History and Philosophy of the Human Sciences

Η διδακτική αυτή προσέγγιση αφορά στο σχεδιασμό και την υλοποίηση της διδασκαλίας στο πλαίσιο ενός μαθήματος φιλοσοφίας σχετικά με τις θεωρίες της γνώσης στη Β΄ Γενικού Λυκείου,  με  βάση  το διδακτικό  βιβλίο  Αρχές  Φιλοσοφίας  στο  πλαίσιο  του  αναλυτικού προγράμματος.  Πιο  συγκεκριμένα,  θα  προσπαθήσουμε  να  προτείνουμε  τον  εμπλουτισμό του κεφαλαίου 3: Αναζητώντας τη γνώση, ενότητα τρίτη: Θεωρίες για την πηγή της γνώσης, χρησιμοποιώντας  στοιχεία  θεωρίας  της  γνώσης  και  της  αντίληψης  των  Προσωκρατικών.  Στόχος  μας  είναι  να  εμπλουτίσουμε  το  κεφάλαιο  αυτό  με  στοιχεία  προσωκρατικής  φιλοσοφίας ως παλαιότερης χρονολογικά και προϋπάρχουσας εκείνης της Κλασικής εποχής  και των Νεοτέρων χρόνων.

An overview of the historical accounts leading to the origination of the Shadow Selves during the Gaian Timelines that have been operating within the 9 lowest dimensions of the Nebadon physical universe ever since, when our higher dimensional aspects of the planet (Hyperborea, Polaris) were first invaded by the negative aliens via waging the Electric-Gaian Wars against us that proceeded their earlier Lyran-Orion warring exploits, has been presented. Accordingly, the Polarians became extinct at the end of these wars, also putting an end to the so-called Golden Age of humanity. At this time, the fragmented pieces of the Polarians as well as some of the Hyperboreans who fell during the same wars were taken to the Wesa System by the Black Hole Entities in order to be closely researched, leading to the reversal of our consciousness that gave rise to the calamity of Metatronic Consciousness Reversal System. And, this coincides with the timeline that through the Metatronic Reversal employing a distorted version of the Fibonacci Mathematical Sequencing, the Black Hole negative aliens with the aid of their captured Metatronic Collective captives and victims who were coerced to cooperate with them, they managed to devise a way to distort the Sextant Matrix with reference to changing the ratio of the quantum spin velocities of our personal as well as planetary magnetic to electric energies, effectively damaging the scheme of the ‘Cosmic Clock’ determining the scheme of our collective consciousness and that of our planetary logos (brain). Accordingly, they devised a distorted and False Time Matrix and installed it in our planetary Grid (as well as other planetary spheres subsequently collectively giving rise to the ‘Black Magic Grids’ ) that is referred to as the Yahweh Matrix, which is based upon a 10D False Tree of Life (such as the Sephiroth worshiped by the Jewish faith), instead of the usual 12D Grid or Universal Tree of Life or Time Matrix. Accordingly, the schematic of this system is based upon Vesica Pisces, a system of two intersecting spheres passing through the center of either other. This represents a closed circuit Bi-wave Energetic system, with the energies flowing from the victim to the aggressor only that is contrary to the usual Trinity Tri-Wave structure comprised of three spheres that exchange energies among one another within an open loop of free energies. In this respect, the God-SOURCE’s free energies are disseminated to all ITS solar organic sentient offspring whose quanta of energy sequentially spin about an invisible umbilical cord stretching between the God-SOURCE and all ITS offspring, torsionally vibrating within two equal intervals of expansion and contraction, with the God’s offspring sequentially expanding away (stretch) and then contracting back (shrink) towards the God-SOURCE, akin to a helical spring. In this respect, the offspring receives free energies from the God-SOURCE during the interval of expansion, followed by getting its expended energies of consciousness replenished upon its return (contraction) to the SOURCE. This way, the offspring, no matter where he-she has anchored its consciousness and at what point to the Neural Network of the God-SOURCE, remains connected to the SOURCE as well as maintains its propinquity to the God-SOURCE. However, the Metatronic Reversal System manages to ‘steal’ magnetic energies during the contracting phase to the SOURCE that represents its return to the SOURCE, thus gradually making a consciousness offspring become more distant from the SOURCE with each sequential intervals of vibration. This is why humanity has become so disconnected from their inner spirit and their higher dimensional aspects (HIGHERSELF) that represents their seed of consciousness that were planted by the SOURCE (or the its liaisons the Guardian-Founders) as ITS offspring, to spiritually nourish via finding enlightenment to grow, leading to their consciousness expansion, transmigration to higher dimensions of consciousness, and procure Ascension. And, indeed, the missing two spherical dimension represent this scheme of magnetic energy pilfering, with the energies being constantly directed towards the Orion Constellation and their Black Hole Storage Energy Moloch Tanks. Accordingly, this manuscript begins by providing an introductory narrative with respect to the first and second seedlings of humans giving rise to the first 4 root races. Then the consequences of the Electric-Gain Wars on the Gaian Timeline Matrix and the Fall of the Hyperboreans  is discussed. Finally, the discourse ends with an account of a Conflict that occurred over Re-Seeding of Humanity. As for the account of formation of the Gaian Shadow or Phantom Body, the discussion has been carried out in a companion paper entitled “Modern Psychology 101: On the Historical Perspectives of the Origin of the ‘Shadow Selves’ - Part III: The Hyperborean Holocaust Timelines and the Formation of the Gaian Phantom Body.”

To Avoid misunderstanding, I should note at once that my point of view is here not that of the mere logic of ideas and doctrines, but that of the concrete logic of the events of history.
From the first point of view, that of the mere logic of ideas and doctrines, it is evident that there are many possible positions other than the “pure” positions which I shall examine. One might ask theoretically and in the abstract, what value these various positions have. That is not what I plan to do. In a word, my point of view is that of the philosophy of culture, and not that of metaphysics.

It will be shown that at least four foundational concepts of Cultural Historical Activity Theory were previously formulated by Hegel, viz., (1) the unit of analysis as a key concept for analytic-synthetic cognition, (2) the centrality of artifact-mediated actions, (3) the definitive distinction between goal and motive in activities, and (4) the distinction between a true concept and a pseudoconcept.

[published in Routledge's "Philosophy and Method in the Social Sciences" series]

This study starts from a simple premise:  human practices are a fundamental constituent — arguably “the” fundamental constituent — of social reality.  It then poses the following question:  What would social scientists’ research look like if they took this insight quite seriously?

That, of course, would depend on what practices are in fact like:  what their generic features are, how they are constituted, how they might be identified and characterised and explained, how they function in concrete contexts, how they might change across time and space.  These are the kinds of questions that this book tries to tackle, insisting that their answers hold important implications for the effective practice of social science.

The book thus attempts to build a philosophical infrastructure for the empirical study of practices in the social sciences and humanities.  At the same time, it also tries to explore the implications of this ontology of human practices for issues in social theory and in the philosophy of the social sciences.  The book thus stands at the intersection of the philosophy of social science, social theory, and the social sciences.

This is an obituary for László Bertalan (1941–2001), Hungarian sociologist, expert on Max Weber and analytical philosophy of social sciences. It also reports on a conference organised to commemorate his work and contains a full bibliography.

À partir d'une réflexion sur la mécanique statistique de Boltzmann, Schrödinger développe une critique du rationalisme mécaniste qui le conduit à adopter une approche ensembliste, ou "holiste", des phénomènes de la nature. La mise en œuvre de cette approche dans le cadre des sciences de la nature débouche sur un retour à une physique du continu et à une interprétation exclusivement ondulatoire de la mécanique quantique, en complet désaccord avec l'interprétation de l'École de Copenhague. L'approche ensembliste mise en œuvre au niveau de la science renvoie à une conception elle-même "ensembliste" de la compréhension par laquelle Schrödinger cherche à justifier ses positions scientifiques et qui a pour effet, au rebours du positivisme, de placer les sciences dans la dépendance des sciences de l'esprit : de même que c'est seulement au sein d'un monde et d'une tradition que l'homme peut comprendre, c'est seulement rapportée à une totalité sociale et historique qu'une théorie peut être comprise et donc jugée. Ce parti est alors associé, dans ses conséquences, à une aporie dont témoignent les aspects à la fois novateurs et, selon certains, rétrogrades de l'interprétation exclusivement ondulatoire de la mécanique quantique : celle de l'impossible conciliation du dépassement et de la fidélité au passé à laquelle se heurte inévitablement toute critique de la modernité.

Résumé
De même que les politologues n’ont pas le monopole de la pensée politique, les philosophes ne sont pas les seuls à philosopher. Des théologiens, des savants, des écrivains, des politiques, des juristes ou des philologues (liste non exhaustive) ont, à travers l’histoire, contribué d’une façon significative à la pensée philosophique. Or il nous semble que ces contributions sont négligées par les historiographes de la philosophie. Nous montrons l’intérêt qu’il y aurait à reconsidérer les méthodes d’écriture de l’histoire de la philosophie pour que celle-ci soit plus inclusive, en insistant particulièrement sur l’apport des scientifiques à la pensée philosophique. Comme ce travail engage une certaine conception de la philosophie, nous commençons par proposer des définitions.

Abstract
Just as political scientists do not have the monopoly on political thought, philosophers are not the only ones to philosophize. Theologians, scholars, writers, politicians, jurists, and philologists (and many others) have, throughout history, made significant contributions to philosophical thought. However, it seems that these contributions have been neglected by historiographers of philosophy. We demonstrate the benefits of reconsidering the methods of writing the history of philosophy in order to make it more inclusive, with a particular focus on the contribution of scientists to philosophical thought. As this work is based on a certain conception of philosophy, we begin by offering some definitions.

Sante De Sanctis (1862—1935), a pioneer of psychology in Rome at the end of the 19th century, applied methods from the expanding field of experimental psychology to the study of dreams, which was considered one of the leading ways to gain an understanding of normal and pathological psychic life. Taking inspiration from several traditions, De Sanctis proposed a study that anticipated a scientific program that also differentiated between contemporary psychoanalytical interpretations according to which previous dream psychology was considered a 'dark forest'. On the contrary, the multi-faceted methodology that he adopted for the study of an, until then, marginal phenomenon of the 'new' psychology, represented an element of originality that also included the elaboration of a psycho-physiological theory of dreams. Although the Italian psychologist's work on dreams was characterized by these important methodological changes, it disappeared from the references of those who contributed to the foundation of modern dreaming psychology after the Second World War. The present article places De Sanctis' psychology of dreams in its scientific context and singles out its originality while also analyzing the reasons for its marginalization.

There are plausible academic as well as social indicators that qualitative research has become an indispensable part of the methodological repertoire of the social sciences. Relying upon the tenets of the qualitative approach which require a priority of subject matter over method and a necessary socio-historical contextualization, I reconstruct some aspects of a social history that have shaped the quantitative-qualitative dichotomy and the quantitative imperative; these include modern individualism, monological rationality, manufacture operating on the grounds of common human labour, mechanics as the first science, quantification as a technology of distanced objectivity and a search for certainty realized at the expense of qualitative attributes. The so-called renaissance of the qualitative approach starting in 1960s, understood as a kind of a return of repressed qualities, is also socio-culturally contextualized. Both anthropogenetic and sociogenetic reconstructions as well as a microgenetic analysis of the research process demonstrate that choices of subject matter and of methodology are socially and culturally embedded and necessarily linked to broader interests and beliefs.

This paper, or, rather, talk, thinks about the idea of the humanities which is, I think, a strangely neglected topic.  It prepares the way for a realist account or theory of the humanities, partly by sketching out the difficulties and possibilities that this involves.

The present article examines the historical narrative proposed by modernization theory about the recent Spanish past. Its assumptions and consequences over historical research focused on the nineteenth century are described in order to understand the lack of intellectual exchange among historians and sociologists in the Spanish academic world. Modernization theory has justified the political consensus that allowed the Spanish transition to democracy and its academic authority has narrowed the scope of historical research about previous democratization processes. Although the paradigm of Spanish backwardness has been refuted by specialists on nineteenth-century Spain, sociologists, economists and historians of the twentieth century still propose a teleological interpretation of the democratization process that assumes the validity of the paradigm of secular Spanish backwardness. The scientific and political authority of modernization theory have made impossible an open academic debate and consequently the work of historians that refute teleological interpretations of development has been neglected, since modernization theory provides a political interpretation of the Spanish Second Republic and the Civil War as historical determined failure in order to legitimize the present democratic monarchy and Constitution.

This article analyses José Ortega y Gasset’s ideas of the tasks of philosophy and the university and how they were related to his diagnosis of the crisis of modern European culture. The texts ’Misión de la universidad’, ’Qué es filosofía?’ and ’La rebelión de las masas’, all written around 1930, are interpreted in light of each other to expose this relationship. Instead of simply declaring tasks for philosophy and the university, Ortega turned these issues into objects of historico-philosophical analysis. The tasks of philosophy and the university were historicized, corresponding to their changing roles in society, and related to the demands of the new situation in the present. The character of the present was not simply determined by applying a ready-made understanding of society, but was itself made an object of historico-philosophical diagnosis. The tasks that Ortega formulated for philosophy (to formulate a new form of reason related to life; to analyse the fundamental structure of ’life’ in the present) and the university ¬(to transmit culture at the level of cultural development; to build a new cultural foundation as a vital system of ideas based on the current level of the disciplines; to act as a cultivating counter-balance to the power of the media) can be seen as part of the solution to the problems diagnosed in La rebelión de las masas: the loss of the former cultural foundation; violence and nihilistic lack of respect for basic norms of civilization; self-righteous presentism and narrow-minded specialization. The final part points to worrying parallels between Ortega’s diagnosis and our contemporary populist condition and raises the question of a future alternative: a philosophical condition with a philosophical democracy based on philosophical citizens. Whether this is possible or not, Ortega’s analysis demonstrates the need to relate the question of the tasks of philosophy and the university to a diagnosis of the present.

In an effort to carve a distinct place for social facts without lapsing into a holistic ontology, John Greenwood has sought to define social phenomena solely in terms of the attitudes held by the actor(s) in question. I argue that his proposal allows for the possibility of a “lone collectivity” that is (1) unpalatable in its own right and (2) incompatible with the claim that sociology is autonomous from psychology. As such, I conclude that the relevant beliefs need to be held by more than one person.

The paper turns to the transmutation of the primarily cultural idea of Czechoslovak reciprocity into a state- building political idea. It does not replicate the traditional disputes surrounding constitutional documents and statistical praxis, it rather focuses on how the newly launched "Czechoslovak sciences" dealt with public and state requests for scientific justification of Czechoslovakism to help fortify the national consiousness. Using concrete examples from the social sciences, including jurisprudence, historiography, geograpgy, linguistics, ethnography and literary studies - represented by the well known exponents odf Czechoslovakism, such as Viktor Dvorský, Václav Chaloupecký, Albert Pražák, František Trávníček, Emanuel Chalupný et al, the paper attempts to determine to what extent their various efforts to scientifically legitimize Czechoslovakism were either semantically or argumentatively dependent on older, pre-war polemics and stereotypes, or to what extent new argumentative strategies emerged with the creation of the common state. The central argument here is that despite the thriving of Czech and Slovak social sciences, the overwhelming majority of approaches merely repicated antecedent concepts. Ultimately, when confronted with social reality and the changing geopolitics, these scientific pursuits of letitimacy failed. Over the course of the 1920s, Czechoslovakism became nothing more than a hackneyed old phrase, rolled for official festivities..

In this chapter, I propose a historical equivalent of HPS (‘history and philosophy of science’) called HPH (‘history and philosophy of history’). I start with some brief comments on HPS – what it is and what it is not. Subsequently, I present four arguments in favor of HPH. Finally, I respond to some questions that my proposal might provoke, suggesting among other things that HPH is not something to be built from scratch, but a form of cooperation that is already among us, whether we call it by that name or not.

Аргамакова А.А.Социальный заказ на прикладное знание как фактор развития социогуманитарных наук // Касавин И.Т. (ред.) Социальная философия науки. Российская перспектива. М.: КНОРУС, 2016. С. 149-162.
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Социальная философия науки — проект нового поворота в исследованиях науки и техники, основанного на социально-философском видении познавательного процесса и синтезе российской философской традиции с новейшими течениями западной мысли. Теоретическое значение социальной философии науки определяется центральной ролью социальной картины мира в процессе производства знания. Ее практическая важность связана с ролью в социотехнической перестройке институтов, ориентированных на хранение, переработку, производство и распространение информации и формирование научной политики. Монография дает читателю представление о новейшей проблематике социально-философского анализа науки и техники в широком культурном и цивилизационном контексте.

"Monumental... an authoritative and disturbing morality tale."—Chicago Tribune

The strongest weapon against pandemic is the truth. Read why in the definitive account of the 1918 Flu Epidemic.

Over a year on The New York Times bestseller list

Magisterial in its breadth of perspective and depth of research, The Great Influenza provides us with a precise and sobering model as we confront the epidemics looming on our own horizon. As Barry concludes, "The final lesson of 1918, a simple one yet one most difficult to execute, is that...those in authority must retain the public's trust. The way to do that is to distort nothing, to put the best face on nothing, to try to manipulate no one. Lincoln said that first, and best. A leader must make whatever horror exists concrete. Only then will people be able to break it apart." 

At the height of World War I, history’s most lethal influenza virus erupted in an army camp in Kansas, moved east with American troops, then exploded, killing as many as 100 million people worldwide. It killed more people in twenty-four months than AIDS killed in twenty-four years, more in a year than the Black Death killed in a century. But this was not the Middle Ages, and 1918 marked the first collision of science and epidemic disease.

Los humanistas (profesor/estudioso de los autores clásicos) evitaron cualquier roce con la escolástica (a favor de la filosofía de Aristóteles). Con la fundación en 1462 de la escuela de Careggi, el principal centro de estudio de los primeros humanistas, la villa donde no solo se traducía las obras de Platón. Sino que también Marsilio Ficino se reunía con sus discípulos en dicha villa campestre, conformado así la nueva Academia Platónica. Los humanistas del norte de Italia a favor de las ideas platónicas, estaban entusiasmados con la nueva escuela. Así surgió esta nueva filosofía, conocida como Neoplatonismo. Y también como no, grandes personajes de la época apoyaron la nueva escuela filosófica, el propio nieto de Cosme, Lorenzo “El Magnífico” y también demás hombres doctos italianos y extranjeros.

This chapter explores the prospects and consequences of various ways to forge Newton ian connections to Hume's philosophy. Two points of view are offered from which these connections are visible and evaluable: first, Hume's experimental method for the studying of the mind, particularly his reliance on analysis, synthesis and successive approxima tions in relation to Newton's method and Newton-inspired methodologies; and second, the relation of Hume's model of the mind to Newton's model of the natural world, particu larly the congruence of Hume's theory of association with the chemical idea of elective affinities as opposed to gravity. In conclusion, the chapter summarizes the significance of these connections for competing interpretations of Hume's science of the mind.

This article aims to deepen our understanding of Nicolas Beauzée's (1717–1789) attempt to establish a science of grammar modeled upon natural philosophy. At this endeavor’s heart stood Beauzee's analysis of grammatical time. Beauzée's tense theory, first published in 1765, had a profound impact on our understanding of tense as a complex system of reference, establishing order relations between events described within discourse and the moment of speech. While historians of linguistics have recognized Beauzée's contribution to the theory of tense, its greater significance has not been hitherto appreciated: Beauzée reinvented general grammar as a modern science combining Cartesian and Newtonian principles. Building on Port Royal’s notion of general grammar, Beauzée sought to establish “grammatical metaphysics”—a sure foundation for a science of grammar. This aspiration, especially evident in his theory of grammatical time, together with Beauzée's numerous references to physics, astronomy, geography, geometry, and metaphysics, amounted to an elaborate strategy of scientification, taking the natural sciences not merely as inspiration but as a coveted epistemological ideal for general grammar’s scientific remodeling.

Umbrüche paradigmatischer Zeitperspektiven in Künsten und Wissenschaften Dieser Beitrag widmet sich der Verwendung von Perspektiven in »Denkstilen«. 1 Jedoch geht es weniger um räumliche denn vielmehr um temporale Blickwinkel, sprich: Zeitperspektiven. Es erhebt sich die Frage, ob in wissenschaftlichen Denkstilen und künstlerischen Darstellungsstilen je temporale Schemata konstruiert werden, die im Anschluss an Ernst Cassirer und Erwin Panofsky (korrespondierend zur Perspektive) als »symbolische Formen« zu gelten haben. Dabei soll insbesondere beobachtet werden, wie ein mutualer Austausch zwischen wissenschaftlichen Theorien, Methoden und Modellen und künstlerischen Wahrnehmungs-, Darstellungsund Handlungsweisen 2 hinsichtlich der dort wirkenden zeitperspektivischen Paradigmen 3 verfasst ist -und v. a. welche gemeinsamen konzeptionellen Muster Künste und Wissenschaften in Komplizenschaft bringen.

In this book, Anastasia Marinopoulou conducts a systematic comparison of modern epistemology and the epistemological concerns of the Frankfurt School, addressing phenomenology, structuralism and poststructuralism, modernism and postmodernism, systems theory and critical realism. Beginning with an examination of twentieth-century epistemology, particularly the concept of lifeworld (Lebenswelt), Marinopoulou traces the development of the field up to the present day, considering basic conceptions such as dialectics, theory and practice in science, and the potential for a political epistemology based on the arguments of critical theory. Throughout this, she provides a concrete analysis of the work of leading Frankfurt School figures, including Horkheimer, Adorno and Habermas, and raises key questions on methodology in science and research. The book contains previously unpublished commentary from Jürgen Habermas (on systems theory), William Outhwaite (on critical realism) and Stefan Müller-Doohm (on the Frankfurt School), provided to the author in recent interviews. It is organized to be of practical use for undergraduate and postgraduate students, and each chapter includes graphs and schemata that condense the basic argument for the area of modern epistemology and methodology under examination.

Anton Wilhelm Amo, an 18th Century African slave who lived, studied and taught philosophy in Germany, formulated a considerable critique of Descartes’ mind/body distinction. The history of philosophy has neglected to a fault Amo and his role in-and-for the history of philosophy. I strive, here, to remove this omission and to present a clear explication of Amo – the philosopher, the African, the unnoticed.

*This is a translation of Amo's dissertation.

The introduction and translation are meant to be a resource (PLEASE CITE &/OR INVITE ME TO PRESENT MY RESEARCH) until Justin E. H. Smith and Stephen Menn Critical Edition of Amo’s first two works is published in the next year or two.

Ao longo dos anos, fizeram -se muitas tentativas para determinar que fator ou fatores estiveram na origem da emergência da linguagem numa espécie e não noutra. As primeiras tentativas centraram -se na hipótese da caça cooperativa e da fabricação de ferramentas, mas uma vez que muitos animais caçam de forma cooperativa e que a linguagem pode ser praticada ou mesmo ensinada (e, de facto, entre os povos pré -letrados, é geralmente ensinada) simplesmente através da observação e imitação, são poucos os investigadores que hoje em dia apoiam estas propostas [...]. Atualmente, a pressão [seletiva] favorita é a que envolve algum grau de interação social, quer seja a 'inteligência maquiavélica' (tentativas de iludir e dominar outros membros do grupo [...]), a conversa banal e os mexericos como substitutos do grooming manual, ou o desenvolvimento de algum tipo de 'teoria da mente' [...]: a capacidade para perceber que o conteúdo da mente dos outros não tem de ser igual ao nosso." (Bickerton, 2007: 514) "A ideia de que, para compreender a origem e evolução da linguagem, precisamos de uma boa compreensão do que é linguagem, goza de um amplo consenso. Contudo, as opiniões dividem -se sobre qual deverá ser a caracterização exata da linguagem e em que termos deve ela ser definida. No entanto, parece haver algum acordo em torno da ideia segundo a qual, antes da emergência da

Klaus Mollenhauer (1928-1998) is one of the most important German theorists of education of the postwar era. Mollenhauer is renowned for his contributions to critical pedagogy and educational social work (Soziapädagogik) in Germany. His late philosophical work, Forgotten Connections: On Culture and Upbringing (2014) has been translated into multiple languages including English, and deals in a highly original and accessible way with education in its most basic human and cultural constituents.
Entry for Encyclopedia of Educational Philosophy and Theory, forthcoming.

Questo volume trae origine dal seminario La nascita delle scienze psicologiche e pedagogiche in Italia tra Ottocento e Novecento, svoltosi presso il Dipartimento di Scienze Umane dell'Università degli Studi dell'Aquila il 12 maggio 2015, nel corso del quale sono state presentate l'opera collettanea La nascita delle "scienze umane" nell'Italia post-unitaria (Milano 2014), curata da , Verso una scienza dell'educazione. II. Pasquale Rossi. Dalla psicologia collettiva alla demopedia (Roma 2013).

Diese Studie führt in den größeren Zusammenhang einer genuin modernen Kritik der menschlichen Raumwahrnehmung, die es ermöglichte, die geometrische Ordnung einer Seh-und Erkenntnisweise zu rekonstruieren, die sich seit und aufgrund der Entdeckung und Durchsetzung der Planperspektive im frühen 15. Jahrhundert gleichsam vor den Wahrnehmungsapparat geschoben hatte. Ich beschäftige mich nicht mit dem Hauptschauplatz dieser Kritik, die sich in der physiologischen Optik Hermann von Helmholtz' von 1867, in der Avantgardemalerei des späten 19. und frühen 20. Jahrhunderts und schließlich in Erwin Panofskys berühmtem Aufsatz zur Perspektive als symbolischer Form vollzog, sondern interessiere mich für eine Relativierung der euklidischen Raumwahrnehmung, die aus dem Studium der Ontogenese der menschlichen Wahrnehmung hervorging, also die Sinne und das räumliche Denken des Kindes zum Thema hatte. Kunsthistoriker und Philosophen haben sich im Anschluss an Panofsky ausgiebig darüber gewundert, dass die Planperspektive eine solche Macht über die Deutung des visuellen Felds erlangen konnte, dass sie sich als dominantes Repräsentationssystem durchsetzen und die Krümmungen und Inhomogenitäten unserer physiologischen Raumwahrnehmung überblenden konnte. 1 Nicht weniger als über den beispiellosen Erfolg der Zentralperspektive als Dispositiv der Raumwahrnehmung sollte man sich meines Erachtens darüber wundern, dass es im Laufe der Moderne möglich werden konnte, hinter die vermeintliche Unhintergehbarkeit der perspektivischen Konstruktion zu blicken und eine vorgängige (primordiale?) Wahrnehmung sichtbar zu machen. Besonders eindringlich hat Maurice Merleau-Ponty dieses Begehren in seinen Arbeitsnotizen zu Das Sichtbare und das Unsichtbare im Oktober 1959 artikuliert: Ich behaupte, die Perspektive der Renaissance ist ein kulturelles Faktum, die Wahrnehmung selbst ist polymorph, und wenn sie euklidisch wird, so deshalb, weil sie sich auf ein System ausrichten läßt. Von daher die Frage: wie kann man von dieser kulturell überformten Wahrnehmung zur ›rohen‹ oder 157 Abb. 5 Ergebnisse aus den Experimenten zur geometrischen Vorstellung des Kindes. Kinderzeichnungen im Teilstadium I B nach einzelnen Modellen.

This article articulates a fundamental crisis of disciplinary philosophy— its lack of disciplinary self-consciousness and the skeptical problems this generates—and, through that articulation, exemplifies a means of mitigating its force. Disciplinary philosophy organizes itself as a producer of specialized knowledge, with the apparatus of journals, publication requirements, and other professional standards, but it cannot agree on what constitutes knowledge, progress, or value, and evinces ignorance of its history and alternatives. This situation engenders a skepticism that threatens the legitimacy of disciplinary philosophy. The article proposes a response to this skepticism, rooted in the conditions that philosophers evince a specific kind of awareness of their own activity and its professional and cultural location, demonstrate this awareness by articulating it in the practice of philosophy itself, and recognize that precisely such articulation lies at the core of the Socratic idea of philosophy as a form of self- knowledge.