Geography

Egyptian agriculture is vulnerable to potential climate change due to its dependence on irrigated crops, a climate that is too dry to support crops, and increasing water demands. This study analyzes the agricultural implications of climate change and population growth plus possible adaptations strategies. A partial equilibrium model that simulates crop and livestock production along with water flows and non-agricultural water Mitig Adapt Strateg Glob Change use is used to analyze the impact of climate change. The study examines the implications of climate change effects on crop yields, livestock performance, non-agricultural water use, water supply, irrigation water use, sea level rise and a growing population. Results indicate that climate change damages the Egyptian agricultural sector and the damages increase over time . Prices for agricultural commodities increase and this has a negative effect on consumers but a positive effect on producers. Egypt may reduce these damages by adapting through lower demand growth, raised agricultural technological progress, sea rise protection and water conservation strategies.

The role of state and private sector in constructing large hydropower dams in the Mekong Region has shifted. Early projects since the 1960s in Thailand and Vietnam were principally conceived, built and operated by the relevant state agencies, typically with funding from the World Bank or the United States, and the Soviet Union respectively. Since the early 1990s, however, partial liberalization of the region’s power sector, alongside regional economic integration and regional power trade steered by the Greater Mekong Subregion programme, has increased the role of private sector energy and construction companies and financiers. Whereas in Thailand and Vietnam, all of the largest hydropower dam projects have been developed already as state-led projects, in Laos and Cambodia, which are both presently undergoing extensive and rapid hydropower development, Public–Private Partnerships (PPP) and Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) are the principal infrastructure investment vehicles. National policies and laws have facilitated this transition, promoted in particular by the World Bank, together with the International Finance Corporation and the Asian Development Bank (ADB). The involvement of these actors and changes to policy reflect a global turn towards neoliberalism since the late 1970s in Northern countries that led to a roll-back of the state and the emergence of the PPP and BOT model for infrastructure development there, closely tied up with privatization processes of state activities.

This chapter adopts a political economy approach to examine how private sector investment have shaped the hydropower development process in the Mekong Basin and the approach of government, investors and developers. The chapter examines in particular the emergence and growing role of IPPs and private sector financing in Laos and Cambodia. We show how the divergent political economies of the two countries have resulted in different models of BOT/ PPP in large-scale hydropower development. The chapter argues that the actual distribution of project risk and benefit does not reflect the original rationale of BOT/ PPP, and in particular leaves the state, local communities, the environment, and electricity consumers with a disproportionate share of risk, to the benefit of the private sector developers and financiers. Yet, the governments of Cambodia and Laos also struggle to negotiate deals as they compete to attract international and regional capital. Overall, it is argued that the interests of IPPs are a significant factor driving hydropower development in the Mekong Basin, shaping energy planning in Thailand and Vietnam, and relevant law and policy on hydropower development in Cambodia and Laos.

By reviewing and blending two main bodies of research (critical transboundary water interaction analysis and centuries of thought on social justice) this paper seeks to improve international transboundary water interaction analysis and diplomacy. Various implications for transboundary analysis and diplomacy are grouped under themes of equitability, process/outcomes, and structural concerns. These include shortcomings of analysis and policy based on unfounded assumptions of equality, and options excluded from consideration by the legitimisation of particular concepts of justice over others. As power asymmetry is seen to enable or disable justice claims and conflict resolution efforts, the importance of ensuring equitable outcomes as a precondition for cooperation is asserted. Similarly, water conflict resolution is found to be more fair – procedurally – than is conflict management, and may be supported to a limited extent by international water law. A number of analytical tasks are suggested for future research and policy, including a call to scrutinise the source of legitimacy of strands of justice invoked. Given the very many perspectives on justice that exist in the network of relevant actors, potential bias in research and diplomacy could be reduced if all involved openly stated the morals underpinning their understanding of 'justice'.

This paper serves international water conflict resolution efforts by examining the ways that states contest hegemonic transboundary water arrangements. The conceptual framework of dynamic transboundary water interaction that it presents integrates theories about change and counter-hegemony to ascertain coercive, leverage, and liberating mechanisms through which contest and transformation of an arrangement occur. While the mechanisms can be active through sociopolitical processes either of compliance or of contest of the arrangement, most transboundary water interaction is found to contain elements of both. The role of power asymmetry is interpreted through classification of intervention strategies that seek to either influence or challenge the arrangements. Coexisting contest and compliance serve to explain in part the stasis on the Jordan and Ganges rivers (where the non-hegemons have in effect consented to the arrangement), as well as the changes on the Tigris and Mekong rivers, and even more rapid changes on the Amu Darya and Nile rivers (where the non-hegemons have confronted power asymmetry through influence and challenge). The framework also stresses how transboundary water events that may appear isolated are more accurately read within the many sociopolitical processes and arrangements they are shaped by. By clarifying the typically murky dynamics of interstate relations over transboundary waters, furthermore, the framework exposes a new suite of entry points for hydro-diplomatic initiatives.

We analyse the threats of global environmental change, as they relate to food security. First, we review three discourses: (i) 'sustainable intensification', or the increase of food supplies without compromising food producing inputs, such as soils and water; (ii) the 'nexus' that seeks to understand links across food, energy, environment and water systems; and (iii) 'resilience thinking' that focuses on how to ensure the critical capacities of food, energy and water systems are maintained in the presence of uncertainties and threats. Second, we build on these discourses to present the causal, risks and options assessment for decision-making process to improve decision-making in the presence of risks. The process provides a structured, but flexible, approach that moves from problem diagnosis to better risk-based decision-making and outcomes by responding to causal risks within and across food, energy, environment and water systems.