, Nicaragua filed suit in the International Court of Justice (I.C.J.) charging the United States ... more , Nicaragua filed suit in the International Court of Justice (I.C.J.) charging the United States with engaging in military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua in violation of the Charters of the United Nations and the Organization of American States, and of general and customary international law. 1 On May 10, 1984, after a hearing at which both states presented evidence and legal arguments, the Court ordered the United States to cease its "covert" war against Nicaragua pending the determination of the case on the merits. 2 The vote was 14-1, with only the U.S. judge dissenting. 3 The Court then held hearings, in which both the United States and Nicaragua participated fully, on the preliminary issues of jurisdiction and admissibility. On November 26, 1984, the Court ruled in Nicaragua's favor on these issues by lopsided margins. 4 Faced with a hearing on the merits of Nicaragua's claims, the United States announced on January 18, 1985, that it would not participate further in the case. 5 Most litigants, of course, do not have the luxury of spurning a court that has declared its jurisdiction over their case, and on those rare occasions when they do so, they are considered fugitives from justice. The Reagan Administration's decision to scorn the World Court, after thirtynine years of active support, cannot have been made lightly. The basis for its decision, however, is not hard to understand; it reflects the Administration's awareness of the factual and legal impossibility of defending its t Members of the Washington, D.C. law firm of Reichler & Appelbaum, which represents
Page 1. NOTES AND COMMENTS THE COSTS OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE By David Wippman * Critics ofintern... more Page 1. NOTES AND COMMENTS THE COSTS OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE By David Wippman * Critics ofinternational criminal justice ... despite substantial annual budgets. In short, they claim that international justice is costly and slow. ...
Unfortunately, the connection between international prosecutions and the actual deterrence of fut... more Unfortunately, the connection between international prosecutions and the actual deterrence of future atrocities is at best a plausible but largely untested assumption. Actual experience with efforts at deterrence is not encouraging. Before placing too much reliance on deterrence as a basis for supporting international criminal prosecutions, especially over possible alternatives such as truth and reconciliation commissions, we ought at least to consider carefully the obstacles to achieving effective deterrence.
for valuable suggestions and for access to their important forthcoming works on these and related... more for valuable suggestions and for access to their important forthcoming works on these and related topics.
The ongoing debate over the legitimacy and utility of the newly formed International Criminal Cou... more The ongoing debate over the legitimacy and utility of the newly formed International Criminal Court has been freighted with overblown rhetoric by Court supporters and opponents alike. The unfortunate result of the polarization of the debate over the ICC is that it obscures what may realistically be expected of the new institution, and potentially distorts the allocation of political and financial resources in the fight against the crimes the new Court is designed to address. The reality is that claims on both sides are substantially overstated. In practice, the Court will be hampered by legal, financial, and political constraints; there is little empirical evidence to support claims that ICC prosecutions will have a substantial deterrent effect; national legal systems in the countries where atrocities are most widespread are usually inadequate and will often be unable to fulfill the role assigned to them by the Court's statute; and the signaling/rule of law promotion function of the Court is likely therefore to be relatively modest. But the Court can contribute to the marginalization of extremists in some contexts, and it can over the long term reinforce normative constraints against the commission of atrocities, even if only at the margins. Moreover, the Court will probably avoid the gray area cases most feared by the United States and other critics, so its impact on state sovereignty and national security decision making is likely to be modest.
El Papel Del Derecho Internacional En America La Soberania Nacional En La Era De La Integracion Regional 1997 Isbn 968 36 6171 8 Pags 121 142, Mar 22, 1997
This claim was advanced by the United States before the Organization of American States (OAS) in ... more This claim was advanced by the United States before the Organization of American States (OAS) in 1989, in rhetorical justification of the U.S. invasion of Panama. 2 At the time, the international community was not impressed. Both the U.N. General Assembly and the OAS voted overwhelmingly to condemn the invasion, 3 even though it was common knowledge that the advent of democracy in Panama had been frustrated by General Manuel Noriega's refusal to seat the government of President-elect Guillermo Endara, and that Endara and most other Panamanians appeared to welcome the invasion. 4 Most states, Latin American countries in particular, rejected the notion that foreign nations could legitimately employ armed forces or other measures of coercion to seat a democratically elected government against the will of an indigenous political elite in effective control of the state. 5 Indeed, many states questioned the propriety of any attempt by foreign states to influence domestic political processes. 6 In the next several years, however, the OAS condemned attempted coups in Surinam and Venezuela, and opposed the now famous "autogolpes" in Peru and Guatemala. 7 The OAS also sent election monitors and human rights observers to join U.N. personnel in overseeing the electoral processes in Nicaragua, Haiti, and other member states. Most significantly, the OAS, along with virtually the entire international community, condemned the Haitian military's unconstitutional overthrow of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. 8 The OAS even took the lead, at least initially, in promoting coercive sanctions against the de facto authorities in Haiti, 9 and it acquiesced in the Security Council's decision to authorize U.S. military intervention to restore the deposed President to power. 10 This new interventionist spirit was not confined to the OAS. On all sides now, we hear that democracy is an idea whose time has come. 2. Id. Although the promotion of democracy figured prominently in the public statements of U.S. officials regarding the objectives of the U.S. invasion, the United States did not claim any right of pro-democratic intervention as part of its legal justification for the invasion. Instead, the United States relied primarily on the right of self-defense (premised on an alleged threat to American lives and to the United States itself) and a claimed right to preserve the integrity of the Panama Canal treaties.
This book looks at why it's so difficult to create 'the rule of law' in post-conflict... more This book looks at why it's so difficult to create 'the rule of law' in post-conflict societies such as Iraq and Afghanistan, and offers critical insights into how policy-makers and field-workers can improve future rule of law efforts. A must-read for policy-makers, field-workers, journalists and students trying to make sense of the international community's problems in Iraq and elsewhere, this book shows how a narrow focus on building institutions such as courts and legislatures misses the more complex cultural issues that affect societal commitment to the values associated with the rule of law. The authors place the rule of law in context, showing the interconnectedness between the rule of law and other post-conflict priorities, such as reestablishing security. The authors outline a pragmatic, synergistic approach to the rule of law which promises to reinvigorate debates about transitions to democracy and post-conflict reconstruction.
tion in management decisionmaking. The close labor-management ties that result from that particip... more tion in management decisionmaking. The close labor-management ties that result from that participation, 7 however, may be subject to challenge under section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), s which prohibits employer domination or support 9 of employee labor organizations.' 0 Most such firms have between one hundred and four hundred employees, SURVEY RESEARCH CENTER, INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN, EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP 8-9 (1978), although at least one worker-owned firm numbers its employees in the thousands, see Thomson, supra note 1, at 7-8 (discussing Chicago and Northwestern Transportation Company, with 3400 employee shareholders out of 14,000 employees). Most worker-owned firms, particularly those organized as cooperatives, have fewer members for two reasons. First, size beyond a certain point strains workers' ability to raise the capital necessary to buy and operate a major factory or corporation. Second, a large number of worker-owners may impede efforts to share management authority, at least in cooperatives where many important decisions are made collectively. See K. BERMAN, WORKER OWNED PLYWOOD COMPANIES 204-05 (1967). The firms produce a large variety of products, see D. ZWERDLING, supra, at 53-79, 95-104 (describing variety of worker-owned firms), and appear most often in labor-intensive industries, see K. BERMAN, supra, at 205. This concentration in labor-intensive industries has been explained as a result of the increased productivity often associated with worker-ownership, see Olympia Veneer Co. v. Comim'r, 22 B.T.A. 892, 901 (1931) (high wages to shareholders in plywood companies constitute reasonable compensation because of greater productivity of worker-owners); SENATE COMM. ON SMALL BUSINESS, supra note 3, at 18 (worker-owned firms generally have higher profits and greater productivity than comparable firms), although some commentators question whether worker ownership does in fact lead to greater productivity, see O'Toole, The Uneven Record of Employee Ownership, 57 HARV. BUS. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1979, at 190; Ross, supra note 4, at 109. Among those who believe that worker-owned firms are more productive, some attribute the improved productivity to employees' recognition that they are working for themselves, c. D. ZWERDLING, supra, at 100 (worker-owners in plywood companies attribute impressive productivity to financial and emotional involvement in their companies), while others contend that increased productivity is primarily attributable to increased participation, see C.
This article examines the legality and wisdom of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization ("NATO") ... more This article examines the legality and wisdom of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization ("NATO") intervention in Kosovo in 1990. The Kosovo campaign pushed at the boundaries of international law in at least two important respects. First, NATO's decision to engage in large-scale military action without prior Security Council authorization raised significant doubts about the status of the law governing the use of force and the viability of United Nations ("U.N.") primacy in matters of international peace and security. Second, NATO's high-altitude bombing campaign, conducted without a single NATO combat casualty but with significant civilian casualties within the FRY, called into question the appropriate relationship between means and ends in an intervention designed to save lives. The long-term impact of the Kosovo intervention in each of these areas of law remains uncertain.
, Nicaragua filed suit in the International Court of Justice (I.C.J.) charging the United States ... more , Nicaragua filed suit in the International Court of Justice (I.C.J.) charging the United States with engaging in military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua in violation of the Charters of the United Nations and the Organization of American States, and of general and customary international law. 1 On May 10, 1984, after a hearing at which both states presented evidence and legal arguments, the Court ordered the United States to cease its "covert" war against Nicaragua pending the determination of the case on the merits. 2 The vote was 14-1, with only the U.S. judge dissenting. 3 The Court then held hearings, in which both the United States and Nicaragua participated fully, on the preliminary issues of jurisdiction and admissibility. On November 26, 1984, the Court ruled in Nicaragua's favor on these issues by lopsided margins. 4 Faced with a hearing on the merits of Nicaragua's claims, the United States announced on January 18, 1985, that it would not participate further in the case. 5 Most litigants, of course, do not have the luxury of spurning a court that has declared its jurisdiction over their case, and on those rare occasions when they do so, they are considered fugitives from justice. The Reagan Administration's decision to scorn the World Court, after thirtynine years of active support, cannot have been made lightly. The basis for its decision, however, is not hard to understand; it reflects the Administration's awareness of the factual and legal impossibility of defending its t Members of the Washington, D.C. law firm of Reichler & Appelbaum, which represents
Page 1. NOTES AND COMMENTS THE COSTS OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE By David Wippman * Critics ofintern... more Page 1. NOTES AND COMMENTS THE COSTS OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE By David Wippman * Critics ofinternational criminal justice ... despite substantial annual budgets. In short, they claim that international justice is costly and slow. ...
Unfortunately, the connection between international prosecutions and the actual deterrence of fut... more Unfortunately, the connection between international prosecutions and the actual deterrence of future atrocities is at best a plausible but largely untested assumption. Actual experience with efforts at deterrence is not encouraging. Before placing too much reliance on deterrence as a basis for supporting international criminal prosecutions, especially over possible alternatives such as truth and reconciliation commissions, we ought at least to consider carefully the obstacles to achieving effective deterrence.
for valuable suggestions and for access to their important forthcoming works on these and related... more for valuable suggestions and for access to their important forthcoming works on these and related topics.
The ongoing debate over the legitimacy and utility of the newly formed International Criminal Cou... more The ongoing debate over the legitimacy and utility of the newly formed International Criminal Court has been freighted with overblown rhetoric by Court supporters and opponents alike. The unfortunate result of the polarization of the debate over the ICC is that it obscures what may realistically be expected of the new institution, and potentially distorts the allocation of political and financial resources in the fight against the crimes the new Court is designed to address. The reality is that claims on both sides are substantially overstated. In practice, the Court will be hampered by legal, financial, and political constraints; there is little empirical evidence to support claims that ICC prosecutions will have a substantial deterrent effect; national legal systems in the countries where atrocities are most widespread are usually inadequate and will often be unable to fulfill the role assigned to them by the Court's statute; and the signaling/rule of law promotion function of the Court is likely therefore to be relatively modest. But the Court can contribute to the marginalization of extremists in some contexts, and it can over the long term reinforce normative constraints against the commission of atrocities, even if only at the margins. Moreover, the Court will probably avoid the gray area cases most feared by the United States and other critics, so its impact on state sovereignty and national security decision making is likely to be modest.
El Papel Del Derecho Internacional En America La Soberania Nacional En La Era De La Integracion Regional 1997 Isbn 968 36 6171 8 Pags 121 142, Mar 22, 1997
This claim was advanced by the United States before the Organization of American States (OAS) in ... more This claim was advanced by the United States before the Organization of American States (OAS) in 1989, in rhetorical justification of the U.S. invasion of Panama. 2 At the time, the international community was not impressed. Both the U.N. General Assembly and the OAS voted overwhelmingly to condemn the invasion, 3 even though it was common knowledge that the advent of democracy in Panama had been frustrated by General Manuel Noriega's refusal to seat the government of President-elect Guillermo Endara, and that Endara and most other Panamanians appeared to welcome the invasion. 4 Most states, Latin American countries in particular, rejected the notion that foreign nations could legitimately employ armed forces or other measures of coercion to seat a democratically elected government against the will of an indigenous political elite in effective control of the state. 5 Indeed, many states questioned the propriety of any attempt by foreign states to influence domestic political processes. 6 In the next several years, however, the OAS condemned attempted coups in Surinam and Venezuela, and opposed the now famous "autogolpes" in Peru and Guatemala. 7 The OAS also sent election monitors and human rights observers to join U.N. personnel in overseeing the electoral processes in Nicaragua, Haiti, and other member states. Most significantly, the OAS, along with virtually the entire international community, condemned the Haitian military's unconstitutional overthrow of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. 8 The OAS even took the lead, at least initially, in promoting coercive sanctions against the de facto authorities in Haiti, 9 and it acquiesced in the Security Council's decision to authorize U.S. military intervention to restore the deposed President to power. 10 This new interventionist spirit was not confined to the OAS. On all sides now, we hear that democracy is an idea whose time has come. 2. Id. Although the promotion of democracy figured prominently in the public statements of U.S. officials regarding the objectives of the U.S. invasion, the United States did not claim any right of pro-democratic intervention as part of its legal justification for the invasion. Instead, the United States relied primarily on the right of self-defense (premised on an alleged threat to American lives and to the United States itself) and a claimed right to preserve the integrity of the Panama Canal treaties.
This book looks at why it's so difficult to create 'the rule of law' in post-conflict... more This book looks at why it's so difficult to create 'the rule of law' in post-conflict societies such as Iraq and Afghanistan, and offers critical insights into how policy-makers and field-workers can improve future rule of law efforts. A must-read for policy-makers, field-workers, journalists and students trying to make sense of the international community's problems in Iraq and elsewhere, this book shows how a narrow focus on building institutions such as courts and legislatures misses the more complex cultural issues that affect societal commitment to the values associated with the rule of law. The authors place the rule of law in context, showing the interconnectedness between the rule of law and other post-conflict priorities, such as reestablishing security. The authors outline a pragmatic, synergistic approach to the rule of law which promises to reinvigorate debates about transitions to democracy and post-conflict reconstruction.
tion in management decisionmaking. The close labor-management ties that result from that particip... more tion in management decisionmaking. The close labor-management ties that result from that participation, 7 however, may be subject to challenge under section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), s which prohibits employer domination or support 9 of employee labor organizations.' 0 Most such firms have between one hundred and four hundred employees, SURVEY RESEARCH CENTER, INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN, EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP 8-9 (1978), although at least one worker-owned firm numbers its employees in the thousands, see Thomson, supra note 1, at 7-8 (discussing Chicago and Northwestern Transportation Company, with 3400 employee shareholders out of 14,000 employees). Most worker-owned firms, particularly those organized as cooperatives, have fewer members for two reasons. First, size beyond a certain point strains workers' ability to raise the capital necessary to buy and operate a major factory or corporation. Second, a large number of worker-owners may impede efforts to share management authority, at least in cooperatives where many important decisions are made collectively. See K. BERMAN, WORKER OWNED PLYWOOD COMPANIES 204-05 (1967). The firms produce a large variety of products, see D. ZWERDLING, supra, at 53-79, 95-104 (describing variety of worker-owned firms), and appear most often in labor-intensive industries, see K. BERMAN, supra, at 205. This concentration in labor-intensive industries has been explained as a result of the increased productivity often associated with worker-ownership, see Olympia Veneer Co. v. Comim'r, 22 B.T.A. 892, 901 (1931) (high wages to shareholders in plywood companies constitute reasonable compensation because of greater productivity of worker-owners); SENATE COMM. ON SMALL BUSINESS, supra note 3, at 18 (worker-owned firms generally have higher profits and greater productivity than comparable firms), although some commentators question whether worker ownership does in fact lead to greater productivity, see O'Toole, The Uneven Record of Employee Ownership, 57 HARV. BUS. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1979, at 190; Ross, supra note 4, at 109. Among those who believe that worker-owned firms are more productive, some attribute the improved productivity to employees' recognition that they are working for themselves, c. D. ZWERDLING, supra, at 100 (worker-owners in plywood companies attribute impressive productivity to financial and emotional involvement in their companies), while others contend that increased productivity is primarily attributable to increased participation, see C.
This article examines the legality and wisdom of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization ("NATO") ... more This article examines the legality and wisdom of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization ("NATO") intervention in Kosovo in 1990. The Kosovo campaign pushed at the boundaries of international law in at least two important respects. First, NATO's decision to engage in large-scale military action without prior Security Council authorization raised significant doubts about the status of the law governing the use of force and the viability of United Nations ("U.N.") primacy in matters of international peace and security. Second, NATO's high-altitude bombing campaign, conducted without a single NATO combat casualty but with significant civilian casualties within the FRY, called into question the appropriate relationship between means and ends in an intervention designed to save lives. The long-term impact of the Kosovo intervention in each of these areas of law remains uncertain.
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