The Uncanny Effect of Telling Genealogies

SOUTHWEST PHILOSOPHY REVIEW Vol. 33, No. 1 January, 2017 ARTICLES MARK SILCOX HOMO LUDENS REVISITED PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS 1 CHRISTOPHER M.P. TOMASZEWSKI INTENTIONALITY AS PARTIAL IDENTITY 15 CHRISTOPHER A. BOBIER DEFLATING MOODS 25 SAMUEL ARNOLD SOCIAL EQUALITY AND THE DUTY TO PARTICIPATE IN PERSONAL AND POLITICAL RELATIONSHIPS 33 MATTHEW WILSON IS EPISTEMIC PERMISSIVISM A CONSISTENT POSITION TO ARGUE FROM? 43 DEBORAH K. HEIKES ON BEING REASONABLY DIFFERENT 53 TORSTEN MENGE THE UNCANNY EFFECT OF TELLING GENEALOGIES 63 DON BERKICH THE PROBLEM OF ORIGINAL AGENCY 75 R. BENSEN CAIN MALICE AND THE RIDICULOUS AS SELF-IGNORANCE: A DIALECTICAL ARGUMENT IN PHILEBUS 47D-50E 83 ANDREW MORGAN SOLVING THE PUZZLE OF AESTHETIC ASSERTION 95 LARRY ALAN BUSK TWO WOMEN IN FLIGHT IN BEAUVOIR’S FICTION 105 R.M. FARLEY THE SELLARSIAN DILEMMA: NOT WHAT IT SEEMS 115 GLENN TILLER BEING DENIED: ANALYTIC METAPHYSICS AND AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY 125 JULIE WULFEMEYER REFERENCE-SHIFTING ON A CAUSAL-HISTORICAL ACCOUNT 133 ERIK KRAG A NEW TIMING OBJECTION TO FRANKFURT CASES 143 PAUL CARRON 151 MONKEYS, MEN, AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY: A NEO-ARISTOTELIAN CASE FOR A QUALITATIVE DISTINCTION ROBERT P. REED MUST GOD PREVENT EVIL? 163 MATTHEW SHEA THOMISTIC EUDAIMONISM, VIRTUE, AND WELL-BEING 173 SARAH H. WOOLWINE CONCEALING DISABILITY: HORKHEIMER AND ADORNO ON PASSING AS ABLED 187 ERIK W. SCHMIDT TROUBLED TRADES: NORMATIVE INCOMPARABILITY AND THE CHALLENGE OF UNIVERSAL MARKETS 195 BRANDON DANIEL-HUGHES PEIRCE’S CONSERVATISM AND CRITICAL COMMONSENSE: INSIGHTS TOWARD A MORE NUANCED THEORY OF INQUIRY 205 JOSÉ LUIS FERNÁNDEZ BRIDGING THE GAP OF KANT’S ‘HISTORICAL ANTINOMY’ 215 Editor’s Note Congratulations to the philosophers whose work is represented here and my thanks for their cooperation in preparing their work for publication. All articles appearing here were presented at the 2016 78th Annual Meeting of the Southwestern Philosophical Society, held in Corpus Christi, TX. Thanks to the conference organizers and program committee for their work preparing the conference and selecting articles. I want to acknowledge the financial support of the Review by Illinois State University. Thanks to Dave Blair of ISU Printing Services, and Shannon Covey and ISU Mail Services for their excellent work. The 2017 meeting of the Society will be held November 2-4 at Baylor University in Waco, TX. Paul Carron of Baylor University will serve as the local arrangements Chairs. - Todd M. Stewart Call for Papers Southwest Philosophy Review Open issue: July 2017 Submissions are invited on any philosophical topic from any perspective. Author’s name should appear only in a separate cover letter file. Submit one electronic copy (DOC, DOCX, or RTF) to the editor by April 15th, 2017. Southwest Philosophy Review is published twice annually by the Southwestern Philosophical Society. The Review is a forum for philosophical inquiry and welcomes contributions from all philosophical perspectives. All journal submissions and correspondence to: Todd Stewart, Editor, Southwest Philosophy Review, Philosophy Dept., Illinois State University, Normal, IL 617904540; tel. 309-438-3757; fax 309-438-8028; email: tstewar@ilstu.edu. The annual institutional subscription fee is $30.00 (add $15.00 for foreign postage). Available back issues and copies of current issues may be purchased for $15.00 each. Online access for institutions, including the entire archive, is provided by the Philosophy Documentation Center. More information is available at http:// www.pdcnet.org/swphilreview. Annual dues for the Southwestern Philosophical Society are $50 for regular members and $25 for students and include a one-year subscription to the Review. Inquiries concerning membership and subscriptions should be addressed to the Secretary-Treasurer: Deborah K. Heikes, Philosophy Dept., University of Alabama at Huntsville, Huntsville, AL 35899; email: heikesd@uah.edu. For meeting information, consult the Society’s web site at: http://www.southwesternphilosophical.org/. © 2017 to the version appearing here, the Southwestern Philosophical Society. © to the text, the authors. The Uncanny Effect of Telling Genealogies Torsten Menge University of Arkansas What is the normative import of telling a genealogy of our present reasongiving practices? In this paper, I will focus on Michel Foucault’s materialist genealogies in Discipline and Punish and The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1, which attend to the social and material settings in which we act and give and ask for reasons. A number of influential critics have interpreted them as a critical evaluation of our reason-giving practices. But understood in this way, Foucault’s genealogical project faces significant philosophical problems. I will sketch a different account, arguing that telling a genealogy can have an uncanny effect: It can disrupt our familiarity with the everyday world by revealing to us the embodied norms that structure our everyday activities. Once we recognize that our situation is structured by normative demands, we cannot simply let ourselves be carried along by found norms. Genealogies call on us to take responsibility for these norms and to practically transform the space in which we act. 1. The Pragmatic Character of Telling a Genealogy: Two Flawed Accounts Questions about the normative import of Foucault’s genealogies have been discussed at length. However, the debate has failed to produce clarity, in part, because critics and defenders of Foucault alike misconstrue the pragmatic character of telling a genealogy: They assume that its primary point is to make truth claims about our present practices and our attachment to them. We can see this by looking at two otherwise very different readings of Foucault’s genealogical project. Many philosophical critics have interpreted Foucault’s genealogies as normative evaluations of our present practices.1 On this reading, Foucault ends up with a negative evaluation because he shows how practices that we took to be emancipatory are actually just new forms of social control; the disconcerting upshot is that “power is everywhere and in everyone” (Fraser, 1989, p. 26). While such critics usually find Foucault’s historical analyses illuminating, they are worried that Foucault is reducing all reason to power. This would either lead to an unattractive form of irrationalism that would undermine Foucault’s own critical evaluation, or it would require Foucault to adopt what Habermas (1987) has called a “cryptonormative” stance, i.e. one which has normative commitments that it cannot make 63 Torsten Menge explicit, let alone justify. Given the limited space, I will only mention two exegetical problems with this reading: First, Foucault has often explicitly denied that evaluation is the primary point of his studies. For example, in an interview from 1983, he says: “My point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, which is not exactly the same as bad” (Foucault, 1983, p. 231). While his genealogies certainly have “ominous overtones” (Fraser, 1989, p. 28), there are few if any explicit evaluations of the practices he is analyzing. Second, Foucault rejects a notion of power according to which power is imposed on rational practices from the outside and thereby undermines any rational claim made by these practices.2 Colin Koopman has recently defended an alternative reading. Disagreeing with the critics just mentioned, he suggests that genealogies do not aim to “establish normative conclusions” about the practices they study (2013, p. 90). While they have a role to play in social criticism, it is only to provide factual input for normative reflection by offering a diagnosis of the problems that a set of practices faces. A genealogy does not show that practices are bad or unjust, only that they are “problematic in that they demand our serious attention” (2013, p. 90). Using Foucault’s own term, Koopman calls this effect “problematization.” While Koopman is onto something, there are a number of problems with his proposal. First, Koopman does not make clear how “problematizing” can avoid evaluative commitments. Characterizing a practice as “dangerous” or “problematic” seems to imply, at least, that there is a risk that the practice might become bad or cause bad consequences, and that kind of judgment surely involves evaluative attitudes.3 But more importantly, I want to resist Koopman’s suggestion that the telling of telling of genealogies by itself is normatively neutral. Koopman is right to say that genealogies show that certain practices “demand our attention.” To demand attention is to make a normative claim on someone. We need to understand better how telling a genealogy can make such a claim and what exactly it is that is being demanded. As we are developing an alternative reading, it is instructive to see that Koopman shares a problematic assumption with critics like Fraser, Taylor, and Habermas. All of them assume that telling a genealogy consists primarily in making truth claims about our present practices–– claims that by their very nature are impersonal and make a claim one everyone. According to the critics, the genealogist makes evaluative truth claims: Starting from publicly available facts about our practices and their history, he establishes an evaluative conclusion that has normative import for everyone (say, for example, that one should not incarcerate people in 64 The Uncanny Effect of Telling Genealogies prisons). In contrast, Koopman argues that the genealogist only makes descriptive claims, truth claims about how practices and their problems have in fact developed. But neither of these readings adequately captures the pragmatic character of telling a genealogy. To problematize, to render something problematic, is different from simply stating a fact. A problem is something that calls out to be solved or addressed, and so to problematize is more akin to demanding that someone attend to an issue. Demanding that someone attend to an issue, making something an issue for somebody, creates a new normative requirement. Moreover, since something can be at issue only for a concrete person with a determinate position in normative space, problematizing is not an impersonal demand that makes a claim on everyone. Instead, it is a second-personal call: It calls on us––those who participate in the practices that Foucault studies––to concern ourselves explicitly with those practices. Based on this idea, we can develop to a more adequate account of the effects of telling a genealogy. 2. Uncanniness and the Legitimacy of Found Norms Foucault provides a suggestive clue for how to understand the pragmatic character of telling a genealogy in an interview he gave in 1983. There–– speaking about his genealogical project––he says that the task of philosophical thought is to “describe the nature of today and of ‘ourselves today’” (1988, p. 36). He further explains: I would like to say something about the function of any diagnosis concerning what today is. It does not consist in a simple characterization of what we are but, instead––by following lines of fragility in the present––in managing to grasp why and how that which is might no longer be that which is. In this sense, any description must always be made in accordance with these kinds of virtual fracture which open up the space of freedom understood as a space of concrete freedom, that is, of possible transformation. (1988, p. 36) In this quote, Foucault is spelling out the claim that a genealogy is a “history of the present” (1977, p. 31). His explication raises three questions: First, how can genealogies help us understand “what we are”? Second, how does understanding what we are help us “grasp why and how that which is might no longer be that which is”? And third, how does this open up a “space of concrete freedom”? Here, I can only gesture at an answer for the first question: For 65 Torsten Menge example, Foucault’s history of sexuality shows how the material practices and concepts concerned with sexuality emerged and became central to our present self-understanding. In the following, my focus will be on the second question: How can telling such a genealogy unsettle the norms and self-understandings in virtue of which we are what we are? The answer is that by revealing the normative claims that an everyday practice makes on us, the genealogy calls on us to take responsibility for the legitimacy of those norms. I will elaborate this claim in the remainder of this section, making use of Rebecca Kukla’s (2002) insightful discussion of uncanniness and the metaphysics of normativity. Critics of Foucault often assume that the material practices at issue in his genealogies are normatively inert and violently intrude upon our reason-giving practices.4 But as Kukla points out, this is a problematic understanding of our everyday interactions with the world and with one another. Human agents always already find themselves engaged in meaningful activities within an embodied and normatively contoured space. When we navigate the world in our everyday activities, we are not merely engaging in causal interactions; we are recognizing and negotiating the force of normative claims.5 This normative structure of the everyday world is not always transparent to us. When we are absorbed in our everyday dealings, the world is familiar to us and wears on its sleeve how it must be coped with; consequently, it does not appear to make demands on us. Only when our everyday coping is disrupted and we are forced to reflect on what made it possible, we come to see that our world is structured by norms. For example, many of us simply find ourselves as gendered beings who do things as men or women (and who treat other as such). We experience this as a brute fact about us and the world. It is only when our familiarity with a gendered world is disturbed that we recognize that gender is not simply a brute feature of the world but a complex social constellation that makes normative demands on us.6 Once we recognize our situation as structured by norms, Kukla argues, our relationship to it changes. The norms that govern the social world are not like laws of nature that compel us as a matter of blind impulse. Norms binds us only in virtue of our recognition of their normative authority. This means that in order for us treat these social norms as norms, questioning their legitimacy must be at least conceivable for us. Thus, when we recognize that our situation is shaped by norms, we have to confront the question whether these norms have a legitimate claim on us. We cannot simply go on to follow the norms unreflectively, as if they bound us independently of our recognition of their authority. 66 The Uncanny Effect of Telling Genealogies Kukla argues that this demand to take responsibility for the legitimacy of found norms shows up in the face of the uncanny. While she imports this as a technical term from Martin Heidegger, uncanniness is a familiar phenomenon. We experience uncanniness when our comfortable dealings with the normatively structured everyday world are disrupted. For example, when taking on a new position as a professor, it can take a long time for me to be at home in it, even if I know more or less what is expected of me. Uncanniness reveals to me the way in which my situation is made up of normative projects, and it forces me to thematize my relationship to these projects. It creates a distance between me and my situation that makes it impossible for me to unreflectively follow the norms governing the situation. Stepping back from them, Kukla argues, I have to commit freely to these norms in the sense that I recognize that they do not immediately compel me. I have to take responsibility for their legitimacy. Foucault’s genealogies reveal to us the embodied norms that structure some of our practices. This generates uncanniness: It creates a distance between me and my normatively structured world. For example, sexuality might not strike us as a fundamentally normative matter––something that makes demands on us––but simply as a given fact about us. But Foucault’s history of sexuality suggests that our self-understanding as sexual beings is not the recognition of a brute fact about ourselves, but a response to norms embodied in our practices. Indeed, having a sexual identity is possible only on the background of a complex set of social-material practices. Once we recognize the normative shape of our situation, we cannot simply let those norms carry us along; we have to consider whether their demands are legitimate.7 This account fits well with how Foucault himself has described the effect of his genealogies. Talking about Discipline and Punish in an interview, he says: When the book came out, various readers—particularly prison guards, social workers, etc.—gave this singular judgment: “It is paralyzing. There may be some correct observations, but in any case it certainly has its limits, because it blocks us, it prevents us from continuing our activities.” My reply is that it is just that relation that proves the success of the work, proves that it worked as I had wanted it to. That is, it is read as an experience that changes us, that prevents us from always being the same, or from having the same kind of relationship with things and with others that we had before reading it. (Foucault, 1991, p. 41) This paralysis should not be understood, as some of Foucault’s readers 67 Torsten Menge have done, as resignation in the face of the realization that the subject is nothing but the effect of power relations.8 Rather, the paralyzing experience that these readers are reporting is one of uncanniness. Reading a genealogy of the very practices that these readers participate in interrupts their familiarity with the world they inhabit as prison guards, social workers, etc. It requires them to face the question whether these norms make legitimate claims. Without being able to take for granted norms that could guide their response, the result is a kind of paralysis. This also means that the uncanny effect is not and cannot be based on a negative evaluation. A negative evaluation could not generate uncanniness because it would simply take the norms on which the evaluation is based for granted (Blattner, 2005). We often do reject norms in light of other norms: Take for example the traditional norm that only two people of the opposite sex can enter into marriage. Over the past forty years this norm has been challenged, with the result that it is not a constitutive requirement for married people to be of the opposite sex anymore. This transformation has been driven by other normative considerations, such as the requirement for legal equality. But insofar as we were able to respond on the basis of familiar norms, the transformation did not did not interrupt our familiarity with our world. 3. Practical Transformation and Reasons for Non-Conformity We can now return to the third question: How does unsettling the norms that govern “what we are” open up a “space of possible transformation”? I argued above that many of Foucault’s readers believe that the primary point of telling a genealogy is to make impersonal truth claims about ourselves and our present practices.9 For example, we might say that Foucault shows that our current sexual identities are socially constructed and that this construction serves powerful and pernicious interests. But Foucault is rather ambivalent about the value of this kind of truth-telling (McWhorter, 1999) and my account helps us understand why. If I take a historical account to tell the truth about myself, I am delegating responsibility for who I am or can be; I only switch one authoritative perspective for another. I treat my subjectivity and the norms that constitute it as given. A genealogy makes explicit the norms that create the space for our self-understandings. But if norms have normative force only in virtue of our recognition, we cannot take the genealogist’s word for who we are or can be. The genealogy raises the question whether these norms make a legitimate claim on me, but it does not settle it. The point of Foucault’s telling a genealogy of sexuality is thus not primarily theoretical. Rather, the appropriate uptake is quite practical. 68 The Uncanny Effect of Telling Genealogies This is why Foucault clarifies the phrase “a space of concrete freedom” by speaking of “possible transformation”: the telling of a genealogy calls us on to transform the space in which we act. Telling a genealogy has a practical normative effect: It gives us reason to act, i.e. to resist or transform our practices. But this reading raises an objection that many of Foucault’s critics have pressed: How can the telling of a genealogy give us reason to act if it does not make any evaluative claims? Consider Nancy Fraser’s version of the criticism: Foucault calls in no uncertain terms for resistance to domination. But why? Why is struggle preferable to submission? Why ought domination to be resisted? Only with the introduction of normative notions of some kind could Foucault begin to answer such questions. (Fraser, 1989, p. 29) Without a normative premise, how could a genealogy call on us to resist a practice or to transform it? My response to this challenge is that telling a genealogy gives us reason to transform our practices because transformation is an appropriate response to uncanniness. This normative effect has to do with our relationship to the norms in question, not with the contents of those norms. Remarks that Foucault (1997b) made about gay identity illustrate this point: In an interview with a French gay magazine, Foucault urges his readers not to understand gay identity as the recognition of some determinate fact about ourselves. To identify publicly as gay is not to live out some deep but long hidden fact about oneself. Instead, it is (or should be) to commit to a future-oriented project that develops new kinds of relationships: Another thing to distrust is the tendency to relate the question of homosexuality to the problem of “Who am I?” and “What is the secret of my desire?” […] The problem is not to discover in oneself the truth of one’s sex, but, rather, to use one’s sexuality henceforth to arrive at a multiplicity of relationships. (Foucault, 1997b, p. 135) On the basis of his history of sexuality, Foucault calls for inventing new forms of relationships, new ways for people to relate to each other outside of standard social institutions such as marriage. This as an authentic response to uncanniness because it does not delegate responsibility for what one does to some given fact about who I am or to the given authority of social institutions. Contrast this with the project to open the institution of marriage to same-sex couples while making no further changes to 69 Torsten Menge this institution and its norms. This move simply makes familiar again what was rendered unfamiliar by the genealogy––we allow ourselves to be carried along by the found social norms that govern interpersonal relationships. We can do this without addressing or taking responsibility for the legitimacy of those norms and it is therefore a way of covering over the uncanniness generated by the genealogy. In contrast, engaging in projects to transform our relationships is an appropriate response to uncanniness. But our reason for transforming our practices has to do not with the content of the norms that the genealogy reveals, but with our relationship to these norms. John Stuart Mill makes a similar argument when he argues for non-conformism in On Liberty.10 Worried about a conformist culture that discouraged individuality, Mill argues that an experimental attitude is the appropriate response to conformism.11 His basic idea is that resistance to conformity is valuable because it challenges the default authority of custom: In this age the mere example of non-conformity, the mere refusal to bend the knee to custom, is itself a service. Precisely because the tyranny of opinion is such as to make eccentricity a reproach, it is desirable, in order to break through that tyranny, that people should be eccentric. (Mill, 2002, p. 140) Non-conformity in the form of an experimental attitude has value independently of the content of a particular custom because by adapting it, I take responsibility for the norms I follow. Along similar lines, the telling of a genealogy calls on us to relate appropriately to the norms that we have been following unreflectively. An experimental attitude towards those norms––one that strives to transform the practices we find ourselves in––is a way to do that. Telling a genealogy can reveal how the situation in which we conduct our lives is governed by norms. This raises the question of their legitimacy and the appropriate response to this question is an experimental attitude. Genealogy does not just provide the strategic knowledge necessary to enact a transformation, as Koopman suggests. Nor does it simply hold us to an already existing normative requirement to resist the practices because they are morally bad. By generating uncanniness, telling a genealogy makes what was familiar to us an explicit normative issue and thereby requires us to actively take responsibility for the norms we used to follow unreflectively. It makes it appropriate and indeed required to creatively transform one’s practices and that, I submit, is an important normative effect of telling a genealogy.12 70 The Uncanny Effect of Telling Genealogies Notes 1 Fraser (1989) argues that Discipline and Punish is a criticism of the disciplinary practices that are used to fabricate and subjugate individuals as objects of knowledge and social control. For Charles Taylor (1994), Foucault’s studies provide us with a reason to resist our supposedly emancipatory discourse about sexuality, for example, because they show that this discourse is itself an insidious form of power. Jürgen Habermas (1987) argues that Foucault’s project is a “total critique of modernity,” since Foucault believes that power pervades even the modern human sciences which purport to produce rationally grounded insights about human beings. 2 In an interview given in 1977, Foucault rejects a notion of power according to which “power is bad, ugly, poor, sterile, monotonous and dead; and what power is exercised upon is right, good and rich” (Foucault, 1988b, p. 120). 3 Allen (2010) discusses this criticism in more detail. In response, Koopman (2013) has argued that Foucault characterizes the practices at issue as morally ambivalent. But moral ambivalence does not mean lack of evaluation, but only ambivalence about whether to evaluate something as good or bad. 4 See, for example, Habermas (1987). 5 Foucault builds on an influential Heideggerian insight here: When talking about disciplinary power in Discipline and Punish, he is not suggesting that we encounter power as a brute causal force, Rather, we engage in disciplinary practices by recognizing and negotiating normative claims that are embodied in social-material arrangements. 6 Whether or not we experience particular embodied norms as demands on us depends in part on how we are socially and materially positioned. If I find it relatively easy to conform to gender norms, their demanding character might be less apparent to me. In that case, the genealogy can have its uncanny effect on me. On the other hand, if I already experience gender as demanding (for whatever reason), the telling of a genealogy might not have this effect on me. This follows from the claim made above, that telling genealogies is a second-personal call; its effects are not impersonal and agent-neutral. 7 Similarly, Karademir (2013) has recently argued that Foucault’s genealogies engender anxiety by revealing “the historical contingency, performativity, and heterogeneity of what is assumed to be self-identical” (p. 385). Anxiety (Angst) is what one experiences in the face of the uncanny. However, I do not think that the recognition of historical contingency is sufficient for bringing about uncanniness. Telling a genealogy can only have an uncanny effect if I recognize that I am already committed to these (contingent) norms in my everyday activities. 8 See, for example, McCarthy (1990). 9 That the genealogist is committed to some truth claims about past events seems obvious to me and I am not going to discuss or defend this claim here. 10 See Davidson (2011) for a detailed discussion of this connection. 11 “As it is useful that while mankind are imperfect there should be different opinions, so is it that there should be different experiments of living…” (Mill, 71 Torsten Menge 2002, p. 132). 12 I presented earlier versions of this paper to audiences at the 2016 Pacific Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association and at the University of Arkansas. I would like to thank those who discussed the material with me on these occasions. I am particularly indebted to Rebecca Kukla, Joseph Rouse, and William Swanson for their extensive comments. Works Cited Allen, Amy. (2010) The Entanglement of Power and Validity: Foucault and Critical Theory. In Christopher Falzon and Timothy O’Leary (eds.), Foucault and Philosophy (pp. 78-98). Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. Blattner, William. (2015) Essential Guilt and Transcendental Conscience. In Denis McManus (ed.), Heidegger, Authenticity and the Self: Themes From Division Two of Being and Time (pp. 116-134). New York: Routledge. Davidson, Arnold. (2011) In Praise of Counter-conduct. History of the Human Sciences 24(4): 25-41. Foucault, Michel. (1977) Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. Alan Sheridan (trans.). New York: Vintage Books. ———. (1978) The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1: An Introduction. Robert Hurley (trans.). New York: Pantheon Books. ———. (1988a) Critical Theory/Intellectual History. In Lawrence Kritzman (ed.), Politics, Philosophy, Culture: Interviews and Other Writings, 19771984 (pp. 17-46). New York: Routledge. ———. (1988b) Power and Sex. In Lawrence Kritzman (ed.), Politics, Philosophy, Culture: Interviews and Other Writings, 1977-1984 (pp. 110124). New York: Routledge. ———. (1991) How An ‘Experience-Book’ Is Born. In James R. Goldstein and James Cascaito (trans.), Remarks on Marx: Conversations with Duccio Trombadori (pp. 25-42). New York: Semiotext(e). ———. (1997a) On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of Work in Progress. In Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics (pp. 229-252). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. ———. (1997b) Friendship As a Way of Life. In Paul Rabinow (ed.), Michel Foucault: Ethics, Subjectivity and Truth (pp. 135-140). New York: New Press. Fraser, Nancy. (1989) Unruly Practices: Power, Discourse, and Gender in Contemporary Social Theory. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Habermas, Jürgen. (1987) The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity. Frederick Lawrence (trans.). Cambridge, UK: Polity Press. Karademir, Aret. (2013) Heidegger and Foucault: On the Relation Between the Anxiety–Engendering–Truth and Being-Towards-Freedom. Human Studies 36(3): 375-392. 72 The Uncanny Effect of Telling Genealogies Koopman, Colin. (2013) Genealogy as Critique: Foucault and the Problems of Modernity. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. Kukla, Rebecca. (2002) The Ontology and Temporality of Conscience. Continental Philosophy Review 35: 1-34. McCarthy, Thomas. (1990) The Critique of Impure Reason: Foucault and the Frankfurt School. Political Theory 18(3): 437-469. McWhorter, Ladelle. (1999) Bodies and Pleasures: Foucault and the Politics of Sexual Normalization. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. Mill, John Stuart. (2002) On Liberty. In Mary Warnock (ed.), Utilitarianism, On Liberty, Essay on Bentham. Malden, MA: Blackwell. Taylor, Charles. (1984) Foucault on Freedom and Truth. Political Theory 12(2): 152-183. 73