_building-partner-capabilities-for-coalition-operations

Building Partner
Capabilities for
Coalition Operations
Jennifer D. P. Moroney • Nancy E. Blacker

Renee Buhr • James McFadden
Cathryn Quantic Thurston • Anny Wong
Prepared for the United States Army
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

The research described in this report was sponsored by the United States
Army under Contract No. W74V8H-06-C-0001.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Building partner capabilities for coalition operations / Jennifer D.P. Moroney ... [et al.].
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references.
ISBN 978-0-8330-4211-8 (pbk. : alk. paper)
1. Combined operations (Military science) 2. United States. Army—
Organization. 3. Multinational armed forces—Organization. 4. United States—
Military relations—Foreign countries. 5. Military planning—United States.
I. Moroney, Jennifer D. P., 1973–
U260.B85 2007
355.4'6—dc22
2007041452
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Preface
This monograph documents research conducted for the U.S. Army on

the feasibility of adopting a new approach to building partner capabili-
ties and capacity for coalition operations. It is the latest in a series of
RAND Arroyo Center studies supporting the Army’s efforts to bol-
ster the capabilities of partner armies for the spectrum of coalition
operations.
Ongoing operations and emerging mission requirements place a
heavy burden on Army resources, resulting in capability gaps that the
Army is unable to fill by itself. One way to fill those gaps is to build the
appropriate capabilities in allies and partner armies through focused
security cooperation. As a supporting entity, the Army must use its
limited resources in a way that effectively builds capabilities that sup-
port Joint requirements, and it must do so through close coordination
with other agencies to build capacity.
This monograph builds on prior RAND Arroyo Center work by
examining the types of capabilities the U.S. Army might develop in
partner armies, based on current and anticipated U.S. Army capability
gaps. This study argues that U.S. Army planners need a more com-
prehensive understanding of the types of capability gaps that partner
armies might fill and a process for matching them with candidate part-
ner armies. The study also provides guidelines for planning associated
Army security cooperation activities and discusses the importance of
developing metrics that would allow the Army to assess its security
cooperation investment over time.
The research for this study was sponsored by the Deputy Chief
of Staff, G-35 (Operations and Plans) and was conducted in RAND
iii
iv Building Partner Capabilities for Coalition Operations
Arroyo Center’s Strategy, Doctrine, and Resources Program. RAND

Arroyo Center, part of the RAND Corporation, is a federally funded
research and development center sponsored by the United States
Army.
The Project Unique Identification Code (PUIC) for the project
that produced this document is DAPRR06027.
For more information on RAND Arroyo Center, contact the

Director of Operations (telephone 310-393-0411, extension 6419; FAX
310-451-6952; email Marcy_Agmon@rand.org), or visit Arroyo’s web
site at http://www.rand.org/ard/.
Contents
Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv
Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xvii
CHAPTER ONE
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Study Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Organization of the Monograph . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
CHAPTER TWO
The Challenge of Building Partner Capability and Capacity:
Theory and Practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Assumptions and Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
The Challenge of Developing Metrics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
The Importance of Train and Equip Programs for U.S. Army
Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Selection of TEPs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Key Factors Examined . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Collective Findings from the TEPs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
v
vi Building Partner Capabilities for Coalition Operations
CHAPTER THREE
Identifying U.S. Army Capability Gaps for Coalition Operations . . . 27
Strategic-Level Guidance Documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
National Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Army Strategies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Army Capabilities Studies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Capabilities Needs Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Capability Gap Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
HQDA G-3 Army Capability Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Army Capability Gaps: A Composite, Illustrative List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
CHAPTER FOUR
Matching U.S. Army Capability Gaps to Candidate Partner
Armies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Step 1: Determine Relative Importance of U.S. Army Capability
Gaps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Step 2: Identify Appropriate Capabilities Based on Level of Effort . . . . . . 43
Step 3: Identify Capabilities of Shared Interest to the U.S. Army
and Partner Armies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Step 4: Identify Candidate Partner Armies Based on Availability
and Political Acceptability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
Step 5: Determine Existing Partner Army Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
Illustrating the Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
Georgia: Sustainment and Stability Operations Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
CHAPTER FIVE
Conclusions and Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
APPENDIX
A. Illustrative Train and Equip Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
B. Explanation of Capability Gaps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
C. Coalition Partner Contributions to U.S.-Led Operations . . . . . . . . . . 89
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
Figures
2.1. Linking Army Security Cooperation to Building Capability

and Capacity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.1. Five-Step Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
4.2. Capability Gaps Appropriate for Building Partner
Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
4.3. Capability Gaps of Interest to U.S. Army and Partner . . . . . . . . . . 49
vii
Tables
2.1. Army Programs Linked to Categories and Outputs . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

2.2. Using Multiple Programs to Develop Outputs and
Outcomes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.1. CNA Capability Gaps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.2. CGA Capability Gaps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.3. G-3’s Army Capability Priorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.4. U.S. Army Capability Gaps: A Composite List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
4.1. Level of Effort . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
4.2. Partner Interests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
4.3. Level of Partner Availability for U.S.-Led Operations . . . . . . . . . . 53
C.1. Number of U.S.-Led Coalition Operations Deployed to by
Partners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
C.2. Partner Contributions (Personnel and Nonpersonnel) . . . . . . . . . . 91
ix
Summary
This monograph outlines an approach to building the capabilities and

capacity of partner armies for coalition operations through the effec-
tive use of Army security cooperation. It is important to clarify two key
terms in this study, specifically, the difference between capability and
capacity. Simply put, capability is the ability to perform a function, and
capacity is the extent of a capability present.1 Ongoing operations and
emerging missions create competing demands for the Army’s capabili-
ties, resulting in requirement gaps that the Army is unable to fill by
itself. Although there are other ways to fill capability gaps (e.g., with
other Services, contractors, or increased Army end-strength), national
and Department of Defense (DoD) strategic guidance emphasizes the
need to leverage the capabilities of allies and partners to fill these gaps.
Thus, this monograph is concerned with how the Army should focus
its security cooperation activities to build the most appropriate capa-
bilities in partner armies. As a supporting entity, it must use its limited
security cooperation resources in a way that effectively builds partner
1 These definitions were developed specifically for this study, and differ somewhat from the
Joint Capability Area (JCA) lexicon. The study team felt that the latter definitions were too
narrowly focused on specific capabilities. According to the JCA lexicon, Building Military
Partner Capability refers to “the ability to improve the military capabilities of our allies
and partners to help them transform and optimize their forces to provide regional secu-
rity, disaster preparedness and niche capabilities in a coalition.” Building Military Partner
Capacity refers to “the ability to encourage and empower the military capacities of our allies
and partners through training, education, assistance, diplomacy and other activities so they
are prepared to protect homelands, defeat terrorists, and protect common interests while
strengthening relations with friendly global and regional powers.” “Joint Capability Areas,
Tier 1 & Tier 2 Lexicon” (2006).
xi
xii Building Partner Capabilities for Coalition Operations
army capabilities that support Joint requirements. To do this, the Army

cannot work in isolation. Partnering with DoD and other U.S. govern-
ment agencies provides the solution and also enables the development
of partner capacity.
This study is part of a larger RAND Arroyo Center effort to assist
the U.S. Army in building partner capabilities through enhanced and
focused security cooperation. It argues that U.S. Army planners need
a comprehensive understanding of the types of capability gaps that
partner armies might fill and provides a process for matching them
with potential partner capabilities. The study also provides insights
into planning associated with Army security cooperation activities and
discusses the importance of developing metrics that would allow the
Army to assess its security cooperation investment over time.
A New Approach to Building Partner Army Capabilities

for Coalition Operations
The study begins with a discussion of the current challenges associ-

ated with building capabilities and capacity with partner armies. The
discussion focuses on the theory of collective action and the challenge
of developing metrics to evaluate Army security cooperation activities.
It describes the U.S. Army’s role in the development of capability and
capacity metrics and shows how they can be linked to security coopera-
tion programs in a way that produces outputs and outcomes relevant
to the desired end-states. Several illustrative train and equip programs
(TEPs) were reviewed to identify specific lessons that the Army should
examine before planning and executing similar TEPs. The review spe-
cifically highlights the importance of selecting capabilities sustainable
by partners. The analysis shows that economic limitations may pose a
serious challenge to the sustainment of capabilities that are relatively
complex and costly. It suggests that caution should be taken to avoid
developing capabilities that are otherwise widely available among allies,
require a high level of effort to build, or are of a lower level of impor-
tance to the U.S. Army.
Summary xiii
The monograph then identifies U.S. Army capability gaps through

a review of strategic and operational guidance documents and relevant
Army and Joint studies. Because the Army is a supporting entity, its
capability gaps reflect Combatant Command (COCOM) require-
ments, taking into account Integrated Priority Lists (IPLs), Joint Oper-
ating Concepts (JOCs), and COCOM Theater Security Cooperation
(TSC) strategies. The result of the review is a set of relevant capability
gaps that may be appropriate for building in partner armies and that
form the analytic basis for subsequent chapters.
Next, the monograph provides a five-step process for matching
U.S. Army capability gaps with candidate partner armies. It presents
a set of criteria to help Army planners select candidate partner armies
for training or equipping programs. The five steps are (1) determine
the relative importance of capability gaps to the U.S. Army in specific
situations, (2) consider the level of effort required to build the capabil-
ity in a partner army, (3) identify capabilities of shared interest to the
U.S. Army and the partner army, (4) identify candidate partner armies
based on past participation in U.S.-led operations, and (5) determine
existing partner army capabilities. The process aims to help Army plan-
ners identify which capabilities are of mutual benefit to the United
States and partner nations. Finally, the study team applied the five-step
process to the data available for one illustrative TEP to gauge its pre-
dictive ability.
Recommendations
The study recommends that Headquarters, Department of the Army

(HQDA) adopt a focused approach for building the capabilities and
capacity of partner armies for coalition operations. To do this, HQDA
should focus its efforts on filling capability gaps to support Joint
requirements and implement a five-step process for matching U.S.
Army capability gaps with partner armies. A further recommendation
is that HQDA incorporate specific lessons from previous and ongo-
ing TEPs to improve future planning, execution, and assessment of its
security cooperation programs. HQDA should focus on the programs
xiv Building Partner Capabilities for Coalition Operations
it controls for building partner capabilities but should coordinate with

other agencies to consider all appropriate resources and activities to
build partner capacity. Finally, the study recommends developing and
employing metrics that link activities to build capability and capac-
ity with the desired ends, thus providing a way to ensure the effective
planning and execution of Army security cooperation activities.
Acknowledgments
We owe a great debt to a number of officers, civil servants, and ana-

lysts for their assistance on this study. These include current and past
members of Army Staff G-35, U.S. European Command, U.S. Army
Europe, Special Operations Command Europe, U.S. Central Com-
mand, U.S. Army Central Command, U.S. Pacific Command, U.S.
Army Pacific, Special Operations Command Pacific, the Joint Staff, the
Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the National Guard Bureau.
We would like to acknowledge the excellent feedback received from
the internal RAND reviewer, Eric Larson, and the external reviewer,
Jeffrey McCausland from Dickenson College. Their thoughtful and
detailed reviews greatly increased the quality of this monograph.
At RAND, Nikki Shacklett, Jed Peters, and Jefferson Marquis
provided valuable comments on early drafts. We also owe a debt of
gratitude to Col. (Ret.) Joe Hogler for his feedback on early drafts.
The project officers for this study were Mark McDonough, Chief
of the Multinational Force Compatibility Directorate in Army Staff
G-35, and Hartmut Lau, Chief, Policy, Plans & Assessments Branch.
They both provided outstanding support to the study on substantive
and also administrative matters. We are grateful for their guidance and
help throughout this one-year effort.
xv
Abbreviations
AAR after-action report

ABCA America, Britain, Canada, Australia
ACOTA African Contingency Operations Training and
Assistance
ACRI African Crisis Response Initiative
ACSA Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement
AFP Armed Forces of the Philippines
AIA Army International Activities
AIAP Army International Activities Plan
APEP Army Personnel Exchange Program
ARCIC Army Capabilities Integration Center
ASCC Army Service Component Command
ASCS Army Security Cooperation Strategy
ASPA American Service-members Protection Act
ASPG Army Strategic Planning Guidance
ATAP Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program
ATR Army Transformation Roadmap
AWC Army War College
xvii
xviii Building Partner Capabilities for Coalition Operations
BMATT British Military Advisory Training Team

BPC Building Partner Capacity
C4 command, control, communications, and
computers
CENTCOM Central Command
CGA Capability Gap Analysis
CI counterintelligence
CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CMEP Civil-Mlitary Emergency Preparedness
CNA Capability Needs Analysis
COCOM Combatant Command
COIN counterinsurgency
CSA Chief of Staff of the Army
CSF Coalition Support Fund
CTFP Counterterrorism Fellowship Program
CTU Counterterrorism Unit
DHS Department of Homeland Security
DoD Department of Defense
DOJ Department of Justice
DOS Department of State
DOTMLPF Doctrine, Operations, Training, Materiel, Leader-
ship, Personnel, and Facilities
DSCA Defense Security Cooperation Agency
EDA excess defense articles
xviii
Abbreviations xix
ERC exercise-related construction

ESEP Engineer and Scientist Exchange Program
EU European Union
EUCOM European Command
EXBS Export Control and Related Border Security
EXORD Executive Order
FCTP Foreign Comparative Testing Program
FID Foreign Internal Defense
FMF foreign military financing
FMS foreign military sales
GDP gross domestic product
GIG Global Information Grid
GPOI Global Peacekeeping Operations Initiative
GTEP Georgia Train and Equip Program
HQDA Headquarters, Department of the Army
HUMINT human intelligence
ICC International Criminal Court
ICRDA-DPS&T International Cooperative Research, Development
and Acquisition–Development, Production, Sci-
ence and Technology
IED improvised explosive device
IFOR International Security Force
IFP International Fellows Program
IMET International Military Education and Training
xx Building Partner Capabilities for Coalition Operations
IPL Integrated Priority List

ISAF International Security Assistance Force
ISC intelligence security cooperation
ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
JCA Joint Capability Area
JCEP Joint Combined Exchange Program
JCET Joint Combined Exchange and Training
JFCOM Joint Forces Command
JMETL Joint Mission Essential Task List
JOC Joint Operating Concept
JOpsC Joint Operations Concept
JTF-HOA Joint Task Force Horn of Africa
KFOR Kosovo Force
MAJCOM Major Command
MARFOREUR Marine Forces Europe
MCF Multinational Force Compatibility
MCO Major Combat Operation
METL Mission Essential Task List
MFO Multinational Force of Observers
MIP Multinational Interoperability Program
MOD Ministry of Defense
MOE measure of effectiveness
MP Military Police
MPP Mission Performance Plan
Abbreviations xxi
NADR Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and

Related Program
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDS National Defense Strategy
NGO nongovernmental organization
NMS National Military Strategy
NSS National Security Strategy
O&M operations and maintenance
OBS Operation Balanced Strike
OEF-P Operation Enduring Freedom–Philippines
OIF Operation Iraqi Freedom
OSD/P Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy
PA&E Program Analysis and Evaluation
PACOM Pacific Command
PFP Partnership for Peace
PKO Peacekeeping Operations
PSI Pan-Sahel Initiative
QDR Quadrennial Defense Review
RDT&E research, development, testing, and evaluation
ROK Republic of Korea
SAO Security Assistance Office
SCG Security Cooperation Guidance
SFOR Stabilization Force
SOCCENT Special Operations Command Central
xxii Building Partner Capabilities for Coalition Operations
SOCEUR Special Operations Command Europe

SOCPAC Special Operations Command Pacific
SOF Special Operations Forces
SOFA Status of Forces Agreement
SOLIC Special Operations Low-intensity Conflict
SON Schools of Other Nations
SOP standard operating procedures
SOUTHCOM Southern Command
SPP State Partnership Program
SSOP Sustainment and Stability Operations Program
SSTRO stability, security, transition, and reconstruction
operations
TEP Train and Equip Program
TRADOC Training and Doctrine Command
TSC Theater Security Cooperation
TSCTI Trans-Sahel Counterterrorism Initiative
TTP tactics, techniques, and procedures
U.K. United Kingdom
U.N. United Nations
USACE U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
USAID U.S. Agency for International Development
CHAPTER ONE
Introduction
Major challenges confront the U.S. Army as it seeks to enhance its abil-
ity to work more effectively with partner armies in an operational con-
text. U.S.- and NATO-led operations in Iraq and Afghanistan provide
recent examples of large-scale coalitions. Efforts in Kosovo, Bosnia,
Haiti, Sinai, and Somalia also demonstrate that the U.S. Army must be
able to operate effectively with many different partner armies of vary-
ing capabilities around the world. These and other missions are creat-
ing competing demands for Army capabilities that result in require-
ment gaps that the Army is unable to fill.
This monograph argues that U.S. Army planners need a compre-
hensive understanding of the capability gaps that partner armies might
fill and a process for matching them with candidate partner armies
whenever possible and appropriate. Although there are various ways to
fill capability gaps (e.g., with other Services, contractors, or increased
Army end-strength), strategic guidance emphasizes the need to lever-
age the capabilities of allies and partners for this purpose.1 Thus, this
1 Previous RAND analysis suggests that, from a standpoint of using comparative advan-
tage as a rational framework for assessing burden-sharing issues, there is potentially a “busi-
ness case” for cultivating foreign partner niche capabilities. Given the U.S. Army’s current
operational and financial constraints, it appears to make sense from a cost standpoint to help
our allies and partners develop their capabilities in certain niche areas. Further research is
needed to decrease the uncertainty over the requirements and costs of building niche capa-
bilities at home and overseas. In addition, the financial benefits accruing to the United States
from developing an overseas niche capability will depend on the degree of risk mitigation
pursued (i.e., the number of niche units built in the Unites States or in partner nations) as
1
2 Building Partner Capabilities for Coalition Operations
monograph focuses on an approach to building the most appropriate

capabilities in partner armies.2
Indeed, emerging Department of Defense (DoD) strategic guid-
ance, including the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)3 and
the 2006 Building Partnership Capacity [BPC] Execution Road-
map, emphasizes building the military capabilities of partner coun-
tries that will enable them to make valuable contributions to coalition
operations.4
The key questions addressed by the monograph include:
• Which types of military capabilities should the U.S. Army target

and why?
• In which partner armies should the Army invest its security coop-
eration resources?
• What are the characteristics of effective security cooperation
activities?
• How will the Army know if its security cooperation investments
are paying off?
Addressing these questions will help the Army effectively and effi-
ciently allocate its security cooperation resources. This study will help
well as the existing shortfalls in the military capabilities and requirements of our foreign
partners. See Moroney, Grissom, and Marquis (2007, p. 101).
2 Although the authors recognize the important role played by other U.S. government enti-
ties in security cooperation, a discussion of interagency collaboration is outside the scope of
this study.
3 Department of Defense (2005).
4 The QDR and the 2006 Building Partnership Capacity Execution Roadmap describe an
evolving concept. The concept includes guidance on how DoD should train and equip for-
eign military forces and also points to the need to improve the capacity of other security ser-
vices (i.e., stability police, border guards, and customs) within partner countries. Moreover,
the concept also calls for improving DoD’s ability to work with nonmilitary forces (i.e., other
U.S. government agencies and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), coalition partners,
and the private sector) in an operational context for integrated operations. The Army is in a
position to influence the direction of DoD’s emerging BPC strategy. At present, the Army
does not yet have its own Service-level plan for BPC.
Introduction 3
the U.S. Army create a more systematic approach to building partner

army capabilities and capacity for coalition operations through secu-
rity cooperation. Two key terms used in this study are capability and
capacity. Capability refers to the ability to perform a function, whereas
capacity refers to the extent of a capability present.5 Although the study
primarily focuses on the development of partner army capabilities, it
also addresses how capability is transformed into capacity through
working closely with other U.S. government agencies and leveraging
other security cooperation activities.
Study Objectives
This study has five objectives. The first is to identify current and antici-
pated U.S. Army capability gaps and determine which of them may be
appropriate for partner armies to fill. The second is to develop a process
that will enable the Army to match these capability gaps with appropri-
ate partner armies. The third is to examine previous and ongoing train
and equip programs (TEPs) to identify lessons that may be used in
future training programs with partner armies. The fourth is to provide
the rationale for developing metrics to track progress in building capa-
bilities and capacity. The final objective is to provide recommendations
for using Army security cooperation resources to enhance the capabili-
ties of partner armies to engage in coalition operations.
5 These definitions were developed specifically for this study, and differ somewhat from the
Joint Capability Area (JCA) lexicon. The study team felt that JCA definitions were too nar-
rowly focused on specific capabilities. According to that lexicon, building military partner
capability refers to “the ability to improve the military capabilities of our allies and partners
to help them transform and optimize their forces to provide regional security, disaster pre-
paredness and niche capabilities in a coalition.” Building military partner capacity refers
to “the ability to encourage and empower the military capacities of our allies and partners
through training, education, assistance, diplomacy and other activities so they are prepared
to protect homelands, defeat terrorists, and protect common interests while strengthening
relations with friendly global and regional powers.” See “Joint Capability Areas” (2006).
Approach
The RAND study team undertook a number of analytic activities to

accomplish the study objectives outlined above, including a literature
review of national, DoD, and U.S. Army strategic guidance on require-
ments for capabilities and security cooperation. The team also reviewed
Army and Joint capability gap assessments, partner capabilities and con-
tributions to coalition operations, and after-action reports (AARs) on
several train and equip programs. The team conducted workshops with
subject matter experts and spoke extensively with key policy planners
and implementers at Department of the Army headquarters (HQDA),
the Combatant Commands (COCOMs), and the Component Com-
mands. The preliminary findings of earlier drafts of this monograph
were also vetted with these functional and regional experts.
Organization of the Monograph
Chapter Two provides an overview of the current challenges associated

with building partner capabilities and capacity with partner armies. It
begins with a set of assumptions regarding security cooperation and a
discussion of the theory of collective action; it then provides an over-
view of the challenge associated with developing metrics to evaluate
Army security cooperation activities. The chapter closes with a discus-
sion of key findings for several TEPs to identify lessons that may be
used for future Army security cooperation. Chapter Two is linked with
Appendix A, which provides background, context, and key findings of
each TEP reviewed by the study team.
Chapter Three identifies U.S. Army capability gaps based on
known requirements identified through a review of strategic and oper-
ational guidance documents and appropriate Army and Joint studies.
It is linked with Appendix B, which provides detailed definitions for
each capability gap.
Chapter Four describes a five-step process for matching U.S. Army
capability gaps with candidate partner armies. Step 1 determines the
relative importance of capability gaps to the U.S. Army. Step 2 consid-
Introduction 5
ers the level of effort required to build the capability in a partner army.
Step 3 identifies capabilities of shared interest to the United States and
the partner. Step 4 identifies candidate partner armies as determined
by past participation in U.S.-led operations. Step 5 determines exist-
ing partner army capabilities. This process will help Army planners
identify capabilities that are mutually beneficial to the U.S. Army and
partner armies. The study team then applied the five-step process to the
data available for one illustrative TEP to gauge its predictive ability.
Chapter Five presents RAND’s recommendations. In addition
to suggesting that the Army adopt a five-step process for matching
U.S. Army capability gaps with partner armies, the chapter outlines
a number of planning, programmatic, and assessment changes that
would make Army security cooperation planning and execution more
effective.
CHAPTER TWO
The Challenge of Building Partner Capability and

Capacity: Theory and Practice
This chapter provides an overview of the current challenges associ-

ated with building capabilities and capacity with partner armies. It
is divided into three sections, beginning with the study’s assumptions
regarding security cooperation, followed by a discussion of the theory
of collective action.
Section two provides an overview of the challenge of developing
metrics to evaluate Army security cooperation activities. It describes the
U.S. Army’s role in the development of capability and capacity metrics
and shows how they can be linked to security cooperation programs to
assess outputs and outcomes relevant to the desired end-states.
Section three provides key findings from several TEPs. The study
team analyzed seven TEPs from a planning/funding and execution per-
spective to identify lessons that could be used for future Army security
cooperation. TEPs represent a mechanism to build partner capabilities
and capacity through security cooperation, providing focused train-
ing and equipment. The analysis includes TEPs conducted in Geor-
gia, Colombia, the Philippines, the Pan-Sahel and Maghreb regions of
Africa, Yemen, and Central Asia. A common set of factors is applied
to determine the strengths and weaknesses of each TEP. An additional
goal of this section is to identify lessons that could inform the develop-
ment of metrics. Detailed descriptions of the background and context
for each TEP are in Appendix A.
7
Assumptions and Theory
The process for matching U.S. Army capability gaps with candidate
partner armies is based on six assumptions. Underlying all of them
is an assumption of rationality.1 Successful collaboration between the
United States and partners depends on the extent to which each is
acting in its own state interest. When these interests align, cooperation
is more likely to be fruitful and sustainable. The first three assump-
tions, therefore, deal directly with U.S. Army interests and the last
three assumptions address partner army interests.
Assumption 1: The U.S. Army has two major reasons for building
partner capabilities and capacity. The first is to integrate partners into
ongoing and future U.S.-led coalition operations around the world.
The second is to enable partners to address domestic and regional prob-
lems without U.S. military participation.2
Assumption 2: The U.S. Army has two primary ways to fill capa-
bility gaps using partner armies. The first is to focus on partner armies
that already have the required capabilities. The second is to build these
capabilities from a basic level or to significantly improve nascent capa-
bilities, over a longer period.
Assumption 3: The U.S. Army can fill some of its capability gaps
with partner armies using security cooperation programs. Ideally, the
U.S. Army could meet all of its capability requirements by itself. How-
ever, budget limitations make it necessary to consider other ways to
acquire these capabilities. Either the capability gap can remain unad-
dressed and the Army accepts that risk or the Army may choose to try
to harness the preexisting abilities of a partner army or to develop a
capability in a partner army through a TEP. This largely depends on
the U.S. Army’s assessment of the reliability of the partner army. The
1 For a seminal work on applying rational actor assumptions to the study of security issues,
see Schelling (1963). Also, see Olson and Zeckhauser (1966, pp. 266–279), and Sandler
(1993, pp. 446–483).
2 This chapter and, indeed, the overall monograph, does not focus on building capabilities
in partner armies for their own domestic purposes or to enable them to participate in opera-
tions in their region without the United States, though we recognize that domestic utility is
an important motivation for BPC.
The Challenge of Building Partner Capability and Capacity 9
cost of developing the partner army’s capability or, indeed, the cost of
forgoing that capability in one’s own army in the hopes that a partner
will be available to fill that gap requires that the expected benefit of
cooperation outweigh the costs.
The next three assumptions provide a context for thinking about
building partner capabilities and security cooperation from the part-
ner’s perspective.
Assumption 4: The strength of a partner’s support for U.S. oper-
ations around the world indicates the extent to which that partner’s
international views and interests overlap those of the United States.
The primary evidence of such support includes a partner’s participation
in major U.S.-led military operations, although location and type of
operation are also important considerations.3 A secondary indicator of
support is the coincidence of the partner’s United Nations (U.N.) Gen-
eral Assembly voting record with that of the United States. A similar
stance on issues deemed “important” by the U.S. Department of State
(DOS) might serve as a signal of shared political interests.4
Assumption 5: Security cooperation activities that aim to build
partner capabilities are more likely to succeed and potentially develop
into capacity if the capability is of interest to both the partner and the
U.S. Army.5
Assumption 6: A partner will probably be more interested in
developing capabilities that (1) have domestic application,6 (2) increase
its international prestige, and (3) support its military transformation or
modernization efforts. A higher level of interest will increase the likeli-
3 See Appendix C for details on how “substantial participation” is determined and for a full
list of the U.S.-led coalition operations examined.
4 These correlations are an important consideration in selecting candidate partner armies
to fill U.S. Army capability gaps, as they suggest that the partner will likely be available to
participate. However, partner countries should be willing to accept the fact that support of
U.S.-led coalition operations may make them a target for terrorist attacks.
5 Other factors such as domestic budgetary constraints that could affect a partner’s ability
to sustain a capability may also influence a partner’s decision to deepen its military coopera-
tion with the United States.
6 The study team views domestic and regional utility as important considerations for gain-
ing partner buy-in and especially for sustaining a capability.
hood of long-term sustainment of capabilities and can potentially lead

to development of capacity—provided the partner has the resources
and will to become involved. The challenge to the U.S. Army is to over-
come the impulses of its partners to be free riders.7
Much conceptual work has addressed this challenge; some of
the insights were useful in establishing the fourth, fifth, and sixth
assumptions detailed above. One way to overcome the collective action
dilemma is to provide certain exclusive goods to those who contribute
to the collective effort. This logic can easily apply to security coopera-
tion: A partner that supports the United States in coalition operations
gains some exclusive good (e.g., training or equipment). By compari-
son, those that do not support the United States in coalition opera-
tions would not receive such training or equipment because they are
less-likely candidates for participation in Army security cooperation
activities.
This logic has been a fundamental force behind U.S. foreign
policy decisions, including its security cooperation endeavors. Nev-
ertheless, getting a partner to support the United States in coalition
operations (or any other enterprise) is not always an easy task—even for
a superpower such as the United States. Moreover, the certainty of this
support is always in question even when the United States appeals to
shared interests and provides partners with incentives such as financial
or military materiel. Therefore, it makes sense to choose partners with
common interests so that the United States will be able to count on its
partners to maintain, sustain, and mobilize their capabilities in support
of shared goals without additional incentives.
Another way to overcome the collective action problem and
engender long-term security cooperation is by tailoring the coopera-
7 Game theory, and the insights provided by rational actor assumptions outlined above,
can give analysts a useful way to think about coalition relationships. Alliances or ad hoc
coalitions are a form of security cooperation that fall under the larger rubric of collective
action problems. A rational state, or rational partner, will often hope to forgo the investment
in providing a public good (in this case, international or regional security) in the hopes that
another state will single-handedly incur the costs. Since public goods are by their nature
nonexcludable, the free rider state will expect to enjoy the good provided by the state incur-
ring the cost. Very often, the stronger the state, the more willing it will be to incur the cost
and allow the other states to free ride. See Olson (1965).
tive relationship in a way that the partner state’s own interest rein-
forces. In gaming terms, it is possible to move from a collaboration
game scenario8 to a coordination game scenario, where cooperation is
the optimal result.9 This type of game is easier to enforce and continue,
since both partners gain a greater payoff from cooperating than from
defecting.10
Maintaining this type of game and, by association, security
cooperation depends on two other important variables. First, both
parties must be convinced that their relationship will continue into
the future; in other words, they are involved in “iterated” games with
one another.11 The expectation that partner states will cooperate in an
indefinite number of interactions is essential to making the long-term
payoff for cooperation outweigh the short-term payoff for defection.
This provides an important insight into the choice set of coalition part-
ners; the states involved in the cooperation should have some reason to
believe that cooperation will continue.12
The second variable that must be accounted for in maintaining
a coordination game is the political suitability of the partner, which
is directly linked with the first discussed above. By and large, demo-
cratic governments, or those with at least some trappings of democracy
(e.g., free and fair elections, open economies, and freedom in expres-
sion and association), may more likely be deemed “acceptable” part-
ners for U.S. security cooperation activities; however, in practice, states
without strong democratic traditions are sometimes acceptable because
of political or military expediencies. However, if the United States is
8 Such as the typically uncooperative Prisoner’s Dilemma with high payoffs for defection.
9 An example is the Battle of the Sexes game.
10 Martin (1992).
11 Axelrod and Keohane (1985).
12 One could argue that countries involved in formal alliances such as NATO (which has
shown remarkable resiliency as an institution and in retaining its membership), or those
interested in joining a formal alliance such as NATO, may be more willing to consider the
long-term payoff. Likewise, states that participate in other cooperative endeavors with the
United States, either through international organizations or through bilateral agreements,
may be more likely to cooperate because of the potential for issue linkage across these coop-
erative domains. See Wallander (2000); Keohane (1984).
training a partner army in, for example, a potentially lethal capability,

criticism is far less likely if it involves a democratic regime. An authori-
tarian regime may use these skills at home; the fact that the United
States provided them with the skills would be politically untenable.
However, when dealing with democracies, one must take into account
the two levels at which partner states are playing. Partner states must
play the “domestic” game, paying attention to their constituents and
domestic special interests, while concurrently playing a game on the
international level with their coalition partners.13
Because states must balance the demands of this two-level game,
it is especially important that state interests and the sentiment of state
electorates be considered when determining how much the U.S. Army
can count on the availability of a given partner to support U.S.-led
coalition operations. Prior assistance to U.S. military efforts may be an
indication that the domestic level is relatively amenable to U.S. foreign
policy. Another indicator of shared interest is a partner’s U.N. General
Assembly voting record. Regardless, the nature of electoral institutions
and democratic governance indicates that at times, established part-
ners will be unable to cooperate in a particular security cooperation
endeavor. Thus, one can only determine the likelihood of cooperation
from a partner in probabilistic terms. Overall, those who have collabo-
rated with the U.S. Army in the past may be more likely to do so in
the future than those who have not, but there is no absolute guarantee
of cooperation in all scenarios. The interests to keep in mind in the
strategic game of coordination include political and military goals. It
is important to bear in mind that often partner interests go beyond
the material (e.g., financial and materiel) to encompass the symbolic.
Partners are likely to have an interest in increasing their prestige, on
either a domestic or international level.14 Prestige has its uses; partner
states may believe that increased prestige will give them more bargain-
ing power in their relationships with other states, or they may believe
that prestigious military capabilities have domestic value in terms of
13 See Putnam (1988).

14 For an example of the literature on prestige and military capabilities, see Perkovitch
(1998); Katzenstein (1996).
national sentiment or distraction from domestic political issues. It

is therefore important to motivate partners to participate in security
cooperation with the U.S. Army not only to meet their domestic needs
but also to foster shared interests with the United States and to secure
partner support in coalition operations.
The Challenge of Developing Metrics15

Measuring the effectiveness of activities requires asking how well an
activity serves to produce the desired results, relative to goals and objec-
tives. For the private sector, this question is often linked to whether,
and to what degree, a company makes a profit. For the public sector,
assessing effectiveness is more challenging, since profit is not the ulti-
mate goal. Instead, the objectives might be linked to public safety and
health, security, economic growth, and other public goods and ser-
vices. Consequently, government agencies have shifted increasingly to
measuring their effectiveness by how well results of their activities con-
tribute to agency missions and goals.
Metrics for capability measure the ability to perform a function,
i.e., the type, quality, and quantity of knowledge, skills, materiel sup-
port, or interoperability achieved. Metrics for capacity measure the
extent of capacity present, i.e., its availability, readiness, operational
strength, or the performance of partner armies. For COCOMs and
partner armies—the users of the new capabilities—knowing what
kind of capability is present is not enough to ensure effective operations
planning and mission success. Therefore, capacity data are important
in determining how quickly the desired capabilities can be mobilized,
how much capability is available, and for how long it can be deployed.
Building partner capability is not an end-state but is instead an
interim step toward building partner capacity. Using logic modeling,
Figure 2.1 illustrates how Army security cooperation contributes to
improving partner support of a particular mission, in this case, stabil-
15 The rationale for developing metrics for building partner capability and capacity builds
on previous RAND Arroyo Center research for HQDA. See Marquis et al. (2006).
ity, security, transition, and reconstruction operations (SSTRO), as an

illustrative end-state.16 Capability and capacity can increase or decrease
over time depending on how well they are sustained. To depict this
relationship, Figure 2.1 uses broken arrows to connect the outputs with
outcomes and the outcomes with ends.
Figure 2.1 can be read from left to right and vice versa. Left to
right is the view most familiar to those involved in planning and exe-
cuting Army security cooperation activities. Reading it from left to
right provides an operational view that connects inputs (e.g., personnel,
funding) to Army security cooperation activities, which in turn pro-
duces outputs; in other words a capability is produced. These capabili-
ties enable the development of outcomes that promote the desired end-
states. By comparison, reading this diagram from right to left allows
for a more strategic view of Army security cooperation that begins with
Figure 2.1
Linking Army Security Cooperation to Building Capability and Capacity
Security
Inputs Cooperation Outputs Outcomes Ends
Activities
Billets, Builds and sustains Partner Partner Improves
$$$ knowledge and acquires capacity partner
skills and supports capability grows support
materiel transfer in SSTRO
Metrics: Metrics:
Quality/type Military
and quantity readiness
of capabilities Operational
acquired strength
Performance
Army Army, other Services, Partner armies COCOMs

other U.S. agencies,
contractors
Title 10 Titles 10 and 22
RAND MG635-2.1
16 Although the Army currently uses the term “Stability Operations,” at the time of this
study, this mission area was referred to as SSTRO.
the desired ends and considers what is needed to attain them. This is a
view common to those involved in strategic policy and program plan-
ning. These two views are complementary, connecting policy guidance
with operational processes. It is important to note that an awareness of
both the policy demands and the operational processes helps to iden-
tify the most appropriate metrics for the outputs (i.e., capabilities) and
outcomes (i.e., capacity) of Army security cooperation.
Army security cooperation activities, whether they involve, for
example, classroom instruction, field training and exercises, or transfer
of equipment, enable partner armies to build capabilities through the
acquisition of skills, materiel support, and interoperability. Army secu-
rity cooperation activities can also contribute to sustaining capabilities,
especially when working with other U.S. government partners, which
in turn can lead to increased capacity.
Previous RAND Arroyo Center research classified more than 70
Army security cooperation activities into eight categories.17 For exam-
ple, as shown in Table 2.1, military training teams, found within the
category of military education and training, can develop a partner
army’s skills. Moreover, U.S.–United Kingdom combined exercises can
promote both skills development and interoperability.
Other types of Army security cooperation activities (e.g., mili-
tary exercises) enable partner armies to test the capabilities they have
acquired. Also, a long-term, stable relationship in security cooperation
helps partner armies sustain capabilities.
It is important to tie capabilities to appropriate security coopera-
tion programs in a way that produces outputs relevant to the desired
end-states. Building partner capability in force protection, for exam-
ple, requires identifying the many programs that will help create this
capability. The point is that Army activities alone may not lead to all
of the desired outputs, and it will probably be necessary to look out-
side the Army for other important contributions. Table 2.2 illustrates
how Army, DoD, and interagency programs might collectively develop
skills, provide materiel support, and build interoperability.
17 Marquis et al. (2006).

Table 2.1
Army Programs Linked to Categories and Outputs
Capability Outputs
(Skills Development,
Materiel Support,
Categories Program Examples Interoperability)
Military education and Military training teams Skills development

training Marshall Center for Security Skills development
Studies
Military-to-military contacts U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Skills development,

(USACE) International material support
Program
Civil Military Emergency Skills development
Preparedness Program
Military-to-military exchanges Military Personnel Exchange Skills development

Program
Reciprocal Unit Exchange Skills development
Program
Standing forums Conference of European Interoperability

Armies
North Atlantic Treaty Interoperability
Organization (NATO)
Standardization Agreement
Military exercises U.S.–United Kingdom Skills development,

combined exercises interoperability
America, Britain, Canada, Skills development,
Australia (ABCA) Exercise interoperability
Program
Research, development, Information Exchange Skills development,

testing, and evaluation Program interoperability
(RDT&E) Engineers and Scientists Skills development,
Exchange Program interoperability
International support United Nations Military Skills development,

arrangements and treaty Observer materiel support
compliance Arms Control Treaty
Implementation
Materiel transfer and Foreign military sales/ Materiel support

technical training financing
Excess Defense Articles (EDA) Materiel support
Table 2.2 shows that Army programs focus more heavily on skills
development and interoperability. Materiel support relies more on
other DoD programs and interagency activities. Collectively, security
Table 2.2
Using Multiple Programs to Develop Outputs and Outcomes
Skills Development Materiel Support Interoperability
Army Schools of Other Nations N/A Army War College

Program (SON), Medical outreach, International Fellows
Civil-Military Emergency Program (AWC-
Preparedness (CMEP), IFP), Multinational
Engineer and Scientist Interoperability
Exchange Program (ESEP), Program (MIP),
Army Personnel Exchange International
Program (APEP) Cooperative
Research,
Development
and Acquisition–
Development,
Production, Science
and Technology
(ICRDA-DPS&T), SON
DoD Counterterrorism Fellowship Exercise-Related Joint Staff exercises,

Program Program (CTFP), Joint Staff Construction CTFP, State
exercises, National Guard (ERC) Partnership Program
State Partnership Program (SPP), ISC, Foreign
(SPP), Intelligence Security Comparative Testing
Cooperation (ISC) Program (FCTP)
Interagency Foreign Military Financing FMF, FMS, Excess FMF, FMS, IMET
Program (FMF), Foreign Military Defense Articles
Sales (FMS), International (EDA)
Military Education and
Training (IMET), Anti-
Terrorism Assistance
Program (ATAP), Export
Control and Related Border
Security (EXBS) Program,
Global Peacekeeping
Operations Initiative (GPOI),
and Nonproliferation,
Antiterrorism, Demining and
Related (NADR) Program
cooperation that leverages programs across the U.S. government can

address all the desired outputs and outcomes, which potentially lead to
the development of capacity.
In practice, the Army plays a supporting role to the COCOMs
in security cooperation. COCOMs articulate their priorities for secu-
rity cooperation through their Theater Security Cooperation Strate-
gies, which aim to advance the goals and priorities of the Secretary of
Defense.18 Clearly articulated goals and objectives from the COCOM

enhance the Army’s efforts to evaluate its security cooperation pro-
grams and activities, as well as ensure that its efforts to plan and priori-
tize resources for future activities support the needs of the COCOMs.
The Importance of Train and Equip Programs for U.S.

Army Planning
Recent and ongoing TEPs are important to analyze for several reasons.
Planners at the strategic level reviewing recent DoD guidance (e.g.,
QDR, BPC Execution Roadmap, OSD Security Cooperation Guidance
(SCG)) have begun to concentrate their security cooperation resources
more heavily on the train and equip aspects of building partner capa-
bilities.19 As mentioned above, TEP lessons can also inform the devel-
opment of metrics for building partner capabilities and capacity by
highlighting specific goals for sequencing activities. Metrics in turn
can be useful in helping Army planners develop TEPs and assess pro-
gram success over time or within a specific phase.20
At the operational level, it would be useful for the U.S. Army
to look more closely into the lessons of past TEPs to avoid inefficien-
cies in future endeavors. It is important that Army planners under-
stand the best sequencing of security cooperation activities (e.g., basic
training before advanced technical training) to maximize the partner
army’s ability to build and sustain a capability. Moreover, by delving
into the details of the operational planning and execution of each TEP,
opportunities can be identified for leveraging the capabilities and
18 “How the Army Runs 2005–2006” (2006).

19 Section 1206 of the 2006 Defense Authorization legislation authorized DoD to appropri-
ate an additional $200 million toward training and equipping foreign forces.
20 In the case of the TEPs examined in this monograph, overall assessments were not con-
ducted. Instead, only piecemeal evaluations of specific security cooperation activities were
conducted ad hoc, and on occasion, of TEP phases. This approach to assessment does not
lend itself to a comprehensive view of how the various security cooperation activities com-
bine to produce a successful TEP.
resources of other actors (e.g., other Services, interagency, or donor

countries) for sustainment purposes—a key factor in developing
capacity.
The study team had a difficult time finding historical data for all
the TEPs analyzed. At the tactical level, historical data on TEPs are not
readily available to units implementing TEPs. Some limited data from
AARs are maintained in various databases at the COCOMs and com-
ponent commands but, overall, historical data, particularly from TEP
assessments, have not been maintained. Army training teams respon-
sible for developing curricula and methods could benefit greatly from
such insights, if they were available.
In an effort to identify some specific TEP lessons, the study team
considered the following key questions:
1. What are the major recurring themes from each TEP?

2. What are the key success stories, perhaps conveyed through
anecdotal evidence?
3. If there were major problems, were they attributable to a plan-
ning or execution issue within the TEP or were the problems
political? Could they have been mitigated through better
planning?
4. In the illustrative TEPs surveyed where the U.S. Army was not
heavily involved during all stages, was there a particular gap the
Army could have filled?
5. What key collective lessons should be taken into account for
future TEPs to avoid mission failure or significant adverse mis-
sion effects?
Selection of TEPs
An illustrative TEP from each COCOM provides geopolitical diver-
sity to our assessment. In addition, the examples include both bilat-
eral and multilateral training, as well as conventional and unconven-
tional training methods. Some were led by the U.S. Army or Army
Special Forces, whereas in others, the Army played the supporting role
to another Service.21
The study team selected a few long-running TEPs that included
distinct training phases. The team believed that the longer the duration
and the more TEP phases, the more likely that AARs and assessments
would be available. Of the seven TEPs considered, three included at
least two distinct phases:
• Georgia Train and Equip Program (GTEP)/Sustainment and Sta-

bility Operations Program (SSOP)
• African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI)/African Contingency
Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program (sub-
Saharan Africa)
• Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI)/Trans-Sahel Counterterrorism Initia-
tive (TSCTI) (North Africa).
The remaining TEPs were of shorter duration and consisted of

only one phase:
• Operation Enduring Freedom–Philippines (OEF-P)

• Plan Colombia
• Yemen
• Operation Balanced Strike (OBS) Central Asia.
Key Factors Examined

Eleven factors were examined relative to each of the seven TEPs:
• Type of program (e.g., peacekeeping)

• Training method (e.g., led by U.S. military, or contractor)
• Specific goals
• Partner forces trained/equipped
• Duration of program
21 Although not an exhaustive representation of all possible TEPs, this sample set reflects
the study team’s best effort to identify a reasonable cross-section of typical TEPs around the
world.
• Cost and specific security cooperation programs/activities em-

ployed
• Army role and other U.S. and partner military forces involved
• Partner and U.S. civilian interagency involvement
• Equipment and infrastructure provided
• Assessment conducted
• Donor countries involved.
What follows is an overview of the key findings from the seven

TEPs along with the overall key themes that emerge from the collective
analysis. The detailed background, context, and key findings for each
TEP are found in Appendix A.
Collective Findings from the TEPs

During the course of the TEP analysis, several common themes
emerged. They are grouped under two headings: planning/funding
and execution. Many of these findings reveal complex issues that will
be difficult to resolve.
Planning/Funding
1. Consider multiple sources of funding at the outset. Because TEPs

are typically not funding sources in and of themselves, the
resources to support them are compiled from several funding
sources. These programs may have different legislative rules and
requirements that govern their use. For example, some pro-
grams allow for the provision of training or equipment, but
others do not. More specifically, some allow for lethal training
and some only for nonlethal training.22 Therefore, it is impor-
tant to include program managers and planners with detailed
knowledge of specific funding issues early on in the planning
process.
22 The authorization in Section 1206 of the 2006 National Defense Authorization Act to
conduct additional TEPs will require creativity to ensure that they are properly resourced
from the outset.
2. Plan for the long term regarding equipment provided to a partner.

Often, the equipment purchased for a TEP is a short-term fix.23
A more strategic view of what that equipment may be used for
in the future, including coalition operations where a high level
of interoperability with the U.S. Army is required, will help
planners determine whether the equipment provided is likely to
be appropriate in the longer term.
3. Sequence training/equipment to ensure suitability to the environ-
ment, and resource accordingly. To increase a partner’s ability to
take advantage of the training provided by a TEP, the provi-
sion of training and equipment in a logical, sequential way (i.e.,
developing basic soldiering skills before introducing advanced
technical training and equipment) is an important consider-
ation. Moreover, a greater awareness of other DoD and U.S.
government agencies’ activities that could be incorporated into
the TEP would help Army planners take a more comprehen-
sive approach to planning and execution. It is also important
for specific training activities (e.g., military training teams) to
accompany the equipment provided, particularly when it is
technologically complex.
4. Train fully manned units with professional soldiers where possible;
plan for recurring training requirements; obtain commitment for
multiple-year sustainment. The partner units selected for a TEP
should be fully manned with professional soldiers (rather than
conscripts) before the start of the TEP. This will ensure a higher
level of return on U.S. security cooperation investment. It is
important to medically clear all soldiers selected for TEP train-
ing. Planning should include provisions for recurring train-
ing after the initial TEP is complete to ensure a higher level of
sustainability. Likewise, a multiple-year commitment from the
partner will also increase capability sustainment.
5. Assess the program as a whole, not just as specific activities or phases.
Of the TEPs considered by the study team, only limited assess-
ments were conducted. In the cases where assessments were
23 Through, for example, an excess defense article grant or from another donor country.
mandated, they typically focused on specific activities or, in

some cases, individual phases. Planners did not assess each TEP
as a whole. A comprehensive, program-wide approach to TEP
assessment would provide a better understanding of the over-
all effectiveness in accomplishing the objectives set forth and
would provide data for output metrics.24 It would also allow the
program managers to see which activities work well and why,
potentially helping to reallocate Army security cooperation
resources to address the gaps.
6. Manage partner expectations early and throughout the TEP. High
operational tempo requirements for U.S. forces sometimes
result in cancellation or postponement of a TEP-related training
activity. Although this is not always avoidable, it is important to
consider the political consequences of canceling or postponing
key training events.
7. Increase U.S. and partner interagency involvement to improve sus-
tainability. Planners may wish to include other security services
in the most advanced stages of the TEP, perhaps as a culminat-
ing event, to test interoperability and procedural issues in the
partner country. National response to disasters and consequence
management exercises may be a venue for considering how the
TEP forces fit within the response capabilities and procedures
on a national level.
8. Coordinate with key donors through a clearinghouse arrangement
to improve sustainability. Consulting donors early on in the
TEP process though bilateral mechanisms, or perhaps through
a broader clearinghouse involving multiple donors, can help
reduce the burden on U.S. forces and increase the sustainment
potential of the TEP-trained forces by ensuring long-term finan-
cial commitment to the trained forces. However, the United
States should not necessarily rely on donors for critical pieces
24 For example, the Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Center at the Army War
College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, or the Center for Army Lessons Learned in Fort Leaven-
worth, Kansas, might consider taking on this role of capturing lessons from DoD train and
equip programs.
of the TEP, since political will and resource availability from

donors is often tenuous and uncertain.
9. Ensure human rights vetting for all participants, not just the mili-
tary. From the U.S. perspective, this includes Leahy Amend-
ment25 vetting for both military and civilian officials.26 TEP
planners must consider violations relative to criminal acts, cor-
ruption, and human rights abuses, for both the partner country
and the individual soldiers. Lack of adherence to the Leahy pro-
visions can quickly put an end to a TEP.
Execution
1. Army conventional forces could have been more heavily involved

in many DoD TEPs. U.S. Special Forces and the U.S. Marine
Corps often led the TEPs, since the training was primarily for
Special Operations Forces (SOF) units. However, of the TEPs
considered in this chapter, the partner military forces started
from a very low level of capability; therefore, highly specialized
U.S. forces may not have been necessary to include at each stage
of the TEP. In future TEPs, the Army should consider augment-
ing the training provided by other Services with conventional
army forces or even reserve forces or the National Guard,27 espe-
cially if operational tempo requirements do not lend themselves
to allowing Army SOF participation.
25 The Department of State has the lead for human rights vetting under the Leahy Amend-
ment provisions. See http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/42314.htm.
26 The Leahy amendment to the DoD Appropriations Act for 2006 states, “None of the
funds made available by this Act may be used to support any training program involving a
unit of the security forces of a foreign country if the Secretary of Defense has received cred-
ible information from the State Department that the unit has committed a gross violation of
human rights, unless all necessary corrective steps have been taken” (P.L. 109-148 §8069).
27 Specifically worth considering is the National Guard’s State Partnership Program (SPP)
which pairs U.S. states with foreign partners to conduct military-to-military, civil-to-mili-
tary, and civil-to-civil activities to build partner capacity.
2. Programs executed by the U.S. military resulted in improved mili-

tary-to-military relationships. Although contractors have effec-
tively augmented U.S. military forces in certain TEPs, they are
no substitute for “the uniform” in developing and sustaining an
official military-to-military relationship with the partner coun-
try. Defense consultants bring a valued expertise to the TEP,
but their involvement is unlikely to create or support a military-
to-military relationship.
3. Building the capability at higher headquarters to manage forces
increases sustainability. Training units without incorporating
higher headquarters into the overall training program and edu-
cating them as to proper use of the forces can inhibit the effec-
tive employment of the TEP-developed capabilities. For exam-
ple, there is a danger that those forces could be used for missions
other than what they were trained for if the higher headquarters
is not involved in training.
4. Emphasis on regional and multinational activities as well as
common doctrine and procedures improves regional interoperabil-
ity. Most TEPs have a regional application, even if the connec-
tion is not explicit. Building capabilities that are applicable at
the regional level requires common standard operating proce-
dures (SOPs) and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs)
with neighbors, and a host of multinational activities to exercise
those capabilities at various stages of the TEP. Such an approach
is likely to improve regional interoperability.
5. Establishing an Army unit specifically for training foreign forces
should be considered. It may be worth considering the establish-
ment of an Army unit that would be dedicated to the training
and equipping of foreign armies.28 Of course, the creation of
such a unit will depend on U.S. operational tempo.
28 For example, the U.S. Marine Corps has done this and has had considerable success in
training foreign forces.
Conclusion
The theoretical discussion in the first part of this chapter stresses the
importance of shared interests in motivating partners to participate in
security cooperation and, more important, to sustain capabilities and
build capacity.
The development of metrics for both building partner capability
and increasing partner capacity to conduct operations is essential to
help planners and operators evaluate the effectiveness of Army security
cooperation activities. HQDA, as the supporting entity, must coordi-
nate with the COCOMs and Army Service Component Commands
(ASCCs) to develop metrics, especially those for capacity. These met-
rics will help to keep security cooperation programs on track by help-
ing to sequence activities in pursuit of specific interim goals and final
end-states. This chapter also illuminates some specific lessons that the
Army should be aware of before planning and executing TEPs in the
future. By highlighting the challenges of collective action, the role of
Army security cooperation activities in producing measurable outputs
and outcomes, and the lessons from previous TEP efforts, this chapter
provides the context and rationale for identifying gaps and for develop-
ing a process to match them with partner armies. The following chap-
ter describes this process in detail.
CHAPTER THREE
Identifying U.S. Army Capability Gaps for

Coalition Operations
This chapter identifies U.S. Army capability gaps1 based on known

requirements identified through a review of national and DoD strate-
gic and operational guidance documents and Army studies on capa-
bility gaps. The intent is to identify a set of capability gaps that might
be met by developing relevant capabilities in partner armies. Compar-
ing multiple studies provided a way to corroborate the importance of
specific capability gaps. Many capabilities appeared in two or more of
the studies considered, despite the different methodologies used by the
authors. This finding increased the study team’s confidence in the list
of capability gaps discussed at the end of this chapter. It is important to
note that the study team relied on the reports and analyses available at
the time to identify current U.S. Army capability gaps. Therefore, the
process described may not be repeatable exactly as written. However,
it should provide a useful template for Army planners to use in future
efforts to identify gaps.
Strategic-Level Guidance Documents
National Strategies
The study team reviewed national and DoD strategic and operational
guidance as well as capability assessment studies to identify capability
gaps. The National Security Strategy (NSS) provides top-level strategic
1 Gaps in capabilities may be the result of no existing capability or a lack of proficiency or

sufficiency in an existing capability. (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2005.)
27
guidance to DoD and other departments and a framework for inter-

agency strategic planning. A major theme of the March 2006 NSS is
that the United States must gain the support and active cooperation of
friends and allies. It is in this spirit that the National Defense Strategy
(NDS)—DoD’s internal strategic guidance document—addresses the
need to strengthen alliances and partnerships.2 The NDS points out
that the United States does not currently have the capacity to address
all global security challenges without assistance and will require the
support of the international community.
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) develops the
National Military Strategy (NMS) to implement the NDS. The NMS
outlines the nation’s military objectives and desired capabilities, priori-
ties, and attributes for all the armed forces in the military operational
spectrum. Carrying forward the guidance contained in the NSS and
NDS, the NMS instructs the military departments to enable “multi-
national partners through security cooperation and other engagement
activities.”3
Both the NDS and NMS direct the Service Chiefs and Com-
batant Commanders to identify required capabilities. Two key meth-
ods for achieving this are the Integrated Priority List (IPL) and the
Joint Operations Concept (JOpsC).4 Combatant Commanders prepare
IPLs, which establish prioritized lists of capability shortfalls.5 In addi-
tion to IPLs, Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), in coordination with
2 National Defense Strategy (2005, p. iv).

3 National Military Strategy (2004, p. 8).
4 According to section four of the JOpsC, “The JOpsC, Joint Operating Concepts (JOCs),
Joint Functional Concepts and Enabling Concepts represent an interrelated construct of
concepts. In this construct of concepts, joint operating concepts, joint functional concepts,
and enabling concepts are subordinate to the JOpsC.” Joint Operations Concepts (2003).
5 The Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms describes the
integrated priority list as “A list of a Combatant Commander’s highest priority requirements,
prioritized across Service and functional lines, defining shortfalls in key programs that, in
the judgment of the Combatant Commander, adversely affect the capability of the Combat-
ant Commander’s forces to accomplish their assigned mission. The integrated priority list
provides the Combatant Commander’s recommendations for programming funds in the
planning, programming, and budgeting system process.”
Identifying U.S. Army Capability Gaps for Coalition Operations 29
other COCOMs, develops JOpsCs, which provide a foundation for

defining military capabilities by describing the characteristics of the
future Joint Force.6 The key point taken from the national-level stra-
tegic documents is the importance of developing U.S. capabilities and
cooperating with partner militaries to meet U.S. strategic goals and fill
capability gaps.
Army Strategies
At the Service level, the Army Strategic Planning Guidance (ASPG)
and the Army Transformation Roadmap (ATR) build the foundation
for comparing capability gaps to Army needs. These documents link
directly to the department-level strategies. The ASPG is the Army’s
institutional strategy and serves as its principal long-range planning
document. The ASPG is linked to the JOpsC and provides guidance
to “optimize our forces, capabilities, and organizations to best con-
tribute to the joint capabilities and methods required of each of the
joint operating concepts and joint functional concepts.”7 The ATR is
the Army’s strategy for executing transformation and military mod-
ernization while sustaining the high demand for operational forces.
It describes how the Army will support the Combatant Commanders’
ability to execute their missions by providing relevant capabilities to
the joint team.8
Army Capabilities Studies
The study team reviewed studies conducted by Training and Doc-

trine Command’s (TRADOC) Army Capabilities Integration Center
(ARCIC) and the G-3.9 In addition, the study team consulted with
experts from the Joint Staff to determine if there are additional capabil-
6 Joint Operations Concepts (2003, pp. 14–17).

7 Army Strategic Planning Guidance FYs 2006–2023 (p. 6).
8 Army Transformation Roadmap (2003, pp. 1–7).
9 The study team engaged in focused discussions with the authors of these studies. The
studies provide detailed information about required capabilities and gaps and offer analysis
that prioritizes them.
ity gaps not identified by the Army.10 The ARCIC, part of TRADOC,
produced two of the four studies used by the study team.11 These two
studies—the Capability Needs Analysis (CNA) and the Capability
Gap Analysis (CGA)—speak directly to current Army capability gaps.
It is important to note that the studies used the Combatant Com-
manders’ IPLs and the JOpsC as primary sources for identifying these
gaps. A discussion of each of these studies follows.
Capabilities Needs Analysis

The CNA assists the Army with the development of its future force by
• identifying and assessing Army requirements to support Joint

required capabilities
• assessing and integrating the programmed Doctrine, Opera-
tions, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, and Facilities
(DOTMLPF) solutions supporting the Army requirements iden-
tified above
• identifying required capability gaps that the Army cannot fill.12
The CNA first identifies 1,300 Joint and Army capabilities from
the JOpsC. It then consolidates these capabilities into 61 “required
capabilities,” which are rank-ordered and sorted into three categories.
The top 30 capabilities represent a high risk of mission failure if absent
or lacking; the second category (capabilities 31–47) poses a medium
risk of mission failure if absent or lacking. The remaining 14 capabili-
ties are low risk, presenting minor mission effect if not addressed. From
these, Army planners identified the top 11 capability gaps, shown in
Table 3.1.
10These discussions revealed no additional capability gaps not already highlighted in the
Army studies.
11 ARCIC is responsible for the identification, design, development, and synchronization of
capabilities into the Army current Modular Force and the future Modular Force, bringing
together all the Army agencies as well as joint, multinational, and other DoD agencies to
manage rapid change. ARCIC identifies capabilities for the Army across Doctrine, Opera-
tions, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) imperatives.
12 U.S. Army, Training and Doctrine Command (2005).
Table 3.1
CNA Capability Gaps
1. Enhanced Soldier Protection
2. Modular, Scalable, and Tailorable Battle Command and Control
3. Enhanced Platform/Group Protection
4. Dynamic Uninterrupted C4 Architecture
5. Ability to Train the Force How and as It Fights
6. Ability to Detect and Identify Full Range of Obstacles
7. Sustainment of Modular Forces
8. Enhanced Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)
9. Modular, Tailorable Forces
10. Capability for Lethal Overmatch
11. Strategic Force Projection/Intratheater Operational Maneuver and Sustainment
Capability Gap Analysis

Also conducted by ARCIC, the CGA differs from the CNA in that it
deals with the near term as opposed to anticipated capability gaps and
draws heavily on COCOM IPLs as primary source documents. This
analysis assesses force needs by identifying both capability gaps and
performance requirements.13
During the evaluation process, ARCIC categorized the gaps by
source and then prioritized them based on frequency of occurrence in
the various sources. Finally, it adjusted the initial draft prioritization
13 The CGA assists in near-term resource decisions, informs Future Force Gaps CNA and
experimentation, influences industry research and development, identifies requirements for
science and technology research, and affects the Army budget in the execution year and
supplemental request. U.S. Army, Training and Doctrine Command (2006).
using the Delphi technique.14 The result was the list of the top ten
capability gaps depicted in Table 3.2.15
Of note, although produced using different source documents
and methodologies, these two ARCIC studies share several capability
gaps. This is an important finding, since the two studies used differ-
ent source documents and methodologies. The concurrence of similar
Table 3.2
CGA Capability Gaps
1. Networked-Enabled Battle Command
2. Protect Force in Counterinsurgency Operations
3. Soldier Protection in Counterinsurgency Environment
4. Logistics and Medical in Counterinsurgency (COIN) Operations and Non-

Contiguous Battlespace
5. Train the Force How and as It Fights
6. Tactical Communications
7. Ability to Conduct Joint Urban Operations
8. Joint Interoperability, Coalition, and Interagency Operations
9. Enhanced ISR Capabilities
10. Timeliness of Analysis, and Information Dissemination
14 RAND developed this technique in the late 1960s as a forecasting methodology. It was
later adopted by the U.S. government as a group decisionmaking tool that permits a group of
experts to arrive at a consensus of opinion when the decisive factors were subjective and not
necessarily empirically observable. Part of this analysis involved a subjective process wherein
gaps were ranked relative to one another. Once quantitatively ranked, each subgap went
through a “Near Term Rating”—a subjective assessment of how near-term solutions mitigate
subcapability gaps: red—does not enable mission performance to standard; amber—can
partially enable mission performance; and green—enables mission performance to standard.
The subgaps were likewise assessed. It is worth noting that the Delphi technique has been
criticized for not being scientifically rigorous. Its chief critic, Harold Sackman, does admit,
however, that the Delphi technique does “have value as an informal exercise for heuristic
purposes” (Sackman, 1974).
15Table 3.2 also illustrates how current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have driven
Army capability gaps specifically for counterinsurgency operations.
gaps across the studies suggests their importance not only for current
use but also for their role in future Army and Joint operations.
HQDA G-3 Army Capability Analysis

The HQDA Army Capability Analysis, led by the G-3, focuses on top
Service capability priorities, as opposed to Joint capability gaps. G-3
uses a subjective, weighted analysis, producing a product linked to such
guidance as the ASPG.16 The result is a prioritized list of the Army’s top
36 capabilities (see Table 3.3).
The study team compared the G-3 study results to findings from
the CNA and CGA and found that 19 of the 36 Army priorities iden-
tified in the G-3 study directly corresponded with the capability gaps
identified in either the CNA or the CGA.
Army Capability Gaps: A Composite, Illustrative List
Table 3.4 presents a composite list of prioritized Army capabilities found

in the CNA, CGA, and G-3 studies. To synthesize the results of the
three Army studies, the RAND study team first identified capability
gaps and capability priorities that appeared in more than one study.17
The study team then developed new gap titles that best described each
of the collective groupings. The results depicted in Table 3.4 are a
grouping of five capability gaps that appeared in all three studies and
an additional six gaps that appeared in only two. The rank-ordering is
directly from the respective studies.
The five capabilities that appeared in all three Army studies likely
represent gaps that are a high priority for the Army. The remaining six
gaps are also presumably still important but considered as somewhat
less so, since they were corroborated in only two of the three studies.
16 Focused discussion with Headquarters, Department of the Army G-3 (2006).

17 The capabilities that were eliminated because of their appearance in only one study were
primarily from the HQDA G-3 study, which focused on improving the institutional Army.
Examples include “tell the Army story,” “man the force,” “meet statutory requirements,” and
“provide morale, welfare and recreation, and Army community activities.”
Table 3.3
G-3’s Army Capability Priorities
1. Conduct combat operations
2. Sustain the force
3. Integrate new/modernized equipment and advanced technologies into the force
4. Research, develop, test, and evaluate new technologies
5. Provide infrastructure to support Army operations
6. Conduct irregular warfare to include Foreign Internal Defense (FID), counter-
intelligence (CI), and stability operations
7. Provide full-spectrum anti-terrorism/force protection
8. Man the force
9. Train, validate, mobilize, deploy, redeploy, and demobilize the force
10. Conduct airborne, air assault, and or special operations
11. Operate in a Joint environment
12. Provide unit-based, collective Mission Essential Task List (METL) training
13. Provide integrated battle command
14. Provide integrated logistics support to the force
15. Provide operational intelligence fusion
16. Recruit and retrain the force
17. Provide institutional training and education
18. Provide quality of life for soldiers and their families
19. Communicate via the Global Information Grid (GIG)
20. Provide movement of Army forces and materiel
21. Generate doctrine to support Army, Joint, and multinational operations
22. Provide a national-level maintenance system
23. Project power from installations
24. Conduct information operations
25. Provide corporate management and business operations
26. Conduct homeland defense and support civil authorities
27. Meet treaty obligations and perform theater security cooperation
28. Provide health/medical service support
29. Preserve order and provide legal administration
30. Enable theater access and theater opening
31. Meet statutory requirements
32. Integrate safety, occupational health, and environmental awareness throughout
Army operations
Table 3.3 (continued)

33. Provide hazardous munitions detection, removal, and disposal
34. Conduct personnel recovery
35. Tell the Army story
36. Provide morale, welfare, recreation, and Army community activities
Conclusion
This chapter synthesizes the separate, but related, efforts within the
Army to identify current and anticipated capability gaps. There may be
other efforts under way to identify Army capability gaps within U.S.
Army academic institutions or outside the Army, but these studies are
the most prominent efforts within HQDA. As they are internal Army
studies, we recognize that there may be inherent institutional biases.
Other studies might come up with alternative lists of capability gaps
that may or may not be in full agreement with the Army studies we
used as the basis for our analysis. The synthesized list, although repre-
senting the Army’s overall top capability gaps, is only an interim step
in identifying capability gaps that would be appropriate for filling in
with partner armies. Additional considerations include whether these
capabilities are appropriate for a partner army, whether the capability
should remain organic to the U.S. Army or other Services, and whether
high-end allies could fill the gaps with existing capabilities. The follow-
ing chapter describes a five-step process for matching U.S. Army capa-
bility gaps with candidate partner armies and applies the data available
from one illustrative TEP to gauge its predictive ability.
Table 3.4
36
U.S. Army Capability Gaps: A Composite List
GAP Title CNA CGA G3 Total

Networked Battle 2. Modular, Scalable, and 1. Networked-Enabled 13. Provide integrated battle command 3
Command Tailorable Battle Command Battle Command
and Control
Force Protection 1. Enhanced Soldier Protection 2. Protect Force in 7. Provide full-spectrum anti-terrorism/ 3
3. Enhanced Platform/Group Counterinsurgency force protection
Protection Operations
3. Soldier Protection
in Counterinsurgency
Environment
C4 and Information 4. Dynamic Uninterrupted C4 6. Tactical Communications 15. Provide operational intelligence fusion 3
Operations Architecture 10. Timeliness of 19. Communicate via the Global
Analysis, and Information Information Grid (GIG)
Dissemination 24. Conduct information operations
Train the Force 5. Ability to Train the Force 5. Train the Force How and 9. Train, validate, mobilize, deploy, 3
How and as It Fights as It Fights redeploy, and demobilize the force
12. Provide unit-based, collective METL
Building Partner Capabilities for Coalition Operations
training
16. Recruit and retrain the force
17. Provide institutional training and
education
Table 3.4 (continued)
GAP Title CNA CGA G3 Total

Logistics 7. Sustainment of Modular 4. Logistics and Medical in 2. Sustain the force 3
Forces Counterinsurgency (COIN) 5. Provide infrastructure to support Army
Operations and operations
non-contiguous 14. Provide integrated logistics support to
battlespace the force
20. Provide movement of Army forces and
materiel
22. Provide a national-level maintenance
system
Enhanced ISR 8. Enhanced ISR Capabilities 9.Enhanced ISR Capabilities 2
Joint Urban 7. Ability to Conduct Joint 11. Operate in a Joint environment 2

Operations Urban Operations
Force Projection 11. Strategic Force Projection/ 23. Project power from installations 2
Intratheater Operational
Maneuver and Sustainment
Medical 4. Logistics and Medical in 28. Provide health/medical service support 2

Counterinsurgency (COIN)
Operations and non-
contiguous battlespace
Joint, Interagency 8. Joint Interoperability, 21. Generate doctrine to support Army, 2

and Coalition Coalition, and Interagency Joint, and multinational operations
Operations Operations
Detect and Identify 6. Ability to Detect and Identify 33. Provide hazardous munitions detection, 2
Obstacles Full Range of Obstacles removal, and disposal
Identifying U.S. Army Capability Gaps for Coalition Operations
37
CHAPTER FOUR
Matching U.S. Army Capability Gaps to

Candidate Partner Armies
This chapter develops a five-step process for matching the capability

gaps identified in Chapter Three with candidate partner armies.1 For
a variety of political, economic, or operational reasons, not every U.S.
Army capability gap can, or should, be filled by a partner army. It
presents criteria designed to help Army planners assess the extent to
which U.S. Army capability gaps are appropriate for partner armies to
fill.2 Additionally, the chapter provides factors to consider when select-
ing partner armies for security cooperation training or equipment
programs.
The second section focuses on the Georgia TEP to illustrate the
five-step process. Specifically, the study team was interested in whether
decisions made in the TEP were consistent with the logic developed
in the process. In other words, if the Army had applied this process
during the planning phase, would the TEP have focused on the same
capabilities? The team selected the Georgia TEP because of its scope,
duration, number of phases, and objective (i.e., deploy capable forces to
1 This chapter builds on recent RAND Arroyo Center research for HQDA, including the
Multinational Force Compatibility (MFC) study, which developed a four-phased planning
framework for selecting candidate capabilities and candidate partner armies for niche capa-
bilities cultivation. See Moroney, Grissom, and Marquis (2007).
2 Although there are other ways to fill capability gaps (e.g., other Services, contractors, and
increased Army end-strength), national and DoD strategic guidance emphasizes the need to
leverage the capabilities of allies and partners to fill these gaps.
39
Iraq). In addition, of all the TEPs examined, the Georgia TEP had the
most robust collection of assessments and after-action reports.
Approach
Considering the previous conceptual discussion, the process devel-

oped by the study team for matching U.S. Army capability gaps with
partner armies includes five steps as shown in Figure 4.1. This process
intends to identify capabilities of interest to the U.S. Army and candi-
date partners.
Step 1: Determine Relative Importance of U.S. Army Capability Gaps

The study team convened a workshop on May 18, 2006, of subject
matter experts from HQDA (G-3 and G-8) and RAND to vet the
Figure 4.1
Five-Step Process
Step 1. Determine relative importance of capabilities
Step 2. Identify appropriate capabilities based on

level of effort
Step 3. Identify appropriate capabilities based on

shared interest
Step 4. Identify candidate partner armies based on

availability and acceptability
Step 5. Determine existing partner army capabilities
Capability gaps matched to partner armies
RAND MG635-4.1
Matching U.S. Army Capability Gaps to Candidate Partner Armies 41
study team’s initial assessment of the importance to the Army of each

capability gap.3 Although each capability is important, the importance
of each relative to another is significant for Army security cooperation
planners as they attempt to allocate resources. Before convening the
workshop, however, the study team bounded the discussions by setting
aside those capability gaps from Chapter Three considered as being
clearly appropriate only for high-end allies or as an organic capability
of the U.S. Army. These capabilities included
• networked battle command

• C4 and information operations
• train the [U.S.] force
• force projection
• Joint, interagency, and coalition operations.
The relative importance of each of the remaining capability gaps

was derived from Table 3.4 in Chapter Three:
• force protection
• logistics
• enhanced ISR
• Joint urban operations
• medical
• detect/identify obstacles.
In addition to the capability gaps from Chapter Three, the work-

shop participants considered an additional four capabilities they
believed would be good candidates. These include
• nonlethal capabilities
• detainee operations
3 The study team identified subject matter experts with deep knowledge of the capabil-
ity gaps as well as with experience working with a variety of partners in several regions
through COCOM Theater Security Cooperation. Officials from the Office of the Secretary
of Defense, Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict (OSD/SOLIC) Stability Operations,
provided additional feedback into this step separate from the workshop.
• engineering
• human intelligence (HUMINT).
Although these four capability gaps did not rank as high in the
Army studies, several participants in the working group with direct
and recent knowledge of ongoing operations strongly recommended
their inclusion.
During the early stages of the workshop discussion, it became
apparent that to reach a consensus of the relative importance of the ten
capability gaps, the threat environment and mission are worth con-
sidering. The study team suggested that the participants consider the
capabilities in the context of a high-threat environment, for example,
the security environment that existed in parts of Iraq in early 2006.
The aim of considering the threat environment was to ensure a stable
context in which the capabilities could be discussed and compared.
The mission category selected for the workshop was SSTRO, chosen
because of its importance to the Army and its utility to partner coun-
tries.4 The workshop participants continued their deliberations with
this scenario in mind.
Another issue was that many of the capabilities can be inter-
preted in a number of ways. For example, it is possible to think about
force protection in terms of a networked weapons system (high-end)
or a small unit patrolling without sophisticated, expensive technolo-
gies (low-end). Thus, each capability gap was discussed relative to a
specific task within the broader category. For example, the workshop
participants discussed force protection in relation to the more specific
task of “base camp protection.” Medical capabilities were discussed
in reference to “controlling infectious diseases.” Nonlethal capabilities
were discussed as “crowd control,” and so on.5 In sum, the greater the
specificity, the better the group was able to form a consensus on the
“importance” factor.
4 As opposed to more high-end capabilities reserved for Major Combat Operations (MCOs),
for example.
5 See Appendix B for a complete description of each capability gap and the specific tasks
considered.
Recognizing that all the capability gaps were important to the

Army, the workshop developed two categories—“more important” and
“less important”—to describe the gaps’ relative importance. The fol-
lowing were “most important”:
• force protection;
• enhanced ISR;
• Joint urban operations
• HUMINT.
Of lesser importance were:
• nonlethal capabilities
• medical
• logistics
• detect/identify obstacles
• engineering
• detainee operations.
Step 2: Identify Appropriate Capabilities Based on Level of Effort

In the second step, the workshop participants considered several factors
relative to each capability. These were
1. complexity of the capability

2. cost to train and equip a partner army
3. level of sensitivity to U.S. national security.
The workshop participants discussed each of these factors in isola-

tion and in a composite form labeled “level of effort,” which combined
complexity, cost, and sensitivity. Observations from this discussion are
presented below.
First, some capabilities are highly complex and technical and
require specialized education and training; others may have a lower
level of complexity. Although the complexity of a capability can derive
from many factors, the study team considered the following two to be
most relevant: (1) the length of time to train, and (2) the technological
nature of the equipment. Using these factors as a guide, the workshop
participants categorized the selected capabilities as having a relatively

low or high degree of complexity.
Second, some capabilities are relatively costly to develop and sus-
tain. Indeed, the high cost of such capabilities could be one reason for
gaps within the U.S. Army. Thus, low-cost capabilities that require
minimal U.S. investment may be desirable for partners.
Third, some capabilities are more sensitive than others in terms of
U.S. national security: for example, enhanced ISR capabilities (higher
level of national security sensitivity) versus medical capabilities (lower
level of national security sensitivity).
Furthermore, an engineering capability, which encompasses a
broad array of disciplines (e.g., civil, electrical, and mechanical), would
be both complex and costly to develop. Building such a capability in a
partner army requires a significant investment in initial and follow-on
training and education to develop and sustain soldiers’ skills. Likewise,
building an engineering capability may require that the U.S. Army pro-
vide and maintain specialized equipment to develop fully an organic
engineering capability in a partner army. The complexity and cost of
such an endeavor would most likely be substantial. Conversely, a capa-
bility such as detainee operations is neither as complex nor as costly
to provide and does not require expensive or specialized equipment.
However, there are serious sensitivities associated with the conduct of
detainee operations. Not only must the partner safeguard U.S. tech-
niques and tactics, but also it must avoid misconduct or the perception
of misconduct. As a result, the U.S. Army must have the utmost confi-
dence in a partner army entrusted with conducting detainee operations
in a U.S.-led operation.
Table 4.1 summarizes the workshop’s findings for Step 2. For each
of the three factors, the shaded boxes indicate those capability gaps the
participants determined to be at the higher end of the spectrum, i.e.,
most costly, most complex, and most sensitive. For example, the work-
shop considered detect/identify obstacles, HUMINT, and enhanced
ISR to be at the higher end for each of the three factors. Engineer-
ing was high in two of the three factors, whereas the remaining capa-
bilities were high in only one or none of the factors. To synthesize
Table 4.1
Level of Effort
Complexity Cost Sensitivity
Detect/identify obstacles Detect/identify obstacles Detect/identify obstacles
HUMINT HUMINT HUMINT
ISR ISR ISR
Engineering Engineering Engineering
Logistics Logistics Logistics
Detainee operations Detainee operations Detainee operations
Joint urban operations Joint urban operations Joint urban operations
Nonlethal capabilities Nonlethal capabilities Nonlethal capabilities
Medical Medical Medical
Force protection Force protection
these results, the study team considered that capabilities deemed high
in two or more factors would require a high level of effort to build with
a candidate partner.
Figure 4.2 shows how the results of this step relate to the discus-
sion of “importance to the U.S. Army” in Step 1. “High level of effort”
meant that it was “high” in relation to two or more of the factors listed
in Table 4.1. The goal was to identify capability gaps that were of high
interest to the U.S. Army in a particular mission and those that would
require less effort to build.
Capabilities in the top-right quadrant of Figure 4.2 are possible
candidates for building partner capabilities, but because of the higher
level of effort required, they may be more appropriate for high-end
allies or for remaining organic to the U.S. Army. According to the
workshop discussion, enhanced ISR and HUMINT would fall in this
category.
Capabilities in the lower-right quadrant would be least attrac-
tive as a security cooperation investment. These capabilities, namely,
detect/identify obstacles and engineering in most cases are probably
not worth the investment of significant Army security cooperation
Figure 4.2
Capability Gaps Appropriate for Building Partner Capabilities
High importance High importance

Capability’s importance to U.S. Army
Low effort High effort
Capabilities most attractive

for BPC in short-term
Low importance Low importance

Low effort High effort
Level of effort required to build capability

RAND MG635-4.2
resources because they are of lower importance to the U.S. Army and
require a higher level of effort to build.
Capabilities that fall in the lower-left quadrant might be worth
considering, primarily because of the relatively low level of effort
required to build. These include nonlethal, medical, logistics, and
detainee operations. These capabilities may still be in the U.S. Army’s
interest to build in partner armies, if resources are available.
Finally, the capabilities in the top-left quadrant are most likely
to be attractive to the U.S. Army because they are of high importance
to the United States and require a lower level of effort in terms of the
security cooperation investment. Development of these capabilities in
an ally or partner army is most likely to be in the U.S. Army’s inter-
est. In this example, they include force protection and Joint urban
operations.
Overall, it may be more appropriate to work with a partner army
to close a capability gap of high importance than one of low impor-
tance. Likewise, of those capability gaps of higher importance, it may
be more appropriate for the U.S. Army to help build partner capa-
bilities that require a lower level of effort. Although high-importance/
high-effort capabilities may not be suitable for building partner capa-

bility, they do suggest areas to pursue with high-end allies, many of
which may already have such a capability to contribute.
Step 3: Identify Capabilities of Shared Interest to the U.S. Army and

Partner Armies
Although the relationship between the importance to the U.S. Army
and the level of effort provides some insight into the types of capa-
bilities appropriate for building with partner armies, it does not give
the whole picture. Step 3 identifies those capability gaps most likely
to be of interest to both the U.S. Army and the candidate partner. In
this step, the relationship provides additional insight into the types of
capabilities that are of interest to both parties and are therefore more
sustainable.
To determine importance to the partner, the study team consid-
ered three factors:
1. Whether the capability has dual-use applicability, meaning that

the capability has utility in both a domestic and a deployed con-
text. The assumption, from the beginning of the chapter, is that
there is a greater chance that the partner will be committed to
developing and sustaining its capabilities if they can also be for
domestic purposes or as a way to enhance or offset expenses of
a country’s military capabilities, such as peacekeeping units for
U.N. operations.6
2. The international prestige associated with building and deploy-
ing a capability, meaning that deploying the capability in an
international context carries the potential to enhance the part-
ner’s stature within the international community; and
3. Whether the capability supports military modernization goals,
which would be useful, for example, in a partner’s efforts to
gain membership in NATO.
6 Moroney, Grissom, and Marquis (2007).

Table 4.2 summarizes the workshop’s findings for Step 3. For each
of the three factors, the elements in boldface indicate those capability
gaps the participants determined to be of greatest interest to partners,
i.e., generally speaking the most dual-use applicability, most presti-
gious, and most applicability to military modernization. For example,
the workshop considered HUMINT and engineering to be at the high
end for each of the three factors. Joint urban operations, enhanced
ISR, detect/identify obstacles, and logistics were high in two of the
three factors, whereas the remaining capabilities were high in only one
or none of the factors. To synthesize these results, the study team con-
sidered those capabilities deemed high in two or more factors to be of
overall high interest to a partner.
The relationship between the importance to the U.S. Army and
the importance to the partner provides the final insight into the types
of capabilities that are appropriate for building with partner armies.
Figure 4.3 illustrates the relationship where U.S. Army and partner
interests converge.
Capabilities in the top-right quadrant are of high importance to
the U.S. Army and the partner and therefore are a high priority for
Table 4.2
Partner Interests
Dual-Use Prestige Modernization
HUMINT HUMINT HUMINT
Engineering Engineering Engineering
Joint urban operations Joint urban operations Joint urban operations
ISR ISR ISR
Detect/identify obstacles Detect/identify obstacles Detect/identify obstacles
Logistics Logistics Logistics
Nonlethal Nonlethal Nonlethal
Medical Medical Medical
Force protection Force protection Force protection
Detainee operations Detainee operations Detainee operations

Figure 4.3
Capability Gaps of Interest to U.S. Army and Partner
Highest importance to U.S. Army Highest importance to both

Capability’s importance to U.S. Army
Capabilities of shared interest

to U.S. and partners
High importance to neither Highest importance to partner
Capability’s importance to partner

RAND MG635-4.3
U.S. Army security cooperation resources. According to the workshop

discussion, these capabilities include Joint urban operations, enhanced
ISR, and HUMINT.
The bottom-right quadrant represents those capabilities that are
not as important to the U.S. Army, relatively speaking, but are impor-
tant to the partner. As such, they are a secondary priority for Army
security cooperation resources. Capabilities such as logistics, engineer-
ing, and detect/identify obstacles may have a better chance of being
sustained in a partner country because of the partner’s interest in using
and maintaining the capability.
Capabilities that fall in the bottom-left quadrant, such as nonle-
thal, medical, and detainee operations, may not be high on either the
U.S. Army’s or the partner’s priority lists and may be considered only if
additional resources are made available. Sustainment of these capabili-
ties in the partner army may be problematic.
Capabilities in the top-left quadrant, such as force protection, are
important to the U.S. Army, and even though they are not as impor-
tant to partners, attempts to conduct security cooperation activities in
these areas are appropriate if the partner is amenable. However, if the
partner is not sufficiently enthusiastic or motivated, sustainment of the

capability is questionable.
Relative to the illustrative capability gaps discussed in the work-
shop, Joint urban operations, force protection, and logistics capabilities
came out relatively high on both lists in the discussion. These, there-
fore, would likely be good candidates for security cooperation because
of their high importance to both the U.S. Army and the partner and
the relatively low level of effort required to build them. Nonlethal,
medical, and detainee operations may be worth considering depend-
ing on the mission requirements, despite possible limitations resulting
from either the high level of effort required or low partner interest.
Step 4: Identify Candidate Partner Armies Based on Availability and

Political Acceptability
In Step 4, the study team developed a list of candidate partners
based on their availability to work with the U.S. Army in capability-
building activities. To do this, the study team identified partners that
have participated in, or provided support to, selected U.S.-led coalition
operations. The operations examined include Operation Iraqi Freedom
(OIF), Operation Enduring Freedom/International Security Assis-
tance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, Operation Secure Tomorrow in
Haiti, Kosovo Force (KFOR), International Security Force/Stabiliza-
tion Force (IFOR/SFOR) in Bosnia, U.N. operations in Somalia, and
Multinational Force of Observers (MFO) in Sinai, Egypt. The opera-
tions represent many regions of the globe, and they are notable for the
duration of their cooperative efforts. This wide selection of operations
allowed for some regional variability7 as well as a longer-term view of
coalition partner contributions.
First, the study team created a list of candidate partners that con-
tributed to these efforts. Then, the study team divided partners into
categories according to (1) high-level support; (2) mid-level support;
(3) low-level support; and (4) noncombatant support (i.e., basing access
7 Something that examining only recent efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan could not
provide.
or refueling). The level of support in the first three categories was deter-
mined by comparing a ratio of troops committed to a coalition effort
to the total active duty armed forces available to that country.8 For
each country, the largest contribution of troops made to a coalition
operation was the basis for the ratio calculation. These ratios were then
compared using quartiles as the dividing line between high, mid, and
low levels of support.9 Countries were considered based on the number
of operations they supported.
Although a high level of support to U.S.-led operations suggests
a correlation of interests with the United States, some partners who
supported just one operation with a substantial number of forces were
also included. The study team deemed them appropriate, since often
the decision to support just one operation is based on consideration of
the resource limitations some countries face. Likewise, some countries
that have provided noncombatant support are included because this
type of support is also an essential part of conducting a coalition opera-
tion. The intention of this exercise was not necessarily to determine
who is a “better” or more capable coalition partner; instead, the ratios
provide insight into how large a contribution a given partner is will-
ing and able to provide, given the best-case scenario. Table 4.3 below
depicts the results. The full table of partner contributions to the eight
coalition efforts, as well as a breakout of the number of coalition efforts
that partners have engaged in with the United States, can be found in
Appendix C.
As a secondary indicator of shared interest, the study team exam-
ined the countries’ U.N. General Assembly voting records (see Appen-
8 By using this ratio, the results of the analysis would not be biased toward states with large
armed forces (and therefore with more to spare for a coalition effort).
9 Troop contributions ranged from 0.04 percent of total armed forces (the Philippines)
to 33 percent of armed forces (Luxembourg—a major outlier). The third quartile includes
partners that provided more than 2.35 percent of their total armed forces; the first quartile
includes partners that provided less than 0.37 percent of their armed forces. Mid-level sup-
porters consisted of those states that contributed between 0.37 and 2.35 percent of their
armed forces. See Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment.
dix C).10 The countries highlighted in boldface in Table 4.3 are those
whose voting coincidence with the United States on General Assembly
votes labeled “important” by the Department of State is particularly
low, potentially indicating a lack of congruence in political interests.
DOS reports were examined to determine voting coincidence with the
United States.11 DOS labels approximately 12–15 votes a year as impor-
tant—these are votes that bear directly on U.S. foreign policy goals and
involve a great deal of U.S. lobbying in the General Assembly. After the
voting data from 2000 to 2005 were compiled, an average was taken
per country for all six years of voting. The country averages were then
divided into quartiles. Of the partners that provided mid- or high-
level support, roughly 90 percent had U.N. voting records that aligned
with the United States. The states in the lowest quartile voted the same
as the United States on important votes less than 32.8 percent of the
time. The study team considered the U.N. voting records a secondary
concern, primarily because countries can often overcome the lack of
shared political interests in light of mutual regional security interests.
The remaining 10 percent of the partners that provided mid- to high-
level support overcame this apparent difference. This is the most likely
explanation for why the states in bold text, contrary to their political
disagreements with the United States, nonetheless contributed troops
to coalition efforts. For this reason, in Table 4.3, the study team chose
to keep these states in the table rather than remove them as potential
partners.
A few other considerations are worth taking into account when
choosing a partner country to work with or train. One is the politi-
cal acceptability of the partners who have demonstrated that they are
available for U.S.-led coalition operations. The acceptability factor is a
political litmus test to determine whether a partner is eligible to receive
security cooperation resources from the United States.12 Determining
10 Other RAND Arroyo Center studies have used U.N. General Assembly voting records to
gauge shared interests with the United States. See Szayna et al. (2004).
11U.S. Department of State (annual). For this exercise, the section entitled “Important
Votes and Consensus Actions” was most useful.
Table 4.3
Level of Partner Availability for U.S.-Led Operations
High-Level Mid-Level Low-Level Non-Troop

Support Support Support Contributions
Australia Albania Azerbaijan Albania
Canada Austria Chile Bahrain
Denmark Belgium Colombia Croatia
Dominican Republic Bulgaria Egypt Dominican Republic
El Salvador Czech Republic Jordan Egypt
Fiji Estonia Kazakhstan Japan
Finland Germany Korea (ROK) Kazakhstan
France Greece Macedonia Korea (ROK)
Georgia Hungary Moldova Kuwait
Great Britain Japan Morocco Kyrgyzstan
Honduras Lithuania Philippines Pakistan
Italy Malaysia Russia Qatar
Latvia Mongolia Singapore Saudi Arabia
Luxembourg New Zealand Thailand Turkey
Netherlands Nicaragua Turkey UAE
Norway Pakistan Uruguay Uzbekistan
Zimbabwe Poland Yemen
Portugal
Romania
Saudi Arabia
Slovak Republic
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
United Arab
Emirates
Ukraine
a partner’s level of acceptability is a structured way to ask whether,

given the current administration’s strategy and policies, developing a
closer security cooperation relationship with the partner is politically
acceptable. The study team identified two indicators that could help
determine acceptability. First, in terms of common political values, it
should be determined whether the partner has processes in place that
lend themselves to democratic practices. One example could be the
presence of a functioning and fair legal system. A potential metric for
this indicator could be the annual Freedom House publication, Free-
dom in the World, which provides scores on political and civil liberties
for all states.13
Second, in terms of diplomatic relations, the Army might consider
the partner’s receptivity to discussions on key issues, as well as the level
and nature of bilateral exchanges, such as regular meetings at multiple
levels, which can indicate a basis for shared political views. Some possi-
ble metrics for this indicator include signed and ratified military agree-
ments, such as the bilateral Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and the
Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA). The conclusion of
these agreements can indicate a partner country’s willingness to deepen
military cooperation with the United States. Another possible metric
of a partner’s willingness to work closely with the United States could
be whether it has signed what is considered to be a contentious agree-
ment, such as a waiver to Article 98 of the Rome Statute governing the
International Criminal Court (ICC).14 The signing and ratification of
such agreements may demonstrate a higher degree of commitment to
deepening political and military cooperation with the United States.15
Step 5: Determine Existing Partner Army Capabilities

The fifth and final step in the process was to determine candidate
partner armies’ capabilities. For illustrative purposes, the study team
13 Freedom House provides its annual data free of charge on its website.
14 Essentially, this waiver means that a partner agrees not to render U.S. service members
to the ICC. The Department of State currently requires such an agreement, or a presidential
waiver, to provide Title 22 security assistance to a foreign state.
reviewed available databases and other current sources, since a coun-

try’s level of readiness may change significantly over time.16
The study team developed a matrix of available partner armies
with existing capabilities that could fill the gaps identified in Chap-
ter Three. These partner armies with existing capabilities represent
the potential for quickly filling gaps. The remaining partners suggest
a potential investment strategy for security cooperation, including
focused resources to build capabilities.
According to the sources consulted, the least available are nonle-
thal capabilities, detect/identify obstacles, and Joint urban operations.
Medical, logistics, detainee operations, and force protection were more
available. The most widely available capabilities were engineering,
enhanced ISR, and HUMINT.17 It seems from these data that all six
capabilities identified as appropriate in Steps 2 and 3 make sense to
build in partner armies, particularly Joint urban operations, force pro-
tection, and logistics.
Illustrating the Process
In this section, we apply the Georgia SSOP TEP to illustrate the pro-
cess developed in this chapter.18 This TEP provides insights into build-
ing partner capacity for operations outside the partner’s domestic arena,
specifically to OIF.19 The following questions are considered: (1) Did
16 Sources for the information include focused discussions with the Central Command
(CENTCOM) CCJ5 Coalition Coordination Cell, Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment for
each of the countries and the CENTCOM Coalition Partners website (indicates which capa-
bilities coalition partners are providing in the region).
17 Although HUMINT in general was considered widely available among the countries
surveyed, the sources consulted did not differentiate between the various components of
HUMINT (e.g., collection, analysis, and dissemination).
18 The team selected the Georgia TEP because of the scope, duration, number of phases, and
objective (i.e., deploy capable forces to Iraq). As discussed above, of all the TEPs examined,
the Georgia TEPs had the most robust collection of assessments and after-action reports.
19 GTEP was aimed exclusively at achieving domestic goals, thus it is somewhat outside the
scope of the coalition capabilities analysis that follows.
SSOP focus on the most appropriate capabilities? (2) If not, what other
capabilities might have been more appropriate and why? (3) Is there a
correlation between the process and the lessons identified in SSOP?
Georgia: Sustainment and Stability Operations Program

GTEP and SSOP are widely viewed as success stories: as a result of
these programs, the Georgian military was in a position not only to
address domestic challenges (e.g., rooting out terrorists in the Pankisi
Gorge—the objective of GTEP) but also to assist in coalition efforts
such as OIF (the objective of SSOP). In the process, the Georgian mili-
tary gained critical skills and developed into a more professionalized
force that respected civilian control of military operations and demo-
cratic governance.20
Per the SSOP Program of Instruction,21 each capability devel-
oped is consistent with the example task definitions used by the expert
workshop (see Appendix B). The SSOP TEP focused on the following
capabilities:
• joint urban operations (e.g., suspect recognition/theory, vehicle

recognition/search, urban and security patrols, urban terrain
attack)
• force protection (e.g., platoon defense in the bivouac, secure heli-
copter landing zones, secure patrols)
• logistics (e.g., record-keeping and accountability, coordina-
tion supply support, functions of logistics and combat service
support)
• medical (e.g., basic first aid, combat life support, preventive
medicine)
• engineering (e.g., explosive ordnance disposal/sappers)
• detect/identify obstacles (e.g., react to rural improvised explosive
devices (IEDs), urban vehicle search, react to suicide bombers,
locate mines, react to mines)
• nonlethal capabilities (e.g., crowd control).
20 GTEP/SSOP unpublished report, U.S. European Command (EUCOM) ECJ5 (2006).

21 EUCOM provided the Program of Instruction for SSOP to the study team.
These can be linked to gaps identified in Chapter Three. However, the

analysis that follows concludes that, although SSOP met its goals at
the strategic level, the United States might have considered different
capabilities for development at the operational level. The ability of the
Georgian government to sustain some of these capabilities is question-
able, and some capabilities could have been provided at a lesser cost by
an ally with an existing capability. The following discussion examines
the Georgian SSOP in relation to the five-step process.
Step 1: Importance to the U.S. Army

The subject matter expert workshop considered the relative importance
of the various capabilities in the context of operations in a high-threat
environment.22 Of the capabilities provided through SSOP, the work-
shop regarded two as being of high importance to the U.S. Army:
Joint urban operations and force protection. Five of the capabilities
transferred through SSOP to include nonlethal capabilities, medi-
cal, logistics, engineering, and detect/identify obstacles were of lesser
importance.
Steps 2 and 3: Level of Effort and Shared Interest

To determine whether SSOP provided the appropriate capabilities to
the Georgian military, the study team considered the six factors dis-
cussed in Steps 2 and 3 of the process. Of the six factors described in
Steps 2 and 3, three affect the U.S. decision to develop a capability (e.g.,
complexity, cost, and sensitivity to U.S. national security). The other
three address the recipient’s desire to receive and sustain a capability
(e.g., international prestige, dual-use, and military modernization).
Although considering all of the capabilities provided through
SSOP, the study team examined force protection in detail, since it
constituted roughly half of the total program costs for SSOP.23 In
addition, the study team considered whether the Georgian military
22 This makes the workshop results relevant to the SSOP deployment intent.
23 Providing force protection capabilities in SSOP cost $30 million.
would be capable, and have the incentive, to sustain the capabilities

developed.24
According to the consensus of subject matter experts at the work-
shop, force protection is neither too complex nor too costly a capa-
bility to provide or for the recipient to sustain. In Georgia, the U.S.
trainers included force protection in basic light infantry tactics. Basic
light infantry training took just 16 weeks—a relatively short time. The
units needed standard-issue equipment such as uniforms, small arms,
ammunition, and body armor and did not require highly specialized
equipment.
The four Georgian light infantry battalions cost approximately
$16.4 million each to train and equip. SSOP also included force protec-
tion training, with basic training for an additional two infantry battal-
ions and a support brigade. The total SSOP training cost approximated
$11.9 million per battalion; together, the combined initial expense for
GTEP and SSOP was approximately $128 million. The grand total for
force protection train and equip efforts was $30 million. This sum is
not abnormally high and is a good indicator of how much it costs to
build this capability from the ground up. Without U.S. assistance, this
initial expense would have been a challenge for the Georgian Ministry
of Defense, with a budget of only $960 million in 2006.25 Sustaining
the force protection capability is significantly less costly to the Geor-
gian government. Previous RAND Arroyo Center research indicates
that the five-year cost of sustaining the SSOP force protection capabili-
ties will be approximately $9.2 million.26
The actual cost of developing a capability is empirically observ-
able, but many other factors play a role in capability sustainment. These
are significantly more challenging to quantify. This is where the judg-
ment of subject matter experts plays a role in Army TEP planning. The
workshop participants also determined that providing force protection
24 The need to sustain capabilities was a key finding in the TEP analysis relative to SSOP.
25 CIA World Factbook.
training to foreign military units is unlikely to pose a threat to U.S.

national security interests.27
At the same time, it is not a particularly prestigious capability;
it does not have great dual-use applicability, nor is it especially useful
in modernization efforts. Therefore, the development of this capabil-
ity may suffer, as it is not of great interest to Georgia. Nonetheless,
it is affordable to the Georgian government and is a useful contribu-
tion to coalition efforts. Overall, the development of this capability in
the Georgia TEPs seems appropriate and consistent with national and
Army priorities.
In addition to Joint urban operations and force protection, the
five-step process points to logistics as an appropriate capability to
develop in a partner army. Nonlethal and medical capabilities were of
lesser interest to the United States and the partner. The two remain-
ing capabilities developed in SSOP—engineering and detect/identify
obstacles—may not have been the most appropriate capabilities to build
in a TEP. Although considered by the workshop to be of high interest
to the partner, both were considered relatively complex and of a poten-
tially high risk to U.S. national security, and detect/identify obstacles
were also of high cost. Therefore, these capabilities might have been
secondary choice if funding were available. Finally, these two capabili-
ties may not be sustainable in Georgia (see Step 4 for details).
Step 4: Availability and Political Acceptability

In terms of availability, Georgian forces have demonstrated a high level
of willingness to participate in U.S.-led coalition operations. SSOP led
to the deployment of the trained battalions to Iraq. As shown above,
Georgia was a high-level contributor, deploying 600 troops to OIF,
totaling about 2.5 percent of its total armed forces.28
27 Multinational Force officials described the Georgian role at a Multinational Force–Iraq

forward operating site as primarily providing force protection. See “Georgians Arrive at
Caldwell.”
28Georgia’s armed forces total 24,700 soldiers. See Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment,
Country Executive Summary.
In determining if a state is “politically acceptable,” a good starting

point is an examination of the partner’s economic and political funda-
mentals. In other words, does it exhibit some characteristics of demo-
cratic rule? Likewise, do economic indicators instill confidence that the
partner’s government is stable or that the government can corral the
economic resources necessary to sustain the capabilities developed in
the TEP after the training concludes?
Georgia passes the democratic governance test: It receives a rating
of “partly free” from Freedom House, indicating that it has some ele-
ments of electoral government and civil liberties. Moreover, Georgia
has signed a number of important agreements with the United States,
including a SOFA, ACSA, and a waiver to Article 98 of the Rome Stat-
ute governing the International Criminal Court. However, economi-
cally, Georgia is a low-income country; its per capita gross domestic
product (GDP) is approximately $3,300 per year.29 This level of per
capita GDP is within an economic danger zone that may bode ill for
regime stability.30 Likewise, these ratings indicate that Georgia may
have financial difficulties sustaining anything but low- or medium-
effort capabilities. This economic frailty is especially important to bear
in mind when selecting which capabilities are sustainable in Georgia.
Step 5: Existing Capabilities

Of the partner country capabilities considered, engineering was the
most readily available by a wide range of armies around the world.
Although medical, logistics, and force protection developed in SSOP
are less readily available among other coalition partners, nonlethal
capabilities, detect/identify obstacles, and Joint urban operations were
the scarcest of the capability gaps.
Summary
SSOP met its basic goals, i.e., the Georgian Army deployed capable
forces to OIF.
29 CIA World Factbook (entry on Georgia).

30 Przeworski et al. (2000).
In general, we found the lessons learned from the case study (see
Appendix A) to be consistent with the insights provided by the five-
step process. For example, we found that Georgia meets the accept-
ability criteria as a state with elements of democratic governance and
has signed the necessary bilateral agreements with the United States.
Georgia clearly has an interest in the capabilities provided (i.e., com-
bating terrorism), which have a dual use at home and when deployed.
It has also gained international recognition and prestige because of
deploying its trained and capable forces to OIF. Therefore, the five-step
process predicts, and the case study bears out, that a security coopera-
tion investment in the form of a TEP in Georgia seems reasonable and
potentially fruitful.
The capabilities focused on, however, according to the five-step
process, should have been slightly different. Although the SSOP was
successful in achieving its primary aim, this could have been an oppor-
tunity to build up additional capabilities currently needed most by the
U.S. Army. Joint urban operations and force protection are two such
capabilities. On the other hand, detect/identify obstacles and engineer-
ing were more widely available, high-effort capabilities that the U.S.
Army could potentially incorporate from allies or partner armies. In
general, it would be more cost-effective to look for the capabilities that
already exist when trying to fill gaps.
Conclusion
The five-step process for matching U.S. Army capability gaps with
candidate partner armies focuses on identifying those capabilities that
are important to the U.S. Army and the partner and require a rela-
tively low level of Army security cooperation resources to build. Over-
all, Joint urban operations, force protection, and logistics capabilities
were the best candidate capabilities because of their importance to the
United States and the partner, the low level of effort required to build
them, and their scarcity within the partner countries being considered.
However, if the scenario changed, the results would likely be differ-
ent. Subject matter experts provide important input to the process and
should be consulted on the capability gaps and also for their exper-
tise on the political, military, and economic situations of the countries
being considered.
This chapter also highlights the importance of selecting appro-
priate capabilities that are sustainable by partners. For example, the
economic limitations facing the Georgian government may pose a seri-
ous challenge to the sustainment of relatively expensive and complex
capabilities such as enhanced detect/identify obstacles and engineer-
ing. It is also important for the U.S. Army to focus security coop-
eration resources, to the extent possible, on building scarce capabili-
ties through TEPs. Finally, the discussion suggests caution so as to
avoid the development of capabilities that are widely available, require
a higher level of effort, and have a lower level of importance to the U.S.
Army.
CHAPTER FIVE
Conclusions and Recommendations
The U.S. Army is facing tremendous demands on personnel, equip-

ment, and other critical resources. The Global War on Terrorism,
(GWOT), SSTRO, and other emerging missions are creating compet-
ing demands for Army capabilities that result in COCOM requirement
gaps that the Army is pressed hard to fill. National and DoD strate-
gic guidance, including the BPC Execution Roadmap, emphasizes the
need to leverage the capabilities of allies and partners around the world
to fill these gaps and bolster their defense self-sufficiency. From a politi-
cal perspective, gaining the support of allies and partners may lead to
effective cooperation and long-term sustainment of capabilities.
As a result of budgetary, military, and political realities, the Army
must consider new ways to focus its security cooperation programs and
activities to build the most appropriate and effective capabilities in can-
didate partner armies. Partners can, and often are, willing to provide
capabilities to U.S.-led operations. From an Army security coopera-
tion perspective, then, the key questions are: What kinds of capabilities
would be the most appropriate to build in which partner armies and
why? What are the best methods for conducting the training? And how
will the Army measure the success of its investment?
This monograph builds on prior RAND Arroyo Center work by
examining the types of capabilities to develop in partner armies, based
on current and anticipated U.S. Army capability gaps. It provides a
process for matching U.S. Army capability gaps with candidate partner
armies. It argues that U.S. Army planners need a more comprehen-
sive understanding of the types of capabilities that might be built in
63
partner armies and describes how those capabilities might develop into
capacity by working with other DoD and U.S. interagency partners.
The study also provides insights into planning the associated Army
security cooperation activities and a rationale for developing metrics
that would allow the Army to assess its security cooperation investment
over time.
The six key conclusions and associated recommendations for
HQDA thus stem from the findings of the preceding chapters.
Focus on building capabilities that support Joint requirements.
Building capable partner armies for coalition operations requires that
the U.S. Army consider the strategic and operational requirements of
the Joint force when planning its security cooperation programs and
activities. The U.S. Army should ensure that the capabilities built in
partner armies are consistent with national and DoD strategic guid-
ance and COCOM requirements. As the supporting entity, HQDA
should ensure that the Army Security Cooperation Strategy reflects
these requirements, taking into account Integrated Priority Lists, Joint
Operating Concepts, and Theater Security Cooperation Strategies.
Adopt a process that matches U.S. Army capability gaps with
partner armies. The process described in this study provides criteria for
evaluating which capability gaps might be most appropriate for partner
armies to fill. In broad terms, the capability should ideally be highly
important to both the U.S. Army and the partner and should require
a relatively low effort to build. Capabilities built at comparatively low
levels of complexity, low cost, and minimal U.S. national security sen-
sitivities would be most appropriate. On the other hand, capabilities
that require a high level of effort may be best suited to high-end allies
with the wherewithal to acquire and sustain them. Further, it is essen-
tial to consider the extent to which the partner army can sustain a new
capability. Capabilities with the potential for dual use, those that lead
to greater international prestige, or those that assist the partner in its
military modernization efforts tend to be more sustainable.
Increase visibility into previous and ongoing efforts to train and
equip partner armies. It is important for the U.S. Army, from an insti-
tutional perspective, to learn from the experiences of its previous TEPs
around the world and to apply this experience to ongoing and future
Conclusions and Recommendations 65
TEPs. Lessons and best practices are critical from both a planning and
execution perspective and must be captured, analyzed, validated, dis-
seminated, and implemented. It is important to ensure that detailed
AAR and assessments of the TEP as a whole exist, but not just for
specific activities or phases. Either the Army Peacekeeping and Stabil-
ity Operations Institute at the Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsyl-
vania, or the Center for Army Lessons Learned in Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas, should be tasked to capture, analyze, validate, and disseminate
lessons from DoD train and equip programs. Results of the assessments
must be shared widely with HQDA, Army Service Component Com-
mands (ASCCs), and other appropriate agencies for planning purposes
and with the deploying units that will develop curriculum, create new
training methods, and conduct the training.
Coordinate closely with ASCCs, COCOMs, OSD/Policy and
DSCA,1 and the interagency when planning TEPs to ensure appro-
priate resources and activities are considered. When the Army has
a significant or lead role in a TEP, it is important for HQDA, as the
supporting entity, to be actively involved in the planning effort, par-
ticularly where Army security cooperation resources are used. In terms
of resources, the desired end-state should be considered when selecting
funding sources to ensure that training and equipment will contrib-
ute to the desired outcomes, whether to meet a short- or a long-term
goal. Moreover, it is important to involve other U.S. government agen-
cies early on when DoD funding sources are either inadequate or not
available. Consulting donors through bilateral mechanisms or through
a multilateral clearinghouse process can result in additional resources
that can potentially reduce the burden on the U.S. Army.
In terms of activities, it is important to ensure that the partner’s
expectations do not exceed TEP goals. HQDA should work closely with
the COCOMs, ASCCs, and the partner armies, for example, through
Army staff talks, to ensure a clear understanding on all sides. When
sequencing TEP activities, the proficiency of the partner army should
1 The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) has a role to play in two areas: (1)
development of metrics for evaluating security cooperation program effectiveness and (2)
security assistance guidance and management.
be assessed to ensure the proper skill level of training. In addition,

when identifying personnel to conduct the TEP, the Army should con-
sider the importance of establishing a long-term, military-to-military
relationship with the partner army. In this regard, military trainers,
rather than contractors, would be more likely to produce the desired
outcome. Finally, although we acknowledge the challenges associated
with providing multilevel training, the Army, nonetheless, should train
higher headquarters staffs to ensure that the partner army can effec-
tively use the capabilities developed in line units.
Focus on programs the Army controls for building partner capa-
bilities and leverage other DoD and interagency programs. Capa-
bilities are the direct outputs of security cooperation activities. Tying
capabilities to appropriate Army security cooperation programs in a
way that produces outputs relevant to the desired end-states is impor-
tant. HQDA should focus on Army capability-building programs that
are designed to develop skills, provide materiel support, and promote
interoperability. However, when the Army alone is not able to con-
tribute to all of the desired outputs, looking across the interagency
community may provide the solution. To achieve this collaboration,
HQDA should actively coordinate with, and clearly communicate
Army capability gaps to, other DoD and U.S. government stakeholders
that control programs designed to build partner capabilities for coali-
tion operations.
Use metrics that link capability and capacity to the desired ends.
The development and implementation of metrics linked to desired ends
is an essential step in ensuring that Army security cooperation activi-
ties are most effective. Developing metrics for capability and capacity
requires awareness of the desired ends and the ability to connect them
with specific Army security cooperation programs. HQDA should
develop capability metrics for Army security cooperation programs for
BPC, for example, those programs that improve skills, provide materiel
support, and promote interoperability. Then, these capability metrics
can be linked to COCOM requirements and plans can be made to
support the development of capacity metrics. This requires close coor-
dination with U.S. interagencies, COCOMs, and ASCCs.
APPENDIX A
Illustrative Train and Equip Programs
The study team analyzed each of the seven illustrative TEPs to deter-
mine the key findings and specific lessons discussed below.
TEP #1: Georgia Train and Equip/Sustainment and Stability

Operations Programs
GTEP took place in Georgia from May 2002 to April 2004, followed
by a second TEP, SSOP, from April 2005 to June 2006. GTEP was
U.S.-led by Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR) and
U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR). It trained four infantry battalions
and a mechanized armor team, and also provided the necessary equip-
ment (e.g., uniforms, field equipment, and weapons) to perform their
tasks. The main purpose of GTEP was to train and equip the Georgian
battalions using company infantry tactics with the intended goal of
managing the volatile Pankisi Gorge region, where suspected terrorists
were operating. In other words, GTEP built the capacity of the Geor-
gian forces to respond to a domestic problem. Training was given to
2,600 soldiers from the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Inte-
rior forces. GTEP cost a total of $64 million, which was taken from 16
DoD and DOS security cooperation resources.1
The follow-on SSOP TEP was in response to shortcomings in
GTEP training (e.g., the lack of command-level knowledge of how
to use the forces trained in the TEP) and the Georgian Army’s indi-
1 For example, Security Assistance (FMF, IMET, and EDA grants), Georgia Border Secu-
rity and Law Enforcement, Cooperative Threat Reduction Defense and Military Contacts,
and operations and maintenance drawdown.
67
cation of interest in assisting in Operation Iraqi Freedom.2 Marine

Forces Europe (MARFOREUR) led the training with contractor
support. Two infantry battalions, two logistics battalions, as well as
signal, reconnaissance, and engineer brigade companies were trained
and equipped, as were the Land Forces Command Staff and an opera-
tions cell from the General Staff. Security cooperation resources were
pooled from FMF, IMET, Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) funds, and
Coalition Support Funds (CSF) to total $65 million. GTEP and SSOP
achieved their primary objectives; GTEP achieved its goal of providing
troops to the Pankisi Gorge, and SSOP-trained forces contributed to
OIF. U.S. government agencies involved included DoD, DOS, and the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
Of all illustrative TEPs considered in this study, the Georgia
TEPs afforded the best data for analysis. Phased assessments con-
ducted by EUCOM and MARFOREUR were made available to the
study team. To garner a greater level of insight and specific lessons,
the study team convened a roundtable discussion involving GTEP and
SSOP experts from EUCOM, MARFOREUR, the Office of the Sec-
retary of Defense for Policy (OSD/P), the DSCA, the Joint Staff, and
DOS. Workshop participants were carefully chosen to include those
with first-hand knowledge of the two Georgia TEPs, including policy,
funding, and operational experts. The nine key findings from the study
team’s analysis of GTEP and SSOP are as follows.
1. Clearly identify desired end-state before planning the TEP. What

is expected of the partner army following a TEP? Is the inten-
tion to have a more professional force, to sustain a capability in
the partner army for domestic or regional use, or to deploy to
a U.S. coalition effort? Had the goal of deployability for U.S.
coalition operations been identified in GTEP, SSOP training
to deploy the forces might have been included earlier on. If the
desired end-state is participation of the partner army in a U.S.
coalition effort, planners should establish this from the outset
2 The focus was on the 1st infantry brigade.

Illustrative Train and Equip Programs 69
and include penalties for nondeployment or nonsustainment of

the capabilities developed.
2. Consider simultaneous training at all levels of command. In
GTEP, the initial focus on the company level was problematic
because the higher headquarters (battalion and brigade com-
manders) were not included in the early stages and therefore
did not know exactly how to employ the trained forces. Higher-
level staffs should be trained alongside their subordinate units to
permit more effective use of TEP-trained forces and to improve
overall unit cohesiveness.
3. Fully man training units with professional soldiers to improve sus-
tainment. It is important to ensure that a partner country has a
plan in place, and the resources identified, to sustain the TEP
units for several years. Contracted or professional soldiers help
ensure longer-term continuity in trained units because they are
building a career in the military and will therefore be around
longer to train new soldiers and staff. Moreover, the establish-
ment of a basic training course for the contracted soldiers will
help ensure the availability of replacement soldiers.
4. Create and maintain forward command-and-control elements
for TEP. MARFOREUR, as the lead training component for
SSOP, created a successful command-and-control element to
draw together the support elements. This ensured continuity
and reduced logistics and administrative problems that could
have otherwise hindered TEP activities.
5. Conduct activities that encourage regular interface of host nation
interagency actors. During GTEP, the Georgian Border Guards
and the Ministry of Interior interacted more frequently than
normal with other Georgian security services within the Min-
istry of Defense, which ultimately improved interagency
coordination.
6. Ensure that security cooperation funding providers and in-country
teams are involved early on in the TEP development. Security
assistance planners, to include those at DSCA and at the Secu-
rity Assistance Offices (SAOs) in-country, should be consulted
in the early phases of TEP development to discuss timelines
and resources. Moreover, the TEP commander on the U.S. side

should coordinate closely with the SAOs and the COCOM
country desk officers in J-4 and J-5 to ensure that the objec-
tives and goals of the TEP link into COCOM Theater Security
Cooperation strategies.
7. Consider appropriate donor resources early in the planning effort.
Donors can be useful for filling gaps in TEP requirements. In
GTEP, the British Military Advisory Training Team (BMATT)
program provided high-impact training as the culminating
event of the TEP. Specifically, each battalion was given a week-
long peacekeeping support operations scenario related to the
British-funded Georgia Security Assistance (GSA) program.
The event maximized the effect of the TEP by providing a real-
world operational context to the training. However, although
early donor involvement is often helpful in parsing resources,
the United States should develop and maintain a contingency
plan in case donor assistance falls through.
8. Where possible, train to U.N. standards. To improve the ability of
forces to deploy for regional or other multilateral operations, train-
ing to U.N. standards is essential, especially for peacekeeping-
related TEPs.
9. Encourage the partner to host multilateral exercises to reinforce
what has been learned. Georgia hosted two Partnership for Peace
(PFP) exercises following the GTEP training, allowing Georgia
to both exercise with, and showcase new TEP capabilities to its
regional partners.
TEP #2: African Crisis Response Initiative/ African Contingency

Operations Training and Assistance Programs
The ACRI TEP occurred from 1997 to 2002, followed by ACOTA
from 2002 to the present. Trained African Army forces under these two
programs include those from Côte d’Ivoire, Benin, Botswana, Ethio-
pia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia,
Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, and Zambia. The ACRI pro-
gram was train-the-trainer oriented, aimed at training African forces
for peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance purposes on a domestic
level. The goal was to train four to five battalions per year. Security
cooperation resources totaled $1.5 million per year.
ACOTA expanded on ACRI by training deployable battalions for
PKOs in regional and global efforts in a hostile environment. The idea
was that the battalions receiving ACOTA training would be available
for PKOs directed by the United Nations, the African Union (AU),
or other international organizations. The target was to train 14 battal-
ions per year. ACOTA training, funded by the DOS GPOI, included
light infantry tactics, small unit tactics, humanitarian operations, and
rules of engagement consistent with the U.N. Charter. Since 1999,
both ACRI and ACOTA have predominantly used contractors as
trainers, with some oversight from the U.S. military. Security coopera-
tion resources totaled $38 million per year from FY 2002 to FY 2005.
France was a key donor country and organized clearinghouse meetings
to deconflict foreign assistance and pool resources, where possible.
In the case of ACRI, EUCOM planners in the Africa branch did
not conduct assessments or capture lessons learned from training or
related events. The study team also was unable to obtain assessments
of ACOTA; it is not evident that they exist. Therefore, the study team
relied instead on focused discussions with key planners and opera-
tors from EUCOM, OSD, and DOS. The three key findings from the
ACRI and ACOTA illustrative TEPs are as follows:
1. For TEPs designed to deploy forces to a regional or out-of-area oper-

ation, resources should be tied to political commitments. Because
some of the ACOTA battalions that received training with a
specific goal to deploy in support of coalition operations never
actually did so, the ACOTA TEPs occur now only if countries
are committed to deploying the units in support of regional,
U.S.-led coalitions, or U.N. peacekeeping missions. For exam-
ple, ACOTA efforts in Botswana ended after the country
decided not to deploy forces to multilateral peacekeeping opera-
tions in the region (either U.N.- or Economic Community of
West African States [ECOWAS]-led efforts) or Operation Iraqi
Freedom.
2. U.S. training units should have access to the necessary funds to carry
out their training tasks. Personnel must have access to cash, gov-
ernment credit cards, etc., to ensure that they are able to oper-
ate effectively and procure small items without difficulty. This
is especially important if funding from multiple sources is used,
which is likely to be the case in most TEPs.
3. Obtaining donor support through a clearinghouse process is worth
considering early on in the TEP. The Africa clearinghouse con-
cept developed in November 2004 to support ACOTA activi-
ties provided a forum for coordinating activities with European
allies. The process will potentially improve sustainability of the
ACOTA TEP; 13 allies plus the European Union (EU) par-
ticipated in and hosted meetings within the clearinghouse con-
struct for ACOTA/ACRI.
TEP #3: Pan-Sahel Initiative/Trans-Sahel Counterterrorism Initiative

PSI began in 2002, followed by TSCTI in June 2005, which is cur-
rently ongoing. Under PSI, SOCEUR and MARFOREUR trained four
African states: Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger. TSCTI expanded
to include Algeria, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tunisia. Both TEPs
intended to build the partner’s military capabilities to combat terrorist
influences in the region, deny terrorists safe haven, protect the borders,
track the movement of terrorists, and enhance regional cooperation in
counterterrorism. PSI and TSCTI trained rapid reaction companies
of soldiers in skills such as marksmanship, communications, patrol-
ling, and medical care. Security cooperation resources for PSI totaled
$7.5 million in FMF from FY 2002 to FY 2003. Funding for TSCTI
increased exponentially to $508 million from FY 2005 to FY 2008.
The study team obtained data for the PSI/TSCTI TEPs from sev-
eral government sources on the planning and operational side, includ-
ing EUCOM, SOCEUR, and MARFOREUR. These data included
some after-action reports and a limited number of activity assessments.
Focused discussions were conducted with EUCOM and OSD on the
planning and with SOCEUR on the execution of PSI and TSCTI. The
six key findings from the PSI and TSCTI TEPs are as follows:
1. Consider providing more advanced technical equipment early on

for combating terrorism-related TEPs. The provision of night
vision devices for counterterrorism-trained forces would likely
have helped the PSI-trained forces capture suspected terrorists.
2. Assess literacy rates before the TEP. Low literacy levels (including
recognizing numbers) in Chad, for example, degraded training
in land navigation, planning, and communications.
3. Consider language barriers and, where possible, hire local inter-
preters. U.S. interpreters did not know the local dialects in Chad
and Niger, inhibiting the ability to train the soldiers.
4. Include training aids in predeployment training. TEP training
should be specific enough to ensure that can training be con-
ducted unassisted. This includes the prior development of all
lesson materials and training aids. Resources in-country may
simply not be available for sophisticated devices (or even simple
ones in some cases). Instructors must be fully trained and famil-
iar with all training aids before deployment.
5. Ensure that contractors have guidance on which equipment is per-
missible to purchase/provide. For example, during PSI, the com-
passes supplied to Chad/Niger were not luminescent, which
limited the possible training activities, especially at night.
6. Emphasize multinational activities and common doctrine. Region-
ally focused TEPs must include training at the multinational
level, using common SOPs and TTPs, to improve regional
interoperability.
TEP #4: Operation Enduring Freedom–Philippines

OEF-P began in May 2003 and is currently ongoing. The aim of the
program is to train and equip the Philippine forces to counter the
activities of terrorist groups, particularly the Abu Sayyaf Group, on a
domestic scale, and to deny safe haven to Al Qaida operatives in the
region. OEF-P units were trained in light infantry, night flying opera-
tions, combat and humanitarian engineering, and intelligence capabil-
ities. OEF-P is U.S.-led and executed by Special Operations Command
Pacific (SOCPAC); contractors are not involved. Security cooperation
resources totaled $180 million from FY 2001 to FY 2004 from FMF,
IMET, and DoD drawdown. In FY 2005, FMF was just under $30
million and IMET funds totaled $3 million.3
The study team collected information from numerous sources.
Mission Performance Plans (MPP) from DOS were consulted for the
specific interagency activities. Focused discussions with officials from
OSD/P, DSCA, the Joint Staff J-5, Pacific Command (PACOM)
J-56, and SOCPAC provided perspectives on U.S. strategic interests
in conducting OEF/P and subsequent security cooperation with the
Philippines. Officials from PACOM and DSCA provided insights into
experiences on the ground and the larger context and history of U.S.
security cooperation with the Philippines. The study team did not have
access to AARs or assessments and it is not clear whether they exist. A
review of data collected produced four key insights from OEF/P:
1. Counterterrorism-oriented TEPs can greatly facilitate the deepen-

ing of bilateral security ties with partners. OEF-P was created at
the end of 2001 to expand the capability of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines (AFP) to capture high-value targets from key
terrorist organizations. Security ties between the United States
and the Philippines grew substantially, making it possible for the
U.S. military to increase its interaction with Philippine security
forces in a variety of relationship-building events.
2. Innovative approaches to TEPs in the civic sector can help the U.S.
military counter terrorist activities. In addition to training and
equipping the AFP for counterterrorism and counterinsurgency
operations, the U.S. military also provided direct military assis-
tance (as part of annual bilateral exercises with the AFP) to
communities by engaging in engineering, medical, and dental
activities. The presumption was that the communities would
then be less likely to provide sanctuary to terrorists. This model
is replicated elsewhere in the Philippines by U.S. forces jointly
with the AFP.
3 IMET funds allocated to the Philippines are the largest in Asia and the second largest in
the world.
3. A partner country’s ability to absorb new capabilities and its com-

mitment to sustaining them is critical to achieving desired outcomes.
Despite some ongoing policy changes for reform and modern-
ization, widespread corruption, institutional weaknesses, and
low morale plague the Philippine government and the AFP,
which greatly diminishes the ability of the AFP to sustain the
TEP-trained forces.
4. Politics can terminate participation in out-of-area operations, even
though trained forces may want to continue their mission. The AFP
was eager to obtain additional military training and assistance
from the U.S. military to help bring about much needed reforms
and modernization. However, the kidnapping of a Filipino civil-
ian contractor in Iraq by insurgents and their demand for Phil-
ippine withdrawal in exchange for his freedom changed domes-
tic public opinion and forced the government to withdraw from
Iraq just one month short of completing the tour. This resulted
in the Philippines losing $10 million in PKO funds.
TEP #5: Plan Colombia

Plan Colombia began in 2000 to train and equip Colombian com-
mando battalions for counterinsurgency and counternarcotics opera-
tions in the domestic arena. The TEP for counterinsurgency and
counternarcotics involved the Army and other Services; contractors
conducted needs assessments and provided technical training and
direct support for materiel. Although Plan Colombia officially ended in
2005, U.S. assistance continues at a high level. U.S. security coopera-
tion with Colombia traditionally focuses on supporting the Colombian
National Police, which has responsibility for countering illicit narcotics
smuggling. Inclusion of a counterterrorism component in Plan Colom-
bia expanded U.S. military involvement, and in TEP efforts in particu-
lar. Indeed, the TEP has become a core component of U.S. assistance
to Colombia. Training efforts focus on including human rights train-
ing, airpower, intelligence, communications, and interdiction capabili-
ties. Security assistance, primarily IMET and FMF (e.g., estimated at
over $100 million for FY 2006), is the main funding source, as is the
Andean Counterdrug Initiative (e.g., estimated at $463,000 for FY
2006).4 U.S. government agencies involved include DoD, DOS, DHS,

and the Department of Justice (DOJ).
The study team obtained input from numerous officials at the
DOS, DSCA, Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) J-5, and U.S. Air
Force International Affairs. The study team also obtained Mission Per-
formance Plans and information on U.S. policy toward Colombia and
use of U.S. assets in Colombia from SOUTHCOM and DOS. The
four key findings from the Plan Colombia TEP are as follows.
1. Political leadership, commitment, and a comprehensive approach

are important considerations at the outset of the TEP. These quali-
ties enabled the TEP to build capability to counter narco-
trafficking, terrorist groups, and insurgents as well as restore
government control over ungoverned territories. Plan Colom-
bia worked to curtail narcotics trafficking and improve security
through a unified counternarcotic and counterterrorism cam-
paign that is executed along with economic development, jus-
tice sector reform, and humanitarian assistance programs.
2. Civilian contractors can play a significant role in supporting TEPs.
Contractors, often ex-military personnel, conduct needs and
capability assessments, training, and maintenance. They often
can provide necessary personnel and skills that the U.S. mili-
tary cannot. As contractors, they can also focus their time to
address specific issues on a continuous basis, as opposed to mili-
tary forces on temporary training assignments.5
3. DoD needs to emphasize sustainment in TEP development. The
United States and the partner countries must consider sustain-
ment as a component of capability building. Budgeting for sus-
tainment with existing security cooperation resources is impor-
tant. Because this was not a consideration in Plan Colombia,
knowledge, skills, and materiel tended to deteriorate not long
after training and materiel transfers were completed.
4 “Colombia: Security Assistance” (n.d.).

5 For example, the Army Special Operations Forces, which typically come into Colombia
to conduct training and leave as soon as training is completed.
4. TEP metrics should have buy-in from the U.S. interagency, espe-
cially if the resources expended come from several agencies. Inter-
agency coordination helped to demonstrate Plan Colombia
results to legislative and executive branch leadership for support
and funding.
TEP #6: Yemen

The TEP in Yemen began in 2002 and is ongoing. The focus is to
increase Yemen’s ability to counter terrorism at home and improve
border security. Training provided by the Yemen TEP included skills
such as hostage situations, counterterrorism operations, response to
domestic crises, and crowd control. The Counterterrorism Fellowship
Program, PKO, FMF, and U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID) provide resources. Yemen received approximately $2 million
in IMET and $18 million in FMF from FY 2005 to FY 2006. The pro-
gram was U.S.-led by Special Operations Command Central (SOC-
CENT), with significant assistance from the United Kingdom.
In March 2006, the study team conducted focused discussions
with several Army officers who were instrumental in the planning
and operational aspects of the Yemen Counterterrorism Unit (CTU).
They were the primary sources of data for this analysis as, again, no
AARs were available. The four key findings from the Yemen TEP are
as follows.
1. To the extent possible, use U.S. military personnel to train partners,

especially where military-to-military relationships are in the early
stages of development. During the Yemen TEP, it became clear
that the Yemen military preferred training from U.S. military
personnel rather than from contractors.
2. Training with U.S. Special Forces or other specialized teams
is needed mostly at the end of a TEP, as the culminating event.
Whereas conventional forces are likely to have the skills nec-
essary to conduct TEPs in less-advanced partners, specialized
counterterrorism training can come only through more special-
ized forces. Joint Combined Exchange and Training (JCET)
exercises, for example, do not have to be the backbone of all
counterterrorism-related TEPs. In the case of Yemen, the Joint

Task Force Horn of Africa (JTF-HOA) provided a vehicle for
specialized training at the end of the TEP.
3. TEP funding sources are not flexible enough to train all criti-
cal security forces. DoD needs the ability to engage and train
with interior forces as well as regular defense ministry forces.
Because of the role interior forces often play in combating ter-
rorism, security cooperation resources should allow training for
these security forces, even though they may not be military. In
Yemen, the CTU interior forces were not initially eligible to
receive IMET—the primary funding source used for this TEP.
4. Partnering with allies is critical for filling personnel gaps and sus-
tainment. In Yemen, British military trainers filled gaps when not
enough U.S. training personnel were available. Over time, the
U.K. trainers were fully integrated into the training schedule.
TEP #7: Operation Balanced Strike

The Operation Balanced Strike TEP began in 2003 and continued
through 2004. Its aim was to develop counterterrorism skills through
live fire exercises, with the specific goal of combating the influence of
the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). The scope of the pro-
gram was regional and SOCCENT led and executed the training. Two
battalions were trained in each of the participating countries—Kyrgyz-
stan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. The program provided infrastructure
such as sniper towers, shoot houses, and classrooms. Security assistance
totaled $13.5 million in FY 2003 from the Iraqi Freedom Fund.
To obtain data for the OBS TEP, CENTCOM and SOCCENT
officials were consulted to obtain both the planning and execution per-
spectives. As in many other TEPs, after-action reports were unavailable
and it is not apparent that they were conducted. However, the study
team did obtain detailed briefings, which provided insights into the
assessment of OBS. The three key findings from the OBS TEP are as
follows.
1. Use of common SOPs or TTPs in bilateral TEPs can improve sub-

sequent regional interoperability. Even in regions such as Cen-
tral Asia, where cooperation between partners is problematic for

political and historical reasons, the use of common standards
can facilitate regional cooperation later when the political envi-
ronment becomes more conducive.
2. Perceived “unfulfilled commitments” can have negative political
consequences. In Central Asia, the perceived lack of U.S. inter-
est in the region affected the political and military relationships
with the three target countries. The countries had intended to
support OIF with a higher level of support, including access to
regional facilities and even deployed troops, but rescinded their
offers to send forces to OIF after OBS was indefinitely delayed.
Overall, the continuous start-stop of this TEP led to dimin-
ished partner support.
3. Consider multiple security cooperation funding sources, not just
security assistance. For OBS, only Title 22 security assistance was
considered as a funding source. However, other security coop-
eration funding sources, such as CTFP and Joint Staff exercises,
could have been applied.
APPENDIX B
Explanation of Capability Gaps
This appendix provides the definitions for the capability gaps identified
in Chapter Three. Reproduced here verbatim are the definitions for
each capability gap as specified in the three Army studies. In develop-
ing Table 3.4, it became clear that the various studies used similar but
slightly different terms to describe the capability gaps. To standardize
the terminology for the purposes of this monograph, the study team
developed titles that best described the capability gaps across all three
studies.
The workshop of subject matter experts also contributed greatly
to the understanding of the capability gap terminology. Their scenario-
based discussions ensured a consistent context for considering the gaps
and were an essential factor in developing a meaningful list of the capa-
bility gaps’ relative importance.
The study team bounded the workshop discussions by setting
aside those capability gaps considered as clearly appropriate only for
high-end allies or as an organic capability of the U.S. Army. These five
capabilities included networked battle command; command, control,
communications, and computers (C4) and information operations;
training the force; force projection; and Joint, interagency, and coali-
tion operations.
The study team determined that the remaining capability gaps
were too broad to enable a focused discussion in the context of a high-
threat environment scenario. Thus, the study team selected an exam-
ple of a specific task within the broader capability gap. These specific
aspects and their associated definitions, as agreed to by the workshop
81
and the study team, are provided here to give the reader insight into
how the capability gaps were assessed by the subject matter experts
and how they relate directly to the capability gaps identified in the
studies.
Networked Battle Command
CGA Study
The network enables joint and expeditionary battle command. It is
about enabling leaders of the joint and expeditionary force to com-
mand and control large maneuver formations, sustain the force with
minimal forward presence, and achieve broad political-military objec-
tives across the full spectrum of operations.
CNA Study
Defined as command and control systems, infrastructure, and proce-
dures that are networked throughout the force. This system of systems
will be adaptable to the requirements of the operation through modu-
lar network construction that enables systems to be added or removed
without network disruption. Includes the ability to promulgate self-
contained, standardized units that are highly deployable and readily
sustainable. These forces will be able to be combined as the mission,
enemy, terrain, time, and troops available dictate. The new modular
organizations provide a mix of land combat power that can be orga-
nized by task for any combination of offensive, defensive, stability, or
support operations as part of a joint campaign.
Workshop Discussion
Not discussed. Determined to be for high-end allies or remain organic
to the U.S. Army.
Force Protection
CGA and CNA Studies

Defined as actions taken to prevent or mitigate hostile actions (to
include friendly fire) against personnel, resources, facilities, and critical
Explanation of Capability Gaps 83
information during those military, paramilitary, political, economic,

psychological, and civic actions taken to defeat insurgency, especially
actions related to overall force protection. Includes actions taken to
prevent or mitigate hostile actions against individual soldiers during
those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and
civic actions taken to defeat insurgency. Remedies include active and
passive measures on the ground, in the air, and in space, all aided by
enhanced situational awareness/understanding. Includes actions taken
to keep soldiers medically and psychologically healthy by easing combat
stress before, during, and after deployment.
Workshop Discussion
The workshop considered the specific task of base camp protection as
an illustration. Task defined as: Situation as in Camp Victory in Iraq,
protect soldier from excessive exposure along lines of communication,
need for persistent surveillance, CS/CSS units lack robust fighting
capabilities, biometrics such as battlefield identification system appli-
cation, identify contractors with base access duties.
C4 and Information Operations
CGA Study
Defined as voice, data, and video communication support to the tac-
tical fight and the capacity and ability to communicate dismounted-
to-dismounted, dismounted-to-mounted at a tactical level in all envi-
ronments. Focused on, but not limited to, battalion level and below.
Includes the ability to analyze intelligence and other information and
provide that information to units to permit the conduct of operations.
Also includes the delivery of timely intelligence information to tactical
units or the accessibility by tactical units to this information.
CNA Study
Defined as open architecture C4 systems that are reliable under all
circumstances and that operate at extended ranges from deployment
through operations in theater and through redeployment. These sys-
tems of systems will readily share information throughout the force.
Workshop Discussion
to the U.S. Army.
Train the Force
CGA and CNA Studies

Defined as tough, realistic training, to include training in theater both
before and after combat operations, which takes full advantage of
existing and emerging technologies. Training should address the unit’s
ability to prepare for both current and future operations. Resources for
training should be readily available to deployed forces in austere cir-
cumstances. These resources should take full advantage of technology
that enables embedded training.
Workshop Discussion
to the U.S. Army.
Logistics
CGA Study
Defined as actions and efforts to promulgate and promote efficient
delivery and consumption of supplies at all levels by all units. Also
incorporates actions to improve combat service, combat service sup-
port, and medical units’ visibility, distribution, accountability, and
operations.
CNA Study
Provide for efficient, effective, and timely delivery of supplies at all
levels by all units throughout the battlespace and the full range of mili-
tary operations, especially where the battlespace is noncontiguous and
operations are conducted at a high tempo. Ensure visibility of the
supply system to all units and organizations supporting or using
the system. Organize and equip supply units to support units from
home station through deployment and return with tailorable supply

packages.
Workshop Discussion
The workshop considered the specific task of distribution capabilities as
an illustration. Task defined as: In-transit visibility, materiel handling
assets, visual display of management and support systems.
Enhanced ISR
CGA and CNA Studies

Defined as activities that synchronize and integrate the planning and
operation of sensors, assets, processing, exploitation, and dissemination
systems in direct support of current and future operations. This is an
integrated intelligence and operations function.
Workshop Discussion
The workshop considered the specific task of detect and warn of direct/
indirect fires as an illustration. Task defined as: Asymmetric tactical
reconnaissance, Q-36/37 radars.
Joint Urban Operations
CGA Study
All Joint operations planned and conducted across the range of mili-
tary operations on or against objectives on a topographical complex
and adjacent natural terrain where manmade construction or the den-
sity of noncombatants are the dominant features.
Workshop Discussion
The workshop experts considered the specific task of distinguish enemy
from populace as an illutration. Task defined as: Ability to observe the
enemy within the populace, limited nonlethal capabilities to expand
soldier options, limited nonlethal training and doctrine knowledge.
Does not include sophisticated future force tracking.
Force Projection
CNA Study
Enable the Army Future Force to respond rapidly from a strategic
distance and deploy by air and sea through multiple entry points for
immediate employment in theater and to conduct intratheater opera-
tional maneuver and sustainment by ground, air, and sea particularly
with mounted, protected forces.
Workshop Discussion
to the U.S. Army.
Medical
CGA Study
Actions and efforts to promulgate and promote efficient delivery and
consumption of supplies at all levels by all units. Also incorporates
actions to improve combat service, combat service support, and medi-
cal units’ visibility, distribution, accountability, and operations.
Workshop Discussion
The workshop considered the specific task of controlling infectious dis-
eases as an illustration. Task defined as: Personal hygiene education,
knowledge of infrastructure, monitor soldiers’ health status remotely.
This does not include pandemic disease control such as Avian Influenza
or large-scale biological or germ warfare.
Joint, Interagency, and Coalition Operations
CGA Study
The ability of all U.S. Service units, coalition units, and allied units to
conduct tactical and operational-level operations. This interoperability
seeks to maximize the effectiveness of Joint, coalition, and allied forces
as well as minimize fratricide among them. Includes the ability of sys-
tems, units, or forces to provide services to and accept services from
other systems, units, or forces and to use the services so exchanged to

enable them to operate effectively together.
Workshop Discussion
to the U.S. Army.
Detect and Identify Obstacles
CNA Study
Enable detection and identification of obstacles, especially explosive
devices, at ranges safe from obstacle ballistics effects. Provide means to
examine, classify, and report obstacles.
Workshop Discussion
The workshop considered the specific task of IED detection and neu-
tralization as an illustration. Task defined as: Protect soldiers from IED
effects, protect multiple platforms, involves sophisticated understand-
ing of the system, not just defeating the device.
Added Capability Gaps
Nonlethal Capabilities
Workshop Discussion
The workshop considered the specific task of crowd control as an illus-
tration. Task defined as: Riot control in crowded markets, riot type
control at the entrances to base camp. This does not include sophisti-
cated electronic monitoring or preemptive crowd control.
Engineering
Workshop Discussion
The workshop considered the specific task of explosive ordnance disposal
as an illustration. Task defined as: Keep major supply routes clear in a
high threat environment.
Detainee Operations
Workshop Discussion
The workshop considered the specific task of prisoner guarding as
an illustration. Task defined as: Guard prisoners in a high threat
environment.
HUMINT
Workshop Discussion
The workshop considered the specific task of analysis as an illustration.
Task defined as: Interdict enemy forces before they encounter friendly
forces, protect installations from sabotage, accumulate intelligence
from reporting elements quickly, lack of decision support tools for tac-
tical commanders.
APPENDIX C
Coalition Partner Contributions to U.S.-Led

Operations
Table C.1
Number of U.S.-Led Coalition Operations Deployed to by Partners
1 Coalition 2–3 Coalition 4–7 Coalition
Operation Operations Operations
Austria Albania Australia
Chile Azerbaijan Belgium
Colombia Bulgaria Canada
Dominican Republic Egypt Czech Republic
El Salvador Fiji Denmark
Georgia Greece Estonia
Honduras Latvia Finland
Japan Luxembourg France
Jordan Macedonia Germany
Kazakhstan Mongolia Hungary
Malaysia Morocco Italy
Moldova New Zealand Lithuania
Nicaragua Portugal Netherlands
Pakistan Republic of Korea Norway
Philippines Russia Poland
89
Table C.1 (continued)

1 Coalition 2–3 Coalition 4–7 Coalition
Operation Operations Operations
Saudi Arabia Singapore Romania
Uruguay Slovenia Slovak Republic
Zimbabwe Sweden Spain
Thailand United Kingdom
Turkey
Ukraine
United Arab Emirates

Table C.2
Partner Contributions (Personnel and Nonpersonnel)
Partner Total
Country Forcea OIF OEF ISAF Bosnia Kosovo Haiti Sinai Somalia Max. %
Albania 12,500 70 n/a PKs 100 Basing 0 0 0 0.80
Australia 52,190 2,000 Major fleet 240 50 0 0 25 650 3.83

unit
Austria 34,024 0 0 0 300 0 0 0 0 0.88
Azerbaijan 72,100 151 23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.21
Bahrain 11,260 0 Basing, 0 0 0 0 0 0 N/A

overflight
Belgium 39,800 0 210 36 300 0 0 0 850 0.75
Bulgaria 45,000 500 0 100 50 0 0 0 0 1.11
Canada 52,300 0 2,250 Battle 1,000 0 700 29 850 4.30

group
Chile 81,000 0 0 0 0 0 300 0 0 0.37
Colombia 190,300 0 0 0 0 0 0 358 0 0.18
Croatia 18,900 0 0 0 Basing 0 0 0 0 N/A
Czech 40,300 300 17 44 850 150 0 0 0 2.11

Republic
Coalition Partner Contributions to U.S.-Led Operations
Denmark 23,860 496 101 460 800 0 0 0 0 3.35

91
92

Partner Total
Dominican 23,700 602 0 0 0 0 Basing 0 0 2.54

Republic
Egypt 440,000 Overflight Overflight 0 1 0 0 0 1,663 0.37

Battalion
El Salvador 15,770 380 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.41
Estonia 5,700 37 10 23 50 0 0 0 0 0.88
Fiji 3,250 700 0 0 0 0 0 338 0 21.50
Finland 30,980 5 60 86 850 0 0 0 0 2.74
France 244,560 0 5,500 750 10,000 4,700 900 15 2,000 4.08
Georgia 24,700 600 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.43
Germany 280,800 0 3,900 2,500 4,000 3,900 0 0 1,500 1.42

Greece 166,000 0 Basing Basing 1,000 429 0 0 0 0.60
Honduras 8,300 370 0 0 0 0 0 0 4.46
Hungary 35,400 500 0 175 500 320 0 41 0 1.41
Italy 202,200 2,700 1,000 2,800 2,100 4,750 0 76 2,500 2.35
Japan 234,880 1,000 Logistics Logistics 0 0 0 0 0 0.43

Partner Total
Jordan 100,500 Training 150 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.15
Kazakhstan 67,300 29 Overflight 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.04
Kuwait 16,200 Basing Basing 0 0 0 0 0 0 N/A
Latvia 5,580 135 0 10 50 0 0 0 0 2.42
Lithuania 9,230 54 40 6 50 30 0 0 0 0.59
Luxembourg 900 0 0 10 300 0 0 0 0 33.33
Macedonia 11,600 34 0 19 0 Basing 0 0 0 0.29
Malaysia 103,300 0 0 0 650b 0 0 0 0 0.63
Moldova 6,562 24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.37
Mongolia 7,650 170 0 21 0 0 0 0 0 2.22
Morocco 200,000 0 Basing 0 650 0 0 0 650 0.33
Netherlands 46,200 1,265 180 361 2,060 0 0 0 0 4.46
Frigate,
New Zealand 10,970 60 logistics 0 50 0 0 20 0 0.55
Nicaragua 14,100 120 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.85

Norway 27,200 150 330 330 750 0 0 3 0 2.76

93
94

Partner Total
Pakistan 620,000 Logistics Logistics Logistics 0 0 0 0 5,000 0.81
Philippines 118,000 51 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.04
Poland 133,150 2,400 0 87 600 800 0 0 0 1.80
Portugal 45,570 128 16 0 900 0 0 0 0 1.97
Qatar 12,400 0 Basing 0 0 0 0 0 0 N/A
Republic of 672,000 465 Logistics 0 0 0 0 0 250 0.06

Korea
Romania 88,235 793 436 306 100 0 0 0 0 0.89
Search & rescue,

Russia 902,000 0 hospital 1,200 3,200 0 0 0 0.35
Saudi Arabia 124,500 Basing Basing Basing 0 0 0 0 678 0.54

Singapore 60,500 180 180 33 0 0 0 0 0 0.29
Slovak
Republic 23,800 104 40 17 50 0 0 0 0 0.44
Slovenia 7,300 5 0 SOF unit 50 0 0 0 0 0.68
Spain 114,774 1,300 540 500 1,100 0 0 0 0 1.13

Partner Total
Sweden 36,940 0 0 84 807 0 0 0 0 2.18
Eng.
Thailand 334,500 443 Company 130 0 0 0 0 0 0.13
Turkey 517,100 0 Air refuel 360 1,200 0 0 0 300 0.23
Overflight,
Ukraine 257,000 1,700 airlift 0 500 240 0 0 0 0.66
United Arab Basing,

Emirates 65,500 0 overflight 0 0 1,200 0 0 (c) 1.83
United
Kingdom 187,970 11,000 1,000 3,500 13,000 3,300 0 0 0 6.92
Uruguay 24,690 0 0 0 0 0 0 87 0 0.35
Zimbabwe 34,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,000 2.94

a
Found in Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, Country Executive Summaries.
b
Estimated—Malaysia contributed one battalion to Bosnia IFOR.
c
United Arab Emirates contributed troops to UNITAF, but no data are available on the number deployed.
Bosnia—number of troops deployed based on IFOR/SFOR.
Kosovo—number of troops deployed based on KFOR.
Haiti—number of troops deployed based on Operation Secure Tomorrow.
Sinai—number of troops deployed based on Multinational Force and Observers.

Somalia—number of troops deployed based on Operation Restore Hope.
95
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Building Partner

Jennifer D. P. Moroney • Nancy E. Blacker

Prepared for the United States Army

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing

© Copyright 2007 RAND Corporation

This monograph documents research conducted for the U.S. Army on

Arroyo Center’s Strategy, Doctrine, and Resources Program. RAND

For more information on RAND Arroyo Center, contact the

2.1. Linking Army Security Cooperation to Building Capability

2.1. Army Programs Linked to Categories and Outputs . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

This monograph outlines an approach to building the capabilities and

army capabilities that support Joint requirements. To do this, the Army

A New Approach to Building Partner Army Capabilities

The study begins with a discussion of the current challenges associ-

The monograph then identiﬁes U.S. Army capability gaps through

The study recommends that Headquarters, Department of the Army

it controls for building partner capabilities but should coordinate with

We owe a great debt to a number of oﬃcers, civil servants, and ana-

AAR after-action report

BMATT British Military Advisory Training Team

ERC exercise-related construction

IPL Integrated Priority List

NADR Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and

SOCEUR Special Operations Command Europe

monograph focuses on an approach to building the most appropriate

• Which types of military capabilities should the U.S. Army target

the U.S. Army create a more systematic approach to building partner

The RAND study team undertook a number of analytic activities to

Organization of the Monograph

Chapter Two provides an overview of the current challenges associated

The Challenge of Building Partner Capability and

This chapter provides an overview of the current challenges associ-

Assumptions and Theory

hood of long-term sustainment of capabilities and can potentially lead

training a partner army in, for example, a potentially lethal capability,

13 See Putnam (1988).

national sentiment or distraction from domestic political issues. It

The Challenge of Developing Metrics15

ity, security, transition, and reconstruction operations (SSTRO), as an

Army Army, other Services, Partner armies COCOMs

Title 10 Titles 10 and 22

17 Marquis et al. (2006).

Military education and Military training teams Skills development

Military-to-military contacts U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Skills development,

Military-to-military exchanges Military Personnel Exchange Skills development

Standing forums Conference of European Interoperability

Military exercises U.S.–United Kingdom Skills development,

Research, development, Information Exchange Skills development,

International support United Nations Military Skills development,

Materiel transfer and Foreign military sales/ Materiel support

Skills Development Materiel Support Interoperability

Army Schools of Other Nations N/A Army War College

DoD Counterterrorism Fellowship Exercise-Related Joint Staff exercises,

cooperation that leverages programs across the U.S. government can

Defense.18 Clearly articulated goals and objectives from the COCOM

The Importance of Train and Equip Programs for U.S.

18 “How the Army Runs 2005–2006” (2006).

resources of other actors (e.g., other Services, interagency, or donor