HAZOP

METHODOLOGY AND CASE STUDY

ALONG WITH HAZOP WORKSHEET.

HAZOP METHODOLOGY AND CASE STUDIES

MAYUR DHOKLE.
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WHAT IS HAZOP: -

 HAZOP stands for Hazard and Operability. It is a method of study for Identifying hazards and
operability problems in a process design. It is a Systematic technique that is applied repetitively
to small sections of the process Design until all parts of the design have been studied. It is a
qualitative means of identifying potential problems; it does not quantify the problems nor offer
Solutions to them.
 The HAZOP study is conducted to identify the potential hazards and operability problems and to
reduce the probabilities and consequences of an incident in the process facilities that would
have detrimental impact to the persons, industry, environment or company reputation.
 To assess the identified hazards by determination of its consequences.
 To suggest applicable recommendations required for risk reduction.

OBJECTIVES OF HAZOP: -

 To provide assurance to Business management that a design, whether for a new facility, a modification
to an existing facility or an operating plant is acceptably safe.
 To be part of the process for satisfying legislators that plants are acceptably safe.
 To provide a reference point for accident/near miss investigations.
 To provide a reference point for future design or plant modification.
 To provide a reference point for operational personnel when considering operational
procedures for the plant.
 To assess the identified hazards by determination of its consequences.
 To suggest applicable recommendations, whenever required for risk reduction.

REFERENCES, CODES YOU CAN USE FOR HAZOP STUDY: -

 IEC 61882: 2016 (Hazards and operability study application guide published by International
electro technical commission).
 American institute of chemical engineers (AIChE): Centre for chemical process safety (CCPS) –
Provides various guidelines and publications related to process safety, including HAZOP.
 American Petroleum institute (API): API RP 750- Management of process hazards.
 Occupational safety and Health Administration (OSHA) 1910.119- Process safety management
of highly hazardous chemicals.

GENERAL PROCESS / PLANT DOCUMENT REQUIRED FOR HAZOP: -

 P&ID.
 Chemicals MSDS/ Datasheets.
 Flow diagrams, heat &material balance document.
 Cause and effect matrix.
 Shutdown philosophy document.
 Risk matrix prepared by organisation if it is available.
 Maintenance and operations philosophy document.
 Relief devices datasheets.
 Pressure vessel, pumps, compressors and turbines datasheets.
 Operating instruction (Batch sheets/ BMR) particularly for batch operations.
 Previous health, safety and environment review or HAZOP reports.
 Hazardous area classifications.
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 Process description.

TEAM MEMBERS REUIRED FOR HAZOP STUDY: -

The ideal HAZOP team size is between 5 to 8 members, but in practice, the team can range
from 20 to 30 members on large projects. The first session usually has a full room of
participants eager to contribute, but interest often wanes over time, leading to a decrease in
the number of team members.

The recommended or necessary members for a successful HAZOP study include:

 HAZOP study leader/facilitator (an experienced, unbiased person familiar with the HAZOP
methodology)
 Scribe engineer
 Representative from the process department
 Representative from the project department
 Representative from the operation department (chemist/plant operator) if the HAZOP is
conducted on an established plant or project
 Representative from the maintenance department
 Representative from the instrument department
 Representative from the HSE (Health, Safety, and Environment) department.
.

HAZOP MEHODOLOGY: -

 Before commencement of study the facilitator or study chairman divided the P&IDs into
number of smaller parts for betterment of study called NODE.
 Then the workshop is begun with opening statement of study chairman, in opening statement
study chairman explains agenda of HAZOP such as objectives of study, brief study methodology,
selected note for workshop, list of deviations / guidewords is going to use, about Risk matrix,
format of HAZOP worksheet.
 Once all team members understood the methodology, the study chairmen select node for
discussion.
 Facilitator apply process deviation.
 Then the real brainstorming session will begin, Team discuss causes for the selected process
deviation.
 Once all credible causes listed down, then team will evaluate applicable consequences for
selected deviation.
 Based on available Risk matrix (Some uses their customized or some uses CCPS risk matrix) the
team will decide severity of hazards.
 Then all available safeguards is identified and recorded.
 Credit is taken for available safeguards.
 Final Risk Ranking or Risk Ranking after safeguard is calculated.
 If the available safeguards are not enough to mitigate Risk then Recommendations will be
suggested.
 The above steps is applied to all selected study Node.
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START Explain overall design intension

of process or equipment

Choose one node for study

Explain design intention of selected

study node

Select guideword

Select Process parameter

Apply process deviation

Identify all credible causes

NO
Yes

Record significant consequences for

each cause

Do Risk ranking based on available Risk

Matrix

Record all available safeguards

Do Risk Ranking after taking Credit of

safeguards

If available safeguard is not enough do

recommendations to reduce Risk

More Parameter
Yes
Yes No
More Node

NO

END
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Below we will learn about all different parts of HAZOP Worksheet.

HAZOP worksheet for overview as per IEC 61882 Standard: -

Guidew Process Parameter Process deviation causes consequences safeguards

ords

1.NO 1.1 FLOW 1.1.1 No flow 1.1.1.1 pump failure 1.1.1.1.1 No quantity to batch leads 1.1.1.1.1.1 Interlock on less flow
to production loss along with shutdown logic.
1.1.1.2 FQI Measuring instrument 1.1.1.1.2 Same as 1.1.1.1.1 1.1.1.1.1 .2 Pump failure indication
failure, instrument reads more quantity along with shutdown logic.
than actual.
1.1.1.3 Control valve failure. 1.1.1.1.3 Same as 1.1.1.1.1 1.1.1.1.1.3 same as above

1.1.1.4 Circulation on-off valve fail to 1.1.1.1.4 Same as 1.1.1.1.1 1.1.1.1.1.4 On-Off valve failure
wrong position. feedback along with shutdown
logic
2.MORE 2.1 FLOW 2.1.1 More flow 2.1.1.1 FQI Failure measuring device 2.1.1.1.1 More quantity of material 2.1.1.1.1.1 Tank has equipped with
measures less quantity than actual it leads to dilute product as well as it High level alarm for operator
allows the control valve to more reduces reaction rate. intervention and also High-High
opening and more flow will occur. Subsequently more charged material level hard wired interlock along
will overflow through tank and lead with shutdown logic which stop
2.1.1.2 Increased pump capacity to LOPC create major safety hazard feed to Tank this will prevent
and create major fire hazard. overflow scenario.
2.1.1.3 Increase NPSH because of 2.1.1.1.2.1 This cause is not credible.
increase in pressure in suction tank 2.1.1.1.3.1 This cause is not credible.
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HAZOP Format as Per –PHAx Format

NODE: -
During HAZOP P&ID is divided into number of small sections by the study chairman, each such section is called Node.

DESIGN INTENT: -

 For chemical industry design intention means what kind of operations is being performed or is going to performed on selected equipment such as what
kind of raw material charging, what type of process or operations is going to perform or is being performed then what parameters has to maintain
while operations of selected Node or equipment.
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 Before examining each node team members summarises the design intent of that node
including normal process conditions and specifications to let the people have necessary
background knowledge about process.
 The Design intention is what the equipment item or process step was designed to accomplish.

For Example if you have node, Node no-1, where you have Tank No-30 and you are performing
some batch process, like

 Charging Raw material Cumene to T-30 from T-60.

 Heating Cumene up to 110ºC by means of steam.
 Circulation of Cumene through pump (P-30/30A) which one available.
 O2 charging through Sparge ring while maintaining reaction temperature 110ºC.
 Sample of reaction mass after 12 hrs.
 Reaction mass transfer to T-40 if expected result obtained.

PROCESS PARAMETERS: -
 These are the physical characteristics considered by the HAZOP team (in conjugations with
guidewords) to establish deviations from the design intent.
 Temperature, Pressure, Flow, Level, Agitation, Raw material charge are the example of process
parameters.
 The HAZOP parameters to be used in the HAZOP study may have to be varied according to the
section of the process is being studied.
 Temperature Pressure, flow, PH, Agitation, etc. some are example of pressure parameters.

In below table I tried to cover almost all possible parameters which are being used in Chemical
industry.

SR.NO PARAMETERS
1 RAW MATERIAL CHARGE
2 AGITATION
3 TEMPERAURE
4 PH
5 COMPOSITION CHANGE
6 PRESSURE
7 FLOW
8 OTHER
9 HEIGHT
10 CORROSION
11 EROSION
12 POWER
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GUIDEWORDS: -

 These are words or phrases that, when considered together with a parameter, form a
hypothetical deviation for the team to considered.
 Guidewords are quantitative words which are applied to the process parameters to define
process deviation.
 Basic guidewords are: No, more, less, low, high, other than, before, after etc.

List of guidewords generally use for HAZOP study:

SR.NO PARAMETERS
1 NO
2 MORE

3 LESS
4 LOW
5 HIGH
6 OTHER THAN
7 BEFORE
8 AFTER
9 EARLY
10 LATER
11 REVERSE
12 MISDIRECTED
13 EXCESS

PROCESS DEVIATION: -
 The combination of process parameter and guidewords defines process deviation.
 For example application of word “NO’ to process parameter “flow” would result into process
deviation as “NO FLOW”.

List of Process deviations along with process parameters and guidewords that is being used in
Chemical industry: -

SR.NO PROCESS PARAMETERS GUIDEWORD PROCESS DEVIATION

No No Flow
Less Less Flow
1 Flow More More Flow
Misdirected Misdirected Flow
Reverse Reverse Flow
Less Less Pressure
2. Pressure
More More Pressure
Less Less Temperature
3. Temperature
More More Temperature
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4. Agitation Other Than Agitation Failure
Low Low PH
5. PH
High High PH
Other Than Power Failure
Other Than Instrument Air Failure
6. Other
Other Than Spillage Of Chemical
Other Than Fire
No No Charge
More More Charge (Quantity)
Less Less Charge (Quantity)
7. Raw Material Charging Before Before Charge
After After Charge
Early Early Charge
Later Later Charge

CAUSES: -

 Causes are simply the reasons behind process deviations.

 Having created a deviation the HAZOP team have to search their minds and apply their
knowledge and experience to establish a cause of that deviations.

List of possible causes present in chemical industry along with Process deviations.

PROCESS
SR.NO CAUSES
DEVIATION
1)Filter or strainer blockage, 2)Defective Pump, 3) Transferring
line leak, 4) Flow measuring device shows Less reacting than
actual, 5) Human error (Operator opened wrong valve than
1. Low Flow
actual), 6)Control valve failure, 7) XV or ON-OFF valve failed in
wrong position, 8) Circulation valve (ON-OFF valve failed to
undesired position) fully or partially open.
1) Total pump failure, 2) Receiving tank bottom or pump
discharge valve completely closed by operator (Human error),
2. No Flow 3) Pump strainer blockage, 4) Failure of flow measuring device,
5) Control valve failure, 6) ON-OFF valve failure on suction or
transferring line, 7) Burst pipe or large line leakage.
1) Increased pumping capacity, 2) Increased suction pressure
(increased NPSH), 3) Reduced delivery head, 4) Control valve
3. More Flow
failure, 5) FQI Failure or flow measuring device shows more
reading than actual, 6) Cross connection of systems.
1) Defective or Failure of NRV, 2) Syphon effect, 3) ON-OFF
valve failure on transferring header where different source line
4. Reverse flow
come,
4) Human error (operator opened wrong valve than expected).
1)Vent line or condenser blockage, 2) Blocked outlet, Vent line
ON-OFF valve or control valve failure in undesired position,
5. More Pressure 3) Heating or cooling controls (control valve) failure, it leads to
vapour generation inside system it may create overpressure, 4)
Pressure measuring instrument failure (Pressure transmitter
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shows less reading than actual), 5) Over filling of equipment
leads to overpressure, 6) Increase in reaction rate leads to
overpressure 7) N2 valve CV wide open, 8) Fire, 9) Reflux failure
10) Cooling water failure, 11) Power failure.12) Gas generation
(Unexpected gas generation within the reactor or column,
perhaps due to side reaction or decomposition can lead to
overpressure,
6. Less pressure 1) Vacuum generation in system, 2) Undetected leakage, 3)
1) Failure of cooling system (cooling media pump failure or
Cooling system control valve failure), 2) Heating Control valve
failure (supply more steam or heating media than required it
leads to increase material temperature, 3) Temperature
7. More temperature
measuring device failure (Device shows less reading than actual
then Heating control will open more than actual required), 4)
Thermal Expansion, 5) Uncontrolled exothermic reaction, 5)
External fire, 6) Fired heater control failure.
8. Less temperature 1) Heating control system failure (supply less steam than
required), 2) cooling control system failure (Cooling control
valve CV wide open it leads to increase cooling rate and
minimize temperature, 3) Higher reflux than required leads to
cool down all vapours generated in reaction, 4) Fouled or failed
heat exchanger will reduce heat transfer rate leads to less
temperature, 5) Measuring instrument failure (Temperature
transmitter shows more reading than actual it leads to less
supply of heating media and minimizes heating rate)
9. High level 1) Pump failure 2) Level transmitter failure ( LT shows less
reading than actual it leads to overfill vessel or column),
3) Control valve or ON-OFF valve failure (LCV failed to closed
position it leads to overfill vessel), 4) Charging Control valve
failure in fully open position, and control valve no longer able to
control flow, 5) Charging line flow measuring device failure (FQI
shows less reading than actual it force control valve to open
and it leads to overfill vessel)
10 No Agitation 1) Power loss, 2) Mechanical failure, 3) Failure of control
systems such as sensors, control valves which trigger Stop logic
of agitator.
11 Other Than 1) Sampling, 2) Lightning,

CONSEQUENCES: -

 These are the impact / result / outcomes of the causes, in simple term if because of particular
cause what and how will impact on production loss, person health, environment.
 "Risk or severity is determined based on the impact on human health and safety, the
environment, community impact, and financial factors such as loss of profits and equipment
damage."
 When ranking risks based on consequences, the worst-case scenario should be selected to
ensure a more accurate assessment of severity.
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List of some consequences along with Process deviations and Causes: -

Let’s take example if I have tank where we react diluted H2So4 react with Fes and the reaction
produces FeSo4 and H2S as a by-product.
Following design activity is performed during reaction

SR.NO PROCESS DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUNCES

1 No flow 1. Pump Failure 1. Loss of production due to late charging of
2. FQI failure Raw material.
3. Line Breakage 2. Severe damage to human health if person
4.Human error present in incident location.
(Operator open
wrong line up
than expected

2 More pressure 1.Vent lines or 1. Because of overpressure it may lead to

condenser LOPC and H2S gas can be entered into
blocked environment create major safety hazard and
2. Heating media environment damage.
TCV failure leads 2. Leakage of H2S create major fire hazards
to increase
vapour
generation and it
may create
overpressure.

1) Charging FeS in reaction.

2) Dilute H2So4 is charged from T-21 to R-31 through centrifugal pump.
3) Reaction temperature is maintained 90-100ºC with the help of steam.
4) Sampling of reaction mass after 2 hrs. of maintaining.
5) Transfer reaction mass from R-31 to T-22.

In above example each cause can have multiple consequences, you can record all consequences
but while risk ranking worst case scenario should be selected.

RISK RANKING: -
 It is process of qualitatively determining the risk as a combination of severity or likelihood with
the help of standard risk matrix.

SEVERITY: -

 Severity refers to the potential consequences of the hazard such as injury damage to human,
property, loss in profit, environment loss and loss of reputation etc.
 Severity is comes under different category, it may come under business impact, environment
impact, Fatality, Reputation.
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In below table you will find Severity along with 5x5Risk Matrix which is made by using HAZOP
experience that is have gain in my organisation.

LIKELIHOOD: -

 Likelihood refers to the probability or frequency of hazard.

 In HAZOP, likelihood relates to the causes of a hazard. It indicates the chances of the cause
occurring over a period, such as 1 year, 10 years, or even more.

In below file likelihood or credit for event is mentioned.

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Likelihood along with initiating cause

Let’s understand severity, likelihood along with example.

 For example there is one activity that you are performing in your industry.
 Let’s say you have to maintain reaction temperature in between 100 to 200ºC by steam as a
heating media. In those system you have one TCV (temperature control valve/ BPSC) and take
deviation more temperature.
 In below example we have consider Process deviation more pressure, and the cause taken as a
failure of TCV (Control valve fails in fully open condition) it provide more heating to reaction
mass and may create over pressurisation situation.
 Due to overpressure reactor or flange joint may get rupture and leads to LOPC (loss of primary
containment).
 Failure of reactor or flange joint releases toxic gas into atmosphere and create major safety
hazard to human health
 Based on consequences above cause will affect human health, so that why we have taken
impact in OSHA (Occupational safety, health assessment).
 Likelihood is taken (-1) because as per likelihood guidelines failure rate of BPCS (Basic process
control system) 1 per 10nth year.
 Final Risk before safeguard is 3.
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SAFEGUARD: -

 Safeguard refers to the any system, procedure, actions or device that helps to prevent or
mitigate a hazardous event.
 High and Low level, pressure and temperature switches along with shutdown logic or alarms to
operator after deviation in system, so operator can take necessary action, or it may be some
interlock (SIS/ESD) or mechanical devices such as RD or PSV to bring the system or operation
within safe condition.
 These are barrier or protection layer provided within system.

List of some Safeguard which is being used in chemical industry.

Recommendations: -
 Recommendations is a suggestion or actions item proposed by the HAZOP team to mitigate risk,
deficiencies, or areas of improvement.
 The purpose of recommendations is to mitigate risk, enhance safety, improve operability, and
ensure compliance.
 These recommendations are typically made after analysing potential deviations in a process and
assessing their causes and safeguards.
 As per our 5x5 Risk matrix, if Risk ranking is come 3 means there is operations or process is
operated at High Risk and we have to do recommendations to reduce Risk.
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Challenged Rules during HAZOP workshop: -

Before moving forward for HAZOP study I would like to introduce you some of HAZOP rules
which is being mostly challenged during workshop.

Double jeopardy.

 Double jeopardy is a situation where two independent events occurs at the same time. For
example TCV (Temperature control valve) failure leading to more heating and generate more
vapour load and the PCV pressure control valve on distillation column failure in close position
both scenarios leading to create over pressure situation inside column.
 Generally double jeopardy situation is avoided in HAZOP workshop, if it considered then it will
make HAZOP study more complicated.

Human error as a cause?

 Many team members will object when human error is recorded as a cause in a HAZOP
workshop, because as per their point view all the personal who works in plant are highly trained
and no personal is going to unintentionally open or close valve.
 It is true that, no personal is unintentionally operate valve in undesired position but if we
consider other factors such as stress, upset conditions at plant, start-up mode or equipment
where frequent change-overs are required can lead to operator to make mistake.
 So, generally the human error is as a cause is accepted and used in HAZOP studies.

Is an operating procedure safeguard?

 Most team members have confusion that SOP/ operating procedure is considered as a
safeguard.
 When people struggles to identify/verify safeguards then first safeguard comes in their mind
that we should record operating procedure as a safeguard.
 Many HAZOP leaders suggest that looking for SOP as a safeguard, team members should
identify more automatic safeguard than considering SOP as a safeguard.
 Generally SOP as a safeguard is applicable for all the scenario and HAZOP worksheet will fill up
quite quick if we start recording SOP as a safeguard.
 Having said that there are situations where it is not practical to engineer an automatic,
therefore, only on those situations operating procedure can be taken as a safeguard.

Non-return valve as a safeguard.

 In HAZOP study Check-valve or Non-return valve is not considered as a safeguard for reverse
flow especially if the reverse flow is going to cause over pressurization or rupture due to
pressure rating change.
 A check valve or non-return valve is not a tight shutoff device and there can be a certain leakage
through it when it is in a close position especially when if it is not inspected or maintained on
periodic basis.
 Sometimes, it is recommended that two dissimilar type check valve are installed in series to
minimize the reverse flow can cause contamination issue rather than over-pressurization and
integrity threat.
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 If you are going to installed check valve for over pressurization scenario then this would not be
helpful, rather than check valve you should install an automatic shutdown valve with detection
of reverse flow or high pressure in low pressure region.

Pass PSV as a cause: -

 In almost all HAZOP study passing of PSV is not considering as a cause for HAZOP scenario.
 It is possible that PSV can pass and there could be leakage through it causing a reduced floe
though the line.
 If you check IPL (independent protection layer) then, PSV is also active protection measures in
IPL or simply last line of defence before accident.
 Generally in HAZOP study we are not fail our last line defence to build HAZOP scenario.
 Therefore, failed condition of pressure safety valve, blow down valve and safety instrumented
system are generally not consider as a cause to build HAZOP scenario.

Control Loop Failure: -

 Does the failure of control valve is valid cause for PHA.

 The control loops are generally connected with PLC (programmable logic controller) or DCS
(Distributed control system).
 In control loops there is generally measuring devices such as pressure transmitter, level
transmitter, temperature transmitter and flow transmitter etc. In a simple form it consists of an
initiator, a logic solver (main control element in which main transform equation is present to
create output action), Final control element (nothing but control valve or pump, compressor
trip action).
 There could be number of measuring instrument and final control elements depending upon
process design.
 Failure of control loop is always debatable but there is a confusion about how it is going to fails,
whether complete or partial failure. Some team members argue that we shouldn’t consider
failure of control valve or initiator at the same time because its double jeopardy.
 To be on safe, when control loop failure is taken as a cause in a HZOP study it is taken as a
complete failure of the loop and we assume that the loop is dead or none of its component is
operational. It is because we are not sure where the random failure could develop and led to
complete control loop failure. Failure can develop in transmitter (initiator), in a transmission
cable from transmitter cable to PLC, PLC itself, software bug, input/output card, power supply
to PLC, solenoid or control valve.
 Therefore complete failure of control loop is consider as a cause for HAZOP scenario rather than
only a transmitter or a control valve failure.

Is a process design safeguard?

 The most times this question arises in HAZOP study that is, process design should we consider
as a safeguard.
 Process design can be consider as a safeguard in certain situation.
 Let’s understand it with example, consider if you have Process vessel where you are doing some
reaction and for that you are charging some raw material within it, if because of control loop
failure if the Process vessel overflow then some of liquid can enter into atmosphere which is
highly corrosive and it can lead to severe damage to people health, the people who is working
around the vent of vessel. But there is one knock out drum in between process vessel and
atmospheric vent line is installed with the High level alarm and high-high trip logic to trap all the
liquid droplets coming from vessel along with vapour.
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 Can we take knock out drum as a safeguard? Most of people will say we should consider knock
out drum as a safeguard because Knock out drum will collect overflow material and it will
initiate hold logic of raw material to vessel. Before reaching to conclusion we must evaluate,
what will be the quantity of liquid which will overflow from the vessel and what is the capacity
of that knock out drum. Let’s assume if the quantity of overflow is massive and small in
comparison to that then it would just take few seconds to overflow the knock out drum will
overflow and in that high level alarm and hi-high level trip will be useless.
 In order to consider safe process design the knock out drum capacity should well enough so it
give time to Alarm and high-high trip the operation and in that case we can consider process
design as a safeguard.

Is an alarm safeguard?

 If we saw layer of protection analysis, when any process deviations occurs then process control
is the first layer which comes into action and try to bring process under control e.g. level,
pressure, temperature, level and flow within the limits.
 In some times the basic process control system (BPCS) may not work all the times and process
can go out of limits. The second layer of protection is deviation alarm which brings the operator
attention and he will get to know there is something abnormal situations in process so he can
act upon the situations and try to bring the operation within limits.
 Before taking credit for alarms as a safeguard various factors should be, such as how much time
is available for the operator to take the action and bring the variable within the safe limits,
before the next layer is activate. So, the time available for operator to complete his action is
important factor before taking credit for an alarm. Other factors also required such a written
instruction for operator, training of operator, periodic maintenance of alarms before alarm
credit can be claimed.

The Failure of a control valve can be considered as a cause?

 Control valve can fail in number of ways like, fail open, fail closed, stuck open and stuck closed
etc.
 There is a one confusion about its failure action. In almost every P&ID diagram fail action of
control valve is shown by a symbol FO (fail open) or FC (Fail close).
 Many HAZOP team members debate that if there is fail action, like “Fail Open” is already shown
on P&ID then only “Fail open” case should be discussed not “Fail close” scenario.
 The answer to that is failure of motive force (instrument air or hydraulic oil) to the actuator of a
control valve lead to valve forcefully close or open as shown on P&ID, but if there is a control
failure then the valve can go in either direction depending upon the random failure in the
control system.
 Therefore, while considering scenario in HAZOP study both fully open and fully close scenario
should be considered.

Manual fire-fighting is a cause?

 Can we consider manual fire fighting is a cause for HAZOP study?

 In a HAZOP study it may consider loss of containment of flammable material leads to create fire
and explosion hazards. Depending upon nature and magnitude of the fire the team can decide
whether they should take credit for manual fire fighting or not.
 Sometimes small fire detection major challenge in industry due to number of factors such as
detection coverage’s and wind velocity at the time of release. That’s why manual fire fighting
can limit the extent of damage in industry.
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 Therefore, HAZOP team should be careful before taking credit for manual fire fighting.
 In last year we did HAZOP study for our existing facility and our EHS team instructed us we are
not going to take any credit for HAZOP study.

CASE STUDY: -
In below example I have tried to cover possible cause and consequences for HAZOP study. The
example that I have taken in blow file is totally imaginary it has no correlation with any
organisation. The example has been prepared here are for study purpose for new and
intermediate engineer to enhance their knowledge in field of Process Hazard Analysis and as
well as to enhance my content writing and technical skills.

Let’s understand HAZOP study with an example, assume ABCD industry makes chemical by
reacting compound A + B and produces product C and by-product H2S (Reason behind selection
H2S as a by-product because H2S is highly toxic and flammable which will make good choice to
create Hazardous situation) during reaction and they want to make qualitative Process Hazard
Analysis (HAZOP).

The first thing we are going to understand here is design intent of selected study node based on
P&ID and data provided by industry (which is total imaginary).

1. Charging of compound A from T-401 to T-501.

2. Charging of compound B from T-402 to T-501.
3. Pump circulation and agitation after charging compound A and B.
4. Heating reaction mass up to 105ºc by using heating media as a steam and maintaining
temperature for 5 hrs. to complete reaction.
5. Sampling of material after 5 hrs.
6. Transferring reaction mass to next tank T-601.

Equipment and instrument data: -

Raw material storage tank specifications: -

Tag No Contain inside Capacity Head MOC Motor

T-401 Storage Tank of material A 25 KL NA SS-316 NA

T-402 Storage Tank of material B 25 KL NA SS-316 NA

P-401 Transferring Pump of T-401 20 m3/hr. 25 m SS-316 15 HP

20
P-402 Transferring Pump of T-402 25m SS-316 15 HP
m3/HR.

Reactor specification: -
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Tag No Specification Capacity Head MOC Motor
T-501 Reactor 15 kl NA SS-316 NA
A-501 Agitator NA NA SS-316 50 HP
P-501 I T-501 Primary Pump 15 m3/hr. 20 m SS-316 10 HP
P-501 II T-501 secondary Pump 15 m3/hr 20 m SS-316 10 HP
LT-5001 Level Transmitter NA NA NA NA
LAHH-5001 High level switch NA NA NA NA
PAHH-5001 High pressure switch NA NA NA NA
PT-5001 Pressure Transmitter NA NA NA NA
PIC-5001 Pressure Transmitter
NA NA NA NA
and controller
HE-501 Condenser 15 m2 NA NA NA
T-701 Condensate collection 5 kl NA
NA NA
Tank

Product Receiver Tank: -

Tag No Contain Inside Capacity Head MOC Motor

T-601 Product Receiver Tank 20 kl NA SS-316 NA
P-601 Transferring Pump of T-601 10 m3/hr 15 m SS-316 7 HP
LAHH-6001 High Level Switch of T-601 NA NA NA NA
T-602 Product Receiver Tank 20 kl NA SS-316 NA
P-602 Transferring Pump of T-602 10 m3/hr 15 m SS-316 7 HP
LAHH-6002 High Level Switch of T-602 NA NA NA NA

Some assumptions are made while preparing HAZOP study: -

1. All the operations which is performed in ABCD ltd. organisation is carried out by DCS recipe
system.
2. Only credible causes is recorded in HAZOP worksheet.
3. Double jeopardy is considered while exploring cause.
4. For critical system and suppose one cause has multiple consequences, then in such
situation worst case scenario is selected to betterment of study.
5. The study assumes that the system is initially in a state of normal operation, with all
components functioning as designed. Any deviations from this state are analysed for
potential hazards.
6. The study assumes that the system has been designed and constructed according to
engineering standards and specifications, with no significant design imperfection.
7. It is assumed that the system has certain built-in safeguards (e.g., alarms, relief valves,
automatic shut-off systems). The effectiveness of these safeguards is considered during the
HAZOP study.
8. Human error is considered as cause for deviation even though the personnel trained or he
has enough.
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CLIENT NAME: - ABCD LTD.

DATE:-
STUDY TITLE: - HAZOP WORKSHEET
SHEET NO: -
MEETING DATE: -
Node/ Process Cause Consequences Category Risk Ranking before safeguard Safeguard Safeguard RANKING AFTER Recommendation
Design deviation SAFEGUARD
intention Severity Likelihood Risk Severity Likelihood Risk
Before after
SF SF
S L RR S L RR
1.Charging No Flow 1. No level in T-401. 1.1 Delay in batch processing, significant BU 2 -1 1 1.1.1 Low level switch provided on T-401 along 1 -1 0
of material business lost. with low level alarm, Activating low level
A from T- switch will not allow operator to initiate
401 to T- charging procedure.
501 1.1.2. Low flow alarm and interlock provided to
charging sequence in case of activating FAL will
initiate hold sequence.

2. J-401 Failure or 2.1 Same as 1.1 BU 2 -1 1 2.1.1 Pump low current alarms along with hold 1 -1 0
breakdown sequence has been provided
2.1.2 same as 1.1.2.
3. Human error 3.1 Same as 1.1 BU 2 0 2 3.1.1. Same as 1.1.2. 2 -1 1
(operator forget to
open pump suction and
discharge line up).
4. FIC-5001 stuck closed 4.1 Same as 1.1 BU 2 -1 1 4.1.1. Same as 1.1.2. 1 -1 0
5. Failure of XV-1002, 5.1 Same as 1.1 BU 2 -1 1 5.1.1 Same as 1.1.2. 1 -1 0
XV-4003, and XV-3002
(stuck closed).
6. Rupture line. 6.1 Same as 1.1 OSHA 4 -2 1 6.1.1 Same as 1.1.2. 1 0 1
6.2 Rupture line allows Flammable 6.1.2 Hazardous area classification has been
material to enter into atmosphere, LOPC performed.
and create major safety hazard.
7. J-401 Pump strainer 7.1 Same as 1.1 BU 2 -1 7.1.1 Same as 1.1.2. 1 -1 0
fully chocked
Less Flow 8 Pump strainer 8.1 Less material in suction line create OSHA 4 -1 3 8.1.1 Low current interlock provided to pump 3 -1 2
partially chocked. starvation of pump and it can damage which will stop pump.
pump, leads to LOPC and create major 8.1.2 Activation of FAL (low flow alarms) will
fire hazard. initiate hold sequence, which will stop J-401
8.2 Delays in batch processing, pump.
significant business lost.

9. FIC-5001 malfunction 9.1 Delay in batch processing, significant BU 2 -1 1 9.1.1 Low flow alarm and interlock provided to 1 -1 0
business loss. charging sequence in case of activating FAL will
initiate hold sequence.
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10 FQI-5001 10.1 Failure of FQI (measuring BU 4 -1 3 10.1.1 Standard operating procedure to check 3 -1 2
Malfunction (it shows instrument) allows operator to charge and write charging quantity and tank level after
more reading than less quantity in reaction, batch failure or completion of charging operation.
actual). significant business loss. 10.1.2 DCS sequence has function to show
deviation between FQI and Tank level, will
allows operator to take immediate action after
wrong charging.
10.1.3 LI-5001 on T-501 for monitoring.

11. Human error 11.1 Delay in batch processing, BU 2 0 2 11.1.1 Low flow alarm and interlock provided 2 -1 1
(Operator opened less significant business loss. to charging sequence in case of activating FAL
valve than actual will initiate hold sequence.
required
More Flow 12. FQI -5001 Failure 12.1 Failure of FQI charge more quantity EN 3 -1 2 12.1.1 Charging of more quantity from feed 2 -2 0
(FQI measures less in reaction and reactor will overflow it tank (T-401) shall imitate hold sequence.
reading than actual). leads to LOPC and create major 12.1.2 LAHH-5001 on T-501 along with alarms
environment hazard and significant and activation of LAHH will close all raw
business loss. material charging valve on T-501.
12.1.3 LI-5001 for monitoring.

More This cause is not

temperature credible for selected
node
Less This cause is not
temperature credible for selected
node
More pressure This cause is not
credible for selected
node
Less pressure This cause is not
credible for selected
node
2. Charging No Flow 13. No level in T-402. 13.1 Delay in batch processing, BU 2 -1 1 13.1.1 Low level switch provided on T-402 1 -1 0
of material significant business lost. along with low level alarm, Activating low level
B from T- switch will not allow operator to initiate
402 to T- charging procedure.
501 13.1.2 Low flow alarm and interlock provided
to charging sequence in case of activating FAL
will initiate hold sequence.

14. J-401 Failure or 14.1 Same as 1.1 BU 2 -1 1 14.1.1 Pump low current alarms along with 1 -1 0
breakdown hold sequence has been provided
14.1.1 same as 1.1.2.
15. Human error 15.1 Same as 1.1 BU 2 0 2 15.1.1 Same as 1.1.2. 2 -1 1
(operator forget to
open pump suction and
discharge line up).
16. FIC-5001 stuck 16.1 Same as 1.1 BU 2 -1 1 16.1.1 Same as 1.1.2. 1 -1 0
closed
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17. Failure of XV-4005, 17.1 Same as 1.1 BU 2 -1 1 17.1.1 Same as 1.1.2. 1 -1 0
XV-4006, and XV-3002
(stuck closed).
18. Rupture line. 18.1 Same as 1.1 OSHA 4 -2 1 18.1.1 Same as 1.1.2. 1 0 1
18.2 Rupture line allows Flammable 18.1.2 Hazardous area classification has been
material to enter into atmosphere, LOPC performed.
and create major safety hazard.
19. J-402 Pump strainer 19.1 Same as 1.1 BU 2 -1 19.1.1 Same as 1.1.2. 1 -1 0
fully chocked
Less Flow 20. Pump strainer 20.1. Less material in suction line create OSHA 4 -1 3 20.1.1 Low current interlock provided to pump 3 -1 2
partially chocked. starvation of pump and it can damage which will stop pump.
pump, leads to LOPC and create major 20.1.2 Activation of FAL (low flow alarms) will
fire hazard. initiate hold sequence, which will stop J-402
20.2. Delays in batch processing, pump.
significant business lost.

21. FIC-5001 21.1. Delay in batch processing, BU 2 -1 1 21.1.1 Low flow alarm and interlock provided 1 -1 0
malfunction significant business loss. to charging sequence in case of activating FAL
will initiate hold sequence.
22. FQI-5001 22.1 Failure of FQI (measuring BU 4 -1 3 22.1.1. Standard operating procedure to check 3 -1 2
Malfunction (it shows instrument) allows operator to charge and write charging quantity and tank level after
more reading than less quantity in reaction, batch failure or completion of charging operation.
actual). significant business loss. 22.1.2 DCS sequence has function to show
deviation between FQI and Tank level, will
allows operator to take immediate action after
wrong charging.
22.1.3. LI-5001 on T-501 for monitoring.

23. Human error 23.1 Delay in batch processing, BU 2 0 2 23.1.1 Low flow alarm and interlock provided 2 -1 1
(Operator opened less significant business loss. to charging sequence in case of activating FAL
valve than actual will initiate hold sequence.
required
More Flow 24. FQI -5001 Failure 24.1 Failure of FQI charge more quantity EN 3 -1 2 24.1.1 Charging of more quantity from feed 2 -2 0
(FQI measures less in reaction and reactor will overflow it tank (T-401) shall imitate hold sequence.
reading than actual). leads to LOPC and create major 24.1.2 LAHH-5001 on T-501 along with alarms
environment hazard and significant and activation of LAHH will close all raw
business loss. material charging valve on T-501.
24.1.3 LI-5001 for monitoring.

More This cause is not

temperature credible for selected
node
Less This cause is not
temperature credible for selected
node
More pressure This cause is not
credible for selected
node
Less pressure This cause is not
credible for selected
node
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Pump Less Flow 25. Failure of XV-7001, 25.1 No Pump circulation will reduce BU 2 -1 1 25.1.1 Low current trip provided to P-501 I and 1 -1 0
circulation XV-7002 (valve failed reaction rate, possible chances of off- P-501 II.
and stuck close). spec product formation, significant 25.1.2.
agitation business loss.
after Raw
No Agitation 26. Failure of A-501 26.1 Failure of agitation leads to no BU 3 -1 2 26.1.1 Agitator on time power consumption is 2 -1 1
material
mixing doing reaction, possible chances shows on DCS graphics and standard operating
charging
of off-spec product formation, procedure to note down agitator current after
significant business lost. one hr. of time interval.
More Flow This cause is not
credible for this
deviation.
More pressure This cause is not
credible for this
deviation.
Less Pressure This cause is not
credible for this
deviation.
Less This cause is not
Temperature credible for this
deviation.
More This cause is not
temperature credible for this
deviation.
Heating to Less 27. Failure of TIC-3001 27.1 No heating to reaction reduce BU 3 -1 2 27.1.1. TI-3001 is available for monitoring and 2 -1 1
T-501 temperature (TIC fails stuck close). reaction rate and it leads to batch Standard operating procedure to note down
failure, significant business loss. temperature after one hr. time interval.
27.1.2 DCS recipe has a function to halt process
if temperature not achieved after 1 hrs. of Raw
material charging along with low temperature
alarm.

28. Failure of XV-3001 28.1 same as 27.1. BU 3 -1 2 28.1.1 Same as 27.1.1 and 27.1.2. 2 -1 1
(fail stuck closed)
29. Utility failure, low 29.1 same as 27.1 BU 3 -1 2 29.1.1. Low steam pressure alarm on DCS. 2 -2 0
steam pressure (steam 29.1.2. same as 27.1.1 and 27.1.2
Failure)
More 30. Failure TIC-5001 30.1. More heating pressurize reactor OSHA 4 -1 3 30.1.1. PAHH-5001 on tank along with alarm, 3 -3 0
Temperature (TIC fails stuck open) and leads to reactor failure, LOPC, activation of PAHH-5001 shall close XV-3001
create major safety and fire hazards. (heating valve).
30.2. More heating creates possible loss 30.1.2. Secondary Temperature measurement
of reactant, leads to batch failure, available on T-501 (TI-5002).
significant business loss. 30.1.3. RD-5001 on T-501.
30.1.4. Vent bypass valve shall open after
activation of PAHH-5001.
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31. Raise in supply 31.1. More heating pressurize reactor OSHA 4 -1 3 31.1.1 (PIC) Control valve provided on main 3 -4 -1
steam pressure (Utility and leads to reactor failure, steam line supply to control steam pressure to
supply pressure overpressure may lead to LOPC, create reactor.
increases). major safety and fire hazards. 31.1.2 TIC-5001 on T-501
31.2. More heating creates possible loss 31.1.3.PAHH-5001 on tank along with alarm,
of reactant, leads to batch failure, activation of PAHH-5001 shall close XV-3001
significant business loss. (heating valve).
31.1.4. Secondary Temperature measurement
available on T-501 (TI-5002).
31.1.5. RD-5001 on T-501.
31.1.6 Vent bypass valve shall open after
activation of PAHH-5001.

More Pressure 32. Failure of PIC-5001 32.1. Reactor may overpessurize leads to OHSA 5 -1 4 32.1.1 Activation of PAHH -5001 will open XV- 4 -3 1
(PIC fails stuck open) failure of reactor or vessel may rupture, 8001 (vent by-pass valve).
overpressure may lead to LOPC, H2S 32.1.2. PAHH-5001 will generate alarm.
may release to atmosphere create major 32.1.3. RD-5001 on T-501.
safety hazards.
32.2 Release H2S gas to atmosphere
create major fire hazard

33. Failure of PI-5001 33.1 Reactor may overpessurize leads to OHSA 5 -1 4 33.1.1. Activation of PAHH -5001 will open XV- 4 -3 1
(Pressure transmitter failure of reactor or vessel may rupture, 8001 (vent by-pass valve).
shows less pressure overpressure may lead to LOPC, H2S 33.1.2. PAHH-5001 will generate alarm.
than actual). may release to atmosphere create major 33.1.3. RD-5001 on T-501.
safety hazards.
33.2 Release H2S gas to atmosphere
create major fire hazard

34. Other than 34. Other than 34.1 Sampling of hot reaction mass will OHSA 2 0 2 34.1.1 Special PPE, heat resistance gloves
Sampling create major burn injury, significant provided to operator for sampling
of reaction safety hazard.
mass after
reaction
completion 2 -1 1
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To be continue……………………………