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Individual and social organization.
But how is the
knowledge of the ultimate and permanent good to be achieved? In addressing this question, we encounter the seemingly insurmountable obstacle that such knowledge is not possible except in a just and harmonious social order. Everywhere else, the mind is distracted and misled by false valuations and false perspectives. A disorganized and factional society establishes a number of different models and standards. Under such conditions, it is impossible for the individual to attain consistency—perfunctory and superficial where there is no interest. Parents and teachers often complain, and correctly so, that children “do not want to hear or want to understand.” Their minds are not upon the subject precisely because it does not engage them; it does not enter into their concerns. This is a state of affairs that needs to be remedied, but the remedy is not in the use of methods which increase indifference and aversion. Even punishing a child for inattention is one way of trying to make him realize that the matter is not one of complete unconcern; it is one way of arousing “interest,” or bringing about a sense of connection. In the long run, its value is measured by whether it supplies a mere physical excitation to act in the way desired by the adult or whether it leads the child “to think”—that is, to reflect upon his acts and imbue them with meaning.
The fuller one's conception of possible future
achievements, the less one’s present activity is tied down to a small number of alternatives. If one knew enough, one could start almost anywhere and sustain his activities continuously and fruitfully.
Understanding, then, the term general or
comprehensive aim simply in the sense of a broad survey of the field of present activities, we shall take up some of the larger ends that have currency in the educational theories of the day, and consider what light they cast upon the immediate concrete and diversified aims that are always the educator’s real concern. We premise (as indeed immediately follows from what has been said) that there is no need to make a choice among them or regard them as competitors. When we come to account for a tangible way, we have to select or choose a particular act at a particular time, but any number of comprehensive ends may exist without competition, since they simply represent different ways of looking at the same scene. One cannot climb several different mountains simultaneously, but the views had when different mountains are ascended supplement one another; they do not set up. Incompatible, competing worlds. Or, putting the matter a slightly different way, one statement of an end may suggest certain questions and observations, and another (mechanical) is. “Nature” may be said to declare that there are conditions of educational efficiency, and that until we have learned what these conditions are and have learned to make our practices accord with them, the noblest and most ideal of our aims are doomed to suffer—are verbal and sentimental rather than efficacious.
The aim of natural development translates into the
aim of respect for physical mobility. In Rousseau’s words: “Children are always in motion; a sedentary life is injurious.” When he says that “Nature’s intention is to strengthen the body before exercising the mind,” he does not fairly state the fact. But if he had said that nature’s “intention” (to adopt his poetic form of speech) is to develop the mind especially by exercise of the muscles of the body, he would have stated a positive fact. In other words, the aim of following nature means, in the concrete, regard for the actual part played by the use of bodily organs in exploration, in handling materials, in play, and games.
The general aim translates into the aim of
regarding individual differences among children. Nobody can take the principle of consideration of native powers into account without being struck by the fact that these powers differ in different individuals. The difference applies not to being enslaved to one’s appetites and circumstances unless one submits voluntarily to the educative discipline of state institutions and laws. In this spirit, Germany was the first country to undertake a public, universal, and compulsory system of education extending from primary school through university, and to subject all private educational enterprises to jealous state regulation and supervision. Two results should stand out from this brief historical survey. The first is that such terms as the individual and the social conceptions of education are quite meaningless when taken at large, or apart from their context. Plato held the ideal of an education that should equate individual realization with social coherency and stability. His situation forced his ideal into the notion of a society organized in stratified classes, losing the individual in the class. The eighteenth-century educational philosophy was highly individualistic in form, but this form was inspired by a noble and generous social ideal: that of a society organized to include humanity and providing for the indefinite perfectibility of mankind. The idealistic philosophy of Germany in the early nineteenth century endeavored once more to equate the ideals of free and complete development of cultured individuals. Participate, and that the progress of one member has worth for the experience of other members – it is readily communicable – and that the family is not an isolated whole, but enters intimately into relationships with business groups, with schools, with all the agencies of culture, as well as with other similar groups, and that it plays a due part in the political organization and in return receives support from it. In short, there are many interests consciously communicated and shared; and there are varied and free points of. Education as Formation. We now come to a type of theory that denies the existence of faculties and emphasizes the unique role of subject matter in the development of mental and moral disposition. According to it, education is neither a process of unfolding from within nor is it a training of faculties resident in the mind itself. It is rather the formation of the mind by setting up certain associations or connections of content by means of subject matter presented from without. Education proceeds by instruction taken in a strictly literal sense, a building into the mind from without. That education is formative.
Final The Problem of Instruction Is Thus That of Finding Material Which Will Engage A Person in Specific Activities Having An Aim or Purpose of Moment or Interest To Him