Chemical warfare

Chemical warfare (CW) involves using the toxic properties of chemical substances as weapons. This
type of warfare is distinct from nuclear warfare, biological warfare and radiological warfare, which
together make up CBRN, the military acronym for chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
(warfare or weapons), all of which are considered "weapons of mass destruction" (WMDs), a term
that contrasts with conventional weapons.

The use of chemical weapons in international armed conflicts is prohibited under international
humanitarian law by the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907.[1][2]
The 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention prohibits signatories from acquiring, stockpiling,
developing, and using chemical weapons in all circumstances except for very limited purposes
(research, medical, pharmaceutical or protective).[3]

Definition

Chemical warfare is different from the use of conventional weapons or nuclear weapons because
the destructive effects of chemical weapons are not primarily due to any explosive force. The
offensive use of living organisms (such as anthrax) is considered biological warfare rather than
chemical warfare; however, the use of nonliving toxic products produced by living organisms (e.g.
toxins such as botulinum toxin, ricin, and saxitoxin) is considered chemical warfare under the
provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Under this convention, any toxic chemical,
regardless of its origin, is considered a chemical weapon unless it is used for purposes that are not
prohibited (an important legal definition known as the General Purpose Criterion).[4]

About 70 different chemicals have been used or were stockpiled as chemical warfare agents during
the 20th century. The entire class, known as Lethal Unitary Chemical Agents and Munitions, has
been scheduled for elimination by the CWC.[5]

Under the convention, chemicals that are toxic enough to be used as chemical weapons, or that may
be used to manufacture such chemicals, are divided into three groups according to their purpose
and treatment:

Schedule 1 – Have few, if any, legitimate uses. These may only be produced or used for research,
medical, pharmaceutical or protective purposes (i.e. testing of chemical weapons sensors and
protective clothing). Examples include nerve agents, ricin, lewisite and mustard gas. Any
production over 100 grams (3.5 oz) must be reported to the Organisation for the Prohibition of
 Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and a country can have a stockpile of no more than one tonne of
these chemicals.

Schedule 2 – Have no large-scale industrial uses, but may have legitimate small-scale uses.
Examples include dimethyl methylphosphonate, a precursor to sarin also used as a flame
retardant, and thiodiglycol, a precursor chemical used in the manufacture of mustard gas but also
widely used as a solvent in inks.

Schedule 3 – Have legitimate large-scale industrial uses. Examples include phosgene and
chloropicrin. Both have been used as chemical weapons but phosgene is an important precursor
in the manufacture of plastics, and chloropicrin is used as a fumigant. The OPCW must be notified
of, and may inspect, any plant producing more than 30 tons per year.

Chemical weapons are divided into three categories:[6]

Category 1 – based on Schedule 1 substances

Category 2 – based on non-Schedule 1 substances

Category 3 – devices and equipment designed to use chemical weapons, without the substances
themselves

History

John Singer Sargent's iconic World

War I painting: Gassed, showing blind
casualties on a battlefield after a
mustard gas attack

Simple chemical weapons were used sporadically throughout antiquity and into the Industrial Age.[7]
It was not until the 19th century that the modern conception of chemical warfare emerged, as
various scientists and nations proposed the use of asphyxiating or poisonous gasses.

Multiple international treaties were passed banning chemical weapons based upon the alarm of
nations and scientists. This however did not prevent the extensive use of chemical weapons in
World War I. The development of chlorine gas, among others, was used by both sides to try to break
the stalemate of trench warfare. Though largely ineffective over the long run, it decidedly changed
the nature of the war. In many cases the gasses used did not kill, but instead horribly maimed,
injured, or disfigured casualties. Some 1.3 million gas casualties were recorded, which may have
included up to 260,000 civilian casualties.[8][9][10]
The interwar years saw the occasional use of chemical weapons, mainly to put down rebellions.[11]
In Nazi Germany, much research went into developing new chemical weapons, such as potent nerve
agents.[12] However, chemical weapons saw little battlefield use in World War II. Both sides were
prepared to use such weapons, but the Allied Powers never did, and the Axis used them only very
sparingly. The reason for the lack of use by the Nazis, despite the considerable efforts that had gone
into developing new varieties, might have been a lack of technical ability or fears that the Allies
would retaliate with their own chemical weapons. Those fears were not unfounded: the Allies made
comprehensive plans for defensive and retaliatory use of chemical weapons, and stockpiled large
quantities.[13][14] Japanese forces, as part of the Axis, used them more widely, though only against
their Asian enemies, as they also feared that using it on Western powers would result in retaliation.
Chemical weapons were frequently used against the Kuomintang and Chinese communist troops,
the People's Liberation Army.[15] However, the Nazis did extensively use poison gas against civilians,
mostly the genocide of European Jews, in The Holocaust. Vast quantities of Zyklon B gas and
carbon monoxide were used in the gas chambers of Nazi extermination camps, resulting in the
overwhelming majority of some three million deaths. This remains the deadliest use of poison gas in
history.[16][17][18][19]

Japanese Special Naval Landing

Forces with gas masks and rubber
gloves during a chemical attack near
Zhabei in the Battle of Shanghai
 Fritz Haber is considered the
"father of chemical warfare"
for his years of pioneering
work developing and
weaponizing chlorine and
other poisonous gases
during World War I.

The post-war era has seen limited, though devastating, use of chemical weapons. Some 100,000
Iranian troops were casualties of Iraqi chemical weapons during the Iran–Iraq War.[20][21][22] Iraq used
mustard gas and nerve agents against its own civilians in the 1988 Halabja chemical attack.[23] The
Cuban intervention in Angola saw limited use of organophosphates.[24] Terrorist groups have also
used chemical weapons, notably in the Tokyo subway sarin attack and the Matsumoto
incident.[25][26] See also chemical terrorism.

In the 21st century, the Ba'athist regime in Syria has used chemical weapons against civilian
populations, resulting in numerous deadly chemical attacks during the Syrian civil war.[27] The Syrian
government has used sarin, chlorine, and mustard gas in the Syrian civil war – mostly against
civilians.[28][29]

Russia has used chemical weapons during its invasion of Ukraine. This has been done mainly by
dropping a grenade with K-51 aerosol CS gas from an unmanned drone.[30]
Technology

Chemical warfare technology timeline

Year Agents Dissemination Protection Detection
Chlorine
Chloropicrin Gas masks, urine-soaked
1914 Wind dispersal Smell
Phosgene gauze
Sulfur mustard
Gas mask
1918 Lewisite Chemical shells Smell of geraniums
Rosin oil clothing
Projectiles with central
1920s CC-2 clothing
bursters
Blister agent
1930s G-series nerve agents Aircraft bombs detectors
Color change paper
Protective ointment
Missile warheads (mustard)
1940s
Spray tanks Collective protection
Gas mask w/ whetlerite
1950s
1960s V-series nerve agents Aerodynamic Gas mask w/ water supply Nerve gas alarm
1970s
Improved gas masks
1980s Binary munitions Laser detection
(protection, fit, comfort)
Novichok nerve
1990s
agents
 A Swedish Army soldier wearing a
chemical agent protective suit (C-
vätskeskydd) and protection mask
(skyddsmask 90)

Although crude chemical warfare has been employed in many parts of the world for thousands of
years,[31] "modern" chemical warfare began during World War I – see Chemical weapons in World
War I.

Initially, only well-known commercially available chemicals and their variants were used. These
included chlorine and phosgene gas. The methods used to disperse these agents during battle were
relatively unrefined and inefficient. Even so, casualties could be heavy, due to the mainly static troop
positions which were characteristic features of trench warfare.

Germany, the first side to employ chemical warfare on the battlefield,[32] simply opened canisters of
chlorine upwind of the opposing side and let the prevailing winds do the dissemination. Soon after,
the French modified artillery munitions to contain phosgene – a much more effective method that
became the principal means of delivery.[33]

Since the development of modern chemical warfare in World War I, nations have pursued research
and development on chemical weapons that falls into four major categories: new and more deadly
agents; more efficient methods of delivering agents to the target (dissemination); more reliable
means of defense against chemical weapons; and more sensitive and accurate means of detecting
chemical agents.
Chemical warfare agents

The chemical used in warfare is called a chemical warfare agent (CWA). About 70 different chemicals
have been used or stockpiled as chemical warfare agents during the 20th and 21st centuries. These
agents may be in liquid, gas or solid form. Liquid agents that evaporate quickly are said to be volatile
or have a high vapor pressure. Many chemical agents are volatile organic compounds so they can be
dispersed over a large region quickly.[34]

The earliest target of chemical warfare agent research was not toxicity, but development of agents
that can affect a target through the skin and clothing, rendering protective gas masks useless. In
July 1917, the Germans employed sulfur mustard. Mustard agents easily penetrate leather and
fabric to inflict painful burns on the skin.

Chemical warfare agents are divided into lethal and incapacitating categories. A substance is
classified as incapacitating if less than 1/100 of the lethal dose causes incapacitation, e.g., through
nausea or visual problems. The distinction between lethal and incapacitating substances is not
fixed, but relies on a statistical average called the LD50.

Persistency

Chemical warfare agents can be classified according to their persistency, a measure of the length of
time that a chemical agent remains effective after dissemination. Chemical agents are classified as
persistent or nonpersistent.

Agents classified as nonpersistent lose effectiveness after only a few minutes or hours or even only
a few seconds. Purely gaseous agents such as chlorine are nonpersistent, as are highly volatile
agents such as sarin. Tactically, nonpersistent agents are very useful against targets that are to be
taken over and controlled very quickly.

Apart from the agent used, the delivery mode is very important. To achieve a nonpersistent
deployment, the agent is dispersed into very small droplets comparable with the mist produced by
an aerosol can. In this form not only the gaseous part of the agent (around 50%) but also the fine
aerosol can be inhaled or absorbed through pores in the skin.

Modern doctrine requires very high concentrations almost instantly in order to be effective (one
breath should contain a lethal dose of the agent). To achieve this, the primary weapons used would
be rocket artillery or bombs and large ballistic missiles with cluster warheads. The contamination in
the target area is only low or not existent and after four hours sarin or similar agents are not
detectable anymore.
By contrast, persistent agents tend to remain in the environment for as long as several weeks,
complicating decontamination. Defense against persistent agents requires shielding for extended
periods of time. Nonvolatile liquid agents, such as blister agents and the oily VX nerve agent, do not
easily evaporate into a gas, and therefore present primarily a contact hazard.

The droplet size used for persistent delivery goes up to 1 mm increasing the falling speed and
therefore about 80% of the deployed agent reaches the ground, resulting in heavy contamination.
Deployment of persistent agents is intended to constrain enemy operations by denying access to
contaminated areas.

Possible targets include enemy flank positions (averting possible counterattacks), artillery
regiments, command posts or supply lines. Because it is not necessary to deliver large quantities of
the agent in a short period of time, a wide variety of weapons systems can be used.

A special form of persistent agents are thickened agents. These comprise a common agent mixed
with thickeners to provide gelatinous, sticky agents. Primary targets for this kind of use include
airfields, due to the increased persistency and difficulty of decontaminating affected areas.

Classes

Chemical weapons are agents that come in four categories: choking, blister, blood and nerve.[35] The
agents are organized into several categories according to the manner in which they affect the human
body. The names and number of categories varies slightly from source to source, but in general,
types of chemical warfare agents are as follows:
Classes of chemical weapon agents

Rate of
Class of agent Agent Names Mode of Action Signs and Symptoms Persistency
action

Cyclosarin Miosis (pinpoint pupils)

(GF) Blurred/dim vision VX is

persistent
Sarin (GB) Inactivates enzyme Headache
and a
acetylcholinesterase,
Soman Nausea, vomiting, contact
preventing the Vapors:
(GD) diarrhea hazard;
breakdown of the seconds
Tabun (GA) to other
neurotransmitter Copious
Nerve minutes; agents are
VX acetylcholine in the secretions/sweating
non-
victim's synapses Skin: 2 to
VR Muscle persistent
and causing both 18 hours
twitching/fasciculations and present
Some muscarinic and
mostly
insecticides nicotinic effects Dyspnea
inhalation
Novichok Seizures hazards.
agents Loss of consciousness

Arsine: Causes
intravascular
hemolysis that
may lead to renal
failure. Possible cherry-red skin

Cyanogen Possible cyanosis

Most
chloride/hydrogen Non-
Arsines Confusion
cyanide: Cyanide persistent
Cyanogen directly prevents Nausea Immediate
Asphyxiant/Blood and an
chloride cells from using onset
Patients may gasp for inhalation
Hydrogen oxygen. The cells air hazard.
cyanide then use
Seizures prior to death
anaerobic
respiration, Metabolic acidosis
creating excess
lactic acid and
metabolic
acidosis.

Vesicant/Blister Sulfur Agents are acid- Severe skin, eye and Mustards: Persistent
mustard forming compounds mucosal pain and Vapors: 4 and a
(HD, H) that damages skin irritation to 6 hours, contact
and respiratory eyes and hazard.
system, resulting lungs
 Nitrogen burns and Skin erythema with affected
mustard respiratory large fluid blisters that more
(HN-1, HN- problems. heal slowly and may rapidly;
2, HN-3) become infected Skin: 2 to
48 hours
Lewisite (L) Tearing, conjunctivitis,
corneal damage Lewisite:
Phosgene
Immediate
oxime (CX) Mild respiratory distress
to marked airway
damage

Similar mechanism
to blister agents in
Airway irritation
that the compounds
Chlorine are acids or acid- Eye and skin irritation
forming, but action Non-
Hydrogen Dyspnea, cough
chloride is more pronounced persistent
Immediate
Choking/Pulmonary in respiratory Sore throat and an
Nitrogen to 3 hours
system, flooding it inhalation
oxides Chest tightness
and resulting in hazard.
Phosgene suffocation; Wheezing
survivors often
Bronchospasm
suffer chronic
breathing problems.

Non-
Causes severe
Tear gas persistent
Lachrymatory stinging of the eyes
Pepper Powerful eye irritation Immediate and an
agent and temporary
spray inhalation
blindness.
hazard.

May appear as mass Inhaled:

drug intoxication with 30
erratic behaviors, minutes to
Causes atropine-like
shared realistic and 20 hours; Extremely
inhibition of
distinct hallucinations, persistent in
acetylcholine in Skin: Up to soil and
disrobing and confusion
subject. Causes 36 hours
Agent 15 water and
Incapacitating peripheral nervous Hyperthermia after skin on most
(BZ)
system effects that exposure
Ataxia (lack of surfaces;
are the opposite of to BZ.
coordination) contact
those seen in nerve Duration hazard.
agent poisoning. Mydriasis (dilated is typically
pupils) 72 to 96
Dry mouth and skin hours.
 Latent period of 4-8
hours, followed by flu-
like signs and 4–24 hours;
symptoms see
symptoms.
Progress within 18-24
Non-living Exposure by
hours to:
biological inhalation or Slight;
Inhalation: nausea,
injection agents
proteins, Inhibit protein cough, dyspnea,
Cytotoxic proteins causes more degrade
such as: synthesis pulmonary edema
pronounced quickly in
Ricin Ingestion: signs and environment
Gastrointestinal symptoms
Abrin
hemorrhage with than
emesis and bloody exposure by
diarrhea; eventual ingestion
liver and kidney
failure.

There are other chemicals used militarily that are not scheduled by the CWC, and thus are not
controlled under the CWC treaties. These include:

Defoliants and herbicides that destroy vegetation, but are not immediately toxic or poisonous to
human beings. Their use is classified as herbicidal warfare. Some batches of Agent Orange, for
instance, used by the British during the Malayan Emergency and the United States during the
Vietnam War, contained dioxins as manufacturing impurities. Dioxins, rather than Agent Orange
itself, have long-term cancer effects and for causing genetic damage leading to serious birth
defects.

Incendiary or explosive chemicals (such as napalm, extensively used by the United States during
the Korean War and the Vietnam War, or dynamite) because their destructive effects are primarily
due to fire or explosive force, and not direct chemical action. Their use is classified as
conventional warfare.

Viruses, bacteria, or other organisms. Their use is classified as biological warfare. Toxins
produced by living organisms are considered chemical weapons, although the boundary is blurry.
Toxins are covered by the Biological Weapons Convention.

Designations

Most chemical weapons are assigned a one- to three-letter "NATO weapon designation" in addition
to, or in place of, a common name. Binary munitions, in which precursors for chemical warfare
agents are automatically mixed in shell to produce the agent just prior to its use, are indicated by a
"-2" following the agent's designation (for example, GB-2 and VX-2).
Some examples are given below:

Blood agents: Vesicants:

Cyanogen chloride: CK Lewisite: L

Hydrogen cyanide: AC Sulfur mustard: H, HD, HS, HT

Pulmonary agents: Incapacitating agents:

Phosgene: CG Quinuclidinyl benzilate: BZ

Lachrymatory agents: Nerve agents:

Pepper spray: OC Sarin: GB

Tear gas: CN, CS, CR VE, VG, VM, VX

Delivery

The most important factor in the effectiveness of chemical weapons is the efficiency of its delivery,
or dissemination, to a target. The most common techniques include munitions (such as bombs,
projectiles, warheads) that allow dissemination at a distance and spray tanks which disseminate
from low-flying aircraft. Developments in the techniques of filling and storage of munitions have also
been important.

Although there have been many advances in chemical weapon delivery since World War I, it is still
difficult to achieve effective dispersion. The dissemination is highly dependent on atmospheric
conditions because many chemical agents act in gaseous form. Thus, weather observations and
forecasting are essential to optimize weapon delivery and reduce the risk of injuring friendly forces.

Dispersion

Dispersion of chlorine in World War I

Dispersion is placing the chemical agent upon or adjacent to a target immediately before
dissemination, so that the material is most efficiently used. Dispersion is the simplest technique of
delivering an agent to its target. The most common techniques are munitions, bombs, projectiles,
spray tanks and warheads.
World War I saw the earliest implementation of this technique. The actual first chemical ammunition
was the French 26 mm cartouche suffocante rifle grenade, fired from a flare carbine. It contained
35g of the tear-producer ethyl bromoacetate, and was used in autumn 1914 – with little effect on the
Germans.

The German military contrarily tried to increase the effect of 10.5 cm shrapnel shells by adding an
irritant – dianisidine chlorosulfonate. Its use against the British at Neuve Chapelle in October 1914
went unnoticed by them. Hans Tappen, a chemist in the Heavy Artillery Department of the War
Ministry, suggested to his brother, the Chief of the Operations Branch at German General
Headquarters, the use of the tear-gases benzyl bromide or xylyl bromide.

Shells were tested successfully at the Wahn artillery range near Cologne on January 9, 1915, and an
order was placed for 15 cm howitzer shells, designated 'T-shells' after Tappen. A shortage of shells
limited the first use against the Russians at the Battle of Bolimów on January 31, 1915; the liquid
failed to vaporize in the cold weather, and again the experiment went unnoticed by the Allies.

The first effective use were when the German forces at the Second Battle of Ypres simply opened
cylinders of chlorine and allowed the wind to carry the gas across enemy lines. While simple, this
technique had numerous disadvantages. Moving large numbers of heavy gas cylinders to the front-
line positions from where the gas would be released was a lengthy and difficult logistical task.

Aerial photograph of a German gas

attack on Russian forces c. 1916

Stockpiles of cylinders had to be stored at the front line, posing a great risk if hit by artillery shells.
Gas delivery depended greatly on wind speed and direction. If the wind was fickle, as at the Battle of
Loos, the gas could blow back, causing friendly casualties.

Gas clouds gave plenty of warning, allowing the enemy time to protect themselves, though many
soldiers found the sight of a creeping gas cloud unnerving. This made the gas doubly effective, as, in
addition to damaging the enemy physically, it also had a psychological effect on the intended
victims.
Another disadvantage was that gas clouds had limited penetration, capable only of affecting the
front-line trenches before dissipating. Although it produced limited results in World War I, this
technique shows how simple chemical weapon dissemination can be.

Shortly after this "open canister" dissemination, French forces developed a technique for delivery of
phosgene in a non-explosive artillery shell. This technique overcame many of the risks of dealing
with gas in cylinders. First, gas shells were independent of the wind and increased the effective
range of gas, making any target within reach of guns vulnerable. Second, gas shells could be
delivered without warning, especially the clear, nearly odorless phosgene—there are numerous
accounts of gas shells, landing with a "plop" rather than exploding, being initially dismissed as dud
high explosive or shrapnel shells, giving the gas time to work before the soldiers were alerted and
took precautions.

The major drawback of artillery delivery was the difficulty of achieving a killing concentration. Each
shell had a small gas payload and an area would have to be subjected to saturation bombardment to
produce a cloud to match cylinder delivery. A British solution to the problem was the Livens
Projector. This was effectively a large-bore mortar, dug into the ground that used the gas cylinders
themselves as projectiles – firing a 14 kg cylinder up to 1500 m. This combined the gas volume of
cylinders with the range of artillery.

Over the years, there were some refinements in this technique. In the 1950s and early 1960s,
chemical artillery rockets and cluster bombs contained a multitude of submunitions, so that a large
number of small clouds of the chemical agent would form directly on the target.

Thermal dissemination

An American-made MC-1 gas bomb

Thermal dissemination is the use of explosives or pyrotechnics to deliver chemical agents. This
technique, developed in the 1920s, was a major improvement over earlier dispersal techniques, in
that it allowed significant quantities of an agent to be disseminated over a considerable distance.
Thermal dissemination remains the principal method of disseminating chemical agents today.

Most thermal dissemination devices consist of a bomb or projectile shell that contains a chemical
agent and a central "burster" charge; when the burster detonates, the agent is expelled laterally.

Thermal dissemination devices, though common, are not particularly efficient. First, a percentage of
the agent is lost by incineration in the initial blast and by being forced onto the ground. Second, the
sizes of the particles vary greatly because explosive dissemination produces a mixture of liquid
droplets of variable and difficult to control sizes.

The efficacy of thermal detonation is greatly limited by the flammability of some agents. For
flammable aerosols, the cloud is sometimes totally or partially ignited by the disseminating
explosion in a phenomenon called flashing. Explosively disseminated VX will ignite roughly one third
of the time. Despite a great deal of study, flashing is still not fully understood, and a solution to the
problem would be a major technological advance.

Despite the limitations of central bursters, most nations use this method in the early stages of
chemical weapon development, in part because standard munitions can be adapted to carry the
agents.

Soviet chemical weapons canisters

from a stockpile in Albania

Aerodynamic dissemination

Aerodynamic dissemination is the non-explosive delivery of a chemical agent from an aircraft,

allowing aerodynamic stress to disseminate the agent. This technique is the most recent major
development in chemical agent dissemination, originating in the mid-1960s.
This technique eliminates many of the limitations of thermal dissemination by eliminating the
flashing effect and theoretically allowing precise control of particle size. In actuality, the altitude of
dissemination, wind direction and velocity, and the direction and velocity of the aircraft greatly
influence particle size. There are other drawbacks as well; ideal deployment requires precise
knowledge of aerodynamics and fluid dynamics, and because the agent must usually be dispersed
within the boundary layer (less than 200–300 ft or 61–91 m above the ground), it puts pilots at risk.

Significant research is still being applied toward this technique. For example, by modifying the
properties of the liquid, its breakup when subjected to aerodynamic stress can be controlled and an
idealized particle distribution achieved, even at supersonic speed. Additionally, advances in fluid
dynamics, computer modeling, and weather forecasting allow an ideal direction, speed, and altitude
to be calculated, such that warfare agent of a predetermined particle size can predictably and
reliably hit a target.

Protection against chemical warfare

Israel Defense Forces "Yanshuf"

battalion soldiers at chemical warfare
defense exercise

Ideal protection begins with nonproliferation treaties such as the CWC, and detecting, very early, the
signatures of someone building a chemical weapons capability. These include a wide range of
intelligence disciplines, such as economic analysis of exports of dual-use chemicals and equipment,
human intelligence (HUMINT) such as diplomatic, refugee, and agent reports; photography from
satellites, aircraft and drones (IMINT); examination of captured equipment (TECHINT);
communications intercepts (COMINT); and detection of chemical manufacturing and chemical
agents themselves (MASINT).

If all the preventive measures fail and there is a clear and present danger, then there is a need for
detection of chemical attacks,[36] collective protection,[37][38][39] and decontamination. Since
industrial accidents can cause dangerous chemical releases (e.g., the Bhopal disaster), these
activities are things that civilian, as well as military, organizations must be prepared to carry out. In
civilian situations in developed countries, these are duties of HAZMAT organizations, which most
commonly are part of fire departments.

Detection has been referred to above, as a technical MASINT discipline; specific military procedures,
which are usually the model for civilian procedures, depend on the equipment, expertise, and
personnel available. When chemical agents are detected, an alarm needs to sound, with specific
warnings over emergency broadcasts and the like. There may be a warning to expect an attack.

If, for example, the captain of a US Navy ship believes there is a serious threat of chemical,
biological, or radiological attack, the crew may be ordered to set Circle William, which means closing
all openings to outside air, running breathing air through filters, and possibly starting a system that
continually washes down the exterior surfaces. Civilian authorities dealing with an attack or a toxic
chemical accident will invoke the Incident Command System, or local equivalent, to coordinate
defensive measures.[39]

Individual protection starts with a gas mask and, depending on the nature of the threat, through
various levels of protective clothing up to a complete chemical-resistant suit with a self-contained air
supply. The US military defines various levels of MOPP (mission-oriented protective posture) from
mask to full chemical resistant suits; Hazmat suits are the civilian equivalent, but go farther to
include a fully independent air supply, rather than the filters of a gas mask.

Collective protection allows continued functioning of groups of people in buildings or shelters, the
latter which may be fixed, mobile, or improvised. With ordinary buildings, this may be as basic as
plastic sheeting and tape, although if the protection needs to be continued for any appreciable
length of time, there will need to be an air supply, typically an enhanced gas mask.[38][39]

Members of the Ukrainian Army's

19th Nuclear, Biological and Chemical
Battalion practice decontamination
drill, at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait

Decontamination

Decontamination varies with the particular chemical agent used. Some nonpersistent agents,
including most pulmonary agents (chlorine, phosgene, and so on), blood gases, and nonpersistent
nerve gases (e.g., GB), will dissipate from open areas, although powerful exhaust fans may be
needed to clear out buildings where they have accumulated.

In some cases, it might be necessary to neutralize them chemically, as with ammonia as a

neutralizer for hydrogen cyanide or chlorine. Riot control agents such as CS will dissipate in an open
area, but things contaminated with CS powder need to be aired out, washed by people wearing
protective gear, or safely discarded.

Mass decontamination is a less common requirement for people than equipment, since people may
be immediately affected and treatment is the action required. It is a requirement when people have
been contaminated with persistent agents. Treatment and decontamination may need to be
simultaneous, with the medical personnel protecting themselves so they can function.[40]

There may need to be immediate intervention to prevent death, such as injection of atropine for
nerve agents. Decontamination is especially important for people contaminated with persistent
agents; many of the fatalities after the explosion of a WWII US ammunition ship carrying sulfur
mustard, in the harbor of Bari, Italy, after a German bombing on December 2, 1943, came when
rescue workers, not knowing of the contamination, bundled cold, wet seamen in tight-fitting
blankets.

For decontaminating equipment and buildings exposed to persistent agents, such as blister agents,
VX or other agents made persistent by mixing with a thickener, special equipment and materials
might be needed. Some type of neutralizing agent will be needed; e.g. in the form of a spraying
device with neutralizing agents such as Chlorine, Fichlor, strong alkaline solutions or enzymes. In
other cases, a specific chemical decontaminant will be required.[39]

Sociopolitical climate

There are many instances of the use of chemical weapons in battles documented in Greek and
Roman historical texts; the earliest example was the deliberate poisoning of Kirrha's water supply
with hellebore in the First Sacred War, Greece, about 590 BC.[41]

One of the earliest reactions to the use of chemical agents was from Rome. Struggling to defend
themselves from the Roman legions, Germanic tribes poisoned the wells of their enemies, with
Roman jurists having been recorded as declaring "armis bella non venenis geri", meaning "war is
fought with weapons, not with poisons." Yet the Romans themselves resorted to poisoning wells of
besieged cities in Anatolia in the 2nd century BCE.[42]
Before 1915 the use of poisonous chemicals in battle was typically the result of local initiative, and
not the result of an active government chemical weapons program. There are many reports of the
isolated use of chemical agents in individual battles or sieges, but there was no true tradition of their
use outside of incendiaries and smoke. Despite this tendency, there have been several attempts to
initiate large-scale implementation of poison gas in several wars, but with the notable exception of
World War I, the responsible authorities generally rejected the proposals for ethical reasons or fears
of retaliation.

For example, in 1854 Lyon Playfair (later 1st Baron Playfair, GCB, PC, FRS (1818–1898), a British
chemist, proposed using a cacodyl cyanide-filled artillery shell against enemy ships during the
Crimean War. The British Ordnance Department rejected the proposal as "as bad a mode of warfare
as poisoning the wells of the enemy."
Efforts to eradicate chemical weapons

Countries with known or possible chemical weapons, as of 2021

Nation CW Possession Signed CWC Ratified CWC

Albania Eliminated, 2007 January 14, 1993[43] May 11, 1994[43]

China Probable January 13, 1993 April 4, 1997

Egypt Probable No No

India Eliminated, 2009 January 14, 1993 September 3, 1996

Iran Possible January 13, 1993 November 3, 1997

Iraq Eliminated, 2018 January 13, 2009 February 12, 2009

Israel Probable January 13, 1993[44] No

Japan Probable January 13, 1993 September 15, 1995

January 6, 2004
Libya Eliminated, 2014 No
(acceded)

Myanmar (Burma) Possible January 14, 1993[44] July 8, 2015[45]

North Korea Known No No

Pakistan Probable January 13, 1993 November 27, 1997

Russia Eliminated, 2017 January 13, 1993 November 5, 1997

Serbia April 20, 2000

Probable No
and Montenegro (acceded)

May 24, 1999

Sudan Possible No
(acceded)

September 14, 2013

Syria Known No
(acceded)

Taiwan Possible n/a n/a

United States Eliminated, 2023[46] January 13, 1993 April 25, 1997

Vietnam Possible January 13, 1993 September 30, 1998

August 27, 1874: The Brussels Declaration Concerning the Laws and Customs of War is signed,
specifically forbidding the "employment of poison or poisoned weapons", although the treaty was
not adopted by any nation whatsoever and it never went into effect.

September 4, 1900: The First Hague Convention, which includes a declaration banning the "use of
projectiles the object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases," enters into
force.
 January 26, 1910: The Second Hague Convention enters into force, prohibiting the use of "poison
or poisoned weapons" in warfare.

February 6, 1922: After World War I, the Washington Arms Conference Treaty prohibited the use of
asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases. It was signed by the United States, Britain, Japan, France,
and Italy, but France objected to other provisions in the treaty and it never went into effect.

February 8, 1928: The Geneva Protocol enters into force, prohibiting the use of "asphyxiating,
poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices" and "bacteriological
methods of warfare".

Chemical weapon proliferation

Despite numerous efforts to reduce or eliminate them, some nations continue to research and/or
stockpile chemical warfare agents.

In 1997, future US Vice President Dick Cheney opposed the signing ratification of a treaty banning
the use of chemical weapons, a recently unearthed letter shows. In a letter dated April 8, 1997, then
Halliburton-CEO Cheney told Sen. Jesse Helms, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, that it would be a mistake for America to join the convention. "Those nations most likely
to comply with the Chemical Weapons Convention are not likely to ever constitute a military threat to
the United States. The governments we should be concerned about are likely to cheat on the CWC,
even if they do participate," reads the letter,[47] published by the Federation of American Scientists.

The CWC was ratified by the Senate that same month. In the following years, Albania, Libya, Russia,
the United States, and India declared over 71,000 metric tons of chemical weapon stockpiles, and
destroyed a third of them. Under the terms of the agreement, the United States and Russia agreed to
eliminate the rest of their supplies of chemical weapons by 2012, but ended up taking far longer to
do so as shown in the previous and following section of this article.

Chemical weapons destruction

India

In June 1997, India declared that it had a stockpile of 1044 tons of sulphur mustard in its
possession. India's declaration of its stockpile came after its entry into the Chemical Weapons
Convention, that created the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and on January
14, 1993, India became one of the original signatories to the Chemical Weapons Convention. By
2005, from among six nations that had declared their possession of chemical weapons, India was
the only country to meet its deadline for chemical weapons destruction and for inspection of its
facilities by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.[48][49] By 2006, India had
destroyed more than 75 percent of its chemical weapons and material stockpile and was granted an
extension to complete a 100 percent destruction of its stocks by April 2009. On May 14, 2009, India
informed the United Nations that it has completely destroyed its stockpile of chemical weapons.[50]

Iraq

The Director-General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Ambassador
Rogelio Pfirter, welcomed Iraq's decision to join the OPCW as a significant step to strengthening
global and regional efforts to prevent the spread and use of chemical weapons. The OPCW
announced "The government of Iraq has deposited its instrument of accession to the Chemical
Weapons Convention with the Secretary General of the United Nations and within 30 days, on 12
February 2009, will become the 186th State Party to the Convention". Iraq has also declared
stockpiles of chemical weapons, and because of their recent accession is the only State Party
exempted from the destruction time-line.[51]

Japan

During the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945) Japan stored chemical weapons on the territory
of mainland China. The weapon stock mostly containing sulfur mustard-lewisite mixture.[52] The
weapons are classified as abandoned chemical weapons under the Chemical Weapons Convention,
and from September 2010 Japan has started their destruction in Nanjing using mobile destruction
facilities in order to do so.[53]

Russia

Russia signed into the Chemical Weapons Convention on January 13, 1993, and ratified it on
November 5, 1995. Declaring an arsenal of 39,967 tons of chemical weapons in 1997, by far the
largest arsenal, consisting of blister agents: Lewisite, Sulfur mustard, Lewisite-mustard mix, and
nerve agents: Sarin, Soman, and VX. Russia met its treaty obligations by destroying 1 percent of its
chemical agents by the 2002 deadline set out by the Chemical Weapons Convention, but requested
an extension on the deadlines of 2004 and 2007 due to technical, financial, and environmental
challenges of chemical disposal. Since, Russia has received help from other countries such as
Canada which donated C$100,000, plus a further C$100,000 already donated, to the Russian
Chemical Weapons Destruction Program. This money will be used to complete work at Shchuch'ye
and support the construction of a chemical weapons destruction facility at Kizner (Russia), where
the destruction of nearly 5,700 tons of nerve agent, stored in approximately 2 million artillery shells
and munitions, will be undertaken. Canadian funds are also being used for the operation of a Green
Cross Public Outreach Office, to keep the civilian population informed on the progress made in
chemical weapons destruction activities.[54]

As of July 2011, Russia has destroyed 48 percent (18,241 tons) of its stockpile at destruction
facilities located in Gorny (Saratov Oblast) and Kambarka (Udmurt Republic) – where operations
have finished – and Schuch'ye (Kurgan Oblast), Maradykovsky (Kirov Oblast), Leonidovka (Penza
Oblast) whilst installations are under construction in Pochep (Bryansk Oblast) and Kizner (Udmurt
Republic).[55] As August 2013, 76 percent (30,500 tons) were destroyed,[56] and Russia leaves the
Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program, which partially funded chemical weapons
destruction.[57]

In September 2017, OPCW announced that Russia had destroyed its entire chemical weapons
stockpile.[58]

United States

On November 25, 1969, President Richard Nixon unilaterally renounced the offensive use of
biological and toxic weapons, but the U.S. continued to maintain an offensive chemical weapons
program.[59]

From May 1964 to the early 1970s the U.S. participated in Operation CHASE, a United States
Department of Defense program that aimed to dispose of chemical weapons by sinking ships laden
with the weapons in the deep Atlantic. After the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of
1972, Operation Chase was scrapped and safer disposal methods for chemical weapons were
researched, with the U.S. destroying several thousand tons of sulfur mustard by incineration at the
Rocky Mountain Arsenal, and nearly 4,200 tons of nerve agent by chemical neutralisation at Tooele
Army Depot.[60]

The U.S. began stockpile reductions in the 1980s with the removal of outdated munitions and
destroying its entire stock of 3-Quinuclidinyl benzilate (BZ or Agent 15) at the beginning of 1988. In
June 1990 the Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System began destruction of chemical
agents stored on the Johnston Atoll in the Pacific, seven years before the Chemical Weapons Treaty
came into effect. In 1986 President Ronald Reagan made an agreement with German Chancellor
Helmut Kohl to remove the U.S. stockpile of chemical weapons from Germany. In 1990, as part of
Operation Steel Box, two ships were loaded with over 100,000 shells containing Sarin and VX were
taken from the U.S. Army weapons storage depots such as Miesau and then-classified FSTS
(Forward Storage / Transportation Sites) and transported from Bremerhaven, Germany to Johnston
Atoll in the Pacific, a 46-day nonstop journey.[61]

In the 1980s, Congress, at the urging of the Reagan administration, Congress provided funding for
the manufacture of binary chemical weapons (sarin artillery shells) from 1987 until 1990, but this
was halted after the U.S. and the Soviet Union entered into a bilateral agreement in June 1990.[59] In
the 1990 agreement, the U.S. and Soviet Union agreed to begin destroying their chemical weapons
stockpiles before 1993 and to reduce them to no more than 5,000 agent tons each by the end of
2002. The agreement also provided for exchanges of data and inspections of sites to verify
destruction.[62] Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the U.S.'s Nunn–Lugar Cooperative Threat
Reduction program helped eliminate some of the chemical, biological and nuclear stockpiles of the
former Soviet Union.[62]

The United Nations Conference on Disarmament in Geneva in 1980 led to the development of the
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), a multilateral treaty that prohibited the development,
production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons, and required the elimination of existing
stockpiles.[63] The treaty expressly prohibited state parties from making reservations (unilateral
caveats).[63] During the Reagan administration and the George H. W. Bush administration, the U.S.
participated in the negotiations toward the CWC.[63] The CWC was concluded on September 3, 1992,
and opened for signature on January 13, 1993. The U.S. became one of 87 original state parties to
the CWC.[63] President Bill Clinton submitted it to the U.S. Senate for ratification on November 23,
1993. Ratification was blocked in the Senate for years, largely as a result of opposition from Senator
Jesse Helms, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.[63] On April 24, 1997, the
Senate gave its consent to ratification of the CWC by a 74–26 vote (satisfying the required two-thirds
majority). The U.S. deposited its instrument of ratification at the United Nations on April 25, 1997, a
few days before the CWC entered into force. The U.S. ratification allowed the U.S. to participate in
the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the organization based in The Hague that
oversees implementation of the CWC.[63]

Upon U.S. ratification of the CWC, the U.S. declared a total of 29,918 tons of chemical weapons, and
committed to destroying all of the U.S.'s chemical weapons and bulk agent.[64] The U.S. was one of
eight states to declare a stockpile of chemical weapons and to commit to their safe elimination.[65]
The U.S. committed in the CWC to destroy its entire chemical arsenal within 10 years of the entry
into force (i.e., by April 29, 2007),[64] However, at a 2012 conference,[66] the parties to the CWC
parties agreed to extend the U.S. deadline to 2023.[64][66] By 2012, stockpiles had been eliminated at
seven of the U.S.'s nine chemical weapons depots and 89.75% of the 1997 stockpile was
destroyed.[67] The depots were the Aberdeen Chemical Agent Disposal Facility, Anniston Chemical
Disposal Facility, Johnston Atoll, Newport Chemical Agent Disposal Facility, Pine Bluff Chemical
Disposal Facility, Tooele Chemical Disposal Facility, Umatilla Chemical Disposal Facility,[66] and
Deseret Chemical Depot.[67] The U.S. closed each site after the completion of stockpile
destruction.[66] In 2019, the U.S. began to eliminate its chemical-weapon stockpile at the last of the
nine U.S. chemical weapons storage facilities: the Blue Grass Army Depot in Kentucky.[64] By May
2021, the U.S. destroyed all of its Category 2 and Category 3 chemical weapons and 96.52% of its
Category 1 chemical weapons.[65] The U.S. is scheduled to complete the elimination of all its
chemical weapons by the September 2023 deadline.[64] In July 2023 OPCW confirmed the last
chemical munition of the U.S., and that the last chemical weapon from the stockpiles declared by all
States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention was verified as destroyed.[68]

The U.S. has maintained a "calculated ambiguity" policy that warns potential adversaries that a
chemical or biological attack against the U.S. or its allies will prompt a "overwhelming and
devastating" response. The policy deliberately leaves open the question of whether the U.S. would
respond to a chemical attempt with nuclear retaliation.[69] Commentators have noted that this policy
gives policymakers more flexibility, at the possible cost of decreased strategic unpreparedness.[69]

Anti-agriculture

Herbicidal warfare

Disabled children in Vietnam, most of

them impacted by Agent Orange,
2004

Although herbicidal warfare use chemical substances, its main purpose is to disrupt agricultural
food production and/or to destroy plants which provide cover or concealment to the enemy.

The use of herbicides by the U.S. military during the Vietnam War has left tangible, long-term
impacts upon the Vietnamese people and U.S. veterans of the war.[70][71] The government of Vietnam
says that around 24% of the forests of Southern Vietnam were defoliated and up to four million
people in Vietnam were exposed to Agent Orange. They state that as many as three million people
have developed illness because of Agent Orange while the Red Cross of Vietnam estimates that up
to one million people were disabled or have health problems associated with Agent Orange. The
United States government has described these figures as unreliable.[72][73][74] During the war, the U.S.
fought the North Vietnamese and their allies in Laos and Cambodia, dropping large quantities of
Agent Orange in each of those countries. According on one estimate, the U.S. dropped 475,500 US
gallons (1,800,000 L) of Agent Orange in Laos and 40,900 US gallons (155,000 L) in
Cambodia.[75][76][77] Because Laos and Cambodia were officially neutral during the Vietnam War, the
U.S. attempted to keep secret its military involvement in these countries. The U.S. has stated that
Agent Orange was not widely used and therefore hasn't offered assistance to affected Cambodians
or Laotians, and limits benefits American veterans and CIA personnel who were stationed
there.[76][78]

Anti-livestock

During the Mau Mau Uprising in 1952, the poisonous latex of the African milk bush was used to kill
cattle.[79]

See also

1990 Chemical Weapons Accord

Ali Hassan al-Majid

Area denial weapon

Chemical weapon designation

Chemical weapons and the United Kingdom

Gas chamber

List of CBRN warfare forces

List of chemical warfare agents

List of highly toxic gases

Ronald Maddison

Psychochemical weapon

Saint Julien Memorial

Sardasht, West Azerbaijan, a town attacked with chemical weapons during the Iran–Iraq War

Stink bomb
 United States Army Medical Research Institute of Chemical Defense

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References

CBWInfo.com (2001). A Brief History of Chemical and Biological Weapons: Ancient Times to the
19th Century (https://web.archive.org/web/20041205051646/http://www.cbwinfo.com/History/Hi
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Cordette, Jessica, MPH(c) (2003). Chemical Weapons of Mass Destruction (https://web.archive.or

g/web/20050416035052/http://www.want2race.net/hper/Chemical_Weapons_of_Mass_Destructi
on.ppt) . Retrieved November 29, 2004.

Croddy, Eric (2001), Chemical and Biological Warfare (https://archive.org/details/chemicalbiologic0

0crod) , Copernicus, ISBN 978-0-387-95076-1

Smart, Jeffery K., M.A. (1997). History of Biological and Chemical Warfare (https://web.archive.or
g/web/20041015013158/http://usuhs.mil/cbw/history.htm) . Retrieved November 24, 2004.

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archive.org/web/20120706121855/http://www.gulfweb.org/bigdoc/report/riegle1.html) .
Retrieved November 6, 2004.

Gerard J Fitzgerald. American Journal of Public Health. Washington: Apr 2008. Vol. 98, Iss. 4;
p. 611

Гречко, А.А. (1976). Годы Войны. Военное Издательство Министерства Оборонны

СССР.Москва.

Further reading

Leo P. Brophy and George J. B. Fisher; The Chemical Warfare Service: Organizing for War Office of
the Chief of Military History, 1959; L. P. Brophy, W. D. Miles and C. C. Cochrane, The Chemical
Warfare Service: From Laboratory to Field (1959); and B. E. Kleber and D. Birdsell, The Chemical
Warfare Service in Combat (1966). official US history;

Glenn Cross, Dirty War: Rhodesia and Chemical Biological Warfare, 1975–1980, Helion & Company,
2017

Gordon M. Burck and Charles C. Flowerree; International Handbook on Chemical Weapons

Proliferation 1991

L. F. Haber. The Poisonous Cloud: Chemical Warfare in the First World War Oxford University Press:
1986

James W. Hammond Jr; Poison Gas: The Myths Versus Reality Greenwood Press, 1999

Jiri Janata, Role of Analytical Chemistry in Defense Strategies Against Chemical and Biological
Attack (http://arjournals.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev-anchem-060908-155242) ,
Annual Review of Analytical Chemistry, 2009
 Ishmael Jones, The Human Factor: Inside the CIA's Dysfunctional Intelligence Culture, Encounter
Books, New York 2008, revised 2010, ISBN 978-1-59403-382-7. WMD espionage.

Benoit Morel and Kyle Olson; Shadows and Substance: The Chemical Weapons Convention
Westview Press, 1993

Adrienne Mayor, "Greek Fire, Poison Arrows & Scorpion Bombs: Biological and Chemical Warfare in
the Ancient World" Overlook-Duckworth, 2003, rev ed with new Introduction 2008

Geoff Plunkett, Chemical Warfare in Australia: Australia's Involvement In Chemical Warfare 1914 –
Today, (2nd Edition), 2013. (http://www.bookdepository.co.uk/Chemical-Warfare-Australia-Geoff-Plun
kett/9780987427908) . Leech Cup Books. A volume in the Army Military History Series published
in association with the Army History Unit.

Jonathan B. Tucker. Chemical Warfare from World War I to Al-Qaeda (2006)

External links

Official website (http://www.opcw.org/) of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical

Weapons (OPCW)

Rule 74. The use of chemical weapons is prohibited. (https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/

eng/docs/v1_rul_rule74) – section on chemical weapons from Customary IHL Database, an
"updated version of the Study on customary international humanitarian law conducted by the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and originally published by Cambridge University
Press."

Chemical Warfare information page (http://sis.nlm.nih.gov/enviro/chemicalwarfare.html)

Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20121113223023/http://sis.nlm.nih.gov/enviro/chemicalw
arfare.html) November 13, 2012, at the Wayback Machine, from the Disaster Information
Management Research Center of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services including
links to relevant sources in the U.S. National Library of Medicine