COMMITTEE L TAILINGS DAMS AND

WASTE LAGOONS

TAILINGS DAM SAFETY

o Bulletin No. XXX

DRAFT FOR REVIEW BY

NATIONAL COMMITTEES
UNCONTROLLED DOCUMENT
UNTIL PUBLISHED

INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON LARGE DAMS COMMISSION INTERNATIONALE DES GRANDS

BARRAGES
61, avenue Kléber, 75116 Paris
Téléphone : (33-1) 47 04 17 80 - Fax : (33-1) 53 75 18 22 http://www.icold-cigb.org./

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 COMMITTEE ON TAILINGS DAMS (2018-2022)

COMITE MATERIAUX POUR BARRAGES EN REMBLAI

BULLETIN WORKING GROUP

Chairman – Canada H.N. MCLEOD

Vice Chairperson – Sweden A. BJELKEVIK
Australia D. BRETT
Brazil J. PIMENTA DE AVILA
Canada A. SMALL
Czech Republic J. HERZA
South Africa D. GRANT-STUART
United Kingdom R. MONROY
United States P.W. RIDLEN (1)
[T. ALEXEVIA (2)]
International Council of Mining and Metals (ICMM) I. GILLANI

ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE MEMBERS

Chile J. TRONCOSO
China H. ZHOU
Democratic Republic of Congo H. WA KITAMBO
Finland H. NURMIi
France F. BROUSSET
Iran M. ASKARI
Norway Ø. TOGERSRUD
Romania C. PRISCU
Russia A. VAKULENKO
Slovakia M. BAKES
Spain F. SÁNCHO CARO
United Kingdom R. MONROY

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Zambia P. KAMPENGELE

(1) Member until 2019

(2) Member since 2020

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 TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Introduction .................................................................................................... 1
2. Tailings Storage Facility Governance ........................................................... 3
2.1. Introduction .......................................................................................... 3
2.2. Dam Safety Roles and Responsibilities .............................................. 4
2.2.1. Accountable Executive (AE) ................................................ 4
2.2.2. Responsible Site Person (RSP) .......................................... 4
2.2.3. Engineer of Record (EOR) .................................................. 5
2.2.4. Independent Technical Reviewer(s).................................... 6
2.3. Tailings Management System ............................................................. 6
2.3.1. Overview ............................................................................. 6
2.3.2. Planning .............................................................................. 8
2.3.3. Implementation .................................................................. 11
2.3.4. Audits, Verifications and Reviews ..................................... 11
2.3.5. Risk Management ............................................................. 12
2.3.6. Management of Change and Incident Reporting .............. 13
2.4. Documentation and Records ............................................................. 13
3. Closure ........................................................................................................ 16
3.1. Closure Design Principles ................................................................. 16
3.2. Closure Phases ................................................................................. 17
3.3. Technical Aspects of Sustainable Closure Design ............................ 18
3.4. Landform Design ............................................................................... 21
4. Dam Classification ....................................................................................... 23
4.1. Consequence classification basis...................................................... 23
4.2. Dam Consequence Classification Categories ................................... 24
4.2.1. Population at Risk and Potential Loss of Life .................... 24
4.2.2. Environment ...................................................................... 25
4.2.3. Health, Social and Cultural ................................................ 25
4.2.4. Infrastructure and Economics ........................................... 25
5. Site Characterization ................................................................................... 28

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 5.1. Introduction ........................................................................................ 28
5.2. Social and Environmental Setting ..................................................... 28
5.3. Physical Setting ................................................................................. 29
5.4. Climate and Hydrology ...................................................................... 30
5.5. Geological and Geotechnical Characterization ................................. 31
5.5.1. Overview ........................................................................... 31
5.5.2. Site Geological Model ....................................................... 32
5.5.3. Geotechnical Design Model(s) .......................................... 33
5.5.4. Geological Setting ............................................................. 34
5.5.5. Geotechnical Characterization .......................................... 34
5.5.6. Borrow Materials ............................................................... 35
5.6. Hydrogeology .................................................................................... 36
5.7. Seismicity .......................................................................................... 37
5.7.1. Seismic Setting and Methods ........................................... 37
5.7.2. Maximum Credible Earthquake ......................................... 39
5.7.3. Site Specific Hazard Assessment ..................................... 39
6. Tailings Characterization............................................................................. 41
6.1. Introduction ........................................................................................ 41
6.2. Classification of Tailings .................................................................... 42
6.2.1. Key principles .................................................................... 42
6.2.2. Geotechnical Classification ............................................... 42
6.2.3. Geochemical Classification ............................................... 45
6.3. Laboratory Testing and In situ Testing .............................................. 46
6.4. Geotechnical Properties .................................................................... 47
6.4.1. In situ Density and Consolidation Behavior ...................... 47
6.4.2. Hydraulic Conductivity....................................................... 48
6.4.3. Shear Strength and Deformation Behavior ....................... 48
7. Design ......................................................................................................... 50
7.1. Introduction ........................................................................................ 50
7.2. Lifecycle Phases and Design Stages of a Tailings Dam ................... 50
7.3. Design Steps for a New Tailings Dam .............................................. 52
7.4. Design of Raises and Ongoing Operations ....................................... 54
7.5. Risk-Informed Design ........................................................................ 54

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 7.5.1. Overview ........................................................................... 54
7.5.2. Observational Method ....................................................... 55
7.5.3. Performance-Based Risk-Informed Safe Design .............. 56
7.6. Dam Failure Modes ........................................................................... 57
7.6.1. Overview ........................................................................... 57
7.6.2. Typical Failure Modes ....................................................... 58
7.6.3. Supporting Analysis for Failure Modes ............................. 61
7.7. Design Basis ...................................................................................... 62
7.8. Design Criteria ................................................................................... 63
7.8.1. General .............................................................................. 63
7.8.2. Flood Design Criteria......................................................... 64
7.8.3. Seismic Design Criteria ..................................................... 67
7.9. Slope Stability Assessment ............................................................... 68
7.9.1. Introduction ........................................................................ 68
7.9.2. Slope Stability Assessment Methods ................................ 69
7.9.3. Limit Equilibrium Method ................................................... 71
7.9.4. Target Factors of Safety for Limit Equilibrium Stability
Analyses ............................................................................ 72
7.9.5. Stability Conditions ............................................................ 72
7.9.6. Post Liquefaction Stability Conditions ............................... 74
7.9.7. Residual Strength in Clay and “Clay Like” Tailings ........... 74
7.9.8. Additional Stability Conditions ........................................... 75
7.9.9. Adjustments to Target FOS ............................................... 76
7.9.10. Three-Dimensional Stability L-E Analyses ........................ 77
7.9.11. Limitations of Limit Equilibrium Analyses .......................... 77
7.9.12. Safety Evaluation with Non-Linear Deformation Analyses 78
7.9.13. Performance-Based Stability Evaluation ........................... 79
7.10. Earthquake Assessment (Seismic Stability) ...................................... 80
7.10.1. Cyclic Liquefaction Evaluation .......................................... 80
7.10.2. Earthquake Stability and Deformation Analyses ............... 81
7.11. Seepage Design ................................................................................ 82
7.11.1. Pore Pressures, Filters and Drainage ............................... 82
7.11.2. Design Measures to Minimize Seepage............................ 83

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 7.12. Hydrotechnical Design ...................................................................... 84
7.12.1. Introduction ....................................................................... 84
7.12.2. Environmental Design Flood (EDF) .................................. 86
7.12.3. Inflow Design Flood (IDF), Critical Duration and Freeboard
.......................................................................................... 86
7.12.4. Water Balance and Water Recovery................................. 88
7.13. Environmental Design ....................................................................... 90
8. Risk Management ....................................................................................... 92
8.1. Introduction ........................................................................................ 92
8.2. Risk Assessment ............................................................................... 92
8.2.1. Overview ........................................................................... 92
8.2.2. Risk Identification .............................................................. 94
8.2.3. Risk Analysis ..................................................................... 95
8.2.4. Risk Evaluation ................................................................. 96
8.3. Preventative Controls and Monitoring Options.................................. 96
8.4. Trigger Action Response Plans ....................................................... 100
8.5. Monitoring ........................................................................................ 102
9. Dam Failure / Breach Analysis .................................................................. 105
9.1. Introduction ...................................................................................... 105
9.2. Dam Breach Assessment ................................................................ 106
9.3. Dam Breach Methodology ............................................................... 107
9.3.1. Dam Failure Runout Mechanisms................................... 107
9.3.2. Dam Breach Modeling and Inundation Mapping............. 108
10. Emergency Preparedness and Response Planning ................................. 111
10.1. Introduction ...................................................................................... 111
10.2. Emergency Preparedness ............................................................... 112
10.2.1. Engineering Assessment of Potential Emergency
Conditions ....................................................................... 112
10.2.2. Establishing the Emergency Operations and Management
System ............................................................................ 113
10.2.3. Testing an ERP ............................................................... 114
11. Construction .............................................................................................. 115
11.1. Introduction ...................................................................................... 115
11.2. Supervision and Documentation ..................................................... 115

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 11.3. Confirmation of Design Intent and Documentation of As-Constructed
Conditions ........................................................................................ 116
12. Operations ................................................................................................. 118
12.1. Introduction ...................................................................................... 118
12.2. Operations, Maintenance and Surveillance Manual ........................ 119
12.3. Engineering Aspects of Operations ................................................. 121
12.3.1. Tailings Deposition and Water Management Plan .......... 121
12.3.2. Surveillance, monitoring and evaluation ......................... 121
12.3.3. Dam safety assessments and audits .............................. 123
13. References ................................................................................................ 124
14. Definitions and Acronyms (incomplete) ..................................................... 130
15. ACRONYMS .............................................................................................. 137

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 FIGURES; TABLES

Figures
Fig. 2.1 Framework for a Tailings Management System (after MAC 2021).. 7
Fig. 2.2 Flow chart of a typical tailings project within a TMS ........................ 8
Fig. 6.1 Indicative gradation ranges for tailings classification types ........... 44
Fig. 6.2 Indicative plasticity chart for tailings classification ......................... 44
Fig. 7.1 Schematic of typical design steps for new tailings facilities ........... 53
Fig. 7.3 Schematic showing operating and flood levels .............................. 85
Fig. 8.1 Risk Assessment Process Diagram ............................................... 93
Fig. 8.2 Critical control framework (ICMM, 2015) ....................................... 99
Fig. 8.3 Illustration of TARP transition from operations to emergency
response ...................................................................................... 101

Tables
Table 3.1 Examples of sustainable closure design considerations ............... 20
Table 3.2 Examples of closure design loading conditions ............................. 21
Table 4.1 Tailings dam consequence classification ....................................... 26
Table 6.1 Summary of tailings types and geotechnical classification ............ 43
Table 7.1 Examples of analyses to inform determination of failure modes ... 62
Table 7.2 Suggested minimum flood design criteria for operating and active
care phases .................................................................................... 66
Table 7.3 Minimum seismic design criteria .................................................... 68
Table 7.4 Target factors of safety .................................................................. 72
Table 8.1 Tailings storage facilities – examples: key preventative controls and
assurance/verification .................................................................... 97
Table 8.2 Example TARPs for flood storage with performance indicators
related to critical controls, and pre-defined actions for various risk
levels ............................................................................................ 101
Table 8.3 Summary of monitoring technology examples ............................. 103
Table 12.1 Example table of contents on an OMS Manual ........................... 120

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 APPENDICES

Appendix A: Shear Strength and Deformation Behavior of Soils and Tailings

Appendix B: Stability Analysis Framework for Tailings Dams with Contractive
Soils

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 FOREWARD

The previous bulletin relating to tailings dam design prepared by the

ICOLD Tailings Dam Committee was ICOLD Bulletin No. 106, Guide to Tailings
Dams and Impoundments, which was published in 1996. Since that time there
have been quantum changes and advances in the awareness of tailings dam
safety and the professional practices that support safe design, operation and
closure of tailings facilities.

This Bulletin consolidates the key aspects related to good design and
good governance of tailings facilities and is a valuable guide for designers of
tailings facilities, as well as operators, managers, and regulatory personnel.

The ICOLD Working Group members provided valuable time and

technical input into this bulletin and deserve special thanks. The member
countries also provided valuable input during our Committee meetings and with
review of this document. We also wish to thank reviewers from the National
Committees and from industry subject matter experts.

HARVEY MCLEOD
CHAIRMAN (2011 - 2021)
COMMITTEE ON TAILINGS DAMS AND WASTE LAGOONS

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 PREFACE

ICOLD has produced this Bulletin to assist the international community

to further develop and adopt safe practices for tailings dam planning, design,
construction, operation and closure with a focus on the technical aspects that are
mentioned but not fully developed in other recent National and Industry
Guidelines and Standards. Governance and human aspects have also been
touched on with appropriate references where other guidance documents are
considered more comprehensive. The Bulletin consolidates key information from
these Guidelines and Standards together with information from various previous
ICOLD Bulletins that address specific aspects of the topic to provide a
comprehensive overview of “what makes a tailings dam safe.” Comprehensive
references are provided to assist users to access more detailed information
where relevant.

In preparing this bulletin, ICOLD has strived to consolidate “leading

practice” for tailings dams.

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 1. INTRODUCTION

This Bulletin has been prepared by ICOLD to document recommended

technical practices for the planning, design, construction, operation, and closure
of tailings dams, with the overarching goal of promoting the safety of these
structures. The Bulletin draws on the experience and technical knowledge of the
members of the ICOLD Technical Committee on Tailings Dams and Waste
Lagoons, with reference to existing Bulletins produced by ICOLD, for example,
guidelines produced by member countries, including Australia (ANCOLD) and
Canada (CDA), and other documentation developed by industry groups such as
the Mining Association of Canada (MAC) and the International Council on Mining
and Metals (ICMM). This bulletin considers practices outlined in the Global
Industry Standard for Tailings Management (GISTM).

The focus of the Bulletin is on the safety of tailings dams, which form the
most significant component of most tailings storage facilities (TSFs).
Nevertheless, the Bulletin provides guidance on the overall TSF when
appropriate and may also be relevant to certain TSFs that do not include a
structure that meets the accepted definition of a dam (such as filtered tailings
“stacks”). The technical and governance principles described in this Bulletin are
to be applied throughout the life phases of a tailings dam, from concept to post-
closure.

This Bulletin focuses on the technical aspects of tailings dam safety, but
it also provides a framework for governance, providing guidance to support
mining companies, tailings engineers, regulatory personnel, and other
professionals who are involved in tailings management.

ICOLD recognizes that many countries have strong national guidelines

and standards already in place to regulate tailings and mine waste storage
facilities, which in some cases may differ from the proposals outlined in this
Bulletin. In this case, the intention is not to contradict existing standards, but to
provide a benchmark against which countries may evaluate their standards.
ICOLD’s intention is to assist in developing a common international approach to
ensuring the safety of tailings storage facilities into the future.

Recent external pressure from investors and ongoing interest from

industry led to the development of the GISTM. The intention of this Bulletin is to
provide technical details which also support the objectives and principles outlined
in the GISTM and other industry guidance documents.

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 The Bulletin is structured as follows:

• Section 2 – Tailings Planning and Governance

• Section 3 – Closure
• Section 4 – TSF classification
• Section 5 – Site characterization
• Section 6 – Tailings characterization
• Section 7 – Design
• Section 8 – Risk management
• Section 9 – Dam failure analysis
• Section 10 - Dam breach analysis
• Section 10 – Emergency preparedness and response planning
• Section 11 – Construction
• Section 12 - Operations

Appendices are included that contain technical notes expanding on

specific aspects identified in the main body of the guidance. This structure allows
for ready inclusion of additional technical notes or updating the technical notes
as new or improved information becomes available.

This Bulletin draws on many documents, but it is also recognized that the
dam safety practices and technologies are evolving and some of the references
used to prepare this Bulletin may be superseded. Although a list of key references
is included, it can be expected that as future documents are produced that would
constitute key references, it is possible to update the List of References rather
than the entire Bulletin.

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 2. TAILINGS STORAGE FACILITY GOVERNANCE

2.1. INTRODUCTION

ICOLD Bulletin 139 “Improving Tailings Dam Safety” (ICOLD, 2011) highlighted
the importance of the Corporate and Management role in setting the standards
for achieving safe TSFs. Companies that are actively improving the state of
practice have three factors in common:

• High performance leadership

• Organization building through good management systems and
dedicated employee participation
• Talent creation by means of development programs and training

This theme has been further developed by various national and international
organizations attempting to assist industry to develop around above listed
factors. For example, ICMM, a mining industry group, released their “Position
statement on preventing catastrophic failure of tailings storage facilities” (ICMM,
2016), which listed the following key elements of a TSF governance framework:
1. Accountability, Responsibility and Competency
2. Planning and Resourcing
3. Risk Management
4. Change Management
5. Emergency Preparedness and Response
6. Review and Assurance
These six key elements were further developed by the MAC in their
Guide to the Management of Tailings Facilities (MAC, 2021), with the objective
of providing a framework for the management of tailings facilities and helping
Owners of tailings facilities develop effective tailings management systems.
ICMM has also developed the “Tailings Management Good Practice Guide”
(ICMM, 2021), which further elaborates the expectations for effective governance
and management of tailings facilities.

TSF governance (including planning) is directed by the Owner of the

TSF, who is ultimately accountable for all aspects of design, construction,
operation, and closure to minimize risks to people and the environment. Having
an adequate management framework with appropriate personnel in place are key
to tailings dam safety.

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 ICOLD endorses the guidance developed by MAC and by ICMM for the
responsible management of tailings facilities worldwide. Other guidance
documents may be developed and implemented in the future. The following
sections outline the core elements of a successful governance framework that
ICOLD believes must be adhered to safely construct, operate and
close/decommission tailings now and in the future.

2.2. DAM SAFETY ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

The roles of the responsible persons involved in the governance of the

TSF should be developed to establish accountability and assurance that key
activities associated with the TSF are appropriately carried out and managed.
The responsibilities of these key roles, as well as supporting roles, should be
communicated throughout the organization. The use of a RASCI (Responsible,
Accountable, Supporting, Consulted, Informed) matrix is highly recommended to
clarify and effectively communicate roles and responsibilities in complex systems.
Further guidance on the application of the RASCI matrix can be found in ICOLD
Bulletin 154 (ICOLD, 2013). Further guidance on the key roles described herein
is provided in ICMM (2021).

While management structures and capacity vary at different facilities, at

a minimum, key roles should include the following:

2.2.1. Accountable Executive (AE)

The Accountable Executive (AE), or equivalent, should be appointed for

each TSF and should be a part of the Mine Owner’s Management Team. The AE
should be appointed by senior management, taking into consideration the
consequence rating, complexity, and risk of the facility. The AE should have
decision-making ability and control (through the business structure) the resources
necessary to exercise this single point of accountability. The AE should be
accountable for maintaining effective governance and integrity of the TSFs
throughout the lifecycle of the mine, so that risks associated with tailings facility
design, construction, operations, maintenance and closure are effectively
identified, controlled, and managed to minimize impacts to health, safety,
communities, the environment, and the business. This includes ensuring that
adequate resources, processes, and systems are in place in consideration of the
complexity of the TSF.

2.2.2. Responsible Site Person (RSP)

A Responsible Site Person (RSP) should be appointed for each tailings

dam as leader of the Operations Team with responsibility for all aspects of day-
to-day operations. The RSP should report to the site management and ultimately
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to the AE with respect to the TSF. The RSP should be responsible for working
closely with the Engineer of Record (EOR) regarding technical matters related to
design, construction, and operation of the tailings dam to make sure the EOR is
informed of any changes to the TSF that deviate from the design intent. The RSP
should preferably be a qualified engineer and have a good understanding of the
design, construction, and operation of the facility. The RSP should be informed
and consulted on all matters related to the TSF and should ensure that key
elements, such as design, documentation, deposition plans, surveillance, and
construction are effectively implemented.

2.2.3. Engineer of Record (EOR)

An Engineer of Record (EOR) should be appointed for each tailings dam.

The EOR should be responsible for providing assurance to the Owner and other
appropriate stakeholders that the TSF is designed with appropriate concern for
health, safety and environment; in alignment with the current state of practice;
and in accordance with applicable regulations, statutes, guidelines, codes and
standards. The EOR further advises the Owner whether the construction of the
facility conforms to the design concept and provides critical support during
operations to advise the Owner whether the operation of the facility is consistent
with the design concept and according to recommended practice. The EOR
should be a professional engineer, suitably qualified and with extensive
experience in design, construction, and operation of dams of similar scale and
complexity to the dam being certified. The EOR is an individual, supported by a
team of Subject-Matter Experts and other technical personnel, as applicable. The
EOR is usually an external consultant, typically employed by an engineering firm
that may be referred to as the EOR Company. However, in some cases, the EOR
may instead be an employee of the Mine Owner. Regardless of the employment
or contracting arrangement, the EOR is accountable for the design and should
remain in responsible charge of the design team when designs are prepared. In
some cases, especially when the EOR is an employee of the Mine Owner or for
older facilities, there may be a separation of the EOR and designer roles. In these
cases, the EOR should either be involved in the design phase to guide the
requirements of the design or should be provided an opportunity to perform a
detailed review of designs performed by others in order to accept responsibility
for the design intent and assure the Owner that the design is appropriate.
Attempts to separate the EOR from the design process are not consistent with
the goals of the GISTM and other international guidelines and should be avoided.

The EOR should have an appropriate level of control of all aspects of

construction and operation of the tailings dam through a robust approval process.
The EOR must have direct access for communication to the AE.

The retention of the background knowledge of the EOR is a significant

benefit to the safety of the tailings dam and the role is envisaged as on-going,
with the intention of maintaining as much continuity as possible during the
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different phase of project development. Any change of EOR should be carefully
planned to avoid loss of critical technical information affecting dam safety. A
succession plan for the EOR should be developed to provide a smooth transition
in the event of a change in personnel. It is also good practice to transfer the
knowledge between several persons to provide flexibility.

2.2.4. Independent Technical Reviewer(s)

Independent reviewers should be appointed for all TSFs and where a

TSF has a classification of at least Very High or Extreme (reference Table 4.1)
more than one reviewer should be appointed to form an Independent Technical
Review Board (ITRB), sometimes referred to as an Independent Tailings Review
Board or using other similar names. The number of ITRB members should be
commensurate with the complexity of the TSF design and site conditions, and the
consequence classification. The reviewers should be appropriately skilled and
external to the Owner’s company and the EOR’s company, with relevant
experience in key disciplines associated with the TSF. The reviewers report to
the AE and are responsible for judging the adequacy of the design, and
operations and governance of the TSF.

2.3. TAILINGS MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

2.3.1. Overview

The Tailings Management System (TMS), also referred to as the Dam

Safety Management system, comprises the key components for management
and oversight of the TSF throughout its life phases from conception to closure.
The primary objective of a TMS is to manage and minimize the risks associated
with the TSF (Refer to 2.3.5). An effective TMS includes the following essential
components:

• Clearly stated objectives, communicated through a policy (or set of

policies) and specific commitments.
• A management framework that allows achievement of the objectives.
• An organizational structure with defined roles, responsibilities, and
authority to implement the commitments.
• Adequate resources to achieve the objectives.
• Training programs to ensure all levels of the organization understand
the objectives and know the correct processes.
• Performance feedback (i.e., audits, investigations, and reviews) to
facilitate continuous improvement.

A framework for Tailings Management System is represented on Fig. 2.1.

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 Fig. 2.1
Framework for a Tailings Management System (after MAC 2021)

The framework and essential elements of the TMS should be established

in the early phases of project development. As a project develops, the TMS
should be expanded in its level of detail as the TSF moves from planning to the
implementation phase.

Fig. 2.2 presents a flow chart of the detailed components typically

involved in a tailings dam project and how these components can be linked to the

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planning, implementation, verification, performance review, and continual
improvement phases of the TMS. The following sub-sections elaborate on the
headings in Fig. 2.2.

Fig. 2.2
Flow chart of a typical tailings project within a TMS

2.3.2. Planning

The objective of planning is to manage risk during all phases of the life
cycle of a TSF, including concept development, design, construction, operation,
decommissioning, rehabilitation, ongoing monitoring and the extended post-
closure period.

Planning should integrate all the processes, systems, procedures, and

other activities required for a safe TSF. Planning includes assigning
accountabilities and responsibilities in support of the tailings management system
(TMS), appointing an EOR and Independent Technical Reviewer(s), developing
a tailings management plan that includes an options evaluation, defining design
criteria, and performing up-front design studies for the TSF. Site characterization
and determination of the tailings properties commences early in the planning
stage (refer to Sections 5 and 6, respectively) and continues through the planning
and implementation phases of development.

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 Planning should consider the potential activities that will take place
throughout the life of the TSF. This will include the initial “mine life” but also should
consider potential extension of mining or changes in production and tailings
properties that might affect the design, operation, and ultimately, closure. It is
important that the requirements and conditions necessary for the safe
construction, operation, and closure of the TSF are integrated in the wider project
plan (Life-of-Mine plan) in both the early stage of the project development and
throughout the life of mine.

Integrating the planning for tailings storage into Life-of-Mine planning

should also consider impacts or synergies with other aspects of the mine
operation. For example, use of mine waste rock for dam construction or using the
TSF to attenuate mine site drainage and collection systems. Cost and
environmental benefits can often be achieved in the overall project with minor
extra effort or cost impact. Tailings storage considerations should be part of
optimizing mining and processing operations.

Additional considerations for planning include:

• Full understanding of the setting, the operating environment, and the

potential risks, including measures to prevent adverse impacts.
• Land ownership and land use.
• Establishing basis for design to nominated standards, methods, and
safety margins to address identified risks and failure modes.
• Development of a closure plan considering the potential final
landscape, land/water use, land ownership, and environmental
safety.
• Adopting a TMS that optimizes and improves the TSF operations and
reduces risks.
• Consideration of possible developments beyond the immediate
economic mine life. Planning should provide a degree of flexibility
that might allow significant strategic and economic benefits to be
achieved in the future with minimal cost in the present.
• Considering the performance of the tailings dam being potentially
affected by other mining operations including blasting, dewatering,
groundwater recharging, surface water redirection, mine pits
development etc.

In the options evaluation for new TSFs, or major changes to existing

TSFs, the full cost of tailings production and disposal from conceptualization to
closure need to be considered. This includes long-term post-closure maintenance
considerations as well as social, geochemical, and environmental aspects. This
will involve selecting appropriate technology in the design to minimize risks
associated with tailings management to an acceptable level during all phases of
the life cycle and support an environmentally and economically viable mining
operation.

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 Initial concept development should consider alternative technologies that
could be appropriate for the project and realistically assess the whole-of-project-
life implications of the technologies on project risks. Technologies chosen should
achieve the identified performance objectives. This should include considerations
of eventual closure and end land use, community expectations, and legal
requirements. Available technologies should be reassessed progressively
through the project life.

The TMS should include operational procedures, techniques, and

methodologies that, through experience and demonstrated application, are
proven to reliably manage risk and achieve performance objectives in a
technically sound and economically efficient manner. The TMS should embrace
continual improvement and operational excellence consistently throughout the
life of a facility, including the post-closure period.

The facility design is advanced in the planning stage beginning with

conceptual and pre-feasibility-level designs and advancing to feasibility-level
designs (terms defined in Section 7.2).

Planning should adapt to potential changes that could impact the TSF
including, but not limited to, the following:

1. Variations in tailings properties resulting from changed ore types or

processing technologies to mined ore, ore types blending,
processing technology etc.
2. Quantities of tailings and water volumes reporting to the TSF,
possibly due to increased production rates or changes in water
management.
3. Personnel changes within the mine or to external consultants.
4. Dam design changes and changes or awareness of unexpected
geotechnical conditions.
5. Climate change.
6. Changes to the ratio of tailings to other mine waste, where the other
mine waste is intended to for tailings dam construction or closure.
Documentation from the planning phase should be comprehensive and
able to stand alone in the event of changes in personnel that have been involved
with the design (from the Owner’s team or the designer’s team). Details should
be provided on the making of key assumptions (where information was lacking),
the basis of key decisions, and their potential risks, so that future personnel do
not lose track of these important aspects.

Page 10
 2.3.3. Implementation

Implementation includes advancing the feasibility-level designs from the

planning phase to preparation of the final design (detailed design to support
construction) and the construction and operation of the tailings dam and the entire
TSF.

Final design should include re-evaluation, and updating as necessary,

the design basis and risk assessment developed in the planning stage. For a TSF
that is constructed in stages over a relatively long period of time, “final” design
will typically include detailed design elaboration of the initial (starter) dam, other
basic facilities, and at least the first dam raise, while the level of detail for the
ultimate configuration may remain at an advanced feasibility-level, especially if
the Observational Method is applied to the design concept. For staged facilities,
detailed design will typically be repeated for each planned raise with sufficient
advanced timing to confirm actual conditions and develop the design with
appropriate oversight and review.

All phases of planning and design are prepared under the responsible
charge of the EOR and reviewed by an independent reviewer or review board. In
some cases, there may be a transition in the EOR from early stages of design to
final design. These transitions must be anticipated and managed according to
formal transition- or management-of-change plans. A succession plan for all key
roles in Section 2.2 should be developed and reviewed periodically. During
construction / operation, there should be ongoing monitoring, design reviews,
preparation or updates to the Operations, Maintenance, and Surveillance (OMS)
Manual and the Emergency Preparedness Plans (EPP); training of operators;
and implementation of tailings disposal operations to meet the design
requirements and intent.

The final design reports, as-constructed reports, OMS Manual and EPP
documents, and other planning phase documents noted above should be
comprehensive to preserve the “corporate memory” in the event of personnel
changes.

2.3.4. Audits, Verifications and Reviews

Ongoing review of the design, construction, and operation of a tailings

dam and other TSF components provides an important feed-back loop to the TMS
and design. As noted in Section 2.3.4, the review stage includes the reviews
undertaken by the EOR, ITRBs, and/or independent peer reviews by third parties.

As part of the tailings governance program, the following should be

undertaken:

Page 11
 • Report by EOR, which should be carried out by the EOR and include,
as a minimum:
o Summary of construction/raise works, QA/QC results,
instrumentation and monitoring results
o Review of structure stability
o Incident reporting
o Review of recommendations
o Review of staffing and resourcing
Recommendations for dam safety requirements and “improvement of
practices” should be documented. The frequency of the EOR report(s) is
normally annual but may depend on the dam classification and the
changes that may be occurring with the TSF. The EOR report is
independent of other dam inspections that may be carried out during the
year.
• Comprehensive Dam Safety Reviews (DSRs) should be carried out
by an independent reviewer or independent review team, using
international best practice guidelines (for example CDA, 2016;
ANCOLD, 2003) at a frequency determined by the classification of
the dam, the complexity of the dam, and potential changes to the
dam. Recommendations for dam safety requirements and
recommendations for “improvement of practices” should be
documented. As a minimum, Action Plans should be developed to
address dam safety recommendations in a timely manner.
• ITRBs should be established for dams with Very High and Extreme
consequence classifications (see Section 4.1), and reviews should
be carried out at least annually. The frequency of ITRB reviews will
depend on the complexity of the TSF and how quickly changes may
be occurring. Independent technical review of dams with lower
consequence classifications should be carried out considering the
complexity of the TSF and the changes that may be occurring.
• Owner Audits should be carried out to verify that the tailings facility
is managed and constructed to meet requirements and that the ITRB,
the EOR and the RSP are effective in meeting the objectives of a
safe dam.

2.3.5. Risk Management

Risk is commonly defined as a measure of the probability and severity

of an adverse effect to life, health, property, or the environment (e.g., ICOLD,
2005). The sources of these adverse effects are referred to as hazards and the
adverse effects to life, health, property, or the environment are referred to as
consequences.

Risk management (further detailed in Section 8) is a fundamental

process to assist in safe tailings dam design and management from the early

Page 12
stages of planning throughout the life cycle of the facility and should be inherently
built into the tailings management system. The use of a structured risk evaluation
process, such as Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) or Potential Failure
Mode Analysis (PFMA), should be an important step in early planning for a
tailings dam. These analyses can be used to assess initial site selection, guide
the design process, and identify risk management protocols throughout the
construction and operating phases.

A risk management plan and risk register should be prepared at the

planning phase that identifies the potential risks and updated regularly as the
project progresses to detailed design and operation. The plan should, to the
extent practicable:

• Eliminate or avoid risks.

• Minimize the likelihood of an unwanted event.
• Respond to, and minimize, the consequences of an unwanted event
or condition.

Risk management can be directly used to identify design requirements

that are not covered in the traditional standards-based or consequence-based
approach, such as piping through the dam foundations and embankment. The
Risk-Informed Design process is discussed in Section 7.5. Risk assessment is
further discussed in Section 8.

2.3.6. Management of Change and Incident Reporting

TSFs are typically built over extensive periods of time. Changes to the
design, construction and operation of the facilities are often proposed due to
changes in plant operation, regulatory requirements, availability of new data,
changes in, or awareness of, new site conditions, etc. As a result, it is important
that these changes are recognized and documented. Additionally, changes in
ownership, personnel, consultants, or contractors can introduce dam safety risks.
A change management system that includes evaluation, review approval and
documentation of all changes should be included in the TMS and implemented.

Incident reporting is important — it documents occurrences at the TSF

with respect to potential dam safety aspects such as cracks, unusual seepage,
loss of freeboard, etc. The lessons learned from incidents is an important element
of continual improvement and reduction of risk.

2.4. DOCUMENTATION AND RECORDS

Careful and thorough documentation is required of all the steps

undertaken through the implementation of the TMS. This documentation
establishes the history and benchmarks for the ongoing safe operation of the
Page 13
facility. A logical and accessible recording system needs to be established to
allow reference to documentation and data necessary for decision-making by the
management team and for demonstration of compliance with regulatory and
owner organization requirements. This is usually a difficult task and great effort
should initially be put into this to manage the normally huge amount of
documentation in a structured way.

Documentation related to the TMS should include:

• Clearly stated policies and specific commitments to the proposed

TMS, including description of the management framework to achieve
the TMS objectives.
• Documentation of the organizational structure proposed for the
tailings management team with roles, responsibilities, and authority
to allow implementation of the commitments being defined.
• Definition of training programs for all levels of personnel involved in
the tailings management activities.
• Definition of a performance feedback system.

Specific documentation through the planning, investigation, design,

construction, and closure phases should at a minimum include the following:

• Site and Technology Alternative Selection report – A report

explaining the site selection and consideration of alternative
technologies considered to determine the Best Appropriate
Technology (BAT) to be implemented at the site. The alternatives
considered should be described together with the methodology used
to select the BAT. This could include a multi-criteria analysis (MCA)
or trade-off study using a weighted rating system to compare how
various options meet desirable or required objectives of the TMS.
• Site Characterization report – A report describing technical
characteristics of the tailings dam site including topography, geology,
geotechnical conditions, groundwater and surface water hydrology,
seismicity, vegetation, fauna, and community aspects. The site
characterization report will establish the original condition of the site
and identify aspects to be considered in the design.
• Design Basis Document (DBD) – A document (report or
memorandum) setting out the basis for design including design
standards or guidelines, geometric parameters, design loadings to
be considered, factors of safety to be achieved in analysis,
operational parameters, and expected closure outcomes. The DBD
is likely to be a “living document” to be updated as design develops,
and operating experience and dam performance is evaluated during
the stages of the life cycle of the storage.
• Risk Register – A register of identified risks, the risk “owner” and
proposed or initiated mitigation measures. The risk register should
be used to guide the design of appropriate risk reduction measures.
Page 14
 The risk register should be reviewed as design progresses, and
regularly through the operating cycles of the tailings dam.
• Design Record Report – A report describing the design process and
outcomes of analyses undertaken to define the final design. The
design record report should contain enough detail to allow peer
reviewers to clearly understand the methods and calculations, and to
assess the validity of the design. The design report should be a
comprehensive documentation of the design process to allow design
data to be retrieved by designers of future raises or closure works.
• As-Constructed report or Record of Construction report – a report to
comprehensively document the construction process, including a
diary of construction, photographic record, presentation of QA/QC
data, instrumentation specification and base readings, and other
information and documentation describing the construction, such as
equipment manuals. The as-constructed report should include a
definitive statement by the EOR that the design intent was achieved.
Any deviation from the initial design should be identified together with
clear and traceable authorization of design changes (this process is
sometimes documented in a distinct Deviance Accountability
Report).
• Operating Reports – Various reports will be generated during the
operating phase of the dam life:
o Daily operator shift reports
o Dam monitoring and surveillance reports
o Routine RSP and EOR inspection reports
o Independent review reports and dam safety reviews

The schedule and scope of these reports should be defined to ensure

that appropriate operational data is recorded, reviewed, and properly stored.

Page 15
 3. CLOSURE

3.1. CLOSURE DESIGN PRINCIPLES

Closure of tailings dams is challenging and probably the most difficult

aspect of overall mine site closure. The importance of properly considering and
planning closure has been highlighted by the GISTM (GTR, 2020) which
reinforces the concept of “design-for-closure”. Design for closure is required in
the early stages of the assessment process for tailings technology options and
initial project planning. Designing for closure will influence the site and technology
selection and design alternatives that are considered for the operational phase.

Successful closure may be much more difficult to achieve as a response

at the end of a facility’s life, when potentially, operational decisions have limited
the options and/or the financial efficiencies that could have been built into the
design. Planning for closure from the very start of mine concept development will
result in reduced risk throughout the life cycle (ICMM, 2018), hence, the closure
philosophy of designing for closure from the beginning of the TSF design is
introduced early in this Bulletin.

Closure of a TSF (ICOLD, 2013) is defined as “the planned final

cessation of tailings disposal and the modification/engineering of the tailings dam
with the objective of achieving long-term physical, chemical, ecological and social
stability and a sustainable, environmentally appropriate after-use”. This includes
transferring the tailings dam from the operating phase to closure and ultimately
through post-closure into the long-term phase that is sustainable and with minimal
risks and requirements for maintenance.

Closure design at the start of the planning process should include input
from a broad range of specialists which could include: mine and tailings planners,
geotechnical and geological engineers, surface and groundwater
hydrologists/engineers, geochemists, biologists, social planners, community
relations planners, landscape architects, and others. In current practice, closure
is often planned in a separate, or parallel, process to the design and operation of
a mine, with the design and operational team working separately from the closure
team. However, it is preferable that a fully integrated approach provides design,
support, and stewardship throughout the life of the mine and beyond. As the
closure plan matures during operations, specialist inputs should be used to
continue to optimize and refine the closure design.

Closure risks should be considered when determining options for tailings

storage, process selection and tailings technology, and applied as a criterion with
realistic weighting during any Multi Criteria Analysis (MCA) or trade-off study.
Page 16
 Social stability begins with the development of site-specific land and
water use objectives that support the long-term sustainable use of the TSF.
Meaningful community engagement and assuring safety is the Owner’s
responsibility and should continue as an ongoing process throughout the tailings
facility lifecycle. The aim of two-way dialog between the Owner and the
community is to ensure that the concerns of local communities are heard and
addressed. True collaboration, rather than just consultation, is key to closure
reclamation success. For this to succeed, appropriate closure criteria are required
and need to be jointly developed and periodically reviewed. Criteria and
community dialogue must be developed specifically for each operation based on
current conditions. Most likely, the collaboration will be somewhat unusual and
unfamiliar to all parties, and the closure team may need to include communication
specialists.

The goal is to determine the end land use and incorporate the closed
TSF into an agreed-upon landscape. An important sustainable benefit of this
approach is that if the community supports the land and water use, there is a
much higher likelihood that the closed TSF will achieve a useful, sustainable
landscape and that the value of the property can revert to the community (or
State). The closure design basis should be agreed upon with the Owner, the
community, regulators, and stakeholders once a conceptual design or alternative
is selected.

Many existing documents already deal with the subject of closing mine
operations and specifically, tailings storage facilities; these are presented in the
Key Reference appendix of this Bulletin. Good International practice today, as
stated in most references, comprises identifying a feasible closure plan in parallel
with developing the tailings disposal methodology and planning for closure
through all phases of a tailings facility lifecycle.

The ultimate closure goal to is to have a sustainable landscape where

catastrophic failure modes have been eliminated and/or where the risks
associated with the structure are judged to be low enough for community
acceptance.

3.2. CLOSURE PHASES

The progression from cessation of mining to the final closure phase can
occur over a broad period of time and typically involves three common phases:

Decommissioning or Transition: Following cessation of mining, closure

works are implemented and monitoring of the performance of the closure works
commences. Closure works could include:

• Earthworks for reshaping the landform to provide desired drainage.

• Provision of a stable drainage outlet spillway or channel.
Page 17
 • Capping of exposed tailings to provide dust control and a vegetation
medium, and reduce infiltration and oxygen ingress (to reduce Acid
Metalliferous Drainage (AMD) risk).
• Buttressing to improve stability.
• Relocation of tailings to a more desirable location to control
environmental aspects. For example, backfilling an open-cut pit
where tailings could be maintained in a stable, saturated condition.
• For dams that can be breached and removed from service, where
they no longer contain water or flowable tailings, this is referred to as
decommissioning.

Active care: During this period, the TSF is being monitored and actively
maintained and there is an ability to respond to unusual or emergency conditions.
Maintenance could include:

• Vegetation restoration
• Erosion repair
• Ongoing water treatment
• Land use development

Passive care: At this stage the maintenance requirements are reduced

to a level consistent with the designated long-term land use. There is no full-time
site presence, although the dams may still be inspected, but on a less frequent
basis. Sites in passive care can be eligible for transfer of ownership and the
leasehold relinquished. At this stage, the topography of the tailings dam could be
described as a ‘land-form’ with similar characteristics as other natural features,
including water-covered storages where the water cover forms part of the agreed
closure plan.

3.3. TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF SUSTAINABLE CLOSURE DESIGN

The technical solutions for establishing a safe and stable facility and/or
landform apply no matter the configuration of the facility. This includes physical
(geotechnical stability, erosion, and settlement), chemical, environmental,
ecological and social stability. All these should be addressed in the early design
when site location, tailings management structure, and the deposition method is
decided. From the first concept of a mining operation, throughout the tailings
facility lifecycle up to finalising the closure, certain questions come up repeatedly:

1. What opportunities are given by the mining operations? What can be

created?
2. What will be the final form of the top and outer surfaces of the TSF
at the end of the active tailings deposition phase?
3. What factors can affect the long-term overall physical and chemical
stability of the TSF?
Page 18
 4. What possible factors regarding closure and long-term condition
are revealed in a risk assessment? How must these be
addressed at design stage?
5. How must the dam be designed to ensure long-term
geotechnical stability?
6. How must the dam be designed to ensure long-term sustainable
hydraulic stability, particularly extreme flood management and
against climate change?
7. How must the dam be designed to ensure long-term ecological
stability of the final dam surfaces and of the surrounding
topography?
8. How can the desired stable closure shape be achieved during
operation and maintained in the long-term?
9. What will be the loading conditions at closure and in the long-
term and how will these change with time?
10. How can we incorporate possible ultimate conditions into the
primary design?
Design for Closure: The requirements for physical, geochemical,
ecological, and social stability need to be considered from the first stages of
planning and technology selection to ensure that commitments of the TSF closure
can be achieved. A fully costed closure plan should be developed prior to
committing to a specific technology and tailings management plan since the
closure costs could have a significant bearing on the economics of the mine.

The subsequent design, construction and operation stages should be

clearly aligned with the intent of the closure plan. As conditions and technologies
evolve and the life of mine potentially extends, the closure plan should be revised
accordingly, provided that the TSF objectives are maintained. Examples of
sustainable design considerations are summarized in Table 3.1.

Page 19
 Table 3.1
Examples of sustainable closure design considerations

Sustainability Technology Options for Consideration

Element
Geotechnical stability Design assuming residual shear strength of tailings, such as modified
upstream, centerline and downstream dams
Eliminate failure mechanisms through design
Robust and resilient designs
Compaction of tailings in the structural zone of an upstream dam
Filtered tailings with compaction, as may be required
Designs that assume filters will plug and will still meet stability
requirements
Designs that reduce hydraulic gradients on closure to reduce piping
risks
Co-disposal with mine waste rock, which in some cases may reduce
the acid generating potential of the mine waste rock
Geochemical Desulphurization of sulfide tailings to produce non-acid generating
tailings, with the sulphide tailings being managed in a small secure
facility or placed in underground workings or mined out open pits
where they can be saturated
Saturated cover designs for PAF tailings facilities with elimination
and/or reduction of stored water volumes
Hydraulic stability Remove the ability to store water
Redundant and/or oversized spillways
Spillways located away from the main dam sections and away from
natural hazards such as snow avalanches or landslides
Ecological stability Design slopes and materials that are resistant to erosion
Vegetation that is resilient to climate change and natural hazards

The design of the facility for closure should also consider the potential
loading conditions that may be experienced over a longer period and some
examples of these loading conditions are summarized in Table 3.2 and further
described in ICOLD Bulletin 153.

Page 20
 Table 3.2
Examples of closure design loading conditions

Sustainability Design Closure Design Considerations

Element
Physical Stability Weathering and degradation of material properties and strength
Stress and Strain Effects on strength and deformations
Erosion of dam fills
Long term seismic effects, e.g. multiple seismic events
Degradation of geosynthetics with potential increases in seepage
Changes to hydraulic gradients and piping risk due to increased
phreatic surfaces
Performance of drains and piezometric levels due to geochemical
clogging or degradation of internal drainage pipes
Hydraulic Stability Climate change leading to increased precipitation and “stress” on
hydraulic structures
Concrete degradation if used for hydraulic structures such as
spillways and diversion channels
Erosion control
Corrosion of pipelines or steel used in structures
Natural Hazards Landslides, rockslides and snow avalanche effects on the
impoundment and structure
Extreme floods in rivers near the toe of the dam
Multiple debris flows which infill a closure lake Which may reduce
the attenuation of extreme floods leading to stress on the spillway
Geochemical Stability Buildup of chemical precipitates leading to blockage of drains and
increased phreatic surfaces.
When acid generating rock is used for construction, long term
weathering may lead to a reduction in the strength of the rockfill.
Ecological hazards Overgrazing leading to loss of vegetation leading to erosion
Erosion of soil covers
Climate change leading to stress on vegetation
Social Stability Excavation of dam fills to be used for other construction purposes
Sabotage or vandalism
Changed water use, such as groundwater supply near the toe of the
dam that could be contaminated.

3.4. LANDFORM DESIGN

Landform design and assessment now benefits from many years of

geomorphic and ecological experience described in literature, as well as
observation of the performance of natural and other mining landforms in a region.
New complex numerical models are rapidly evolving, making tools available for
designing long-term stable landforms.

Page 21
 Landform design should facilitate practical closure with stable drainage
patterns, non-erodible surfaces, reduced settlement potential and slopes with
conservatively high factors of safety against structural instability. The closure
design should account for the expected long performance life of the TSF and
consider, for example:

• Drainage design for extreme floods considering potential plugging of

closure spillways by debris, trees, ice, or animal activity.
• Minimization of stored water.
• Freeboard and drainage paths allowing for long- term settlement and
earthquake induced deformation, including cumulative settlements
from repeated earthquakes events.
• Implementation trials of closure plans during operation to confirm
feasibility and design parameters.
• Setting of performance targets that will validate the transition through
the Active Care and Passive Care phases of closure.

In many cases the land where mining operations are undertaken is

initially undisturbed land and the obvious closure option could be to turn it back
to a natural landscape. In other cases, communities or towns have grown up
around the mine and it may be that originally undisturbed land may be more
appropriately used for something different. To date there are examples around
the world where the land of mining operations has been turned into something
new, with a new value for the local community and/or society.

Closure solutions for tailings facilities and mine sites should create “new
value” for the closed facilities with reduced maintenance requirements being
managed by a sustainable institution; community, municipality, state etc., which
will have the incentive to maintain the land if there is a benefit, i.e. a positive
outcome. Potential closure concepts should be explored in the early stages of
closure planning to focus on what possible opportunities a new, or existing, mine
can give.

Page 22
 4. DAM CLASSIFICATION

4.1. CONSEQUENCE CLASSIFICATION BASIS

Tailings dams are classified according to the potential consequences of

failure of the dam with respect to population, environment, societal and economic
impacts. This form of classification has been operating in various countries for
many years. For the purpose of this Bulletin, ICOLD defines a failure scenario as
a combination of a failure mode that is physically possible, has a technical basis
for its occurrence, and an estimated deformation and runout/inundation which is
based on supportable technical analyses.

When establishing the consequence classification, the potential for a

failure is considered, no matter how low the likelihood of failure and allowance
needs to be made for uncertainty. The basis and rationale for eliminating potential
failure modes as not physically possible must be rigorously developed and
properly documented.

The consequence classification should have a technical basis for its

occurrence, and an estimated runout/inundation that is based on supportable
technical analyses. This practice differs from that used during risk assessments
when failure modes may be discounted based upon negligible likelihood.
Similarly, the likelihood of a failure scenario may be considered when undertaking
emergency management planning, which is further discussed in Section 10.
Failure Modes are further discussed in Section 7.6.

Dam classification is undertaken for the following reasons:

• To inform the selection of design loading criteria (refer to discussion

in Section 4.2.2).
• To inform the dam safety stewardship and management programs.
• To meet a regulatory or stakeholder requirement.

Section 4.2 and Table 4.1 presents the consequence classification

framework that was developed for this Bulletin, based upon dam classification
frameworks from several jurisdictions around the world. Many countries have
their own methodology for classification of dams, which are often related to the
height of the dam and the volume in the reservoir, and country specific
requirements should always be addressed.

It is important to note that the dam classification category should not be

considered as a measure of risk (which inherently considers likelihood). On the

Page 23
contrary, the dam classification category is used to support design and operating
decisions intended to reduce the likelihood of failure and hence reduce risk.

The dam consequence classification is made by assessing the effects of

two general failure conditions:

• “Sunny day failure” or “Fair weather failure” - used to describe a dam

failure when there is no existing natural flood occurring in the
downstream receiver. The level of the pond in the TSF could be at
the normal operating water level or at a high operating water level.
• “Flood failure” or “Wet weather failure” - used to describe a dam
failure during a natural flooding event where the tailings facility has a
maximum water inflow and the dam breach flow is added to the
natural flood flow in the receiving environment.

For the Fair-weather failure, the effects of the failure are attributed to the
dam breach. For a Flood failure, the concept of incremental losses is considered.
For example, if a flood event is occurring in a downstream receiving environment
at the same time as the dam failure, there may already be damage occurring due
to that flooding. In this case, the incremental damage associated with the dam
failure is also used to inform the consequence classification.

Typically, the consequences of failure are initially assessed qualitatively

with a simplified approach. If there is a potential for loss of life, or if the
consequences of failure on the environment, human health, social and cultural
assets, or infrastructure indicate a Consequence Classification of High or above,
then a more detailed dam breach analysis may be required.

4.2. DAM CONSEQUENCE CLASSIFICATION CATEGORIES

4.2.1. Population at Risk and Potential Loss of Life

Life safety can be assessed in terms of Population at Risk (PAR) and

Potential Loss of Life (PLL). The PAR in an inundation area (due to the dam
breach) provides an indication of the number of people that could be exposed to
the hazard. This includes persons who live in the inundation area, together with
an allowance for people who may be there on a short-term or intermittent basis
(e.g. seasonal or recreational visitors and temporary travelers).

The effects on the PAR could range from inconvenience and economic
losses to loss of life.

The analysis should consider persons who are within the dam breach
inundation zone within and beyond the mine limits. However, this consideration
must not conflict or limit the Owner’s obligations under the applicable national

Page 24
Health and Safety acts. Training of mine staff and communication systems can
be considered with respect to evacuation procedures and the potential for
reducing loss of life.

The PLL in the inundation area (due to the dam breach) is an assessment
of potential fatalities from within the PAR and depends on many factors such as
depth of flow, velocity, time of day, advanced warning, topography, transportation
routes, mobility, etc.

4.2.2. Environment

Environmental values comprise aquatic and terrestrial habitat, including

the presence of rare and endangered species. Water quality effects include
surface and groundwater use, as well as aquatic habitat, livestock, and wildlife
use. The geochemistry of the released tailings may influence surface water
quality in cases where potentially acid-generating tailings, or tailings with neutral
metal leaching, are deposited within the inundation zone. If the tailings are not
able to be recovered, they may have longer term effects on water quality and
terrestrial habitat. The toxicity of the released process water may also have short
term effects or in a worst-case scenario, long-term effects if species are
eliminated from the area affected. In general, the scales of the impacts are
considered on both short-term and on the potential for long-term effects and on
the ability for the environment to recover.

Seepage and air quality should also be considered as a credible failure

mode as in some cases they can have significant long-term impacts.

4.2.3. Health, Social and Cultural

Health, social and cultural values include disruptions or losses to local

businesses, services, or social dislocation of people and workers, as well as
potential losses to local and regional recreational, heritage and cultural assets.
Human health may be influenced by the toxicity of the tailings process water and
leaching of released tailings, or from seepage of contaminated water from a TSF.

4.2.4. Infrastructure and Economics

Infrastructure and economic losses typically relate to third-party property,

not the infrastructure losses on the mine lease or economic losses to the Owner.
Infrastructure losses can include bridges, highways, power stations, commercial
and residential/properties etc. Loss of infrastructure that contains hazardous
substances can exacerbate the consequence. Loss of employment and the
economic requirements to compensate persons and property are considered.
Economic assessment should also include the clean-up and rehabilitation costs
Page 25
potentially borne by the community in the event of bankruptcy of the Owner. The
economic consequences do not directly consider the Owner costs that may be
due to loss of production, potential liability costs, loss of shareholder value or
social license.

Table 4.1
Tailings dam consequence classification

Incremental Losses
Consequence
Classification
Dam Failure

Environment3,

Health, Social

Infrastructure
Population at

Loss of Life2

Economics 5
& Cultural
Potential
Risk1

and
4

Low none none Minimal short-term Minimal effects Low economic

loss of and disruption of losses: area
environmental business and contains limited
values. No expected livelihood. No infrastructure or
impact on livestock / measurable effects services
fauna drinking on human health. - <US$1M.
water. Limited area No disruption of
of impact and heritage,
restoration feasible recreation,
in short term. community or
cultural assets
Significan 1-10 none Limited loss or Limited effects and Losses to
deterioration of disruption of recreational
t
environmental business and facilities, seasonal
values. Potential livelihood (<500 workplaces, and
contamination of people affected). infrequently used
livestock/fauna No measurable transportation
water supply. effects on human routes.
Potential area of health. Limited loss - <US$10M
impact < 5 km2. of regional
Restoration possible heritage,
in <5 years. recreation,
community, or
cultural assets.
High 10- 1 - 10 Significant loss or 500 - 1,000 people High economic
deterioration of affected by losses affecting
100
critical disruption of infrastructure
environmental business, services, public
values. Potential or social transportation, and
contamination of dislocation. commercial
livestock/fauna Significant loss of facilities, or
water supply. regional heritage, employment.
Potential area of recreation, Moderate
impact 5 km2 – 20 community, or relocation /
km2. Restoration cultural assets. compensation to
possible but difficult Potential for Some communities.
and could take > 5 short-term human <US$100M
years health effects.

Page 26
 Incremental Losses

Consequence
Classification
Dam Failure

Environment3,

Health, Social

Infrastructure
Population at

Loss of Life2

Economics 5
& Cultural
Potential
Risk1

and
4
Very High 100- 10 to Major loss or > 1,000 people Very high
deterioration of affected by economic losses
1000 100
critical disruption of affecting important
environmental business, services, infrastructure or
values including or social services (e.g.
rare and dislocation for highway, industrial
endangered species more than one facilities, storage
of high significance. year. Significant facilities for
Potential area of loss of national dangerous
impact >20 km2. heritage, substances), or
Restoration or recreation, or employment. High
compensation community relocation/compen
possible but very facilities or cultural sation to
difficult and requires assets. Significant communities.
a long time (5 years long-term human <US$1B
to 20 years). health effects.
Extreme > 1000 > 100 Catastrophic loss of > 5,000 people Extreme economic
critical affected by losses affecting
environmental disruption of critical
values including business, services, infrastructure or
rare and or social services (e.g.
endangered species dislocation for hospital, major
of high significance. years. Significant industrial complex,
- Potential area of National heritage major storage
impact > 20 km2. or community facilities for
Restoration or facilities or cultural dangerous
compensation in assets destroyed. substances or
kind impossible or Potential for employment. Very
requires a very long Severe and/or high
time (>20 years). long-term human relocation/compen
health effects sation to
communities and
very high social
readjustment
costs. > US$1B
Notes:
1. Population at Risk: Includes allowance for people who may be within the inundation zone
on a short-term or intermittent basis (e.g. seasonal or recreational visitors, temporary
travelers or workers)
2. Potential Loss of Life: There are several methods used to estimate PLL – refer to
references
3. Environmental values: Include aquatic and terrestrial habitat and life, the presence of rare
and endangered species, and ecosystem integrity.
4. The potential effects due to released tailings or process water consider the geochemical
properties, restoration time, and the effectiveness of restoration.
5. Infrastructure and economics: Include indirect and tangible losses. Costs are indicative
only.

Page 27
 5. SITE CHARACTERIZATION

5.1. INTRODUCTION

The objective of site characterization is to establish conditions and

parameters that impact and/or would be impacted by the TSF design,
construction, operations, and closure. The site characterization should cover the
dam site, the TSF area, and its surroundings, including the potential dam break
impact zone. Site characterization of existing TSFs also includes the deposited
tailings, dams and associated structures.

The characterization activities are iterative, with continual improvement

of the site understanding as the project develops from planning through to the
closure. The site characterization covers a wide range of aspects including the
following conditions, which are further discussed in this section:

• Social and Environmental setting

• Geomorphology
• Climate and Hydrology
• Geological and geotechnical conditions
• Hydrogeology
• Seismicity

A comprehensive site characterization requires a broad mix of professionals

such as, geologists, geomorphologists, geotechnical engineers, hydrotechnical
engineers, hydrologists, and hydrogeologists, environmental specialists etc. The
selection of the design team, and the identification of independent reviewers,
should consider professionals who have experience commensurate with the
complexity of the site and the potential design considerations.

5.2. SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL SETTING

The social and environmental context is important for all life phases of a
TSF project. Notably, a thorough understanding of the social and environmental
conditions is required to determine the TSF Classification (Section 4) and, in turn,
the TSF classification forms the basis for selecting TSF design and operational
criteria.

The social setting comprises political, socioeconomic, technological,

social, cultural and security factors that include social distinctiveness, regional
economic dynamic, technological development, community culture, traditions,
heritage etc. The overall social setting of the project should be captured in the
Page 28
overall project impact study; however, the TSF-specific context may need to be
further investigated. The social setting may impact the TSF in the following ways:

• Exclusion zones, heritage and sites of cultural significance may

impact the footprint, access, borrow areas, etc.
• Population growth in downstream areas may increase potential dam
breach consequences over time.
• Site security requirements may impact technology selection,
operations, and closure.
• Government rules that promote local employment may impact the
selection of technology for construction and operation.
• Concerns of the surrounding community may limit size and
geometry.
• The residual value of the asset after operations may impact the
closure design (e.g. illegal miners may target tailings).
• Poor social acceptance, including protest activities or other
disruptions, may impact dam safety.

The environmental setting comprises water quality (both surface and

groundwater), water uses downstream (aquatic, livestock/fauna, drinking),
aquatic and terrestrial habitat and the potentially sensitive environmental
receptors of all potential emissions or other impacts both within the TSF footprint
and in the receiving environment. The environmental setting of the project should
be captured in the overall project impact study; however, the TSF specific context
requires specific attention as they may control components of the design.

While the social and environmental components, including stakeholder

liaison, are directed by the TSF owner, the designer for the TSF is responsible
for incorporating these aspects into the design, operational, and closure
requirements. The social and environmental setting of the TSF should be
captured in a social and environmental constraints map(s), or framework, that is
progressively updated throughout the TSF project life.

5.3. PHYSICAL SETTING

The site geomorphology studies and the configuration of the physical

features in and around the site provides the context of the existing landforms and
their relationship with the geological setting. Physical features can be depicted in
three-dimensional topographical models that are used as a base for ongoing data
collection from site investigations and development changes of the TSF and
related structures. The site topography is typically developed in stages, starting
with aerial surveys through to detailed ground surveys. The accuracy of the
surveys should be commensurate with the design and construction requirements
and confirmed by field surveys at critical stages of design and construction.

Page 29
 It is important to capture the on-going as-constructed conditions of
relevant excavations and falls within the potential influence area of the TSF, as
significant changes could materially affect the understanding of the site and the
influence on design.

5.4. CLIMATE AND HYDROLOGY

Climate comprises the meteorological conditions and patterns, including

temperature, atmospheric moisture (including precipitation in the form of rain and
snow, as well as humidity), evaporation, and wind that characteristically prevail
in a particular region over a long period of time. Hydrology covers the occurrence,
distribution, and runoff of surface water. The site hydrology, including surface and
subsurface flows, is governed by the climate, site topography, land cover and
geology.

Climate and hydrology have significant impact on all phases of a TSF,

from planning to closure. Climate and hydrology influence the surficial geology,
hydrogeology, and the geotechnical conditions at the TSF. The amount of
precipitation and the climate type influences the rate of infiltration into the ground
as well as the natural removal of water from the system through evaporation.
Precipitation could introduce artesian pressures in confined or unconfined
pervious layers in, or beneath, the TSF.

Site-specific climatic and hydrologic data are often limited for new
development sites at the time of initial design. In most instances, a data collection
program is initiated during project feasibility and environmental impact studies,
but these data are, to a large degree, limited to very short-term periods and need
to be carefully considered. As a result, the climate characterization of a project
area is supported with regional historic data, which are extrapolated to the site
considering known or potential weather patterns, similarities of watershed
characteristics, and an understanding of the fundamentals of hydro-
meteorological systems, including lapse rates and orographic effects. A
correlation of the regional data to the short-term site-specific data is often used
to support the extrapolation.

The meteorological characterization of a TSF site includes average,

unusual, rare, and extreme conditions, which are derived from regional and site-
specific observations. The hydrological design inputs such as the frequency,
durations and intensity of rainfall events and the flood exceedance, and rating
curves of water courses, should be derived by a hydrologist familiar with the
regional/local hydro-meteorological systems. In cold climates, patterns of snow
accumulation and melt are needed, often with depths of frost penetration and ice
accumulation.

Climate change influences weather patterns, often with increases in the

intensity of short duration precipitation and potentially wetter or drier than normal
Page 30
conditions. Understanding the potential for changes is required to support the
appropriate water management strategy for a TSF.

An understanding of potential long-term climatic changes should be

incorporated into closure planning and the decisions made in the short-term that
result in deviations from the closure plan. The frequency, durations and intensity
of rare and extreme rainfall events and flood estimates as well as potential
changes in evaporation and the effects of the permafrost changes, should be
reviewed regularly to capture changes in climatic data which can affect stability,
seepage, water balance and other factors, particularly on closure.

5.5. GEOLOGICAL AND GEOTECHNICAL CHARACTERIZATION

5.5.1. Overview

A thorough understanding of the site geology and the geotechnical

conditions is crucial for the safety and structural integrity of the TSF, as
demonstrated by the Los Frailes (Spain in 1998), Mt Polley (Canada in 2014),
Cadia (Australia in 2019) and many other TSF failures. Geological and
geotechnical characterization is a systematic and iterative process of
determination and verification of the conditions at the TSF site. The general
approach is to develop a broad appreciation of the site with respect to the overall
landscape, geology, geomorphology, and seismicity in the region and then
progress further to more detailed, site-specific information as the design process
progresses. The collection and interpretation of site data advances through the
project development process, so that a sufficient, three-dimensional
understanding of the site conditions commensurate with the nature of the dam
and appurtenant facilities is developed before construction is initiated. This
systematic characterization of the regional and site-specific geology and
associated historic processes leads to development of a Site Geological Model
(SGM), which is a primary outcome of the site characterization and forms the
basis for the associated geotechnical and hydrogeological parameters used for
design.

The site geology and geotechnical conditions are characterized from a

combination of desktop studies and intrusive and non-intrusive site investigations
carried out in phases. These studies and investigations identify, and
progressively reduce, risks and uncertainties, while increasing the reliability of
information used for the TSF design, construction, operation, and closure. During
scoping-level design (discussed in Section 7.2), the concept for the dam may be
partially or completely developed for one or more alternatives, and some level of
site characterization work is required. However, it must be recognized that the
concept and location for the dam(s) and other major features could require
changes resulting from the continuously advancing understanding of the SGM as

Page 31
the site characterization progresses. Thus, the development of design through
different phases is usually an inherently iterative process.

Characterization of a site’s geological and geotechnical conditions are

closely linked. Geological characterization comprises identifying the factual
condition of the physical structure and substance of a site’s soil and rock units. In
identifying the units and any geological features, a geotechnical investigation
aims to provide geotechnical parameters to the site to quantify engineering
material properties for any design activities, and to quantify hazards that must be
addressed in the design of the TSF.

5.5.2. Site Geological Model

The SGM is a compilation of data including maps, plans, sections, and

reports that capture all objective information regarding the rock and soil types
across the site, as well as geological hazards. The SGM should cover the entire
TSF footprint, as well as the surrounding area to provide the geotechnical and
geological context of the site, potential sources of borrow materials for TSF
construction and the potential geohazards that may influence the site. The SGM
should be treated as the factual data source for the site’s geological information.
The SGM includes the following components of the TSF footprint and the
surrounding area:

• bedrock & structural geology

• surficial geology and geomorphology
• seismicity
• hydrogeological conditions
• geotechnical and geochemical conditions

A preliminary SGM should be developed using existing geological maps,

reports, satellite imagery, photogrammetric and/or LiDAR data, site
reconnaissance, and consideration of the potential geological history and
geomorphology of the site. The geologic data set should include relevant data
from exploration drilling for the ore deposit (consideration of geotechnical
parameters useful for tailings and waste rock characterization should be
incorporated into the exploration drilling program.) The preliminary SGM must
capture the general composition and assembly of the rock and soil types across
the site and identify major geological and geotechnical hazards such as
discontinuities, faults or weak or high permeability zones, or
landslides/rockslides. The preliminary SGM informs the planning of the site
investigation, the purpose of which is to verify and further refine the preliminary
SGM with additional geological, hydrogeological, and geotechnical inputs.
Because the site investigation program should focus on the hazards identified in
the preliminary SGM, site investigations should not start before the preliminary
SGM is developed.

Page 32
 Site investigation programs can include non-intrusive geological and
geophysical surveys, drilling, cone penetration testing, test pitting and sampling
for laboratory tests. The extent of the site investigations should be commensurate
with the geotechnical complexity of the site and with consideration to the potential
consequences of failure of the TSF. As a general principle, it is prudent to assume
that the dam foundation could be complex and to proceed with site investigations
to confirm the foundation characteristics. The outcomes of the geological and
geotechnical investigations must be provided back to the SGM, which is further
refined and developed with the new inputs.

It is important that the methods of rock and soil classification, geological,

geotechnical logging, as well as the rock and soil classification reference
standards (ASTM, AS, USCS, EC, etc.) are clearly defined and used consistently
throughout the course of the SGM and development of the Geotechnical Design
Model (see Section 5.5.3). Equally important is quality control of the field and
laboratory investigations and testing, to ensure high quality data are collected.

For existing TSFs, the SGM should also include the factual
characterization of the in situ tailings (Section 6) and impounding structures
(dams).

5.5.3. Geotechnical Design Model(s)

The SGM forms the basis of the Geotechnical Design Model (GDM).
Whereas the SGM presents the source of factual information, a GDM presents
the interpretive information for engineering design purposes and for a particular
analysis (e.g., slope stability, piping assessment, deformation assessment etc.),
design scenario, loading condition, or a limit state. As a result, there may be
multiple GDMs for a single TSF. In addition, other scenario models based on the
SGM, such as hydrogeochemical or groundwater flow models, may be required
for the TSF design and operations.

As GDMs present material characteristics including tailings (Section 6)

that are appropriate for a particular analysis (such as stability, deformation, or
seepage), the zonation and spatial presentation of the material units in the GDM
should reflect the representative units, which may not necessarily match the
factual zoning presented in the SGM or other GDMs. The spatial presentation of
data should be appropriate for the parameters and properties that are being
applied in the model. It is important, however, to clearly document the connection
between the SGM and the GDMs.

Depending on its objective, development of a GDM may require

additional investigations and testing. For example, an assessment of seismically
induced deformation may require specific cyclic shear tests conducted on
samples from a selected foundation zone(s). In these cases, it is important to
update the SGM and GDM with the newly acquired data.
Page 33
 The use of the GDM for the TSF is further described in Section 7.9.

5.5.4. Geological Setting

Geological characterization starts with studying regional geology to

provide a wider geological context of the site and link it to the regional and
continental geology. The regional geological setting should capture the geological
history, rock types and their composition, as well as the key regional features that
affect the geotechnical properties of the rocks at site, such as faults, fractures,
joints, and types and degree of alteration and weathering.

The regional surficial geologic history is important in understanding and

determining the site-specific conditions. Assessment of the surficial geology
should begin with understanding the geomorphology and deposition and
weathering history (e.g., glacial sequences and stratigraphy, physical and
geochemical weathering of rock in situ, sediment transport mechanisms, etc.).

Understanding the regional geology forms the basis for site-specific

geological mapping and investigations. Bedrock and surficial geological mapping
of the project areas should emphasize geological and geotechnical hazards such
as faults, fractures, jointing, and bedding; the presence of problematic rock types,
such as calcareous rock, or hazardous features such as karst; and the potential
for landslides and rockslides.

The geological setting forms the basis of the SGM model and as the site
investigations and project activities progress, the geological setting is refined and
the SGM updated.

5.5.5. Geotechnical Characterization

The objective of the geotechnical component of the site characterization

program is to define geotechnical units, including tailings and their characteristic
parameters, then used in the GDM for the TSF design. The geotechnical units
represent zones of rock and soil of distinct characteristics, similar genesis, and
similar mechanical properties.

The typical physical and engineering properties of rock units include:

• lithology
• orientation and distribution of main joint sets, textures or fabric
(including bedding orientation)
• weathering
• permeability, and compressive and shear strength

Page 34
 Typical physical and engineering properties of soil units and tailings
include:

• specific gravity, density, gradation (particle size distribution)

• Atterberg limits, moisture content, consistency, dispersivity
• permeability, consolidation, porosity, and shear strength

The engineering properties are determined based on field and laboratory

tests. In situ testing is required to fully characterize granular/non-cohesive soils,
which are difficult to sample undisturbed. Undisturbed samples of cohesive soils
are required for unit weight, permeability, shear strength and consolidation
testing. Further details on geotechnical characterization of tailings, which is also
applicable to foundation soils and existing dams, is provided in Section 6.4.

5.5.6. Borrow Materials

The characterization of the site should also include potential borrow

sources for embankment construction materials. Even when tailings are used to
construct most of the dam, a starter dam of natural materials will almost always
be required, and sources of filter materials, drainage materials, core materials,
rip rap, soil cover for reclamation, and other special components of the dam
design will typically require sourcing of conventional borrow materials. When
mine waste rock is used to construct the tailings dam embankments, the waste
rock properties need to be characterized. The types of investigations for borrow
sources are similar to that of the dam foundations, although the emphasis will be
on how the materials perform after they have been placed into the dam, rather
than how they perform in situ. Laboratory testing programs are essential. Test
fills may also be used to evaluate site-specific engineering properties and
construction issues.

Planning and design studies should include documentation of the

sources for all major material zones used in dam construction. The
documentation should include estimates of the quantity of borrow needed,
considering an appropriate amount of waste, based either on field trials or typical
waste rates from previous experience, or the literature. Requirements for
processing (e.g., dewatering, blasting, crushing, sorting, screening, washing, or
other mechanical or chemical processing) need to be described. Some degree of
investigations (typically including geophysical investigations and geotechnical
drilling and sampling), laboratory testing, and characterization must be performed
during the design process, but more extensive investigations are often required
during the construction and operation phases, especially if borrow area
exploitation occurs over a long period of time. The requirements for borrow
investigations and testing during construction must be documented in the design
documents. Borrow areas should be designated on the drawings and
considerations for permitting, land acquisition, safety, and restoration must be
documented in the construction documents.
Page 35
 5.6. HYDROGEOLOGY

The purpose of a hydrogeological assessment of a TSF is to understand

the interaction of the natural groundwater regime, seepage from the TSF, and
surface flows. This understanding allows quantification of the likelihood, and
impact, of contaminated seepage from the TSF on the surrounding environment
and receptors. The assessment should extend sufficiently far upstream and
downstream of the TSF to include all water sources entering the system —
surface and groundwater flows — as well as potential receptors of seepage.

In the context of a TSF, a hydrogeological assessment broadly focuses

on identifying and understanding:

• Sources – Water sources into the hydrogeologic system. For a TSF,

this is mainly seepage from the TSF. In addition, surface water that
flows from the TSF basin should be considered.
• Pathways – Permeable zones within the TSF, TSF basin and
adjacent areas that may allow the seepage to interact with the
surrounding groundwater regime.
• Receptors – Includes flora, fauna, groundwater aquifers and users of
groundwater and surface water that may be negatively impacted due
to the groundwater regime change and/or contaminated seepage
from the TS.

The reliability of the assessment is dependent on collecting as much data

as possible to support numerical modelling and to calibrate the model over time.
Data collection should include:

• Characterization of the geochemical properties of the tailings and

actual or expected (in the case of greenfield TSFs) seepage. Where
it is possible that the orebody or tailings processing method may
change over time, the subsequent change in tailings geochemistry
should be understood and accounted for.
• Investigation into the geological units, the characterization of their
hydrogeological properties, and identification of hydrogeological
units for the GDM.
• Sampling of groundwater pressures and water quality. This should
occur over several annual cycles to understand seasonal variations.
• Identification of potential receptors and the impact on them should
they be affected by contaminated seepage. The impacts should be
estimated with respect to the predicted properties of the seepage
from the TSF.

Page 36
 5.7. SEISMICITY

5.7.1. Seismic Setting and Methods

The objective of a seismotectonic assessment is to develop an

understanding of the regional tectonic conditions, the possible seismic sources
(active and non-active faults and other seismotectonic features), and the
seismicity (i.e., the occurrence or frequency of earthquakes) in the vicinity of the
dam site, which can be used to perform a seismic hazard analysis for the site.
The seismic hazard analysis establishes the design ground motions, with due
consideration for their uncertainty, that will be used for liquefaction analysis,
seismic response assessment, and seismic-deformation analysis of the TSF. The
design ground motions represent the seismic forces—typically presented as a
response spectrum and time histories of acceleration, velocity, and
displacement—that affect the structure’s performance and are used to design
facilities to safely withstand seismic loading. The ground motions resulting from
an earthquake occur at the TSF site or other location of interest and should not
be confused with the earthquake itself—which refers to the seismic event that
occurs on the seismic source (e.g., a fault).

Seismic hazard analysis considers two approaches: 1) probabilistic

seismic hazard analysis (PSHA) and 2) deterministic seismic hazard analysis
(DSHA), sometimes also called scenario-based seismic hazard analysis. In both
approaches, the seismic hazard analysis must identify the potentially active faults
and other seismic sources that could affect the TSF site. The selection of
appropriate model parameters, earthquake source and recurrence models, and
ground-motion models (i.e., ground motion prediction equations) can be
complicated, and typically requires significant engineering judgment and
expertise. The PSHA method expressly estimates the likelihood that various
levels of earthquake-caused ground motion will be exceeded at a given location
for a given future time period, while the DSHA method typically does not use
likelihood in the selection of a design earthquake and requires that a defined
seismic source be identified.

The DSHA method is not appropriate for all sites, and ICOLD
recommends that it always be accompanied by a PHSA when used. In regions
having spatially-distributed earthquakes but no identified potentially active faults,
the DSHA approach is not appropriate because significant levels of ground
motions cannot be associated with a known, active source. This is the case in
areas such as the Canadian Shield, the Amazonian craton in Brazil, the Gawler
craton in Australia, the Sarmatian craton in Russia and Ukraine and similar areas
around the world. In these situations, the seismicity should be represented using
distributed earthquake source models in a PSHA.

An issue that sometimes arises in seismic hazard analysis is identifying

whether faults are active or inactive. Historically, accepted practice has been to
Page 37
consider faults with evidence of activity within the Quaternary Period (most recent
2.6 million years), as described in Bulletin 148 (ICOLD, 2016). However, in some
geologic settings, it has also been considered appropriate to include only faults
showing activity within a subset of the Quaternary period, depending on site-
specific or region-specific geology. The timeframes used to define “active” faults
ranges significantly, with typically arbitrary limits of 10,000 years; 35,000 years;
50,000 years; 100,000 years; and 500,000 years being used by various
regulatory agencies in the United States alone. In these cases, the PSHA
becomes especially useful in informing the selection of a design earthquake
ground motion. The Reference section of this bulletin contains additional
guidance on source selection and activity rates and describe the key fault
parameters that should be used to characterize faults, such as rate of strain
release (i.e., fault slip rate), amount of fault displacement in each event, length
and area of fault rupture, earthquake size, and earthquake recurrence interval.

In PSHA, all historical earthquake events, seismic sources, and resulting

ground-motions are considered, and the annual exceedance probabilities (AEPs)
for a range of ground-motion levels are modeled. The PSHA is useful to inform
the decision about fault activity since all fault parameters are considered.
Nevertheless, care must be exercised in the application of fault slip rates to older
sources, and the method can bias the analysis toward more distant sources if the
fault parameters are not carefully selected.

In DSHA, estimates are made of ground motions at the TSF site due to
one or more specific scenarios (i.e., earthquakes) that are associated with
specifically identified, potentially active seismic sources. A PSHA is helpful in
identifying scenarios for use in a deterministic analysis, recognizing that there
may be several scenarios to be considered when assessing the seismic response
of a dam. The scenarios include different earthquake sources and the estimation
of the ground motion effects at the TSF.

The estimation of the ground motions at a TSF site are associated with
epistemic uncertainty (which is due to uncertainty in the ground motion models),
as well as aleatory variability (which is due to variability in the subsurface
conditions between the source and the site). Modern seismic hazard analysis
addresses uncertainty by estimating the ground motions using multiple ground
motion models and considering the median plus some multiple of the standard
deviation. When a DSHA is used, the most common ground motions applied to
TSF design criteria are the 50th percentile ground motion (median plus zero
standard deviations) and the 84th percentile ground motion (median plus one
standard deviation). Thus, there remains a statistically significant probability that
the ground motions from a given earthquake event could be higher than even the
84th percentile ground motion, and again the PSHA may be useful in guiding the
selection of an appropriate design ground motion. Multiple ground motion models
are also applied in a PSHA, and the resulting ground motions are usually
presented as median values for varying return periods, although hazard curves

Page 38
may be presented for various fractiles, typically up to three standard deviations,
for selected spectral acceleration values.

5.7.2. Maximum Credible Earthquake

The DSHA method is typically applied in the selection of a Maximum

Credible Earthquake (MCE). The MCE is commonly defined as “the largest
reasonably conceivable earthquake magnitude that is considered possible along
a recognized fault or within a geographically defined tectonic province, under the
presently known or presumed tectonic framework” (ICOLD, 2016). Many
regulations and older dam safety guidelines will require dams and tailings dams
to consider the MCE in design, especially for facilities with high potential
downstream consequence.

The MCE is sometimes mistakenly thought to always have a very

infrequent occurrence. However, in certain settings, especially along tectonic
plate boundaries, the MCE may reoccur on a relatively frequent basis (i.e., be
associated with a relatively low recurrence interval). For example, in Western
North America, MCE events may correspond to recurrence intervals on the order
of 200 years, and in Peru and Chile, recurrence intervals for MCE are commonly
in the range of 1,000 years to 2,500 years or less. In more stable geologic
environments, recurrence intervals may be on the order of 100,000 years or
greater. The MCE is not selected based on any specific AEP; however,., the
ground motions resulting from the MCE can be compared to the ground motions
calculated from a companion PSHA with associated return period. In some cases,
the MCE ground motion may be substantially lower than, for example, a 10,000-
year earthquake ground motion, and in other cases, it may be significantly higher
than a 10,000-year ground motion. Significant engineering judgment and
expertise is required in these cases.

5.7.3. Site Specific Hazard Assessment

Seismicity must be evaluated for TSFs of all consequence classifications.

National seismic hazard models (such as those developed by the United States
Geological Survey and Geoscience Australia) are developed for use in building
codes that typically address AEP’s of 1/475 or 1/2,475, but no lower. Although
these national-scale studies may be useful for conceptual design and planning
studies, they do not constitute site-specific seismic hazard analyses and may not
be appropriate for use in a TSF design. Tailings dams typically have more
stringent requirements including consideration of much lower AEP’s, more
detailed treatment of epistemic uncertainty in earthquake source and ground
motion models, and site-specific representation of local site conditions.

Page 39
 Site-specific seismic hazard analysis for a TSF should include:

• Compilation and review of historical data and literature on seismic

hazard in the region surrounding the site.
• Development of a catalog of historical earthquake records,
declustered from foreshocks and aftershocks.
• Assessment of tectonic conditions and identification of potentially
active faults that could influence the site.
• Characterization of the local and regional seismic sources, including
both fault sources and distributed earthquake sources, within a
radius of no less than 300 km around the site.
• Selection of a set of Ground Motion Prediction Equations (GMPE)
suitable for the regional seismotectonic context.
• For DSHA, the identification of one or more scenario-based
earthquakes and the ground-motion intensity level(s) for design
purposes (often selected as the logarithmic mean plus one standard
deviation, or the 84th percentile ground-motion level), and
development of ground-motion response spectra for these intensity
levels.
• For PSHA, the treatment of epistemic uncertainties through the
definition and justification of a logic tree.
• For PSHA, the computation of hazard curves and Uniform Hazard
Spectra (UHS) showing fractiles of the hazard, for multiple AEP’s,
typically ranging from 1/100 years to 1/10,000 or less.
• The development of time histories of acceleration (and typically
velocity and displacement) for the design levels identified by the EOR
or use in design analyses.

The science of seismic hazard analysis continues to evolve and the

database of large earthquakes in highly instrumented areas continues to expand.
The release of a major seismicity study, especially one that incorporates data
from one or more recent large earthquakes, should trigger review of the design
earthquake for tailings facilities, and may justify an updated seismic hazard
analysis and possibly re-evaluation of the design using the latest state of
knowledge on seismic hazard. Further guidance on performing seismic hazard
analysis may be found in the various literature cited in the Reference section of
this Bulletin.

Section 7.8.3 provides guidance on the selection of a design earthquake

and related parameters for different consequence categories.

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 6. TAILINGS CHARACTERIZATION

6.1. INTRODUCTION

Tailings characteristics have a significant impact on the performance

and, usually, the structural integrity of a TSF. Therefore, tailings permeability, soil-
moisture characteristics, consolidation characteristics, shear strength,
geochemical characteristics and other parameters must be understood to predict
and manage performance of the facility over its life. The rheology of a tailings
slurry should also be characterized to design the transport systems, but is beyond
the scope of this bulletin. This section describes the key characterization
components that form the basis for accepted practices for tailings dam design
and evaluation.

It is important to recognize that classification of tailings is a dynamic

process and changes to tailings classification may occur due to changes in ore
types, processing technologies and deposition practices that result in variations
in tailings classification spatially within the tailings facility over its lifecycle.

The tailings characterisation should be included in the Site Geological

Model and Geotechnical Design Model (Section 5.5.2 and Section 5.5.3).

The engineering properties of tailings that should be adequately

characterized for design of new facilities or evaluation of existing facilities include,
at a minimum:

• Consolidation behavior (void ratio versus effective stress

relationships).
• Hydraulic conductivity (permeability) and related properties.
• Shear strength and deformation behavior, including potential for
brittle behaviour, and the susceptibility to cyclic and/or static
liquefaction.

Development of representative geotechnical parameters of interest

should involve a combination of laboratory testing, in situ testing, review of case
history data in the technical literature, and consideration of potential computer
simulations and modeling. The engineering behavior of in situ tailings is
dependent on several factors: the void ratio, degree of saturation, interparticle
structure (soil fabric), particle mineralogy, particle shape, brittleness, and other
factors. Of these, the in situ void ratio—especially in relation to the critical state
void ratio – is the most influential on shear strength and the potential for
liquefaction to occur, as discussed further in Section 7.9 and Appendices A
and B.
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 For development of greenfield projects, in situ testing of the tailings
materials is not possible and laboratory testing and case histories must be heavily
relied on. During operations it is important to conduct in situ testing, sampling,
and confirmation testing in the laboratory to confirm whether the characterization
performed during initial design stage is valid and whether updates to the
characterization is warranted. For existing facilities, it may be challenging to
retrieve and transport samples and then accurately replicate the stress state and
conditions that reflect the in situ heterogeneity and properties. Therefore, in situ
measurements are vital to understanding and interpreting the behavior of tailings
in existing TSFs.

Section 6.4 provides further guidance for characterizing the geotechnical

parameters of interest for tailings, as well as engineered fills and foundation soils
that affect stability.

6.2. CLASSIFICATION OF TAILINGS

6.2.1. Key principles

Generally, the classification of tailings is made based on two broad

categories — geotechnical behavior and geochemical behavior — that are
interrelated and should not be considered in isolation. Characterization of the
tailings should begin with the physical and basic engineering properties of the
materials to be managed and progress into more detailed assessment,
depending on the project specific needs and circumstances. Geotechnical
classification of tailings provides a framework for identification/application of
geotechnical parameters that correspond to types of tailings.

6.2.2. Geotechnical Classification

The physical properties of tailings are governed primarily by the

mineralogy of the host rock (ore) and the mechanical grinding and mineral
processes such as leaching, oxidation, flotation and other processes used to
optimize mineral recovery. The chemicals used in processing may also have a
secondary effect on behavior, which effects may become significant e.g., laterite
nickel tailings and alumina residue.

Determination of physical and index properties (e.g., particle size

analysis, Atterberg limits, specific gravity of soil solids, etc.) are the first step in
characterizing the geotechnical properties of tailings. For existing facilities,
additional parameters to be evaluated include in situ water content, in situ dry
density (or void ratio), and degree of saturation. The number of test samples
taken should be sufficient to characterize variability and uncertainty in the range

Page 42
of tailings types and geotechnical properties that may have a significant effect on
TSF design and performance.

ICOLD Bulletin 181 (ICOLD, 2020) has classified tailings into five broad
types depending on their physical properties (e.g., particle size, plasticity,
consolidation), and these five categories are summarized in Table 6.1.
Fig. 6.1and Fig. 6.2 reproduced from Bulletin 181, provide ranges of particle size
distribution (gradation) and plasticity (Atterberg limits), respectively, that
correspond to these general categories. This classification system provides a
useful framework for predicting general behavior of the tailings during the design
process and during alternative selection. Estimates of various tailings properties
for each tailings type have been developed based on historical data, and a series
of charts defining certain expected properties and behaviors for typical materials
within these types are presented in Bulletin 181. The idealized charts provided in
Bulletin 181 allow estimation of indicative parameters for important
characteristics such as initial settled density, beach slopes, hydraulic
conductivity, coefficient of consolidation, void ratio versus effective stress, yield
stress, and other similar relationships. Parameters estimated using the charts in
Bulletin 181 can be used for preliminary sizing of facilities, conceptual
development of TSF management concepts, identification of potential
challenges, risk assessments, and other initial planning activities, but do not take
the place of full characterization of tailings properties based on site-specific data.

Table 6.1
Summary of tailings types and geotechnical classification

Tailings
Symbol Description (compare) Example of mineral/ore
Type

Coarse Salt, mineral sands, coarse coal

CT Silty SAND, non-plastic
tailings rejects, iron ore sands

Hard Rock Copper, massive sulphide, nickel,

HRT Sandy SILT, non to low plasticity
tailings gold

Altered Porphyry copper with

Sandy SILT, trace of clay, low
Rock ART hydrothermal alteration, oxidized
plasticity, bentonitic clay content
tailings rock, bauxite. leaching processes
Iron ore fines, bauxite (red mud),
fine coal rejects, leaching
SILT, with trace to some clay, low
Fine tailings FT processes,
to moderate plasticity
metamorphosed/weathered
polymetallic ores
Silty CLAY to CLAY, moderate to Oil sands (fluid fine tailings),
Ultra Fine
UFT high plasticity, very low density phosphate fines; some kimberlite
tailings
and hydraulic conductivity and coal fines

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 Fig. 6.1
Indicative gradation ranges for tailings classification types

Fig. 6.2
Indicative plasticity chart for tailings classification

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 6.2.3. Geochemical Classification

Geochemical characterization of tailings is required to determine the

potential for metal leaching and acid rock drainage (AMD, also known as acid
and metalliferous drainage (AMD) — under both neutral and acidic conditions.
AMD is a naturally occurring process that can be accelerated in some mine waste
materials, including tailings. Acid generation occurs when minerals containing
sulphide and elemental sulphur are exposed to the weathering effects of oxygen
and water. The oxidation of sulphur and precipitation of ferric iron generates
acidity. ARD occurs when the resulting acidity is entrained by water that flows out
of a waste deposit into the surrounding environment. Metal leaching is associated
with acidic drainage due to high metal solubility and sulphide weathering rates
under acidic conditions. Metal leaching can also occur in neutral pH settings and
is referred to as Neutral Drainage.

The generation of acid drainage and associated metal leaching is the net
result of two types of reactions broadly referred to as acid generating (sulphide
oxidation) and acid neutralizing (mineral dissolution). Characterization efforts
focus on understanding the mineralogy of the tailings; assessing the chemical
reactions that are expected to occur over time, assuming the materials have free
access to water and oxygen; and assessing whether and to what degree there
are accompanying acid-neutralizing materials that can offset the acid-generating
reactions.

Tailings geochemical characterization should be carried out in

conjunction with process water quality testing, and the testing should recognize
the potential for longer-term geochemical changes. Geochemical testing typically
proceeds using a combination of so-called “static” and “kinetic” testing methods.
Static testing involves subjecting test specimens to Acid-Base Accounting (ABA)
tests and total metal content analysis. In kinetic tests, humidity cell tests are used
to simulate the oxidation reactions that would occur upon exposure of sulphidic
materials to the environment. Kinetic tests are designed to verify the AMD
potential by enhancing and accelerating the rate of acid generation in sulphide-
containing material so that results can be obtained in a timely manner to allow
modeling of future impacts. Sample selection and sample representativeness are
important to allow extrapolation of the testing to the orebody and the deposited
tailings over the life of the TSF.

While geochemical characterization of tailings is a necessary part of a

TSF design, the focus of this bulletin is primarily on dam safety and stability.
Bulletin 181 provides additional information on geochemical characterization, and
the Global Acid Rock Drainage (GARD) guide (INAP, 2014) — available free of
charge at www.gardguide.com — is considered the international standard for
predicting, preventing and managing acid mine drainage in tailings and other
mine wastes.

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 6.3. LABORATORY TESTING AND IN SITU TESTING

One of the challenges of characterizing tailings for greenfield projects is

that testing is done on pilot scale tailings samples that do not necessarily reflect
the in situ properties For example, hydraulically deposited tailings, particularly at
low percent solid slurries, typically results in significant segregation with coarser
particles and/or higher specific gravity particles deposited near the discharge
point and finer material being transported towards the decant pond or in low
elevation portions of the impoundments.

The lower the density of the tailings slurry (i.e., the more water relative to
the solid fraction), the greater the degree of segregation that occurs during
hydraulic deposition. As a result, the materials in the tailings impoundment may
be substantially different than indicated from the pilot scale testing or from bulk
samples collected prior to deposition. So, even with a tailings material generally
classified as “coarse tailings”, “hard rock tailings” or “altered rock tailings” in
Table 6.1, there will frequently be a high degree of heterogeneity in the TSF with
zones of comparatively “coarse” tailings, comparatively “fine” tailings, and usually
some degrees of intermediate materials, most often in a highly layered
(interbedded) structure, particularly if the discharge points are rotated spatially
within the impoundment area. Deposits of coarser particles will behave differently
than the fine particles (typically called “slimes”). A higher degree of homogeneity
be found with “fine tailings” and “ultra fine” tailings classifications and when
mechanical separation (e.g. cycloning) is performed, or when relatively high
density slurries are discharged (ultra-high density deposition).

Laboratory testing programs should reflect the full range of tailings

characteristics that can exist in the facility. For greenfield developments, this
means developing idealized sub-materials based on segregated lock-cycle test
samples and experience with other similar tailings. For existing facilities, it means
developing a site investigation program that will adequately represent the variety
of materials and conditions that exist in the tailings deposit.

In situ tailings properties are typically developed from field surveys,

including cone penetration testing with pore pressure measurements (CPTu),
Standard Penetration testing (SPT), field shear vane tests, and less frequently
used methods such as pressure meter, dilatometer, and other methods. The
CPTu is widely agreed to be the most reliable, repeatable, and versatile means
available to characterize in situ behavior. The CPTu device also can be modified
to perform geophysical measurements such as shear wave and compressive
wave velocity measurements (the acronym SCPTu and the seismic cone is used
when equipped with a geophone sensor that measures seismic velocity). A
disadvantage of the CPTu is the inability to directly a characterize the stress-
strain behavior, which is typically inferred from correlations and engineering
judgment, including experience with similar tailings. Calibration of site-specific or
material-specific correlations using calibration chambers may be justified in some

Page 46
cases to improve the reliability of the SCPTu data and may become more
prevalent in the future (but is not currently part of standard practice in design).

Laboratory testing on samples retrieved from field investigation programs

has an important role in tailings characterization, although there are significant
challenges. The most significant challenge is obtaining an undisturbed sample
that is representative of in situ conditions. There are two approaches to help
address this challenge: a) carefully retrieve undisturbed in situ samples with
carefully transportation to a laboratory without measurable disturbance; and
b) reconstitute samples in the laboratory to replicate the field conditions as
reasonably as possible.

A balanced methodology utilizes both in situ and laboratory testing to

estimate in -situ parameters. This involves performance of drained and undrained
triaxial shear strength testing on a variety of reconstituted samples covering the
range of tailings gradations (e.g. types) prepared at various initial void ratios and
effective stresses without attempting to directly replicate field conditions. The
results of these tests can be used to develop a generalized framework of soil
behavior based in critical state soil mechanics for the tailings gradation/type
independent of the in situ density and stress state. In situ testing, such as CPT,
can then be used to establish the state of the soil in situ, which, when calibrated
with the generalized framework established using laboratory testing, can be used
to indirectly estimate anticipated field behavior upon shearing.

6.4. GEOTECHNICAL PROPERTIES

6.4.1. In situ Density and Consolidation Behavior

Consolidation refers to changes in density (and void ratio) due to

changes in applied stress. Void ratio is defined as the volume of voids (water and
air) divided by the volume of solid particles in a soil mass. The void ratio is
inversely proportion to the dry density–meaning that, as the void ratio increases,
the density decreases, and vice versa. If a load is applied to a soil deposit, air
voids will compress and, to the extent that drainage is available, water (which is
incompressible) will tend to flow out of the pore spaces, the void ratio decreases
and the density increases. If drainage is completely inhibited, then pore water
pressures will increase under the addition of a load (offsetting the change in total
stress and resulting in no change in effective stress), and consolidation (i.e., the
increase in density/reduction in void ratio) does not occur. More commonly,
drainage is partially inhibited, and consolidation occurs over time, as pore water
pressure is expelled from the soil voids as a function of the hydraulic conductivity.
This process is constantly occurring in a tailings deposit as a TSF fills over time.
After filling of the deposit ends, consolidation may occur over an extended time,
causing the tailings surface to settle release of consolidation water into the
surrounding environment.

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 The density/void ratio of a tailings deposit is important in two primary
ways: 1) it affects the mass (tonnage) of tailings that can be placed into a fixed
volume and 2) it affects other engineering behaviors, most importantly shear
strength and the potential for liquefaction to occur.

Bulletin 181 provides discussion of testing methods to assess the initial

void ratio and the void ratio versus effective stress relationship through settling
and consolidation tests. The seepage-induced consolidation test (SICT) allows
characterization of the void ratio-effective stress relationship across a wide range
of effective stress, particularly at very low stresses that are difficult to measure
using conventional oedometer tests. The void-ratio/effective stress relationships
can be used in a model to predict the change in dry density over time as an
impoundment is filled with tailings slurry.

6.4.2. Hydraulic Conductivity

Hydraulic conductivity is a physical property of soils that measures the

ability of the material to transmit fluid through pore spaces and fractures in the
presence of an applied hydraulic gradient. It is heavily dependent on void ratio
and particle size distribution. It can be measured in both laboratory and field
applications. In the laboratory, the SICT method described in the previous section
provides hydraulic conductivity over a range of stresses. Other laboratory
methods using flexible-walled or rigid-walled permeameters and large strain
consolidation testing may also be used.

Field methods include falling-head and constant-head borehole

conductivity tests, and borehole packer testing in bedrock which provide
estimates of horizontal permeability. Hydraulic conductivity properties can also
be interpreted from CPTu dissipation tests.

When soils are unsaturated or partially saturated, soil moisture

characteristic curves and the relationship between unsaturated hydraulic
conductivity and soil suction are also needed to model flow and
infiltration/capillary actions for cover designs.

6.4.3. Shear Strength and Deformation Behavior

The shear strength and deformation behavior of tailings is a critical

aspect of geotechnical characterization of tailings. However, the subject can be
complex, and a full explanation of shear strength behavior is beyond the scope
of this bulletin. This section identifies the high-level aspects to be addressed in
tailings characterization and design of tailings dams. The critical concepts that
must be understood to predict the behavior of tailings include:

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 • Whether the tailings exist or will exist in a state that results in dilative
or contractive behavior during shearing.
• Whether the tailings are now or possibly can become saturated or
nearly saturated.
• Whether the expected behavior will change over time, especially with
changes in the stress conditions.
• Whether the tailings are likely to shear in a strain-softening or a
strain-hardening manner.
• Whether the tailings could fail in a brittle manner.

Appendix A provides more detailed guidance on how to characterize the

shear strength and deformation behavior of tailings and other soils that may be
present in the structural zones of a tailings dam.

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 7. DESIGN

7.1. INTRODUCTION

The design of a TSF is an extended process linking the Planning and

Implementation stages of the TMS (Section 2.3). Preliminary design starts when
the need to store tailings is identified and the final design typically ends when
closure has been implemented and accepted. In some cases, the design activities
may continue after closure has been completed due to changes in site conditions,
regulatory requirements, or other factors. The goal of design is to safely store the
tailings during the full tailings facility lifecycle and to have a safe sustainable
structure after its closure.

A TSF has many components and systems such as dams, impoundment,

reclaim water, tailings delivery, seepage collection, monitoring, water
management, safety and communications systems, access roads and others.
The design of the TSF considers these components to ensure they work together
as an integrated system.

The design is informed by operational requirements, closure

requirements (Section 3), site and tailings characterizations (Section 5 and
Section 6) and specific Design Basis and Design Criteria (Section 7.7 and 7.8).

7.2. LIFECYCLE PHASES AND DESIGN STAGES OF A TAILINGS DAM

A TSF typically transitions through the following lifecycle phases:

• Concept development— the general location, configuration, and type

of dam is considered
• Planning and site selection—involves a comprehensive review of
potential sites, dam technologies and dam configurations. This step
typically involves multi-criteria analysis with stakeholders of the
various tailings technologies and site locations to work to alignment
with technical social and environmental considerations
• Site classification, including all necessary geotechnical
investigations
• Design of the dam
• Construction of the dam—initially the starter dam and then dam
raises throughout operations
• Operation— routine tailings deposition and water management,
integrated with progressive raising of the dam in stages

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 • Closure (Active Care)— the TSF is transitioning to the passive
closure phase, but still requires active care to assure safety and
protection of the environment
• Closure (Passive Care)— the TSF is required to perform safely,
without active care, in-perpetuity with no material risks to people and
the environment

Design stages for a new tailings dam typically includes:

• Scoping-level or Conceptual design – this design stage develops the

initial concept for the dam, including site selection and possible
options for the dam configuration, location, size, etc. The study
typically focuses on identifying major features that influence the dam
siting, configuration, and operation. Importantly at this stage, a
closure plan should be identified, and the feasibility of safe closure
confirmed (refer to Section 3). The key objective of this stage is to
understand the critical aspects of the project and to confirm if design
should move toward the next phase.
• Pre-feasibility design – this stage typically considers multiple options
and possibly multiple sites for the dam. The preferred dam
technology(s) and site(s) will typically be defined during this stage.
• Feasibility design – this stage advances the design to support
financing, environmental assessments, and other regulatory
requirements for approval of the project. Feasibility design for TSFs
is often taken to a higher level to inform permitting and financing.
Once again closure should be a major consideration in assessing
feasibility.

Detailed design – this stage occurs just prior to construction and is when
the scope of work, specifications, and construction drawings are prepared.
Additional regulatory approvals may be required after the detailed design has
been completed and prior to construction commencing. The closure plan
approach and design should be confirmed as part of this stage.

Design stages during operations include:

• Raises of the dam to suit the actual tailings deposition results and
water management requirements.
• Design changes to adapt to developing understanding of the site
conditions, the performance of the dam and risk reductions
measures.
• Design changes due to changing regulatory or governance
requirements.
• Progressive updating of the closure plan as necessary.
• Detailed closure design prior to potential closure.

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 7.3. DESIGN STEPS FOR A NEW TAILINGS DAM

The design of a tailings facility is a progressive and iterative process that

starts with conceptual planning of requirements for storage and potential sites
and technologies for dam construction. The design is part of the Tailings
Management System (described in Section 2) and progresses through stages
from scoping level to feasibility design, leading to detailed design and
construction. Fig. 7.1 shows a schematic of the typical steps and studies involved
during the process. A key over-riding tenet is to continue to reduce the risk and
cost of the facility and to optimize the transition to a long-term, stable facility on
closure.

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 Identify design basis
• total tailings to be processed, production rate, tailings type, geochemistry, site
constraints (environment, climate, social, land), closure requirements, etc.

Conceptual Design – Scoping Level

• Identify objectives and criteria for design, including requirements for closure
• Identify potential TSF sites (greenfield, brownfield, in pit, underground)
• Develop layouts (assess tailings technologies, construction types, deposition
methods, water management, environmental constraints)
• Prepare conceptual models (climate, seismicity, geology, hydrogeology,
geochemistry) based on desk-top and field reconnaissance studies
• Identify social and environmental factors for each site/technology
• Preliminary identification of potential consequence classification

Option Assessment
• Compare sites using a structured approach, considering safety, environment,
social, cost, risk and reliability, closure requirements, etc.; sometimes referred
to as the multi criteria or multiple accounts analysis (MCA/MAA)
• Select the best few sites/options

Planning
• Risk identification/assessment of preferred alternatives and identification of
uncertainties
• Scoping of site investigations and design requirements
• Integration with environmental and social conditions and objectives

Prefeasibility/Feasibility/Detailed Design
• Prefeasibility design to determine preferred alternative
• Site investigations (mapping, drilling, geophysical surveys, etc.)
• Laboratory testing to confirm/determine material and tailings parameters
• Determine seismicity, climate, etc.
• Design (stability, seismic response, filters, zonation, foundation preparation,
strengths, water management, seepage control, water balance, deposition
plans, etc.)
• Closure design

Documentation and Risk Management

• Prepare drawings and Design Report and document all work
• Update risk assessment (e.g. FMEA)
• Identify requirements for further work to reduce uncertainties and risk
Fig. 7.1
Schematic of typical design steps for new tailings facilities

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 7.4. DESIGN OF RAISES AND ONGOING OPERATIONS

The initial design of the tailings dam typically considers the starter dam
and the raises required to reach full dam capacity. However, subsequent detailed
designs of individual dam raises often need adjustment from the initial design to
respond to conditions such as:

• Changes in production rates and actual settled densities that

influence the storage requirements.
• Ongoing site investigations and laboratory testing that provides a
better understanding of the foundation conditions and
characterization of the in situ tailings placed (particularly for
upstream construction).
• Changing water balance conditions.
• Response to dam performance monitoring (pore pressures,
deformation, seepage, etc.).
• Contractor schedules and constructability of dam components.
• Quality assurance observations with respect to such aspects as dam
fills (gradation and compaction), abutment/foundation conditions.
• Changes to closure requirements.

7.5. RISK-INFORMED DESIGN

7.5.1. Overview

Section 2.3.5 discussed the overall risk management approach for

assisting in safe tailings dam design and Section 8 provides further details. In the
context of the design process, the Designer (EOR) and Owner needs to:

• Consider the potential failure modes associated with the tailings dam
and associated facility components
• Evaluate the risks
• Establish design controls and measures to limit these risks.

The potential dam failure modes are to be described in terms of their

initiating event, failure mechanism, failure process, and consequences. Semi-
quantitative or quantitative risk assessments are then commonly used to
characterize likelihood and consequences for each failure mode to derive the risk
profile of the TSF. A risk register should be prepared during the design stage and
updated throughout the life of the TSF and into closure.

Risk-informed design aims to reduce the total risk presented by the TSF
to below tolerability limits specified by the owner and regulators and/or as low as
reasonably practicable (ALARP).

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 Risk-informed design goes beyond the traditional standards-based
approach and can address failure modes that are not typically part of the
traditional-standards based approach. As such, risk-informed design can be seen
as an enhancement of the standards-based approach, providing defendable
basis for decision making.

7.5.2. Observational Method

The Observational Method (Peck, 1969) is a process of verifying design

assumptions and using additional data, knowledge and lessons learned to revise,
improve and optimise the design. The Observational Method has been used to
manage uncertainty associated with material parameters, stability assessment,
and safety evaluations and is a tool to support the design and manage risks.
Baecher and Christian (2003) provide a summary of the essential aspects of the
Observational Method as follows:

“The observational method grew out of the fact that it is not feasible in
many geotechnical applications to assume very conservative values of the
loads and material properties and design for those conditions. The resulting
design is often physically or financially impossible to build. Instead, the
engineer makes reasonable estimates of the parameters and the amounts by
which they could deviate from the expected values. Then the design is based
on expected values – or on some conservative but feasible extension of the
expected values – but provision is made for action to deal with the occurrence
of loads or resistances that fall outside the design range. During construction
and operation of the facility, observations of its performance are made so that
appropriate corrective action can be made. This is not simply a matter of
designing for an expected set of conditions and doing something to fix any
troubles that arise. It involves considering the effects of the possible range of
values of the parameters and having in place a plan to deal with occurrences
that fall outside of the expected range. It requires the ongoing involvement of
the designers during the construction and operation of the facility.”

To properly utilize the Observational Method to manage uncertainty and

reduce risk, the full method as described above must be adopted. Also, it is
important to note that the Observational Method is not always applicable,
particularly where:

• The nature of the project does not allow the design of the dam or
TSF to be altered during construction and operation (i.e., it will not
be possible to implement contingency measures to improve the
safety of the dam, if required); or
• The mode of failure occurs relatively rapidly (i.e., in a “brittle” manner
where there is rapid and significant strength loss over small shear
strains), and no, or little instrumentation response can be expected

Page 55
 prior to failure; or the critical failure mode is due to seismic loading
where there is not enough time to respond.

7.5.3. Performance-Based Risk-Informed Safe Design

The performance-based risk-informed safe design (PBRISD) approach,

introduced by Morgenstern (2018), combines the Observational Method and the
risk-based approach to TSF management discussed above. The approach
requires an understanding of the facility risk profile based on its current
performance and understanding the impact of potential changes and future
development of the facility risk profile. This understanding then allows for making
risk-informed decisions at any stage of the TSF from the conceptual design for a
tailings dam, through construction and operations, to closure. The approach
involves the following key steps:

1. Identify the key failure modes for the tailings dam that could lead
to uncontrolled release or inoperability of the tailings dam. These
will be informed by the risk assessments described earlier.
2. For each of the failure modes, identify performance parameters
(e.g., achieved density of construction material and tailings, pore
pressures, deformation, freeboard, etc.) that impact the risk
profile of the TSF and hence should be monitored and reviewed
during dam construction and operations.
3. Establish performance criteria (also referred to as quantifiable
performance objectives) for each of the monitored performance
parameters. The performance criteria may also be informed by
regulatory requirements and should be captured, along with any
assumptions that were used in the development of the
anticipated values, in a design basis memorandum (DBM).
4. Based on understanding the performance criteria and the impact
on the risk profile, establish appropriate triggers and a Trigger
Action Response Plan (TARP) and to assist with the Critical
Control verification (Refer to 8.3).
5. Monitor and document the actual performance against the
predicted performance to validate the design
parameters/assumptions and update the risk profile of the
facility:
a. Conduct analyses that “history match” performance to gain
improved understanding of the potential failure modes and, if
necessary, modify the performance criteria and the DBM.
b. If there are adverse deviations from the predictions/assumptions
that could increase the risk profile, take action to correct the

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 situation by either improving the situation or modifying the design
to account for these and reduce the risks.
c. If the actual performance is better than expected, then possibly
optimize the design to account for these favorable conditions.
Steps 2 through 5 are also part of the Observational Method. The
PBRISD approach calls for more rigor in defining and documenting the
performance criteria. To support feasibility level and detailed design, the PBRISD
approach requires a comprehensive understanding of the site conditions,
geotechnical parameters, modeling, etc. as described in Sections 5 and 6.

The PBRISD approach can be used to compensate for some of the

limitations of limit equilibrium analyses as discussed in Section 7.9 and the safety
of the dam can be described in terms of how well the dam performs, as well as
the Factor of Safety. For dams with brittle elements the PBRISD approach can
be used to (a) predict conditions under which strength loss could occur, (b) design
against that condition, and (c) monitor to confirm the effectiveness of the design.

7.6. DAM FAILURE MODES

7.6.1. Overview

A failure mode is the way or means by which failure occurs. The term
failure means the loss of function i.e., the ability of an element/component or of a
system to perform as intended. This includes loading factors and/or mis-operation
of any element or component. A failure mode requires an initiating event (e.g.
earthquake, floods, construction loads, etc.), that leads to a failure mechanism,
and the failure of the system (or loss of function).

A failure mode depends on the system that is being considered. For

example, a failure of a tailings pipeline can occur if there is a defect in the tailings
pipeline and/or excess pressure or blockage. The failure may be initiated by the
defect in the pipe, the failure mechanism is the defect expanding, followed by a
loss of tailings. In this case, the system is the tailings pipeline. However, in the
context of this Bulletin, the system is the dam. A breach of the tailings pipeline
would then become an initiating event, followed by erosion of the tailings dam,
and if the erosion was sufficient, then either significant deformations or breach of
the dam could occur.

In the context of the system being the dam, the failure mode commences
with an initiating event (cause) that is the loading mechanism or physical
condition that starts the failure process. This is followed by the failure
progression, which is the mechanism that can lead to a dam failure (such as
overtopping, instability, or internal erosion/piping), but it is important to note that
not all failure mechanisms will result in a failure of the dam. The failure

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mechanism may become arrested or there may be interventions that prevent the
failure mechanism from progressing to a full dam breach.

Dam failure modes need to consider technical aspects such as the dam
materials, foundations, abutments and the impoundment footprint and catchment
area, as well as human aspects that could compromise the structural integrity of
the dam. Such human aspects can, for example, range from poor construction
quality control and assurance, lapses in operation of the TSF, civil unrest that
prevents access for maintenance and safe management of the TSF, among other
factors.

7.6.2. Typical Failure Modes

Typical failure modes include:

1. Instability Due to Foundation Failure

Instability of the dam foundation can be initiated by:

o Undetected weak materials

o Incorrect strength assumptions
o Unexpected pore pressure generation
o Artesian pore water pressures
o Liquefaction of cohesionless soils and cyclic softening of
cohesive soils
o Incorrect seismic hazard/response analysis
o Erosion at the toe due to nearby water courses
o Excavation at the toe (such as for seepage collection
ditches or open pits)

The failure mechanism involves a loss of strength and inability to support

the applied loading that leads to deformations. Depending on the scale
of deformation, a breach of the dam could occur.

Foundation failure is a common failure mode for tailings dams with the
most recent examples of Cadia, Australia (2018), Mt. Polley, British
Columbia, Canada (2016), and Los Frailes, Aznalcollar, Spain (1998).
The potential for a foundation failure increases in complex geologic
formations, particularly in materials that could include weak clay layers
(e.g. complex glacial history at Mt. Polley), or weak bedding planes (e.g.
claystone layers within the mudstone, sandstone sequences at
Aznocollar). Lightly over-consolidated clays and desiccated residual clay
soils are sensitive to the height of the tailings dam and may become
normally consolidated as the height of the tailing dam increases. Soil
behavior changes significantly once the pre-consolidation stress is
exceeded. The soil becomes normally consolidated and, if saturated, can
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result in positive pore pressure generation during shearing. This can
result in progressive failures that can occur rapidly. Loose, saturated,
granular soils may be susceptible to static liquefaction and cyclic
liquefaction under seismic loading.

Detailed site characterization is essential to reduce the risk of this failure

mode.

2. Instability of Dam Slope

Instability of the dam slope can be initiated by:

o Inclusion of weak materials in the structural portion of the

dam, possibly due to lack of compaction and/or poor
drainage.
o Liquefaction of non-cohesive soils and cyclic softening of
cohesive soils.
o Incorrect seismic hazard/response analysis.
o Incorrect estimate of the pore pressures under the range of
operating conditions.
o Erosion at the toe due to nearby water courses.
o Excavation at the toe (such as for seepage collection
ditches or open pits).
o Landslide at an abutment.
As can occur for instability in the foundation, instability of the dam slope
can lead to deformations that could ultimately result in a dam breach.

Upstream tailings dams with thin structural shells are typically more
vulnerable to slope failure as the tailings are normally placed in a
heterogeneous manner and are contractive. This was observed with dam
failure examples in Brazil in 2015 and 2019. Static liquefaction of
upstream dams may become a concern as the dam height increases,
and static stresses and stress concentrations increase. Cyclic
liquefaction due to seismicity must be considered.

Centerline and downstream dams are normally constructed with

compacted fills with QA/QC procedures typical of conventional earth and
rockfill dams. However, they can still be susceptible to slope failures if
design and QA/QC measures are not adequate.

3. Overtopping
Overtopping of the tailings dam can be initiated by the following means:

o Large flood that exceeds capacity of spillway

o Large flood with blocked spillway (by debris or ice)
o Wave Action
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 o Operational Upset (improper water management)
o Sabotage
o Uncontrolled rupture of a tailings slurry delivery or water
reclaim pipeline could erode the dam crest
o Landslide into reservoir (rock, snow, or soil)
o Settlement of crest (due to static and/or seismic
deformations)

Overtopping can lead to erosion of the crest of the dam, but the degree
of erosion is a function of the duration of the overtopping and the nature
of the material that forms the crest and dam slope. Several dams have
not failed by overtopping because the duration was short and the material
at the crest was non-erodible (possibly with vegetation). It is typically
assumed that overtopping will cause significant erosion that could result
in a breach of the dam.

Baie Mare (2000) is an example of overtopping due to a rain-on-snow

event, common in cold temperate climates. Merriespruit (1994) is an
example of inadequate freeboard. Facilities that store the flood (no
spillway) may be more susceptible to overtopping as the ability to
implement emergency controls, such as pumping, may be hindered
during an extreme event.

4. Piping (Internal Erosion)

Piping (internal erosion) occurs when the hydraulic gradients are high
enough to move fine particles within the dam fill and there are not
adequate filters to control movement of particles. This can lead to internal
erosion and the development of voids in the dam body that can ultimately
lead to failure.

Initiating events that can lead to piping include:

• Material incompatibility between low and high permeability zones.

• Elevated pore water pressures and increased hydraulic gradients.
• Hydraulic fracturing due to poor stress distribution within the dam,
differential settlement, or resulting from deformations due to seismic
or static events.
• Pipes through the dam, including decant towers and pipes, (seepage
along pipe, collapse of pipe).
• Underground features that could cause internal erosion.

Piping can occur in a dam, but there are examples where the internal
erosion has occurred, but the core and filter zones have self-healed and
prevented a breach of a dam. However, it is prudent to assume that
internal erosion can result in loss of material from within the dam that can

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 cause deformations of the dam and, if the deformations are large enough
and the pond high enough, a breach of the dam.

The Omai (1992) piping failure occurred when the water pond was against the
face of the downstream constructed dam and the filter between the clay core and
the rockfill shell was not adequate to prevent piping of fines out of the core.

Compared to water dams, in TSF’s, the water pond is typically farther away from
the structural zone of the dam, therefore the risk of piping extending to the water
pond should be reduced and potentially confined within the tailings beach. This
consideration is particularly relevant for upstream construction, which is more
susceptible to differential cracking and consolidation settlement.

5. Environmental Effects
Tailings dams are typically designed and constructed to limit surface and
groundwater contamination. Potential failure modes include release of
constituents of potential concern by either seepage or release during storm
events. Failure of seepage barriers to perform as expected may be due to
unidentified seepage paths, poor construction, and other factors. Insufficient
stormwater containment provisions can lead to overtopping or the requirement
for emergency releases of water.

Other environmental failure modes may include, for example, dust

generation or fauna impacts with contaminated water.

Risk assessment methodologies to address the failure modes in detail

are further discussed in Section 8 of this Bulletin.

7.6.3. Supporting Analysis for Failure Modes

Table 7.1 provides examples of the analyses and considerations that can
be used to inform the failure modes assessment.

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 Table 7.1
Examples of analyses to inform determination of failure modes

Failure Modes Examples of Analyses and Considerations

Geotechnical Range of parameters applied within stability analyses and/or
mechanisms with the deformation modeling including both static and seismic loadings
foundation and dam (Section 7.9).
structure Considerations include liquefaction and strain softening potential in
dam and foundation materials and potential changes in drainage.
Overtopping Hydrotechnical analyses that consider IDF storm events (including
long duration and multiple events) and freeboard requirements.
Considerations include climate change, mis-operation, spillway
erosion, spillway blockage, deformation of crest due to settlement or
instability, landslide generated waves in the reservoir, tailings
pipeline rupture, human error, sabotage, etc.

Internal erosion Seepage analyses with a range of parameters and determination of

hydraulic gradients, seepage velocities, etc.
Considerations include: filter design, differential settlement,
hydraulic fracturing, bedrock preparation, conduits in the dam fill,
dispersivity of the soils, frost effects on top of core, etc.
Environmental releases Range of parameters for seepage modeling and site conditions,
Range of potential flow rates and tailings/water release over time

7.7. DESIGN BASIS

The Design Basis establishes the key parameters and criteria needed to
progress the design. These parameters are established at the start of the TSF
design and updated during design and operations to reflect changes.

The design basis parameters are developed to list the key characteristics
and assumptions that characterize the site and are adopted in the design to
achieve the goals/targets identified in the design criteria (Section 7.8). Key
parameters include, but are not limited to, life of mine tonnage and production
rate, water constraints, tailings properties, strengths, densities, seismic and flood
loading requirements, climate, water quality, tailings geochemistry and other key
data. Design Basis could also include items such as scheduling, interaction with
other structures, constraints or limitations, borrow sources, etc. These
parameters are established at the start of the TSF design and updated during
operations to reflect improved knowledge.

Updating the Design Basis during the operational phase is linked with the
Performance-Based Risk-Informed approach. During operations, these design
parameters continue to be assessed as additional information arises and are
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compared against design assumptions and used to update the design and
operations. The same approach also applies to potential uncertainty with the dam
foundation characteristics or environmental conditions.

The Design Basis is developed by the EOR/Design Engineer and

accepted by the Owner prior to commencement of the design. The Design Basis
may be presented at the start of the initial design process as a Design Basis
Memorandum (DBM) and progressively updated as the Design Basis Report, as
the design progresses and throughout the tailings facility lifecycle.

7.8. DESIGN CRITERIA

7.8.1. General

Design criteria are the key elements of a safe design and are typically
related to the main failure modes. The design criteria should consider the
consequences of failure modes that are physically possible and have a technical
basis for their occurrence. The design criteria should consider the consequence
classification (Section 4), but the consequence classification does not account for
potential impacts to an Owner. Many Owners go beyond what the design criteria
would be based solely on the consequence classification, particularly if there is a
potential for loss of life.

The design criteria are explicit goals and/or defined targets that the
design needs to achieve. The criteria are developed in accordance with the
operational and regulatory requirements and are developed at the beginning of a
design process by the Owner of the facility in consultation with the EOR and/or
Design Engineer. It is important for the design criteria to meet applicable
regulatory and permitting obligations as well as recognizing the potential losses
to the Owner in the event of a failure. The overarching purpose of the structure
and its objectives (not necessarily quantifiable, but some may be) are also stated
with the design criteria and/or performance objectives.

As a tailings facility is constructed, operated, and closed, the design

criteria may be modified. Generally, higher consequence dams also require a
higher standard of care with design, construction/operations, and governance.

The design criteria for flood and earthquake for water dams have been
developed for many jurisdictions around the world and some jurisdictions also
have specific requirements for tailings dams, which are commonly aligned with
water dam criteria. The criteria are typically related to the probability of a certain
event happening in any year (AEP); however, this can also be thought of as the
size of flood or seismic event that could be expected to occur within a certain time
period.

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 The criteria presented in the following sections should be considered as
guidance for minimum criteria. As a general principle, each facility should be
assessed for the potential to increase the design criteria to reduce risk to “as low
as reasonably practicable” (ALARP). In some cases, there may be opportunities
to make design changes that meet higher criteria without significantly increasing
the cost, while reducing risk. Equally, higher criteria may be adopted to reflect the
potential for temporary or permanent closure of the mine even in the event of a
small-scale failure. In all cases, local jurisdictional requirements should be met or
exceeded.

The design criteria for closure may consider a higher criterion than for
operations to reflect the long-term performance requirement. Other
considerations are:

• Assess the worst-case scenario for change to the dam classification

over the expected post-closure life of the TSF. The selection of the
design criteria for closure should consider the potential changes to
the facility over the long-term, which may be positive or negative. For
example, tailings consolidation and drainage may reduce the risk of
liquefaction and “flowability”, and removal of the ability to store water
reduces the risk of dam overtopping.
• Settlement of new communities in the area could increase the
potential for loss of life or impacts to communities and infrastructure.

Design criteria for flood and seismic design are presented in the next
sub-sections. Design guidance for geotechnical Factors of Safety can be complex
and these are discussed in Section 7.9. Design guidance for seepage and surface
water components are discussed in Section 7.11 and Section 7.12, respectively.
Design guidance to minimize potential environmental effects are discussed in
Section 7.13.

7.8.2. Flood Design Criteria

Most countries have defined criteria and methods to select the return
period of the inflow design flood (IDF), which generally fall into three methods:

• Empirical – based on size of dam and storage without reference to

downstream consequences of failure.
• Consequence Based – depending on the assessment of the
consequence classification of the dam in the event of failure, as
described in Section 4.
• Risk Based – the selection of the design flood based on risk and the
findings of a risk analysis.

The IDF is the flood used for design of the TSF and its appurtenant works,
particularly for sizing the spillway and outlet works and for determining extreme
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flood storage and freeboard requirements. The tailings facility must be capable
of withstanding the flood conditions, accepting some damage and a temporary
reduction in factors of safety, but without causing failure of the dam.

The extension of rainfall data records to predict extreme flood AEP is

difficult, considering the relatively short length of the historical record of reliable
rainfall and flood flow data. Extensions of AEPs beyond the historical record are
therefore only estimates and need to be considered conservatively.

Meteorological studies can also be used predict the maximum theoretical

rainfall that can occur at any location based on topography, temperature of the
air and other factors. This is termed the probable maximum precipitation (PMP).
The flood runoff resulting from the PMP is referred to as the probable maximum
flood (PMF), which can be assessed by applying the PMP, plus snowmelt where
appropriate, to assumed antecedent basin conditions in the catchment area.
Whilst the PMP is commonly considered as “a maximum physical limit that cannot
be exceeded” it should be recognized that, for a particular study area, it is only
an approximation due to the physical complexity of the phenomena and
limitations in data, therefore due consideration of the duration of the event is
required.

As an estimate of a maximum physical limit, the PMF does not have an

AEP, but is commonly accepted to have an AEP of between 1:10,000 for very
large catchments and 1:107 for catchments under 100 km2. An assumption on the
AEP of the PMF is usually needed to allow an estimation of the magnitude of
extreme flood events beyond the credible limit of extrapolation, as indicated in 0.

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 Limits of uncertainty as the flood AEP increases. (Nathan et al, 2001)

Table 7.2 provides the suggested minimum IDF criteria corresponding to

the consequence classification. The criteria represent recommended minimum
criteria during the operating and active care periods. Higher criteria are
recommended for the passive care closure phase. In understanding the
uncertainties in the flood magnitude and likelihood, the AEO, RTFE, and the EOR
should assess each facility for the potential to increase the design criteria as far
as reasonably practical.

Table 7.2
Suggested minimum flood design criteria for operating and active care phases

Consequence Flood Criteria -- Annual Exceedance Probability (AEP)1

Classification Operations and Active Care Closure
Low 1/200

Significant 1/1,000

High 1/3rd between 1/1,000 and PMF

Very High 2/3rd between 1/1,000 and PMF

Extreme PMF
Note: 1) The criteria presented is guidance for suggested minimum criteria.

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 ICOLD recognizes that Table 7.2 deviates from the Flood Design
Criteria adopted by the GISTM, although the objective of both criteria is to design
tailings dams for appropriately conservative design floods. However, given the
uncertainty in estimating annual flood frequencies greater than about 2000 years,
and the wide range of estimated AEPs associated with rainfall depths
approximately equal to PMP values around the world, ICOLD believes that
estimates of the PMF should be performed to determine the magnitude of
extreme flood events for most TSFs, and particularly for Very High and Extreme
Consequence facilities.

The flood design criteria must also consider the critical duration of the
IDF, which is to be used for either routing the flood through a spillway or when
storing the flood. Determination of the critical duration and additional
hydrotechnical guidance is provide in Section 7.12.

ICOLD recommends that, as far as practical, an emergency spillway be

provided and/or planned for as part of the emergency response plan, as
discussed in Section 10.2.1.

7.8.3. Seismic Design Criteria

As with floods, the estimation of earthquake loadings is a complex matter

and includes significant uncertainty (ICOLD, 2016). As described in Section 5.7,
a seismic hazard assessment is required to determine the earthquake loading
parameters.

Table 7.3 includes suggested Minimum Seismic Design Criteria for the
operating and active care periods of the TSF lifecycle. As for the flood criteria,
each facility should be assessed for the potential to increase the design criteria
as far as practical. Higher criteria should be considered for the passive care
closure phase, selected with consideration of the extended time that the structure
is intended to remain in a safe structural condition. The AE, RSP, and the EOR
should assess each facility for the potential to increase the design criteria as far
as reasonably practical.

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 Table 7.3
Minimum seismic design criteria

Consequence Seismic Criteria1 Annual Exceedance Probability2or Maximum Credible

Classification Ground Motion3
Operations and Active Care Closure
Low 1/200

Significant 1/1,000

High 1/2,4754

Very High 1/5,000 or 50th percentile MCE1,3

Extreme 1/10,000 or 84th Percentile MCE1,3

Notes:
1) The selection of the probabilistic or deterministic (scenario-based) design earthquake ground
motions should consider the seismic setting and the reliability and applicability of each method.
2) The criteria presented are guidance for suggested minimum criteria. Each facility should be
assessed for the potential to increase the design criteria to further reduce risk.
3) MCE is based upon a deterministic seismic hazard assessment that considers a range of
scenarios.

There may be significant differences in the ground motions associated

with the MCE (deterministic approach) and the corresponding ground motions
indicated by the AEP-based (probabilistic) criteria presented in Table 7.3. In
areas of relatively lower seismic activity, the identified faults may have extremely
low slip rates and/or long recurrence intervals. As a result, the MCE ground
motion may be unrealistically high and would correspond to an event with a very
low AEP. Conversely, in seismically active regions, the MCE ground motions may
be inappropriately low for design because the identified fault may have an
extremely high slip rate and a short recurrence interval and corresponds to a high
AEP. In practice, this means that in some cases, the lower of the two criteria may
be appropriate. However, in some seismic settings, the larger of the two criteria
may be realistic and should be considered. Therefore, the selection of seismic
design criteria for Very High and Extreme consequence TSFs may sometimes
require a consensus of a panel of seismic experts.

7.9. SLOPE STABILITY ASSESSMENT

7.9.1. Introduction

Assessment of slope stability is a key element of the safety evaluation of

tailings dams and is most often based upon Factor of Safety (FOS) values
calculated using limit-equilibrium (L-E) analyses. Alternatively, stability analyses
can be carried out using advanced numerical models (i.e., non-linear deformation
analyses or NDA) that are based on stress-strain constitutive relationships.

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Despite being used successfully in Europe, limit states analysis is less commonly
used in practice and is not addressed in this Bulletin. Probabilistic methods may
be applied using either of these methods.

The safety of an existing slope can also be inferred from performance

data. This method is not available for the design of new facilities—because no
performance data are available—nor is it appropriate for facilities that rely on the
strength of highly brittle materials, because there are no methods to monitor and
predict or and detect brittle failures in advance. However, for other dams, the
safety of the slope can be inferred from an examination of pore pressure data
(well within planned ranges) and deformation data (limited to no deformation).
However, the safety of the dam based on performance data may not account for
conditions that the dam has not yet seen, such as extreme water levels or seismic
loading.

This section focusses on L-E analyses for stability and provides limited
discussion on non-linear deformation analysis and performance-based
assessments.

Slope stability assessment should be supported by a geotechnical design

model (GDM) with design material parameters derived using objectively
measured data and current and defendable engineering principles that consider
material variability, the scale of variability, and the behavior uncertainties. The
delineation of regions and the design properties within the same geological
setting may vary depending on the material behavior under the particular loading
condition. Appendix A provides the key principles of material behavior under
shearing, a good understanding of which is essential for carrying out any slope
stability assessment. The analyses should consider the range of potential
material properties and potential variations in pore pressures/ phreatic conditions
due to extreme floods and variable decant pond conditions.

7.9.2. Slope Stability Assessment Methods

The L-E method is used for the design of new facilities and to assess the
stability of existing facilities. In most cases, L-E analyses are viewed as sufficient
for design and assessment when the FOS calculated for all loading conditions
exceed the minimum values (described in Section 7.9.4. Furthermore, L-E
analysis is normally sufficient for facilities where materials comprising the
foundation and the structural zones of the tailings dam are expected to be dilative
over the full range of operating conditions over the life of the facility and
appropriate and sufficient piezometric data are available.

However, when contractive materials are present, especially when

significant strain-softening and/or brittle behavior is possible, some of the
underlying assumptions of L-E analysis may not be met, and NDA may be
required to assess if deformations could lead to failure. While NDA methods
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inherently allow for more advanced representation of the complex nature of
shearing and deformation behavior of soils, they are not necessarily superior to
the more simplified limit-equilibrium method because of the range of uncertainties
associated with the material parameters for an NDA model. Caution and
engineering judgment are required when implementing both types of analysis.

Often in the assessment of existing facilities, L-E analysis may be used

as a screening tool to identify whether advanced deformation analyses or
alternative methods for assessing the stability of the dam are warranted as
detailed in Section 7.9.12. Further discussions on the advantages,
disadvantages, and limitations of L-E and NDA methods are provided below.

Caution is required when contractive soils are present in the structural

zone of the embankment or foundations. As the strain-stress dependency is not
captured in the L-E analysis, NDA’s may be appropriate to assess the safety of
the dams where the shear resistance is strongly strain-dependent as discussed
in Sections 7.9.2, 7.9.6 and 7.9.7.

Seismic loading induces pore pressures and potential reductions in shear

strengths, so it is important that appropriate material and pore water pressure
characteristics are applied for post-seismic loading conditions when building up
the GDM. Potential effects include strain softening and seismic-induced excess
pore water pressures that should be considered for the TSF foundations and the
structural zones of the embankments.

When undertaking a slope stability assessment, the following should be

considered:

• The consequences of failure.

• The overall complexity of the problem.
• The expected soil response to shearing (i.e., contractive/dilative) and
its variation with confining stress and stress level, including the
potential for brittle failure mechanisms.
• The variability and uncertainty associated with material properties,
the subsurface conditions, and the pore pressure conditions.
• The methods of construction and operating conditions.
• Comprehensiveness of site investigations and geotechnical
monitoring.
• Time‐dependent, deformation‐dependent, and stress‐path‐
dependent processes that may affect the critical material properties
such as the operational pore pressures and shear strengths.
• Strain‐incompatibility of the different materials forming the dam and
its foundation.
• The potential for and implementation of an effective risk
management system to reduce or mitigate the residual risks
associated with the uncertainties of these factors over the lifecycle of
the dam.
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 This section on Slope Stability Assessment includes two Appendices to
assist in understanding key principles of soil mechanics and the application of
factors of safety to in situ conditions:

• Appendix A provides guidance on characterization of shear strength

and deformation behavior of natural soils and tailings materials. The
designer must understand and apply the concepts described in
Appendix A when selecting the inputs for L-E stability analyses.
Appendix A also includes a description of brittleness and a
preliminary definition.
• Appendix B provides guidance for selection of analysis methods and
minimum FOS values for tailings facilities with contractive materials
within the structural zones of the facility.

7.9.3. Limit Equilibrium Method

The L-E method of slope stability is formulated around the “method of

slices”. Several different L-E methods of slices are available, with the primary
difference being in the interpretation of the inter-slice forces. The most common
methods are implemented in a variety of commercial slope stability software
packages.

L-E slope stability analyses are typically assessed for one or more
representative 2-D cross section(s). Multiple sections are usually analyzed to
identify one or more critical section(s) that have the lowest FOS and/or have the
highest consequences of failure. Modern L-E software packages have built-in
search routines that can quickly analyze multiple potential failure surfaces (both
circular and non-circular) in a search for the shear surface that yields the lowest
FOS, although care must be taken that the resulting surfaces appear reasonable.
Through this process, critical shear surfaces are identified that, were they to fail
or undergo significant movement, could result in the uncontrolled release of the
stored contents (water and/or tailings) and/or would represent a major
consequence to the safety of the facility, either immediately or in the form of a
progressive failure. Typically, failure along these critical shear surfaces would
result in loss of freeboard, loss of a significant portion of the dam crest, or
significant damage to critical dam safety features (e.g., core, filter, seepage
collection features, etc.). Slip surfaces that are deemed inconsequential (e.g.,
very shallow surface slumps) may be dismissed.

The FOS calculated in L-E analysis is typically defined as a reduction

factor that is required to reduce the shear strength of materials to bring the driving
and resisting forces into a state of limiting equilibrium. The calculated FOS in a
L-E analysis is the same for each slice and for the entire slip surface, which is a
simplification as the FOS for each slice varies, and significant load transfer can
occur when strain-softening materials are present. This simplifying assumption is
one of several limitations to the L-E approach described further in Section 7.9.11.
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However, because of its simplicity and generally favorable track record when
appropriate input parameters are selected, the L-E method is suitable for most
design cases.

7.9.4. Target Factors of Safety for Limit Equilibrium Stability

Analyses

Slope stability of dams is typically assessed using minimum FOS criteria

specified for the most common loading conditions, the magnitudes of which are
related to the dam classification of the TSF. This approach is referred to as the
“standards-based” approach and is used by most dam safety regulations or
guidance documents to define the minimum safety requirements.

Table 7.4 provides target FOS for two principal stability conditions: static
and post-liquefaction. The targets are considered minimums. This section and
Appendix B provides guidance to assess where adjustments may be made to
these targets.

Table 7.4
Target factors of safety

Stability Condition Target Minimum Factor of Safety

Static Conditions 1.5
Post-Liquefaction Conditions1 1.1
Note: 1) In clay-like soils and shales the residual shear strength case should target the same
minimum FOS as the post-liquefaction case

The target FOS in Table 7.4 assume that internationally accepted good
practice has been adopted with respect to the site characterization, selection of
parameters, and design approaches and that a GDM has been developed as
discussed in Section 7.9.1

7.9.5. Stability Conditions

Stability analyses are typically conducted for the following situations:

• TSF end of starter dam construction and construction phases.

• TSF normal operations.
• TSF after an extreme rainfall event and when it takes several weeks
or months to reduce the water level.
• TSF with temporarily suspended operations.
• TSF in care and maintenance (active care closure).
• TSF in passive care closure.

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 Liquefaction triggered during static loading is addressed in the post-
liquefaction stability condition.

L-E stability analyses should apply appropriate shear strength properties

that reflect the range of loading conditions and behaviors expected of the soils
comprising the foundation and structural zones of the dam. For dams that
comprise dilative soils, the selected peak strength to be used in the stability
modelling should be at low strains.

For dams that have contractive elements in the dam shell or foundation
and that may be (or may become) saturated or partially saturated, undrained
shear strength parameters must be considered (refer to Appendix A for further
guidance on contractive soil characterization). If contractive soils are present in
the dam and/or foundation, it may be appropriate to assume that there could be
an initiating event that could result in undrained loading and shearing in the
contractive elements. For contractive soils, the undrained shear strength is
typically lower than “drained strength parameters” and would thus indicate that
undrained loading and shearing conditions will generally control the stability
assessment.

A “drained analysis” of contractive materials could provide misleading

and non-conservative results since it is unlikely that a dam with contractive
elements will fail in a drained manner. A common misconception is that after a
dam is constructed and the excess pore pressures resulting from construction
have dissipated, the contractive materials in the dam may be considered
“drained” and effective-stress parameters are appropriate for future slope stability
analysis. However, if an initiating event results in undrained loading and shearing,
then the material can quickly transition from a drained to undrained condition as
shear-induced excess pore pressures are generated (see Appendix A) and the
undrained strengths will control stability.

Typical initiating events for undrained failure under static conditions

include:

• Raising of a tailings dam, thus adding soil load to the dam, resulting
in an increase in loading and stress concentrations along potential
failure surfaces associated with higher dam heights, which can
induce excess pore water pressures that can lead to undrained
shearing.
• Reduced soil loads at the downstream slope or toe (by erosion, slope
re-grading, or excavation). This can lead to deformations of the dam
and/or foundation that induce excess pore water pressures and
undrained shearing.
• Development of significant erosion features on the downstream
slope of a dam due to an extreme precipitation event(s), that can
change the stress and deformation conditions in the dam.

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 • Erosion of significant portions of the dam and tailings during an
overtopping flood event that can change the stress and deformation
conditions.
• Deformation and shear straining in materials at the base of a dam
that are contractive or are ductile and can experience large strains.
This can cause a change in stress state of the materials in the upper
portions of the dam, resulting in static liquefaction of contractive
elements.
• Progressive failure (over-stressing of a local zone in the soil or rock,
leading to stress transfer and failure of adjacent zones), especially
when creep mechanisms apply. Creep rupture can commence as a
drained process but can accelerate and transition to undrained
shearing.
• Changes in the pore pressure conditions in a dam or foundation. This
can cause the effective stresses to increase and result in
deformations that initiate the undrained event.
• A rising phreatic surface that results in a reduction in mean effective
stress.

7.9.6. Post Liquefaction Stability Conditions

Liquefaction of cohesionless soils in the dam or foundation can be

initiated by a seismic event or through stress changes and deformations (static
liquefaction). The potential for liquefaction during a seismic event is based on the
susceptibility of the soil to liquefaction and the magnitude of the seismic event.
The magnitude of the seismic event is established as part of the design criteria.
It is important to note that under large seismic events, soil that may normally be
considered dense could potentially experience liquefaction.

The potential for static liquefaction is based on the susceptibility to

liquefaction, but also the shear strength and deformation characteristics and the
magnitude of the deformations.

If liquefaction can occur, then stability analyses for the post-liquefaction

condition assume that the potentially liquefiable soils fully liquefy, and a post-
liquefaction residual strength is applied. The post liquefaction stability condition
may be the critical case governing the stability.

7.9.7. Residual Strength in Clay and “Clay Like” Tailings

Appendix A provides a discussion on residual strengths. As noted above,

the term post-liquefaction residual shear strength is used for cohesionless soils
or clay-like soils with a moisture content > 80% of the liquid limit. Residual
strength conditions in a clay layer can occur through deformations that cause the
shear strength to pass the peak and reduce to a lower strength. For a clay, the
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residual strength is the ultimate strength when there is no volume change
occurring and with no effects from particle orientation.

Clay, clay shales, or plastic soils in the foundation of a dam may have
undergone shearing due to geologic processes that created zones/layers that are
at residual strength prior to the construction of the dam. In this case, the residual
shear strength needs to be accounted for in the design of the dam.

If pre-shearing has not occurred, then the peak strengths of the clay are
used for the static stability condition. As a check, the residual strength of the clay
can be assumed in the model and checked against a targeted FOS of 1.1. If pre-
shearing has occurred, then the target FOS could be higher.

7.9.8. Additional Stability Conditions

Table 7.4 provides target FOS for static and post-liquefaction conditions.
This sub-section addresses other stability conditions that are typically requested
in regulations:

• End of construction
• Rapid drawdown
• Seismic and post seismic loading for dams with dilative soils

End of Construction

End of construction conditions are conventionally applied to water dams

to recognize that construction-induced pore pressures frequently develop in
foundations and/or embankments prior to placing a dam into service. The
minimum FOS for End of Construction conditions for a water dam has typically
been set as a minimum of 1.3 because this is a temporary condition and there is
no water or other contents impounded, meaning that the consequences of a
failure would be low.

In the context of tailings dams, the End of Construction condition could

apply to the construction of a starter dam of a tailings dam before water and
tailings are impounded. This condition could also apply to other mining dams
before water and solids are impounded.

In some cases, the End of Construction loading condition has been

misapplied to ongoing raises of tailings since it was judged that the tailings dam
was under “construction”. As noted above, for tailings dams under construction
or being raised, the target FOS should be 1.5.

When a tailings dam is being raised, the stability of the upstream slope
for the raise should be checked. A target FOS of 1.3 can be accepted for this
slope provided there is no potential for loss of containment.
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 Rapid Draw Down

Rapid draw down could potentially be a concern for a tailings dam in the
initial stages of operations before beaches are established. Reclaim and water
treatment requirements may draw the pond down quickly. If this condition could
occur, then the designer should specify a suitable target FOS that accounts for
the frequency and magnitude of the drawdown and considers the consequences
of failure of the upstream slope due to rapid drawdown. This also applies to other
mining dams that do not have a beach upstream of them.

Seismic and Post-Seismic Loading for Dams with Dilative Soils

For dams that are built of dilative soils on a dilative foundation which
would not experience liquefaction during a seismic event, it is possible to assess
the post seismic stability by estimating pore pressure generation during the
seismic event and calculating a FOS. This is a complex analysis and often is not
the controlling case for stability. The focus of the stability assessment should be
on expected deformations resulting from a seismic event and, therefore, a
deformation analysis should be undertaken rather than a stability analysis.

ICOLD does not support the use of pseudo-static analysis to provide an

indication of deformations due to earthquake loading. The pseudo-static analysis
method has been superseded by better approaches for estimating deformations.
However, as many dam safety regulations continue to require the pseudo-static
method, it should be properly applied and interpreted.

7.9.9. Adjustments to Target FOS

The target FOS presented in Table 7.4should be considered as initial

targets that may be adjusted after consideration of several factors.

Higher FOS targets could be adopted to account for the following

considerations:

• Design for Passive Closure to account for uncertainties over time.

• High degree of uncertainty in geologic conditions, material
properties, or pore pressure conditions such as may occur in early
stages of design.
• Presence of sensitive and/or strain‐softening soils that could be
adversely affected by localized stress concentrations and excessive
deformation.
• Potential for changes to soil properties or loading conditions with
time.

Lower FOS for static conditions can be adopted through comprehensive

implementation of the Observational Method (Section 7.5.2) supported by a
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detailed GDM. The Observational Method, however, cannot be used for this
purpose if there are brittle materials in the dam or foundation and if measures
cannot be implemented to improve the FOS if adverse performance is observed.

For the case where a pre-sheared clay or clay shale exists in the
foundation and a residual shear strength has been assigned to this layer, then it
is possible to consider a lower target FOS since some of the uncertainty
associated with the FOS calculation has been removed.

As an overarching principal, target FOS can be established with support

from risk assessments and compliance with ALARP principles.

7.9.10. Three-Dimensional Stability L-E Analyses

There are occasions where slope stability assessment may be better

represented by a three-dimensional (3-D) model rather than a two-dimensional
model (whether in L-E or NDA analyses). Examples of such situations include
embankments in narrowing or widening valleys and sharp convex or concave
embankment bends. The selection and application of FOS targets for 3-D
analyses should generally follow those identified for 2-D analyses. However, the
targets shown in Table 7.4 have been developed based on experience gained
with 2-D slope stability models and the use of 3-D analysis must carefully
consider the specific site conditions. Added uncertainty associated with shearing
resistance along the ends of the sliding mass may prompt an increase in the
target FOS. Three-dimensional modelling should not be used in simple
geometries to replace 2-D analysis and increase FOS as determined from the 2-
D analysis.

7.9.11. Limitations of Limit Equilibrium Analyses

The key limitations of L-E analyses are:

• The underlying principles do not account for strains and

displacements.
• The calculated FOS does not satisfy displacement compatibility of
materials along the slip surface.
• The FOS is for the entire shearing surface with no consideration to
localized zones that may be over-stressed beyond the peak strength.
• Shear and normal stresses calculated on the shear surface under the
individual slices are unrealistic.

Due to these limitations caution must be exercised and NDA should be

considered when there are:

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 • Materials for which significant strength loss and/or brittle behavior
could be expected.
• Complex subsurface/internal features of the dam or interbedded
layers of materials with very different stress-strain characteristics
resulting in strain incompatibility.
• Creep mechanisms may be possible.

7.9.12. Safety Evaluation with Non-Linear Deformation Analyses

Finite-element (FEM) or finite-difference (FDM) models that simulate the

stress-strain behavior of soils can better represent an embankment slope stability
than the L-E methods as long as the required input data is available. These NDA
models incorporate constitutive relationships that represent the non-linear,
interdependent relationships between effective stress, pore pressure, and strain
that occurs in situ. NDA models can be used to represent both the static and
dynamic (i.e., seismic) conditions. The primary difference between static and
dynamic NDA is in the method of applying a load to induce shearing in the dam
being modeled (although there may be several lesser-order differences).

For a dynamic analysis, deformation is usually introduced by applying a

time history record of acceleration, velocity, or displacement from an earthquake
ground motion record. The models then calculate the stress-strain-pore pressure
response based on the constitutive model selected and the specific formulation
of the numerical platform (i.e., computer software). Dynamic modeling of tailings
dams, water dams, and other embankments have been performed since the
1960’s and there is extensive documentation in the technical literature.

When evaluating seismic performance of a dam with NDAs, a relatively

simplified gravity turn-on analysis can be performed. A simplified gravity turn-on
analysis involves using the same model that was used in the dynamic phase and
assigning liquefiable soil properties to those zones that have liquefied, and then
applying gravity.

The FEM or FDM software is used to estimate potential post-earthquake

deformations when cyclic liquefaction is indicated by solving for equilibrium of a
structure with post-liquefaction (i.e., residual) shear strengths, similar to the post-
peak/post-liquefaction L-E analyses. The initial static stress conditions are
calculated using drained strengths and then zones expected to liquefy during
earthquake shaking are assigned a reduced strength and the model is used to
analyze equilibrium under gravity loading.

This same technique can also be applied to assess deformations

resulting from so-called “static liquefaction” in tailings dams as discussed in
Appendix A. In theory, with the right constitutive model, the initiation of static
liquefaction and subsequent deformation behavior can be evaluated using NDAs.

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However, the potential for development of a loading sequence that leads to static
liquefaction is currently very difficult to categorically disprove and/or predict.

While NDA’s have the potential to provide an improved assessment

compared to an L-E analysis, an improved outcome is not guaranteed as the
state of practice for deformation modelling is evolving. Deformation models are
inherently complex with input parameters that often have significant and
potentially greater uncertainty than the typical inputs to an L-E analysis.
Uncertainty in the input parameters leads to at least the same degree of
uncertainty in the output of the model. Deformation models should only be
undertaken by, or under the direct oversight of, an experienced modeler with a
comprehensive understanding of soil behavior and a recognition of the relation
between modeled behavior and real-world behavior.

The FEM/FDM numerical platforms can also be used to calculate a FOS

using the Shear Strength Reduction (SSR) method of slope stability analysis, to
arrive at a factor of safety similar to the result of an L-E analysis. The SSR
technique involves applying a factor to the shear strength that brings a slope to
the verge of failure (similar to the L-E calculation). The shear strengths of all the
materials in the FEM/FDM model are reduced by the same shear strength
reduction factor, which is adjusted until instability is attained. A slope is
considered unstable in the SSR technique if the model does not converge to a
solution within a specified tolerance. This method can provide insights to the
possible location of critical slip surfaces that complement the critical slip surfaces
provided by L-E analyses. SSR modeling can be most useful in scenarios where
internal geometries in the embankment create the potential for irregular slip
surfaces to develop. The same target FOS criteria presented in Table 7.4 can be
applied to the SSR approach.

Deformation modelling can be a very valuable tool for assessment of a

tailings dam that is being raised and where there are stress-strain dependent
soils that influence the strengths. Monitoring of deformations and pore pressures
can be used to calibrate the model over time, leading to an improved
understanding of the soil behavior. Deformation criteria should be established
that consider aspects such as crest settlement that can lead to overtopping and
damage narrow zones of fill, such as filters or cores. Application of the
“observational method” with the associated constitutive models may, in certain
cases, support the use of lower FOS values evaluated using conventional L-E
analyses.

7.9.13. Performance-Based Stability Evaluation

As noted above, there are several limitations to the L-E approach for
assessing the stability of a dam. The L-E analyses are appropriate for new dams
designed without performance data available. A performance-based stability

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evaluation can be undertaken for dams built and raised over several years,
provided the stability of the dam does not rely on peak strength of brittle soils.

Limit equilibrium FOS calculations should be supplemented by NDA

where deformations, stress states, pore water pressures and other measured
behaviors may provide a better indication of performance and safety of the dam.
In a performance-based approach, the initial FOS targets should be evaluated
and modified based on the behavior of the materials involved and recognizing the
level of risk and uncertainty.

Section 7.5.3 provides further discussion on the Performance Based

Risk Informed Design.

7.10. EARTHQUAKE ASSESSMENT (SEISMIC STABILITY)

Several aspects of earthquake (seismic) analysis and design have been

addressed in previous sections because the evaluation of earthquake loading
overlaps with certain aspects of slope stability analysis. This section provides an
overall summary of the approach to evaluating earthquake stability for tailings
dams.

There are two basic components of earthquake design for tailings dams:
1) an evaluation of the potential for cyclic triggering of liquefaction and 2)
evaluation of potential deformations and related damage to the embankment.
Earthquake ground motions required for the earthquake evaluations should be
developed from a seismic hazard analysis as described in Section 5.7 and the
design earthquake selected as described in Section 7.8.3.

7.10.1. Cyclic Liquefaction Evaluation

Procedures for assessment of cyclic triggering of liquefaction are well-

documented in the literature (e.g., NASEM, 2016) and are not elaborated in this
Bulletin. These assessments are usually made based on the results of seismic
cone penetration testing (SCPT), which includes both conventional CPT data and
shear wave velocity profiling. Similar methods based on Standard Penetration
Test (SPT) are also possible, but generally discouraged for tailings, since the
SCPT provides greater resolution and generally provides a more robust
characterization for lower cost in most applications. Jefferies and Been (2016)
provide useful commentary on cyclic liquefaction and the current standard of
practice for evaluating liquefaction triggering and present an alternative
approach. Liquefaction potential can also be assessed as part of a numerical
modeling effort using non-linear deformation analysis (NDA) or similar software
platforms.

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 7.10.2. Earthquake Stability and Deformation Analyses

If liquefaction is indicated (either due to a cyclic or a “static” trigger

mechanism or both) then the post-liquefaction (residual) shear strength of the soil
should be applied to the liquefied materials and the predicted FOS checked
against the Post-Liquefaction criterion in 7.9.4. Although evaluations considering
post-peak strengths for brittle materials should be considered even in cases
where triggering assessments indicate that triggering is not expected as noted in
prior sections, cyclic liquefaction triggering analyses are valuable tools for
evaluating the likelihood of triggering in the event of an earthquake, which is
useful to assess overall risk of an existing structure. It is important to note that
even if liquefaction triggering due to cyclic loading is not indicated during an
earthquake, some strength loss could occur during earthquake shaking. This is
particularly relevant in clays (which are generally not prone to liquefaction), as
well as in some dilative materials, where earthquake loading may lead to
deformations which can lead to strain softening and cyclic failure. This loss of
strength could result in localized shearing that could subsequently trigger flow
liquefaction in brittle materials within the embankment section. As such, cyclic
liquefaction triggering analyses should not be used to rule out any possibility of
flow liquefaction triggering in brittle or strain softening materials in the event of
earthquake loading. If strength loss is indicated, then the same stability criteria
apply. These types of analyses may be performed using either L-E or NDA
methods.

For dams where liquefaction and/or significant strength loss is not

expected (e.g., dams comprised of dilative materials constructed on competent,
non-liquefiable foundations) but where significant earthquake loading is
expected, the seismic stability can be evaluated either using simplified
deformation analyses or NDA methods. Simplified analyses (Reference Annex)
may be used to estimate the magnitude of deformation expected during
earthquake shaking. In areas of high seismicity, where design ground motions
are relatively large, NDA is more commonly used. This is especially true if (a) the
estimated deformation calculated using a simplified analysis is greater than about
1 meter or more than approximately one percent of the maximum height, or (b)
there are unusual features of the dam that are sensitive to deformations—such
as thin cores or complicated geometric configurations—where a higher resolution
analysis, indicating where deformations are likely to occur, is important. It should
be noted that simplified analyses are relevant only when no liquefaction or
significant strength loss is expected during shaking—NDA can be used for cases
with or without liquefaction.

There are currently no prescriptive criteria for allowable deformations that

can be applied universally. The assessment of “acceptable performance” during
earthquake shaking should be made with careful oversight of independent
reviewers experienced in earthquake deformation assessments. Generally, the
objective for the design earthquake (sometimes called the “safety evaluation

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earthquake”, see ICOLD, 2016) is to prevent uncontrolled release of the contents
of the facility, although some level of damage may be considered acceptable,
provided that the damage would not lead to a progressive failure and that the
damage can be reasonably repaired prior to resuming operations.

7.11. SEEPAGE DESIGN

7.11.1. Pore Pressures, Filters and Drainage

An understanding of the seepage that develops through the

embankments, abutments, foundations, and impoundment footprint is required
for design. Seepage analyses need to account for under-consolidation of tailings,
e.g., elevated pore pressure as well as lower pressures due to downward
gradients. For slope stability analyses, normal loading consolidation and shear-
induced pore pressure are important mechanisms, and these are considered in
Section 7.11. This section addresses the seepage and groundwater conditions
that develop due to flow of water through the dam and foundation. Unlike water
dams, tailings dams need to consider factors such as ongoing infiltration due to
spigotted slurry tailings; consolidation release water that reports to the decant
pond; and the typical heterogeneity of deposited tailings with variable
permeability layers. The variable conditions and multiple water sources make the
normal 2-D seepage analyses challenging and assessment of seepage models
should consider the potential variability.

An understanding of the groundwater regime, guided by seepage

modelling, aids in the selection of instrumentation (piezometers) locations to
monitor performance of the dam during its lifecycle. It is also necessary to
understand the difference between the phreatic surface and pore pressure as
they may or may not coincide, depending on the soil properties, particularly if
vertical drainage is occurring or if excess pore pressures developed due to
loading. Numerous tools are available for hydrogeological assessments, and the
selected method should be appropriate for data and information known about the
TSF and hydrogeological properties of the surrounding areas.

Of importance in the medium- to long-term, is the change in mining

activity and how it may influence the hydrogeological regime around the TSF.
Examples include ceasing deposition into a TSF and decommissioning of
dewatering bores in the areas around the TSF. These activities can affect
groundwater levels and flows and changes to these activities should be
investigated as part of the assessment. Consideration should also be given to
assessing closure conditions and the long-term impacts on the groundwater
regime. While this is important for all TSFs, this is also applicable to below-
groundwater, in-pit TSFs, where seasonal groundwater variations expose
deposited tailings to transient groundwater conditions.

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 Drains and/or drainage layers in the dam are used to maintain a lower
phreatic surface to improve stability and reduce the risk of piping on the
downstream slope of the dam. The design of drainage is described in ICOLD
Bulletin No 97, “Tailings Dams Design of Drainage”. Drainage components may
also be required to control uplift pressures due to artesian conditions. Design of
dam zonation and filters should maximize the benefit of the tailings to reduce the
hydraulic gradients by limiting the use of high permeability fill zones adjacent to
the tailings.

Filter requirements for closure should consider potential changes to the

hydraulic gradients, which may decrease with a dry closure alternative, and the
potential for geochemical clogging of filters due to precipitates associated with
the geochemistry of the tailings.

7.11.2. Design Measures to Minimize Seepage

Minimization of seepage may be (a) an engineering control to reduce

hydraulic gradients and seepage flow rates; and/or (b) an environmental control
to minimize potential seepage of contaminated water to the receiving
environment (refer to Section 7.13 of this Bulletin). Seepage controls in a dam
typically include low permeability soil zones and, in some cases, geosynthetic
liners. Geomembrane lined dams may need to consider a bedding that is filter
compatible with the tailings, in case there are defects in the liner.

Methods to minimize foundation seepage include cut-offs (e.g. slurry

trenches and grouting), interception trenches or wells, and collection sumps/dams
below points of seepage. Cut-offs are useful in areas where preferential seepage
zones of higher permeability exist within the foundations. In situ soils (clays) may
have relatively high permeability due to fissures, root holes etc. and permeability
may be reduced by re-working and compaction. Low permeability liners include
many options: compacted clay, bentonite mixed soils, geomembranes such as
high density and linear low-density polyethylene (HDPE or LLDPE), geosynthetic
clay liners (GCL) and bituminous materials. Well-constructed
geomembrane/tailings liner systems have been shown to have extremely low
leakage rates, on the order of 0.001 L/s/km2. Synthetic liner systems may have
limited life expectancy, although well designed and specified liners can have a
design life in terms of hundreds or possibly thousands of years. However, the
long-term effect of liner degradation and potential future release of contaminants
needs to be considered. When considering the potential need for an engineered
lining system, such as a geomembrane or a composite liner, it is necessary to
quantify the benefit of such a solution. Tailings typically have a very low
permeability, particularly the tailings at the base of the TSF where consolidation
has reduced void ratios and thus hydraulic conductivities.

Consideration of an engineered lining system with drains should address

the risks associated with underdrainage, as seepage through the tailings would
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need to be collected and managed. The drains may also provide flow paths for
seepage to be directed to defects in the under-liner. Internal drainage systems
may be prone to failure, so design should consider limited use of
underdrain/geomembrane systems. The higher pressures could increase
seepage loss and reduce the consolidation of the tailings.

Impoundment liners and low permeability elements in the dam and

impoundment may also be required to limit environmental effects associated with
the geochemistry of the tailings pore water as described in Section 7.13 of this
Bulletin.

7.12. HYDROTECHNICAL DESIGN

7.12.1. Introduction

Water management for the TSF needs to allow for both dam safety and
environmental safety in an operational situation where the water storage capacity
is continually being modified by the deposited tailings and dam raises, and water
quality is often unsuitable for release to the environment.

When storing tailings, there must be allowance in design and operations

that leaves adequate room for water storage, including:

• A minimum water pond to allow settling of fines and, in some cases,

for geochemical attenuation of reclaim water.
• Temporary storage of normal seasonal inflows (rainy season or
snowmelt periods).
• In cold climates: (a) storage of water to account for ice formation and
to allow deposition below the ice; and (b) effects of ice reducing
availability of process water and freeze-thaw effects on containment
dams.
• Temporary storage of process water that could cause environmental
harm if released, known as the Environmental Design Flood (EDF)
• Storage or routing of the Inflow Design Flood (IDF) to ensure the
integrity of the containment dams.

Fig. 7.3 shows a section through a generic tailings dam with the operating
and flood water levels depicted schematically.

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 Maximum Operating Level

Decant Pump or
outlet
Fig. 7.3
Schematic showing operating and flood levels

The Normal Operating Water Level (NOWL) is controlled by either a

pump system or a gravity decant system. The NOWL can be subject to
fluctuations due to seasonal variations and environmental conditions, resulting in
periods when water accumulates in the impoundment. These inflows must be
managed between the normal operating level and the maximum operating water
level (MOWL). In some cases, the NOWL may be drawn down further to
accommodate temporal inflows. The MOWL is selected to ensure that sufficient
storage is provided to accommodate average seasonal inflows, which can then
be drawn down during the drier months of the year.

Where applicable, an EDF level is maintained between the MOWL and

an outlet spillway to contain an EDF.

The IDF level is established to either store the IDF or to rout the IDF
through a spillway or similar outlet structure. Where the EDF or IDF are
temporarily stored, water must be removed by the decant or pump system over
an appropriate time period.

Operating water levels should be based on an appropriately detailed

water balance, which can change over the life cycle of the facility.

Wave runup and freeboard, between the maximum IDF and the dam
crest, should be provided to prevent wave action overtopping the crest. It may be
appropriate to add additional freeboard to allow for wind set-up in larger storages,
for uncertainties of calculation, and/or potential for dam crest settlement,
particularly if erosion may cause embankment breaching.

Although there will normally be some minimum level of water storage

required to allow settlement of fines or process water attenuation, it is very
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desirable to minimize the decant pond size and to maximize the extent of tailings
beach development.

7.12.2. Environmental Design Flood (EDF)

The EDF is the flood that is to be managed without release of untreated

water to the environment. Retention of water during the EDF requires storage
capacity above the MOL.

The selection of the return period and duration of the EDF must consider
factors such as the water quality that could be released, regulatory requirements,
frequency of overflow events, the rate and duration of overflows, the
environmental sensitivity of the receiving environment, downstream flow in the
receiving environment and recipient, downstream mixing characteristics, and
public perception. The selection of an appropriate EDF is therefore site-specific
and should be derived through:

• consultation with regulatory agencies

• consideration of environmental effects associated with the
frequency, magnitude and duration of an infrequent release
• consideration of dilution that may be available from flood flows in the
receiving water
• consideration of the costs associated with varying degrees of
environmental control.

Typical EDF return periods range from 1 in 10 years to 1 in 200 years,

but more stringent criteria may be required depending on the site conditions. The
appropriate EDF duration typically ranges from weeks to months depending on
the assimilative capacity of the receiving water and, when available, the capacity
of the water treatment system. An example of a methodology to determine the
EDF is presented in Appendix C.

The MOWL should be identified for each TSF and when exceeded,
appropriate operational procedures and relevant portions of the Trigger Action
and Response Plan (TARP as described in Section 8.4) should be initiated.

7.12.3. Inflow Design Flood (IDF), Critical Duration and Freeboard

The inflow design flood (IDF) is the most severe inflow flood (peak,
volume, shape, duration, timing) for which the tailings dam and associated
facilities (spillway) are designed to protect the dam from overtopping.
Determination of the IDF return period is addressed in Section 7.8.2 of this
Bulletin.

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 Other technical considerations for the IDF include:

• IDFs typically occur during periods where antecedent precipitation

results in saturated ground conditions, which lead to high volumetric
runoff coefficients (e.g. greater than 90%).
• Antecedent events and the critical duration can influence the flood
storage and flood routing requirements.
• IDFs may vary seasonally. For example, in cold climates rain-on-
snow events may or may not be critical IDF events.
• Functionality of diversions and other factors, such as localized
landslides due to high rains or freezing/snow plugging of diversions
structure.
• Functionality of spillways, such as ice jamming or ice formation.

The IDF needs to consider the critical duration of the flood. Where the
design flood is to be passed through a spillway, the critical duration will be
determined by flood routing through the impoundment.

Where the IDF is to be stored, determination of the critical duration

should consider:

• Potential duration of extreme storms or multiple extreme storms

considering the emergency response capability to release water
under the likely conditions of the extreme event. Critical durations
can vary from days to weeks.
• The ability to construct an emergency spillway in a location that
would not jeopardize the safety of the dam.
• The storage available within the freeboard allowance and the
erodibility of the dam construction materials if the dam is overtopped.

Wherever practicable, it is good practice to provide an emergency

spillway to safely route the IDF without the need for emergency measures to be
taken or to allow for automatic measures (such as fuse plugs).

If the IDF is stored in the TSF, then the design must carefully consider
the risk of overtopping and allow for removal of the stored water over a realistic
time period established by considering the drawdown rate and the hydrology of
the area (the likelihood of successive large storms). If an emergency spillway is
considered that requires measures be taken to pass the IDF (such as excavating
a section of the embankment crest), emergency preparedness plans should
include allowances for the consequences resulting if those measures are not
taken. Where the IDF is to be temporarily stored, the dam design must be suitable
for safe storage and, for upstream constructed dams, a minimum beach width
could be specified.

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 Determination of minimum freeboard should consider surrounding
topography, catchment area, potential for cascading failure inflows or emergency
water releases, and impoundment layout including:

• Potential wind-induced wave run-up and damage from erosion.

• Potential settlement resulting in low sections on the dam crest.
• Freeze and thaw effects in the upper portion of the dam, particularly
if there is a frost susceptible core zone.

Wave runup and wind-induced storm surge or set-up of the water surface
may be influenced by the timing of high wind in relation to high precipitation and
the sizes of TSF and the contributing catchment areas. Both depend on the area,
shape of the water surface and water depth, and the tailings beach. Methods to
calculate the required freeboard for these are available in numerous guidelines
for water dams. Notwithstanding the determination of freeboard, a minimum
criterion of 1.0 m should be considered.

Additional freeboard could be considered to contain displaced tailings

and water when there is a risk of natural hazards such as landslide or snow
avalanches.

7.12.4. Water Balance and Water Recovery

A water balance model for the TSF is used to track the ongoing water losses
and gains during the life of the facility and for optimizing the use of water.
Tailings transport water is one of the larger components of the water balance
with water loss to tailings voids often being the largest water loss, and much of
the remainder being recycled to the process plant or discharged to the
environment, if appropriate. Water will also be lost through evaporation and/or
seepage. Water gains may include runoff from the TSF catchment areas and
groundwater inflow. The TSF is also often used to attenuate water flows from
other disturbed areas associated with the mine and these inflows must be
accounted for in the water balance.

Components of Water Balance to be considered include:

• Stream Management - The tailings area is often separated from the

surrounding catchment areas and water streams to minimize contact
water management and flood design requirements. The design flow
capacity of diversion works should relate to the relevant predicted
flood flows and the benefit of reducing water inflows to the TSF. The
diversion works typically have limited capacity to pass the IDF and,
therefore, the inflows need to be considered in managing the design
flood. The potential failure of a diversion system (due to lack of
capacity, local landslides, freeze/snow plugging, etc.) is likely during

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 extreme flooding and the added inflow to the tailings dam should be
considered.
• Precipitation – Precipitation can be a major component of water
inflow, with catchment runoff mixing with process water in the TSF.
Run-off calculations should be made in accordance with normal
hydrological methods. Run-off from the (a) contributing land
surfaces, either as direct or indirect (pumped) catchments, (b) any
tailings beaches and (c) the pond area itself, will need to be
considered. In regions with highly seasonal precipitation, runoff
coefficients need to take account of pre-existing soil moisture
conditions. In regions with snow, runoff needs to consider rain-on-
snow events and frozen conditions in the subsoil.
• Tailings Decant Water - Tailings consolidate as they are deposited
with a significant portion of slurry transport water reporting directly to
the decant pond. Typically, there is an increase in initial settled
density with sub-aerial deposition as opposed to sub-aqueous
deposition. As tailings dry, the capillary tension in the pores may
cause major consolidation forces, which may or may not add to
released water.
• Evaporation - Evaporation from tailings beaches and ponds can lead
to significant water losses. Losses from ponds can be evaluated from
pan-evaporation data using appropriate adjustment factors. A
common assumption for wet beaches is to assume beach
evaporation is equal to lake evaporation. Salinities above that of sea
water may reduce evaporation significantly. More importantly, the
formation of a salt crust on the tailings surface creates a barrier which
slows further drying of the beach and impedes release of
consolidation water.
• Seepage - Seepage will occur through the embankments,
foundations, and impoundment footprint. Seepage losses may not be
significant in the overall water balance, but the environmental impact
of contaminated seepage may be a significant factor.

Water Recovery

Recovery of water may be achieved by a fixed or floating pump system

or a gravity system. Floating pump stations allow flexibility of operation with water
level changes being easily accommodated. Pump sizing may need to cope with
volumes accumulated in severe flood events. Floating gravity decants or siphon
decants can also be developed if adequate head is available.

Fixed decant structures are often used and typically comprise concrete
or steel tower structures with controllable outlets at various levels. The structural
design of tower decants should consider the potential down-drag forces applied
to the structure by consolidation settlement of the tailings, seismic loading and
other risks during operation. The design should address how the structure will be
decommissioned on dam closure. Pipes through the embankment have been the
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cause of internal erosion failures under tailings dam embankments. If this type of
outlet pipe is provided, particular care is needed in design and construction to
reduce the risk of this type of failure and routine internal inspections should be
undertaken.

7.13. ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN

Environmental design of the TSF considers the potential effects of the

TSF on the receiving surface and ground water quality, the potential for dust
emissions, and potential effects on flora and fauna associated with the TSF
impoundment water or beach. The Environmental Design Flood discussed in
Section 7.12.2 of this Bulletin is established to protect the receiving surface water
during operations. The groundwater aspects are discussed in Section 5.6 and
7.11.

Environmental design is an important component of closure to provide

long term geochemical and ecological stability of the TSF. As discussed in
Section 6.2.3, geochemical characterization of the tailings and process water is
required to inform the design with respect to potentially permissible seepage rates
and the closure plan.

Constituents of potential concern that may be associated with the tailings

pore water, with respect to the environment, should be identified. As a minimum,
the process water quality should be compared against potential receiving
environment water quality objectives. E.g. drinking water, aquatic life, livestock
water, etc.

Contaminants in groundwater may be subject to attenuation by various

natural processes including decay, biological and/or chemical breakdown,
retardation/absorption, dispersion, and dilution. Flow through unsaturated zones,
particularly if the soils or weathered rocks have high clay content, is particularly
important in this regard. Estimates of cyanide and metals absorption
characteristics in soils may be augmented with laboratory-scale tests.

A seepage analysis and an understanding of what rate of seepage may

be acceptable for environmental purposes should be integrated into design of the
dam and impoundment. The “allowable” seepage rate to the receiving
environment should be estimated to support engineering design of seepage
control measures. In some cases, it may be possible to base estimates of quality
solely on the measured quality of decant water; however, it is becoming
increasingly necessary to predict the fate of contaminants (contained within the
tailings seepage water) in the surrounding environment. Determination of
allowable seepage rates should be informed by technical advisors such as
geochemists, hydrogeologists, and environmental (aquatic) specialists.

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 A monitoring program for surface and ground water quality should be in
place. Where water treatment for discharge is required, it is important to
determine the quality of process influent and discharge water, criteria for
discharge (quality and flow), design meteorological events, etc.

Air quality may also be a concern with some TSFs, with dust generation
from exposed tailings beaches possibly requiring special control, such as from
controlled spigotting, spray irrigators, tackifiers, or vegetation.

As far as possible, design measures to mitigate potential water quality

effects should be assessed and could include:

• Treating process prior to discharge in the TSF, for example by

eliminating use of cyanide or treating to levels where toxicity is not of
concern;
• Processing to segregate and manage tailings, for example flotation
separation of sulphides to reduce volumes of potentially acid
generating tailing;
• Adding minerals or chemicals to neutralize the reactivity of sulphides,
such as adding limestone to increase alkalinity, or
• Compaction and/or saturation of sulfidic tailings to inhibit oxidation to
mitigate the AMD potential.

These considerations should also be considered as part of the closure

design as discussed in Section 3. Where unacceptable risks to sensitive
receptors are identified, appropriate controls and mitigating actions should be
designed. Such controls could include liner systems, seepage interception works
and dewatering bores.

Groundwater sampling and monitoring for contaminants in seepage from

the TSF should be carried out regularly to verify if implemented controls and
actions are functioning as expected. The level of constituents of potential concern
should be reviewed against environmental requirements and supporting trigger
limits set out as part of a risk assessment.

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 8. RISK MANAGEMENT

8.1. INTRODUCTION

Risk management comprises the assessment of risk including

identification of preventative and mitigative measures and controls, the
implementation of these measures and controls, and the monitoring of
appropriate indicators to ensure that the risk is managed effectively.

Risks must be identified, assessed, evaluated, and controlled through all

phases of the TSF lifecycle to enable effective risk-informed decision making and
risk informed design as discussed in Section 7.5.

Risk assessment can be a complex process and the following sections

should be viewed as an introduction to the risk assessment concept only. If a risk
assessment is to be undertaken, more detailed discussion and guidance should
be sought from best practice guidelines (such as ICOLD, USACE, USBR and
ANCOLD).

8.2. RISK ASSESSMENT

8.2.1. Overview

Risk assessment is a sequential process of risk identification, risk

analysis and risk evaluation where:

• Risk identification is a procedure to find, recognize, and describe the

risks.
• Risk analysis is a process to understand the nature, sources, and
causes of the identified risks to estimate the level of risk.
• Risk evaluation is a process that compares risk analysis results with
risk criteria to determine whether a specified level of risk is tolerable.

The key activities of risk assessment including the phase in which they
should be completed is provided in Fig. 8.1.

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 Fig. 8.1
Risk Assessment Process Diagram

Risk assessments are typically carried out as one of the following types:

• Qualitative – Both the likelihood and consequences of failure are

described using qualitative statements such as negligible, unlikely,
insignificant, major, catastrophic etc.
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 • Semi-quantitative – The likelihood of failure is quantified in terms of
annual probability and consequences are described using scales for
consequence categories.
• Quantitative – Both the likelihood and consequence are numerically
quantified.

The level and complexity of risk assessments range from screening to

detailed and both the type and the level of assessment should depend on the
following aspects:

• Purpose and objective of the assessment

• Potential consequence of a failure
• Quality and quantity of the various input information
• Available resources

Irrespective of the type and level of the risk assessment, the inputs and
methods must be transparent and consistent to provide comparative outcomes
that allow for a meaningful interrogation and comparison of all assessed risks for
one dam or a portfolio of dams.

8.2.2. Risk Identification

Hazard identification

Hazards, or initiating events, are the sources of potential adverse effect

to life, health, property and/or the environment. Hazards can be external initiating
events such as earthquakes, floods, landslides, etc., or internal events such as
increasing loads as the dam is raised or weak materials in the foundation or dam,
or human actions and misoperation.

As it is impractical and often impossible to assess the effect of all

hazards, hazard identification for the purpose of risk assessment is typically starts
with identification of all hazards that could exist or occur at the TSF. Hazards
which are not applicable are removed from further assessment.

Failure Mode Identification

Failure modes describe the conditions and circumstance that must occur
for the hazards to result in the adverse effects and provide an explanation of the
mechanism of failure. Hazards are often considered together with associated
failure modes and this process is often iterative to identify all hazards and failure
modes for further assessment. The key failure mode mechanisms are further
discussed in Section 7.6. Examples of failure modes and hazards that are less
typical but can occur include uncoordinated mining activities, human error,
geochemical dissolution or precipitate plugging of filters, etc.

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 8.2.3. Risk Analysis

The objective of the risk analysis is to produce the risk profile of the dam
in a risk framework. The risk framework is used to communicate the risks
presented by the dam and the format and structure of the framework depends on
the intended objectives and wider context of the risk assessment. Risk profiles of
tailings dams are typically expressed as a function of the likelihood of failure and
the failure consequences.

Estimate likelihoods of failure

The likelihood of failure for each failure mode is estimated using

appropriate, reasonable, and defensible methods which may also be supported
with event failure trees analysis. There are numerous methods for estimating the
likelihood of typical considerations. Care must be taken to adopt likelihood
estimation methods that are appropriate given the purpose of the assessment
and the available information. It must also be recognized that numerical values
for likelihoods range from quantitative (such as return periods for extreme floods)
to semi-qualitative where professional judgement from relevant subject matter
experts is used.

The methods for various failure modes must also provide comparable
outcomes so that a consistent risk profile can be developed that includes each
assessed failure mode. The likelihood values should reflect the actual conditions
onsite and not an overly conservative view of the TSF or conditions.

Estimation of consequences

An appropriate assessment of the consequence of failure, for example,

major deformation with or without release of water and/or tailings should be
carried out to assist with the estimation of consequences of failure. The
consequence of failure can be informed using various breach scenarios which
and analyses which are described in Section 9. The type and description of failure
consequence depends on the type and level of the risk assessment. In semi-
quantitative and quantitative risk assessments, the societal consequences of the
dam failure are typically expressed using the PLL as outlined in Section 4.2.1.

It is acknowledged that it is not possible to carry out a dam break

assessment that reflects every failure mode that is included in the risk
assessment. Therefore, the consequences of dam failure are commonly based
on “representative dam breaks” that represent several failure modes under Sunny
Day and Flood conditions as discussed in Section 9. Representative dam breaks
typically used for the consequence assessment may not be sufficient for the
purpose of detailed, quantitative risk assessment and a specific dam break
model(s) may be required for specific failure modes.

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 8.2.4. Risk Evaluation

Risk evaluation comprises the assessment of the risk profile within the
risk framework to determine if risks are tolerable and what actions, if any, are
required to manage and mitigate risks. Risk evaluation includes the following:

Assessing risk profile

The risk profile should be assessed within the risk framework to answer
the question “Is the risk profile tolerable?” If the answer is no, assessment should
be undertaken to understand which risks, failure modes and hazards dominate
the risk profile and what can be done to bring the risk profile to within tolerable
limits. The concepts of As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) is often used
in assessing the risk profile and developing risk mitigation measures.

Assessing risk reduction options

If risks are intolerable, or are tolerable but must be managed, risk

reduction option(s) should be identified to reduce the risk profile to tolerable
levels.

Ongoing assessment and management

The risk profile should be continually updated at an appropriate

frequency to reflect the actual performance of the TSF and onsite conditions, as
well as to demonstrate if management activities are achieving the objective of risk
mitigation and management. This final step is fundamental to the principles of
risk-informed performance-based management.

Typically, a risk assessment and a register of risks is maintained

throughout the TSF lifecycle to reflect ongoing changes, advanced knowledge of
site conditions and the state of practice.

8.3. PREVENTATIVE CONTROLS AND MONITORING OPTIONS

Preventative controls are established to prevent a dam failure (material

unwanted event). These are developed during the design of the facility and then
updated during the construction and operation. If the failure, or unwanted material
event, occurs, there will be a consequence. Mitigative controls are implemented
to reduce either the risk or the consequence of the event. These controls need to
be reviewed and monitored throughout the life of the TSF.

Monitoring of tailings dams is not limited to visual observations and

instrumentation, but also includes ongoing design reviews as described in
Section 2.3.4. Table 8.1 presents the typical dam failure modes that were

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identified in Section 7.6 and the associated preventative controls. It also includes
examples of monitoring/verification methods.

Table 8.1
Tailings storage facilities – examples: key preventative controls and assurance/verification

Typical Failure
Key Preventative Controls Examples of Assurance/Verification
Modes
Site Investigation Peer review, External review boards,
Dam design Dam Safety Reviews (DSR)
Pore Pressure Piezometers, seepage weirs, Dam
Foundation monitoring/responding Safety Inspections (DSIs)
Instability Deformation
Inclinometers, DSIs
monitoring/responding
Design – static stability Peer review, External review boards,
Design – seismic stability DSR

Material characterization As-constructed records, Data records,

QA/QC DSI
Design – static stability Peer review, External review boards,
Dam slope DSR
Instability Design – seismic stability
Monitoring/responding to –
Piezometers, DSI
pore pressure
Monitoring/responding to - Slope surveys, Lidar, inclinometers,
deformations drones, satellite, DSI
Design - limiting hydraulic
gradients Peer review, External review boards,
Piping DSR, As constructed records
Design - filter compatibility
QA/QC of filters As constructed records, DSI
Design criteria
Design -flood storage Peer review, External review boards,
capacity DSR
Design - spillway capacity
Overtopping Monitoring/controlling water
Level recorders, cameras, DSI
levels
Monitoring width of beaches Survey and visual assessment
Monitoring/controlling flows Flow meters, cameras, DSI
Peer review, External review boards,
Design decant structure
DSR
Decant Operations and maintenance DSI, Camera surveys and deformation
procedures monitoring
Monitoring/controlling flows Flow meters, DSI
Peer review, External review boards,
Design erosion controls
DSR
Inspection and maintenance DSI
Geohazards and
Erosion Peer review, External review boards,
Design geohazard controls
DSR
Monitoring slopes, snowpack, Satellite, Lidar, inclinometers, snow
deformations gauges

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 Typical Failure
Key Preventative Controls Examples of Assurance/Verification
Modes
Waste and water chemical
characterization
Peer review, External review boards,
Design of seepage controls
DSR
Design of filters for ARD
Water
precipitates
Contamination
Peer Review, Real time sensors, e.g. pH,
Monitoring water quality EC, Neutron probes, Lysimeters,
Sampling and testing
Monitoring water flows Stream gauges, seepage collection weirs

Critical Controls

A critical control is crucial to preventing an event or minimizing the

consequence of the event. The examples of key preventative controls indicated
in
and other identified preventative controls should be assessed to determine if they
are critical controls. Key indicators for a critical control include:

• Would the absence or failure of the control significantly increase the

risk despite the existence of other controls?
• Does the control address multiple causes or mitigate multiple
consequences?

A decision tree framework for selection of critical controls is shown

Fig. 8.2.

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 Fig. 8.2
Critical control framework (ICMM, 2015)

Mitigative Controls

Mitigative controls are measures that may be implemented if a dam

failure occurs. These measures could be implemented prior to failure and may
include:

• construction of deflector berms to direct inundation flows around

critical facilities; and
• maintenance of a large beach width to minimize the potential for
release of water in the event of a slump of the dam.

Mitigative measures to be implemented prior to, or during failure could

include, for example:

• construction of emergency spillways;

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 • installation of emergency pumping systems to reduce stored water
volumes; and
• placement of fill materials in the dam breach.

8.4. TRIGGER ACTION RESPONSE PLANS

A Trigger Action Response Plan (TARP) is a concise document prepared

to assist in decision making in relation to specific critical risk controls. A TARP
describes the appropriate actions to take under circumstances where conditions
progress through a series of changes from normal towards “failure”. Appropriate
actions are defined at each stage and designed to prevent, or mitigate, an
adverse condition. A TARP may finally trigger an Emergency Response Plan.

Typically, a TARP uses a “traffic light” format with three to five levels of
risk and appropriate responses documented. Four or five Alert Levels are typical
and include:

• Green: normal operations with normal variance in conditions and

monitoring
• Yellow: changed conditions or monitoring anomalies have been
identified and the conditions are being investigated and assessed in
more detail. In some frameworks this level is further divided to
distinguish between stable situations with normal review to a
potentially higher alert level that requires action to mitigate the
situation. The level is still within safe limits, but there may be a
potential for escalation. The Emergency Response Plan (ERP) team
would be advised but would not be at an alert level.
• Amber/orange: there is a potential for escalation to failure and active
intervention is required. Intervention could include, for example,
construction of a buttress, raising the dam crest, pumping surplus
water, etc. The Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan
(EPRP) is activated.
• Red: failure has either occurred or is imminent and the full ERP is
implemented.

An example of the transition of TARPS from the operating conditions to

the ERP conditions is illustrated in Fig. 8.3.

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 Potential
emergency

Fig. 8.3
Illustration of TARP transition from operations to emergency response

TARPs should be simple, robust, relate to easily referenced conditions

(e.g., water levels, instrument readings) and focused on prevention and control.
An example TARP with performance indicators related to critical controls and pre-
defined actions is presented in Table 8.2.

Table 8.2
Example TARPs for flood storage with performance indicators related to critical controls, and
pre-defined actions for various risk levels

Alert/Investigate
High Alert/ Stop-
Phase 2
Indicator/ Phase 1 Rectify Withdrawal
Normal Potential
Control stable Potential Active
unstable
situation emergency Failure
situation
Flood
Dam is
storage Water levels
90% of IDF overtopping
volume between 35% of IDF 70% of IDF
with and/or waves
(facility normal and with continued with continued
continued are eroding
that seasonal precipitation precipitation
precipitation the crest of
stores the inflow levels
the dam
IDF)
Examples of Pre-Defined Actions
All items from All items from All items
Increased previous previous from
Surveillance surveillance. situation plus: plus: previous
activities and EOR notified. -EOR to be on -Mobilize situation
frequencies Track weather site EPRP Team plus:
according to patterns and -Initiate plans and secure -Initiate full
OMS manual. rainfall for: potentially and expedite emergency
predictions. raise dam, resources response
pumping measures

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 Alert/Investigate
High Alert/ Stop-
Phase 2
Indicator/ Phase 1 Rectify Withdrawal
Normal Potential
Control stable Potential Active
unstable
situation emergency Failure
situation
equipment, and
emergency resources
spillway
excavation
-Excavate
diversion
channels
Prepare to
mobilize EPRP
team
Examples of Personnel Notified
All personnel
All personnel
from
All personnel from previous
All personnel previous
Responsible from previous situation plus:
from previous situation
Person plus: -EPRP team
situation plus:
Process Plant -Dam owner -COIs
plus: -Regional or
Manager -AE -External
-Regulators State
EOR -ITRB contractors
Emergency
Resources

8.5. MONITORING

Monitoring is an important component of surveillance activities for tailings

facilities and are closely linked to TARPs and critical controls. Monitoring is used
to both confirm that conditions are stable as well as to inform if conditions are
changing and may require intervention and is an important element in risk
management and risk reduction.

Monitoring technologies are rapidly developing and adapting to ongoing

technological developments and improvements in application of the technologies
to monitoring of dams. When applied effectively, monitoring technologies provide
valuable tools for assuring dam safety. However, not all technologies are
applicable, and care should be taken to ensure that selected technologies are
effective in monitoring the relevant critical controls and in providing information
on the performance of the dam. For example, stress and strain monitoring in a
dam may be of benefit in assessing how a very high dam in a high seismic

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environment has responded during earthquake loading but would have little value
for a low dam in a low seismic environment.

Table 8.3 provides a summary of some of the current monitoring

technologies. Be aware that this is a continually evolving and improving field.

Table 8.3
Summary of monitoring technology examples
Equipment
Measuring Parameters
Application Research / Experience
Device and Measured
Methods
Monitoring of Pore Pressures or Moisture Changes
Electric Monitor pore pressure
piezometers with changes due to Standard practice at many mines.
Pore pressure
telemetry to loading and changes Strings at multiple depths is
and temperature
process plant or in hydrogeological preferred
phone conditions
TDR, Neutron Saturations levels
Probes and temperature
Passive Electrodes are
Research and long-term field
electrical method placed on the dam
measurements have been
Self Potential which is sensitive surface both for
performed especially in US,
to the flow of investigation and
Canada, France and Sweden.
seepage water monitoring
Basic research since 1996 in
Cables are
Germany and Sweden. Further
Temperature installed in new or old
research especially in France,
Distributed and strain are dams for seepage
Austria, the Netherlands, UK and
Fiber Optic measured in evaluation using
US.
sensing optical fibers using temperature and
Challenges are calibrating
laser light. strain analyses to
measurements to site
assess movements
conditions.
Monitoring of Deformations
Either forced or natural ambient
Long term loads are used for excitation.
Dynamic
Vibration monitoring of the Change in dynamic response
response (modes
Measurements integrity of concrete under the same loading conditions
and frequencies)
structures indicate changes in the integrity of
the structure
Electro-
Devices are Recent developments allow
Borehole Mechanical
placed where continuous monitoring both in
Instruments devices used to
movements/tilts may vertical boreholes as well as
(inclinometers) measure
occur longitudinally within the dam.
deformation
Common practice at dams
Change in Monitoring of dam sensitive to settlement and to
Settlement plates
elevation settlement understand the deformation and
stress state of the dam.
Accurate
Global Extensive research with
distance
Navigation Local monitoring improved accuracy for different
measurements
Satellite System of movements. applications.
between orbits and
(GNSS)
sensor.
Laser scanning Accurate Provide a three Technology continuously

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 Equipment
Measuring Parameters
Application Research / Experience
Device and Measured
Methods
and digital distance dimensional improving by lasers, sensors and
imagery measurements geometric model of digital image processing. Method
using laser with dam. Deformations is used in several countries as a
high spatial can be detected by normal procedure.
resolution over regular
surfaces measurements
Surveying of
Satellite dams and High resolution surface
Photogrammetry
Synthetic impoundment and surveying method producing a
method using
Aperture Radar monitoring of digital3-D representation of the
Satellite images
(Satellite SAR) movements at surfaces
regular intervals
Surveying of
Photogrammetry High resolution surface
Ground survey dams and
method using surveying method producing a
Aperture Radar impoundments and
ground station digital 3-D representation of the
(GBInSAR) monitoring of short-
images surfaces
term movements
Monitoring of Stresses
Monitor stresses at
Applicable for high dams sensitive
Load cells Stress different locations in
to stress and strain changes.
the dam
Other Monitoring Technologies
High resolution underwater
Bathymetric surveying producing a digital 3-D
Multi-beam
Echo-sounding survey of ponded representation of the surfaces.
bathymetry
water Used on tailings ponds with a
miniature submarine.
Allows visual reconnaissance on
Monitoring of
Drones and a continual or periodic basis.
Visual record spillways, beach
cameras Drone surveys can be used to
lengths
calculate flood storage volumes
Monitoring
attenuation of
Seismographs Earthquake
earthquakes and the Common in high seismic setting.
(accelerometer) acceleration
seismic response of
the dam.
Active electrical Research and long-term field
Electrodes are placed
method that can measurements have been
Resistivity on the crest or at the
detect changed performed especially in USA,
dam toe.
material properties Canada, France and Sweden.
Non-destructive
Detect changes
and rapid method
in properties of Localization of seepage zones,
based on measuring
Ground near surface soil sinkholes and deterioration of
transmission time for
Penetrating layers, localization cores in embankment dams.
radar signals
Radar (GPR) of defects or voids Monitor remedial grouting of
reflected from or
in concrete dams. Limited survey depth
transmitted through a
structures
media
Monitoring water
Electrical
Water quality quality to optimize
conductivity and
sensors attenuation/mixing
pH
with receiving waters
Note: Table adapted from: ICOLD Bulletin 158, Dam Surveillance Guide, 2018, Table 8.1 General
comments on the application of some methods for dam monitoring and investigations

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 9. DAM FAILURE / BREACH ANALYSIS

9.1. INTRODUCTION

Dam failure/breach analysis includes consideration of different types of

potential failure modes and the likelihood of their occurrence, with the objective
of assessing what could be the outcome of different failure modes which could
lead to a breach of the dam. The results of the failure/breach analyses are used
to support the dam classification of the dam as discussed in Section 4.

A failure mode commences with an initiating event (cause) that is the

loading condition or physical condition that starts the failure process. This is
followed by the failure progression, which includes the failure mechanism. For
example: a seismic event could lead to excessive deformation of a dam, that
leads to overtopping and catastrophic release of water and tailing. In this
example, the seismic event is the loading condition, the failure mechanism is the
deformation that is sufficient to allow the pond to overtop the dam, and the failure
process ensues when the overtopping is sufficient to breach the dam. This
describes the overall failure mode.

It is important to note that not all loading conditions and/or failure

mechanisms will result in a breach of the dam. The failure mechanism may
become arrested or there may be interventions that prevent the failure
mechanism from progressing to a breach.

If the dam failure mode assessment indicates that the failure scenario
would likely result in limited runout, then simplified or semi-quantitative methods
for the dam breach analysis may be appropriate. If the dam failure mode
assessment indicates that the failure scenario could be extensive, then a detailed
dam breach analysis is required.

Unlike the failure of a water dam, in which the stored water has instant
mobility, the outflow of tailings in the failure of a tailings dam, which typically
contains less water, is controlled by the viscosity and mobility of the tailings.
Deformation of the tailings dam may or may not lead to release of water and
tailings.

Runout of tailings from an overtopping failure will be governed by the

volume of stored water available to erode/transport tailings and the potential for
liquefaction flow of the remaining tailings. Additionally, tailings deposits are
normally loose and saturated and therefore susceptible to static and dynamic
liquefaction, which if not constrained may flow as a “slurry flow” (Fundão and
Feijão (Brazil)). Tailings may also contain constituents of potential concern and
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the biophysical effects of tailings solids can be expected to be higher than for
water dams.

Hydrotechnical models adapted from water dam breach assessments

can be used to estimate the breaching of the dam and inundation of the
downstream environment, where non-Newtonian models can be demonstrated
as an approximation of the resulting outflow.

The dam failure assessment may be developed to various levels of

details, depending on the purpose of the consequence assessment (dam
classification, Emergency Panning, Risk Assessment), the stage of the TSF
project, and the magnitude of the potential losses.

The state of practice for tailings dam failure assessments and tailings
dam breach assessment is evolving and the reader is cautioned to ensure that
assessments are not overly optimistic or pessimistic. The Canadian Dam Safety
has issued a Bulletin on Dam Breach Analysis (2021) which provides guidance
on hydrotechnical analyses and some limited guidance on geotechnical analyses
to support a dam breach assessment. However, the science of the failure
mechanisms, particularly static liquefaction and water eroded effects should
continue to be scrutinized as the science evolves. Dam breach assessments
should also be updated as the dam evolves over the life of the mine with the goal
of reducing and/or eliminating failure modes. The principles outlined in this
section of the bulletin should be used to guide the dam failure/breach assessment
for application today, recognizing that ongoing developments will continue to
improve the technology and allow updates to the assessments in the future.

9.2. DAM BREACH ASSESSMENT

The tailings dam breach assessment is used to assess the potential

tailings transport and flooding downstream of the dam and to map the extent of
land disturbance. Critical elements of this assessment include estimating the
deformation of the dam (e.g. the geotechnical mechanism and outcome of the
failure), the potential volumes of water and tailings that could be released, and
the potential for liquefied tailings to be released.

A “Sunny Day” or “Fair Weather” event would typically consider a failure

due to a slope/foundation failure, piping or an extreme earthquake. The potential
extent of deformation or liquefaction of tailings or foundation soils should be
incorporated into the consequence of failure. The normal operating pond water
volume should be used, unless it can be demonstrated that the dam breach would
not conceivably reach the pond level—then it may not be necessary to assume
that the pond is released during this analysis.

A “Flood Induced” or “Rainy Day” failure could be triggered either by an

extreme flood or by a series of smaller events or due to “mismanagement” of the
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TSF. Overtopping typically leads to erosion and progressive failure of the dam.
The failure mode could be combinations of overtopping, piping, or slope
instability. This analysis is also done to determine the incremental effects of a
failure on the downstream environment when there is a flood already occurring.
In some cases, the flood can already cause significant damage in the
downstream environment and lead to evacuation of people to higher ground,
without the dam failure. For this reason, the dam breach analysis should consider
a range of receiving water flood events (from average conditions to PMF
conditions) to arrive at the most significant incremental losses due to the dam
breach.

The volume of water accumulated varies between TSFs that store the
flood or TSFs that have operating spillways. For TSFs that store water, the
volume of water considered for the dam breach should be the total volume that
could be expected to be stored during the extreme flood event.

9.3. DAM BREACH METHODOLOGY

9.3.1. Dam Failure Runout Mechanisms

Dam breach assessments for tailings dams can include three main
mechanisms of runout (flow), and their combinations:

Water transported tailings:

Tailings will be transported by the release of stored water until the solids
concentration of flow increases and transitions to high density slurry flow. The
solids concentration will vary from very low at the start of the failure and increase
until it reaches in the order of 65% to 70% solids by weight (Hard Rock (HR)
tailings with SG=2.75). At this stage, it will behave in a similar manner to a mud
flow with limitation to its mobility. Methods for accurately predicting the volume of
tailings that would be eroded with a finite volume of water are progressing and
depend on many factors, such as the volume of water and the erodibility of the
dam and type of tailings. Recent experience with back-analyses of the Mount
Polley (2014) failure indicated that approximately 1 m3 of tailings (mass plus
interstitial water) was transported for each 1 m3 of stored water (MEM, 2016).
This ratio indicates that the average solids density (HR tailings with SG=2.75) of
the combined released flow was on the order of 50% solids by weight (SG=2.75).
The Mount Polley outflow volume also included a limited, high density slurry flow
runout near the dam breach and it is important to note that the residual tailings
slopes in the TSF were up to 2H:1V, indicating that widespread static liquefaction
did not occur.

The volume of water/sediment flow is also influenced by lower density

tailings which occur in the top few meters of many impoundments, which are at a

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solids concentration of <65% by weight (HR tailings with SG-2.75) and hence
could flow. Tailings become Increasingly more consolidated with depth with
corresponding higher yield stresses which may be less susceptible to slurry flow.

Static liquefaction and high-density slurry flow:

The state of practice for estimating if static liquefaction of contractant

tailings will occur during a dam breach is evolving. Case histories of dam failures
show a broad range of potential high density slurry flow behaviour. The
susceptibility to liquefaction and the runout flow behaviour are determined by the
properties of the tailings, such as the liquidity index, yield stress, brittleness index,
and density. The recent Brazilian iron ore tailings (Fine rock tailings) failures
(Fundão (2015) and Feijão (2019)) are examples of extreme sensitivity to static
liquefaction.

It is important to note that static liquefaction may or may not lead to

release of water and tailings. In cases where the liquefied tailings have been
constrained by non-saturated tailings, such as Sullivan (Canada) and Cadia
(Australia) the tailings dams slumped to a flatter slope with limited release of
tailings. In addition, water transported tailings often removes the most susceptible
loose tailings and it is important not to double account for these processes.

Seismic liquefaction

Saturated or near saturated tailings can be susceptible to liquefaction

under seismic loading. Case histories from seismic failures suggests that the
released tailings flow out to slopes on the order of 3% to 10%. However, the
actual geometry will be influenced by the seismic loading and the tailings
properties. Case histories also suggest that seismic liquefaction may be limited
to the upper portions of the TSF and that not all tailings liquefy and flow,
potentially due to their higher yield stress at depth.

9.3.2. Dam Breach Modeling and Inundation Mapping

Dam breach modeling should be carried out for both the fair weather and
rainy day (flood induced) scenarios. Overtopping scenarios can consider different
flood conditions in the receiving environment to assist in comparison of the
overtopping failure with natural flood events.

Numerical models that can model the full range of water/sediment runout
and mudflow runout are evolving and often the dam breach mechanisms are
modeled separately, resulting in an assessment that involves a minimum two-
step process, including:

• Use of a water/sediment transport flow model which treats the

water/sediment as a Newtonian fluid with some models incorporating
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 rheology. The extent of water/sediment release, however, is
constrained by the volume of water that can transport the tailings, as
discussed in Section 9.3.1.
• Assessing the potential for static and (or) seismic liquefaction during
the dam breach and use of non-Newtonian high density slurry
(mudflow) models to assess the runout based upon the potential
rheology, brittleness and residual shear strengths of the tailings. Use
numerical models or empirical methods for predicting runout slopes.

The interaction of the two models and the resulting inundation mapping
need to be carefully considered to reflect the complexity and relevance.

Quantitative dam breach models for the water and sediment flow typically
use numerical models. The breach formation is a function of the available water
volume, the tailings beach and the dam fill parameters. Breach formations for
tailings dams are often assessed using the methods developed for water dams,
which are not appropriate, and care is required in developing realistic breach
geometry and times. Breach times are related to the outflow volume (water and
eroded tailings) and the erodibility of the dam materials.

The turbulent flow of tailings and water with a dynamic and directionally
dependent viscosity, interacting with, and changing, the flow boundaries (i.e.
erosion of downstream channel) is a very complex process. Although the
theoretical basis of these complex interactions is understood, the numerical
complexity of the problem exceeded the computational limits at the time of writing
this bulletin. Additionally, the heterogeneity of tailings and the variabilities in
breach times, outflow volumes, etc. add additional complexity.

The flow of water and sediment can be modelled with commercially

available software that continues to improve to better capture the sediment
component of flow and potentially, with time, should capture the breach formation
and mud flow components more effectively. The inundation outflow is overlaid on
a surface model and estimates of flow rates, velocity and spatial distribution of
the runout are developed.

Current numerical models do not confidently estimate the behavior of

TSF dam breach outflows (from water flow transitioning to erosional flow and
potential liquefaction and high-density slurry-flow). Numerical geotechnical
models are currently being researched/developed to eventually be able to model
static liquefaction and eventually allow the hydrotechnical and geotechnical
mechanisms to be integrated. Where accuracy is critical, multiple methods and
scenarios should be assessed before selecting or adopting the final output. The
sensitivity assessment should consider the potential magnitude of the breach flow
depending on the key input parameters and to verify the credibility and
reasonable conservatism of the dam breach model.

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 High density slurry flows (mud flow) models have been used for some
landslide assessments and there are some commercially available programs.
However, the application of these models and their interaction with the
water/sediment flow model and modeling of liquefaction initiation continues to
evolve.

A qualitative or semi-quantitative assessment may be appropriate for

preliminary assessment of the dam classification recognizing, for example, that
dams classified as Low or Significant may not warrant a detailed numerical
assessment. The assessment of an overtopping failure could determine the
potential volume of water/tailings transport and assume a breach time and flow
velocity to determine an average flood flow characteristics for the downstream
inundation zone.

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 10. EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE
PLANNING

10.1. INTRODUCTION

An emergency at a tailings dam is any event or situation that could

compromise dam safety or the safety of individuals in the vicinity or compromise
the ability of the TSF to fulfil the function for which it was intended. Frequently,
an emergency is the result of a combination of circumstances that require active
intervention by operations, management and external resources.

An emergency could be initiated either by natural causes beyond the

control of the operator (e.g. extreme flood or earthquake), or by operational
issues (dam slump, spillway erosion, etc.). In either event, intervention is
required. Depending on the severity of the event and risk associated with it,
reporting and intervention will need to be escalated to the appropriate level. This
escalation should be linked to, and guided by, the Trigger Action Response Plan
(TARP) as discussed in Section 8.4.

The Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan, known by various

other titles in different jurisdictions, documents the potential failure modes of the
dam and the measures to mitigate failure and respond to the potential outcomes
of a failure. Internal and external community engagement and communication
plans should be prepared for each level of severity.

It is recognized that there are different scales of emergencies at a mine;

this bulletin is focused on tailings dam failures which represent the higher levels
of emergencies.

Emergency activation (EA) levels corresponding to the potential severity

of an incident on a tailings dam could include:

EA level 1: When active intervention is potentially required, the AEO and

ERP team are notified. It is not an emergency situation but has
the potential to become one.
EA level 2: An imminent emergency is occurring that could lead to failure of
the dam. Active intervention and external notification are likely
required. Emergency mitigative measures are implemented.
EA level 3: A failure is either occurring or has occurred. Full emergency
response and crisis management actions are implements.

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 All employees engaged on the operation of a tailings dam should be
trained to recognize unusual situations, and to understand that any deviation from
normal operation could result in an emergency requiring that appropriate action
be taken. Actions to be adopted for Alert levels 1 and 2 are covered under normal
Operating, Maintenance and Surveillance (OMS) procedures, which transition to
actions that should be adopted for Alert Levels 3 and 4, which should be covered
in the EPRP. Alert Level 3 activities overlap both the OMS and the EPRP.

The EPRP should detail the hierarchy of reporting and should delegate
responsibility for actions to be implemented to specific individuals or entities. The
EPRP should include contact details of all persons or organizations affected or
required to take actions and should identify specific assembly areas to be used
in the case of evacuation. All assembly areas must be easily accessible and
clearly demarcated.

As a minimum the EPRP should document relevant information and the

actions to be taken as appropriate for each Alert Level. This could include a
summary of the dam (height, volumes) and plan of the TSF and the downstream
inundation area in the event of a dam failure for sunny-day and rainy-day
conditions. The EPRP should also include procedures for engagement with local
authorities, emergency services, the affected community and other stakeholders
on dam safety, procedures and EPRP plans.

In the case of extreme events, the EPRP should document the

establishment of a crisis control center (location, personnel involved and their
roles, communication, emergency power source, food, water, rescue equipment
and transport, media releases, family notification, etc.).

10.2. EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

10.2.1. Engineering Assessment of Potential Emergency

Conditions

The following actions must be undertaken and documented to

adequately prepare the EPRP.

• Perform FMEA and evaluate plausible failure modes. Identify

potential failure modes and features that could be a precursor to, or
an indication of, a potential incident (e.g., cracking, slumping,
seepage, inadequate freeboard, abnormal weather etc.).
• Develop dam breach and flood inundation studies for the potential
catastrophic failure outcomes. Develop maps of the inundated area
and estimates of potential inundations times to reach key areas and
potential depth of the flow.

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• Look for ways to minimize the extent of the flow and impacted area
in the event of a dam breach (should be a part of the critical mitigating
controls).
• Prepare a mitigation plan (e.g., removal of released tailings and
stabilization of the existing failed facility, stockpiling of construction
materials, resourcing pumps, raising the dam, etc. Where the design
flood is stored, assess potential locations for construction of an
emergency spillway and identify the resources and time required to
construct the spillway.

10.2.2. Establishing the Emergency Operations and Management

System

Considerations for establishing the EPRP systems include:

• Identification of an emergency plan owner responsible for preparing

the plan, maintaining and updating the plan as necessary, and
performing training and drills to ensure site staff can implement the
plan.
• Identification of roles and responsibilities and a command/decision-
making structure.
• Identification of safe higher-ground locations for people to evacuate
to in an emergency. Place signs to guide people to these locations.
Perform training to simulate evacuation and adjust the plans as
appropriate. Consider day and night scenarios.
• Establishing a warning/alert system (sirens, cell phones, etc.); testing
the system.
• Identification of trigger mechanisms requiring that emergency
services or the community be notified, with procedures for
disseminating information and/or communicating warnings.
• Identification of an emergency command center location. List the
required resources for the command center and where they will come
from (e.g., speaker phones, generator, portable printers, fuel, paper
maps, light, water for drinking, food, etc.).
• Identification of other equipment that may be required (vehicles,
drones, helicopters, lighting, blankets, first aid, etc.). Prepare
necessary permits (e.g., for flying the drones).
• Assessing the availability of equipment in the event of multiple
emergency scenarios associated with the local area.
• Preparation of a list of agencies and people (internal and external) to
call, including experts in emergency situations, grief counsellors,
people to answer calls from the communities, hospitals/doctors,
suppliers of food and water, etc. Also, who will provide updates to
the press, and how.
• Identification of accommodation where evacuated people can be
taken to.
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 • In a case of hazardous tailings, preparation of a list of instructions for
safe handling and treatment of injuries.
• Implementation of a system for tracking the people who could be
impacted by a potential failure (usually the workers), how they can
be contacted and what to do if they are not responding.
• Identification of roads for access to potentially impacted areas,
locations where road closures may be required, and road detours.
• Review of the existing monitoring network and identification of
additional monitoring required in the event of a failure. This should
include environmental monitoring of the impacted area and
monitoring of the physical stability of the failed facility and other
facilities that could be impacted (e.g., bridges, roads, pump stations,
pipelines, etc.).

At least annually, train key personnel to make sure they are familiar with
all the considerations above. Adjust the plans based on the learnings from drills
and training.

Describing Emergency Responses

The EPRP should list the steps to be followed during an emergency

(large scale failure of the dam is imminent or is in progress) and contain the
information needed for a quick reaction.

10.2.3. Testing an ERP

• It is important to regularly test an ERP to ensure that all aspects have

been properly considered, the communications plan is workable, and
training has been adequate.
• Testing should be held on a regular basis, typically annually.
• The test should be planned well in advance with clear goals and
objectives, identified responsibilities, and plans for interacting with
internal and external stakeholders.
• The test should be based on a well-documented, realistic scenario,
with considered special circumstances such as power failure or loss
of access.
• It is important that participants understand the purpose of the test—
highlighting deficiencies in the ERP with the intention of improving
the plan for possible future real-life emergencies.
• A thorough debrief report should be prepared after completion of an
emergency simulation with a formal review of the EPRP as an
outcome.

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 11. CONSTRUCTION

11.1. INTRODUCTION

Construction management, technical supervision and quality

assurance/quality control (QA/QC) are essential to ensure that project
specifications and the design intent are met for all phases of the TSF lifecycle.
Construction works/teams should be aware of the operational requirement (such
as spigotting, beach development, piping systems, etc.). The responsibilities for
technical direction and documentation of the works should be documented and
defined prior to the commencement of construction.

11.2. SUPERVISION AND DOCUMENTATION

The EOR is responsible for the design, documentation and specification

of the tailings dam construction works and should be involved in construction.
Specifications should include QA/QC requirements for foundation preparations,
fill placement and civil/mechanical works. In most cases it is preferable that the
Designer should also be the EOR, but where this is not the case, the EOR should
have a defined relationship to the Designer allowing ongoing interaction to ensure
the design intent is achieved and that any potential changes to site conditions
and/or potential design considerations are communicated and acted upon. The
EOR typically certifies (and in some jurisdictions this is a regulatory requirement)
that the tailings dam has been constructed in conformance with specifications
and the design intent.

QA typically comprises management of the design, construction, and

operation process to ensure that the systems in place deliver the quality
objectives of a project, including specifications and design requirements. QA
should typically be carried out by the EOR or their designate. QC comprises
inspection of the work and testing of materials to verify compliance with the
specifications. The QC work may be done by the EOR or an independent testing
company who reports to the EOR. A QA/QC Manual that presents QA
methodology and the types and frequency of QA/QC test work, inspection,
recording and reporting requirements, in accordance with the construction
specification, should be prepared, maintained, and amended when required. The
Manual should include a site organization chart showing lines of communication
and responsibilities for the construction management team. The manual should
include protocols for acceptance and rejection of components of the work, and
re-work and re-testing requirements.

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 Tailings dam construction may be carried out by the Owner, Contractors,
or combinations of the two. The construction management team must have a
defined relationship to the operations team to ensure that operational
requirement for ongoing tailings management are integrated into the construction
works.

11.3. CONFIRMATION OF DESIGN INTENT AND

DOCUMENTATION OF AS-CONSTRUCTED CONDITIONS

As-constructed conditions typically vary from the original design and, as

a result, adjustments are made throughout the TSF lifecycle to incorporate new
knowledge about the site conditions, and operational, design and regulatory
practices. Comprehensive documentation of the as-constructed conditions is
critical to support future design assessments and, where required, design
changes.

Foundation Conditions

The prepared foundation should be inspected and mapped by a qualified

geotechnical engineer/ engineering geologist. The EOR should confirm by visual
verification and in some cases in situ testing to confirm that the geotechnical
conditions encountered are consistent with the design assumptions.
Observations of potentially unusual conditions, such as localized springs or shear
zone in bedrock foundations, should be documented. Some foundation
conditions require special consideration, for example: (a) steeply dipping highly
fractured bedrock that requires resloping and/or treatment with slush grout; or (b)
localized pervious zones that were not anticipated and require special excavation
or grouting. Where design changes are required, they should be documented and
approved by the EOR to assure that the design intent is not compromised.

Borrow and Construction Fills

Borrow materials and construction fills can change over the TSF lifecycle
and may require modifications to the design. Where borrow sources are within
the impoundment area, care is required that the excavation of materials does not
expose unexpected conditions, such as seepage channels, for example. As with
the dam foundations, internal borrow areas should be comprehensively mapped,
documented and approved by the EOR. This observation is also relevant to
potential borrow areas that are near the downstream footprint of the dam.

Construction materials may comprise natural soils or rockfill, mine waste

rock, cycloned sand, or spigotted tailings. Geotechnical properties of materials
comprising the structural portion of the dam should be documented. The
geochemical properties of fills should be documented, and it is preferable not to
include potentially acid generating fills in the dam.

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 Where tailings are used within the structural portion of the dam, their
distribution (layering) and geotechnical properties (e.g. strength, plasticity, water
content, etc.) should be documented.

As-Constructed Drawings and Reports

As-constructed conditions should be documented on representative

cross-sections and plans that form a continuous record of construction over the
TSF lifecycle. As far as practical, the cross-sections should include key
instrumentation, such as piezometers, piezometric levels and locations of other
instrumentation.

As-constructed reports are commonly prepared at appropriate periods

where significant construction has been carried out. A data management system
should be in place to provide for safe storage and retrieval of as-constructed
information.

Confirmation of Design Intent

The EOR should, in preparation of the annual dam safety

assurance/inspection reports, document potential changes to the as-constructed
conditions and, where required, support and document design changes with
appropriate data and analyses.

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 12. OPERATIONS

12.1. INTRODUCTION

Operation of tailings dams should be in accordance with approved

procedures, documented in an OMS Manual, and overseen by an appropriately
qualified team, including an RSP and EOR as described in Section 2.2. The OMS
Manual should outline all designer and operator requirements for operation,
maintenance and dam safety surveillance that must be met to ensure the ongoing
safety and effective operation of the TSF. The OMS Manual should also
reference, and be linked to, the Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan
(EPRP) to assist in responding to changing conditions if there is a potential that
they could lead to a significant dam safety issue or potential failure.

The objective of the operational phase of a tailings dam is to ensure that

the tailings facility:

• is maintained in a safe and stable state;

• meets the design intent;
• meets legal requirements;
• is operated to achieve environmental requirements; and
• allows transition to the closure plan and intended use after closure.

These objectives should be met by operating in accordance with the

requirements of the OMS Manual

The operation of the TSF should consider the following objectives:

• control access and safety of all personnel;

• control distribution of the tailings to achieve the required geometric
shape of the deposit, to maintain ponded water within the specified
position and to manage beach development;
• control the level and position of the stored water to maintain
freeboard;
• control the reclaim of process water either with decants or pump
barge systems;
• control the flow and discharge of storm water to prevent damage;
• control access so that only those persons authorized to gain access
for the purposes of operation and supervisory management can do
so;
• optimize the recycling of water from the TSF;
• keep non-contact water separate from contact water and prevent
unplanned releases of contact water; and
• control dust.
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 12.2. OPERATIONS, MAINTENANCE AND SURVEILLANCE
MANUAL

An OMS Manual should be completed, normally prior to commissioning

of a tailings dam and updated throughout the life phases. Operational
Management Plans within the OMS Manual should specifically highlight all
designer requirements for operation and response actions that must be met to
ensure the ongoing safety of the dam.

The Operation Plan should include, as a minimum:

• Description of the TSF, expected nature of the tailings, production

rate, life of mine plan, dam type, dam raising schedule, etc.
• Roles and responsibilities of key personnel and organization chart.
• Dam consequence classification and key design criteria
(geotechnical, water management, environment).
• Deposition plan: spigot discharge locations, beach management, etc.
• Water management: requirements for managing diversions, pond
size/location, reclaim and discharges, freeboard management,
decant systems, pump barges, etc.
• Environmental controls: e.g., seepage collection, water discharges,
dust control, etc.
• Surveillance requirements for dam inspections.
• Risk assessment register.
• Summary of preventative controls.
• List of Critical Controls and trigger action response plans.
• Maintenance requirements for pumps, pipelines, channels, etc.
• Training requirements for key staff.
• Summary of the emergency preparedness and response plan
(EPRP) and links to the document.
• Document management plan.

The OMS Manual should specify relevant requirements for operators and
the minimum level of operator training. The Manual should include a section
dedicated to information specifically required by field operators, with the
operators themselves preferably involved in preparation of this section. The
operator’s section should be printed as a stand-alone document and used by the
operators for guidance in their daily work.

OMS Manuals for tailings dams are typically updated every few years to
reflect changing conditions, either with design, operation, or personnel and to
reflect on opportunities for risk reduction and/or increased efficiencies. More
frequent updating may be required if there are changes to personnel, operating
methods or storage arrangements. Typical of contents of an OMS manual is
shown in Table 12.1.

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 Table 12.1
Example table of contents on an OMS Manual

1 TSF Description 5 Maintenance

Overview Maintenance programs
Summary of design, site description, life Tailings pipelines
of mine, infrastructure Water reclaim system
Design criteria summary and Water diversions and ponds
consequence classification Dam(s)
Testing of control equipment

2 Governance 6 Surveillance
Roles and responsibilities Risk register
Change management Preventative controls
Incident management Critical controls
Documentation and tracking Dam instrumentation
Training Visual inspections
TARPS
Escalation procedure and response to
TARPS

3 OMS Activities 7 Linkage to Emergency Preparedness

Summary table of key activities covered Plan
in the Manual
4 Operations
Deposition requirements (beaches,
spigotting, cycloning)
Freeboard, water levels and water
balance procedures
Construction schedule and controls
Environmental controls
Unusual operations

Detailed guidance on developing an OMS Manual is provided in MAC,

2021b.

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 12.3. ENGINEERING ASPECTS OF OPERATIONS

12.3.1. Tailings Deposition and Water Management Plan

The tailings deposition plan should document the tailings discharge

procedures, such as numbers of spigot discharge points and timing, and the
requirements for managing the shape of the beaches to manage the decant water
pond and to meet beach width requirements for the dam. The deposition plan
should be integrated with the requirements for water management, freeboard,
and construction raising of the dams. Where saturated beaches are required for
dust control or mitigation of potential oxidation of sulfidic tailings, procedures
should be documented. Where beach density is required to meet specific targets
for strength or minimization of liquefaction risk, the procedures to achieve and
test these densities should be prescribed.

The water management plan described in the OMS manual must clearly
identify the critical water levels, particularly where the IDF needs to be contained
and minimum beach widths are required.

Tailings dams are often progressively raised during operation. Such

raising should not increase the risk of operating the dam and needs to account
for climate during raising (flood risks, wet weather, cold weather) and
geotechnical parameters. The interaction of construction work with tailings
discharge must be coordinated to ensure there is no conflict that may interrupt
the schedule of tailings discharge required to meet the deposition plan.

Upstream tailings dams require a higher level of quality control on

placement of tailings within the structure zone of the dam, which may require
special operator training in monitoring and surveillance.

12.3.2. Surveillance, monitoring and evaluation

The operational procedures for the TSF should include provisions for
surveillance (i.e., regular inspection, monitoring, and evaluation) and
documentation thereof. Conditions can develop during operations, which if not
detected early, could lead to potential dam safety concerns, or compromise future
plans for dam raising or closure.

Section 8.4 of this Bulletin describes identification of failure modes,

assessment and determination of critical controls and their corresponding
TARPs. The TARPs are a critical component of operations and should be
documented in the OMS Manual. Operating personnel should be trained in the
TARPs and in timely response to potential changing conditions.

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 In ensuring effective surveillance of tailings dams, the Owner should
select suitable operational staff and arrange for their training in the areas of dam
safety management, with regular refresher courses to keep operators up to date
with current practices. As part of that training, operators should be capable of
recognizing abnormal conditions and circumstances that could affect the safety
of their dams and be able to institute appropriate actions, including when to call
for more expert assistance.

Inspection and monitoring of the dam by trained staff should be carried

out on a frequency commensurate with the complexity of the operations, the dam
classification of the dam and in accordance with the EOR’s requirements. The
items that need to be monitored and the relevant associated instrumentation
should be designated by the EOR to enable a suitable coverage of the aspects
that affect the ongoing safety and operational performance of the facility.

Ongoing recording of inspection findings, monitoring instrument

readings, and recording any incidents is essential for TSFs. Attention is drawn to
ICOLD (1996) “Monitoring on Tailings Dams”, which deals with the monitoring of
tailings dams during construction and operation.

Records covering the following should be kept in an accessible, secure

repository and in an organized form:

• Groundwater monitoring with special emphasis on the environmental

impacts of the tailings dam on groundwater (e.g., geochemical
processes).
• Surface drainage and seepage monitoring; both visual observations,
seepage flow measurement and water quality are typically required.
• Capacity monitoring (tailings, process water, water recovery,
evaporation).
• Tailings monitoring (e.g., beach development, drainage, density,
desiccation).
• Monitoring of instrumentation and instrumentation readings.
• Water balance.
• Monitoring of equipment and pipework.
• Monitoring of dam movements, stresses, cracking and seepage.
• Inspection reports (i.e., times, dates, observations).
• Incident reports (i.e., time, date, nature, actions).

The monitoring reports must be reviewed by the EOR, or their designate,

who should provide written confirmation that the facility is operating within the
design constraints. Unusual or unexpected monitoring data must be immediately
shared with the EOR and appropriate actions implemented.

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 12.3.3. Dam safety assessments and audits

Dam safety assessments and audits should be carried out routinely, with
timing taking consideration of the consequence classification of the dam. It would
be normal for a TSF to undergo an annual safety inspection by an independent
specialist dam engineer, with a detailed dam safety review (DSR) by a specialist
team at least every 5 years or more frequently for High and Extreme
consequence classification dams.

The DSR should comprise a systematic review and evaluation of all

aspects of design, construction, operation, maintenance, and surveillance, and
other relevant processes and systems affecting a dam, to evaluate the design
criteria with current standards, operational compliance with design intent, stability
and functionality of the dam, and to identify appropriate remedial measures if
necessary (MAC, 2019).

Maintenance
Appropriate maintenance must be carried out to ensure ongoing dam
safety. In addition to normal maintenance of plant and equipment, it may be
necessary to maintain the structure of the tailings dam with repair of cracks and/or
erosion rills, grading of roads, and various other matters. The principle in
determining maintenance priorities is to attend to all items that affect the structural
integrity first, followed by environmental items and then by conventional
maintenance.

Page 123
 13. REFERENCES

Global References

ICOLD 2011, Bulletin 139, Improving Tailings Dam Safety – Critical Aspects of
Management, Design Operation and Closure, International Commission of
Large Dams, Paris France, 2011
ICOLD, 2013. Bulletin 153. Sustainable Design and Post-Closure Performance
of Tailings Dams. International Commission on Large Dams, Paris France
2013http://www.icold-cigb.org./. ISSN 0534-8293

ICOLD, 2021, Bulletin 181, Tailings Dam Design - Technology Update.

International Commission on Large Dams, Paris France, http://www.icold-
cigb.org./. ISBN 9780367770464

ANCOLD (Australian National Committee on Large Dams). 2019. Guidelines on

Tailings Dams: Planning, Design, Construction, Operation and Closure, revision
1. Hobart, Tasmania, Australia: ANCOLD.
CDA (Canadian Dam Association), 2019. Application of the Dam Safety
Guidelines to Mining Dams. CDA Technical Bulletin. Markham, Ontario,
Canada: CDA.
GISTM, 2021 Global Industry Standard on Tailings Management, August 2020.

ICMM 2021 Tailings Management – Good Practice Guide, International Council

on Mining and Metals

MAC, 2019, Towards Sustainable Mining - Tailings Management Protocol,

Mining Association of Canada, February 2019
MAC, 2021, A Guide to the Management of Tailings Facilities Version 3.2, March
2021, Mining Association of Canada, March 30, 2021

The 2016 revisions to Part 10 of the Health, Safety and Reclamation Code for
Mines in British Columbia is a useful example of legislative documentation
prepared following the Mount Polley tailings dam failure in 2015.

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Additional References for Chapter Text

Chapter 2 Tailings Management System

ICOLD, 2013, Dam Safety Management: Operational phase of the dam life
cycle, International Commission on Large Dams, Paris, 2013
MAC (Mining Association of Canada) 2019. A Guide to the Management of
Tailings Facilities, version 3.1. Ottawa, Ontario, Canada: MAC.

Chapter 3 Closure

ICMM: Integrated Mine Closure – Good Practice Guide, 2nd Edition,

International Council of Mining and Metals, 2018
ICOLD Bulletin 153, Sustainable Design and Post-Closure Performance of
Tailings Dams, International Commission of Large Dams, 2011
World Bank & IFC (International Finance Corporation), 2002. It’s Not Over
When It’s Over: Mine Closure Around The World, Mining and Development
Series. Washington, USA.
Tailings Management - One of a series of handbooks of the Leading Practice
Sustainable Development Program for the Mining Industry, published
September 2016 – Government of Australia

Chapter 5 Site Characterization

EGBC (Engineers Geoscientists of British Columbia), 2016. Site

Characterization of Dam Foundations in BC, APEG BC Professional Practice
Guidelines V1.0, 2016
Atkinson, G.M. 2004. “An Overview of Developments in Seismic Hazard
Analysis.” 13th World Conference on Earthquake Engineer, Vancouver, BC,
Paper No. 5001, August.
Australian National Committee on Large Dams, 2019. “Guidelines for Design of
Dams and Appurtenant Structures for Earthquake,” July.
Baker, J. W., 2015. “Introduction to Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis.”
White paper by Dr. Jack W. Baker, Stanford University.
Baker, J., Bradley, B., and Stafford, P., 2022. Seismic Hazard and Risk
Analysis. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK. ISBN 9781108425056.
Bommer, J., 2002. “Deterministic vs. Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Assessment:
An Exaggerated and Obstructive Dichotomy.” Journal of Earthquake
Engineering, Vol 6, Special Issue 1, pp. 43-73.
Bommer, J., Abrahamson, N., Strasser, F., Pecker, A., Bard, P-Y., Bungum, H.,
Cotton, F., Faeh, D., Sabetta, F., Scherbaum, F., and Studer, J. (2004). “The
challenge of defining the upper limits on earthquake ground motions,”
Seismological Research Letters. 70 (1).

Page 125
Bommer, J., and N. Abrahamson, 2007. “Why Do Modern Probabilistic Seismic
Hazard Analyses Often Lead to Increased Hazard Estimates.” Bulletin of the
Seismological Society of America, Vol. 96, No. 6, pp. 1987-1977, December.
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), 2018. “Engineering Guidelines
for the Evaluation of Hydropower Projects,”
ICOLD, 2016, Bulletin 148, Selecting Seismic Parameters for Large Dams —
Guidelines, International Commission on Large Dams, Paris, 2016
ICOLD, 2021, Bulletin 181, Tailings Dam Design - Technology Update.
International Commission on Large Dams, Paris France, http://www.icold-
cigb.org./. ISBN 9780367770464
New Zealand Society on Large Dams (NZSOLD), 2015. “New Zealand Dam
Safety Guidelines.” ISBN 978-0-908960-65-1.
U.S. Committee on Large Dams (USCOLD), 1999. “Updated Guidelines for
Selecting Seismic Parameters for Dam Projects,” White Paper prepared by the
USCOLD Committee for Earthquakes, US Committee on Large Dams (now
U.S. Society on Dams), Denver, Colorado, April.
U.S. Society on Dams (USSD), 2022. “Updated Guidelines for Selecting
Seismic Parameters for Dam Projects,” White Paper prepared by the USSD
Committee for Earthquakes, U.S. Society on Dams, Denver, Colorado, in
progress.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2018.. Updated Implementation
Guidelines for SSHAC Hazard Studies. NUREG 2213.
World Meteorological Organisation, Manual on Estimating Probable Maximum
Precipitation (PMP), WMO-No, 1045, 2009)
Recent handbooks provided by the Australian Federal Government including
“Tailings Management” (DITR, 2016a)”, “Preventing Acid and Metalliferous
Drainage” (DITR, 2016b), and “Mine Closure” (DITR, 2016c) expand on the
issue of managing the geochemical stability of the sulfidic wastes within a
physically stable dam, or within tailings released as a result of dam failure. The
GARD Guide (http://www.gardguide.com) produced by the International
Network for Acid Prevention (INAP), also provides leading practice guidance on
the geochemical management of sulfidic mine wastes, including tailings.
Klohn Crippen Berger. 2017. Mine Environment Neutral Drainage (MEND)
Project: Study of Tailings Management Technologies. “Study of Tailings
Management Technologies: MEND Report 2.50.1,” in 24th Annual BC MEND
Metal Leaching /Acid Rock Drainage Workshop on November 29, 2017,
Vancouver, B.C. Ottawa, ON : MEND (Mine Environment Neutral Drainage);
MAC (Mineralogical Association Of Canada). Accessed October 31, 2017.
http://mend-nedem.org/wp-
content/uploads/2.50.1Tailings_Management_TechnologiesL.pdf

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 Chapter 7 Design

Citations in Chapter Text

Bray, J., and Travasarou, T. (2007). “Simplified procedure for estimating
earthquake-induced deviatoric slope displacements.” Journal of Geotechnical
and Geoenvironmental Engineering, Vol 133, No. 4, American Society of Civil
Engineers, pp. 381–392.
Bray, J.D., Macedo J., and Travasarou, T. (2017). Simplified Procedure for
Estimating Seismic Slope Displacements for Subduction Zone Earthquakes.
Journal of Geotechnical and Geoenvironmental Engineering, 144(3), 04017124-
1—04017124-13.
Canadian Dam Association (CDA), 2013. “2007 Dam Safety Guidelines, 2013
Edition” Canadian Dam Association, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada.
Davies, et al.
Dawson, E.M., Roth, W.H., and Drescher, A. (1999) “Slope Stability Analysis by
Strength Reduction.” Geotechnique 49, No. 6, pp. 835-840.
Duncan, J.M., & Wright, S.G. (2005). Soil Strength and Slope Stability. John
Wiley & Sons, Hoboken, N.J, USA.
ICOLD (2013). Bulletin 155: Guidelines for Use of Numerical Models in Dam
Engineering. Commission Internationale des Grands Barrages/International
Commission on Large Dams (ICOLD), Paris, 204 pp.
ICOLD (2016). Bulletin 148: Selecting Seismic Parameters for Large Dams
Guidelines” Commission Internationale des Grands Barrages/International
Commission on Large Dams, Paris, 75 pp.
Jefferies, M., and Been, K. (2016). Soil Liquefaction: A Critical State Approach,
Second Edition. CRC Press.
Ladd, C. C. (1991). Stability Evaluation during Staged Construction. Journal of
Geotechnical Engineering, 117(4), 540–615.
https://doi.org/10.1061/(asce)0733-9410(1991)117:4(540)
Morgenstern, N.R., 2018. “Geotechnical Risk, Regulation and Public Policy.”
The Sixth Victor de Mello Lecture, presented at the 9th Portuguese-Brazilian
Geotechnical Congress, Salvador, Bahia, Brasil, August 2018. Published in
Soils and Rocks, Volume 41, No. 2, pp. 107-129, Associacao Brasileira de
Mecanica dos solos e Engenharia Geotecnica.
Pells, S. and Fell, R. (2002). Damage and cracking of embankment dams by
earthquakes, and the implications for internal erosion and piping. UNICIV
Report R 406, The University of New South Wales, ISBN 85841 3752.
Pells, S. and Fell, R. (2003). Damage and cracking of embankment dams by
earthquake and the implications for internal erosion and piping. Proceedings

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21st International Congress on Large Dams, Montreal. ICOLD, Paris Q83–R17,
International Commission on Large Dams, Paris.
Robertson, P.K. 2010. “Evaluation of flow liquefaction and liquefied strength
using the cone penetration test.” Journal of Geotechnical and
Geoenvironmental Engineering, ASCE, 136(6): 842–853.
Swaisgood, J. (2003). “Embankment dam deformations caused by
earthquakes,” Proc., 2003 Pacific Conference on Earthquake Eng.,
Christchurch, New Zealand.
Swaisgood, J. R. (2014). “Behavior of embankment dams during earthquake,”
Journal of Dam Safety, ASDSO, Vol. 12 No. 2, pp 35-44.
National Academies of Science, Engineering and Medicine (NASEM), 2016.
“State of the Art and Practice in the Assessment of Earthquake-Induced Soil
Liquefaction and its Consequences.” The National Academies Press,
Washington DC.
Nathan et al 2001
References for: Mt. Polley, Cadia, Aznocollar, Fundao, Feijeo Baie Maire
Merrispruit Omai, (Philippine decant?

Additional References
Chen, W. F. (1975). Limit analysis and soil plasticity, Elsevier Scientific,
Amsterdam, Netherlands.
Christian, J. T., Ladd, C. C., and Baecher, G. B. (1994). ‘‘Reliability applied to
slope stability analysis.’’ Journal of Geotechnical Engineering, Vol 20, No. 12,
pp 2180–2207, December.
Duncan, J. M., (2000). “Factors of Safety and Reliability in Geotechnical
Engineering.” Journal of Geotechnical and Geoenvironmental Engineering, Vol.
126, No. 4, American Society of Civil Engineers, pp. 307 – 316, April.
Hynes-Griffin, M.E., & Franklin, A.G. (1984). “Rationalizing the Seismic
Coefficient Method” Department of the Army, Waterways Experiment Station,
Vicksburg, MS, USA, July.
Leshchinsky, B., & Ambauen, S. (2015). Limit Equilibrium and Limit Analysis:
Comparison of Benchmark Slope Stability Problems. Journal of Geotechnical
and Geoenvironmental Engineering, 141(10), 04015043–1-04015043–8.
https://doi.org/10.1061/(asce)gt.1943-5606.0001347
Youd, T.L., I. M. Idriss, R. D. Andrus, I. Arango, G. Castro, J. T. Christian, R.
Dobry, W. D. L. Finn, L. F. Harder, Jr., M. E. Hynes, K. Ishihara, J. P. Koester,
S. S. C. Liao, W. F. Marcuson III, G. R. Martin, J. K. Mitchell, Y. Moriwaki, M. S.
Power, P. K. Robertson, R. B. Seed, and K. H. Stokoe II. (2001). “Liquefaction
Resistance of Soils: Summary Report from the 1996 NCEER and 1998
NCEER/NSF Workshops on Evaluation of Liquefaction Resistance of Soils.”

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Journal of Geotechnical and Geoenvironmental Engineering, Vol. 124 No. 10.,
October, pp. 817-833.

Rowe, R.K., P. Joshi, R.W.I. Brachman and H. McLeod. (2017). “Leakage

through Holes in Geomembranes below Saturated Tailings.” Journal of
Geotechnical and Geoenvironmental Engineering. 143(2).

Chapter 8 Risk Management

ICMM, 2015, Critical Control Management, Implementation Guide, International

Council on Mining and Metals

ICOLD Bulletin 158, International Commission on Large Dams, Dam

Surveillance Guide, 2018,
Chapter 9 Dam Failure/Breach Assessment

CDA (Canadian Dam Association), 2021, Technical Bulletin -Tailings Dam

Breach Analysis, ISBN 978-1-989760-02-04
Jeyapalan, J.K., Duncan, M, Seed, H.B. (1983), Investigation of Flow Failures of
Tailings Dams, Journal of Geotechnical Engineering. 1983, 109 (2): 172-189
Lucia P.C, Dunca J.M. and Seed H.B, 1983 Summary of research on case
hisories of Flow failure of mine Tailings impoundments. Mine Waste Disposal
Technology, Proceedings of the Bureau of Mines Technology Transfer
Workshop, Denver, Colorado, 46-53

Chapter 10 Emergency Preparedness Activities

MAC, 2021, A Guide to the Management of Tailings Facilities Version 3.2, March
2021, Mining Association of Canada, March 30, 2021

Chapter 11 Construction

ISO 9000:2015. Quality Management Systems—Fundamentals and

Vocabulary. Geneva, Switzerland: International Organization for
Standardization.

Chapter 12 Operations

MAC (Mining Association of Canada) 2021. Developing an Operation,

Maintenance and Surveillance Manual, for Tailings and Water Management
Facilities, Version 2.1, March 2021.

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 14. DEFINITIONS AND ACRONYMS (INCOMPLETE)

Accountable Executive (AE)

One or more executives directly answerable to the CEO and who communicate(s)
with the Board of Directors and is/are accountable for the safety of tailings
facilities and minimizing the social and environmental consequences of a
potential tailings facility failure. The AE may delegate responsibilities, but not
accountability. (GISTM)

Acid and Metalliferous Drainage (AMD)

The outflow of metal affected water to the environment. Typically acidic water but
may be neutral and metalliferous (see below) or highly saline. AMD occurs
naturally within some environments as part of the rock weathering process but is
exacerbated and accelerated exposure of sulphidic rocks or tailings to oxygen
and moisture. AMD is also known as acid mine drainage, or acid rock drainage
(ARD).

Active Care
A mine site phase in which there is ongoing operation, maintenance, surveillance,
inspection, and an ability to respond to emergencies at the tailings facility. The
phase may be decades to hundreds of years long. The phase may involve wet
closure covers and the management of ponds.

As Low as Reasonably Practicable (ALARP)

Reducing potential risk of harm as far as possible. To be ALARP, the cost and
other impacts involved in reducing the risk further must be shown to be grossly
disproportionate to the benefit gained.

Annual Exceedance Probability (AEP)

The probability that a particular event will be exceeded in any year. For example,
a 1 in 1,000 AEP Storm is a storm event which produces a rainfall that is
statistically likely to occur once in 1,000 years.

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Change Management
The process of managing changes in projects during design, construction and
operation to reduce negative impacts to the quality and integrity of the tailings
facility. The impact and consequences of changes vary according to how they are
managed, among other things. Change management includes an evaluation of
the change, a review and formal approval of the change, followed by detailed
documentation, including drawings and, where required, changes to equipment,
process, actions, flow, information, cost, schedule, or personnel.

Closure
A planned, final cessation of tailings disposal and the modification/engineering of
the tailings dam with the objective of achieving long-term physical, chemical,
ecological and social stability and a sustainable, environmentally appropriate
after-use.

Comprehensive Dam Safety Review (DSR)

A review that includes an assessment of site conditions, dam stability, TSF
operations, etc. The framework of the review should align with the Canadian Dam
Association Guideline (reference). A DSR is carried out by an independent
engineer.

Contractive behaviour
Reduction of soil volume during shearing. If the sheared materials are saturated
or have a high moisture content, the material contraction is accompanied by an
increase of pore water pressures in the shear zone.

Critical Controls
Preventative controls, which if not implemented, could potentially lead to failure
of the dam. Critical controls also mitigate the consequences of an undesirable
event. The absence or failure of a critical control disproportionately increases the
risk, despite the existence of other controls.

Dam Breach Assessment (DBA)

An assessment of the potential consequence of failure of the dam, including
considerations of water transported tailings release and the potential for
additional liquefied tailings release. Considers the operating case (sunny day)
and the extreme flood case (flood-induced).

Dam Safety Verification

A verification of the safety of a Tailings Dam, including as a minimum, a physical
inspection of the dam, review of monitoring and surveillance results, and review

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of stability. A dam safety assessment should be carried out at least annually by
the EOR.

Decant pond
A pond within a tailings dam that allows collection and clarification of stormwater
and tailings water released during settling and consolidation of tailings.

Design Basis Memorandum (DBM)

A record of the important design related parameters for the TSF, typically
including site conditions, geotechnical properties, design criteria, water
management and environmental components.

Design Basis Report (DBR)

A document providing the basis for the design, operation, construction,
monitoring and risk management of a tailings facility.

Designer of record
Person with appropriate qualifications and experience responsible for the design
of the tailings dam.

Deterministic seismic hazard analysis (DSHA)

An approach to seismic hazard analysis using the known seismic sources near
the site as well as historical seismic and geological data to generate discrete,
single-valued events or models of ground motion at the site.

Dilative behaviour
A behaviour in which soil volume increases during shearing. If the sheared
materials are saturated or have a high moisture content, the material dilation is
accompanied by a reduction of pore water pressures in the shear zone.

Engineer of Record (EOR)

A qualified engineering firm responsible for confirming that the tailings facility is
designed, constructed, and decommissioned with appropriate concern for
integrity of the facility, and that it aligns with and meets applicable regulations,
statutes, guidelines, codes, and standards. The EoR may delegate responsibility,
but not accountability.

Emergency Preparedness and Response Plans (EPRP)

A plan documenting the potential failure modes of the dam and the preparedness
and response plans required to address various levels of severity.
Communication plans are developed for each level of severity. May be called
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Emergency Response Plan (ERP), Emergency Management Plan (EMP) or Dam
Safety Emergency Plan (DSEP).

Environmental Design Flood (EDF)

The maximum flood inflow that could occur before release to the environment has
been determined to be acceptable.

Failure Modes Effects Analysis (FMEA)

A methodology for identifying potential failure modes and consequences. The
risks are assessed with respect to the likelihood of occurrence and the
consequences. A standardized framework is typically used for likelihood (5 levels)
and consequences (typically 5 levels with respect to: environment, financial,
health & safety)

Global Industry Standard on Tailings Management (GISTM)

A set of safety, design, and governance standards, developed by the Global
Tailings Review and directed at operators. The GISTM applies to existing and to-
be built tailings facilities.

High Density Slurry Flow

Tailings slurry flow that has a high percent solids concentration (weight of solids
/ (weight of solids + water)). Typical solids concentrations would be on the order
of 70% by weight for tailings with a specific gravity of 2.75.

Impoundment
The area containing the tailings and decant water that is confined by the tailings
dam and natural barriers.

Incident Management
A system to document incidents at the TSF, with corrective actions identified and
completed.

Long term Closure

A closed facility that has a low risk of a catastrophic consequence with limited or
no water/tailings release, and limited capacity for stored tailings to flow. It could
be considered to have a risk profile similar to its surroundings.

Leading Practice

“Leading practice” is defined as practice that “has consistently shown results

superior to those achieved with other means, and that is used as a benchmark”.
One must note that “leading practice” evolves as improvements are developed,
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which is particularly relevant for tailings dams where understanding and
technologies continue to develop.

Liquefaction
A state in which soil stiffness and strength is lost due to undrained loading or
unloading.

Maximum Credible Earthquake (MCE)

The largest ground motion that can result from a conceivable maximum
earthquake from a recognised fault or within a geographically defined tectonic
zone, under the presently known or presumed tectonic framework.

Mine Closure
A process being undertaken between the time when the operating stage of a mine
is ending or has ended, and the final decommissioning or rehabilitation is
completed. Closure may only be temporary or may lead to a period of care and
maintenance.

Mitigating Controls
Design and operational controls that reduce the consequence of a dam failure.
These may also include active controls with equipment and emergency response
teams.

Multi Criteria Analysis (MCA) - Multiple Accounts Analysis (MAA)

Methods, techniques, and tools that explicitly consider multiple objectives and
criteria (or attributes) in decision-making problems. A method to build consensus
among stakeholders, consider a wide range of options, identify potential risks,
and develop a plan with specific actions.

Probable Maximum Precipitation (PMP)

The greatest depth of precipitation for a given duration, meteorologically possible
for a given size storm area at a particular time of year, with no allowance made
for long-term climatic trends.

Probable Maximum Flood (PMF)

The largest flood that could conceivably occur. Usually estimated from probable
maximum precipitation, and where applicable, snow melt, coupled with the worst
flood-producing catchment conditions.

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Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Assessment (PSHA)
An evaluation of the ground motion level that will be exceeded at a specific
frequency or annual probability.

Static Liquefaction
Liquefaction caused by a rapid increase of pore water pressures resulting from
an undrained response of contractive soils subject to monotonic shearing.

Tailings
Residue produced from ore or metallurgical processes. Tailings typically
comprise sand/silt/clay particles in slurry form.

Tailings Storage Facility (TSF)

A facility for storing tailings, typically comprising one or more dams. TSF refers
to the dams, tailings discharge systems, water management and reclaim
systems, and associated works. In this document TSFs also include dams that
may store water, process residues, sediment or filtered tailings.

Operations, Maintenance and Surveillance (OMS) Manual

A document containing plans, procedures, and processes for the operation,
maintenance and surveillance of a tailings facility. Also called a Management
Plan, Operations Plan, or an equivalent title, an OMS is intended to facilitate
improved risk management and TSF performance. The OMS also defines and
describes roles, responsibilities, and levels of authority.

Passive Care
The closure stage where the maintenance requirements are reduced to a level
consistent with the designated long-term land use. There is no full-time site
presence, although the dams may still be inspected, but on a less frequent basis.
Sites in passive care may be eligible for transfer of ownership and the leasehold
relinquished. At this stage, the topography of the tailings dam could be described
as a ‘land-form’ with similar characteristics as other natural features.

Post-Closure
In this Guideline, post-closure is the period after Mine Closure and rehabilitation
works are completed and the tailings dam enters a period of long-term monitoring
to confirm that the tailings dam is likely to perform safely into the long-term.

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Post Seismic Condition
A description of soil strength after liquefaction / strain softening where strength
loss occurs due to a seismic event. This does not include the horizontal driving
forces of the earthquake.

Preventative Controls
Design and operational controls that are in place to prevent a dam failure or
unwanted event.

Quality Assurance and Quality Control (QA/QC)

Processes for monitoring and confirming the quality of construction. Quality
Assurance refers to the processes that measure the quality of construction and
that construction meets the design intent. Quality Control refers to the processes
that ensure dam construction meets the specifications for design.

Residual Shear Strength

The strength of soil after significant shearing (deformation), which may be caused
by seismic, static or historical movements.

Responsible Person (Responsible Tailings Facility Engineer)

An engineer appointed by the Operator to be responsible for the tailings facility.
The engineer must be available at all times during construction, operations, and
closure and have qualifications and experience at a level matching the complexity
of the TSF. The RP is typically responsible for the scope of work and budget
requirements for the TSF, including risk management. The Responsible Person
may delegate tasks and responsibilities for aspects of tailings management, but
not accountability.

Risk Management Process

A process of systematic application of management policies, procedures, and
practices to identify, analyze, evaluate, treat, monitor, and review risk.

Trigger Action Response Plan (TARP)

A tool to manage risk controls, including critical controls. A TARP identifies trigger
levels based on the performance objectives and risk management plan for the
tailings facility and describes actions to be taken if the levels are exceeded.

Undrained Response
Condition under which pore water pressure changes (increases or decreases) in
a mass of soil resulting from a change in stress or strain.

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 15. ACRONYMS

AE Accountable Executive
AMD Acid and Metalliferous Drainage
ALARP As Low as Reasonably Practicable
AEP Annual Exceedance Probability
DSR Dam Safety Review
DBA Dam Breach Analysis
DBR Design Basis Report
DSHA Deterministic Seismic Hazard Analysis
EOR Engineer of Record
EPRP Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan
EDF Environmental Design Flood
FMEA Failure Mode Effects Analysis
GISTM Global Industrial Standard for Tailings Management
MCE Maximum Credible Earthquake
NDA Non-linear Deformation Analysis
PMF Probable Maximum Flood
PMP Probable Maximum Precipitation
PSHA Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis
OMS Operations, Maintenance, Surveillance manual
RP Responsible Person
TARPs Trigger Action Response Plans

Page 137
 APPENDIX A: SHEAR STRENGTH AND DEFORMATION
BEHAVIOUR

TABLE OF CONTENTS

A.1 Introduction

A.2 Fundamental Concepts Of Soil Behavior Under Shearing

A.2.1 Drained Versus Undrained Shearing Conditions

A.2.2 Dilative Versus Contractive Behavior

A.2.3 Strain-Hardening Versus Strain-Softening

A.2.4 Brittle Versus Ductile Behavior

A.3 Cpt-Based Measurement Of In situ State And Soil Properties

A.4 Liquefaction And Residual Undrained Strength

A.4.1 Liquefaction

A.4.2 Residual Post-Liquefaction Shear Strength

A.5 Selection Of Appropriate Shear Strength Parameters For Design And

Analysis

A.6 Special Considerations

A.6.1 Stress-Dependent Behavior

A.6.2 Partial Saturation

A.6.3 Progressive Failure

A.6.4 Strain Incompatibility

A.6.5 Other Strain-Related Considerations.

A.6.6 Comments On Undrained Strength Ratio

A.7 References

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A.1 INTRODUCTION
When evaluating the stability of a tailings dam, it is important to
understand the underlying principles of soil mechanics and the specific behaviors
of the materials that influence the stability of the dam. Although the precepts of
shear strength and deformation behavior of soils (including tailings) have been
known and published within the geotechnical engineering literature for many
decades (some key aspects for more than a century), recent catastrophic failures
have revealed a lack of understanding of the mechanical behavior of tailings
among some tailings dam practitioners, especially when materials exhibiting
“contractive” behavior are present.

This appendix describes the key principles of shear strength and

deformation behavior, with an emphasis on tailings. It is expected that the reader
has some background in science and engineering and a fundamental
understanding of mechanics of materials, at a minimum. The concepts in this
chapter must be understood by designers and technical personnel supporting the
operation of tailings dams as a foundation to performing and applying slope
stability evaluations. A full explanation of shear strength behavior is beyond the
scope of this bulletin. By necessity, the explanations herein may seem somewhat
simplified to those with advanced expertise in soil mechanics and geotechnical
engineering.

While this appendix emphasizes tailings materials, the principles also

apply to soils in the foundation and other structural zones of a tailings dam. A
detailed discussion on soil mechanics is beyond the scope of this Appendix and
the interested reader should refer to many textbooks, keynote lectures and
papers published on the subject. Documents published by the International
Society of Soil Mechanics and Geotechnical Engineering are freely available from
the Society’s webpage.

A.2 FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS OF SOIL BEHAVIOUR UNDER

SHEARING
Shearing of a soil mass occurs when a change in the stress state is
introduced either by changes in external loading, changes in pore water pressure,
changes in the soil matrix or a combination thereof. The response of the soil mass
to the change in stress (i.e., the shear response) is a highly complex process that
involves the interaction of particles, water and sometimes air within the soil
matrix. Soil particles, which are formed by a wide range of elemental materials
(i.e., minerals) with vastly different intrinsic properties, interact during shearing by
colliding, sliding, rotating, and otherwise moving in relation to other particles
within the soil matrix, as the water and/or air in the surrounding void space
redistributes in response to the ongoing particle rearrangement.

Shear resistance in soils is understood to be proportional to the normal

effective stresses between particles within the matrix of the sheared soil, effective
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stress being the difference between the total stress and the pore water pressure
(which may be either positive or negative with respect to atmospheric pressure).
Chemical and mechanical bonding of particles and/or interlocking of the particles
may also contribute to the shear resistance of soils in some cases. Because the
soil mass is a collection or arrangement of particles and not a rigid body, changes
in the effective stress are accompanied by deformation (strain) as the particles
move in relation to each other. This stress-strain relationship is interactive: a
change in stress results in strain (deformation), and strain results in a change in
stress.

As a soil experiences shear strain, shear resistance is mobilised through

engagement of particles in the stress-strain interactions. As shearing progresses,
the position, orientation and the number of engaged soil particles change, which
is accompanied by volumetric changes of the soil mass (unless the volume
change is prohibited by physical constraints). A soil experiencing reduction of
volume (i.e., changing from loose to dense) during shearing is referred to as being
contractive, and a soil that experiences increase in volume during shearing is
referred to as being dilative. The contraction and dilation phenomena of sheared
soils are discussed further in Section A.2.2. A soil that is dilative at a particular
stress state may become contractive at a different stress state, i.e., a soil is not
necessarily always dilative (or contractive).

If the void spaces (i.e., pores) are filled with water, the changes in the
particles’ arrangement causes water to flow into or out of the changing pore
spaces. If the flow of water into or out of the soil mass is prevented or impeded,
the shear-induced rearrangement of particles results in a change in pore water
pressure, since water is an incompressible fluid (for the purposes of soil
mechanics). These pore pressure changes increase or decrease the effective
stress between the particles, which correspondingly increases or decreases the
shear resistance and the soil’s ability to resist further rearrangements of soil
particles. The greater the change of the pore water pressure during shearing, the
greater impact it has on the soil’s ability to resist further deformations.

If the soil has sufficient drainage capacity to concurrently dissipate the

shear-induced changes of pore water pressures and drainage is not otherwise
inhibited, the shearing is referred to as drained. Under drained conditions,
changes in effective stress are the result of changes in the applied load only, and
there is no effect of pore pressure on the soil’s shear resistance. However, if
drainage from or to the sheared soil is prevented, or significantly inhibited, the
shear condition is generally referred to as undrained. In this case, the effective
stress is modified by both the shear-induced changes in pore water pressure and
the changes in the applied stress. Since the prevention of drainage means that
no volume change can occur, the undrained condition is also referred to as
constant-volume shearing (which is not to be confused with the critical state, as
described in Section A.2.2). In undrained shearing, the soil’s resistance to
deformation is affected by the change in effective stress brought about by the

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change in pore water pressure induced by shearing (also referred to as excess
pore water pressures), as discussed further in Section A.2.1 and A.2.3.

The rearrangement of particles, and the resulting effects on volume

change, excess pore pressure generation and dissipation, and potential change
in shearing resistance continue as the soil continues to deform until a terminal
phase is reached. The acting stresses and the soil structure at the terminal stage
reach an equilibrium, and the soil can be continuously sheared at the same shear
stress without measurable changes of structure. This terminal state of constant-
volume shearing is often referred to as the critical state. At the critical state, a soil
will continue deforming at constant shear stress without experiencing further
changes in volume or effective normal stress.

Understanding the continuous changes in the structure and effective

stresses within the soil mass during shearing and the terminal stage is the
essential basis of predicting how soil will behave under different loading
scenarios. Four fundamental concepts that must be understood to predict the
shear strength behavior of foundation soils and tailings materials as required for
dam safety analysis are:

• Drained versus undrained shearing

• Dilative versus contractive behavior
• Strain-softening versus strain-hardening
• Brittle versus ductile behavior

These concepts are described in sections A.2.1 through A.2.4.

A.2.1 Drained versus Undrained shearing conditions

It is common in practice to refer to soil shear strength as either “drained
shear strength” or “undrained shear strength” to recognize the dependence of soil
behavior on the drainage conditions under which shearing occurs. However,
these terms need to be clearly understood and carefully applied. In fact, these
are short-hand versions of what would be more correctly presented as, for
example, “the shear strength occurring under fully drained conditions”.

The division into two opposing conditions of drained versus undrained is

an oversimplification that sometimes leads to misunderstanding of soil behavior.
Perfectly drained or undrained conditions are typically achievable only in
laboratory conditions where a soil sample can be isolated and the drainage
conditions and applied stresses and/or strain rate can be controlled.

In the triaxial test, a specimen of the soil is encased in an impermeable

membrane and water flowing into and out of the soil is controlled by a valve.
When the valve is closed, drainage is prevented, and undrained conditions are
forced to occur (so long as the specimen is fully saturated). When the sample
drain valve is left open during shearing, drained conditions are allowed but not
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necessarily achieved where the soil shearing physically occurs. To maintain the
drained conditions within the soil sample, the rate of strain must be slow enough
such that all excess pore pressures are allowed to dissipate as shearing takes
place. This type of tests is called a strain-controlled test and is the most common
in practice. Although strain-controlled tests are useful to understand the stress-
strain behavior of the tested soil, they do not strictly represent what occurs in real-
world settings where the rate of strain is not controlled.

Stress-controlled tests, in which shearing occurs under predefined stress

levels, do not limit the rates at which the sample is strained, thus better represent
in situ conditions. Stress-controlled triaxial tests completed on very loose
samples of cohesionless soils have shown sudden dramatic failures although the
drainage valve was left open allowing for drained conditions. In these cases, even
though drainage was allowed, the failure occurred in an undrained manner
because the rate of pore pressure generation within the shear zone exceeded the
rate of pore pressure dissipation. In other words, there was insufficient time for
the water to flow out of the shearing zone to any significant degree during the
failure. When the failure of the sample occurs in a such rapid manner, the rate of
strain in a stress-controlled test cannot be reliably measured making the test
interpretation difficult.

As shear resistance of soils is directly proportional to the effective

stresses in the soil matrix, shearing behavior of soils depends on the rate at which
the effective stress changes. The rate of change in effective stress is not
necessarily the rate at which external load is applied to the soil mass. The true
rate of concern is the rate of pore pressure generation, which may be almost
instantaneous, especially in loose, brittle materials. Thus, the rate of pore
pressure generation compared to the rate of excess pore pressure dissipation is
the key differentiator between drained and undrained conditions in real-world
settings.

The rate of pore pressure dissipation is related to the permeability of the

soil and the length of the drainage path. It must be emphasized that drained
conditions may not be sustainable (or achievable) in loose cohesionless soils or
where weak particle-to-particle bonding is found. These soils may exhibit a
sudden change from drained to undrained behavior, resulting in rapid excess
pore pressure generation with associated dramatic reductions in effective stress
and shear strength, even if the soils are of high permeability.

The so-called drained strength applies to dry soils, which cannot

generate pore water pressures, and to saturated soils when the condition of full
dissipation of excess pore pressures is met. When performing a limit equilibrium
stability analysis, drained strength can also be correctly applied to saturated soils
that are dense enough to dilate during shearing. In this case, dilation of the dense
soil during undrained shearing will result in negative pore pressure generation,
which will result in the drained strength being less than the undrained strength
until the pore water pressures are dissipated.
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 The drained strength (Sd) is typically represented by a friction angle, φ′,
and a cohesion value, c′, which are referred to as “effective stress parameters”,
following the effective shear strength theory introduced by Terzaghi in the 1920s,
using the following equation (Mohr-Coulomb equation):

′
𝑆𝑆𝑑𝑑 = 𝜏𝜏𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 = 𝜎𝜎𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 tan 𝜙𝜙 ′ + 𝑐𝑐 ′
where τff is the shear stress at failure on the failure plane and σ’ff is the
normal effective stress on the failure plane. Most soils do not have a true
cohesion, but because the failure line is usually curved at low effective stress, the
cohesion intercept, c’, is sometimes used to approximate the true strength at very
low effective stress. As a reminder, there is no aspect of the drained strength that
is affected by shear-induced excess pore pressure because excess pore
pressure is—by definition—assumed to be zero for drained conditions. Drained
strengths are unlikely to be relevant at all to a saturated, contractive material
because of the rate aspects described earlier.

The term undrained shear strength applies to the soil behavior observed
when the dissipation of excess (shear-induced) pore pressures is prevented or
inhibited. If the pore water pressures generated during shearing can be measured
or reliably calculated, the undrained shear resistance at any state can be
expressed in terms of the effective strength parameters. For contractive soils, the
excess pore pressures generated during shearing are positive (meaning they
reduce the effective stress) and may be a significant component of the total pore
pressure. However, given the difficulties in measuring or accurately predicting the
true pore pressures along the shearing surface during undrained loading, the
undrained strength is often formulated in terms of total stresses. The basic
definition of undrained shear strength using total stresses is:

(𝜎𝜎1 − 𝜎𝜎3 )𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓

𝑆𝑆𝑢𝑢 =
2
i.e., half the difference between the major (𝜎𝜎1 ) and minor (𝜎𝜎3 ) principal
stress at failure, or the radius of the largest Mohr circle.

The undrained shear strength is also often represented using a stress

ratio (Su/σ′v,0) where σ′v,0 represents the initial vertical effective stress prior to
initiation of shearing. This latter formulation is particularly useful when
determining the increase in undrained strength during staged loading.

For dilative soils, the pore pressures generated during shearing are
negative, which increases the effective stress and thereby increases the shear
strength under undrained conditions. Therefore, for dilative materials subject to
potential undrained shearing conditions, when carrying out a limit equilibrium
analysis, it is appropriate to use effective stress parameters because the
undrained shear strength of a dilative soil will temporarily be higher than the

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drained strength but cannot be sustained indefinitely (eventually the excess pore
pressures will return to zero).

Note that an underlying assumption for both the drained and undrained
conditions is that all voids between solid particles are filled with an incompressible
fluid (water) that fully transmits pressure changes. However, soils that are less
than 100 percent saturated can also exhibit undrained shearing behavior. See
Section A.6.2 for further guidance.

A.2.2 Dilative versus Contractive Behavior

The concept of dilatancy as a foundational element of soil behavior was
introduced by Reynolds (1885) and advanced by Taylor (1948) and Rowe (1962),
among others. Dilatancy refers to the change in volume during shearing. The
application of dilatancy (using terms like contractive and dilative) to undrained
(constant volume) shearing may be confusing, because the undrained soil mass
does not actually experience volumetric changes. The original meaning of
dilatancy has been extended in common geotechnical practice to also describe
the increase or decrease in pore water pressures during undrained shearing.
Soils that exhibit increase of pore water pressure during undrained shearing are
commonly referred to as being contractive and soils exhibiting reduction of pore
water pressure during shearing are referred to as being dilative. Dense dilative
soils tend to contract slightly at small strains but dilate at larger strains. Hence,
the terms dilative and contractive represent behavior at large strains.

The concept of dilatancy eventually led to critical state soil mechanics

(CSSM), which presents a general framework of soil behavior highlighting the
importance of changes in volume, pore water pressures and effective stress to
understanding and modeling soil response. CSSM theory (Casagrande 1936,
Roscoe et al., 1958; Schofield and Wroth, 1968; Jefferies and Been, 2016; and
others) refers to the point of balance of the stress field and the structure at the
critical state, where the material will not undergo any further volume change as it
continues to deform (i.e., shear) under the application of a constant stress. The
structure of a soil at this critical state is represented by the critical void ratio, ec,
which for the purpose of simplification is considered unique to each soil for a
given effective stress condition. Using continuum mechanics, the stress field is
simplified, when considering the results from triaxial tests, to the mean effective
principal stress (p‘) and the deviator stress (q), which is defined as the difference
between the major and minor principal stresses 1. All the points of balance
between the structure and stresses for a given soil (i.e., the critical states) can
thus be reduced to a single surface in the plotted space of p’, q, and e (void ratio),

1
There are two conventions used in plotting stress paths: the convention used by
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and a similar convention from Cambridge
University. The MIT method considers q as (σ′1-σ′3)/2 and p′ as (σ′1+σ′3)/2. The
Cambridge method considers q as σ′1-σ′3 and p′ as (σ′1+ σ′2+ σ′3)/3, which for a triaxial
test is equal to (σ′1+ 2σ′3)/3.
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as illustrated in Figure A-1 2. All stress paths of both drained and undrained
shearing terminate at the Locus of Critical State (CSL), provided that sufficient
shearing can occur to achieve the critical state. The CSL is shown in the three-
dimensional p’–e–q space in Figure A-1 and is more commonly presented in two-
dimensional space of e-log p′, as illustrated in Figure A-2.

Figure Appendix A-1: Illustration of critical state locus and state parameter in e-
p’-q space for isotopically consolidated triaxial compression tests

The CSL should be understood as a projection of the soil behavior into

the p’, q, e space and would be better represented by a band of potential critical
state points (indicated by the small circles in Figure A-1) rather than a single line
to capture the uncertainty associated with the adopted simplifications.

2
Note that the stress paths illustrated in Figure A-1 are represented of isotropically-
consolidated undrained triaxial tests, where q is initially equal to zero, for simplicity of
the illustration. In field conditions, the initial q is frequently non-zero.
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Irrespective of the simplifications, the CSSM is a useful framework for explaining
the basic principles of soil mechanics and the multivariable processes of soil
shearing.

When a soil exists in a state where the void ratio is greater than the void
ratio associated with the CSL at a given stress state, and a shear stress is applied
(i.e., a change in the stress state occurs), the soil will contract until it reaches a
critical void ratio on the CSL. The contraction toward the CSL will be
accompanied by a reduction in void ratio, change of effective stress, or a
combination of the two. If the soil exists in a state where the void ratio is less than
the void ratio associated with the CSL and a load is applied, it will dilate toward
the CSL through increasing its void ratio, changing the effective stresses or a
combination thereof.

Figure Appendix A-2: Illustration of critical state locus and state parameter in e-
log p' space
The difference between the initial void ratio and the critical void ratio (i.e.,
the CSL) at any value of mean effective stress is defined as the state parameter,
ψ, as illustrated in Figure A-1 and Figure A-2. Negative values of the state
parameter indicate a denser-than-critical (i.e., dilative) state and positive
numbers indicate a looser-than-critical (i.e., contractive) state. So, a soil existing
at any state above and to the right of the CSL in Figure A-2 is described as
contractive and a soil at a state below and to the left is described as dilative.

If drainage is prevented, then the volume of the soil cannot change during
shearing, and the pore water pressure will change instead. Two undrained

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(constant-volume) shearing paths are represented by red and blue lines in Figure
A-1 and Figure A-2 to illustrate the pore pressure response in undrained shearing.

For a soil that is dense of critical state (eA > ec), represented by Point A,
the dilation during undrained shearing is exhibited by an increase of the effective
stress (p’) and the deviator stress (q) at constant void ratio (eA). This is shown by
a horizontal stress path from point A to the right, ending at Point A’ on the CSL in
Figure A-2 and a planar stress path from point A to Ac in Figure A-1.

Conversely, for a soil that is loose of critical state (eB < ec), represented
by Point B, soil contraction is exhibited by a reduction of the effective stress (due
to increasing pore water pressure) at constant void ratio. The stress path is
horizontal in the p’–e projection (Figure A-2) and leads from point B to point B’ on
the CSL. In the p’–e–q space the stress path is planar from point B to point Bc
(Figure A-1).

Consideration of these concepts leads to the following important

observations:

• The further the void ratio is from the CSL (i.e., the greater the
absolute value of the state parameter), the greater the amount of
volume change/pore pressure change that needs to occur to reach
critical state
• For contractive soils under undrained conditions, the further away the
initial void ratio is from the CSL for a given value of mean effective
stress, the greater will be the tendency for the material to contract
during shearing and the greater will be the excess pore water
pressure generated during undrained shearing. This will result in a
lower ultimate undrained shear strength when the stress path
reaches the critical state line.
• For a given mean effective stress, the higher the initial void ratio, the
greater the amount of excess pore pressure that will be generated in
undrained shear. Thus, as the initial void ratio increases, the more
likely that undrained strength loss (and potentially liquefaction) can
occur.

Rapid strength loss in undrained shear is often referred to as flow or static

liquefaction. Discussion regarding liquefaction is provided in section A.4.

When drainage is allowed during shearing, volume change will occur on

the stress path from the initial stress state to critical state. So, for example, a soil
at an initial state of B that is sheared in drained conditions, may follow a shearing
path similar to B-B”, as illustrated in Figure A-1 and Figure A-2. This stress paths
represents a drained shearing of the soil with the initial void ratio of eB < ec. It
starts at point B and, as the shearing progresses, the soil contracts (reduces in
volume) and hardens under drained conditions, which is demonstrated by
increasing p’ and q values as shown in Figure A-1 and Figure A-2. The shape of
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drained stress paths depends on the ability of the soil to dissipate the shear-
induced pore water pressures at the applied strain rate and other factors. Thus,
it is more difficult to predict than undrained stress paths.

The difference between contractive and dilative behavior should also be

understood in terms of a triaxial compression (TX-C) strength test. Figure A-3
presents the results of isotropically-consolidated undrained (ICU) TX-C tests
performed on specimens of a clayey sand material prepared to 80%, 90% and
95% of the maximum dry density determined according to ASTM D 1557 (i.e.,
Modified Proctor compaction test). These will be referred to as “loose” (80%),
“medium-dense” (90%) and “dense” (95%) test specimens. All three specimens
were consolidated to the same initial confining pressure and sheared while
preventing drainage and measuring pore water pressures. The lower right figure
presents the stress path (p’-q diagram using the MIT notation), the lower left
figure presents shear stress versus axial strain, and the upper left figure presents
excess pore pressure versus axial strain. The diamonds represent the shear
strength defined at the maximum principal stress ratio (i.e., σ′1/σ′3), and the
triangles represent the shear strength defined at peak shear stress.

Figure A-3: Results of triaxial compression test on samples with varying void
ratio (provided courtesy of Knight Piésold).

As indicated in Figure A-3, the stress path of the loose specimen curves
around to the left and reaches “failure” at a shear stress just less than 200 kPa.
The stress path of the medium-dense specimen initially moves to the right on the
diagram, reaches a peak value, then turns to the left, and the shear resistance
steadily declines to the end of the test. The stress path of the dense specimen
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initially moves to the right and continues moving upward and to the right until the
end of the test, with the peak value maintained approximately from about 10
percent axial strain until the test was terminated at about 20 percent axial strain.
The stress path of the loose specimen ends to the left of the initial value of p’ (for
clarity, denoted by the vertical red line), and is said to be strongly contractive. The
stress path of the dense specimen ends to the right of the origin and is said to be
strongly dilative. The stress path of the medium-dense specimen indeed ends to
the right of the origin and is considered to be overall slightly dilative up to about
20 percent axial strain, but the strength is still declining when the limiting strain is
reached, and it appears that the specimen has not yet reached the critical state
(due to the inherent strain limitations of the triaxial test). The post-peak strength
loss at 20 percent axial strain is approximately 22 percent.

It must be understood that dilation or contraction is dependent on both

the initial void ratio, the effective confining stress, and the initial static shear stress
(known as stress bias) at which the soil exists prior to the application of a load
(i.e., a change in effective stress). Soils that dilate at a given void ratio at low
stresses may contract at higher consolidation effective stresses (e.g., as a tailings
dam increases in height). For example, the cause of the Mount Polley tailings
dam failure in 2015 was due, in part, to in situ stresses in an initially
overconsolidated clay foundation soil, under the weight of the dam, exceeding
the past consolidation stresses so that the behavior changed from dilative to
contractive with resulting increase in pore pressures and undrained shearing.
Due to the potential for changes in behavior, the shearing behavior must be
characterized for the entire range of stresses and conditions over the life of the
facility. There are many other complexities in understanding shear strength, some
of which are described in further detail in the technical literature.

A.2.3 Strain-Hardening versus Strain-Softening

The term strain hardening refers to material behavior where the
shearing resistance (i.e., strength) increases with increasing strain. By contrast,
strain softening (also called strain-weakening) refers to a deterioration of
strength with increasing strain after an initial peak is reached.

Dilative cohesionless materials typically strain-harden in undrained

shearing within the range of strains experienced in most laboratory strength tests,
but they may strain-soften in some cases at very large strains. Strain hardening
in undrained conditions is due to the shear-induced reduction of pore water
pressures causing the soil to gain strength to large strain levels. In drained
conditions, dilative materials typically reach a peak shear resistance before they
strain-soften somewhat at higher strains due to an increase in void ratio
(dilatancy) and possibly particle crushing effects.

The behavior of contractive cohesionless soils is more difficult to

generalize, and these materials may exhibit a combination of strain-hardening
and strain-softening behavior over the range of shear strains they undergo. When
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sheared under drained conditions, a contractive soil reduces its void ratio and
strain hardens as the shear resistance increases due to the denser packing of
the soil particles. In undrained conditions, contractive cohesionless materials
often reach an initial peak shear resistance at relatively low strain level and then
either gradually or rapidly strain-soften. The medium dense specimen in Figure
A-3 demonstrates an example where the material undergoes relatively gradual
strain softening after reaching its peak value.

Clays with plate-like minerals (e.g., kaolinites, montmorillonites, etc.) can

also undergo strain softening under both drained and undrained shearing
conditions, but due mostly to other phenomena than occurs in cohesionless soils.
In clays, strain softening is due to the reorientation of clay particles, which creates
“polished” surfaces along the shear surface. Bishop (1967) presented the results
of drained shear tests on stiff clays to demonstrate the diminishing shear
resistance of plastic clays caused by the development of continuous bands of
strongly orientated particles, which resulted in the strain softening of the clays to
a residual strength. This type of strain softening can be understood to be primarily
caused by the reduction of the soil friction angle due to particle realignment,
although the shear-induced pore water pressures also play a role in the strength
loss.

A.2.4 Brittle versus Ductile Behavior

For all soils that contract during shearing, caution must be applied in
characterizing the undrained shear strength and using that characterization in
slope stability evaluations. If strain softening is possible, there is a risk of
progressive failure, and additional caution is needed. The highest level of caution
is needed if the contractive soils have the potential to fail in a “brittle” manner, as
demonstrated in the 2019 failure of the Feijão tailings dam at Brumadinho, Brazil
(and other notable tailings dam failures). However, as described by Robertson
(2017), “not all contractive soils are strain-softening and not all soils that strain
soften have high brittleness”. Recognizing the different behaviors and accounting
for them in geotechnical characterization and modeling is critical to designing safe
tailings dams.

Ductility is a term from materials science that describes a material’s

ability to undergo significant plastic deformation before it ruptures. Brittleness is
the tendency of a material to suddenly lose strength without first undergoing
significant plastic deformation, typically occurring at a relatively low degree of
strain. This sudden loss of strength is the mechanism behind flow (static)
liquefaction. Brittleness has historically been quantified in geotechnical
engineering based on the ratio between peak strength and residual undrained
strength. The brittleness index, IB, first presented by Bishop (1967), is a
normalized parameter ranging from 0 to 1 calculated as follows:

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 (𝜏𝜏𝑝𝑝 − 𝜏𝜏𝑟𝑟 )
𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵 =
𝜏𝜏𝑝𝑝
where τp is the peak (or yield) strength value and τr is the residual
undrained strength value. A value of zero means no strength loss (i.e., no
brittleness) and a value of 1 means the residual undrained strength is zero (i.e.,
total strength loss). Although this ratio represents one significant aspect of brittle
behavior (i.e., the magnitude of the post-peak strength loss), it does not address
the strain aspect (i.e., the rate of strength loss) and may be better described as
a measure of sensitivity, typically defined as the ratio of peak undrained strength
to residual undrained strength (i.e., S = τp/τr). Robertson (2020) has suggested
that IB be renamed “Strength Loss Index” to recognize the usefulness of IB as a
measure of the magnitude of strain softening.

While the mechanisms for brittle behavior in sands, silts, and clays are
similar, different mechanisms may have greater contributions to brittleness based
on soil type. With clays, particle reorientation plays a large part and excess pore
pressure generation may contribute to a lesser degree. In cohesionless materials
(sands and non-plastic silts), the rapid loss of strength seen in brittle materials is
primarily due to the generation of excess pore pressures during shearing,
although it can also be related to the collapse of the soil structure when
cementation is present and particle reorientation may play a minor role.
Regardless of the cause of brittle behavior, the Strength Loss Index provides a
useful measure of post-peak strength loss for all types of soils.

The Global Industry Standard on Tailings Management requires that

brittle failure modes be identified and addressed with conservative criteria.
However, the Standard does not define how to identify brittle behavior, and there
is very little definitive guidance in the current technical literature.

In general, stress-strain behavior based on laboratory testing has been

the historical method to assess brittleness. Been (2016) recommended the use
of triaxial tests to identify brittleness but did not provide specific guidance or
criteria to define brittleness. Robertson (2017) suggested that a soil exhibiting
post-peak strength loss greater than 40 percent (i.e., a value of IB greater than
0.4) can be considered “highly brittle”, based on analysis of high-quality case
histories where flow failure (i.e., static liquefaction) occurred. Macedo and
Vergaray (2021) suggested that flow liquefaction (full softening) may be indicated
by IB greater than 0.6. State parameters also expected to be a good indicator of
potential brittle failure and liquefaction potential, especially in cohesionless soils
(e.g., Jefferies and Been, 2016).

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 Figure A-4 illustrates different types of brittle and ductile stress-strain
behavior in CIU Triaxial tests on soils and tailings. Similar behavior can be
observed using other kinds of tests, but the triaxial test is the most common test
method in use in practice. The different curves in Figure A-4 are described as
follows:

• Curve A represents a classic ductile behavior with plastic yielding

where the soil reaches a peak strength at about 2-3 percent axial
strain and then continues to shear at constant stress. This soil
appears to have reached critical state. The peak strength and the
large-strain (residual) strength are equal.
• Curve B exhibits classic strain-hardening behavior, wherein the
shear stress continually increases until the end of the test is reached
at 20 percent axial strain.
• Curve C represents a ductile, slightly strain-softening material. This
material is initially strain-hardening up to about 8 percent axial strain,
then slowly loses about 5 percent of its strength after reaching the
peak value.
• Curve D is a strain-softening material that loses approximately 40
percent of its strength after reaching a peak at approximately 3
percent axial strain. This material would have a Strength Loss Index,
IB, greater than 0.4 (the slope of the curve at the end of the test
indicates that further strength loss would occur at higher strain).
• Curve E is a strain-softening material that loses only about 20
percent of its strength after the peak. This material has a Strength
Loss Index greater than 0.2.
• Curve F demonstrates classic brittle behavior where the soil reaches
a peak strength at a relatively low strain level (1 to 2 percent axial
strain) and then suddenly and rapidly loses nearly all its strength.
This idealized curve is modeled after one of the CIU TX-C tests
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 carried out on a lightly bonded, contractive tailings sample for the
Feijão No. 1 tailings dam (Robertson et al. 2019).

Although the triaxial and other shear test methods can be used to
illustrate the potential for brittle behavior it is important to note that the rate of the
shear resistance loss has been shown to be very sensitive to the method of
testing, sample preparation and even sample geometry (Bishop, 1967; Bishop,
1973). This sensitivity is understandable because the shear resistance loss is
primarily attributed to the shear-induced pore water pressure development that
cannot be measured directly within the shear zone in any laboratory apparatus.
In addition, the development of shear-induced pore pressures is strain rate
dependent, and different rates of shear resistance reduction (magnitude of
brittleness) would be measured at different strain rates even though the residual
shear strength value may be similar.

The level of strain that tailings may experience in upstream-raised tailings

dams may be substantial, and these accumulated strains cannot be reliably
measured. The accumulation of strain in contractive and saturated zones may
bring the tailings state close to the peak shear resistance and only a marginal
movement is then required to trigger a flow failure.

It is important to note that the assessment of strain-based criteria for

brittle behavior poses a significant challenge (likely explaining the relative lack of
guidance in the literature), especially for cohesionless materials. Currently,
empirical methods based on CPT are heavily relied upon for evaluation of
undrained strength loss in cohesionless materials. However, these empirical
methods are based on only a handful of case histories where flow failure has
occurred. When laboratory testing is performed in conjunction with CPT, there is
often only marginal agreement between the empirical (in situ) methods and
laboratory-based procedures. ICOLD recommends using several shear test
methods and high-quality laboratory equipment with trained and experienced
laboratory staff for testing contractive, potentially brittle materials.

Recognizing that more research is needed for the characterization of

brittle behavior in both field and laboratory applications, ICOLD recommends that
a conservative approach be taken when evaluating brittleness due to the high
potential consequence of flow failures when highly brittle materials are present in
the structural zones of tailings dams. ICOLD therefore presents the following
indicative criteria to be considered when assessing the potential for “highly brittle”
soils in a tailings facility:

1. exhibits a Strength Loss Index, IB, greater than 0.4 or

2. exhibits IB greater than 0.2 and
a. reaches a peak shear strength at 3 percent strain or less, and

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 b. loses more than 20 percent of the peak strength prior to reaching
10 percent strain.
These criteria are represented graphically in Figure A-5.

ICOLD cautions that these indicative or screening criteria must be

applied with a high level of engineering judgment and scrutiny, especially when
brittleness and the potential for flow (static) liquefaction are being ruled out. The
measurement of brittleness index is reliant on estimation of the peak undrained
strength and the residual undrained strength. Peak undrained strength is
dependent on type of loading and resulting stress path and there is significant
uncertainty in measuring both peak and residual undrained strengths. The
measurement of strain is also extremely difficult and subject to significant
uncertainty, as discussed further below. The assessment of brittleness should be
based on the entire “body of evidence”, including laboratory testing, in situ testing,
case histories, and professional judgement with respect to applicability of the data
and the potential loading scenarios. The need for caution cannot be
overemphasized.

Figure A-5: Proposed Brittleness Criteria considering Strength Loss Index (IB)
and Strain Rate

The measurement of strain in the laboratory is typically limited by the

testing apparatus. In the triaxial test, the direction of principal stresses and strains
remains fixed during a test. Although normal strains are measured, shear strains
can be calculated. In the direct simple shear apparatus (DSS), shear strains are
measured: principal stress rotations occur during a test, but are indeterminate.
The DSS test is useful in characterizing undrained behavior in plane strain
conditions, but is limited in other ways (the sample is not subjected as a whole to
a uniform stresses and strains, although the stresses and strains in the central
region of the sample are uniform).

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 Further research is needed to improve the methods for characterizing
brittleness in both field and laboratory applications. In the interim, ICOLD
recommends a conservative approach be taken when evaluating brittleness due
to the high potential consequence of flow failures when highly brittle materials are
present in the structural zones of tailings dams.

A.3 CPT-BASED MEASUREMENT OF IN SITU STATE AND SOIL

PROPERTIES
Determination of the CSL is defined in the laboratory, as described by
Jefferies and Been (2016) and Reid et al. (2020). For greenfield facilities,
laboratory testing—potentially combined with numerical modeling—may be used
to predict shearing behavior of future anticipated tailings deposits, provided that
representative bench-scale or pilot-scale tailings samples are available and are
considered in proper context. However, predicting how a soil deposit located in
or beneath a tailings dam will behave under various loading conditions is
dependent on the actual void ratio occurring in the field setting, which must be
based on a measurement of the soil conditions in situ. This is not easily done for
many soils. Field sampling techniques using relatively undisturbed, thin-walled
tube samples or hand-excavated block samples (especially when soil freezing is
properly employed) provide the most reliable method of directly measuring in situ
void ratio, but may be extremely costly, physically impossible at the worst, and
are often unreliable due to many reasons (e.g., disturbance during transport,
transfer of the specimen from the sampling device into the testing apparatus,
etc.).

The CPTu currently provides the most practical means to infer the in situ
state of many soils, especially tailings. Correlations between laboratory tests and
controlled CPT experiments have led to relationships to estimate the in situ state
parameter, ψ, as described in Jefferies and Been (2016). Robertson (2016)
describes similar methods and a classification system using normalized CPT
parameters to divide soils into six soil behavior types, considering contractive
versus dilative behavior and a differentiation based on clay-like, sand-like, and
transitional material behavior, as shown in Figure A-7. Robertson (2016) and
others have concluded that a value of ψ > -0.05 or greater inferred from the CPT
can be used to reliably identify contractive soils. The combination of the CPTu
with seismic sensors, such as geophones, for measuring seismic wave velocities
(referred to as the seismic CPTu or SCPTu) is accepted practice. The SCPTu is
useful for assessing the presence of microstructure (e.g., Robertson 2016) and
is also recommended by Jefferies and Been (2016). Jefferies and Been (2016)
also recommend conducting self-boring pressuremeter tests, where appropriate,
to assess the in situ horizontal stress coefficient, Ko, on large projects where the
additional effort is justified.

For characterization of existing tailings deposits, as well as many

foundation soils and some embankment materials, the use of Figure A-7 forms a
basis for identifying whether the materials will behave in a contractive or dilative
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manner and whether the potential for strain-softening and/or brittle behavior is
indicated. An example of a data plot from series of CPTu probes for a typical hard
rock tailings facility superimposed on the Robertson (2016) classification chart is
shown on Figure A-7. The plot demonstrates the heterogeneous nature of the
tailings deposit. In this example, most of the data points fall within the contractive
zone, indicating that the material is anticipated to behave in a contractive manner
upon shearing, as is typical for hydraulically deposited tailings. Most of the data
plot as sand-like contractive and transitional-contractive, meaning they may be
prone to strain-softening behavior and may fail in a brittle manner when sheared
in undrained conditions. A small amount of the data plot in the clay-like
contractive-sensitive zone, which indicates the materials are strain-softening, are
likely to experience significant strength loss, and are potentially brittle. A small
amount also lies within the clay-like contractive zone. These materials will not
likely be brittle but may lose some strength during shearing. A significant number
of the data points are transitional—contractive. These materials are potentially
liquefiable and may be brittle and should be carefully characterized. Without
positive indications of non-brittle behavior, they should be treated as liquefiable
for design purposes.

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 Note: Data
points on the
plot are from
typical
investigation
program for
Hard Rock
tailings.

Figure A-7 Example of typical soil behaviour type classification for example
tailings material using the Robertson (2016) chart.

A.4 LIQUEFACTION AND POST-LIQUEFACTION STRENGTH

A.4.1 Liquefaction
The concept of soil liquefaction has been written on extensively in the
literature. Historically, much emphasis has been placed on seismically induced
or “cyclic” liquefaction, which refers to a buildup of pore pressures induced by
rapid (undrained) cyclic loading with shear stress reversal. The concept of “flow
(static)” liquefaction has been perhaps lesser understood and less studied than
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liquefaction triggered by earthquake loading. Due to the large amount of
information available in the literature, it is not necessary to elaborate the details
of liquefaction in this Appendix. Rather, the authors believe it is important to note
the following:

• Flow (static) liquefaction is a result of rapid and significant strength

loss of highly contractive materials sheared in undrained conditions.
A possible resulting flow failure is then a result of the substantial
reduction of (and in some cases the elimination of) effective confining
stress, and shear strength, within the soil mass.
• Cyclic liquefaction is the result of pore pressure generation due to
earthquake or similar rapid cyclic loading that can result in a loss of
effective confining stress during the cyclic loading. This loss of
effective confining stress results in a decrease in stiffness with
associated large deformations during shaking. Cyclic liquefaction
applies primarily to level or gently sloping ground where shear stress
reversal occurs during an earthquake. For highly contractive
materials with a static bias (i.e., sloping ground), cyclic loading can
also initiate (or trigger) flow liquefaction. Hence, flow liquefaction can
be initiated by either static or cyclic loading.
• Jefferies and Been (2016) provide an exhaustive treatment of the
principles of liquefaction. Robertson (2010, 2017, 2021) provides a
summary of liquefaction and its relation to brittleness, which also
provide great value to the reader. There are some differences in the
approaches taken by these two authors in the application to stability
assessments, as briefly touched on below and elaborated more
thoroughly in the technical literature.
• If flow liquefaction (i.e., severe undrained strength loss) is indicated,
regardless of whether it is initiated by cyclic or static loading, the
post-liquefaction (i.e., residual or liquefied) strength is the most
important characteristic of the material.
• Assessing the potential for flow liquefaction is not a simple evaluation
and must be undertaken under the direction of qualified geotechnical
engineers with a comprehensive understanding of advanced soil
mechanics.

A.4.2 post-peak shear strength

The selection of an appropriate shear strength at large strains, after the
occurrence of a peak or yielding value, is critical for tailings and other soils that
exhibit strain-softening behavior. The term “post-peak” refers to any shear
resistance value after the peak, which includes, but isn’t limited to, the lowest
strength value occurring after the peak (yield) strength has been passed. Several
different terms have been used in the literature to describe the minimum value of
shear strength at large strains, including critical-state, steady-state, post-
liquefaction, post-peak, liquefied, residual, and perhaps others. The remolded

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shear strength of clays occurs after very large strains and refers to the shear
strength after particle reorientation.

ICOLD has adopted the term “residual undrained strength” for most
applications of large-strain strength in strain-softening materials, consistent with
most recent publications. The term “post-liquefaction” is also commonly used
when referring to cyclic liquefaction (and sometimes static liquefaction), but may
create some confusion if cyclic liquefaction is not indicated. For clarity, the term
“residual strength” will be used herein to refer to the minimum value of shear
strength occurring after a peak value has been reached and strain softening has
occurred.

Residual undrained shear strengths typically develop after a soil

undergoes large strains, although brittle cohesionless materials, such as very
loose tailings with low plasticity, can reach residual values with limited shear
deformation. The mechanisms causing brittleness in clays are different than in
cohesionless soils. For a clay , the residual strength is the ultimate strength after
the clay particles have reoriented, which results in a significant reduction of the
effective stress friction angle, although excess pore pressure generation can also
contribute to the reduction in strength. For very loose, non-plastic sands and
tailings, the loss of shear strength after the peak value (instability condition) is
reached is the result of excess pore pressure generation, and the residual
undrained strength refers to the shear strength value corresponding to near-zero
effective stress. Over time, the strength of a liquefied cohesionless soil will
typically increase from the residual undrained strength value as the excess pore
pressures dissipate.

Clays or other plastic soils in the foundation of a tailings dam may exist
at a residual strength condition after having undergone shearing prior to dam
construction as a result of geologic processes, such as glacial ice thrusting. In
this case, the residual shear strength in these natural soils is not caused by
deformations of the dam. The foundation zone(s) existing at residual shear
strength need to be appropriately accounted for in the design of the dam.

Residual shear strength of contractive materials is based on soil

behaviour, mineralogy, particle shape, plasticity, state (i.e., the relationship
between the in situ void ratio and the critical state void ratio), initial effective
stress, stress history, etc. The amount of deformation required to achieve the
residual undrained strength varies depending on gradation, angularity, plasticity,
and density, as well as possible microstructure, such as light bonding. For clays,
the shear strain required to reach the residual condition is typically more than for
sands and silts, unless there is light bonding. However, an exception would be
“quick clays”, denoted as clay-like contractive—sensitive materials on the soil
behavior type chart shown above. Most “quick clays” have some microstructure
that enables a significant strength loss at small strains. These materials can
behave in a brittle manner, losing their strength rapidly.

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 Robertson (2010), Sadrekarimi (2014), Idriss and Boulanger (2008),
Olson and Stark (2002), and others have developed empirical CPT-based
correlations to estimate undrained residual strength of sands and silty sands. Of
these, Robertson (2010, 2021) has gained the most prominence in tailings dam
design. The Robertson (2021) correlation between undrained strength and the
clean-sand equivalent cone resistance (Qtn,cs) is illustrated in Figure A-8. It is
important to note that all the correlations for sand-like and transitional materials
are based on a limited dataset of back-calculated strengths associated with flow
failure case histories and there is significant variability in that dataset. Flow
liquefaction failures are relatively rare, so there is limited data available from
which to correlate residual undrained strengths. As such, there is significant
uncertainty associated with the correlations and their applicability to a wide range
of material types. Jefferies and Been (2016) have expressed some reservation
about the Robertson (2010) and other related empirical correlations and present
an alternative approach based on the state parameter. ICOLD considers that both
methods are consistent with current accepted practice and encourages that both
methods be used and compared whenever practical to do so. .

Robertson (2021) indicates that the CPT penetration process in sand-like

soils is typically drained and that Qtn,cs is a proxy for state parameter. In clay-like
soils, the CPT penetration process is typically undrained, and the residual
undrained strength can be estimated directly from the CPT sleeve resistance, fs,
to avoid the added uncertainty of estimating state parameter. CPT-based
correlations for the residual undrained strength of clays and clay-like materials
have been studied extensively (e.g., Lunne et al., 1998) and show that the value
of sleeve resistance (fs) measured during undrained penetration in the CPT is a
good estimation of the residual undrained strength of a clay.

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 Figure A-8: Residual Undrained Strength from CPT (from Robertson, 2021)

Laboratory determination of residual undrained shear strength of tailings

is challenged by the difficulties in collecting representative undisturbed samples
and/or remolding samples at representative densities. CPTu is often the primary
assessment tool available, particularly for evaluation of residual undrained
strength. A promising approach emerging in practice that involves using a
combination of laboratory testing and in situ testing to evaluate expected field
shearing behavior, including peak and residual undrained shear strengths and
stress-strain behavior, is described by Jefferies and Been (2016). This method
utilizes a series of shear strength tests conducted on remolded samples prepared
at various initial void ratios and effective stresses to develop a critical state locus
representing a generalized framework of shearing behavior based on CSSM.
In situ testing (e.g., CPT, vane shear, etc.) can be used to evaluate the
distribution of state parameter and material types in the field, which can be used
with the laboratory-based behavioral framework to predict expected field
behavior. The Jefferies and Been (2016) approach is theoretically based and
incorporates an empirical adjustment to match the case history observations.

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A.5 SELECTION OF APPROPRIATE SHEAR STRENGTH
PARAMETERS FOR DESIGN AND ANALYSIS
The selection of appropriate strength parameters, especially for
contractive and brittle materials, for use in analysis and design of a tailings facility
requires significant experience and engineering judgment. The degree of
conservatism applied in selection of strength parameters needs to reflect the
amount of variability in the in situ material(s); the amount and perceived quality
of data available; the degree of uncertainty associated with the parameters of
concern (i.e., the shear strength and stress-strain behavior); the uncertainties
associated with deriving a design parameter from the available, inherently
imperfect, data set; and the severity of the consequences. The parameters
selected for design must be supported by objectively measured data and
defensible well-reasoned interpretation techniques and the parameters should
also be compared with values from relevant published case histories (as
illustrated in Figure A-8). Silva et al., (2008) provide useful guidance on the
selection of appropriate factors of safety based on the degree of uncertainty
within a risk-informed decision-making framework. The failure to properly
recognize and address the uncertainty in material parameters and stress
conditions may be a common root cause of many past tailings dam failures.

The parameters used in stability assessments (e.g., friction angle,

undrained shear strength, porewater pressure) are not truly represented by a
single value; rather, there is a distribution of possible values that vary spatially
within the dam and/or foundation. For each of these parameters, a characteristic
(or representative) value should be selected such that there is an appropriately
low probability that areas of lower strength (or higher porewater pressure) exist
at a scale that could affect the stability of the structure. The average value is
typically not an appropriate representative parameter for use in stability analyses,
unless the scale at which the parameter varies is small compared to the scale of
a potential shear surface so that the full distribution would be encountered along
the shear surface. Often a sensitivity analysis is helpful to evaluate the
uncertainty in calculated factor of safety over the range of expected shear
strength values.

When selecting a representative parameter, the designer should also

consider the size and comprehensiveness of the data set. For small data sets,
the statistical parameters for the sample set (e.g., mean and standard deviation)
may be significantly different than those of the underlying population (that is, the
mean and standard deviation that would be calculated if a much larger test
program were performed). Therefore, for small data sets even an apparently
conservative parameter choice, such as the mean minus one standard deviation
for undrained strength, may not actually be conservative. Although there may not
always be enough data to undertake a rigorous statistical analysis, statistical
thinking should always underpin the selection of the parameters.

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 Selecting strength parameters for dilative materials is well understood
and detailed in literature, and using effective (drained) shear strength parameters
with zero excess pore pressures is typically considered appropriate. However,
selection of soil strength properties for contractive materials is comparatively
more complicated and insufficient guidance is currently provided in published
literature.

Ideally, a combination of field and laboratory testing should be used to

assess undrained shearing behavior. Field testing should include SCPTu and
possibly other methods, such as a vane shear or the self-boring pressuremeter.
Laboratory testing should include triaxial compression (TX-C) and direct simple
shear (DSS), and may also include ring shear or other methods of assessing
large-strain strength. If the results of TX-C and/or DSS tests on representative
specimens appear to reach a critical-state strength within the range of shear
strain normally considered for these tests (i.e., approximately 18-20% for TX-C
and approximately 25-30% for DSS), then the assessment may be relatively
straightforward. If shear resistance is still decreasing at the end of the TX-C
and/or DSS test, then the potential for further strength loss at higher strain levels
must be considered.

Laboratory shear strength testing of tailings is frequently performed using

strain-controlled methods and isotropically-consolidated undrained (CIU)
conditions. Ladd (1991) and Carrier (1991) advised that CIU tests may
overestimate undrained shear strength. Ladd (1991) recommended performing
anisotropically-consolidated undrained (CAU) strength tests initially consolidated
to the approximate in situ stress ratio (Ko). Furthermore, caution must be used in
using strain-controlled tests to eliminate brittle behavior. Stress-controlled tests
may better represent actual conditions, especially with very loose, cohesionless
materials.

For new facilities, which frequently do not have meaningful data to predict
tailings properties, designs should be based on conservative assumptions, based
on published data and the professional experience of the Engineer of Record and
the supporting team, that consider contractive behavior of the tailings unless
specific design measures are included, such as compaction or other means to
ensure dilative behaviors. Most hydraulically-deposited tailings exhibit contractive
behavior, and the likelihood of brittle failure modes is high in hydraulically-
deposited tailings. Unless proven otherwise, designs should be based on the
assumption that tailings are contractive. It is possible to design conditions where
tailings could be dilative and non-liquefiable, but the method of placement must
be controlled sufficiently to ensure that contractive conditions are prevented in all
loading scenarios before the potential for contractive behavior is eliminated.

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A.6 SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS

A.6.1 Stress-dependent behavior

As described above, strength and deformation behavior of soils is
dependent on effective confining stress. Therefore, the full range of stresses that
currently exist or may exist in the future over the life of the facility must be
considered. For example, a clay present in the foundation of a tailings dam may
initially be overconsolidated and typically dilative during shearing. However, as
the dam is raised over time, and the effective stress increases, the
overconsolidation ratio (OCR) decreases. Once the OCR decreases to a value of
less than approximately 3-4, the soil becomes increasingly contractive and the
undrained strength is smaller than the drained strength, i.e., those initially dilative
materials will become contractive during shearing. The undrained strength ratio
will continue to decrease until the effective stress reaches the pre-consolidation
pressure, at which point the material becomes normally consolidated. This
phenomenon was a key factor in the failure of the Mt. Polley tailings storage
facility (BCMEM, 2015a, 2015b). The SHANSEP method (Ladd and Foote, 1974)
considers the effect of overconsolidation on the undrained strength of clay.

Shearing behavior of non-plastic materials like sands and silty sands is

also stress dependent. As confining stress increases, tailings may become more
contractive than the same material at a lower confining stress, especially if
particle crushing occurs. On the other hand, the potential for brittle failure may be
reduced at sufficiently high confining stresses. Robertson (2017) noted that
contractive sand-like soils become progressively more ductile with increasing
stress.

A.6.2 Partial Saturation

Caution must be exercised in considering partially saturated soils.
Particulate materials (soils or tailings) in which the pore space is partly filled with
liquid (usually water) and partly with gas (usually air) are said to be in an
unsaturated/partly saturated state. Although any material with a degree of
saturation below 1.0 will fall into this category, the term is usually associated with
situations where the gas phase is continuous. In unsaturated soils, the pore
pressure is negative with respect to atmospheric pressure. The behavior of such
materials differs from that of their fully saturated counterparts in several important
ways, of which the increase in strength due to the occurrence of matric suction
(matric suction is the difference between the pressure of gas and the pressure of
fluid in the pores) can have on the stability assessment. Although an increase in
matric suction will result in higher undrained strength and improved stability,
reliance on this additional strength is discouraged, due to the potential for loss of
suction from possible future water infiltration. When assessing the stability of
tailings dams, it is often advisable to treat materials as being either dry above
the phreatic surface (i.e. assume that the pore water pressure is zero and ignore
any effect of suction) or fully saturated below the phreatic surface (i.e. assume
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positive pore water pressures), recognizing that the shearing behavior of partially
saturated soils is quite complex. For most soils with a saturation of greater than
about 85 percent, the air in the void spaces is non-continuous. As a general rule-
of-thumb, soils with a degree of saturation greater than about 85 percent should
be considered as saturated, although soils with degrees of saturation between 70
percent and 85 percent should be carefully evaluated.

A.6.3 Progressive failure

Progressive failure can occur when a mass of soil displaying a softening
stress strain behavior is loaded non-uniformly. In this case, some parts of the
mass can fail first and failure can propagate along a rupture plane. The post-peak
strains within the failure zone will increase and strength will reduce from peak to
residual. Final rupture of the soil mass can occur before a failure surface at
residual strength has fully developed. At failure, a part of the final failure surface
has reached residual undrained strength, whereas another part has not lost
strength beyond the peak value. Therefore, the average strength of the mass at
failure will be less than peak and greater than the residual undrained strength of
the soil.

Designers should assess the potential for progressive failure when

evaluating the stability of tailings dams, as the effect of progressive failure is
strain-dependent and cannot be predicted from conventional limit equilibrium
stability analyses.

A.6.4 Strain incompatibility

Strain incompatibility occurs when the potential failure surface passes
through materials, in which shear resistance is mobilized at significantly different
strains due to differences with initial stiffness. Under these circumstances, the
application of peak shear resistance values for all materials would overestimate
the stability because the materials will not contribute equally to the overall slope
stability resistance. Such situations can occur where softer more ductile materials
(clay-like) are interlayered with zones of stiffer more sand-like materials.

When strain incompatibility is identified, an appropriate analytical method

that considers the stress-strain dependency of the various materials can be used
to assess the slope stability under both the static and seismic loading conditions.

A.6.5 Other Strain-Related Considerations.

The reader should be aware that the strains measured in a triaxial test
specimen are axial strains, whereas the true interest lies in the shear strains that
occur on the failure plane. Shear strains can be estimated from triaxial tests, but
it requires special procedures that must be planned for in advance. The direct
simple shear test imposes simple shear conditions, so that the strains measured
are truly shear strains, but direct measurement of the principal stresses is not

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possible (so calculation of the mean effective stress is complicated). In real-world
applications, shear strains may be concentrated on narrow shear zones,
especially if thin, contractive strain softening layers are present.

A.6.6 Comments on Undrained strength ratio

The shear strength of saturated contractive materials is often expressed
as a ratio between the undrained shear strength (Su) and the initial effective
vertical stress (σ′v,0) within the soil mass, i.e., Su/σ′v,0. For clays, this ratio can also
be modified to consider stress history, using the SHANSEP approach presented
in Ladd and Foote (1974). The SHANSEP approach can be represented by the
following equation (modified after Ladd, 1991):

𝑆𝑆𝑢𝑢
𝑆𝑆𝑢𝑢 = � ′ � × 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑚𝑚 × 𝜎𝜎𝑣𝑣′
𝜎𝜎𝑣𝑣,0 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁

For sands, silts, and normally consolidated clays, the OCR value is one
(1), and the undrained shear strength is calculated simply as:

𝑆𝑆𝑢𝑢 ′
𝑆𝑆𝑢𝑢 = ′ 𝑥𝑥 𝜎𝜎𝑣𝑣
𝜎𝜎𝑣𝑣,0
It is important to emphasize that it is the initial effective vertical stress that
is correctly used to calculate the Su/σ′v,0 value for use in analysis. The subscript
“v” indicates vertical and the “0” indicates initial conditions. This ratio is
sometimes expressed with a simplified version of Su/p′, which sometimes leads
to confusion with the mean principal stress in a p′-q plot, which can in turn lead
to an incorrect and non-conservative interpretation of the undrained strength
ratio. The mean principal stress (p′) is equal to the initial vertical effective stress
(σ′v,0) prior to shearing in an isotropically-consolidated triaxial test, but that is the
only time when that equality applies in the interpretation of the test results. In the
actual L-E slope stability analysis, a correctly programmed computer program will
use the vertical effective stress (σ′v) to calculate Su for the FOS computation.

Page 166
A.7 REFERENCES
Been, K. (2016). “Characterizing Mine Tailings For Geotechnical Design.”
Geotechnical and Geophysical Site Characterisation 5, Australian
Geomechanics Society, Sydney, Australia, ISBN 978-0-9946261-1-0.
Bishop, A.W. 1967. Progressive failure – with special reference to the
mechanism causing it. Proc. Geotechnical Conf., Oslo, Vol.2:142–150.
Bishop, A.W. 1973. The Stability of Tips and Spoil Heaps. Quarterly Journal of
Engineering Geology, Vol. 6, pp. 335-376.
Brown, B. and Gillani, I. (2016). “Common errors in the slope stability analyses
of tailings dams,” in PM Dight (ed.), Proceedings of the First Asia Pacific
Slope Stability in Mining Conference, Australian Centre for Geomechanics,
Perth, pp. 545-556.
British Columbia Ministry of Energy and Mines, BCMEM (2015a). “Report on
Mount Polley Tailings Storage Facility Breach, report of the Independent
Expert Engineering Investigation and Review Panel”, January 30.
BCMEM (2015b). “Investigation Report of the Chief Inspector of Mines, Mount
Polley Mine Tailings Storage Facility Breach, August 4, 2014”. November
30.
Carrera, A., Coop, M., & Lancellotta, R. (2011). Influence of grading on the
mechanical behaviour of Stava tailings. Géotechnique, 61(11), 935-946.
doi:10.1680/geot.9.p.009
Carrier, W. David III (1991). Stability of tailings dams. XV Ciclo di Conferenze di
Geotecnica di Torino, Italy, November.
Casagrande, A. (1936). “Characteristics of Cohesionless Soils Affecting the
Stability of Slopes and Earth Fills.” Journal of the Boston Society of Civil
Engineers, January.
Chandler, R. J. & Tosatti, G. (1995). “The Stava tailings dams failure, Italy,” July
1985. Proc. Instn Civ. Engrs, Geotech. Engng 113, No. 2, 67–79.
Idriss, I. M., and Boulanger, R.W. (2008). “Soil Liquefaction During
Earthquakes”, Monograph No. MNO-12, Earthquake Engineering Research
Institute, Oakland, CA.
Jefferies, M., and Been, K. (2016). Soil Liquefaction: A critical state approach,
second edition. CRC Press, Boca Raton, Florida, USA.
Ladd, C. C. (1991). "Stability Evaluation During Staged Construction," Journal
of Geotechnical Engineering, ASCE, Vol. 117, No. 4, April 1991, pp. 540-
615.
Ladd, C. C. and Foott, R. (1974). "New Design Procedure for Stability of Soft
Clays," Journal of the Geotechnical Engineering Division, ASCE, Vol 117,
No. 4, pp. 540-615.
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Lunne, T., Robertson, P. and Powell, J. (1997). “Cone Penetration Testing in
Geotechnical Practice.” CRC Press, ISBN 13 No. 9780419237501, 352 pp.
Macedo J., and Vergeray, L. (2021). “Properties of Mine Tailings for Static
Liquefaction Assessment.” Canadian Geotechnical Journal, 30 July,
https://doi.org/10.1139/cgj-2020-0600.
Mitchell, J. K., & Soga, K. (2005). Fundamentals of soil behavior, 3rd ed. Wiley.
Olson, S.M. and Stark, T.D., 2002. “Liquefied strength ratio from liquefaction
flow failure case histories.” Canadian Geotechnical Journal, Vol. 39, No. 3,
May, pp. 629-647.
Reid, D. (2017). “A New Load Controlled DSS at UWA”. Online article posted at
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/new-load-controlled-dss-uwa-david-reid/.
Accessed on January 9, 2021.
Reid, D., Fourie, A., Ayala, J. L., Dickinson, S., Ochoa-Cornejo, F., Fanni, R.,
Garfias, J, Da Fonseca, A., Ghafghazi, M., Ovalles, C., Riemer, M.,
Rismanchian, A, Olivera, R., and Suazo, G. (2020). Results of a critical
state line testing round robin programme. Géotechnique, 1-15.
doi:10.1680/jgeot.19.p.373.
Reynolds, O. (1885) “On The Dilatancy of Media Composed of Rigid Particles in
Contact, With Experimental Illustrations” Philosophical Magazine. 20, 469-
481.
Robertson, P.K. 2010. “Evaluation of flow liquefaction and liquefied strength
using the cone penetration test.” Journal of Geotechnical and
Geoenvironmental Engineering, ASCE, 136(6): 842–853.
Robertson, P.K. 2016. “Cone penetration test (CPT)-based soil behaviour type
(SBT) classification system — an update.” Canadian Geotechnical Journal,
Vol. 53, No. 12.
Robertson, P.K. 2017. “Evaluation of Flow Liquefaction: influence of high
stresses.” Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on
Performance-Based Design in Geotechnical Engineering, International
Society for Soil Mechanics and Geotechnical Engineering, Vancouver, B.C.,
Canada, July.
Robertson, P. K., De Melo, L., Williams, D., & Wilson, W. G. (2019). Report of
the Expert Panel on the Technical Causes of the Failure of Feijão Dam 1”.
Retrieved November 30, 2020, from
https://bdrb1investigationstacc.z15.web.core.windows.net/assets/Feijao-
Dam-I-Expert-Panel-Report-ENG.pdf
Robertson, P.K. (2021). Evaluation of Flow Liquefaction and Liquefied Strength
Using the Cone Penetration Test: an update. Canadian Geotechnical
Journal, 18 June, https://doi.org/10.1139/cgj-2020-0657.

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Roscoe, K. H., Schofield, A. N., & Wroth, C. P. (1958). On The Yielding of Soils.
Géotechnique, 8(1), 22–53.
Rowe, P.W. (1962). “The Stress Dilatancy Relation for Static Equilibrium of an
Assembly of Particles in Contact” Proceedings of the Royal Society of
London A, 269, 500-527.
Sadrekarimi, A. (2014). “Effect of the Mode of Shear on Static Liquefaction
Analysis.” Journal of Geotechnical and Geoenvironmental Engineering,
ASCE, 140(12), pp. 04014069-1-04014069.
Schofield, A. N., & Wroth, P. (1968). Critical state soil mechanics. McGraw-Hill.
Skempton, A. W. (1954). “The Pore Pressure Coefficients A and B.”
Géotechnique, 4(4), 143–147. https://doi.org/10.1680/geot.1954.4.4.143
Taylor, D. W. (1948). Fundamentals of Soil Mechanics. John Wiley, New York.

Page 169
 APPENDIX B: STABILITY ANALYSIS FRAMEWORK FOR
TAILINGS DAMS WITH CONTRACTIVE SOILS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

B.1 Introduction
B.2 Stability Analysis Cases
B.2.1 Case 1: Not Strain Softening
B.2.2 Case 2:
B.2.3 Case 3:
B.2.4 Case 4: Highly Brittle Behavior Expected

B.3 Summary

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B.1 INTRODUCTION
This Appendix provides a framework and process (illustrated in Figure B-
1) for selection of appropriate analysis techniques and factors of safety for
stability analysis of existing tailings dams when contractive materials are present
in the structural zones of the dam and foundation. The intent of this appendix is
not to provide a prescriptive requirement. Instead, the primary objective is to
provide guidance for designers, regulatory personnel, and mine owners in making
important decisions regarding existing facilities, by providing practical guidance
to aid in recognizing different types of stress-strain behavior exhibited by
contractive soils, identify appropriate actions to take in the stability evaluations,
and prioritize mitigation efforts when existing tailings facilities do not meet target
minimum factors of safety. This guidance applies whenever natural soils or
tailings are located within the structural zones of a tailings containment facility,
such that they control the structural integrity of the dam, such as foundation soils,
embankment fills, or when any portion of the dam or its raises are supported by
impounded tailings.

For new facilities, the use of contractive soils in structural zones should
be avoided whenever possible. Whenever practical, contractive soils in the
foundation of new tailings facilities should either be removed and replaced or
modified in situ to prevent possible contractive failure modes. However, it is not
always practical or possible to eliminate contractive materials, and it is possible
to design for these soils with appropriate techniques. Thus, the approach
described herein could be applied to the design of new facilities where the
elimination of contractive materials in the structural zones is not feasible.

Section 7 of this ICOLD Bulletin provides target minimum factors of safety

(FOS) values for two primary loading conditions, which are provided in Table 7.4.
Section 7 allows for lower FOS values to be considered when the targets are not
met. This Appendix provides guidance that may be applied in those situations
where revised targets may be deemed acceptable based on site-specific
conditions, including recognition of whether the soils will be contractive or dilative
during shearing, if the soils could be brittle or ductile, and other considerations.

The flow chart presented as Figure B-1 provides a framework for

selecting the appropriate analysis techniques, especially when the targets
specified in Table 7.4 are not met. Note that the flowchart in Figure B-1 addresses
many, but not all, of the stability cases that can be encountered. It is intended to
illustrate a rational process for establishing revised targets for the FOS with the
process being extended to apply to other cases that are not described herein.

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 Figure Appendix B-1: Flowchart for Slope Stability Analyses

The flow chart in Figure B-1 first differentiates between soils that dilate
or contract during undrained shearing across the range of expected loading and
phreatic conditions. The treatment of dilative soils is addressed in Appendix A
and many geotechnical engineering texts. The reader must have a complete
understanding of the essential concepts of geotechnical engineering presented
in Appendix A before applying the approach described herein.

For existing tailings dams, identifying soils that exhibit highly brittle
behavior is an essential element of the presented approach. Methods to identify
highly brittle behavior are described in Appendix A. The flowchart and
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descriptions below consider the definition of brittleness as described in
Appendix A.

The use of highly brittle materials in the structural zones of new dams
must be avoided. Brittle materials in the foundation should be avoided, but if this
cannot be done, then these materials need to be considered appropriately in the
analysis and the design advanced to contain these materials to prevent
uncontrolled release of the contents of the tailings facility. When highly brittle
materials are present in existing facilities, extreme caution is required due to the
possibility for flow (static) liquefaction to occur. Furthermore, any strain-softening
soil is potentially subject to progressive failure, and the likelihood and severity of
a progressive failure increases with increasing Strength Loss Index (i.e., with
increasing brittleness).

In all cases involving strain-softening soils, but especially when brittle

materials are present, a key determination is the factor of safety (FOS) calculated
using the residual undrained strength indicated for the soil. The flowchart uses a
FS value of 1.1 as a screening value; however, the reader should be cautious to
not misinterpret this screening value as a determinate value of acceptability. If
the FOS calculated using an appropriately conservative residual undrained
strength is greater than 1.1, then the likelihood of facility failure is generally
considered to be low if there is an initiating event for strength loss. However, it
may be prudent to target a value higher than 1.1 if there is significant uncertainty
in the strength characterization or other factors (such as potential variations in
the pore pressure conditions).

Conversely, if the calculated FOS using a reasonably conservative

residual undrained strength is less than 1.1, then the likelihood of a instability is
generally considered to be relatively high. In general, the lower the calculated
FOS, the higher the likelihood of flow failure. If highly brittle materials are present
and the FOS using residual undrained strength is less than 1.0, then risk
management methods are required to either stabilize the dam or mitigate the
consequences of failure. This may include evacuation of people and critical
infrastructure in the downstream inundation zone until the hazard has been
adequately addressed. It is important to note that instrumentation and monitoring
are not an acceptable solution in a case where highly brittle materials are present
and the FOS using residual-strength is less than 1.0 because a flow failure can
occur suddenly and without warning.

The application of FOS of 1.1 for screening (or any alternative considered
in practice) must use carefully selected material parameters that represent an
appropriate degree of conservatism, considering the inherent variability and
uncertainty in natural soils and tailings, and the level of understanding of all
materials available to the practitioners performing the evaluation. Section A.45 in
Appendix A provides guidance on the selection of material properties. Silva et al.
(2008) provides further guidance on the selection of factors of safety and the
assessment of uncertainty in slope stability analyses.
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 The process represented by the flowchart in Figure B-1 is based in part
on FOS values calculated using limit equilibrium methods. The following sections
provide guidance on the use of numerical modeling methods (non-linear
deformation analysis, or NDA) for the various stability cases. While NDA methods
inherently allow for more advanced representation of the complex nature of
shearing and deformation behavior of soils, they are not necessarily superior to
the more simplified limit-equilibrium method. Caution and engineering judgment
are required when implementing both types of analyses. Section 7.9 of the
Bulletin provides additional discussion of the differences in the two methods.

B.2 STABILITY ANALYSIS CASES

This screening process identifies four possible “cases” for contractive
materials (including three variations of the fourth case)

• Case 1 – Not Strain Softening

• Case 2 – Limited Strain Softening
• Case 3 – Moderate to High Strain Softening
• Case 4 – Highly Brittle

o Case 4A - FOS using residual shear strengths >1.1.

o Case 4B - FOS using residual shear strengths < 1.1,
Consequence Classification is Low or Significant.
o Case 4C - FOS using residual shear strengths < 1.1,
Consequence Classification is High to Extreme

The guidance presented herein:

• Describes the analysis methods that are appropriate for each case
• Provides guidance on selection of an appropriate FOS for each case
• Describes the selection of appropriate parameters for all cases
• Provides guidance for special considerations for certain soil types
and loading conditions

B.2.1 CASE 1: NOT STRAIN SOFTENING

Case 1 applies to a facility where contractive soils are present, but these
soils do not exhibit strain softening behavior (see Appendix A for explanation).
For this case, the undrained slope stability can be evaluated using a limit
equilibrium (L-E) analysis with a peak undrained strength ratio inferred from CPT
and/or laboratory testing. If no contractive, strain softening materials are identified
within structural zones of the dam and foundation, a minimum FOS of 1.3 for
undrained shearing can be adopted, provided that the parameters selected are
appropriately characterized and reasonably conservative, as described in
Appendix A. The reason that a FOS of 1.3 may be appropriate is because there
is no loss of strength, meaning that the peak undrained strength and the residual
undrained strength are equal.

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 Seismic triggering of cyclic liquefaction should be evaluated as described
in Appendix A. As noted in the main text, if there is no cyclic liquefaction due to
seismic loading, then the performance of the dam during earthquake shaking can
be assessed using simplified deformation analyses using methods by Bray et al.
(2017) or similar. Non-linear deformation analyses (NDA) are frequently required
if seismic triggering of cyclic liquefaction is indicated and may also be appropriate
for high- to extreme-consequence structures even if cyclic triggering is not
indicated.

B.2.2 CASE 2: LIMITED STRAIN SOFTENING

Case 2 applies to a scenario where contractive soils are present and
some limited strain-softening is expected, but there is sufficient evidence to
support that the large-strain (residual) strength is no more than 20% less than the
peak undrained shear strength (i.e., IB less than 0.20). This case corresponds to
the green-shaded (generally non-brittle) area in Figure A-5. Assessing post-peak
behavior can be somewhat complicated and some judgment is often required to
select an appropriate large-strain strength if the shear resistance is still
decreasing within the limits of the testing method used.

The evaluation of seismic triggering of cyclic liquefaction may be

performed, but the residual (post-liquefaction) strength indicated for the material
should be adopted regardless of the outcome of cyclic liquefaction triggering
analyses.

If the amount of post-peak strength loss can be demonstrated with

reasonable certainty to be less than 20%, then the stability can be evaluated
using L-E analysis for the following two conditions:

• Condition 2A: static analysis using appropriate large strain residual

undrained strength, with a target minimum FOS of 1.1.
o If the calculated FOS is less than 1.1, then mitigation
measures are expected to be required to raise the FOS to
an acceptable level. If this is not readily achievable, then an
NDA could be used to assess performance of the facility
under gravity loading. See comments below for guidance on
applying an NDA.
o A calculated FOS greater than 1.1 for this case is
considered acceptable for most facilities.
• Condition 2B: static analysis using an appropriate peak undrained
strength. Selection of the minimum FOS should be carefully
assessed based on the level of confidence in the shear strength
characterization. For well-characterized materials, a reasonably
conservative strength relationship, and well-understood pore
pressure conditions, a minimum factor of safety of 1.3 may be
acceptable so long as the FOS for the residual undrained strength
case is greater than the target minimum. If there is greater
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 uncertainty in the strength characterization and/or pore pressure
conditions, then a higher minimum FOS should be used that is
appropriate to the level of uncertainty.
o If the calculated FOS is less than 1.3, then mitigation
measures to raise the FOS to an acceptable level need to
be implemented. If a minimum value greater than 1.3 is
selected, then the same requirement for mitigation applies.
For facilities located in areas with low seismicity, or for low- and
significant-consequence facilities with moderate to high seismicity, the analyses
for Condition 2A above will typically suffice for evaluating earthquake loading,
since the residual undrained strength is the same whether “triggered” by cyclic or
monotonic loading.

For facilities located in areas of significant seismicity, additional analyses

should be performed to evaluate earthquake-induced deformations. The Bray et
al. (2017) and other simplified methods assume no significant strength loss during
shaking. If the amount of post-peak strength loss is less than about 5-10 percent,
then Bray et al. may be appropriate. However, an NDA will frequently be required
to evaluate performance of the tailings dam during the design earthquake when
the facility is in an area of high seismicity. The NDA model must use a constitutive
model that can appropriately simulate the strain softening behavior during
shaking.

B.2.3 CASE 3: MODERATE TO HIGH STRAIN SOFTENING

Case 3 applies to a facility where one or more contractive soils are
present that are strain-softening and are expected to exhibit more than 20% loss
of shear resistance (i.e., IB > 0.2) but no more than 40% post-peak strength loss
(i.e., IB < 0.4) and do not exhibit highly brittle behavior, according to the criteria
for highly brittle behavior described in Appendix A. Case 3 corresponds to the
yellow shaded (slightly brittle) area in Figure A-5 in Appendix A. In this case, the
soil will typically exhibit a residual undrained strength at large strains, but a flow
liquefaction failure is not indicated.

The approach to L-E analysis is similar to Case 2, but with a higher

minimum factor of safety for peak undrained conditions, as follows:

• Condition 3A. static analysis using appropriate large-strain residual

undrained strength, with a target minimum FOS of 1.1.
o If the calculated FOS is less than 1.1, then mitigation
measures are required to raise the FOS to an acceptable
level. If this is not readily achievable, then an NDA could be
used to assess performance of the facility under gravity
loading. See comments below for guidance on applying an
NDA.
o A calculated FOS greater than 1.1 for this case is

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 considered acceptable for most facilities.
• Condition 3B: static analysis using an appropriate peak undrained
strength. For Case 3, the minimum FOS should be no less than 1.5.

As with Case 2, triggering analyses for cyclic liquefaction may be

performed, but the residual (post-liquefaction) strength indicated for the material
should be adopted regardless of the outcome of cyclic liquefaction triggering
analyses.

For facilities located in areas with low seismicity, or for low- and
significant-consequence facilities with moderate to high seismicity, the analyses
for Condition 2A above will typically suffice for evaluating earthquake loading,
since the residual undrained strength is the same whether “triggered” by cyclic or
monotonic loading.

For facilities located in areas of significant seismicity, additional analyses

will be required to evaluate earthquake-induced deformations. The Bray et al.
(2017) and other simplified methods are not valid for Case 3 because of the
underlying assumption of no significant strength loss during shaking. An NDA will
be required to consider the site response, estimate pore pressure response, and
evaluate deformations due to inertial forces associated with earthquake shaking.
The NDA model must use a constitutive model that can appropriately simulate
the strain softening behavior during and after shaking. Most cyclic liquefaction
constitutive models, such as UBCSand and PM4Sand, do not fully capture the
potential for post-earthquake failure associated with the large amounts of
strength loss. To evaluate the potential for this type of failure mechanism, a post-
earthquake deformation analysis should also be completed wherein fully
softened, residual undrained strengths are assigned to the materials that are
expected to be strain softening, gravity is turned on, and the model deforms until
static equilibrium is reached (if static equilibrium is not reached, it indicates flow
failure). This latter analysis is applicable to Condition 3A above.

B.2.4 CASE 4: HIGHLY BRITTLE BEHAVIOR EXPECTED

Undrained Case 4 applies to facilities where one or more contractive soils
are present where these materials are expected to fail in a brittle manner. Case
4 corresponds to the red-shaded zone in Figure A-5. Case 4 generally
corresponds to an increased likelihood of sudden loss of shear resistance and
flow liquefaction. This case has been further subdivided into 3 subcategories
based on the calculated FOS using residual undrained strength and the
downstream consequence classification, as follows:

• Case 4A – FOS using residual shear strengths >1.1.

• Case 4B – FOS using residual shear strengths < 1.1, Consequence
Classification is Low or Significant.
• Case 4C – FOS using residual shear strengths < 1.1, Consequence
Classification is High to Extreme
Page 177
 The first step in evaluating a facility that classifies as Case 4 is to perform
an L-E analysis using appropriate residual undrained strengths. The residual
undrained strength(s) should be carefully evaluated and should initially be lower-
bound values. If the calculated FOS is greater than 1.1, then Undrained Case 4A
applies, and the potential for a flow failure with uncontrolled release of the
impoundment contents is not indicated by the analyses. The next steps for a Case
4A facility are described below.

If the calculated FOS using an appropriate residual undrained strengths

is less than 1.1, then the potential for instability is high – the lower the FOS, the
higher the likelihood of a flow failure with uncontrolled release. The next steps
depend on the downstream consequences. If the Consequence Classification is
Low or Significant (i.e., no potential loss of life), then Case 4B applies. If the
consequence classification is High, Very High, or Extreme (i.e., there is a
potential loss of life), then Case 4C applies, and the facility is considered to
represent a very high risk. The recommended approaches to Case 4B and 4C
are also described below.

Case 4A: FOS using residual undrained strength > 1.1

• For most facilities, a static L-E analysis should be performed using

peak undrained strengths. The minimum FOS for this case will
typically need to be greater than 1.5, but it may be appropriate to
target a FOS higher than 1.5 due to the potential consequences of
exceeding the peak undrained strength and triggering movements. A
residual FOS greater than 1.1 may still result in deformations of the
dam depending on the deformation characteristics of the soil and
other factors such as seismic loading. The possibility of secondary
effects that result from the deformations need to be accounted for in
the design. For example, if there is a significant pond of water in the
facility and the deformation causes loss of freeboard, then the pond
could cause a secondary effect by flowing into the breached area
and resulting in uncontrolled release of tailings and water, similar to
the Mt. Polley failure. Thus, the FOS based on either peak and
residual undrained strengths needs to be carefully considered and
the potential effects of experiencing an undrained failure need to be
evaluated and mitigated to the extent possible. Performance of an
NDA may be recommended as part of this evaluation.

For facilities located in areas with low seismicity, or for low- and
significant-consequence facilities with moderate to high seismicity, the residual
undrained strength analyses for Case 4 will typically suffice for evaluating
earthquake loading, since the residual undrained strength is the same whether
“triggered” by cyclic or monotonic loading. The undrained residual undrained
strength analysis in this case is equivalent to a post-earthquake analysis that is
commonly performed in earthquake analysis of water dams.

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 For facilities located in areas of significant seismicity, an NDA will
typically be required to evaluate deformations due to inertial forces associated
with earthquake shaking. Earthquake loading may increase the lateral extent and
severity of the deformation indicated by static liquefaction. The considerations
described previously for Case 3, pertaining to non-linear deformation analysis,
also apply to Case 4A.

Risk assessment, including the evaluation of likelihood of potential

triggers for liquefaction, may be appropriate for Case 4A facilities.

Case 4B: FOS using residual undrained strength < 1.1, Low to
Significant Consequence Classification

Case 4B applies to a TSF with a Consequence Classification of Low or

Significant, where there is minimal likelihood of fatalities in the downstream
impacted zone. In this case, there may be justification to perform a risk
assessment to assess the likelihood of triggering an undrained loading condition.
If the overall risk is deemed reasonably low, then the behavior under static and
dynamic loading conditions may be performed to evaluate whether uncontrolled
release of tailings is likely and/or to design mitigations to prevent such failure. If
the risk is deemed to be unacceptably high, then the facility should be treated as
Undrained Case 4C. It is important to recognize that triggering of undrained
conditions in contractive materials is difficult to evaluate. When designing tailings
facilities for closure, it can be difficult to ensure that a suitable triggering event will
not occur at some time in the life of the structure.

Generally, the analysis of peak undrained stability and seismic stability

follows the recommendations for Case 4A.

Case 4C: FOS using residual undrained strength < 1.1, High, Very
High, or Extreme Consequence Classification

Undrained Case 4C applies when the FOS with residual undrained

strength is less than 1.1 and the dam consequence rating is High, Very High, or
Extreme. This case requires a high level of scrutiny and mitigation measures
should be prioritized. If the consequence rating is driven by potential loss of life,
then difficult decisions will typically need to be made by the Owner, with
consultation from the Engineer of Record and the Independent Technical Review
Board (ITRB), on interaction with the downstream community and the
implementation of risk management steps that should include mitigation
measures. In some cases, immediate mitigations to protect people in the
downstream impacted zone may be required. Regardless of whether any
immediate measures are needed, the TSF must either be reinforced to achieve
acceptable factors of safety for all loading conditions, or the facility should be
decommissioned to remove the hazard or measures taken to minimize the
consequences.

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B.3 CLOSING
It must be noted that the framework in this Appendix is based on the use
of conservative assumptions, such as an appropriate (potentially a lower-bound)
residual undrained strength and the assumption that undrained strength loss will
be triggered. The true likelihood of a failure occurring may in fact be low. A
calculated FOS using L-E methods and a lower-bound residual undrained
strength near unity (1.0) may be unnecessarily conservative, especially if there is
a high degree of certainty surrounding the characterization of material properties
and loading conditions and if appropriate controls are in place to adequately
manage risk. Generally, however, the lower the calculated factor of safety, the
higher the severity of the problem, the greater the risk, and the less likely that the
L-E is overly conservative. The full nature of the risk needs to be understood in
making decisions on how to respond to a Case 4C situation.

In many cases, especially if the calculated factor of safety is near 1.0, an

NDA may be justified for Case 4C conditions, often using more advanced field
and laboratory testing than required for facilities with lower risk. However, it
should be noted that there are significant challenges to performing numerical
analyses for Case 4C conditions, and an NDA may not in fact produce a definitive,
technically supported outcome. Additional levels of oversight and scrutiny are
required in these cases, and the usual ITRB may need to be supplemented with
specialized expertise.

Triggering analysis and risk assessment may be helpful in understanding

urgency and the need for immediate actions, as well as in communicating the risk
to regulators and the affected communities. Triggering analyses should be
applied with extreme caution in Case 4C situations and in no case should be used
to justify eliminating mitigation efforts. However, the emphasis for Case 4C
facilities, must be on the reduction of consequences rather than on refining the
estimation of likelihood in a risk assessment.

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