Truth and The World: DR David J. J. Austin University of York Spring Term 2023 (PHI00137H)

TRUTH Dr David J. J.
Austin
University of York
AND THE Spring Term 2023

(PHI00137H)
WORLD Lecture 6
RECAP
TRUTH-MAKER THEORY
Consider the following sentence:

‘My cat is on the mat’
What makes this true?
The most obvious answer seems to be that the sentence is true because my
cat exists, the mat exists, and the cat is on the mat.
In other words, the world includes my cat being on the mat.
TRUTH AND THE WORLD 2023 3

TRUTH-MAKER THEORY
Truth-maker theory says that there is an intimate link between truth and
ontology:
Between what is the case and what there is.
According to truth-maker theory, for a proposition to be true requires there
to be some entity or entities that make it true.
The truth-makers are the ontological ground of the truth – their existence
explains why the proposition in question is true.

TRUTH-MAKER THEORY
So, let’s put things a little more formally:

TM: is true if, and only if, is made true by some existing
entity or entities.

TRUTH-MAKER THEORY
It looks very much as if by endorsing TM we are endorsing the thought that

what’s true depends on what exists, i.e., the thought that all truths need
truth-makers. We can put this in the following terms:
For any , is true if, and only if, it is made true by some
existing entity or entities.
This is called ‘truth-maker maximalism’.

TRUTH-MAKER THEORY
As we saw, one way of thinking about the truth-maker theory is in light of

the correspondence theory of truth.
Indeed, many see TM as constituting what should be preserved in the
correspondence theory of truth.

TRUTH-MAKER THEORY
As we have seen, according to the correspondence theory of truth, truth is a

relation between a truthbearer and a correspondent in the world:
• Truthbearers
• Relation
• Correspondents
Thus, it is relatively easy to see the transition to truth-maker theory…

“Propositions correspond or fail to
correspond to reality […] The
correspondents in the world in virtue of
which true propositions are true are our
truth-makers.”
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TRUTH-MAKER THEORY
Similarly, then, truth-maker theory is a relation between a truthbearer

and a truth-maker in the world:
• Truthbearers
• Relation
• Truth-makers

TRUTH-MAKER THEORY
In both the lecture and seminar last week (taking propositions as the
primary truthbearers), we looked at the following question:
What exactly is the nature of the truth-making relation, i.e. between a
true proposition and its truth-maker?
To ask this question is to probe what sort of analysis, if any, can be given
of the truth-making relation.

TRUTH-MAKER THEORY
Whatever the relation is, it is not a causal one!

That is, it’s not the same as a person making an artifact, such as a house.
Why not?
Two reasons…

TRUTH-MAKER THEORY
(1) Propositions are abstract entities, and thus simply not the kind of thing
that can enter into causal relationships.
(2) Causal connections are contingent connections, in the sense that the
entities related by cause and effect might both have existed but not been so
related—my kicking of the ball caused the breaking of the window, but
both might have existed and not been so related, had you caught the ball
but something else broken the window.

TRUTH-MAKER THEORY
The truthmaking relation is usually taken to be a relation of necessitation.

If some entity makes a proposition true, then it’s simply impossible for
it to exist and that proposition to be false.
The idea, then, is that the mere existence of a truth-maker is sufficient for
the truth of the proposition in question.

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In last week’s seminar, we
looked at:
(1) Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra’s
Why truthmakers
(2) Jennifer Hornsby’s
Truth without truthmaking
entities
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LAST WEEK’S SEMINAR
Key points to take away from the seminar:

1. For Rodriguez-Pereyra, the following truth-maker relation holds:
Necessarily, if is true, then there is some entity in virtue of which
it is true.


2. He argues that the truth-maker relation is a clear commitment of our
thought about truth, independently of whether or not we are metaphysical
realists. Specifically, he claims that the relation is needed to explain
truth’s asymmetry, i.e.:
Whereas is true because p, it is not the case that p because is
true.


3. His contention is that this asymmetry is best explained by regarding
true propositions as requiring ontological ground, where this just means
that a proposition’s truth is determined by the existence of a truth-maker.


4. Rhetorically, he asks: What is grounding but a relation? And thus
what do relations do but link entities? He goes on to say that to admit this
is to admit that for a proposition’s truth to be grounded in reality, there
must be an entity that does the grounding, and that this can only be a
truth-maker.


5. He claims that the in virtue of notion at the heart of his truth- maker
relation is primitive, and thus there is no explanation that can be given in
place of it. However, he does think that we can clarify the notion by
specifying which propositions are true in virtue of which entities.


6. Hornsby’s response to this is to deny that grounding is a relation, and
to recommend that we explain the asymmetry of truth in a way which
does not reify items introduced by expressions such as ‘the rose’s
being red’. (To reify, remember, is to treat as a thing. In other words,
Hornsby charges Rodriguez-Pereyra as being misled by verbal form into
thinking simply because some noun has a use, there must be something to
which it refers (in this case, some entity which plays the role of a truth-
maker.)
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TRUTH-MAKER THEORY
Truth-maker theorists are motivated by ontological questions:

The idea being that we can make progress on figuring out what exists
by pursuing questions about what truth-makers there are.

TRUTH-MAKER THEORY
Considerations about truthmaking have thus lead to different views about

what exactly is included in the world’s ontology.
These considerations often go hand in hand with the metaphysical debate
between realists and nominalists in discussions over the nature of
properties.

PROPERTIES
Properties are those entities that can be predicated of things or, in other
words, attributed to them. Properties are often called predicables.
Properties are also ways things are, entities that things instantiate.
For example:
If we say that this is a leaf and is green, we are attributing the properties
leaf and green to it, and, if the predication is veridical, the thing in question
exemplifies these properties.

THINGS
Before looking at the nature of properties, however, it’ll be helpful to look

at the things which properties are attributed to…

THINGS
Consider the following again:

1. The table in my office is made from wood
2. The table in my office is brown
3. The table in my office is flat
4. There is a table in my office

THINGS
Although we will get to the sort of ontology we might call upon to ensure
that our discourse about properties is true, the question we’re asking now
is:
What sorts of entity were being referred to by the subject term in the
sentence (i.e., (1)-(4))?
It would be natural to think that the term ‘the table’ is picking something
out and so the referent of the term is a part of the truth-maker for the
propositions expressed by each of (1)–(4).
THINGS
Let’s begin with the observation that it appears that there is something
common to each of (1)–(4):
Something that is picked out by the term ‘the table’.
Each of them seems to ascribe some properties to the table.
The natural thought, then, is that the table itself is distinct from those
properties.
There is a table and the table has all of the properties described above.
THINGS
Broadly speaking, there are 2 theories of things:

• Substance-Attribute Theory
• Bundle Theory

[W]‌h en we talk or think of any
particular sort of corporeal
substances, such as horse, stone etc.,
though the idea we have of either of
them be but the complication or
collection of those several simple
ideas of sensible qualities, which we
used to find united in the thing called
horse or stone; yet, because we
cannot conceive how they should
subsist alone, nor one in another, we
suppose them existing in and
supported by some common subject;
which support we denote by the name
substance, though it be certain we
have no clear idea of that thing we
suppose a support.

SUBSTANCE-ATTRIBUTE
THEORY
The table we were speaking of a moment ago, then, is a substance.
Note, the meaning of ‘substance’ in this debate differs from the meaning it
has in more everyday situations.
We typically take ‘substance’ as meaning some particular chemical kind of
matter – such as gold, silver, lead etc. Or, perhaps, to think that term
‘substance’ is even less specific – as in, ‘there was an odd looking
substance on the pavement’.

SUBSTANCE-ATTRIBUTE
THEORY
The term ‘substance’ as Locke is using it here is a term of art:
It is that which unites properties (e.g., like the table’s properties).
Locke provides us with two arguments for this view.

SUBSTANCE-ATTRIBUTE
THEORY
Argument 1:
P1.We think that ordinary objects (tables, horses, stones etc.) have
properties.
P2.It seems to us as if these properties are united in some way.
C: This suggests that there is something that plays the role of uniting the
disparate properties. This is substance.

SUBSTANCE-ATTRIBUTE
THEORY
Argument 2:
P1.We cannot conceive of properties just being in the world (e.g., I cannot
simply imagine some redness, or some flatness).
P2.If I can imagine these properties at all, it is only as they are
instantiated by some entity or other.
C. Whatever it is that plays the role, then, of having these properties is
that which we will call ‘substance’.

SUBSTANCE-ATTRIBUTE
THEORY
There also seems to be another role being performed by substance...

SUBSTANCE-ATTRIBUTE
THEORY
Suppose also that the table is in a room full of other tables, each of which
has the same properties as our original table. If all of the tables have
precisely the same properties, then it is unclear what it is that makes it true
that we have many tables.
The table in my office is different from all other tables because it is a
different substance. That is, it is the uniqueness of substances that plays the
requisite role in individuating objects from one another. Substance
accounts for numerical difference.
SUBSTANCE-ATTRIBUTE
THEORY
For all that’s been said about substance, however, the notion remains rather
opaque.
Substance is that which bears properties, but does not have any properties
essentially.
But what is it?
All that we have really done is specify a role that is to be played: the
bearing of properties and individuating. That is not a terribly informative
analysis.
THINGS
Broadly speaking, there are 2 theories of things:

• Substance-Attribute Theory
• Bundle Theory

BUNDLE THEORY
The problem that we identified with substance theory seemed to be with

substance itself – it seemed difficult to explain how to understand its nature
and how to describe it.
A natural thought, then, is to drop it from our ontology altogether.
Of course, we still have our original sentences to consider.
But perhaps we made a wrong turn…

BUNDLE THEORY
Again, consider the following:

1. The table in my office is made from wood
2. The table in my office is brown
3. The table in my office is flat
4. There is a table in my office

BUNDLE THEORY
Originally, it was suggested that the obvious inference was that because
there appeared some thing in common in each of (1)–(4), that was not
identical to the properties, we should posit a thing – substance.
That thing, however, has caused a problem, so let’s just drop it and say the
following instead:
Objects are just bundles of properties.

IDENTITY OF INDISCERNIBLES
With substance-attribute theory and bundle theory in mind, consider the

following:
Identity of Indiscernibles: necessarily, if, for every property F,
object x has F if and only if object y has F, then x is identical to y.

Consider, however, a symmetrical universe containing nothing but two spheres

which are absolutely identical: for every property we can imagine of one sphere, the
other sphere has exactly the same corresponding property.
In such a universe the two spheres would be indiscernible!

The point of this thought experiment is this:

If these things (i.e., the spheres) have identical properties and there
is nothing more to them than their properties, then these things must be
identical.
But isn’t it possible for two things to have all of their properties in
common and be numerically distinct?

Bundle theory avoids this problems only if properties are understood as

particulars of some sort.
The substance-attribute theory avoids it even if the two objects literally
have all of the same properties.
What this tells us, then, is that we need a better understanding of the nature
of properties!

WHAT ARE PROPERTIES?
Theories of properties fall into 2 broad categories:

1. Properties as universals
• Transcendent universals (e.g., Plato and Russell)
• Immanent universals (e.g., Aristotle and Armstrong)

WHAT ARE PROPERTIES?
Theories of properties fall into 2 broad categories:

2. Properties as particulars (i.e., nominalism)
• Resembling objects (e.g., Price)
• Tropes (e.g., D.C. Williams)
• Collections of objects (e.g., Lewis)
We will talk about these views next week!

THE PROBLEM OF UNIVERSALS
It is a striking feature of the world that many different things can be in

some respect the same.
…but how can many different things be in some respect the same?

PROPERTIES AS UNIVERSALS
Transcendent Universals:
• For a to be F is for a to stand in relation R (instantiation) to a
transcendent universal.
• ‘Transcendent’ because there’s a realm of universals = non-spatio-
temporal location. They are abstract objects.
• The view is Platonic. We may even say ‘the Form of F’

Particular a does not just instantiate part of the ‘form’ F, because different
particulars would then instantiate different parts of F.
We would then lose the solution to the problem of universals: we would
have the problem of explaining why two F things are similar just in virtue
of instantiating different parts of the Form. After all, I have different parts,
but they’re not all similar.
So, R must be a relation between a and the whole of F.
The view commits us to properties as existing outside space and time and,
thus, to abstracta.
And as we know, there are substantial concerns with positing abstract
entities.
So, we had better have some good reason for thinking that properties exist
outside space and time.

Note that Edinburgh is to the north of London.
Notice, also, that ‘to the north of’ seems to be something that is repeatable.
Edinburgh is to the north of London, as are Sheffield, Nottingham, Leeds,
Durham and Peterhead.
We might think, therefore, that there is a universal ‘north of’.

‘North of’ does not seem to exist in the
same sense in which Edinburgh and
London exist. If we ask ‘Where and
when does this relation exist?’ the
answer must be ‘Nowhere and nowhen’.
There is no place or time where we can
find the relation ‘north of’. It does not
exist in Edinburgh any more than in
London, for it relates the two and is
neutral between them. Nor can we say
that it exists at any particular time. Now
everything that can be apprehended by
the senses or by introspection exists at
some particular time. Hence the relation
‘north of’ is radically different from
such things. It is neither in space nor in
time, neither material nor mental; yet it
is something.

Russell’s argument, then, is that if the relation exists, but is in neither space
nor time, then the universal must exist quite apart from its instances that
appear in the world!
But here’s a thought…
It seems to make perfect sense to say of properties and relations that they
exist whenever their instances do.

That is, although there is no sense in which the relational property ‘to the
north of’ exists at some place and time to the exclusion of all others, it is
nonetheless something that exists in space and time by virtue of ‘being to the
north of’ being something that is instantiated by concrete particulars –
Edinburgh and London.
This leads us, then, to the view that properties are immanent universals.

Immanent Universals:
• In contrast to transcendent universals, the view of universals as
immanent treats them as existing only at their instances.
• Were it to be the case that no red objects exist, then the colour red would
not exist.
• This view is broadly Aristotelian.

Immanent Universals:
It is preferable to avoid positing universals as distinct from their instances,
in addition to their existing at their instances – and concerns about what it
actually means to exist ‘outside space and time’.
It becomes apparent that we have substantial reason to prefer an
Aristotelian view of universals – that they are immanent.

PREDICATES AND PROPERTIES
An important distinction:
• Sparse vs. abundant properties

SPARSE VS. ABUNDANT
PROPERTIES
Be aware that not every predicate seems to denote a property. Consider the
following sentence:
The sky is not green.
This sentence is true and ‘not green’ seems to perform as a predicate.
It seems to make sense, then, to ask whether we need a further universal of
‘not green’ that the sky need instantiate?
After all, we have said that predicates denote properties.
SPARSE VS. ABUNDANT
PROPERTIES
It might be thought, however, that it is more natural to think that the truth-
maker for the sentence, ‘The sky is not green’, just is the sky’s being blue,
rather than the sky’s instantiating some further property ‘being not green’.
It would be natural to think that sentences like this show us, not that there
are properties such as ‘being not green’, but that not every predicate
denotes a universal.
Rephrase ‘The sky is not green’ as ‘it’s not the case that the sky’s green’.

SPARSE VS. ABUNDANT
PROPERTIES
But here’s a more worrying case:

x is non-self-exemplifying

SPARSE VS. ABUNDANT
PROPERTIES
Suppose, for a moment, the property ‘non-self-exemplifying’ exemplified

itself.
Then, in virtue of being the property ‘non-self-exemplifying’ it would have
to not be self-exemplifying.
In other words, if the property ‘non-self-exemplifying’ self-exemplifies,
then it non-self-exemplifies.
Contradiction!

SPARSE VS. ABUNDANT
PROPERTIES
If, on the other hand, it does not self-exemplify, then it self-exemplifies

itself since it is purportedly the property of being ‘non-self-exemplifying’.
Contradiction!
So, it seems safe to assume that no such property can exist.
That is, it seems right to infer that not every grammatically well-formed
predicate can denote a property.

SPARSE VS. ABUNDANT
PROPERTIES
All of this raises an interesting and important question.

We began with the idea that many of the predicate terms with which we are
familiar, predicates like ‘is red’, denote properties – we called them
‘predicables’!
However, since we are now supposing that not all predicates denote
properties, we must then ask: ‘which ones do’?

SPARSE VS. ABUNDANT
PROPERTIES
One very intuitive thought is that we should restrict our account of which
predicates denote properties to only those properties that:
(a) make a causal difference or,
(b) those that make a difference to what is true.
After all, if a property does not make a causal difference, and does not
make a difference to what is true, then it is hard to see why we should want
to posit it.

SPARSE VS. ABUNDANT
PROPERTIES
To see these principles in action, consider the case we might make against
disjunctive properties – that is, properties that correspond in their structure
to instances of disjunctive predication:
(D) x is red or blue.
If x has is red, then (D) is true (that’s inimical to the nature of a disjunction
– it’s true if either disjunct is true).
So, do we then need to think of x as instantiating a disjunctive property?

SPARSE VS. ABUNDANT
PROPERTIES
Notice that x being red makes a causal difference.

Were it not red, x would not, say, look that way to a perceiver.
But x being red or blue doesn’t make the slightest contribution to the
causal powers of x.
The disjunctive ‘property’ would make no discernible contribution to the
causal powers of x
All of the work is done by the property red.
SPARSE VS. ABUNDANT
PROPERTIES
Notice further that if x instantiates the property red, then x and red make
true <x is red or blue>.
Given that this is so, we can preserve the truth of (D) without recourse to
including any disjunctive universals in our ontology.
Similar considerations as these can obviously be brought against ‘negative’
properties, too. If an object has the property blue, like the sky, then no
further causal or truth-making work would be done by it also positing the
property of ‘not green’, like with ‘the sky is not green’.
SPARSE VS. ABUNDANT
PROPERTIES
One way to make sense of this is to make a distinction between sparse and
abundant properties:
Abundant properties are such that there is a property for every descriptive
condition that you care to give. Our disjunctive properties could go on this
list, as could nearly any other predicate that you specify.
So, there is an abundant property of ‘being a banana or a cat’, a property of
‘being square and yellow’, and so on. But these predicates are not
the interesting predicates.
SPARSE VS. ABUNDANT
PROPERTIES
One way to make sense of all this is to make a distinction between sparse
and abundant properties:
Sparse properties will be relatively few – only those properties that are
posited by our ultimate and best physical theory. These properties – the
ones uncovered by our best physics – may also be called ‘natural’.

Physics has its short list of ‘fundamental
physical properties’: the charges and
masses of particles, also their so-called
‘spins’ and ‘colours’ and ‘flavours’, and
maybe a few more that have yet to be
discovered ... What physics has
undertaken, whether or not ours is a
world where the undertaking will
succeed, is an inventory of
the sparse properties.

SPARSE VS. ABUNDANT
PROPERTIES
Here is the picture:

Predicates denoting the posits of our best and final physics are, in
fact, denoting properties – all other predicates are denoting parts of the
world that are constructed out of the various natural properties.

SPARSE VS. ABUNDANT
PROPERTIES
For example:
The chair you’re sitting on satisfies the predicate ‘is black’, and so there is
a property of being black.
But the property is not perfectly natural.
Instead, ‘the chair is black’ is to be understood as made true by a particular
construction of natural properties:
E.g., properties of mass, charge, spin, etc.
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LET’S TAKE STOCK
We started this lecture by looking at substance-attribute theory and

bundle theory.
When faced with the thought experiment of the two spheres in a
symmetrical universe, however, it wasn’t clear how we could respect the
Identity of Indiscernibles on either of these views.
What this showed us is that we needed a better understanding of the nature
of properties.

LET’S TAKE STOCK
The thing is, there’s a further problem…

But now that we have a better understanding of properties, maybe we can
resolve this as well!
Note, I’ll state the problem in terms of bundle theory, but it should be
obvious that it’s a problem for substance-attribute theory as well.

FURTHER PROBLEM…
Let us suppose that we have two particulars:

The table in my office
The door to my office
Let us also suppose that the door is to the north of my desk. The following
sentence would then look to be true:
(OT) The office door is to the north of the office desk.

FURTHER PROBLEM…
What makes (OT) true? Assuming bundle theory (though not committing
ourselves to any particular view of properties for the time being), we’ll
need:
(1) a bundle of properties that is to be identified as the table; (2) a
further bundle of properties that is the desk; and (3) a relation – to the
north of – that stands between the two bundles.
This collection of entities, or so it would seem, is the truth-maker for (OT).

FURTHER PROBLEM…
But does it?

We have two bundles and a relation ‘to the north of’, but these three
entities, on their own, don’t obviously generate the result that the office
door is to the north of the office desk…

FURTHER PROBLEM…
The list of entities (the office desk, the relation ‘to the north of’ and the
office door) makes no mention of the ways in which the entities on the list
are arranged with respect to one another.
Indeed, these three entities could make true (OT*):
(OT*) The office desk is to the north of the office door.
It will all come down to how we arrange them with respect to one another.

FURTHER PROBLEM…
This is a problem:
What makes it true that the office door is to the north of the office
desk can’t also make it true that the office desk is to the north of the
office door!
Thus, sentences (OT) and (OT*), though similar, will clearly require
different truth-makers .

FURTHER PROBLEM…
Suppose that we allow ‘R’ to stand for any relational term (such as ‘to the
north of’) and that we let ‘a’ and ‘b’ stand for any two particulars.
What we want is to have different truth-makers for the expressions Rab and
Rba.
At the moment, however, we seem to be lacking that. All we have as truth-
makers are the particulars, a and b, and the relation R.
We need something more…
Armstrong makes the point, here:
‘Let a love b, and b love a. The two
states of affairs are presumably
independent. Either could have occurred
without the other […] Yet the two
different states of affairs involve exactly
the same constituents. How are they to
be differentiated?’

STATES OF AFFAIRS
The ‘something more’, according to David Armstrong, is what he calls:

States of affairs
For him, the world is most fundamentally a world that is a collection of
states of affairs.
What we need to be clear on, however, is that ‘state of affairs’ has a very
particular, metaphysical commitment for Armstrong.

The role that Armstrong gives to states
of affairs is very similar to that which
Russell called ‘facts’:
‘The first truism to which I wish to draw
your attention [...] is that the world
contains facts, which are what they are
whatever we may choose to think about
them, and that there are also beliefs,
which have reference to facts, and by
reference to facts are either true or false
[...] If I say ‘It is raining’, what I say is
true in a certain condition of weather
and is false in other conditions. The
condition of weather that makes my
statement true (or false as the case may
be), is what I should call a ‘fact.’’

STATES OF AFFAIRS
So, how should we understand a ‘state of affairs?’

STATES OF AFFAIRS
Here is Armstrong’s definition, to be further unpacked:

A state of affairs exists if and only if a particular has a property, or a
relation holds between two or more particular.

STATES OF AFFAIRS
More specifically, though, for Armstrong, a state of affairs has two

constituents:
(1) A ‘thin particular’
(2) Either a property or relation
Let’s try to make sense of what a ‘thin particular’, or as it appears in the
definition ‘particular’, is.

Armstrong characterizes a ‘thin particular’
in the following way:
‘The thin particular is the particular
considered in abstraction from all its
properties. Although not bare, it is very thin
indeed. (But you can be thin without being
bare.) For me, all thin particulars, although
numerically different, are, as it were,
indistinguishably different. Particulars ...
have no mysterious inner and particularized
essence that marks off one from another and
accounts for their numerical difference. The
secret of numerical difference is simply
numerical difference ... Notice, however,
that it is not hidden, as Locke had it hidden.
Even in our most basic, most elementary,
perceptions we are aware of particulars,
though of course particulars as having
certain properties and relations, that is:
particulars in states of affairs.’
STATES OF AFFAIRS
A thin particular, then, is a particular – such as a table, Barry from

Eastenders, a rabbit – considered ‘in abstraction from all its properties’.
An example of a thin particular might be something like a table considered
in abstraction from all of its properties.
Note, nothing accounts for the numerical difference and distinctness of thin
particulars. Rather, they are numerically different and distinct. We can,
through perception, become aware of particulars, through seeing them in
states of affairs. That, at least, is Armstrong’s claim.
STATES OF AFFAIRS
It’s important to notice that, because of the reasoning Armstrong gives, a

thin particular will not be a substance. Recall that a substance is such that
it accounts for numerical difference:
Two tables will be distinct from one another iff they are distinct
substances, where the substance has, in some sense, the essential
property of being that particular substance.
Armstrong simply denies that there is any such property involved.

STATES OF AFFAIRS
Importantly, for Armstrong, there are (at least) two different senses of ‘part’
available to us:
(1) Standard mereological parthood, where the fusion of any particulars a, b
and c, is identical to the fusion of b, c and a.
(2) ‘Non-mereological parthood’.
But why does Armstrong introduce the second sense?

STATES OF AFFAIRS
Suppose that we have three particulars, a, b and c.

Imagine that they are parts of an object in the mereological sense of
parthood.
There is, as we have seen, no difference between a + b + c and b + c + a.
We get the same fusion composed out of a + b + c and b + c + a.

STATES OF AFFAIRS
However, as we’ve also seen, there is a difference between the state of

affairs Rab and Rba, despite the fact that both states of affairs have the
very same elements as constituents.
Thus, whatever sort of composition is involved in states of affairs, it is not
the same sort of composition that is involved when we think about
mereological fusions.
This ‘non-mereological sense’ of parthood is one where the way in which
we arrange the constituents does matter to what is composed.
STATES OF AFFAIRS
Suppose that we have an object composed from a, b, and c.

a, b and c, are mereological parts of a fusion O and they are the only
parts.
O is identical to the fusion O* that is composed from c, b and a.

STATES OF AFFAIRS
Suppose, however, that we have a state of affairs, S, which has as its non-
mereological parts, the relation R, and the particulars a and b, and that they
form the state of affairs, Rab.
The state of affairs S is not identical to the state of affairs, Q, that includes
the same constituents, but that is non-mereologically composed such that
Rba.

STATES OF AFFAIRS
Armstrong does not say that much about what, exactly, non-mereological
composition is.
It is, in some senses, a primitive notion in his theory.

Dr David J. J. Austin david.Austin@york.ac.uk

Truth and The World: DR David J. J. Austin University of York Spring Term 2023 (PHI00137H)

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TRUTH Dr David J. J.

AND THE Spring Term 2023

Consider the following sentence:

TRUTH AND THE WORLD 2023 3

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So, let’s put things a little more formally:

TRUTH AND THE WORLD 2023 5

It looks very much as if by endorsing TM we are endorsing the thought that

TRUTH AND THE WORLD 2023 6

As we saw, one way of thinking about the truth-maker theory is in light of

TRUTH AND THE WORLD 2023 7

As we have seen, according to the correspondence theory of truth, truth is a

TRUTH AND THE WORLD 2023 8

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Similarly, then, truth-maker theory is a relation between a truthbearer

TRUTH AND THE WORLD 2023 10

TRUTH AND THE WORLD 2023 11

Whatever the relation is, it is not a causal one!

TRUTH AND THE WORLD 2023 12

TRUTH AND THE WORLD 2023 13

The truthmaking relation is usually taken to be a relation of necessitation.

TRUTH AND THE WORLD 2023 14

SAMPLE FOOTER TEXT 2023 16

Key points to take away from the seminar:

TRUTH AND THE WORLD 2023 17

Key points to take away from the seminar:

TRUTH AND THE WORLD 2023 18

Key points to take away from the seminar:

TRUTH AND THE WORLD 2023 19

Key points to take away from the seminar:

TRUTH AND THE WORLD 2023 20

Key points to take away from the seminar:

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Key points to take away from the seminar:

Truth-maker theorists are motivated by ontological questions:

TRUTH AND THE WORLD 2023 24

Considerations about truthmaking have thus lead to different views about

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TRUTH AND THE WORLD 2023 26

Before looking at the nature of properties, however, it’ll be helpful to look

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Consider the following again:

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Broadly speaking, there are 2 theories of things:

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SAMPLE FOOTER TEXT 20XX 32

TRUTH AND THE WORLD 2023 33

TRUTH AND THE WORLD 2023 34

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Broadly speaking, there are 2 theories of things:

TRUTH AND THE WORLD 2023 40

The problem that we identified with substance theory seemed to be with

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Again, consider the following:

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With substance-attribute theory and bundle theory in mind, consider the