all
national systems in the same direction, the effect over time should be some
convergence towards the EC model, since the latter is the point of reference
for all national networks. In the words of Adrienne Heritier et al., one may
think of path-dependent corridors of adaptation that are open to each of the
national policy networks.94 Since all national networks are, however,
influenced by the same Euro-level pattern existing in the relevant field, the
result should be adaptation towards more similarity. Some divergence will
persist, but probably in a more moderated form than before the EU gained
influence on national policy networks.
In other words, one may expect systematic empirical studies to reveal a
trend towards cross-sectorally divergent styles of public-private interaction
with nevertheless rather more convergence than before between the
geographic layers of the European Union and amongst the member states.
We could thus be heading towards more 'uniform pluriformism' in the
European multi-level system.
NOTES
Previous versions of this paper were presented at two West European Politics Special Issue
Conferences, Oxford, Nuffield College, 1998 and 1999; at the 6th Biennial International
Conference of the European Community Studies Association, USA, Pittsburgh, 2-5 June 1999;
at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 2-5 Sept. 1999; and at the
European Forum of the European University Institute, Florence. Thanks to the commentators
(Hussein Kassim, Christopher Allen, J. Nicholas Ziegler) and participants for their feedback.
1. 'Corporatism can be defined as a system of interest representation in which the constituent

units are organized into a limited number of singular, compulsory, non-competitive,
hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, recognized or licensed (if
not created) by the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their
respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders
and articulation of demands and supports'. See P.C. Schmitter, 'Still the Century of
Corporatism?', Review of Politics 35 (1974), p.13.
2. Lehmbruch contrasted 'corporatist' co-operation of organisations and public authorities, and
'pluralist' pressure politics. See G. Lehmbruch, 'Introduction: Neo-Corporatism in
Comparative Perspective', in G. Lehmbruch and P.C. Schmitter (eds.), Patterns of
Corporatist Policy-Making (London and Beverly Hills, CA: Sage 1982), p.8 with further
references. Along these lines, a corporatist policy-making process was also described as 'a
mode of policy formation in which formally designated interest associations are incorporated
within the process of authoritative decision-making and implementation. As such they are
officially recognised by the state not merely as interest intermediaries but as co-responsible
"partners" in governance and social guidance', See P.C. Schmitter, 'Interest Intermediation
and Regime Governability in Contemporary Western Europe and North America', in S.
Berger (ed.), Organising Interests in Western Europe: Pluralism, Corporatism, and the
Transformation of Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1981), p.295.
3. For example, A. Cawson, 'Introduction: Varieties of Corporatism: The Importance of the
Meso-level Interest Intermediation', in A. Cawson (ed.), Organized Interests and the State.
Studies in Meso-Corporatism (London: Sage 1985), p.8.
4. P.C. Schmitter, 'Neo-corporatism and the Consolidation of Neo-democracy' (Paper
presented at the 8th International Conference on Socio-Economics, Geneva, 12-14 July
1996), p.3. Until today, the comparative industrial relations literature tends to speak about
'corporatism' (without further specification) if in a state, labour markets and industrial
relations are managed by co-operative governance of industry, unions and (partly) the state,
even if other policy areas in the same political system may follow completely different
patterns. In political science, Scandinavian scholars take the same approach because in their
countries, centralised wage bargaining is empirically the major incident of corporatist
patterns. See F. Traxler, 'Farewell to Labour Market Associations? Organized versus
Disorganized Decentralization as a Map for Industrial Relations', in C. Crouch and F. Traxler
(eds.), Organized Industrial Relations: What Future? (Aldershot: Avebury 1995), p.5, and F.
Karlhofer and E. Tálos, Sozialpartnerschaft und EU. Integrationsdynamik und
Handlungsrahmen der österreichischen Sozialpartnerschaft (Vienna: Signum 1996), p.245.
Economists tend to speak about corporatism as a particular style of economic policy and the
conceptual incongruencies become even more obvious if we look at the extreme diversity of
specific indicators for, and detailed measurements of, corporatism. See H. Keman and P.
Pennings, 'Managing Political and Societal Conflict in Democracies: Do Consensus and
Corporatism Matter?', British Journal of Political Science 25 (1995), pp.271-81.
5. V.A. Schmidt, 'Loosening the Ties that Bind: The Impact of European Integration on French
Government and its Relationship to Business', Journal of Common Market Studies 34
(1996), pp.224-54; and V.A. Schmidt, 'European Integration and Democracy: The
Differences among Member States', Journal for European Public Policy 4 (1997),
pp.128-44.
6. B. Kohler-Koch, 'The Evolution and Transformation of European Governance', in B.
Kohler-Koch and R. Eising (eds.), The Transformation of Governance in the European
Union (London: Routledge 1999), pp.26ff.
7. S.S. Andersen and K.A. Eliassen, 'European Community Lobbying', European Journal of
Political Research 20 (1991), pp.l73ff.
8. W. Grant, 'Introduction', in W. Grant (ed.), The Political Economy of Corporatism (London:
Macmillan 1985), p.19. 'Since pluralism is so vague a set of ideas it is difficult to understand
how opponents can have rejected it with such confidence', see G. Jordan, 'The Pluralism of
Pluralism: An Anti-theory?', Political Studies 39 (1990), p.286. German authors may use a
very different concept; 'pluralism' has a less specific meaning in German, since it was used
to distinguish liberal societies from monist ones before the international debate on
corporatism started in 1974 - see G. Lehmbruch, 'Der Beitrag der Korporatismusforschung

zur Entwicklung der Steuerungstheorie', Politische Vterteljahresschrift 37 (1996), p.736.
9. A. Cawson, 'Pluralism, Corporatism and the Role of the State', Government and Opposition
13 (1978), pp.182ff. The 'vectors of influence' were perceived to run only in one direction,
i.e. from private lobbies to state agencies. See G. Lehmbruch, 'Wandlungen der
Interessenpolitik im liberalen Korporatismus', in U. von Alemann and R.G. Heinze (eds.),
Verbande und Staat. Vom Pluralismus zum Korporatismus. Analysen, Positionen, Dokumente
(Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag 1979), pp.51ff. No co-operation in the narrow sense was
assumed, i.e. no multi-directional relations. However, it is very difficult to draw the boundary
between 'negative co-ordination' (i.e. an implicit mutual adaptation of the competing actors
which is included in the pluralist pattern) on the one hand, and the active mobilisation of
consensus (i.e. direct negotiations which are a typical feature of corporatism), on the other.
See R. Czada, 'Konjunkturen des Korporatismus: Zur Geschichte eines Paradigmenwechsels
in der Verbändeforschung', in W. Streeck (ed.), Staat und Verbande (Westdeutscher Verlag
1994), p.53, and F. van Waarden, 'Dimensions and Types of Policy Networks', European
Journal of Political Research 21 (1992), p.34.
10. E. Bomberg, 'Issue Networks and the Environment: Explaining European Union
Environmental Policy', in D. Marsh (ed.), Comparing Policy Networks (Buckingham and
Philadelphia: Open University Press 1998), p.183. Also see D. Marsh, 'The Utility and
Future of Policy Network Aalysis', in ibid., p.189, and, implicitly, Schmidt, 'European
Integration and Democracy', p.134.
11. Equal or unequal influence are here considered a matter of empirical fact, not of definition.
12. For various rankings of countries in terms of 'corporatism' see, for example, Schmitter,
'Interest Intermediation and Regime Governability'; G. Lehmbruch, 'Sozialpartnerschaft in
der vergleichenden Politikforschung', in P. Gerlich, E. Grande and W.C. Müller (eds.),
Sozialpartnerschaft in der Krise (Vienna: Böhlau 1985); and M.M. Crepaz and A. Lijphart,
'Linking and Integrating Corporatism and Consensus Democracy: Theory, Concepts and
Evidence', British Journal of Political Science 25 (1995), pp.281-8; and the country studies
in Lehmbruch and Schmitter (eds.), Patterns of Corporatist Policy-Making; P.C. Schmitter
and G. Lehmbruch (eds.). Trends Towards Corporatist Intermediation (Beverly Hills and
London: Sage 1979); and R. Kleinfeld and W. Luthardt (eds.), Westliche Demokratien und
Interessenvermittlung (Marburg: Schüren 1993).
13. V.A. Schmidt, 'National Patterns of Governance under Siege: The Impact of European
Integration', in Kohler-Koch and Eising (eds.), The Transformation of Governance in the
European Union, pp.155-71; W. Streeck and P.C. Schmitter, 'From National Corporatism to
Transnational Pluralism: Organized Interests in the Single European Market', in V. Eichener
and H. Voelzkow (eds.), Europäische Integration und verbandliche Interessenvermittlung
(Marburg: Metropolis 1994), pp.171-215; and A. Lenschow, 'Transformation in European
Environmental Governance', in Kohler-Koch and Eising (eds.), The Transformation of
Governance in the European Union, pp.39-59.
14. See M. Green Cowles, 'The TABD and Domestic Business-Government Relations:
Challenge and Opportunity' (Paper presented at the conference on Europeanization and
Domestic Change, Florence, 19-20 June 1998); and Schmidt, 'National Patterns of
Governance under Siege', p.156.
15. For example, Schmidt, 'European Integration and Democracy', p.135.
16. The impact of European integration on interest intermediation in the member states has so
far hardly been discussed in detail and broad-based comparative empirical studies on the
practical effects in the member states are missing. There are at least a few recent exceptions
offering interesting insights on the sectoral and case study level. For example, Maria Green
Cowles looks at the 'Transatlantic Business Dialogue' and its impact on national
government-business relations in France, Germany and the UK. See Green Cowles, 'The
TABD and Domestic Business-Government Relations'. Andrea Lenschow discusses the
implementation of EC environmental policy acts and their impact on state-society relations
in Germany, the Netherlands, Spain and the UK. See Lenschow, 'Transformation in
European Environmental Governance'. A study of the implementation of four EC-
environmental Directives in Britain and Germany also allows some insights into
private-public relations, see C. Knill and A. Lenschow, 'Adjusting to EU Regulatory Policy:

Change and Persistence of Domestic Administrations' (Paper presented at the conference on
Europeanization and Domestic Change, Florence, 19-20 June 1998).
17. Streeck and Schmitter, 'From National Corporatism to Transnational Pluralism, p.215.
18. I choose the term EC - and not EU - in this section, since EU governance is often used to
describe the entire multi-level system, not only the EU as a specific supra-national political
system. As the debate on patterns of governance focuses on EC policy fields and usually
neglects the second and third EU pillars with their very special style, using EC here is also
correct in legal terms. The typology presented below can nevertheless be applied to the
second and third pillars, too.
19. Schmidt, 'European Integration and Democracy', p.134.
20. Ibid., p.138.
21. Schmidt, 'National Patterns of Governance under Siege'; and Schmidt, 'Loosening the Ties
that Bind'.
22. Schmid, 'National Patterns of Governance under Siege', p.157.
23. Schmidt, 'Loosening the Ties that Bind', p.249.
24. B. Kohler-Koch, 'Catching up with Change: The Transformation of Governance in the
European Union', Journal of European Public Policy 3 (1996), pp.359-80.
25. Kohler-Koch, 'The Evolution and Transformation of European Governance', p.32.
26. In terms of our discussion of the impact of Europeanisation on national interest politics, it is
important to note that much of the literature does not systematically distinguish changes in
the national policy process due to a trickling down of impacts from the EU level, on the one
hand, and the participation of national actors in the European decision process, on the other.
27. '(I)n point of fact, all the interest intermediation systems of Western Europe are "mixed".
They may be predominantly of one type, but different sectors and subsectors, classes and
class factions, regions and subregions are likely to be operating simultaneously according to
different principles and procedures'. See P.C. Schmitter, 'Modes of Interest Intermediation
and Models of Societal Change in Western Europe', in Schmitter and Lehmbruch (eds.),
Trends Towards Corporatist Intermediation, p.70. Also see Lehmbruch, 'Introduction: Neo-
Corporatism in Comparative Perspective', p.27.
28. For example, see the contributions in Berger (ed.), Organising Interests in Western Europe;
Cawson, 'Introduction: Varieties of Corporatism'; Grant, 'Introduction'; W. Streeck and P.C.
Schmitter (eds.), Private Interest Government. Beyond Market and State (London: Sage 1985).
29. Lehmbruch, 'Sozialpartnerschaft in der vergleichenden Politikforschung', p.94.
30. B. Kittel and E. Tálos, 'Interessenvermittlung und politischer Entscheidungsprozeß:
Sozialpartnerschaft in den 1990er Jahren', in F. Karlhofer and E. Talos (eds.), Zukunft der
Sozialpartnerschaft: Veränderungsdynamik und Reformbedarf (Wien: Signum 1999),
pp.118ff. Also see W.C. Müller, 'Die Rolle der Parteien bei der Entstehung und Entwicklung
der Sozialpartnerschaft', in P. Gerlich, E. Grande and W.C. Müller (eds.),
Sozialpartnerschaft in der Krise (Vienna: Böhlau 1985), p.220; E. Tálos, 'Entwicklung,
Kontinuitat und Wandel der Sozialpartnerschaft', in E. Tálos (ed.), Sozialpartnerschaft:
Kontinuität und Wandel eines Modells (Vienna: Verlag für Gesellschaftskritik 1993), p.27; E.
Tálos, K. Leichsenring and E. Zeiner, 'Verbände und politischer Entscheidungsgrozeß - am
Beispiel der Sozial- und Umweltpolitik', in Tálos (ed.), Sozialpartnerschaft; and F. Traxler,
'Sozialpartnerschaft am Scheideweg: Zwischen korporatistischer Kontinuität und
neoliberalem Umbruch', Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft 22 (1996), p.19.
31. F. Karlhofer and H. Sickinger, 'Korporatismus und Sozialpakte im europäischen Vergleich',
in Karlhofer and Talos (eds.), Zukunft der Sozialpartnerschaft, p.242.
32. For example, M.M. Atkinson and W.D. Coleman, 'Strong States and Weak States: Sectoral
Policy Networks in Advanced Capitalist Economies', British Journal of Political Science 19
(1989), p. 157. The fact that the sectoral economies, in turn, are increasingly internationalised
represents one of several challenges to cross-sectoral corporatist regimes. See J.R.
Hollingsworth and W. Streeck, 'Countries and Sectors: Concluding Remarks of
Performance, Convergence, and Competitiveness', in J.R. Hollingsworth, P.C. Schmitter and
W. Streeck (eds.), Governing Capitalist Economies - Performance and Control of Economic
Sectors (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1994), p.289.
33. P. Kenis and V. Schneider, 'Policy Networks and Policy Analysis: Scrutinizing a New
Analytical Toolbox', in B. Marin and R. Mayntz (eds.), Policy Networks. Empirical Evidence
and Theoretical Considerations (Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag & Westview Press
1991), p.28.
34. Ibid., p.42; and R. Mayntz, 'Policy-Netzwerke und die Logik von Verhandlungssystemen',
in A. Héritier (ed.), Policy-Analyse. Kritik und Neuorientierung (Opladen: Westdeutscher
Verlag 1993), pp.44ff.
35. For example, see Marin and Mayntz (eds.), Policy Networks; J. Kooiman, 'Findings,
Speculations and Recommendations', in J. Kooiman (ed.), Modern Governance. New
Government-Society Interactions (London: Sage 1993), pp.249-62; F.W. Scharpf (ed.),
Games in Hierarchies and Networks (Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag & Westview Press
1993); more recently see T. König, 'Modeling Policy Networks', Journal of Theoretical
Politics (Special Issue) 10/4 (1998), pp.387-8. However, a common conceptual approach to
'policy networks' was not developed: 'By definition of what makes a theoretical "fashion",
this term is attributed great analytical promise by its proponents, whereas critical
commentators argue that its meaning is still vague and that the perspective it implies has not
yet matured into anything like a coherent (middle range) theory. What they agree on is their
subject of concern, discourse and dispute, and that is sufficient to establish "policy networks"
on the theoretical agenda of contemporary social science, without necessarily guaranteeing
the declared value. On the contrary, a speculative oversupply of networking terminology may
inflate its explanatory power so that some form of intellectual control over the conceptual
currency in circulation, both its precise designations and its amount of diffusion, becomes
inevitably a clearance process within the profession.' See B. Marin and R. Mayntz,
'Introduction: Studying Policy Networks', in Marin and Mayntz (eds.), Policy Networks,
p.11.
36. A.G. Jordan and J.J. Richardson, 'Policy Communities: The British and European Policy
Style', Policy Studies Journal 11 (1983), p.603. Also see D. Marsh and R.A.W. Rhodes
(eds.), Policy Networks in British Government (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1992); and R.A.W.
Rhodes and D. Marsh, 'New Directions in the Study of Policy Networks', European Journal
of Political Research 21 (1992), p.181.
37. A policy community has a very limited number of participants and some groups are
consciously excluded, while issue networks comprise large numbers of participants;
concerning the type of interest, in a policy community 'economic and/or professional
interests dominate', while an issue network encompasses a 'range of affected interests'.
38. There are three sub-dimensions: frequency of interaction (in policy communities, there is
'frequent, high-quality, interaction of all groups on all matters related to policy issue',
whereas in issue networks contacts fluctuate in frequency and intensity); continuity (changes
from 'membership, values and outcomes persistent over time' to 'access fluctuates
significantly'); and the consensus variable that reaches from 'all participants share basic
values and accept the legitimacy of the outcome' to 'a measure of agreement exists but
conflict is ever present'.
39. Two sub-dimensions, i.e. distribution within network and distribution within participating
organisations: a policy community is characterised by all participants having resources and
the basic relationship being an exchange relationship in which leaders can deliver members;
in an issue network, by contrast, some participants may have resources, but they are limited
and the basic relationship is consultative, plus there is varied and variable distribution and
capacity to regulate members.
40. Rhodes' and Marsh's policy community is characterised by the somewhat contradictory
statement 'There is a balance of power between the members. Although one group may
dominate, it must be a positive sum game if community is to persist'. By contrast, an issue
network comprises 'unequal powers, reflects unequal resources and unequal access. It is a
zero-sum game'. See Rhodes and Marsh, 'New Directions in the Study of Policy Networks',
p.187.
41. Ibid., p.187.
42. Ideal-types never 'explain' anything. One may certainly add on to the original Marsh/Rhodes
approach hypotheses from theoretical concepts in political science (for example
structuralism) and thus change it; see suggestions in D. Marsh, 'The Utility and Future of
Policy Network Analysis', in Marsh (ed.), Comparing Policy Networks, p.185. When adding
different potential explanatory variables, however, there is a danger one will end up with
only an over-complex inventory for empirical research.
43. Without doubt, there is also some impact of the national on the European level but this is
beyond the scope of this article.
44. The mainstream of scholarly writing on interest politics at the European level describes
specific groups and their development without asking explicitly whether the pattern of
interest politics is corporatist or pluralist. The focus tends to be on the number of groups in
a given field and the date of their foundation as well as on specifics of group membership
and reasons for joining Euro-groups.
45. J. Greenwood, J.R. Grote and K. Ronit (eds.), Organized Interests and the European
Community (London: Sage 1992); S. Mazey and J. Richardson (eds.), Lobbying in the
European Community (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1993); R.H. Pedler and M.P.C.M.
Van Schendelen (eds.), Lobbying the European Union (Aldershot: Dartmouth 1994);
Eichener and Voelzkow (eds.), Europäische Integration und verbandliche
Interessenvermittlung; in J. Greenwood (ed.), European Casebook on Business Alliances
(London: Prentice Hall 1995); and H. Wallace and A. Young (eds.), Participation and
Policy-making in the European Union (London: Oxford University Press 1997).
46. Most recently see Kohler-Koch and Eising (eds.), The Transformation of Governance in the
European Union.
47. Streeck and Schmitter (eds.), Private Interest Government. Beyond Market and State.
48. J. Greenwood and K. Ronit, 'Established and Emergent Sectors: Organized Interests at the
European Level in the Pharmaceutical Industry and the New Biotechnologies', in
Greenwood et al. (eds.), Organized Interests and the European Community, p.69.
49. A. Cawson, 'Interests, Groups and Public Policy-Making: The Case of the European
Consumer Electronics Industry', in Greenwood et al. (eds.), Organized Interests and the
European Community, p.99.
50. T. Grunert, 'Decision-Making Processes in the Steel Crisis Policy of the EEC:
Neocorporatist or Integrationist?', in V. Wright and Y. Mény (eds.), The Politics of Steel:
Western Europe and the Steel Industry in the Crisis Years (1974-1984) (Berlin and New York
1987), p.222.
51. V. Eichener and H. Voelzkow, 'Europäische Regulierung im Arbeitsschutz: Überraschungen
aus Brüssel und ein erster Versuch ihrer Erklärung', in Eichener and Voelzkow (eds.),
Europäische Integration und verbandliche Interessenvermittlung0 and V. Eichener and H.
Voelzkow, 'Ko-Evolution politisch-administrativer und verbandlicher Strukturen: Am
Beispiel der technischen Harmonisierung des europäischen Arbeits-, Verbraucher- und
Umweltschutzes', in Streeck (ed.), Staat und Verbände.
52. V. Eichener, 'Entscheidungsprozesse bei der Harmonisierung der Technik in der
Europaischen Gemeinschaft. Soziales Dumping oder innovativer Arbeitsschutz?', in W. Süß
and G. Becher (eds.), Politik und Technikentwicklung in Europa. Analysen ökonomisch-
technischer und politischer Vermittlungen im Prozeß der Europäischen Integration (Berlin:
Duncker & Humblot 1993).
53. G. Falkner, EU Social Policy in the 1990s: Towards a Corporatist Policy Community
(London and New York: Routledge 1998).
54. See Cawson, 'Interests, Groups and Public Policy-Making', p.99.
55. As outlined above, many definitions of corporatism, pluralism and even policy network
ideal-types have actually included the implementation dimension. It was never quite clear,
however, how an empirical network should be classified that fits the definition in only one
dimension, policy-making or implementation. Since Euro-politics leave the implement-
ation of policies to the national level, it seems useful not include an implementation
dimension here. Whether private interests are included in the implementation of EU
policies and whether the national policy networks analysed are involved in, the
implementation of European or national policies should, where relevant, be studied
empirically.
56. Streeck and Schmitter, 'From National Corporatism to Transnational Pluralism'; Schmidt,
'European Integration and Democracy'; Schmidt, 'National Patterns of Governance under

Siege'.
57. See Falkner, EU Social Policy in the 1990s.
58. In practice, this necessarily happens anyway since authors are often confronted with contrary
findings on different dimensions of the complex typology but nevertheless have to choose
one ideal-typical label for the specific policy network in the end. This is easier with a more
economic typology.
59. This would then be a network of exclusively public actors (for example a para-state agency,
a parliamentary committee and one or two ministries).
60. However, monetary policy seems to qualify, or at least it did before the establishment in 1999
of a so-called macro-economic dialogue of the European Central Bank with different
political and economic actors (the practical significance of which, however, still remains to
be established).
61. Kohler-Koch, 'Catching up with Change'.
62. In fact, one could also perceive a 'corporatist policy community' as a specific subtype of a
generic-type 'policy community'. However, since both the exclusivity of non-state group
membership and the degree of involvement are typically stronger than in a traditional type
of policy community, it seems plausible to make it a distinctive ideal-type in a two-
dimensional typology as the one presented here.
63. This fits in very well with the style where 'political goals are not just determined by
(legislation, regulations and public administration) alone, but by way of the multi-stratified
informal decision-making process between groups', where 'the state' is more an arena than
an actor and where the upgrading of common interests is as common as the pursuit of
particular interests. See Kohler-Koch, 'Catching up with Change', p.370. Accordingly, the
EU is seen to perform process management instead of steering from above, while the
boundaries between the private and the public become blurred. It is perceived to bring
together interested actors and promote social learning based on discourse and political
entrepreneurship. Ibid., p.372, and Kohler-Koch, 'The Evolution and Transformation of
European Governance', p.32.
64. Whether or not changes actually take place depends on mediating factors such as institutions
and agency at the national level. They need to be studied in much more detail than hitherto.
For example, so far, we know hardly anything about whether and how specific party systems
or state forms favour stability or adaptation of particular policy networks.
65. As already mentioned above, the definitions of various public-private constellations in EU
policy-making differ. The following examples are necessarily taken from case studies with
differing conceptual backgrounds and even thematic focuses. Nevertheless, the presented
evidence allows the characterisation of the cases with reference to the policy network ideal-
types developed here, even though the author of the particular study may not necessarily
have referred to a network ideal-type or even a label such as pluralist, statist or corporatist.
66. For example, for the case of European monetary policy see Dyson in Kohler-Koch and
Eising (eds.), The Transformation of Governance in the European Union; in tourism, see J.
Greenwood, 'Tourism: How Well Served, and Organized, is "The World's Largest Industry"
in Europe?', in Greenwood (ed.), European Casebook on Business Alliances, p.139.
67. Note, however, that this field has meanwhile been 'Europeanised'. Empirical studies might
reveal statist clusters at the EU level, but they seem, in fact, less frequent than other policy
networks.
68. In the sense of the definition used here, i.e. not assuming equal influence for all groups.
69. For example, as described for environmental policy by Bomberg, 'Issue Networks and the
Environment'; for biotechnology by J. Greenwood, 'European Bioindustry', in Greenwood
(ed.), European Casebook on Business Alliances; for water supply by W.A. Maloney, 'Euro
Awakenings: Water Supply Representation in Europe', in Greenwood (ed.), European
Casebook on Business Alliances, p.155.
70. A. McLaughlin, 'Automobiles: Dynamic Organization in Turbulent Times?', in Greenwood
(ed.), European Casebook on Business Alliances, p.175.
71. See Falkner, EU Social Policy in the 1990s. The Maastricht Treaty established patterns where
collective agreements between labour and industry (in practice, by the three players UNICE,
ETUC, and CEEP) formulate the EC labour law standards to be applied in the member states.
It is always the same major interest groups who co-decide public policies with the EC 'state
actors', i.e. the Commission, the Council and the EP.
72. Kittel and Tálos, 'Interessenvermittlung und politischer Entscheidungsprozeß'.
73. Karlhofer and Tálos, 'Sozialpartnerschaft und EU'; G. Falkner et al., 'The Impact of EU
Membership on Policy Networks in Austria: Creeping Change Beneath the Surface', Journal
of European Public Policy 6 (1999), p.496.
74. As in Austria, labour law issues are predominant also in EC-level tripartite social policy-
making under the Maastricht Social Agreement (incorporated in the EC-Treaty at
Amsterdam). For details see Falkner, EU Social Policy in the 1990s.
75. Falkner et al., 'The Impact of EU Membership on Policy Networks in Austria'.
76. Bomberg, 'Issue Networks and the Environment'.
77. The basic type of network was changed neither in social nor in environmental policy since
EU accession.
78. This is crucial in order not to simply confirm our limited knowledge on presumably
'national' styles. Clearly, the meso level is not necessarily always the ideal level of analysis.
In fact, the most appropriate level of (dis)aggregation (national/policy-specific/single
decision) for a given research question has to be established in empirical research and may
differ from country to country. With a view to interest intermediation, however, it seems that
the meso level is the most adequate for comparative purposes. On the one hand, there is a
rich literature pointing towards increased sectoralisation of erstwhile national systems; on the
other, it is scarcely possible to disaggregate further and study, say, all single decision-
processes in the field of environmental affairs for all (or even several) member states.
79. In the following sub-paragraph, the national social partners are directly addressed and asked
to review such obstacles 'within their sphere of competence and through the procedures set
out in collective agreements'.
80. Lenschow, 'Transformation in European Environmental Governance', p.9.
81. Ibid., p.17.
82. Streeck and Schmitter, 'From National Corporatism to Transnational Pluralism', pp.203ff.
83. F.W. Scharpf, 'Negative and Positive Integration in the Political Economy of European
Welfare States', in G. Marks et al. (eds.), Governance in the European Union (London: Sage
1996).
84. Also see M. Green Cowles and T. Risse, 'Conclusion', in T. Risse, M. Green Cowles and J.
Caporaso (eds.), Europeanization and Domestic Change (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press forthcoming), p.5.
85. Streeck and Schmitter, 'From National Corporatism to Transnational Pluralism', p.203.
86. Lenschow, 'Transformation in European Environmental Governance'; T. Risse et al. (eds.),
Europeanization and Domestic Change; Knill and Lenschow, 'Adjusting to EU Regulatory
Policy'.
87. B. Unger, 'Österreichs Wirtschaftspolitik; Vom Austro-Keynesianismus zum Austro-
Liberalismus?', in Karlhofer and Tálos (eds.), Zukunft der Sozialpartnerschaft; E. Tálos and
G. Falkner, 'Österreich in der EU: Erwartungen — Gegenwart - Perspektiven', in E. Tálos
and G. Falkner (eds.), EU-Mitglied Österreich. Gegenwart und Perspektiven (Vienna: Manz
1996).
88. This is another indicator that corporatist patterns nowadays tend to be located at a lower
structural level and fulfil narrower functions than previously. In particular, they often
facilitate labour law and pay adaptations to EMU rather than being a macro-level governance
pattern as was the case during the 1970s. See G. Falkner, 'Corporatist Governance and
Europeanisation: No Future in the Multi-level Game?', Current Politics and Economics of
Europe 8 (1999), pp.387-412.
89. For example, G. Fajertag and P. Pochet (eds.), Social Pacts in Europe (Brussels:
Observatoire Social Européen 1997); and A. Hassel, 'Soziale Pakte in Europa',
Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte 10 (1998), pp.626-38.
90. Notwithstanding the possibility that, at the same time, European integration or the EU as an
institution might promote corporatist patterns in particular areas by other means.
91. See Mazey and Richardson (eds.), Lobbying in the European Community.
92. Research designs based on ideal-types always leave a number of other potentially relevant
dimensions aside. This article is no different. A further issue that would have led too far here
are the potential influences of the substantive policy output of the EU on national interest
groups and their relations. It seemed both useful and necessary to focus on the forms of co-
operation here, not on the contents or styles of policies. It will, however, certainly be of
interest to study empirically if, for example, re-distributive policy areas are characterised by
different feedback into the national systems than regulative or distributive fields. Moreover,
European integration might also have some effects on national interest group structure. They
could not be discussed here in any detail, in favour of analysing procedural patterns and
effects (which are at the core of interest intermediation, as opposed of simple interest
representation). In the frame of studies following the design presented here, these topics must
be tackled as empirical matters - as must be issues such as the balance of power between
groups and group categories (see explanation of Figure 1).
93. It seems likely, but remains to be established empirically, that the EU features the most
differentiated policy subsystems of all European political systems.
94. A. Héritier et al., Die Veränderung von Staatlichkeit in Europa. Ein regulativer Wettbewerb:
Deutschland, Großbritannien, Frankreich (Opladen: Leske & Budrich 1994).

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West European Politics

ISSN: 0140-2382 (Print) 1743-9655 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fwep20

Policy networks in a multi‐level system:

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402380008425402

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Does the European Union (EU) represent a case of transnational pluralism

networks as the typical settings of public-private interaction in policy-

EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND NATIONAL PUBLIC-PRIVATE

In the EU, one finds quite diverse models of public-private interaction in

Differing Definitions of 'Corporatism' and 'Pluralism'

decision-making, which are, however, accommodated during the policy

Differing Models and Expectations Concerning the EU

Schmidt argues that European integration enhances the autonomy of

A NEW APPROACH TO STUDYING THE IMPACT OF EUROPEAN

Varying Networks rather than '...isms' throughout the Multi-Level System

science. The following discussion first summarises existing knowledge on

The National Level

country studies now frequently prefer a refined heuristic approach based on

long-standing political practice. For example, different directorates-general

A Typology Connecting Two Strands of Literature

Statist Issue Traditional Corporatist

Membership _ Unstable: Rather stable: Extremely

Involvement Insignificant: Consultative: Participatory: Decisive:

The two suggested core dimensions are membership and involvement of

paradigm. The traditional policy community, by contrast, is characterised by

TYPES OF POTENTIAL IMPACT ON NATIONAL INTEREST

This section, first, further specifies the variegated influence of different EU

Specific EC Decision Patterns

Statist Issue Traditional Corporatist

Statist confirmation tendency tendency towards tendency towards

Z Issue tendency confirmation tendency towards tendency towards

tendency towards confirmation

Based on the assumption that various 'cultures' of EU-level decision-

issue network. If we pursue this logic, a traditional EC policy community (as

Positive Integration Measures

as a side-effect of some policy goal, but sometimes intentionally, the EU

The Role of Mediating Factors

• Do more direct types of EC influence favour effects on the national

establish than pluralist competition of societal actors suggests that they

CONCLUSION: CONVERGING TOWARDS 'MODERATE DIVERSITY'?

1. 'Corporatism can be defined as a system of interest representation in which the constituent

corporatism started in 1974 - see G. Lehmbruch, 'Der Beitrag der Korporatismusforschung

private-public relations, see C. Knill and A. Lenschow, 'Adjusting to EU Regulatory Policy:

'European Integration and Democracy'; Schmidt, 'National Patterns of Governance under

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