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    Deepwater Horizon: I Bob Watsh

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    OSDocs2012
    The mud gas separator on the Deepwater Horizon rig likely exceeded its design capacity when flow and pressure from the well were diverted through it, sending gas to multiple locations on the vessel. This occurred after a kick was detected in the well but before the blowout preventer was closed, allowing large quantities of gas to flood areas and migrate upwards. The mud gas separator's failure to contain the excess flow contributed to the explosions and fire on the rig.

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    Deepwater Horizon: I Bob Watsh

    Uploaded by

    OSDocs2012
    25 views4 pages
    The mud gas separator on the Deepwater Horizon rig likely exceeded its design capacity when flow and pressure from the well were diverted through it, sending gas to multiple locations on the vessel. This occurred after a kick was detected in the well but before the blowout preventer was closed, allowing large quantities of gas to flood areas and migrate upwards. The mud gas separator's failure to contain the excess flow contributed to the explosions and fire on the rig.

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    TREX-04792

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    The mud gas separator on the Deepwater Horizon rig likely exceeded its design capacity when flow and pressure from the well were diverted through it, sending gas to multiple locations on the vessel. This occurred after a kick was detected in the well but before the blowout preventer was closed, allowing large quantities of gas to flood areas and migrate upwards. The mud gas separator's failure to contain the excess flow contributed to the explosions and fire on the rig.

    Copyright:

    Attribution Non-Commercial (BY-NC)
    Download as PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Download as pdf or txt
    25 views4 pages

    Deepwater Horizon: I Bob Watsh

    Uploaded by

    OSDocs2012
    The mud gas separator on the Deepwater Horizon rig likely exceeded its design capacity when flow and pressure from the well were diverted through it, sending gas to multiple locations on the vessel. This occurred after a kick was detected in the well but before the blowout preventer was closed, allowing large quantities of gas to flood areas and migrate upwards. The mud gas separator's failure to contain the excess flow contributed to the explosions and fire on the rig.

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    DEEPWATER HORIZON

    Invesligolion llem Tickel Relerence No. Documenl Conlrol Diverling Equipmenl Copocily 0185

    Draft for revierv and comment

    i Bobwatsh

    oF QuEsiloN/EVENT INTEREST Did the flow direrted throughthe nrudgasseparator exceed desigr capaciry? the

    2 2.1

    Scope ANDMETHoD INVESTIGATIoN oF Scope Aspecfs Coyered Mud GasSepa.rator (MGS) design operation and Aspecls Nol-Covered

    2.2

    Method of Invesligolion

    2.3

    ReferenceDocumenls

    i***.***-_***:
    3

    -*,-

    .- _

    SUMMARYoF lNVEsTtcATtoN After review ofthe data and results ofthe hydraulic analvsis ofthe Macondo 252 rvell by StressEngineering. along rvith rer.'iewof the u'itness teslimonv that indicated florv had been diverted tlrough the mud gas separator.it is highlv likelv that flolv and pressure exceeded the design capacih' of the mud gas separalor. resulting in sending gas to multiple locationson the vessel.

    Frruornos CoNc[ustoNs AND

    CONFIDENTIAL WORK IN PROGRESS

    qlqz
    I

    CONFIDENTIAL

    Exhibit No. Worldwide Court Reporters, Inc.

    TRN-tNV-02845086

    HORIZON DEEPWATER
    lronsoceon lniernol lncident lnvesligotion

    4.1

    Foilures/DireclCquses Typicall-v,diverting the retum mud through the MGS would only be done to removesmall quantitiesof to was selected the gas. Florv exceeded capacitvof the MGS because divertersystem t"he background mud gasseparator when it shouldhavebeenlined up directlyto the ovettoardlines. divert throughthe Excessflorv was causedby expansionof gas in the riser, abovethe BOP. This large quafiiry of gas areasrvhereit ignited causing flooded various locationson the rig and migratedto non-hazardous forcedthe mud columnout of the the explosions.As the gasrosetoward 0re surface rapid expansion flooded,flows up the riserfloodingthe MGS andoverwhelming system.After the MGS rvascompletely the the vent line on dre MGS caused 15 PSI rupturedisc to opensendingmud and gasthroughthe six inch starboard overtoardrelief line, as well as dorvnthroughthe retum line to the gumbobox and back rnini trip tank througltthe tank overllow line. up to the Causes Factoryunderlying Contributory in{lux into the well bore from the The BOP shouldhavebeenclosedas soonas therewas a detectable mud transferscontributedto the lack of fonnation, however.a numberof factors including simultaneous the up early detection. Oncegas migrated the tvell bore and reached riser,the BOP shouldhavebeen and shouldhavebeenclosed lined flow frorn the well andthe divertersystem closed isolateadditional to up to divert all flow coming to the surfacethroughthe openendedoverboardlines and arvayfrom the rig. as With flow routedtluoughthe MGS, the designflorv for thc MGS wasvery quickly exceeded the gas pressure would lraveforcedthe mud out of the MGS mud seal(20ft U-tube).allowinggasto flow freely of area. In additionlargearnounts gasflowedup theoverllolv dowl thc rcturnlinc to the rnudproccssing relief line and up the line to the mini trip tank, out of the MGS vent line, throughthe MGS overboard tltis higlt tum at the top causing MGS vacuumbreakcrlinc. The vacuumbreakcrline had a 180degree area. floodingthe drill floor andsurrounding backdorvn. velocitygasto be directed

    Organizotionol response the rvell controlevent. The to and lack of earlyrvell kick detection incorrect Training- Possible fact that the nonnal line up of the diverterrvastlrough tlreMGS to reducethe possibilityof mistakes issuesmay have contributedto the driller's causingmud dischargeoverboardand environmental to riscr gasfroln bcingdiverted overboard. responsc. DivcrtingthroughtheMGS prcvcnted People

    Environmenlol discharge. of the procedures thisrig to reduce possibility overboard for operating Standard Technicol florv in and flow out tneasure to in lirnitations the abilit,vof the systerns accuratelv Thereare significant oPerittions. duringsorne 4.2 Polenliql leorning lor Ongoing Operolions

    Review pressureratings for and the rval'that the rvell control equipment is operated Improt'e the melhods for accurately tneasuring Mtrd punp efficiency. tnud flolv in and I retunr mud flou'oul of the u,,ell. Additional automatic nronitoring to assisl and alert the driller to chansesthat mav take place.

    Higlt High

    -i.tpt"t"

    E;;ii;;;;f

    Drilling. fron control s]'stcms. for capabilitics criticalinformation ir,r togging

    Higlt

    CONFIDENTIAL WORK IN PROGRESS

    2 CONFIDENTIAL

    TRN-tNV-0284s087

    DEEPWATER HORIZON
    Ironsoceon lnternol lncidenl lnvestigotion

    BOP,DP. PowerMarngementetc with emphasis streaminginfonnation to town and on retrieval of information during or after an emergency. Black box information would bavegreatlyassisted rvithunderstanding exactlywhathappened theDWH. on
    Equipment Training

    Review ventilation systemswith an emphasison gas migration to avoid possible resulting low ofporver. in explosions Additional training in the area of uell control. kick recognition and safestresponse, diverting to overbard ratherthanthroughthe MGS. Additional training in ilre areaof simultaneous operationsand times when theseshould be avoidedto reduceconfi.rsion when interpretingmud volumesinto andout of the well.

    High High HiCh

    Training

    ANDFrcuREs Taglrs

    FigureI

    I Coplionlitle (5-00000) I

    Ioble I

    lloble iitle Herel

    _ CONFIDENTIAL WORK IN PROGRESS

    CONFIDENTIAL

    TRN-rNV-02845088

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