Introduction: Logic and Politics

Introduction. Logic and politics Franca d’Agostini*, Elena Ficara+, Fabien Schang† * Department of Political, Economic and Social Sciences, University of Milan, Milan, Italy + † Philosophy, Paderborn University, Paderborn, Germany Lycée Alfred Mézières, Longwy, France to appear in History and Philosophy of Logic, Special Issue on Logic and politics Introduction. Logic and politics The aim of this special issue is to explore the intersections of logic, intended as the formal science of valid consequence, and politics, the practical science of associated life. The analyses here provided deal with the theme in two ways: by considering what logic can do for politics, so proposing possible formalizations of political arguments, or using logical notions and tools to interpret political facts and problems; by considering what politics can do for logic, so examining how logical choices are and have been affected or determined by extra-logical facts of political relevance. The two perspectives outline a territory of inquiry which is not so much frequented, in political and logical literature, but is becoming more and more interesting nowadays. Keywords: history of logic; logical form; logical and political normativity; logical and political pluralism; feminist logic; discrimination; democracy. The aim of this special issue is to explore the intersections of logic, intended as the formal science of valid consequence, and politics, here understood as the practical science which investigates how societies make collectively binding decisions. The analyses are both historical and theoretical, they deal with the theme in two ways (inclusively): - by considering what logic can do for politics, for instance proposing possible formalizations of political arguments, or using logical notions and tools to interpret political facts and problems - by considering what politics can do for logic, for instance examining how logical choices are, have been, or could be affected or determined by extralogical facts of political relevance. The two perspectives outline a territory of inquiry which is hardly frequented, in political or logical literature, but is becoming more and more interesting nowadays. There are even reasons to believe that a new sector of studies called Political Logic (intended in the same way in which we intend ‘Social Epistemology’ or ‘Political Epistemology’), could be of special interest for logicians and philosophers in general. Traditionally, there has been a certain enmity or extraneousness between logic and politics: because it is assumed that the sphere of politics is and should be an extralogical and maybe logic-resistant domain, and/or because logical (deductive) tools and principles are held to be useless in the analysis of political facts. In contrast, sparse intersections have been proposed, for instance within the framework of programs aimed to apply formal methods to political reasoning and arguing. On the other hand, many authors have variously emphasized the connection between logic and democracy: typically, John Stuart Mill, or John Dewey. Clearly, a double meaning of ‘logic’ is involved: in the former case it merely means ‘formal methods’; in the latter, we have the loose and traditional idea of logic as ‘art of good reasoning’. Naturally, we also have the tradition of ‘political logic’ coming from Hegel and Marxism in its manyfold versions and surroundings, in which the idea of ‘logical forms’ is preserved. But dialectical logic nowadays does not officially belong to the area of logic, and the nature and real efficacy of the option is still highly controversial. All this describes, in our diagnosis, an open and problematic area of research, involving a series of generally unanswered questions, such as: is logic as applied to politics the mere application of formal methods to analyse political issues? If it is, what are its benefits and costs? If it is not, what do (should) we mean by ‘logic’ in this context? Or also: is logic independent and neutral with respect to events and circumstances of political relevance (injustice, discrimination, exploitation, cultural appropriation and cancellation)? Have there been, in history, interesting and still heuristic ways of intersecting the two areas? Are the current developments of classical and sub-classical logic profitably applicable to contemporary political concerns? The articles here collected propose a first exploration of the field, so providing some insights for a new idea of ‘political logic’ in all its problematic aspects. The first three contributions study the impact of logic over political choices. In ‘Politics, history and logic in Max Weber’ Ferrera presents Max Weber’s approach to historical causation, situating it in the wider context of his epistemology, and especially discusses those aspects of Weber’s work that pioneered – at least implicitly – the use of modal logic for social science explanations. The paper especially focuses on Weber’s ‘method of singular causal analysis’ by proposing one example (the causal role played by the Battle of Marathon in paving the way for the birth of Western rationalism) and by developing a model of it. In ‘(What) is feminist logic? (What) do we want it to be?’ Cook and St Croix deal with the possibility conditions of a ‘feminist logic’. They tackle basic questions such as: is a feminist logic a specific, non-classical logic? Is it ‘the logic’ as applied to largely feminist concerns, such as the notions of gender, discrimination etc.? Is it simply an evaluation of logic (and its history) from a feminist perspective? How should/can we locate feminist logic within the current debates in philosophy of logic? In answering, the authors present their proposal by locating it within the contemporary debates on logic revision, anti-exceptionalism about logic, and logical pluralism. They analyse Plumwood’s groundbreaking article of 1993 The politics of reason, which launches important ideas about the nature and tasks of a feminist logic. In ‘Logic and discrimination’ Ficara explores the connection between logic and discrimination, also with reference to Plumwood’s ideas. Although Plumwood’s analysis is not limited to a consideration of the notion of discrimination, what she writes is useful for illuminating some basic mechanisms of thought that inform discriminatory practices. Ficara proposes first a series of examples that make the connection between logic and oppression envisaged by Plumwood clear. Then she examines two questions: Can logic produce discrimination? Can logic contribute to the fight against discrimination? If so, how? The last three contributions examine the impact of political facts over logical choices in some crucial historical phases. In ‘The birth of logic out of the spirit of democracy’ d’Agostini advances a version of the theory whereby logic had deep origins in democracy, by re-reading Gorgias’ Encomium of Helen. The discovery of democracy in ancient Greece called political (and scientific) attention to the inferential activities of citizens, and politicians’ ability of taking advantage of them, for better or worse. Sophists, in particular, discovered that people’s inferences follow constant structures, that these forms of arguments have impact on choices and decisions concerning public good, and then that, by dominating logical forms, you dominate politics in democracy. With the Encomium Gorgias launched these ideas, so contributing to lay the ground for Aristotle’s ‘science of syllogism’. In ‘Polish logicians on the social functions of logic’ Woleński examines the interplays between logic and politics in the Polish School of Logic starting from 1914. Flourished in the period between 1920 and 1939, the School was philosophically influenced by Kazimierz Twardowski (1866–1938). For Twardowski any sort of argument can be clearly formulated and judged in terms of inferential rules, so logic is fundamental for every kind of human activity, professional as well as private. These rules regard semiotics, formal logic and methodology of science. Woleński shows how this position was shared by Twardowski’s students, among them Jan Łukasiewicz, Stanisław Leśniewski, Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz and Tadeusz Kotrabiński, as well as by the next generation of logicians and philosophers, and especially by Alfred Tarski. Woleński highlights that they all considered logic, philosophy and science as completely neutral with respect to politics and ideology, but they also considered logical skills as indispensable in political activities. In ‘Rethinking logical and political normativity’ Maffettone examines the notion of normativity in logic and politics, and their possible intersections. The 20th century divide between the analytical and the continental idea of logic is explored, by noting that they both––with significant differences––can be seen as proposing a ‘bottom-up normativity’, which may have immediate political effects. Logical normativity postulates universality, in descriptive but also prescriptive sense, as it implies a connection between reality and reason able to orient actions universalistically. For a bottom-up conception (as specifically advanced by Deleuze’s logic of sense) the universalistic approach does not descend from above on an elusive reality but is a selforganization of multiple processes occurring in a horizon which is typically affected by political facts and choices. The open question is whether this proposal is still adaptable to the current conditions of democratic politics.