Blue Nile & Diamond Retailing

By,
• Anshul Suryvanshi - 1902031
• B Pranav Aadithyan – 1902045
• Akshay Charole – 1902053
• Neil Chavan - 1902055
Case Description:

• Discusses about the dilemma of diamond makers to either

lower the price or lose the customers
• Highlights the difference in the financial performance of
online (Blue- nile) and brick and mortar stores (Tiffany and
Zales) before, during and after economic slowdown
• In 2008, World Federation of Diamond Bourses, issued an
appeal for the diamond producers to reduce the supply of
new gems entering the market to reduce supply
• In 2008, discount retailers such as Wal-Mart and Costco
continued to thrive but traditional jewellery retailers filed
for either bankruptcy or closing some of their outlets
Blue Nile
• Started by Doug Williams as Internet Diamonds, In 1999 it was bought by Mark Vadon and
named as Blue Nile to sound elegant and upscale
• Offered high-quality diamonds and fine jewellery at outstanding prices
• Focused on educating the customers on four Cs—cut, color, clarity, and carat and allowed
customers to build their own ring
• Allowed customers to have their questions resolved on the phone by sales reps who did not
work on commission
• Blue Nile kept a lower markup of 20 to 30 percent compared to 50% of local retailers due to
lower inventory and warehouse expense
• Blue Nile had a single warehouse in the United States where it stocked its entire inventory
• To gain customer trust Blue Nile offered a 30-day money back guarantee on items in returned
original condition
• In 2007, the company launched Web sites in Canada and the United Kingdom and opened an
office in Dublin with local customer service and fulfillment operations
• International sales had increased from $17 million in 2007 to more than $33 million in 2009
despite poor economic conditions
• In the third quarter of 2008, the company saw its first decline in sales with its reported sales of
$65.4 million being 2.9 percent less than the same quarter in 2007.
Zales
• Zales Jewelers was established by Morris (M. B.) Zale, William Zale, and Ben Lipshy in 1924
• Their marketing strategy was to offer a credit plan of “a penny down and a dollar a week.”
• Company grew to hundreds of stores by buying up other stores and smaller chains since 1941
• In 1986, the company was purchased in a leveraged buyout by Peoples Jewelers of Canada and Swarovski
International.
• In 1992, its debt pushed Zales into Chapter 11 bankruptcy for a year
• It became a public company again in that decade and operated nearly 2,400 stores by 2005
• The company’s divisions included Piercing Pagoda, which ran mall-based kiosks selling jewelry to teenagers;
Zales Jewelers, which sold diamond jewelry for working-class mall shoppers; and the upscale Gordon’s
• Losing market share to discounters like Walmart and Costco made Zales to move away from its promotion-
driven, lower end reputation to upscale and fashion conscious
• Moving to upscale led to a disaster as there were delays in bringing in new merchandise, and same-store
sales dropped and lost traditional customers without winning the new ones
• In 2006, new CEO transited back to promotional retailer image which led to loss of $26.4 million due to
inventory write downs
• The company had some success with its new strategy but was hurt by the rise in fuel prices and falling home
prices in 2007 that made its middle-class customers feel less secure
• In February 2008, the company announced a plan to close approximately 105 stores, reduce inventory by
$100 million, and reduce staff in company headquarters by about 20 percent
Tiffany
• Tiffany opened in 1837 as a stationery and fancy goods emporium in New York City and in 1886, Tiffany
introduced its now famous “Tiffany setting” for solitaire engagement rings
• Tiffany’s high-end products included diamond rings, wedding bands, gemstone jewelry, and gemstone bands
with diamonds as the primary gemstone
• Besides its own designs, Tiffany also sold jewelry designed by Elsa Peretti, Paloma Picasso, the late Jean
Schlumberger, and architect Frank Gehry
• By 2010, Tiffany had 220 stores and boutiques all over the world with about 80 of them in the United States. Of
its global outlets, Tiffany had more than 50 in Japan and almost 45 in the rest of the Asia-Pacific region
• Stores ranged from 1,300 to 18,000 square feet with an average of 7,100 square feet
• Its flagship store in New York contributed about 10 percent of the company’s sales in 2007.
• Besides retail outlets, Tiffany also sold products though a Web site and catalogs
• The direct channel focused on what Tiffany referred to as “D” items, which consisted primarily of non-
gemstone, sterling silver jewelry with an average price of $200 in 200 while more than half the retail sales
came from high-end products such as diamond rings and gemstone jewelry with an average sale price in 2007
higher than $3,000
• Tiffany maintained its own manufacturing facilities in Rhode Island and New York but also continued to source
from third parties but internal contributed to 60% in 2007
• In 2007, approximately 40 percent of the diamonds used by Tiffany were produced from rough diamonds
purchased by the company
• In 2007, 86 percent of Tiffany’s net sales came from jewelry, with approximately 48 percent of net sales coming
from products containing diamonds of various sizes
1) What are some key success factors in diamond retailing? How do
Blue Nile, Zales, and Tiffany compare on those dimensions?
• As with most retailing, the key success factors in diamond retailing can be measured by customer service
factors and cost factors.
• Customer Service:
• Blue Nile offers customers to “build their own ring” while Customers purchasing at Tiffany and
Zales have been limited to the inventory available at the store. Customers who are comfortable
making large purchases online will find the low-pressure purchasing experience at Blue Nile,
supported by the educational Web site, salaried sales support, and thirty-day return guarantee,
appealing. Given that the jewelry is made to order, clients at Blue Nile must be willing to wait to
receive their orders, unlike at Tiffany or Zales.
• The Tiffany brand is very strong and well established. It is associated with glamour, trust, and
customer service. These associations allow the company to sell at higher margins than its
competitors. Diamond and other high-end jewelry purchases are expensive, and many customers
will trade off other factors for the Tiffany customer experience when making such purchases.
Moreover, when spending thousands of dollars for a single item, customers often want to see and
feel what they are buying.
• Zales does not have the product variety and availability that Blue Nile provides, nor does it have
the brand name advantage that Tiffany enjoys. The weaker brand is reflected in the firm’s margins,
which are lower than those of Tiffany. Blue Nile’s focus on low prices is reflected in the lower
margins it has relative to both Zales and Tiffany.
1) What are some key success factors in diamond retailing? How
do Blue Nile, Zales, and Tiffany compare on those dimensions?
• Facility & Inventory Cost:
• Blue Nile operates out of one warehouse, with its entire inventory at this facility. The inventories at
both Tiffany and Zales are disaggregated through their stores.
• High-end jewelry items are high-priced, have relatively low demand, and have high demand variability.
Such items realize the most savings in inventory holding cost through lower safety stock inventory when
the inventory is aggregated.
• Further, since items sold through the Blue Nile Web site are customized, the inherent postponement
allows the company to keep inventory aggregated longer, thus reducing safety inventory even more.
While Blue Nile’s inventory-to-sales ratio is around 6 percent, the ratios for both Tiffany and Zales are
about 40 percent.
• In addition to stores all over the world, Tiffany has manufacturing facilities, a retail service center that
supplies stores, and diamond processing centers in seven countries. While Tiffany has advantages from
being vertically integrated, Blue Nile operates on a very low fixed-cost structure.
• Blue Nile also has an advantage in facility operating costs. Because customers design, select, and order
jewelry on the Web site, the company does not incur the level of human resources costs in the form of
sales staff that Tiffany and Zales do.
• Transportation costs:
• As with most e-retailers, its higher at Blue Nile than at Tiffany or Zales.
• The outbound transportation distance and hence costs and time tend to be much higher when
inventories are aggregated, as is the case at Blue Nile.
• In the case of Tiffany and Zales, some economies of scale can still be realized on inbound transportation
at all downstream stages of the supply chain until the merchandise hits retail stores, and the customer
takes care of the last mile of outbound transportation costs.
2) What do you think of the fact that Blue Nile carries more than 30,000 stones priced at $2,500 or higher while
almost 60 percent of the products sold from the Tiffany Web site are priced at around $200? Which of the two
product categories is better suited to the strengths of the online channel?
• Blue Nile:
• In the case of Blue Nile, the primary reasons could be the savings in inventory holding cost due to lower safety stocks and
the broad product variety and product availability that the firm can offer customers.
• Stones priced at $2,500 or higher are unique, high-value items with relatively low demand and high demand variability.
• The high demand variability necessitates carrying larger safety stock in order to meet required customer service levels.
Given the high price of the stones, the cost of holding them in inventory is proportionally higher.
• Aggregating inventory reduces the amount of safety stock required since the demand variability is less than in a
disaggregated scenario. By aggregating the inventory in the online channel, Blue Nile also broadens the product availability
and variety available to customers.
• It is a smart move for Blue Nile to aggregate and carry its high-priced products with low demand and high demand
variability on an online channel.
• Tiffany:
• The Tiffany brand is built on the glamour, luxury, and quality that customers perceive when visiting a Tiffany store.
• The company’s inventory includes a wide variety of items ranging from very high-end diamond jewelry to basic but elegant
tableware.
• Tiffany has stores as small as 1,300 square feet, and in 2008 the firm began opening stores of about 2,000 square feet
selling high-margin products in affluent U.S. areas.
• Given the strategic importance of the brand image, the breadth of inventory, and the push toward smaller facilities and
lower cost, it makes sense for Tiffany to position the high-end luxury products at the store and move the D items to the
online channel.
• This allows it to utilize the limited facility space to highlight the high-end items and customer service and offer the lower-
end items online, where product substitution can be used as means of aggregating inventory and lowering safety stocks for
the D items.
• This structure, however, puts Tiffany at a cost disadvantage relative to Blue Nile because Tiffany decentralizes its high-value
items with low demand and high variety while centralizing its lower-value items.
• Such a cost disadvantage can be justified if Tiffany can maintain its strong brand and associate it with the store experience.
3) What do you think of Tiffany’s decision to not sell diamonds
online?
• Tiffany has an image of providing luxury items to customers. Since,
Diamonds are of high value, customers tend to purchase them after
experiencing the feel of it.
• Also, online shoppers prefer buying cheaper items online after
comparing the costs.
• Hence, Tiffany decided focus on retail outlets, focusing on high-end
products having high variety to reach the premium customer base
• However, It increased the inventory level and overall safety stock of
Tiffany when compared to online model
• This structure, however, puts Tiffany at a cost disadvantage relative to
Blue Nile because Tiffany decentralizes its high-value items with low
demand and high variety while centralizing its lower-value items.
• Such a cost disadvantage can be justified if Tiffany can maintain its
strong brand and associate it with the store experience.
4) Given that Tiffany stores have thrived with their focus on selling
high-end jewelry, what do you think caused the failure of Zales
with its upscale strategy in 2006?
• Zales’s upscale strategy was in response to fierce competition it was facing from mass merchant
department stores such as Wal-Mart, national chain department stores such as JCPenney, and
home shopping networks.
• A large portion of the company’s revenue came from value-oriented customers who frequented
malls. The success of the Zales brand was built on the perception of the good value one got for
the money, but with that came the perception of being inexpensive.
• It takes much time and effort to educate new customers and transform a brand. Zales tried to
make too many radical changes in too little time. The firm drastically changed its portfolio of
products, 15 percent of the suppliers in the supply chain network were new and included new
overseas vendors, and holiday promotions and monthly payment plans were eliminated, to
name a few changes.
• All this resulted in the firm’s losing not only its core customer base but also sales due to delays
in bringing merchandise in on time and not making inroads into new target markets.
• Given that it has a much weaker brand than Tiffany; Zales’s strategy of bringing high-end
jewelry to its stores raised its inventory costs without raising its margins enough to offset this
increase.
• Zales’s inventories in FY 2006, when it tried the high-end strategy, rose to 47 percent of sales,
even higher than Tiffany’s; its margins, however, remained lower than Tiffany’s.
5) Which of the three companies do you think is best structured to
deal with weak economic times?
• A lean and nimble structure is an advantage in a downturn. Blue Nile has a distinct
advantage in this regard with its very low fixed-cost structure compared to Tiffany and
Zales.
• Property and equipment to net sales ratios are 2.38, 13.93, and 25.46 percent for Blue
Nile, Zales, and Tiffany, respectively. Both Zales and Tiffany are contractually tied up in
many medium- to long-term leases for their facilities.
• The selling, general, and administrative expenses at Tiffany and Zales are about four
times those incurred at Blue Nile. Much of this discrepancy can be attributed to the
costs of operating stores.
• Blue Nile also has a very low investment in inventory compared to the other two
companies.
• The cost of sales at Blue Nile is higher, but this can attribute to the lower margins and
the higher cost of outbound distribution. The low-cost structure at Blue Nile is well
suited for times when demand shrinks in the industry. Blue Nile should take advantage
of its low-cost structure and lower prices to get more market share.
• Zales is perhaps in the weakest position to handle the downturn, given the inventory
write-off it had to take when its high-end strategy failed. With tightened credit, Zales
may find it difficult to survive the downturn. Tiffany certainly has the strength to survive
the downturn but is hurt significantly by dropping sales, given its relatively high fixed
costs.
6) What advice would you give to each of the three companies
regarding its strategy and structure?
• Blue Nile:
• It has a strategy that focuses on lower prices on a large variety of high-end stones that aligns very well with its
centralized structure.
• Its marketing focus on convincing customers that the four Cs and third-party validation are the key ingredients when
valuing a diamond is also well aligned with its structure, which does not allow customers to touch and see the stone
before buying.
• Given its significant cost advantages and customers’ tendency to try to save money during difficult times, Blue Nile has a
significant opportunity in this downturn.
• Blue Nile can take an aggressive position, emphasizing its lower prices with similar quality to very high-end diamond
retailers. Although this is a difficult message to sell in general, it may be easier in the difficult economic environment of
2009.
• Zales:
• From a financial perspective, Zales needs to get control of its inventories. One way to do this is to centralize more of its
expensive diamond inventory, making it available to stores as needed. Lower-value diamonds could be stocked and sold
from retail stores.
• For higher-end diamonds, rings with imitation stones could be used to help customers select a style, followed by having
the real diamond installed later at a central location and shipped to the store for customer pick-up.
• Zales’s ideal situation seems to be one in which it stocks and sells lower-cost products from decentralized locations with
higher-value stones centralized and provided on demand.
• Tiffany:
• It cannot centralize its high-end stones because that would conflict with its brand image.
• Pricing pressure at retail is likely to continue with the growth of Blue Nile at the high end and retailers such as Wal-Mart
and Costco at the lower end.
• As a result, Tiffany must continue working hard to maintain its brand image. Its move into the wholesale part of the
diamond business has potential pluses—it gives the company the wholesale margin and could give it some form of
exclusivity on its stones.