Safety and Hazard Analysis

(CHE 1007)

Dr.A.Babu Ponnusami
Associate Professor
SCHEME

MODULE-6
LECTURE-1,2
HAZARD AND OPERABILITY STUDY
 HAZARD EVALUATION TECHNIQUES

1960 - 2001 1960 - 2001 1965 - 2001 1970 - 2001 1972 - 1974 1974 - 2001
Safety Check Lists Relative PHA What if HAZOP
Review Ranking

Walk Historical ICI Mond Preliminary Brainstorming Hazards

Through Lists Index Hazard Operability
Inspection Analysis Analysis
Yes / No Dow FEI
Hazardous Mtls Line by Line
Hazardous Opns Deviation
Analysis
This presentation only considers the HAZOP technique.
HAZOP – HAZARD & OPERABILITY
INTRODUCTON:
 HAZOP was developed by Lawley (1974) of ICI. Bas
ed on early account by Elliott & Owen (1968).
 A HAZOP study is a widely used method for the id
entification of hazards
 Hazop studies are carried out by an experienced,
multidisciplanary team.
 Review all physical aspects of a process (lines,
equipment, instrumentation) to discover potential
hazards.

HAZOP results in a very systematic assessment of hazards

INTRODUCTION CONTD..

 A HAZOP is a rigorous and highly structured h

azard identification tool
 The plant/process under investigation is spli
t into study nodes & lines and equipment are
reviewed on a node by node basis
 Guideword and deviation lists are applied to
process parameters to develop possible deviat
ions from the design intent

HAZOP results in a very systematic assessment of hazards

WHEN TO USE?
Optimal from a cost viewpoint
1. when applied to new plants at the point where
the design is nearly firm and documented or
2. to existing plants where a major redesign is p
lanned.

It can also be used for existing facilities.

RESULTS
Types: The results are the team findings.
Which include:
( 1) Identification of hazards and operating prob
lems,
( 2) Recommended changes in design, procedure, et
c., to improve safety; and
( 3) Recommendations for follow-on studies where
no conclusion was possible due to lack of in
formation.
Nature: Qualitative.
REQUIREMENTS
Data:
 The HAZOP requires detailed plant descriptions,
such as drawings, procedures, and flow charts.
 A HAZOP also requires considerable knowledge of
the process, instrumentation, and operation, and
this information is usually provided by team mem
bers who are experts in these areas.
Staff:
 The HAZOP team is ideally made up of 5 to 7 prof
essionals, with support for recording and report
ing. For a small plant, a team as small as two o
r three could be effective.
TIME AND COST

 The time and cost of a HAZOP are directly related t

o the size and complexity of the plant being analyz
ed.
 In general, the team must spend about three hours f
or each major hardware item.
 Where the system analyzed is similar to one investi
gated previously, the time is usually small.
 Additional time must be allowed for planning, team
coordination, and documentation.
 This additional time can be as much as two three ti
mes the team effort as estimated above
 HAZOP STUDY - TEAM COMPOSITION

A Team Leader, an expert in the HAZOP Technique

Technical Members, for example
New Design Existing Plant
Design or Project Engineer Plant Superintendent
Process Engineer Process Supervisor
(Foreman)
Commissioning Manager Maintenance Engineer
Instrument Design Engineer Instrument Engineer
Chemist Technical Engineer
Principles of HAZOP
Concept:
•Systems work well when operating under design conditions.
•Problems arise when deviations from design conditions occur.
Basis:
•A word model, a process flow sheet (PFD) or a piping and
instrumentation diagram (P&ID)
Method:
•Use guide words to question every part of process to discover
what deviations from the intention of design can occur and what
are their causes and consequences may be.
 PRINCIPLES OF HAZOPS
GUIDE WORDS*
NONE
MORE OF
LESS OF
PART OF
MORE THAN
OTHER

CAUSE DEVIATION CONSEQUENCES

(from standard (trivial, important,
condition catastrophic)
or intention) -hazard
difficulties -operating
*COVERING EVERY PARAMETER RELEVANT TO THE SYSTEM
UNDER REVIEW:
i.e. Flow Rate. Flow Quantity, Pressure, Temperature, Viscosity, Components
STUDY NODES:
The locations (on P&ID or procedures) at which the process
parameters are investigated for deviations. These nodes are points
where the process parameters (P, T, F etc.) have an identified
design intent.
INTENTION:
The intention defines how the plant is expected to operate in the
absence of deviations at the study nodes.
DEVIATIONS:
These are departures from the intension which can be discovered
by systematically applying the guide words.
• Process conditions
• activities
• substances
• time
• place
GUIDE WORDS
Guide Words Meaning
No, None Negation of Intention
More Of Quantitative Increase
Less Of Quantitative Decrease
As Well As (More Tha Qualitative Increase
n) Qualitative Decrease
Part Of Logical Opposite of Intenti
Reverse on
Other Than Complete Substitution
 DEVIATIONS GENERATED BY EACH GUIDE WORD
GUIDE WORD DEVIATIONS
NONE No forward flow when there should be, i.e. no flow.
More of any relevant physical property than there should
be, e.g. higher flow (rate or total quantity), higher
MORE OF temperature, higher pressure, higher viscosity, etc.
LESS OF Less of any relevant physical property than there should be,
e.g. lower flow (rate or total quantity), lower temperature,
lower pressure, etc.
PART OF Composition of system different from what it should be,
e.g. change in ratio of components, component missing, ect.
MORE THAN More components present in the system than there should
be, e.g. extra phase present (vapour, solid), impurities (air.
Water, acids, corrosion products), etc.
OTHER THAN What else can happen apart from normal operation, e.g.
start-up, shutdown, uprating, low rate running, alternative
operation mode, failure of plant services, maintenance,
catalyst change, etc.
 HAZOP GUIDE WORDS
NO or NOT Negation of intention No Flow of A

MORE Quantitative increase Flow of A greater than design flow

LESS Quantitative decrease Flow of A less than design flow

AS WELL AS Quantitative increase Transfer of some component additional to A

PART OF Quantitative decrease Failure to transfer all components of A

REVERSE Logical opposite of intention Flow of A in direction opposite to design direction

OTHER THAN Complete substitution Transfer of some material other than A

More recent computerization techniques use a Standard Set Of Generic Deviations

For Specific Section Types. See Dev'ns tab for examples.
 COMMON HAZOP ANALYSIS PROCESS
PARAMETERS

Flow Time Frequency Mixing

Pressure Composition Viscosity Addition

Temperature pH Voltage Separation

Level Speed Toxicity Reaction

 PREPARE FOR THE REVIEW
Attitude
Preparation Meeting Leadership

HAZOP
Review By Documentation Follow-up
Team

Knowledge Info for study

Experience Teams HAZOP P&Ids, Layout
Experience

Table

Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards Action

HAZOP FLOW SHEET
Select a process
section or
operating step

Explain design Repeat for all

intention process sections

Select a process Repeat for all

variable or task process variables

Apply guide word Repeat for all

to process variable guide words

Examine Develop action

Consequences items
associated with
deviation

List possible Assess acceptability

causes of of risk based on
deviation consequences

Identify existing
safeguards to
prevent deviation
 EXAMPLE:1 FB  FA
A B

C
 The flowsheet shows that raw material streams A and B are tran
sferred by pump to a reactor, where they react to form produc
t C.
 Assume that the flow rate of B should not exceed that of A.
 Otherwise, an explosion may occur. Let’s consider the flow of
A in line 1:

NONE No flow of A
MORE Flow of A greater than design flow
LESS Flow of A less than design flow
AS WELL AS Transfer of some component additional to A
PART OF Failure to transfer a component of A
REVERSE Flow of A in a direction opposite to design
direction
OTHER THAN Transfer of some material other than A
Beginning

1 Select a vessel
2 Explain the general intention of the vessel and its lines

3 Select a line

4 Explain the intention of the line

5 Apply the first guide words

6 Develop a meaningful deviation

7 Examine possible causes

Examine consequences
8
Detect hazards
9
Make suitable record
10
Repeat 6-10 for all meaningful deviations derived from first guide words
11
Repeat 5-11 for all the guide words
12
Mark line as having been examined
13
Repeat 3-13 for each line
14
Select an auxiliary system (e.g. Heating system)
15
Explain the intention of the auxiliary system
16
Repeat 5-12 for auxiliary system
17
Mark auxiliary as having been examined
18
Repeat 15-18 for all auxiliaries
19
Explain intention of the vessel
20 Repeat 5-12
21 Mark vessel as completed
22 Repeat 1-22 for all vessels on flow sheet
23 Mark flow sheet as completed
24 Repeat 1-24 for all flow sheets
25 Figure 8.9 Hazard and operability studies : detailed sequence of examination
End (Chemical Industry Safety and Health Council, 1977 Item 6)
HAZOP DISPLAY

Guide Word Deviation Possible Causes Consequences Action Required

No No Flow Pump Fail System Over- Shutdown
Heated System
Line Blockage
Operator
Stops Pump
More More Excessive Over-Cooled Product
Flow Pump Speed Product Unacceptable;
(Control System) (Incomplete Dump
Reaction)
EXAMPLE

 An alkene/alkane fraction containing small amo

unts of suspended water is continuously pumped fro
m a bulk intermediate storage tank via a half-mile
pipeline into a buffer/settling tank where the res
idual water is settled out prior to passing via a
feed/product heat exchanger and preheater to the r
eaction, is run off manually from the settling tan
k at intervals. Residence time in the reaction sec
tion must be held within closely defined limits to
ensure adequate conversion of the alkene and to av
oid excessive formation of polymer.
RESULTS OF HAZARD AND OPERABILITY STUDY OF PROPOSED OL
EFINE DIMERIZATION UNIT: RESULTS FOR LINE SECTION FROM
INTERMEDIATE STORAGE TO BUFFER/SETTLING TANK
Guide Deviation Possible causes Consequences Action required
word
NONE No flow (1)No hydrocarbon available Loss of feed to reaction (a) Ensure good
at intermediate storage. section communications with
and reduced output. intermediate storage
Polymer formed in heat operator
exchanger under no flow
conditions. (b)Install low level alarm
on settling tank LIC.

(2)J1 pump fails (motor Covered by (b)

fault, loss of drive,
impeller corroded away As for (1) (c)Install kickback on J1
etc.) pump.

(3)Line blockage, isolation As for (1) (d)Check design of J1

valve closed in error, or J1 pump overheats. pump strainers.
LCV fails shut.

(e)Institute regular
(4)Line fracture As for (1) patrolling & inspection
of transfer line.
Hydrocarbon discharged
into area adjacent to public
highway.

(1)
 Results of hazard and operability study of proposed olefine
dimerization unit: Results for line section from intermediate storage to buffer/settling tank
Guide word Deviation Possible causes Consequences Action required
MORE OF More flow (5)LCV fails open or LCV Settling tank overfills. (f)Install high level alarm
bypass open in error. on LIC and check
sizing of relief opposite
liquid overfilling.
(g)Institute locking off
procedure for LCV
bypass when not in use.
Incomplete separation of water (h)Extend J2 pump suction
phase in tank, leading to line to 12’’ above tank
problems on reaction section. base.
More pressure (6)Isolation valve closed in Transfer line subjected to full (j)Covered by (c) except
error or LCV closes, with pump delivery or surge pressure. when kickback blocked
J1 pump running. or isolated. Check line.
FQ and flange ratings
and reduce stroking
speed of LCV if
necessary. Install a PG
upstream of LCV and
an independent PG on
settling tank.
(7)Thermal expansion in an Line fracture or flange leak. (k)Install thermal expansion
isolated valved section due relief on valved section
to fire or strong sunlight. (relief discharge route to
be decided later in study).
More (8)High intermediate storage Higher pressure in transfer line (l)Check whether there is
temperature temperature. and settling tank. adequate warning of
high temperature at
intermediate storage. If
not, install.

(2)
 Results of hazard and operability atudy of proposed olefine
dimerization unit: results for line section from intermediate storage to buffer/settling tank
Guide word Deviation Possible causes Consequences Action required
LESS OF Less flow (9)Leaking flange of valved Material loss adjacent to public Covered by (e) and the
stub not blanked and highway. checks in (j).
leaking.
Less (10)Winter conditions. Water sump and drain line (m)Lag water sump down
temperature freeze up. to drain valve and steam
trace drain valve and
drain line downstream.
PART OF High water (11)High water level in Water sump fills up more quickly. (n)Arrange for more frequent
concentration intermediate storage Increased chance of water phase draining off of water from
in stream. tank. passing to reaction section. intermediate storage tank.
Install high interface level
alarm on sump.
High concen- (12)Disturbance on distillation Higher system pressure. (p)Check that design of
tration of lower columns upstream of settling tank and associated
alkanes or intermediate storage. pipework, including relief
alkenes in stream. valve sizing, will cope with
sudden ingress of more
volatile hydrocarbons.
MORE Organic acids (13)As for (12) Increased rate of corrosion of (q)Check suitability of
THAN present tank base, sump and drain line. materials of construction.
OTHER Maintenance (14)Equipment failure, flange Line cannot be completely (r)Install low-point drain and
leak, etc. drained or purged. N2 purge point down-
Stream of LCV. Also
N2 vent on settling tank.

(3)
Example10.2:
Consider the reactor system shown in Figure. The reaction is
exothermic, so a cooling system is provided to remove the excess
energy of reaction. In the event that the cooling function is lost, the
temperature of the reactor would increase. This would lead to an
increase in reaction rate, leading to additional energy release. The
result would be a runaway reaction with pressures exceeding the
bursting pressure of the reactor vessel.

The temperature within the reactor is measured and is used to

control the cooling water flow rate by a valve.
Perform a HAZOP study on this unit to improve the safety of the
process. Use as study nodes the cooling coil (process parameters:
flow and temperature) and the stirrer (process parameter: agitation).
Solution:
The guide words are applied to the study node of the cooling
coils and the stirrer with the designated process parameters.
The potential process modifications resulting from this study
(Example 10-2) are the following:

• Install a high-temperature alarm to alert the operator in the

event of cooling function loss,

• Install a high-temperature shutdown system (this system would

automatically shut down the process in the event of a high
reactor temperature; the shutdown temperature would be
higher than the alarm temperature to provide the operator with
the opportunity to restore cooling before the reactor is
shutdown),
The potential process modifications Contd.

• Install a check valve in the cooling line to prevent reverse

flow (a check valve could be installed both before and after
the reactor to prevent the reactor contents from flowing
upstream and to prevent the backflow in the event of a leak
in the coils),
• Periodically inspect the cooling coil to ensure its integrity,
• Study the cooling water source to consider possible
contamination and interruption of supply,
• Install a cooling water flow meter and low-flow alarm
(which will provide an immediate indication of cooling
loss).
 HAZOP PITFALLS
Poor understanding by management of the HAZOP procedure

An Ethylene plant has 100 P&IDs, 625 equip't items. 625 items
Consider 5 variables, Pressure, Temperature, Flow
Composition and Function. 5 variables
Consider 6 Guidewords, None, More of, Less of
Part of, More than and Other than. 6 guide words
Questions to be answered = 18750 questions
Consider 5 minutes per question = 5 min./question
Time for ethylene plant HAZOP study = 93750 minutes
4 hour, 240 minutes sessions per day = 250 minutes/day
No. working of days = 375 days
Days per week = 5 days/week
No. of weeks to complete HAZOP for plant = 75 weeks
OTHER PITFALLS:
 Inexperienced HAZOP team.
 Inadequately trained or in-experienced leader.

Common HAZOP Mistakes:

• Failing to establish a "safe" environment for team
members.
• Consequences of events not carried to conclusion.
• Taking unwarranted credit for safeguards.
• Too little credit given for safeguards.
• Failure to make recommendations as specific as possible.
• Poor record keeping of HAZOPS.
• Failure to HAZOP start-up and shut-down procedures.
• P&IDs not up-dated or poorly constructed.
HAZOP
Advantages
 Will identify hazards, and events leading to an
accident, release or other undesired event
 Systematic and rigorous process

 The systematic approach goes some way to ensurin

g all hazards are considered
Disadvantages
 HAZOPs are most effective when conducted using P
&IDs, though they can be done with PFDs
 Requires significant resource commitment

 HAZOPs are time consuming

 The HAZOP process is quite monotonous and mainta

ining participant interest can be a challenge