Turkish Journal of Politics (2011)

TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 TJP Ömer Çaha The Transition of Feminism from Kemalist Modernism to Postmodernism in Turkey Sadık Ünay The Rise of the Regulatory State in Europe Recep Türk Feasibility of Presidential System in Turkey İsmail Hamdi Köseoğlu Is a Two-Party System Possible in Turkey? Hilal Şimşek Turkish Immigrants in the UK and the Ankara Agreement Ömer Faruk Ertürk Winner Pays It All: Who is Loser Then? The Current Parliamentarism In Search of Presidentialism in Turkey Bahadır Çelebi The Failure of Assertive Secularization Project in Turkey Salih Yücel Is Islam Part of the Problem or Solution: An Australian Immigrant Experience? İhsan Yılmaz and Begüm Burak Instrumentalist Use of Journalism in Imposing the Kemalist Hegemonic Worldview and Educating the Masses in the Early Republican Period Turkish Journal of Politics Editor Ihsan Yilmaz Fatih University, Turkey Editorial Board Ahmet Kuru, San Diego State University, USA Ahmet Arabaci, Fatih University, Turkey Asim Jusic, American University in Bosnia and Herzegovina Bekir Cinar, Epoka University, Albania Berdal Aral, Fatih University, Turkey Bezen Balamir Coskun, Zirve University, Turkey Birol Akgün, Selcuk University, Turkey Bulent Gokay, Keele University, UK Charles Allen Scarboro, Fatih University,Turkey Ebru Altinoglu Ercan, Fatih University, Turkey Eiji Oyamada, Doshisha University, Japan Eren Tatari, Rollins College, Florida,USA Ertan Efegil, Sakarya University, Turkey Greg Barton, Monash University, Australia Hanne Petersen, Copenhagen University, Denmark Hisae Nakanishi, Doshisha University, Japan Ihsan Dagi, Middle East Technical University,Turkey John L. Esposito, Georgetown University, Washington, USA Klas Grinell, Museum of World Culture, Sweden M. Lutfullah Karaman, Fatih University, Turkey Max Farrar, Leeds Metropolitan University, UK Michalengelo Guida, Fatih University, Turkey Michael Butler, Clark University, USA Mohamed Bakari, Fatih University,Turkey Nejima Susumu, Toyo University, Japan Nuri Yurdusev, Middle East Technical University,Turkey Omer Caha, Fatih University,Turkey Onder Cetin, Fatih University , Turkey Ozguc Orhan, Fatih University,Turkey Ozlem Demirtas Bagdonas, Fatih University, Turkey Paul Weller, University of Derby, UK Philip Bruckmayr, University of Vienna, Austria Ravi Perry, Clark University, USA Saban Calis, Selcuk University, Turkey Sadik Unay, Yıldız Technical University, Turkey Sammas Salur, Fatih University, Turkey Simon Robinson, Leeds Metropolitan University, UK Srinavasan Stimaran, Clark University, USA Steve Wright, Leeds Metropolitan University, UK Tayyar Ari, Uludag University, Turkey Tahir Abbas, Fatih University, Turkey Talip Kucukcan, Marmara University, Turkey Turan Kayaoglu, University of Washington, USA Umit Kurt, Clark University, USA Vahram Ter-Matevosyan, Yerevan State University, Armenia Editorial Assistant Begum Burak Fatih University, Turkey Turkish Journal of Politics (ISSN:2146-1988) is an international peer-reviewed journal of political science produced under the editorial sponsorship of the Social Sciences Institute at Fatih University, Istanbul. TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 Fatih University 2011 Social Sciences Institute TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Contents Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 The Transition of Feminism from Kemalist Modernism to Postmodernism in Turkey Ömer Çaha 05 The Rise of the Regulatory State in Europe Sadık Ünay 21 Feasibility of Presidential System in Turkey Recep Türk 33 Is a Two-Party System Possible in Turkey? İsmail Hamdi Köseoğlu 49 Turkish Immigrants in the UK and the Ankara Agreement Hilal Şimşek 61 Winner Pays It All: Who is Loser Then? The Current Parliamentarism In Search of Presidentialism in Turkey Ömer Faruk Ertürk 75 The Failure of Assertive Secularization Project in Turkey Bahadır Çelebi 89 Is Islam Part of the Problem or Solution: An Australian Immigrant Experience? Salih Yücel 99 Instrumentalist Use of Journalism in Imposing the Kemalist Hegemonic Worldview and Educating the Masses in the Early Republican Period İhsan Yılmaz and Begüm Burak 109 TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 The Transition of Feminism from Kemalist Modernism to Postmodernism in Turkey Ömer Çaha Fatih University, ocaha@fatih.edu.tr Abstract In the 1980s, the feminist movement made its voice heard by going down to streets through alternative protest campaigns and actions. Feminist groups, however, have shifted their attention from streets to the institutional works and academia in the post-1990s and this has paved the way for a change in their perception of women and women’s problems in Turkey. This study attempts to analyze the journey of the feminist movement from Kemalist understanding of modernism to what is called postmodernism. The article argues that being acquainted with alternative discussions in feminism and in particular with postmodern feminism in academia, new generations of Turkish feminist groups have changed their attentions from an essentialist understanding of women to diverse women’s identities. Contrary to the Kemalist understanding of modernization that envisage the emancipation of women through modern education and profession, these women came to accept that each woman has her own way of emancipation and self-realization. This article emphasizes on the role of the institutional and academic works developed by feminist groups in their transition from a monolithic and essentialist understanding of women to diverse women’s identities and alternative ways of self-realization. Keywords Women’s Movement, Feminism, Postmodern Feminism, Modernism, Turkish Feminism, Turkish Women. 5 TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 Feminist Way of Organization The organizational form has always been a subject of discussion among feminist women. Feminists consider the conventional organizational form to be oppressive, authoritarian, hierarchical and thus restrictive of personality and individual participation. Feminists, who define such organizational forms as “masculine” models based on a leader’s domination, embrace a model of non-hierarchical organization in which everybody is able to participate and to have a voice. Şirin Tekeli, a prominent feminist author and activist, states that the hierarchical, centralist and leader-oriented character of the conventional organizational form “justifiably caused us to defend the absence of organization at the beginning” (Tekeli, 2004). In the 1980s, the women driving the feminist movement did not form notable institutions, except the Women’s Circle, which was in the form of a company, and shelters for women towards the end of the 1980s. The feminist movement, which had developed as a radical critique of traditional institutions and values, could not have been expected to lean towards organizations such as political parties, associations, foundations or labor unions. Tekeli (2004) states that they have turned such organizations upside down: We have turned upside down all components of the old-style organizations, being women who are not a mass but a small group, not leaders but equal individuals, not decision-makers and its observers but codecision makers and practitioners, and not militants who deny themselves but women whose personalities are shown respect. We have restricted mostly those who have natural “leadership” tendencies in our own organizations. Everything has changed from the meeting place to the seating order, from the way we begin to speak to the wording in a conscious and “spontaneous” manner. 6 It is observed that feminist women who participated in the women’s institutions that emerged throughout the 1990s were careful to remain aloof from a formal way of organization due to its hierarchical structure. It is seen that either a “home-centered organization” or a “rotational organization” has been put forward by feminists in the pursuit of an organizational form in which women, especially educated, employed and academicians, who had always taken a backseat to men, would not be relegated to a secondary role again. For example, feminist author and activist, Stela Ovadia, points to the importance of rotational organization as an ideal model for women despite the fact that it slows things down and functions very slowly (Ovadia 2006, 28). Şirin Tekeli (2004), on the other hand, suggests that a home-centered organization model enables women to better express themselves and renders possible the participation of all. Tekeli underlines that the stages of formation of the Library of Women’s Works and KADER (The Association for the Support and Training of Women Candidates) have been shaped around the home-centered small organizational structure. Similarly, the demonstrations that occupied the streets in the 1980s, such as March Against Violence, Purple Needle, We Want the Nights, Whistle, Women in Black, and Saturday Mothers were planned in houses and popularized from door to door within this organizational model. The feminist movement had to turn towards formal institutionalizing in the 1990s, although it discussed the issue of “what kind of organizational model?” The pioneers of the movement, who thought that they had overcome the problem of social legitimacy by making their voices heard through street demonstrations, started to form institutions at the national or local levels which would be more permanent, would create real solutions to problems and would not be sin- TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 gle-centered (Çubukçu, 2004b). We observe a trend of widespread institutionalization on the basis of small groups in the 1990s, partly as a natural outcome of the feminist movement’s nature against the singlecenteredness. Nearly every women’s group has institutionalized in a different way by defining their own feminisms or maintaining their own feminist existences. In this respect, it can be argued that the movement, which had separated into perspectives such as “egalitarian,” “radical” and “socialist” in the 1980s, separated in the 1990s at the organizational level rather than at the level of perspectives or approaches. Feminism from the Street Protests to the Institutional Works As mentioned above, Feminists attempted to spend their energy in establishing alternative institutions that directly touch with women’s experienced problems. The Women’s Library and Information Center (Kadın Eserleri Kütüphanesi ve Bilgi Merkezi) can be cited as the most important organizational success of the feminist movement in Turkey. The Women’s Library and Information Center Foundation, which was officially founded by Jale Baysal, Füsun Akatlı, Şirin Tekeli, Füsun Yaraş and Aslı Davaz Mardin in 1989, inaugurated its library in 1990, which has been the most important archive, documentation and information center for those researchers who study women’s issues. The purpose for founding the center was to collect resources and works written by and on women, and to organize various conferences, symposia and panel discussions on the subject (Mardin 2002, 191-196). The founders define the mission of the center as to better know the history of women, to present these data to new generations of re- searchers in an organized way and to store today’s written documents for the use of future generations. One of the founders, Aslı Davaz Mardin, explains the mission of the Women’s Library to be “to handle the documents on women with a feminist consciousness and to pave the way for them to be implemented with a feminist consciousness” (Çımrın 2006, 146-147). The Purple Roof Women’s Shelter Foundation (Mor Çatı Kadın Sığınağı Vakfı) emerged as an organization that defined its main field of activity as directly fighting violence against women. The idea of a shelter for women emerged after a series of activities against violence that followed the campaign named Women’s Solidarity against Beating, initiated by women in 1987. As this idea matured in due course, the Purple Roof Women’s Shelter Foundation was established in Istanbul in 1990 (Arın, 2007). The Purple Roof is a local organization operating in Istanbul; however, it often co-organizes events with women’s organizations located in other cities. The main philosophy of the Purple Roof is based on the idea of “solidarity.” Providing and ensuring solidarity and interaction among women is the primary aim of the organization (Yalçın and Taylı, 2007). The founders of this association think that women’s shelters form one of the pillars of solidarity and therefore they attach significance to women’s shelters among their activities. Since the idea of a shelter for women was first proposed by women in this organization, its name has often been identified as synonymous with the shelter. The Purple Roof generally operates in line with certain generally accepted principles in the women’s movement. These principles could be juxtaposed as follows: not creating and producing hierarchy, working on a voluntary basis, sharing authority and responsibilities alternately, making decisions collectively and working for solidarity among women 7 TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 (Mor Çatı, 2008). Another organization originated by the feminist women’s movement is the Association for the Support and Training of Women Candidates (Kadın Adayları Destekleme ve Eğitme Derneği/KA-DER) established in March 1997. Some considered the association as an outcome of the February 28 period since it was founded at a time when the February 28 decisions were issued by the military and the debate of Islamism/laicism was hot in Turkey. The foundation of KADER was presented by some newspapers as “girls of the Republic who will shoulder modern/secular Turkey” (Bora 2002, 116). However, KA-DER has always underlined that it would remain at an equal distance from all political parties and defines its target as “to increase the number and percentage of women in elective political and public duties, and to work for women’s right to equal representation and thus to strengthen democracy and the entire society.” According to the values of the Association the women to be supported should comply with certain principles. These principles can generally be summarized as being conscious of womanhood and sensitive to women’s problems, attaching importance to women’s solidarity, working to alleviate all kinds of discrimination against women, having innovative projects that will lead the society further, defending human rights, democracy and the constitutional state, attaching importance to the strengthening of the civil society, going against all kinds of fanaticism and racism, and behaving honestly (Ka-der, 2009). The role of international organizations and agreements is significant in the institutionalization of the women’s movement after 1990. The Turkish government’s obligation to fulfill its liabilities arising from international agreements, the chain of women’s summits organized by the Unit- 8 ed Nations in the mid-1990s, and the UN Special Sessions where the five-year practices related to the decisions taken at these summits were assessed have played important roles in the institutionalization of the women’s movement in Turkey (Işık 2002, 59). Such international platforms have also formed a basis for the women’s movement in Turkey to develop projects. Projects of feminist groups have also been influential in the institutionalization of the women’s movement. The process that gained momentum especially after the EU accession process caused the women’s movement to be accused of being “project-seeking feminism.” It is noteworthy to state that this has been valid for civil societal organizations not only in Turkey but also throughout the rest of Europe. Another organization that has become known through the projects it carried out (and it is still continuing its existence through notable projects) is the Flying Broom (Uçan Süpürge), which aims to establish communication among women. The Flying Broom was founded and began its activities in 1996 with the support, firstly of a women’s group based in Netherland, and then of the Embassy of Canada. Eventually, the organization gradually enlarged its scope, thanks to the international projects it undertook, and gained nation-wide recognition (Kardam and Ecevit 2002, 93). The aim of the association is defined as “to enhance gender equality consciousness, provide information and training to empower women, and contribute to the development of efficient policies for solving women’s problems stemming from inequality” (Uçan Süpürge, 2008). The Flying Broom defines itself as a “communication center” that has comprehended the importance and influence of communication (Güner, 2011). Although the Flying Broom is a women’s organization, it develops communication and cooperation, TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 not only with women’s organizations, but also with other civil societal organizations as well (Ergin 2006, 45). The Flying Broom also carries out preparation work on behalf of Turkey for international events. For example, it conducted the preparation work on behalf of women in Turkey for the fifth year of the “The Fourth World Conference” on Women organized by the UN in Beijing in 2000. It organized workshops in Ankara with the participation of representatives of women’s organizations from different cities of Turkey to get prepared for the Beijing+5 United Nations meeting where the past five years would be assessed and prepared a report on the most recent and most notable issues, problems and solution offers concerning women in Turkey (Kardam and Ecevit 2002, 98). Through these kind of activities the feminist women who have been organized around the Flying Broom come together with women from different social and cultural backgrounds as well as ideologies or identities. This, indeed, paves the way for the development of an interconnection among the women from different segments of society and thus a ground of tolerance and mutualrespect. Another typical example of projectseeking feminist organizations is the Women’s Human Rights-New Ways Association (Kadının İnsan Hakları-Yeni Çözümler Derneği/). It was founded in 1993 and has gained advisory status with the Economic & Social Council of the UN. The association operates to ensure women’s effective participation in the social and political lives as independent individuals and equal citizens, and carries out researches on the problems experienced by women in terms of human rights and solution proposals, and strives to influence the national and international decision-making mechanisms for women’s rights. The association produces projects, provides training and develops publications on issues such as violence against women, education, economic rights, legal rights, sexuality, fertility rights and girls’ rights (Kadının İnsan Hakları, 2009). It cooperates not only with the domestic governmental agencies but also with international organizations in order to receive support for the projects it develops at the local and national level. The association was awarded the 1999 Leading Solutions Award by the Association for Women in Development (AWID). Another organization founded by feminist women and developed at the national level after 1990 is the Women’s Legal Rights Commissions (Kadın Hukuku Komisyonları) within the body of the Union of Turkish Bar Associations. Women’s Legal Rights Commissions, whose number is over fifty all around the country, provide those women who have been subjected to violence with legal assistance (KSSGM, 2007). These commissions work to ensure the implementation of the rights given to women through the Law No. 4320, which seeks to protect women against domestic violence. As parts of this organization, the Women’s Rights Implementation Center in Istanbul and the Women’s Counseling Center in the Ankara Courthouse have been carrying out notable activities since 1990 (Işık 2002, 51). These Centers provides female victims who have been subjected to violence and abuse of rights with legal and psychological counseling. Besides this, it carries out documentation works by collecting court decisions and various publications and aims to reach a larger audience by producing periodical and non-periodical publications. The Ankara Women’s Counseling Center offers legal counseling support not only to women living in Ankara but also to those living in different cities of the country and even abroad (Kaplan 2008, 128-133). 9 TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 Besides the above-mentioned organizations active at the national level, numerous women’s organizations operating at the local level have also emerged after 1990 within the feminist movement. Women’s Center (Kadın Merkezi/KA-MER), one of such local organizations, was founded in Diyarbakır in 1997 and has carried out very important activities towards women within feminist framework (Akkoç 2002, 213-215). Another local group of women in Van has been publishing a magazine named Purple Pencil (Mor Kalem), organized around an organization named Van Women’s Association (Van Kadınlar Derneği/VAKAD). Indeed, as interest in women’s problems spread throughout the country after the 1990s, various local feminist groups came to the scene to struggle for the rights of women. Numerous micro-scale women’s groups have manifested their own feminist stances either under the umbrella of an association or around a magazine Feminist Publications in the Post-1990s: From Monolithic Tone to Diverse Voices The feminist women’s movement, along with institutional activities in the forms of associations, foundations and corporations, has also performed notable activities in the field of publication. Magazines that emerged in the 1990s and the 2000s belonged not to certain feminist movements, but to certain groups. In the 1980s, however, magazines were the transmitters of different feminist perspectives and each of egalitarian, socialist or radical feminist group was centered on a magazine (Çubukçu, 2004a). Magazines published by feminist women in the 1990s represented different styles of activity and different regions rather than different feminist perspectives. Magazines published by 10 feminist women in the 1990s and the 2000s such as “Cımbız, Kadın Postası, Dolaşan Mavi Çorap, Eksik Etek, Çağdaş Kadın, Kültür ve Siyasette Feminist Yaklaşımlar, Kadın Bülteni” are the magazines published by small feminist groups coming together either in certain organizations/institutions or in certain cities and regions. Therefore, one can say that such magazines would not be long-lasting. However, the monthly national magazine Feminine Newspaper: Monday (Kadınlara Mahsus Gazete: Pazartesi) has managed to become an important feminist publication that is worth stressing since it has managed to continue its existence for more than ten years within the feminist movement. Pazartesi had been published between March 1995 and April 2006 as a monthly politic-actual news magazine. One of the authors of the journal Filiz Koçali (2002) defines Pazartesi as “a magazine aiming to popularize feminism and to stimulate a wider group of women.” Instead of approaching issues as a homogeneous group, every individual in Pazartesi approached them from their own perspectives. One of the editors of the magazine Handan Koç (2008) states; “We always kept our pages open to different ideas within feminism.” For this reason, different perspectives and different interpretations have found a chance to be published on the pages of the magazine. She indicates that both suburban women and Islamic women could find themselves in the magazine and they attempted to interact with them (Ibid). The magazine, by conducting a long interview with Sibel Eraslan, the head of Istanbul Women’s Commission of religious Welfare Party, attempted to analyze the problems that veiled women experience from their own perspective and through their narrations. Pazartesi tried to preserve its feminine perspective during the Feburary 28 period TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 through which Turkish society became polarized around Islam and secularism, and managed to consider the issue of woman to be an issue outside of this polarization. This process is explicated by one of the authors of the magazine as follows: The February 28 process, which started long before the February 28, split women as well. February 28, when roughly summarized, pointed to political Islam as the ultimate threat and to the Kurdish problem as the second, and asked for the support of civilians in the fight against these groups. Many women, feminists, supported February 28 in one way or another. However, February 28 became a consolidating development for Pazartesi, rather than a splitting one. Today, I see that we evaluated February 28 very accurately, and this has been one of our most important achievements. Although we were aware of the fact that every right-minded feminist should struggle against political Islam, we did not fall into the trap of the official ideology, Kemalism and the repressive mindset. As we were at odds with political Islam ideologically, we argued against the exclusion and seclusion of women due to the headscarf. We criticized the presentation of civil marriage and “modernism” to women as the way of emancipation. While almost all oppositional groups missed their footings in front of February 28, I believe that what we defended is also a contribution to feminism (Koçali 2002, 78-79). The consideration of women’s problems by Pazartesi before and beyond all kinds of ideological engagements and disputes is a significant indicator that shows the transformation of the feminist women’s movement. When one considers the fact that distinctions like Kemalism/anti-Kemalism or laicism/Islamism are in fact the camouflaging guard plates of a power contestation, it is of the utmost importance for the actors who pioneer the women’s movement to keep seeing women’s problems as the primary problem without falling into traps in this fight. It would not be wrong to argue that Pazartesi, in this respect, showed a significant success. Yet another magazine in line for being an important publication of the feminist women’s movement in the 2000s is Amargi, published by Amargi Women’s Academy. Amargi is a theoretical-political feminist magazine that has been published since June 2006. Amargi, which means “freedom” and “return to mother” in the Sumerian language, is a quarterly magazine and exhibits an attitude similar to that of Pazartesi presented above. In the first issue of Amargi, an article written by Hidayet Tuksal, whose name is connected with “Islamic feminism,” was included. As early as its first issue, Amargi addressed the headscarf issue as its cover subject. The articles in this issue generally argued that the headscarf ban is a violation of women’s human rights. Fatma Nevin Vargün (2006) asserts that the headscarf with its modern appearance bridges the articulation of Muslim women in public life. According to Vargün, “those women who are permitted to study and go out and work with the headscarf are able to participate in life. They can take part in life since they enter into the public sphere, although in the veiled manner. This is a positive advancement.” Indeed, it is possible to claim that the feminist women’s movement seems to be in an intensive interconnection with society through both organizational and publication activities. This makes it possible for feminist groups to perceive the real problems of women from their own perspectives without falling into the trap of ideological separations between Islamism and Kemalism. As the movement comes into contact with diverse women, it acquires a grasp of problems of different women and becomes 11 TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 the voice of struggle against these problems. This, eventually, will make feminism more acceptable and understandable by the larger masses in Turkey. Feminism in the Academia: the Contact of Feminists with Diverse Faces of Women’s Problems Feminism today in most places of the world is not only a social movement, but also a distinct scientific discipline and perspective in academic life. It could be stated that the feminist perspective developed in academia stays away from the positivist/ modernist approach based on causation and determinism. In American universities where the postmodern way of thinking is very weak, it is known that of those academicians who are inclined to this way of thinking most are feminist academicians. For postmodernism provides feminist academicians with the opportunity to develop a new epistemological approach, a new knowledge-production and a new theory going beyond positivist knowledge based on empirical findings. In the feminist academic works influenced especially by Lacan’s and Derrida’s philosophy, French feminism and the psychoanalytic approach, observable and measurable facts are outdistanced and women’s life experiences, histories and subconscious become the fields of study and, thus, more complex processes and causes of women’s subordination are explored (SJGS, 2000). Women’s studies entered into the agenda of the academia in Turkey as late as the 1970s. There had been a very limited number of studies on women until these years except the studies conducted by such female academicians as Nermin Abadan Unat 12 (1981), Tezer Taşkıran (1973) and Şirin Tekeli (1977). A set of studies emerged in the 1960s and the 1970s which addressed the issue of woman mostly from a modernist perspective. In this framework, especially those issues like women’s position in the development index and in the country’s development were studied. With the development of the feminist movement, the issue of woman began to become an area of interest in academia. Beginning from the early 1990s, research centers or departments on women emerged in various universities in Turkey. Today, departments or centers on women’s studies are found in more than 30 Turkish universities. It is possible to state that the fields of study and practices at these centers have been shaped in line with the interests and standpoints of people working in or contributing to these centers. For this reason, although it is difficult to argue that all centers operate with a feminist perspective, it could be stated that these centers are sensitive to women’s problems. In general, the activities of the centers could be grouped into the organizing of national or international level panels, conferences and seminars, the production of educational materials, the carrying out researches to explore and spread the knowledge on women’s studies, the preparing of publications, and the organizing of various courses oriented towards women. The target groups of these centers are mostly students, women’s organizations, professional organizations, political parties, labor unions, public institutions, municipalities and people from certain occupational groups (doctors, judicial authorities, constables etc.). It could be stated that women educated in Women’s Studies generally acquire consciousness about women’s problems connected to diverse reasons, womanhood and the feminist movement. Satı Atakul (2002, TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 307), who received her MA degree from the Department of Women’s Studies at Ankara University, says “the department served for me as a gate opening to my womanhood and to other women, and I started to hold on to life and I became a feminist there.” She also tells the story of how, through the discussions, readings and researches in the department, students started to come face-toface with women more, to understand their problems, and to closely observe what being a woman meant in the Turkish society. All these processes paved the way for them to discover themselves We went through a preparation period in order to be able to write our grandmothers’ story. We interviewed them if they were alive, interviewed our mothers and our relatives, we recorded videos, compiled what remained from their belongings such as recipes, expressions they used frequently, trappings and photos etc. One of the requirements of the study was to visit their graves. I had my longest and most intimate conversation with my mother thanks to this. A woman said in her article: “I was late to my mother, I don’t want to be late to other women.” I guess that one of my most important discoveries during this study was that I apprehended this. This operation of discovery had a staggering didactic content for each of us. The stories of our grandmothers touched us in these meetings and pulled at our heartstrings. At the end, I believe everybody was more acquainted with others (Ibid, 316-317). The last sentence of the quote gives important clues about the outcomes of the points of contact that the feminist movement has established with society through research centers. Feminists, through the organizations they created, particularly the research centers in universities, have found the opportunity to make more contact with other women living in their society and, thus, they eventually began to better comprehend the fact that they are the actors of the same problem in different parts of society. Some women who in the 1980s used to say “never with an Islamic woman, even though she is a feminist,” noticed in the 1990s, although they were dispersed to different political positions, different ethnic groups, different beliefs, different occupations, different classes and different statuses. They recognized that all women are above all “women” and this identity actually underlies numerous problems. This, therefore, paved the way for feminist women to eventually diverge from the modernist Kemalist understanding; in other words, to step down from their ivory towers by intermingling with society more. As a matter of fact, this points to the transformation in the elitist character of feminism in the 1980s. It would not be wrong to argue that as feminists noticed the fact that women of other groups were before anything and anybody else “women,” the feminist movement became more sensitive to the problems experienced by women from different parts of society. Academic women’s studies can generally be grouped under two main perspectives: modernist and feminist approaches. The modernist approach, although sensitive to women’s problems, is an approach that explores and questions issues such as women’s educational level, their modernization, equality between women and men, employment opportunities, etc. The feminist approach, however, gets off the ground questioning the power-based academic knowledge. Departing from the idea that knowledge, method and academia are at the same time engaged with power, it questions all kinds of the sources of power (Sancar, 2003). The feminist approach that interrogates the social, political, economic and cultural underpinnings of power naturally 13 TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 develops different attitudes towards scientificity, the methodology of scientific work, and its problematics. When we consider the fact that feminism has been identified with the critique of patriarchal culture, it becomes apparent that the academic feminist approach should above all be critical and skeptical, and should stand aloof from the de facto suppositions of the modernist/ positivist approach. Not only in Turkey but also in the academic worlds of developed countries in general, it is of a special importance for researchers and academicians who conduct women’s studies with a feminist perspective to unveil women’s “life stories.” This approach is a deviation from positivism, as emphasized above. The source of knowledge, according to the positivist approach, which supposes that “reality narrates itself,” is the object itself. Two researchers who use the same scientific tools end up with the same knowledge. The relationship between the researcher and the object that is being researched is no different from that between a physicist and the physical phenomena. Any kind of interaction is beside the point. However, in the methodological disciplines that emerged through the influence of the postmodern approach, there exists a reciprocal interaction between the subject (researcher) and the object, and the knowledge is something that emerges as a result of this interaction. Feminist researchers, departing from this approach, believe that theory and practice is the same thing, or in other words, the theoretical knowledge is nothing but the experienced life histories. A feminist researcher, as she excavates down deep in the life stories she is exploring, interacts and coalesces with them, and experiences the process of “mutual knowing” with the people explored (Hawkesworth, 1989). The knowledge to be revealed by the feminist researcher, therefore, does not pretend to, 14 and cannot, be “objective,” as it is the case in positivism. The reading women’s subconscious or, in other words, women’s subjective experiences constitutes an important field of study in academic feminism. Departing from this point of view, an attempt is being made to bring the “oral history” approach, which is based on narrative, into the social sciences in general, and into women’s studies in particular. Aynur İlyasoğlu .2006: 97), one of the prominent feminist academics who have been making an effort towards this, defines the “oral history” method as “the gathering of history from individuals’ memories through their verbal (oral) expressions.” According to İlyasoğlu, oral history is both one of the oldest (since it is pre-scriptural) and the newest and most important methods (since it was developed in social sciences quite recently). Oral history reveals the hidden voices, lost connections, depressed feelings, thoughts and experiences of the subconscious. Besides, the oral history method enables the collection of more integrated data since it is an interdisciplinary approach. An example where the oral history method was used is the Pilot Project of Women’s Oral History in Turkey, carried out by a group of researchers from various disciplines for the Women’s Library and Information Center. In this project, oral history research was conducted with women aged above 70. Women’s oral narratives were recorded and analyses were carried out by considering their life histories, families, living standards, professions, educational backgrounds, spare time activities, relations with religion, with the world, and with health and legal institutions, friendships, social activities, organization, politics, sexuality, violence, migration, stratification and writing habits (Ibid). In short, the body of women’s studies which emerged in the universities in Turkey TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 does not limit this field only to a research field, but at the same time, works for the emergence of an activist group of academicians through this field. It could be stated that this group is undergoing a process in which it interacts with the research subjects through which it collects data and forms an integral bond with them. The Journey of Feminists from Kemalist Modernism to Postmodernism The Kemalist understanding of modernization is based upon a single truth and strives to make society believe in that way. This understanding of modernization, which was developed under the influence of 19th century positivism, adopts a single way of existence. According to this belief system, reality, accuracy and validity belong to what is modern. The traditional is wrong and unacceptable. Everything that is connected to the traditional is seen from this point of view. This understanding of modernization, naturally, sees woman’s existence as depending on her becoming modern, that is, her becoming a well educated and professional woman. The Kemalist understanding of modernization, departing from this epistemological approach, vertically divides the society roughly into two: “those who found the true path and thus are saved” and “those who are ignorant and backward.” Throughout the history of the Republic, the latter group has been oppressed, insulted and subordinated by the Kemalist elite. This elitist approach, unfortunately, has taken hold of generations of women in universities, professional life and the bureaucracy. Republican women have always been at war against those women whom they accused of being backward since they did not fall within the Kemalist pattern (Çaha, 2010). It would not be wrong to argue that this is the dominant understanding that had been prevalent until the 1980s among educated women, especially women in the academia. For the first time, in the 1980s, feminists developed a discourse that dissociated them from Kemalists. However, despite this break, feminist women did not adequately protect and support those women who were stigmatized by Kemalist women in the 1980s. Yet in the 2000s, as the feminist movement in Turkey became institutionalized and climbed down to various strata of society, feminist women began to move away from the Kemalist understanding of modernization that championed a uniform and single truth, and to become more sensitive to different realities, to different voices and different claims developed by women. Especially with the adoption of the newlyemerged approaches in the social sciences by Turkish feminists, feminist movement in Turkey started to become more and more open to different ways of existence in Turkey. The postmodern scientific approaches that emerged throughout the world (hermeneutics, phenomenology, ontology, existentialism, symbolic interactionism, ethnomethodology, etc.) have been rapidly moving away from the world of positivism that has a single truth (Nicholson, 1990). Naturally, institutions where the diversity of scientific approaches resonates most are universities. Various postmodern approaches have attracted feminists in Turkey, as is the case throughout the entire globe, and rendered them more sensitive to different truths. An approach called “post-feminism,” which criticizes feminism through the set of ideas provided by postmodernism, has emerged within the feminist movement (Modleski, 1990). It would not be wrong to argue that postmodernism has been most influential among Islamists who have been searching for legitimacy against Kemalism, 15 TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 and among feminists who have been searching for legitimacy against the male-centered uniform cultural codes of the Turkish society. The primary issue on which feminists disagree with Kemalist modernists is the “headscarf” issue. While the Kemalist modernist approach sees the headscarf as a symbol of traditionality and reactionary attitudes towards modernization and thus strives to exclude veiled women from the public sphere, most feminist academics consider the headscarf to be a medium that brings women to the public sphere and thus liberates women from traditional familial barricades. Nevertheless, it should be noted that this way of reading embodies a modernist expectation. In other words, feminists tolerate the headscarf with the expectation that it will modernize women. However, Turkish feminist researchers and academicians who take into consideration the postmodern approaches and the internal diversity of global feminism, see different social stances including veiling as windows opening to multiple truths and different ways of existence. Seeing the headscarf as one of the manifestations of the multiplicity of truths is a brave thing for the generations who have undergone the socialization process within the Kemalist framework and its uniform understanding of modernity. Since this signifies running counter to Kemalism and a radical break, it is difficult to say that feminists, like all other secular groups, are willing to show courage for this. It should be noted, however, that a feminism, in Turkey or elsewhere, that mentions the multiplicity of languages, cultures, experiences, socializations, beliefs and styles, should also admit the multiplicity of truths as well. Otherwise, it is condemned to be a uniform modernist attitude and approach. It needs to be underlined that the empa- 16 thetic attitude has significantly differentiated feminist women from Kemalists after 1990. Feminists, as they moved away from Kemalism, became more capable of understanding women from different identities, classes, ethnicities, statuses and beliefs. In this process, it is possible to observe that feminist women have become more sensitive to Kurdish women and religious women, who are excluded from the public sphere due to their headscarves. The magazine Amargi, as early as its first issue, made the “headscarf” issue its cover subject and examined the issue from a perspective very different from that of Kemalist women. Fatma Nevin Vargün (2006) says, “acting with a presupposition that ‘if Sharia comes, all women will be forced to cover their heads and these women will be tasked that day with forcing us to veil’ hinders and even completely eradicates empathy from the very beginning.” In the same issue, Zeynep Direk, in her article entitled “On the Headscarf Ban,” harshly criticizes the European Court of Human Rights for their finding justified the decision of the Turkish government to dismiss Leyla Şahin from university due to her headscarf. Direk (2006), from a critical perspective, argues that the headscarf indeed provides women with a sort of opportunity to be present and participate in the public sphere: Removal of those intellectuals who are capable of deciphering the male dominance in religion from universities due to their headscarves is of course a major loss for feminism. If our existence belongs both to the profane and sacred worlds, it is the task of feminist criticism to strive to critically open the ways of presence in both of these spheres as women experiencing their own adventures. The enlightenment within Islam is once more expressed in women’s de- TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 mands to receive education and to realize themselves. Moreover, this enlightenment paves the way for the sacred to be re-read from women’s perspective. When the feminist consciousness does not draw the boundaries of enlightenment so narrow, as only the struggle between the positive sciences and faith, then the headscarf will cease to be the symbol of backwardness and of a lifestyle running counter to the advancement of reason. The above lines imply that since women are situated both in the sacred and secular worlds, they could present examples of existence and self-realization in both of these spheres. The article also includes an expectation that women who wear the headscarf and are attempting to take part in modern institutions will play a critical role in the transformation of the traditional interpretation of Islam. Therefore, on the one hand, the headscarf is seen as a way of existence, and on the other hand, it is the focus of a pragmatic expectation. Direk writes, in the same article, “the expelling of veiled women from universities is for me a barrier in front of the enlightenment movement, and it is also an anti-feminist act since it ignores the violence committed to the female body” (Ibid). According to an understanding that has recently been widespread among feminists, veiled students and women who would like to be employed with their headscarves are indeed undergoing a kind of modernization process. When considering the dilemma of women and modernization, it could be stated that feminists in Turkey oscillate between the uniform modernist and the multidimensional postmodern ways of existence. It would not be inaccurate to argue that the feminist movement in Turkey has been gradually evolving from the feminism of the 1980s, throughout which it had modernist overtones, to a postmodern direction. When the adventure of the feminist movement over the last two or three decades is examined, various changes are notable. The feminist movement, which was on a quest for legitimacy in the 1980s, had naturally to hit the streets and resonated in the streets as a new voice. By doing this, it also declared its divergence from Kemalism and socialism, out of which it evolved. In the 2000s, however, the feminist movement tending to increasingly institutionalize, carried out important projects through original organizations and, as an outcome of these, gained a certain level of self-confidence. The feminist movement has increasingly stopped being a reactionary and discursive movement through organizations and projects, and has turned into a movement using teamwork in an attempt to cure social problems. The generations that have imported feminism to Turkey naturally brought different approaches within feminism, too. In that respect, in the 1980s, feminists were concentrated around three main approaches and each of them tried to make its voice heard through its own publication. The distinction among feminists during those dates was nothing but differences in terms of “perspectives” and “approaches.” However, in the 2000s, we could say that feminists gathered around common problems, and the distinction among them was no longer a matter of perspective, but a matter of “frequency” and “team.” As feminists intermingled with the society, they began to concern themselves with more real problems. While there were only three feminist publications in the 1980s (Kadınca, Feminizm and Kaktüs), today there exist numerous different associations and publications at the local level. However, as indicated above, this divergence is a matter of different teams. In addition, the movement, which was active only in 17 TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 the metropolitan cities of the country in the 1980s, managed in the 2000s to spread into the periphery. Feminists are now active not only in cities like Ankara, Istanbul and Izmir, but also in cities such as Diyarbakır, Antalya and Van. With the spread of feminism, which emerged in the big cities, to the periphery, the periphery was prepared to be sensitive to women’s problems and rights. One can correlate the fact that there are women members of parliament coming from cities like Ağrı and Van, which are considered to be conservative, to this preparation. The movement has also been undergoing a transformation in the sense that it does not totally consist of educated and professional women anymore. Now, women from different classes, professions and statuses take part in the movement. From this point, we can infer that the feminist movement is gradually ceasing to be an elitist movement and is turning into a truly social movement. In the 1980s, sexual freedom was the main theme within the feminist movement. With sexual freedom, it was meant that women should take control of their own bodies. It can be said that this was the main theme prevalent in the writings of Duygu Asena, a popular feminist columnist during the 1980s. However, in the 2000s, it seems that the single most important women’s problem was not considered to be sexual freedom, but the struggle against a world of other problems. It has been discovered by feminists that women are oppressed for different reasons behind different walls (classes, religious groups, communities etc.). Women of different classes, different ethnicities, and different beliefs are being subordinated for various reasons peculiar to their respective groups (Anthias, 1983). The feminist movement of the 2000s became more aware of this. Therefore, feminists began to stake out a claim on the headscarf issue, although not as much as veiled women 18 did and so was the case on the problems of Kurdish women. A notable example of the feminist enthusiasm towards the women outside of them is the attempts of some feminist women to support the struggles against headscarf ban. It was indeed amazing not only for Kemalists but also for some old-fashioned feminist groups when two feminist women attracted attention to the headscarf ban by wearing headscarves in front of the media projectors. Following the call of conservative Yenişafak newspaper under the heading “Women’s Solidarity against the Ban,” three journalists like Nazlı Ilıcak, Nuray Mert and Leyla İpekçi together with two feminist authors of Amargi magazine, namely Ülkü Özakın and Pınar Selek, posed for the cameras with headscarves on April 2, 2007 (Yenişafak, 2007). The attempt of secular and feminist women to wear headscarf in order to draw attention to the ban on headscarf was the most outstanding support given by secular women to their religious fellows. This was, indeed, a matter of courage besides being a fundamental revolution for feminists in approaching their religious counterparts and their values. In conclusion, we can say that feminist groups who made their voice being heard firstly around the mid-1980s in the street, have come to push their mark over numerous successful organizations and institutional activities that created lasting effects. As indicated above, the issue of women is today no longer an issue that concerns only feminists, but has entered into the agendas of different groups. Even though each group defines its own “women’s problem” and points to a specific dimension of the problem, it is apparent that they react to common chronic problems experienced by women in the same manner. It would not be wrong to argue that the feminist movement TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 has played a significant role in this. On the other hand, the fact that the diverse women’s problems depend on diverse social, economic and cultural contexts, has not only encouraged feminist women but also women from other sections of the Turkish society to be more tolerant towards, and enthusiastic about, the alternative ways of self-realizaReferences Akkoç, N. 2002. “Diyarbakır Ka-Mer’in Kuruluş Hikayesi ve Yürüttüğü Çalışmalar.” In A. Bora and A. Güldal (eds.) 90’larda Türkiye’de Feminizm. İstanbul: İletişim. tions and emancipations for women. This is, indeed, a fundamental deviation from Kemalist understanding of modernization which still marks the pattern of change and values associated with this change throughout the Republican period which started in 1923. İlyasoğlu, A. 2006. “Türkiye’de Kadın Tarihinin Araştırılmasında Yöntem Sorunları ve Sözlü Tarih Yöntemi.” Kadın Çalışmaları Dergisi, 1, 3, SeptemberDecember. Anthias, F. and N. Yuval-Davis. 1983. “Contextualizing Feminism: Gender, Ethnic and Class Divisions.” Feminist Review, 15, Winter. Işık, S. N. 2002. “1990’larda Kadına Yönelik Aile İçi Şiddetle Mücadele Hareketi İçinde Oluşmuş Bazı Gözlem ve Düşünceler.” In A. Bora and A. Güldal (eds.) 90’larda Türkiye’de Feminizm. İstanbul: İletişim. Arın, C. 2007. Interview Ömer Çaha and Tuncer Ekicioğlu. 15 December. KA-DER. 2009. http://www.ka-der.org.tr/. Acces date 13 January. Atakul, S. 2002. “Kadın Çalışmaları Öğrencisi Olmak.” In A. Bora and A. Güldal (eds.) 90’larda Türkiye’de Feminizm. İstanbul: İletişim. Kadının İnsan Hakları. 2009. http:// www.kadinin insanhaklari. org/biz_ kimiz. php. Acces date 23 March. Bora, A. 2002. “Bir Yapabilirlik Olarak Ka-Der.” In A. Bora and A. Güldal (eds.) 90’larda Türkiye’de Feminizm. İstanbul: İletişim. Kaplan, M. 2006. “Gönüllü Bir Kuruluşta Kadın Çalışmaları: Ankara Barosu Kadın Danışma Merkezi.” Kadın Çalışmaları Dergisi, 1, 3, September-December. Çımrın, F. 2006. “Kendisine Gelecek Hazırlayan Bir Alan Olarak 1980 Sonrası Türkiye’de Kadın Çalışmaları.” Kadın Çalışmaları Dergisi, 1, 3, September-December. Kara, N. 2006. “80 ve 90’larda Türkiye’de Feminist Hareket.” Kadın Çalışmaları Dergisi, 1, 3, SeptemberDecember 2006. Çubukçu, S. U. 2004a. “1980 Sonrası Kadın Hareketi:Ataerkilliğe Karşı Meydan Okuma.” In F. Berktay (ed.) Türkiye’de ve Avrupa Birliği’nde Kadının Konumu: Kazanımlar, Sorunlar, Umutlar. Istanbul: KADER Yayınları. Çubukçu, S. U. 2004b. “Demokrasiye Önemli Bir Katkı: Kadın Sivil Toplum Örgütleri.” In F. Berktay (ed.) Türkiye’de ve Avrupa Birliği’nde Kadının Konumu: Kazanımlar, Sorunlar, Umutlar. Istanbul: KA-DER Yayınları. Kardam, F. and Y. Ecevit. 2002. “1990’ların Sonunda Bir Kadın İletişim Kuruluşu: Uçan Süpürge.” In A. Bora and A. Güldal (eds.) 90’larda Türkiye’de Feminizm. İstanbul: İletişim. Koç, H. 2008. “ ‘Kadınlara Mahsus Gazete’ Pazartesi Yoluna Devam Ediyor.” interview Ömer Suvarı. http:// www.zipistanbul. com/ 170pazartesi. htm. Acces date September 23. Koçali, F. 2002. “Kadınlara Mahsus Gazete Pazartesi.” In A. Bora and A. Güldal (eds.) 90’larda Türkiye’de Feminizm. İstanbul: İletişim. Direk, Z. 2006. “Başörtüsü Yasağı Üstüne.” Amargi, 1, June. KSSGM. 2007. http://www.kssgm.gov.tr/ baro. html. Access date October 13. Ergin, Ç. K. 2006. “Kadın Sivil Toplum Kuruluşlarının Kadın Bilincine Katkıları ve Uçan Süpürge Örneği.” Kadın Çalışmaları Dergisi, 1, 3, SeptemberDecember. Mardin, A. D. 2000. “Görünmezlikten Görünürlüğe: Kadın Eserleri Kütüphanesi ve Bilgi Merkezi Vakfı.” In A. Bora and A. Güldal (eds.) 90’larda Türkiye’de Feminizm. İstanbul: İletişim. Güner, H. 2011. Interview Ömer Çaha and Nurhayat Kızılkaya. March 18. Modleski, T. 1991. Feminism without Women: Culture and Criticism in a “Postfeminist” Age. New York: Routledge, 1991. Hawkesworth, M. E. 1989. “Knowers, Knowing, Known: Feminist Theory and Claims of Truth.” Signs, 14, 3. Mor Çatı. 2008. http://www.morcati.org.tr/nasilcalisiyoruz.html. Acces date 9 December. 19 TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 Nicholson, L. J. and N. Chodorow (eds.). 1990. Feminism/ Postmodernism. New York and London: Routledge. Sancar, S. 2003. “Üniversitelerde Feminizm? Bağlam, Gündem ve Olanaklar.” Toplum ve Bilim, 97, Fall. Social Justice Group Staff. 2000. Is Academic Feminism Dead? Theory is Practice. New York: New York University Press. Springer. 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Acces date April 2. 20 TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 The Rise of the Regulatory State in Europe Sadık Ünay Yıldız Technical University, sadikunay@hotmail.com Abstract In the contemporary political economy literature, the political authority is broadly assumed to be responsible for the realization of income redistribution, macroeconomic stabilization and regulation functions in the socio-economic sphere. This study is mainly predicated on the paradigmatic shift in public policy facing the key policy makers in the industrialized world, and national as well as regional (EU-level) implications for European policy makers. To this end, the major elements of the profound shift towards independent regulatory agencies are described followed by a survey of mainstream theories of regulation. The analysis on the European Commission as an “autonomous regulator” is followed by a comparative analysis of two contrasting national regulatory trajectories in the UK and Germany, representing a liberal anti-regulatory tradition and corporatist/formalized regulation patterns respectively. Finally, main challenges facing regulatory federalism and emergence of the EU as a “regulatory state” are explored. Keywords Statutory Regulation, Public Policy, European Integration, Regulatory State. 21 TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 Introduction It has recently become conventional wisdom to state that statutory regulation via independent agencies, also known as “American-style regulation” for historical reasons, is in the process of rapidly becoming the leading instrument of public policy in Europe. The growth of statutory regulation implemented by agencies operating outside the direct line of hierarchical control, or oversight, by the central administration has greatly accelerated since the 1980s in an increasing number of policy areas (Majone, 1994 and 1995). In the contemporary political economy literature, the political authority is broadly assumed to be responsible for the realization of three crucial functions in the socio-economic sphere: income redistribution, macroeconomic stabilization and regulation. In this context, the redistribution function includes all transfers of financial and productive resources from one social group to another, as well as the provision of “merit goods” that the government compels individual citizens to consume, i.e. primary education. The stabilization function is mainly concerned with the preservation of high economic growth rates, price and employment stability which are basically achieved through fiscal, monetary, labourmarket and industrial policies. Finally, the regulatory function involves those public measures pertaining to improvements in the allocative efficiency of the market mechanism by correcting acute market failures (Majone 1996c, 54). Although all modern states are somehow engaged in these functions, the relative importance attached to particular functions has certainly changed from one country to another, and from period to period. Particular national priorities are reflected in divergent national organisational forms depicted 22 through such labels as the “welfare state”, “Keynesian state” and “regulatory state”; emphasizing redistributive, stabilization and regulatory functions respectively. This study is mainly predicated on the paradigmatic shift in public policy facing the key policy makers in the industrialized world, and national as well as regional (EU-level) implications for Europe. To this end, the first objective is to lay down the groundwork by indicating the major elements of the paradigmatic shift towards independent regulatory agencies and depicting the international context in which this shift took place. Afterwards, a brief descriptive survey is presented concerning the concept of regulation and its different modes, followed by an overview of outstanding theories of regulation. As one of the main objectives of the study is to unveil the dynamics of interaction between European and national policy-making mechanisms, the part elaborating on the European Commission as an “autonomous regulator” will immediately be followed by a comparative analysis of two contrasting national regulatory trajectories. The cases of the UK and Germany are specifically selected as representative samples of contradictory regulatory frameworks whereby the former is characterized by a predominantly liberal anti-regulatory tradition, paving the way for waves of extensive regulation; whereas the latter has sought to offload excessive regulatory burden of a formalized tradition through deregulation. The final part of the study elaborates on the main challenges facing regulatory federalism in Europe and briefly speculates on the prospects of Europe emerging as a “regulatory state”. The Rise of Statutory Regulation in Europe Although proposing an ultimate causation about the rise of independent regula- TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 tory institutions is difficult in the European context, the major factors underlying this development can be summarized as external, mostly American, influences: The crisis of interventionist policies and the welfare state, the regulatory framework needed for privatization and deregulation, and the cumulative impact of European Community/ Union regulations. American regulatory philosophy and practice have exerted a considerable impact on European policy-makers in three distinct periods during the formative phase of the European Community, during the expansion of social regulation in the 1970’s and in the early 1980’s marked as the era of deregulation of privatization. Economic regulation in Europe reflected the lack of popular acceptance of the market as an engine of progress. Hence the widespread attitude emerged to be the replacement of the market through public ownership rather than increasing its efficiency by correcting specific forms of market failure. Powerful external pressures were needed to modify such deeply embedded attitudes which were exerted by the US in the aftermath of the Second World War. During post-war reconstruction, the US successfully attempted to ensure the primacy of economics over politics in Europe as in Japan, and thus de-politicise issues of political economy into questions of output and efficiency (Maier 1978, 23-48). In the post-Second World War decades, economic and social policies in Europe were legitimized by the strong belief on the abilities of governments in providing macro-economic stability and ensuring social justice and an egalitarian distribution of wealth. However, the stagflation of 1970’s led to the collapse of the post-war settlement based upon full employment and the welfare state. Monetarism and supply-side economics emerged to be the new orthodoxy along with the rise of new-right political trends both in the US and Europe. The growth of statutory regulation by independent agencies owed much to the awareness of the mismatch between the institutional capacities of the Keynesian welfare state and growing complexity of socio-economic problems (Majone 1996c, 56). When the phase of deregulation and privatization came in the 1980’s, one of the most important lessons for the European regulators was the need for a clear separation of regulatory and operational responsibilities. A second lesson was that neither deregulation nor privatization could mean a return to laissez faire. Since in Europe nationalization has been the functional equivalent of American-style regulation, privatization is thought as re-regulation, meaning the replacement of one mode of regulation, public ownership, by another mode, namely statutory regulation. As a consequence of re-regulation, the role of the state began to change from a producer of public goods and services to that of a regulator trying to ensure that economic actors play their roles properly. The Concept of Regulation and Its Modes Regulation, in the sense of “rules issued for the purpose of controlling the manner in which private and public enterprises conduct their operations” is historically as old as the notion of government. However, the dominant modes of regulation have substantially changed over time. When talking about regulation, in the US and increasingly in Europe, reference is usually made to “sustained and focused control exercised by a public agency, on the basis of a legitimate mandate, over activities that are generally regarded as desirable to society” (Selznick 1985, 363-64). This very definition of reg- 23 TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 ulation implies the necessity for detailed knowledge and intimate involvement with the regulated activity besides passing the relevant laws. In fact; The art of regulating an industry requires knowledge of details of its operations, ability to shift requirements as the conditions of the industry may dictate, the pursuit of energetic measures upon the appearance of an emergency and the power through enforcement to realize conclusions as to policy (Landis 1966, 25-6). Statutory regulation by independent agencies has a long tradition in the US, while it is a quite recent phenomenon in Europe. Ideology has not been the only, but an important, factor in the emergence of this structural difference. American-style regulation which leaves ownership of industries in private hands, expresses a widely held belief that the market mechanism works well under normal circumstances and should be interfered with only in cases of market failure. The European response to market failures, on the other hand, has been shaped by a long tradition of state dirigismé and bureaucratic centralization. Instead of relying on specialized agencies, regulatory functions have been generally assigned to ministerial or semi-corporatist bodies. Regulation through Public Ownership Historically, public ownership has been the dominant mode of economic regulation in Europe, if it could be perceived as regulation at all. Public ownership of especially the natural monopolies, such as the railways, gas and electricity was supposed to give the state the power to impose a planned structure on the economy and to protect public interest against powerful private interests. Regardless of the multiplicity of objectives and ideological justifications, the central as- 24 sumption was always that public ownership would increase government’s regulatory capacity. Subsequent experience, however, demonstrated that public ownership and public control cannot be assumed to indicate the same state of affairs. Nationalization has failed not only with respect to its objective of economic regulation and control, but also with respect to the socio-political objectives of consumer protection and public accountability. Governments generally resisted proposals that public corporations should be treated in the same way as private monopolies. Hence, the European consumer was considerably less well protected vis-á-vis public corporations than the American consumer was against private monopolies that were subject to legal controls imposed by an independent regulatory body. Consequently, public ownership both reduced the ability of governments to regulate the economy and interrupted a policy-learning process which could have produced, half a century ago, the kind of regulatory institutions that Europe has recently been struggling to develop (Majone 1996a, 14). Statutory Regulation by Independent Agencies An alternative mode of regulation which has recently become strikingly popular is predicated upon the principle that public utilities and other industries that are likely to affect public interest, should remain in private hands but be subject to rules developed and enforced by specialized agencies. Such bodies are usually established by statutes as independent authorities, in the sense that they are allowed to operate outside the line of hierarchical control, or oversight by the Departments of Central Government. Independent regulatory agencies commended themselves because they offered the possibility of achieving expertise in the treatment of social problems, rela- TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 tive freedom from the exigencies of party politics, grater ease in recruiting relevant experts and expeditiousness in their dispositions. In the 1970’s, the legal, political and economic criticisms of American-style regulation found expression under the label “regulatory failure”. It was asserted that, just as the market fails in certain circumstances to serve the public interest, so did public regulation; hence, market failure was not a sufficient justification for government intervention. An acute regulatory failure could, in fact, have more seriously damaging consequences than some form of market failure. Nevertheless, a comparative analysis of the American and European versions of regulatory activity may lead to two major conclusions: First, the great paradox of nationalization is that public ownership has considerably weakened, let alone strengthen, the regulatory capacity of the state. By confusing the roles of a manager and a regulator, while also effectively subordinating the latter to the former, public ownership has impeded the development of specialized regulatory institutions. Second, a mode of regulation emphasizing independence and expertise not only produces more effective regulatory policies, but can only push for thorough deregulation when economic and technological changes make public oversight no longer necessary. Despite all the criticisms it has been subjected to, the American model of statutory regulation by independent agencies has proved to be remarkably successful in practice and has been widely imitated internationally (Majone 1996a, 23). by a public authority, self-regulation plays a significant role in highly technical areas such as standardization and whenever product quality is an outstanding consideration. At the national level, technical regulation has been delegated to private organizations for a long time in most of the European countries, and generally with satisfactory results. Many private technical standards are determined through a consensual process which requires negotiations between government officials, industry representatives and other relevant parties, i.e. trade unions. The main advantage of entrusting regulation to “self-regulatory organizations” (SRO’s) is that practitioners of an economic activity are likely to be better informed about the specifics of their field than the public authorities. Hence, their ability to discover and expose malpractice is substantially superior. The major disadvantage of this mode, however, is that the potential willingness of an SRO to publicize and punish wrong-doers is likely to be less than that of a public regulator (Kay and Vickers 1990, 240). A possible solution to this problem is a two-tier system where a public agency acts chiefly as a “regulator of regulators”, with the SRO’s handling the day-to-day rule-making and supervision duties. This demonstrates that even when self-regulation enjoys a comparative advantage, the existence of a powerful public regulator is vital to “guard the guardians” (Majone 1996a, 26). Consequently, self-regulation can be perceived as a useful adjunct to statutory regulation under certain circumstances, but clearly it is not an alternative to it. Self-Regulation Regulation can also be achieved by delegating responsibilities to private or semiprivate bodies, in which case one speaks of self-regulation. With or without approval Theories of Regulation The Normative Theory of Regulation Until the early 1960’s the prevailing 25 TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 theory of regulation regarded market failure as the chief motivating reason for regulatory intervention. Statutory regulation and/or public ownership were supposed to eliminate, or reduce, the inefficiencies engendered by particular types of market failure. It was argued that market failures were observed when the conditions for the validity of the fundamental theory of welfare economics were not satisfied. So much so that markets did not lead to efficient allocation of resources which will make some groups better off; without, at the same time, making some groups worse off. Accordingly, market failures could stem from a multitude of factors, the most important ones being monopoly power held by large corporations, negative externalities, information failures and inadequate provision of public goods (Majone 1996b, 28). The market-failure approach to regulatory intervention has frequently been subject to heavy criticisms claiming that it represents a normative, rather than positive, theoretical approach to regulation. Nevertheless, it provided a basis for identifying situations where the government ought to do something, tempered by the considerations of regulatory failure. Economic Theory of Regulation As opposed to the normative perspective, the economic theory of regulation purports that regulation is not about enhancing efficiency by correcting market failures, but about redistributing income from some groups in society (typically, consumers and diffused interests) to others (producers and politicians). George Stigler (1971), who popularized the positive or “economic theory of regulation” attempted to provide a theoretical basis for the idea that regulatory agencies are generally captured by producers. He contended that political actors are utility maximizers in need of votes and money which can be provided by groups 26 positively affected by regulatory decisions. Because of the difficulties of organizing collective action, concentrated business have an overwhelming advantage over more diffused groups in mobilizing the resources for regulatory politics, so a politico-economic exchange takes place between self-interested politicians and organized business interests. Peltzman (1976) provided a more general politico-economic model. According to him, as long as some consumers can offer votes or money for a small departure from a regulatory regime protecting producer groups, pure producer protection will not be generally the dominant political strategy. Political actors, or regulators acting on their behalf, will allocate economic benefits across producer and consumer groups so that total political utility is maximized. Gary Becker (1983) provided a significant advance for the theory by introducing the concept of “deadweight loss”. Deadweight loss, a measure of the inefficiency of redistribution, refers to the difference between the “winners’ gains” and “losers’ losses” from regulation-induced change in output. Becker’s argument established an interesting link between the economic and normative theories of regulation by contending that the political process will be drawn toward efficiency-enhancing regulation, because neither winners nor losers would rationally oppose changes that eliminate some deadweight loss. To conclude, positive and normative theories of regulation should be viewed in a complementary manner rather than being mutually exclusive approaches. Although the two theories provide critical insights, they are not sufficiently rich to explain the complex dynamics of regulatory policy-making, because they largely ignore the sophisticated institutional environment within which regulators operate and multiple pressures on regulatory agencies. TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 Institutionalist Theory of Regulation Even though an institutional perspective is widely accepted as central to a proper understanding of the regulatory process, it is worth noting that the institutional theory of regulation is not yet as elaborate and systematized as the two previous approaches. The bulk of the recent inspiring work in the positive theory of institutions is investigating the political and bureaucratic networks through which interests are translated into public policy (Moe, 1987). Moreover, a major component of the theory has to do with the political control of bureaucracy and delegation of power to regulators. As to the control of regulators, institutionalist analysts maintain that regulators could be monitored and kept politically accountable only by means of a combination of effective control instruments including the following: the executive power of appointment, strict procedural requirements, professional standards, public participation and judicial review. When such a complex system functions properly, no single authority controls an independent agency, but certainly the agency is under public control (Moe, 1987). Unveiling Supranational Regulation The European Commission as Regulator As opposed to widespread perceptions on the enormous quantitative and qualitative growth of European regulation since the 1960’s as a natural outcome of the economic integration process, the actual sources and leading agents pushing for Community/ Union-level regulation are quite diversified. In the first instance, multinational corporations (MNCs) and export-oriented firms tend to prefer European to national regulations, not only to avoid the costs of meet- ing different and often inconsistent national standards, but also the risk of progressively more stringent regulations in some of the member states. Besides, public-interest organizations like environmentalists and consumer protection groups (particularly the ones from countries with lower levels of protective regulation) frequently voice demands for EU-level regulation. However, by far, the most important source of such demands has been the member states themselves (Majone 1996d, 67). Several reasons could be envisaged underlying the efforts of a country to use the EU legislation for imposing its own regulatory practices on the other member states (Heritier et al. 1994). If successful, such a strategy would minimize the costs of legal and institutional adaptation to new European rules and give a competitive advantage to the national industry which is already adjusted to the particular regulatory regime. Precisely for these reasons, other countries may be expected to oppose the proposal. The final outcome will depend on both the ability of the proposing country to form a winning coalition in the Council of Ministers, and the congruence of the national approach with the general regulatory objectives of the European Commission. In spite of the attempts of member states to limit its discretion, the Commission is frequently able to play the role of a policy entrepreneur. Kingdon (1984, 189) proposes three basic qualities that successful policy entrepreneurs should be equipped with: First, they must be taken seriously as experts or authoritative decision-makers. Second, they must have a good reputation due to their negotiating skills. Finally, and most importantly, they must be persistent. Commission officials have displayed over the course of recent years all the virtues of a successful policy entrepreneur in general, 27 TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 particularly the virtue of persistency to an extraordinary degree. Most important advances in European public policy have been achieved after many years during which the Commission persisted in its attempts to soften up the opposition of member states, while waiting for a window of opportunity to open. The nature of the Treaty of Rome as a “framework treaty” or a “relational contract” let to a situation in which it broadly framed the relationship among the related parties. But the Treaty avoided foreseeing and accurately describing all relevant contingencies that may arise in the course of the contract as well, thereby stimulating the entrepreneurial function of the Commission. Benefiting from the delegation of important powers to its discretion, the Commission served as the vicarious representative of groups not directly part of the legislative process (Wilson 1980, 370), and hence diffused interests found the opportunity of being better represented at the European level compared to the national level. Divergence of National Trajectories: Germany v. s. UK Regulatory Transformation in the UK Britain has a long tradition of democratic institutions and an equally-long tradition of a well organized, highly mobilized, interest group system. Over time, these two sets of institutions developed a very close and often symbiotic relationship which led to the erosion of the distinction between “public” and the “private” realms. Traditionally, power has been shared between government and organized civil society by means of institutionalized channels to incorporate interest groups into the permanent machinery of policy-making (Richardson, 1994: 180). 28 However, the election of Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative Government in 1979 saw a determined challenge, both to the established socio-economic groups and the mainstream public policy style. A definitive shift from a consensual to an impositional style of governance became apparent with the underlying premise that solutions should be imposed on recalcitrant interests which laid down the origins of confrontational politics in the post-1980 era. The new approach was characterized by a desire to introduce new rules of the game in many areas, a determination to change organizational cultures in both private and public sectors, and a wish to change resource allocation mechanisms. “Deregulation” has really meant “re-regulation” in Great Britain, because, during the course of privatization, governments came to realize that unregulated markets produce costs and externalities which were politically, socially and economically unacceptable. There have been so many examples of regulatory creep that it is fair to characterize the post-Thatcherite Britain as a “regulatory state” (Richardson 1994, 192). Regarding the impact of EC-level regulation on Britain, particularly the second half of the 1980’s saw a striking increase in European regulation impinged upon the UK. In fact, the thrust of many of the policies proposed by the European Commission has parallels with the process of regulatory reform which accompanied privatization in the UK. As the privatization program has involved the creation of formal regulatory systems for all the major industries, Britain has become the principal exception to the pattern of “informal regulation” characteristic of most of the other member states. The development of the regulatory responsibility at the EC-level has been generally respectful of the existing regulatory capacities of the member states, but faced serious problems stemming from differential national capa- TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 bilities. The UK’s developed system of sectoral regulatory agencies has been surprisingly effective in meeting their stated objectives, and by and large they have also avoided the manifestations of regulatory capture. However, the principal problem here was that, partly because these agencies came into being as a natural consequence of the privatization program, they had few counterparts in other countries, which created serious coordination problems (McGowan and Seabright 1995, 246). Regulatory Tradition in Germany The key characteristics of the German regulatory practice corresponded to several of the elements of unity and diversity that characterize the German policy process in general (Bulmer 1992, 65). Unity is provided, in the first instance, by the pervasive role of laws as a regulatory instrument. Regulation is largely, but not exclusively, achieved by means of Rechsstaat, indicating the “rule of law”. Formalized regulatory or legal culture of German administration contrasts with the UK’s flexible bargaining culture in the pre-Thatcher era. Furthermore, the concept of Ordnungspolitik (politics of order) expresses a general German principle of organization, independent governance of social sectors under the general supervision of the state (Katzenstein, 1989, 333). This independent mode of governance includes assignment of discretionary powers to semipublic agencies like the Bundesbank and the Federal Cartel Office, co-determination arrangements at the corporate level, workers’ councils and other forms of private governance. All in all, the coherence of regulatory patterns in Germany should be understood as a manifestation of the political system mainly based on the dominant role of laws, semi-public agencies, private-interest gov- ernance, corporatist arrangements and co-operative federalism. That is why German regulatory regimes generally have had a highly integrated and organic structure. The institutions of regulation, like the general policy process, were not susceptible to radical change, unless all the key actors in a policy sector reached a widespread consensus. Germany, like the European Union and unlike the UK, has only addressed the issues of regulatory reform in the 1990’s. However, in sharp contrast to the UK, the federal authorities did not pursue regulatory reform as part and parcel of a neoliberal ideological program which has also been true for the European Union. German familiarity with the importance of laws and regulations as regulatory instruments also found parallelisms in the EU practice. Hence, generally speaking, there existed a fair degree of congruence between the overall approaches to regulation both in the European Union and Germany. Conclusion: The Future of Europe as a Regulatory State At an analytical level, to assess the historical development and future prospects of regulatory federalism in Europe, three major factors have to be taken into consideration (Majone 1996e, 265). The first one is the extraordinary impact of EU laws, policies and judicial decisions on the attitudes of the member states which has been reflected in the choice of policy instruments and styles of policy-making at the national level. A second central issue relates to the interactions between national and European regulation. It is crystal clear that the patterns of these interactions are far from having reached any sort of stable equilibrium. The picture of intergovernmental relations in the EU has been complicated by the lack of mutual trust, the tendency to use European legis- 29 TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 lation for peculiar national advantages, differential national regulatory capacities and the uneven level of implementation of the EU regulations. Third, the limits of independence or autonomy for national and European regulators still need clarification which is central to the future of regulation in Europe. This is not only because agency independence is an effective means for achieving policy credibility, but also a necessary condition for a fundamental reform of the regulatory process towards a coordinated partnership among national and European authorities. Policy learning is actually a two-way process which occurs both at national and European levels. Just as European practices have a considerable impact on domestic policy-making, commentaries and reports from national authorities or evidence of policy failure frequently cause European regulators to reconsider changes in the EU-level approaches. To sum up, it seems very unlikely that any reform attempt in the direction of a more effective, flexible and decentralized regulatory system can succeed without a greater spirit of cooperation and mutual trust than national governments have conveyed so far. In the post-Maastricht era, serious institutional reforms have been initiated by national governments and with the completion of the last wave of expansion into 27 member states, provision of inter-governmental coordination became an even more sophisticated and sensitive issue. Going to the future, failure to constitute the groundwork for greater trust and closer partnership between national and EU-level institutions can only result in either excessive centralization, or progressive erosion of the economic and political capabilities of the European Union as a “supranational regulatory state” 30 TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 References University Press. Becker, G. S. 1983. “A Theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 98, pp. 371-400. Moe, T. 1987. “Interests, institutions and positive theory: The politics of the NCRB’, Studies in American Political Development, 2, pp. 236-99. Bulmer, S. 1992. “Completing the European Community’s internal market: The regulatory implications for the Federal Republic of Germany”, in Dyson, K. (ed.) The Politics of German Regulation, Aldershot: Dartmouth. Peltzman, S. 1976. “Toward a more general theory of regulation”, Journal of Law and Economics, 19, pp. 211-40. Heritiér V. et al. 1994. Die Veränderung von Staatlichkeit in Europa, Opladen: Leske und Budrich. Katzenstein, P. 1989. “Stability and change in the emerging Third Republic”, in Katzenstein, P. (ed.) Industry and Politics in West Germany: Toward the Third Republic, Ithaca (NY): Cornell University Press. Kay, J. A. and Vickers, J. 1990.“Regulatory reform: An appraisal”, in Majone (ed.) Deregulation or Reregulation? Regulatory Reform in Europe and the United States, London: Francis Pinter. Richardson, J. 1994. “Doing less by Doing More: British Government, 1979-1993”, West European Politics, 17, 3, July 1994, London: Frank Cass. Selznick, P. 1985. “Focusing organisational research on regulation”, in Noll (ed.) Regulatory Policy and the Social Sciences, Berkeley: University of California Press. Wilson, J. Q. (ed.) 1980. The Politics of Regulation, New York: Basic Books. Kingdon, J. W. 1984. Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies, Boston: Little Brown. Landis, J. M. 1966, [1938] The Administrative Process, New Haven: Yale University Press. Maier, C. 1978. “The politics of productivity: Foundations of American international economic policy after the second world war”, in Katzenstein, P. (ed.) Between Power and Plenty, Madison (WI): University of Wisconsin Press. Majone, G. 1994. “Paradoxes of privatization and deregulation”, Journal of European Public Policy, 1, 1, pp. 53-69. __ 1995. “Independence and accountability: Nonmajoritarian institutions and democratic government in Europe”, in Weiler, M., Dehousse, J. and Cassese, H. (eds.) Collected Courses of the Academy of European Law, London: Klumer Law International. __ 1996a.“Regulation and Its Modes”, in Majone, G. (ed.) Regulating Europe, London: Routledge. __ 1996b. “Theories of Regulation”, in Majone, G. (ed.) Regulating Europe, London: Routledge. __ 1996c.“The Rise of Statutory Regulation in Europe”, in Majone, G. (ed.) Regulating Europe, London: Routledge. __ 1996d. “The European Commission as Regulator”, in Majone, G. (ed.) Regulating Europe, London: Routledge. __ 1996e. “The Future of Regulation in Europe”, in Majone, G. (ed.) Regulating Europe, London: Routledge. McGowan, F. and Seabright, P. 1995. “Regulation in the European Community and its Impact on the UK’, in Bishop, M., Kay, J. and Mayer, C. (eds.) The Regulatory Challenge, New York, Oxford: Oxford 31 TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 Feasibility of Presidential System in Turkey Recep Türk Fatih University, recepturk70@hotmail.com Abstract This paper discusses strengths and weaknesses of the various governance models and then evaluates the recent presidential system discussions in Turkey. First, it describes the problematic applications of Turkish parliamentarism and concludes that Turkey needs a serious change in its constitutional system design. Then, this paper points out why pure presidentialsm cannot be feasible for Turkish political culture and finally, offers its own suggestions regarding best governance model for Turkey. Keywords Parliamentarism, Presidentialism, Semi-Presidentialism, Problems of Turkish Parliamentary System, Presidentialism in Turkey. 33 TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 Introduction Political systems or regimes have been one of the hot topics among philosophers, scientists, politicians, and bureaucrats since the ancient Greek era. Thought of a better political regime has occupied many precious minds so far and it seems to be continued that way. Turkish politicians were not excluded from that quest so that discussions about governmental system change are not new and it comes to surface repeatedly. Turkish public has witnessed recurring discussions about the merits of presidential systems and its suitability to Turkish political culture. Governmental system discussions have started with the eighth President T. Özal, then continued by his successor President S. Demirel and lately by Prime Minister R.T. Erdogan (Gonenc, 2005). They all argued that the presidential system is more suitable for Turkish society and political system, however no leader has been able to convince the mass majority yet (Kalaycioglu, 2005). Even though the subject comes to surface every so often, (and maybe it is because of the Turkish debating culture) no one really knows what we are arguing. Let us take the last attempt of Erdogan as an example. Other than Prime Minister Mr. Erdogan’s mentioning of presidential systems, nothing is clear about his suggestions, but that does not prevent Turkish media and politicians from out crying, objections, and explaining quickly why that was such a bad idea and how it would unfit to Turkish political system. In spite of lack of a concrete, factual proposal, Turkey has engaged in a political debate over whether a presidential system would end up in an authoritarian regime such as in Latin American countries or could produce a more democratic and effective regime. 34 As a political science professor and a politician, Zafer Uskul rightly points out, even though there are many presidential modals out there, because of the obscurity we can only make an educated guess that the Prime Minister meant the US presidential system, so we can comment on that (Uskul, 2005). This paper is structured in three parts. In the first part, I will shortly explain the problems of Turkish parliamentary system and the growing dissatisfaction with Parliamentarism. The second section will focus on two different versions of Presidentialism, which are being presidential and semi-presidential systems, and their applications in the US and France. The third section evaluates the arguments both in favor of and against the prospective applications of presidential system in Turkey. The conclusion will discuss the wider relevance and implications of this work. Turkish Parliamentary System Parliamentarism has been one of the defining characteristics of Turkish constitutional system since 1876 constitution. Turkey has more than 120 years of constitutional experience and the multi-party system since 1945. Nonetheless, in those 60 years of multi-party system, Turkey has witnessed four military coups (including postmodern coup of 97). The casulties of those military interventions were great. A Prime Minister and two other ministers have lost their lives, many politicians including party leaders spend some times in jail cells, and Turkish democracy was hit heavily. Turkish political history is known for its problematic, uneasy, and unstable nature. Military interventions can be common in those countries that could not succeed a fast, steady and healty socio-economic and TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 political development. Previous researches agreed on the close relationship between social instability, level of socio-economic development and military coups (Finer, 1962; Huntington, 1995; Pinkney, 1990). Turkey was not any exception to that rule and saw many military intervention to its political life. Since the multi-party era, political turmoils, government crises, short-lived cabinets were quite common for Turkish political history. Single and strong Justice and Development Party era between 2002-2010 may seem quite the opposite, however, the question of how long it lasts and what happens afterward is not known. Some of the main problems of Turkish Parliamentary system can be stated as follows: • Turkey’s unique and complex structure of 1982 constitution, • Election process and wide executive powers of Turkish Presidency, • Double-headed executive branch, • Restraining PM’s legislative power with presidential veto power, • Short- living and impotent multi-party coalitions, • Lack of effective, decisive and active governments during 90’s • Intertwined structure of executive and lagislative branch of Parliamentarism, • Slow legislative process, etc. 1982 constitution of Turkey has designed a unique, unprecedented presidential position. By the power invested in presidency, Turkish governing system is not either a parliamentary system or a presidential sys- tem. According to a law professor and a key politician of governing party Burhan Kuzu, 1982 Constitution has brought a completely new and a “sui generis” system regarding the legal power invested in the presidency. Turkish political system cannot be called a parliamentary, presidential or a semi-presidential system. It is a rather mixture of all those system in a complex way (Kuzu, 1996). Even though the 1982 Constitution states clearly that Turkish system is a parliamentary system, articles giving power to the presidency beyond parliamentary systems prove otherwise. Some law professors suggested that the given rights of Turkish presidency are much stronger than that of French semi-presidency, so that they see Turkish system as semi-presidential system (Fendoglu, 2010). Considering comprehensive power given to presidency, some scholars even suggested that 1982 Constitution of Turkey introduced a political system above the semi-presidential and close to the presidential system (Duran, 1984). Supplementary to the vast power invested in president by Turkish constitution, 2007 constitutional amendments, foreseeing direct election of the president by people and adopted in a referendum make it hard to call Turkish system as parliamentarism anymore. Since the direct election of the president is an important tool to establish the strict seperation of executive and legislative structures in presidential system, scholars mentioned above have credible arguments to call Turkish system as a unique or mixed system. In addition to that unique and complex structure of Turkish constitution, another problem of Turkish political structure is the double-headed executive branch. Intervention of presidents to executive branch was another ource of problems that caused a 35 TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 double-headed system in which the president and the Prime Minister fell into disagreements. Last president of Turkey Mr. Sezer’s disapproval of the then Turkey’s Prime Ministers and his attempts to block their actions are still fresh in the memories of Turkish people. A.N. Sezer has exercised his veto power on legal proposals 73 times, far more than any of the previous presidents (K. Evren is coming in second with 26 times). Another argument of those who support presidential system to be adopted in Turkey is the slow legislative process. Slow legislative process is a product of multi-party coalitions in parliamentarist systems. Multi-party governments usually need more time to pass any legislation than a single party government because of the bargaining process. PM Erdogan, along with Presidents Özal and Demirel of Turkey, maintained that Turkey needed presidential or semi-presidential system because Turkey’s growing and pressing problems require an “effective executive” which would take necessary decisions quickly and apply them effectively and the president in such systems fits this requirement (Uran, 2010). The last but not least argument that I will mention here is the intertwining structure of executive and legislative branches. Turkey’s strict political party system prevents National Assembly from performing its main duty of checks and balances of the executive branch. Since Prime Ministers are commissioned according to the majority in the parliament (the leader of the majoritywinning party in most cases), under the regime of strict political party discipline, it is almost impossible for deputies from majority winning party to raise a voice against mighty party leaders. Members of small parties cannot make a difference alone in this picture. Turkish party leaders’ extensive 36 power to determine the electional lists for their parties only adds to their impact. As Prof. Fendoglu points it out with the factual numbers, political party leaders are almost untouchable. Since 1961 constitution, there have been 251 attempts for motion of censure, but only two of them were accepted and the rest were rejected. As for another controlling instrument of parliaments over governments, only 14 out of 644 parliamentary inquires were taken into agenda, and 14 out of 888 parliamentary investigation proposal were accepted. It is obvious with those numbers that Turkish Assembly is far from checking and balancing the governments. It is more like PM’s of Turkey have been using the Parliaments nothing more than a notary office (Fendoglu, 2010). Presidential System and Its Main Characteristics There are two different versions of seperation of powers governing modal, which are presidential system and parliamentray system. Presidentialism is generally defined by three criteria. First, the head of state is popularly elected (directly or indirectly) for a fixed time span; second, the parliament can neither appoint nor remove the government; third, the head of state is also the head of government (Sartori, 1989). In presidential system, power seperation between executive branch and legislative branch is more rigid than parliamentary system. Presidents are elected by public for a fixed term and are independent of parliamentary votes of confidence. They appoint their ministers to build their cabinets (Morlan, 1975). Since those cabinet members are only responsible to the president, and have no political identities, some constitutional law TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 expertises assert that it cannot be called Cabinet (Evcimen, 1992). They are only secretaries of the president (Corvin, 1976). As Giovanni Sartori puts it, the position of Presidents in this system is primus solus as opposed to inter pares in parliamentary system. In brief, some of the main characteristics of presidentialism can be stated as follow: • Popular election for a fixed office time (legislation has little or no control of the selection process and removal) • Presidential control over the selection and removal of the ministers, • Cabinet members are appointted out of the legislative branch, • President has veto power, yet legislative branch makes the budget, • Two seperated institutions, mutual checks and balances • President has no right to propose legislation, (Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997) Because of those characteristics stated above, this system creates powerful executive organ, which also leads to more stable governments. As for the stable governments, the US is a good example. All the US presidents have completed their terms with only one exception. Richard Nixon was the first and the only US President to resign from the office (Goldwater and Casserly, 1998). In addition, because of the monolitic structure of the executive branch, it is believed that this system is more likely to produce fast and effective decision-making process in times of crisis and in case of emergency (Evcimen, 1992). At the time of World financial crisis, the US was able to respond quickly, on the other hand, European countries were no matches to the US and they were heavily critized for their very slow decision-making process. Many political scientists think that this example shows the merit of the presidential system and its ability to respond quickly and effectively in times of crisis. Moreover, presidential system is expected to produce governments that are more democratic. Three main arguments are usually pointed out to prove the claim that presidential system is more democratic. Direct, and popular characteristic of the election system is believed to create democratic government. It is widely accepted that direct elections are a lot better than appointment of executive branch by a parliament. Secondly, from accountability perspective, presidential system is believed to be better than parliamentarism (Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997). It is asserted that since the president has sole power, it is easier for the population to identify who is responsible in case things go wrong. Thirdly, based on identifiability, as Mainwaring and Shugart assert, presidential system is better than parliamentarism. It means voters know who they are voting for, and who is to become executive after winning the elections. On the contrary, in parliamentary system, becoming prime minister and process of forming coalitions may not always be foreseeable. The presidential system has its merits for sure, however it is not immune from pitfalls or any shortcomings. This governing system was criticized for some of its features. The most important critique of presidentialism is its tendency to lead to authoritative regimes (Siaroff, 2003) as it was witnessed in many Latin American countries (Linz, 1985). Tendency of presidential regime to an authoritarian style of government is expected because of concentration of power in 37 TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 hands of a popularly elected president. According to some political scientists, such as Fred Riggs, failures of presidentialism outside the US are due to deep structural problems with the institutional design rather than with ecological problems. Since it is a winner-take-all race in presidentialism, Linz argues, “The zero-sum game in presidential regimes raises the stakes of presidential elections and inevitably exacerbates their attendant tension and polarization.” (Linz, 1994). Observation of political systems of countries all over the world shows that only a few stable democracies have presidential system of government. This concern was repeated publicly in Turkey’s governmental system change discussions and it is not completely baseless. Another accusation of presidential system is the gridlock risk. Because of its nature, in the presidential system, the legislative and execurtive branches are two independant institutions. Technically, majority of legislation and president can be from different parties. In case of partisan differences between executive and lagislature, the whole system can fall into a gridlock and can become unmanageable (Hauss, 1997). Lack of institutionalised mechanism in eliminating the paralysis executive-legislative power in presidential system (esp. with undisciplined party structure) is exacerbating the danger of the consequences of such cases. Dual legitimacy problem is another concern of sceptics of presidential system. Juan J. Linz explains in detail competing claims to the legitimacy. Dual legitimacy of the president and the legislature contributes to tendencies for both institutions to refuse to compromise since each believes it represents the people. Both powers are popularly elected, and the origin and survival of each is independent from the other (Shugart and Carey, 1992). Linz warns that if a majority 38 of legislators favor policies different from those the president pursues, a dramatic conflict between the assembly and the executive can erupt, and there is no principle exists to solve such disputes. As for other critiques of presidential system, we can state those: zero-sum elections, non-inclusive governance, the fixed term of the president, and rigid seperation of powers are accused of being less favorable to democracies. Moreover, presidential system may not be viable for every political culture. It has a tendancy to flourish in the climate of weak, disorganized political parties, which harbor less ideological differences between them. This tendency is more obvious in the US because of its electoral system. First-pastthe-post election system emposes on directly elected and regionally identifiable MPs to take their voters as first priority over his/her party’s inclinations. On the contrary, in parliamentarism, since governing party needs majority in the parliament, it is necessary to keep a well-disciplined party structure, unified actions, and block voting. Failing to do so can result in bringing down the government. Another reason for presidentialism being not viable for every political climate is, as Mainwaring points out, that presidential system is not compatible with fragmented society and multi-party structure (Mainwaring, 1993). In case of president’s party not gaining majority in parliament, which is very likely in fragmented party systems, it is almost inevitable to see a power confrontation between president and parliament and following political gridlock. It would be extremely hard for a president to establish a coalition to pass any legislation in a multiparty structured parliament. Two-party system, on the other hand, can facilitate presidentialism since this system forces parties to gather around central parties. TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 Semi-Presidentialism Duverger used the term ‘semi-presidentialism’ first to describe the French Fifth Republic, in his book “Echec au roi“ (Defeat of the King) in which he called it as a regime semi-presidentiel (Duverger, 1978). Maurice Duverger’s description points out three main characteristics of the system as the election of president by popular vote; the president possessing considerable power; and existence of a premier and cabinet that are subject to legislative confidence, who perform executive functions (Duverger, 1980). Robert Elgie’s description is accepted by the most of the recent studies of semipresidentialism and he explain it as “it is a regime where a popularly elected fixed-term president exist alongside a prime-minister and cabinet who are responsible to the parliament“ (Elgie, 1999; Siaroff, 2003; Shugart, 2005; Amorim Neto and Storm, 2006; Skach, 2007; Schleiter and Morgan-Jones, 2009). The two countries that are most famous for adopting and using the semi-presidentialism are France and Russia along with other fifty-three countries. In semi-presidentialism, both president and prime minister are active in the dayto-day administration of the state in this system and prime minister and cabinet are collectively responsible to the legislative branch. This system is different than Parliamentarism in a sense that it has a popularly elected president who is a lot more than a ceremonial figurehead contrary to the position of presidents in parliamentary systems. It is also different from the presidential system in a sense that the cabinet is responsible to the legislature and the legislature can force the cabinet to resign which is not a case in the presidential system. In addition to those, in semi-presidential system, the president can dissolve parliament, which is not typical either in parliamentarism or presidential system. Thus, a semi-presidential system combines features of both presidential and parliamentary regimes with dual executives as its core feature. Semi-presidential system has both its merits and weaknesses. Advantages of this governing system: • Combines positive characteristics of presidential and parliamentarism, • There are better chances for coalitions than the chance is the presidential system, thus the possibility of more containing, embracing policies, • Lijphardt argues that it “encompasses the advantages of direct democratic elections and stability, which is linked to the the status of the president, to the flexibility of the parliamentray governance and the prime minister.” (Lijphardt, 1998), • The ability to provide checks and balances within the executive. • For the disadvantages of the semi-presidential system, we can state some of them such as: • Cohabitation and intra-executive conflicts, (Elgie, 2005; Samuels and Shugart, 2009; Kasselman, 2009, Linz and Stephan, 1996) • Surpassing the role of the government and the head of the government, (Colton and Skach, 2005) • Its dynamic and evolving structure, its ability to transform itself to the pure presidential system, (Elgie, 2005; Colton and Skach, 2005) are the principal disadvantages. Cohabitation is the main problem of semi-presidential system. Cohabitation is 39 TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 used to explain the situation in which the President and the Prime Minister are coming from different and opposing parties. Even though that constitutes a serious problem, some political scientists see that as an acceptable choice. According to Elgie, semipresidential system with balanced presidential and prime ministerial powers can be also problematic since it may lead to a situation of cohabitation. However, this variation “Should be classified as a relatively wise constitutioal choice. Although balanced semi-presidentialism is almost invariably associated with intra-executive conflict, the experience of some consolidated democracies show that such conflict is surmountable” (Elgie 2005, 13). Intra-executive conflict does not always occur in the circumstances in which the president and the prime minister come from opposing parties. Even if they come from the same party or ideologically close parties, conflict can occur. As Linz and Stephan point out, it is especially likely when the president is not the leader of a parliamentary majority; when the prime minister is not supported by a majority; when the constitutional text is vague; and when there is no established constitutional practice (Linz and Stephan, 1996). Recent studies also show that semipresidential system has different internal variations. Shugart and Carey focus on the relationship between the president and the prime minister, on how the prime minister is appointed. They argue that there are two distinctive types of semi-presidential systems based on this critical relationship between the two executives (Shugart and Carey, 1992). Robert Elgie also distinguishes between various sub-types of semi-presidential systems. Elgie argues that semi-presidential system with ceremonial presidents 40 tend to function well because they are essentially parliamentary systems. On the contrary, higly presidentialized system tends to be problematic. Two kinds of problems are likely to arise from highly presidentialized system. First, the president often asserts power against the legislature, which is not controlled by the president or his party. In the long term, that can lead to the point of an illeberal democracy. Today’s Russia is an example of how a presidential regime can lead to imperial presidency (Colton and Skach, 2005). Second problem likely to arise from higly presidentialized system is that the since the president appoints the PM without necessarily achieving legislative majority, the executive and legislative rivalry can lead systematic political and policymaking paralysis as in cases of both Taiwan and South Korea where the president appoints the prime minister without legislative majority (Liao and Huang, 2006; Choon, 2006). To sum up, semi-presidentialism is widely accepted as a bad choice comparing to parliamentarism and presidentialism. Comparing presidentialism and semi-presidentialism, in addition to gridlock risk between executive and legislative branch in presidentialism, semi-presidential system harbors an extra risk of intra-executive conflict since it has two strong executive organs. At the same time, semi-presidential system still carries the risk of divided minority government risk, which was peculiar to parliamentarism and supposed to be eliminated with presidential systems. To decide among semi-presidential versions, premier-presidentialism in which Prime Minister is responsible only to the legislative with weaker president is accepted to be better than president-parliamentarism in which system PM is also responsible to president and power of the president is strenghtened. According to a recent study, done by Elgie and Schleiter, when a PM is accountable to both the assem- TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 bly and the president, the risk of democratic breakdown is increased by a factor of 5.24 compared to semi-presidential countries where the PM is accountable only to the assembly (Elgie and Schleiter, 2010). Applicability of Presidentialism or SemiPresidentialism In Turkey Discussions regarding the possible political system change are going on for some time and neither side seems to convince the mass population with the merits of their arguments yet. As I mentioned in the first part, Turkish political system, which is parliamentarism for a long time, has been through hard times for many years and some of its problems are structural which means that they cannot be eliminated with small changes. It is obvious that since the foundation of the young republic, Turkey has witnessed three constitutions, four military interventions and sixty governments in eighty years, which proves that something is not going right. In times of coalitions or minority governments, Turkey suffered heavily from weak governments, whose inability to control or lead the parliament to produce serious legislations costed great to Turkish economy and social life. Multi-party coalitions and shortlived governments clouded accountability principle and brought ambiguity on who is responsible for the failure. Short-living coalitions founded on delicate balances prevented them from taking serious measures against social and economic crises, which occured frequently, back then. Coalition and minority governments failed to act quickly, strongly, and decisively. Turkey’s constitutional problems started with the 1961 Constitution. Disappointed and afraid of repeating the history again, lawmakers and military leaders of 1960 Coup decided to weaken the strong position of PM, and they brought some additional powerhouses into the Turkish politics to divide the power among them (see Heper, Sezginer, Özbudun, Kuzu). Strenghtening the presidency as an alternative to PM (dividing the executive power between the president and the PM) and founding the Constitutional court should be seen from this perspective (Özbudun, 1991). In addition to restricting the power of PM and reshuffle the executive branch, 1961 constitution strengthened the judiciary (establishment of the Constitutional Court can be seen in this regard) branch and put forward the legislative to balance the future unreliable governments. Today, according to constitutional law experts, including B. Kuzu, E. Özbudun and many others, Turkey is neither a parliamentarist nor semi-presidential rather a unique mixture of a governance system. Before starting to examine wheter or not presidential system can be a solution to those problems of Turkey, let us first remember and analyse the accuracy of the arguments of those who flatly opposes any system changes in Turkey. Presidential System Creates More Authoritarian Executive First arguments of those who are against any system change in Turkey argue that presidentialism or semi-presidentialism will create authoritarian or even a dictatorial executive (Ertan, 2010; Kalaycioglu, 2007; Tezic, 1991). They say presidential system produces dictatorship in those countries that have not completed their democratization process. Lack of fully independent judiciary system, Turkey’s Ottoman history of single manship, and lack of democratic culture are claimed to contribute to this end. 41 TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 However, some other political scientists maintain that presidential system is more democratic than parliamentarism. Erdogan puts forward three assertions to support their theses. a) Election of presidency directly by populus is more democratic than election of presidency by a parliament, b) Based on accountability principle, presidential system is more democratic than parliamentarism (Erdogan, 1996). In case of coalitions or/and government changes between two elections, it is not easy for the voters to identify who is accountable for that specific period in parliamentarism. c) On the ground of identifiability, presidential system is maintained to be more democratic than parliamentarism. Contrary to presidential system, the voters cannot know who will be the PM and with whom their parties will build coalitions in parliamentarism (Erdogan, 1996). Aside from the risk of excluding the marginal political groups and minorities in presidential system with two main parties in case of ethnic seperations, divided societies and big socio-economic differencies (Ulusahin, 1999), both parliamentarism and presidentialism are compatible with pluralistic democracy. Parliamentarism can function; it only needs some reforms Another argument is that presidentialism is a bad choice for Turkey and they suggest that parliamentarism can be put back on track again to function smoothly with some little changes (Soysal, 2006; Turgut, 1998). They assert that search for an alternative political system means throwing away the valuable experience Turkey has earned with parliamentarism. Some other scholars 42 do not see any structural faults and define the source of the problems as Turkish political culture and practices (Yazici, 2002). Kalaycioglu portrays Turkish political culture as neopatrimonial, and depicts politicians as focusing only to winning the elections and seeing themselves as the true representative of the people, perceiving compromises as bowing down and losing the game, and not liking the idea of balancing the majority (Kalaycioglu, 2007). Even though above mentioned arguments are reflecting realities of Turkish political culture, source of Turkey’s long lasting problems are not only cultural but also structural. When talking about the necessity of system change, Turkey’s President back then S.Demirel said: “I have seen six governments in four years of my time. From this picture, something is not right here. The Executive should be independent from the Legislative, and the Legislative and the Judiciary together have to be able to check and balance the Executive appropriately. This can be succeeded only in presidential system.” I am not pointing out presidential system as an only solution for Turkey; however, we cannot overlook the need for a big system change. If Turkey wants to become a regional or even global power, it has to improve its constitutional design that has structural problems and requires a great revision to correct those weaknesses. Rationalized Parliamentarism Solution to the problems that critics of presidential system scholars offer is rational parliamentarism. There are some procedures in parliamentarism to strenghten the executive branch in terms of stability and TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 efficiency. Political systems adopting those procedures are called rationalized parliamentarism (Hekimoglu, 2008). 1949 German Constitution and 1958 French Constitutions are examples of such regimes. Procedures regarding easing the rules to establish governments and obstructing the rules on application of no-confidence vote, lowering the treshold for a government to win confidence, facilitating law-making process (block voting, accept or drop) are some of instruments to reach a strong, decisive and quick execution in rationalized parliamentarism regimes (Gözler, 2000). Limiting the right for MPs to place no-confidence voting and constructive vote of no confidence, which allows a parliament to withdraw confidence from a government only if there is positive majority for a prospective successor, are other means of this rationalized system. Gözler offers this as a solution for Turkey. Some other scholars, including Erdogan Teziç and Erdal Onat also suggest that rational parliamentarism instead of the completely new and different presidential regime (Onar, 2005; Tezic, 1998) should be the solution. teristics of presidential system and lack of mediating institutions, coups and other anti-democratic measures would be resorted to solve the problems as it was witnessed in many Latin American countries (Ulusahin, 1999). If a concensus on more fundamental changes cannot be reached in Turkey, Turkish political actors should contemplate on this solution more seriously because of Turkey’s need for some urgent measures to strenghten the executive branch in order to have efficient and stabile governments. Personalization of Process, Single Manship Fears Gridlock Scenario and Regime Crisis Moreover, opponents assert that when the President and the majority of the Parliament are from different political background, there is a big chance of falling into gridlock under presidentialism in Turkey. In such cases, because of the rigid charac- Though ending up with anti-democratic interventions may be the case for some countries because of the gridlock crisis with presidentialism, it is hard to say that Turkish parliamentary system has produced the most harmonious political atmosphere. With the parliamentarism, the possibility of gridlock is still exists. Rather than between the president and the prime minister as in presidential system, in Turkish parliamentarism, the same risk prevails or even it happens every so often. Turkey’s de facto semipresidential design (strong president along with strong PM) contains the risk already. As Horowitz points out, parliamentary governments are equally prone to the instability and gridlock crisis as it were witnessed in many occasions in Asia, Afrika and even in Europe. Generally for presidentialism and especially in Turkey case, it is strongly advocated that directly elected, strong presidency will lead to the personalization of the process, and will encourage the president to ignore any opposition (Uran, 2010). In addition to the nature of presidentialism, strong and disciplined party structure of Turkish politics will produce a single man system or a new sultan of Turkey (Uskul, 2005). Those who support that thesis assert that taking the Ottoman history of seven centuries into consideration, presidencial system in Turkey will lead to elected sultans (Soysal, 2007). This argument reflects some old fears 43 TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 so that current president of Turkey, Mr. Gul felt the need to explain and assure the public that potential presidential system in Turkey would be nothing alike the sultans of Ottoman era. We cannot deny that this argument has some merits. Especially taking it together with the fact that political parties are seen as the personal domains of the party leaders (party leaders’ unchallengable positions in the parties), there has to be some measures taken to prevent such outcomes. In Turkish practice, party leaders are solely responsible to determine MPs lists and the cities they are nominated from. Law on political parties and election system need to be changed in order to succeed democratization of political parties and achieve participatory democracy. Conclusion This article examines two different forms of presidential systems and then summarizes the problems of Turkish political system and offers a solution to fix those chronic problems. Because of years of crisis (socioeconomic and political) producing three constitutions and four military interventions, Turkish governing system has reached to the point that it needs a total reformulation of the system. First question, we are supposed to answer at this point is that which governing system is the best for any given country. However, there is no straight answer to this question. In fact, all the empirical researches have yet to confirm definitely whether parliamentarism, presidentialism, or semipresidentialism is the best way of governing system. All three systems have their merits and their weaknesses. However, that is not to say that there is no any generally reached 44 consensus over the regime types. For the reasons that I explained above, most political scientists regard semi-presidentialism as a bad choice. Comparing presidentialism and parliamentarism, on the other hand, is not an easy task. Even though most of the scholars favor parliamentarism over presidentialism, there is a less consensus on chosing between parliamentarism and presidentialism. Because of the nature of those two governing systems, we cannot easily define one of them as a better choice under all circumstances. One specific feature of a system can be labeled both as a merit and a disadvantage from different aspects. Taking “fix term“ feature of presidentialism for example, contrary to instability of parliamentarism, this is the main factor providing stability in presidential governing modal. However, the same feature can be blamed to be anti-democratic because it is believed that once the president know he or she does not need a consensus, he or she will have less tendency to compromises. The same is valid also for “zero sum game“ feature of the system. On one hand it provides stability, on the other hand, it is found less democratic for not presenting all of the voters. This indistinctness can also be seen in pro and con arguments of presidentialism versus parliamentarism. Linz, based primarily on his comperative analysis of the frequent failure of democracy in Latin America (where presidential forms of governments predominate), in contrast with the remarkable success of the democratization process in Spain (under a parliamentary monarchy), argued that presidential systems are prone to political polarization and instability, and are particularly poorly suited for new democracies. The argument that the practice of the presidential system is successful only in the US so far, has some merits; however, TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 other social scientists produced a counterassertation that parliamentarism has failed to produce stability except the UK case. I can extend the list for almost any features of all the systems. A governing system can bring stability, decisive, strong, and efficient executive, however it does not always guarantee the most democratic governance or just the opposite, very democratic and strong from representativeness aspect, but insufficient, ineffective, and short-living coalitions. Those facts take us to the point that no single form of government can maximize the achievements of the alternative systems’ merits and minimize the relevant weaknesses simultaneously so that there is no generally good or bad system but whether a right choice for a specific country. Thus, in order to determine which is the better political system for a given country, its citizens should decide on their priorities. As for the question of which new form of the political system can be best for Turkey, we can restate why parliamentarism (at least in its current form) is not the answer. To summarize briefly the problems of Turkish parliamentarism, first issue is the coalition governments and the stability. Parliamentarism has not yet brought as much harmonius and democratic political atmosphere as Linz predicted in his work. By looking at the history of Turkish politics, Turkish practice of parliamentarism, so far, has produced only fragile, and short-living (42 governments in 60 years) governments (Gözler, 2000). Second problem of Turkish parliamentaris is the double-headed executive. The balance of Turkish system was deteriorated with 1961 Constitution which weakend the executive and put forward the legislative and judicial branches. Following 1980 Coup, trying to reestablish the power of the executive branch with 1982 Constitution, coup leaders made another grave mistake and decided to empower the presidency instead of PM. The result was counterproductive and Turkish executive branch became double-headed since. Thus, what I call „normalization of Turkish political structure“ (combining executive powers in one hand and dismantling of deep bureacuratic executive apparatus) is the key point and it will help to establish a political atmosphere where political parties can build a strong, efficient, long-lasting and functioning governments. Third problem is the intertwining structure of Turkish legislative and executive branches. As I stated above, fusion of power is a common weakness of parliamentarism. Majority winning party and its leader has a full control in Turkish parliament and executive branch. Because of political party structure and politics, MPs of majority party, and accordingly Turkish parliament as a whole is far from performing checks and balance duty against the executive. The last key problem that I will summarize here of Turkish parliamentarism is related to intra-party democracy. Because of the strong party discipline, the leader of the majority winning party controls the parliament and the government simultaneously. Because of party structure, party leaders are the sole ruler of their parties, sole decisionmakers of party policies, and they have great influence and authority over their MPs. To implement intra-party democracy, candidate selection, leader selecting and party policy selection processes in a political party need to be changed. Otherwise, the leader dictatorship cannot be broken down.As a solution for the problems of Turkish parliamentarism, eventhough presidentialism is offering some merits, Turkish voters wanted for a long time, such as stability and effective governments; I have some doubts about 45 TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 its suitability to Turkish political structure. Higly politicized population, strong party traditions, less internalized democratic culture and tradition, not effective seperation of powers, lack of control mechanisms and strong central political structure of Turkey make it hard to adopt pure presidentialism as it is in the US. Obviously, Turkey would become more stabile with adopting presidentialism but having a president finishing his term fully in the office alone is not enough for more developing, democratic and prosperous Turkey. In a case where president and majority of parliament coming from different political parties, a president lacking of power to pass a bill in the parliament would not serve to that purpose. Without mediatory culture, new crisis will arise between the President and the Parliament and they will fall into gridlock, not much different than today’s picture. So far, I have pointed out the fact that neither presidentialism nor parliamentarism can solve Turkey’s continuing problems. We should not forget the fact that the performance of governing systems are greatly affected by the interactions of first degree players (which are the president, the prime minister and the parliament) with the secondary degree sources and institutions (such as electoral law, party systems, constitutional court, federal vs. centralized state structures, regulatory bodies and courts etc.). Thus, it will not be sufficient to change the form of government alone to produce the expected outcome. In my opinion, Turkey should develop its unique governing system, which foresees strong executive power for Turkey to keep its developing and growing performance. Combining all the executive powers in one hand and investing more power in this executive organ (even more than presidentialism foresees) is the key for the Turkey’s prob- 46 lems. Strong executive with full authority on issues such as economy, finance and management of bureaucracy on one hand, but completely independent parliament who is solely responsible for law-making in fundamental policy areas and performing checks and balance duty against this strong executive on the other hand would solve Turkey’s chronic problems. I look at the problem from functionalization aspect of the system, regardless of its name or categorization. Thus, Turkey should not limit its options between choosing two main systems and contemplate on developing its own system with taking best characters of both parliamentary and presidential systems. While doing that, we should keep in mind those intertwinning factors mentioned above. The best government system has more to do with the practice of a system rather than the system itself. Accordingly, the way of application those rules are as much important as (if not more than) the building or adopting a new regime type. Thus, Turkey can develop a governing system that suits best to its political culture, fits to its historical and other special conditions and answers to its chronic problems. Let us not forget the last important fact that Turkey has been enjoying a decisive, strong government for the last eight years and nobody knows how long more this is going to continue. This single party government would be the perfect timing to implement such huge changes if there will be any. Previous experiences of Turkish political history thought us that it is very hard to make fundamental reforms when multiparty coalitions govern the country. 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Başkanlık ve Yarıbaşkanlık Sistemleri, Türkiye Icin Bir Degerlendirme, Istanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 48 TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 Is a Two-Party System Possible in Turkey? İsmail Hamdi Köseoğlu Fatih University, ihkoseoglu@fatih.edu.tr Abstract Turkey experienced many different party systems since the single-party system was officially removed in 1946. While only three parties participated the elections in 1950 the amount of the parties was twenty in 1999 elections. Yet the political spectrum has been dominated by the same ideologies for a long time. The most dramatically change about the party numbers in Turkish politics was happened in 2002. Only two parties were could pass the election threshold. A third party was added to them in the elections in 2007. Turkish parties, which used to be close to each other regarding the votes are now crystallizing as the elites and the rest. This article investigates the future of Turkish party-system by focusing on a currently popular discussion topic in Turkey. Is a two-party system possible in Turkey? Methodology of the article is to compare statistical information of elections and parties in Turkey with the major theories about party numbers and election systems. In order to explain the parties better, the article mainly focuses on the ideological traditions in Turkish politics. Keywords Party-System, Party Number, Turkish Politics, Turkish Parties, Two-Party System 49 TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 Introduction Turkey once again discusses to change governmental system as well the constitution (Today’s Zaman 2011). After the single-party system had ceased in 1945, governmental system of Turkey have been, officially, always parliamentary. Current discussions include switching to the presidential system which will favor a two-party system rather than the long-time practicing multi-party system (Toker 2011). Discussions about the constitutional change also include one of the most controversial issues in the Turkish electoral system - %10 election threshold. This article investigates whether a two-party system possible in Turkey in near future. First part of the article reviews the major theories about the party numbers. Second part analyzes the historical background of political parties and their numbers in Turkey. And the last part investigates the problem of two-party system in Turkey as what is most likely to happen in the near future. Theoretical Framework Number of the effective political parties is one of the most important topics in Political Science and Political Sociology literature. Discussion about the party number mostly started after the French sociologist Mourice Duverger’s hypothesis, which later identified as Duverger’s Law, about electoral systems effect on numbers of the parties. Duverger (1970 [1951]) claims that an election system which produces a single-winner (plurality voting system) is more likely to generate a two-party system. On the other hand, proportional representation system tends to favor multi-party system. However it will not be accurate to simplify Duverger’s ideas to this mechanical concept. He also mentions the voters’ psychology and says people do not want to ‘waste’ their votes by 50 choosing a party with less chance to win. So, they prefer to vote the lesser of two evils. Duverger also claims that number of the political parties also depend on the conflict issues in the society such as right – left and conservative – secular conflicts. And multiparty system rises when these conflicts are less related to each other. Duverger (1970 [1951]), while analyzing the multi-party system, also says that when a party splits one of the parts become more moderate and this fraction always take benefit of the separation. In proportional representation system fractions of the same ideology do not favor to unite because separation does not harm them too much. So this system reduces the tendency of transforming to a two-party system. However he also distinguishes the phenomena of establishing of a new party (a new ideology) and separating from a party (same ideology) as the first one is more difficult. Important amendments in Duwerger’s Law have been proposed continuously. Dougles W. Rae (1971 cited in Riker 1982), an American political scientist, suggest that Duwerger’s Law is not applicable where strong local minority parties available. William H. Riker (1982), an American political scientist, proposed that if a part becomes the second best choice for most of the voters and gain votes in this way one-party domination will be established and two-party system will not be applicable. Riker also mentions that smaller parties have benefits in the proportional representation system as a small or new established party can have political influence with fewer votes. Rein Taagepera and Bernard Grofman (1985), both American political scientists, suggest a combination of electoral system and conflict issue approaches. According to their suggestion if there is only one conflict TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 issue in a society then a two-party system will occur from plurality voting system and two or three-party system will occur from proportional representation system. On the other hand, if the country has more than one conflict issues then two or three-party system will occur from the plurality voting system and proportional representation system favors even more parties. William Roberts Clark and Matt Golder (2006), both American political scientists, also advocate the same idea. According to their analysis social conflicts can only enhance the number of parties when the electoral system allows it. The most important study on the conflict issues, perhaps, made by Seymour Martin Lipset, an American sociologist, and Stein Rokkan, a Norwegian sociologist, in their book Party Systems and Voter Allignments. Lipset and Rokkan ( suggest that number of the political parties in a society base on the number social cleavages in the society. Lipset and Rokkan also point out that not every cleavage turns into a political party. They identify four stages for a social conflict issue to transform into a political party. Those are – (1) legitimation, (2) incorporation, (3) representation and (4) majority power. Their main focuses in this process is merges, alliance and coalition among cleavages while transforming to a party. History of Turkish Party System Political Traditions in Turkey1 Turkey has four major traditions represented as political parties. (1) Kemalist tradition that represented by Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP; Republican People’s Party) which is the oldest political party in Turkey. (2) Nationalistic tradition is currently represented by Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi – (MHP; Nationalist Movement Party). (3) Moderate right wing tradition which traditional representatives lost their power and mostly dominated by the ruling Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AK Parti; Justice and Development Party). (4) Islamist tradition that represented mostly, by the Saadet Partisi (SP; Felicity Party) and also which the roots of AKP lies. Among them CHP claim itself as a moderate left – or in other words social democrat – and others describe themselves as right wing parties. A new tradition can be added to these four historical one. Kurdish political tradition separated from other traditions and became active in politics since early 1990’s. So far three parties which claimed to represent the Kurdish identity had been banned by the Turkish judiciary. An analysis of the Turkish politics without concerning the Kurdish political parties will not be valid. CHP was founded in 1923 only twenty days before the Turkish Republic was officially established. Since then it is one of the main parties in Turkish politics. First major challenges two CHP from same tradition was Cumhuriyetçi Güven Partisi (CGP; Republican Trust Party). CGP was founded by a group of politicians who separated from the CHP. They menaged to receive %6,6 and %5,3 votes in 1969 and 1973 respectively. However their momentum stopped soon after and the party only could receive %1,9 votes in 1977 elections. Second major challenge to CHP rose after the 1980 military coup. CHP was banned and only new established Halkçı Parti (HP; People’s Party) was allowed to join the elections by the junta Data about the parties were collected from the website of Turkish Parliamant www.tbmm.gov.tr and the official gazete www.resmigazete.gov.tr. 1 51 TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 among Kemalist tradition. Second Kemalist party of the era was founded right after the elections. Two parties merged in 1985 and changed the name to Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti (SHP; Social Democratic People’s Party). SHP also merged with re-established CHP in 1995. Another main figure of the Kemalist tradition was Demokratik Sol Parti (DSP; Democratic Leftist Party) which formed in 1985 and led by Bülent Ecevit, former president of the CHP. Although CHP faced with some challenges by new parties which mostly established by former CHP members, it remained as the central figure of Kemalist tradition. Latest party of the Kemalist tradition was established by former DP members in 2002 under the name of Yeni Türkiye Partisi (YTP; New Turkey Party). The party was abolished itself only two years later2 Nationalistic and moderate right wing traditions are effective in the politics as soon as the single-party system was abolished. Demokrat Parti (DP; DemocratParty) which identified as the source of right wing politic in Turkey was found in 1946 and became government in 1950 for ten years. Although DP was challenged by Hürriyet Partisi (HÜR. PAR; Freedom Party) it kept its position as the central and most powerful party in the moderate right wing politics. After the military coup in 1960 two parties were established as successors. Adalet Partisi (AP; Justice Party) became the most powerful one among them after the 1961 elections. Yeni Türkiye Partisi (YTP; New Turkey Party) lost its power over the time and ceased itself in 1973. However another new party called Demokratik Parti (DEM.PAR; Democratic Party) also claimed legacy in the moderate right tradition and hindered the AP to become the sole successor of the DP. Two parties were established and were allowed to participate the elections after the 1980 coup. Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi (MDP; Nationalist Democracy Party) abolished itself in 1985. On the other hand Anavatan Partisi (ANAP; Motherland Party) gained the central position in the moderate right wing. Former leaders of the AP established their new party called as Doğru Yol Partisi (DYP; Right Path Party) in 1983. ANAP and DYP competed during the 1990’s. They also tried to merge under the name of DP in 2007 but failed. DYP changed its name to DP eventually. Today Turkey’s moderate right wing politics does not have a powerful party. Some political analysts believe that the ruling AK Parti now dominates this tradition (Ete 2008). Millet Partisi (MP; The Nation Party), first party which represent the nationalistic tradition was found in 1948 by separating from the DP. The party changed its name to Cumhuriyetçi Millet Partisi (CMP; Republican Nation Party) in 1954 and merged with the minor Çiftçi Partisi (ÇP; Peasants’ Party) in 1958 and named as Republican Peasant Nation Party. The party changed its name to MHP in 1969 as Alparslan Türkeş, a retired coronel, became the leader of the party. MHP was banned like the other parties after the 1980 coup. Nationalist tradition established their new part under the name of Milliyetçi Çalışma Partisi (MÇP; Nationalist Mission Party). However MÇP changed its name to MHP once again in 1993. Second and smaller party of the nationalist camp was found in 1993 by a group of former MHP members. The party was named as Büyük Birlik Partisi (BBP; Great Union Party). Another party which favors the nationalistic ideas was found in 2002 by media tycoon Cem Uzan. Uzan called his party as Genç Parti (GP; Youth Party). Although there is Two parties with the name of Yeni Türkiye Partisi were established in Turkey. First on was a moderate right party in 1960’s. And the second one was a Kemalist party in 2000’s. 2 52 TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 a controversy about how the GP should be classified I believe that Uzan’s discourse was closer to the nationalism more than anything else3. tablished the AK Parti. SP, however, divided again in 2010. Numan Kurtulmuş, former president of the SP, resigned from the party and established a new one which, named as Halkın Sesi Partisi (HAS Parti; Voice of the People Party) with his followers. The Islamist tradition, however, did not come into the political scene until 1970. National Order Party which established by Necmeddin Erbakan, was the first and main political party of this tradition. Party was banned only one year later however it changed its name to National Salvation Party. Erbakan’s political and economic view’s, called as Milli Görüş (The National Vision) was state centered, therefore more close to the nationalistic tradition than the moderate right tradition. MSP, along with other political parties banned after the 1980 coup. Refah Partisi (RP; Welfare Party) was established to represent the tradition in 1983. However it was banned by the Turkish judiciary in 1998. Fazilet Partisi (FP; Virtue Party) was established in the same year and became a new representative of the Islamist tradition. However it was also banned in 2001. A major disintegration was occurred in the same year. Islamist tradition split in two parts. Followers of the Milli Görüş formed a new party calles Saadet Partisi (SP; Felicity Party) and another group who think Milli Görüş is not applicable any more es- First effective party within Kurdish tradition in Turkey was established in 1990 by a group of politician who had been members of SHP. The new party called Halkın Emek Partisi (HEP; People’s Labor Party). All parties of Kurdish tradition were banned by the judiciary. In historical order those parties were Demokrasi Partisi (DEP; Democracy Party), Halkın Demokrasi Partisi (HADEP; People’s Democracy Party), Demokratik Halk Partisi (DEHAP; Democratic People’s Party) and Demokratik Toplum Partisi (DTP; Democratic Society Party). Today the tradition was represented by Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi (BDP; Peace and Democracy Party). Duverger in his book, which was written in 1951, Turkish system is also a twoparty system based on the results of 1950 elections. Main parties were CHP and DP in his definition. However the system changed dramatically in Turkey over the decades. After the military coup in 1960 a new system was came into scene. While nationalist TABLE 1: LIST OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES ACCORDING TO THE TRADITIONS TRADITION PARTIES KEMALIST CHP CGP HP SHP DSP YTP MOD. RIGHT DP AP YTP DEM.PAR HÜR. PAR ANAP MDP NATIONALIST MP CMP CKMP MHP MÇP BBP GP RP FP SP AK Parti HAS Parti HADEP DEHAP DTP BDP ISLAMIST MNP MSP KURDISH HEP DEP DYP Genç Parti as a very exceptional case in Turkish politics has no clear ideology. However Cem Uzan’s election promises were more close to the nationalism. Same phenomena can be observed in Italy with Silvio Berlusconi either. 3 53 TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 parties continue to struggle with the percentages between %3,4 and %8,5, except the 1961 elections, Kemalist and moderate right traditions were split. In addition, Islamist tradition became a new challenger to the right wings parties in general after the early 1970’s. 17 governments were founded between 1961 and 1980. Only four of them were majority single party governments. A new order in party systems was established after the 1980 military coup. One-party domination with 3 major parties continued until the 1991 elections which three parties succeeded to have more than %20 of the votes and two more received more than %10. Seven governments which established between 1991 and 2002 were collations and two governments which formed by a single party were minority governments. One-party domination with three major parties was re-established in Turkey after 2002. Election Systems in Turkey Turkish election system for the parliament is currently a party list proportional representation system with a %10 threshold and D’hondt method. Parties generate their candidate lists for each district. Votes are cast for the party and the list. Numbers of the candidates who win the elections are calculated with D’hondt system for each district. However, only the parties which received more than %10 of the nationwide votes are allowed to have seats in the parliament. In general system favors the big parties over the small or more local parties. A list based plurality voting system was applied between 1950 and 1957. Proportional representation system was adopted in 1960 with a district threshold. Same system was applied until 1980 without the threshold. However in 1965 votes of the parties in an electoral district which were not enough to gain seat in the parliament add to each other and calculated in a different method called national remainder system. This method 54 protects the minor parties more than the proportional representation system. Proportional representations system was used after the 1980. However until 1995 two thresholds, %10 nationwide and electoral district was added to the system. Current election system was adopted before the 1995 elections (TÜİK 2008). It appears that %10 percent threshold, which is the highest in Europe forces the voters to chose a fraction within the same ideology as well as to chose a party from another tradition if the his/her favorite party seems not to able to pass the threshold. In this regards the threshold operates like a second-round election. TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 Election Results in Turkey4 TABLE 2: ELECTIONS RESULTS IN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS BY PARTIES AND THE POLITICAL TRADITIONS* ELECTIONS TRADITIONS 1950 1954 1957 1961 1965 1969 1973 PARTIES % MPs % MPs % MPs % MPs % MPs % MPs % MPs CHP 39,6 69 35,1 31 41,4 178 36,7 173 28,7 134 27,4 143 33,3 185 6,6 15 5,3 13 KEMALIST CGP HP SHP DSP YTP MODERATE RIGHT TOTAL 39,6 69 35,1 31 41,4 178 36,7 173 28,7 134 34 158 38,6 198 DP 55,2 416 58,4 503 48,6 424 AP 34,8 158 52,9 240 46,6 256 29,8 149 YTP 13,7 65 3,7 19 2,2 6 11,9 45 41,7 194 3,4 3 DEM.PAR HÜR.PAR 3,5 4 52,1 428 MDP ANAP DYP NATIONALIST TOTAL 55,2 416 MP 4,6 1 CMP 58,4 5,3 503 5 6,5 48,5 223 56,6 259 48,8 262 6,3 31 3,2 6 2,2 11 3 1 6,2 7 4 CKMP 14 54 MHP MÇP BBP GP TOTAL ISLAMIST 4,6 1 5,3 5 6,5 4 14 54 8,5 42 MSP 3,4 3 11,8 48 RP FP SP AKP TOTAL KURDISH 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11,8 48 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 HEP HADEP DEHAP DTP BTP TOTAL 55 TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 TABLE 2: ELECTIONS RESULTS IN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS BY PARTIES AND THE POLITICAL TRADITIONS* ELECTIONS TRADITIONS 1977 1983 % MPs 41,4 213 1,9 3 % 1987 MPs % 1991 MPs % 1995 MPs 1999 % MPs % 10,7 49 8,7 2002 MPs 2007 2011 % MPs % MPs % MPs 19,4 178 20,9 99 25,9 135 25,9 135 KEMALIST 30,5 117 24,8 99 8,5 20,8 88 10,8 7 14,6 76 22,2 136 1,2 31,6 95 25,3 125 30,9 136 21,7 13 1,1 43,3 216 30,5 117 33,3 99 178 MODERATE RIGHT 20,9 112 5,4 36,9 189 1,8 1 38,7 190 6,4 16 23,3 71 45,1 211 68,4 282 36,3 292 24 115 19,6 132 13,2 86 5,1 19,1 59 27 178 19,2 135 12 85 9,5 55,4 351 51 293 38,8 267 25,2 171 14,6 18 129 0 0,65 5,4 0 0,65 0 8,4 14,3 71 13 53 7,2 3 NATIONALIST 8,2 2,9 19 7 ISLAMIST 6,4 16 8,6 24 0 0 2,9 0 7,2 0 19 8,2 7 16,9 62 21,8 158 1,5 19,5 129 15,4 111 16,6 0 17,3 34,3 363 36,8 363 2,5 8,6 24 0 0 7,2 0 16,9 KURDISH 62 21,8 158 15,4 111 0,7 72 13,7 46,6 341 49,8 327 48,9 341 51,1 327 2,3 53 1,26 18 4,2 4,7 6,2 22 35 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 18 All data in the tables were colelcted from the TÜİK (2008). 4 56 4,2 0 4,7 0 6,2 0 0 22 0 35 TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 * DEP allied with SHP and MÇP allied with RP in 1991 elections. BBP allied with ANAP in 1995 elections. DSP allied with CHP and 2007. Members of the DTP and members of the BTP joined the elections as independent candidates in 2007 and 2011 respectively TABLE 3: PARTIES AND TRADITIONS IN THE PARLIAMENT** NUMBER OF PARTIES IN THE PARTIES PARLIAMENT 3 5 5 4 6 8 8 8 3 7 6 12 20 18 14 16 3 3 4 4 6 8 7 6 3 3 5 5 5 2 3 3 TRADITIONS IN PARLIAMENT ELECTIONS 1950 1954 1957 1961 1965 1969 1973 1977 1983 1987 1991 1995 1999 2002 2007 2011 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 2 2 3 3 4 2 3 3 ** Alliances and independent candidates did not included TABLE 4: ELECTION RESULTS BY THE POLITICAL TRADITIONS*** ELECTIONS KEMALIST MOD. RIGHT NATIONALIST ISLAMIST KURDISH TOTAL 1950 1954 1957 1961 1965 1969 1973 1977 1983 1987 1991 1995 1999 2002 2007 2011 39,6 35,1 41,4 36,7 28,7 34 38,6 43,3 30,5 33,3 31,6 25,3 30,9 21,7 20,9 25,9 55,2 58,4 52,1 48,5 56,6 48,8 41,7 38,7 68,4 55,4 51 38,8 25,2 14,6 5,4 0,65 4,6 5,3 6,5 14 8,5 6,2 3,4 6,4 0 2,9 0 8,2 19,5 16,6 17,3 13,7 0 0 0 0 0 0 11,8 8,6 0 7,2 16,9 21,8 15,4 36,8 48,9 51,1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4,2 4,7 6,2 4,8 6,5 99,4 98,8 100 99,2 93,8 89 95,5 97 98,9 98,8 99,5 98,3 95,7 95,9 97,3 97,9 *** Alliances shown together. Independent candidates shown separately. 57 TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 TABLE 5: GRAPHIC OF THE ELECTION RESULTS BY TO THE POLITICAL TRADITIONS According to Table 3 even the parliament has more parties they are just the fractions of the same ideology rather than representing different ideas. According to the Table 2 only one of the parties within the same tradition survives over the years. If two parties compete with close percentages, like ANAP and DYP in 1990’s, most possible both of them will lose their powers. Graphic in the table 5 shows that Islamist tradition started to dominate the moderate right voters after the 1980’s. And by the Kurdish political movement became visible in the early 1990’s Turkish nationalism also started to rise (TÜİK 208; Resmi Gazete 2011). Conflict Issues in Turkey Since the number of the conflict issues in a society plays a central role to determine the number of the parties, current cleavages should be studied to understand the party system. There are three major political cleavages in Turkey. The oldest one among them is the center – periphery relations. Kemalist tradition represents the center and the other traditions represent the periphery in this conflict (Mardin 1973). Second major cleavage is religion – secularism conflict. Kurdish tradition is still not very involved with this issue however, in my opinion, current representatives of this tradition is more close to the secular camp along with Kemalist tradition. Moderate right, nationalist and Islamist traditions are generally in favor of more religious ideas (Küçükömer 1969 58 [2009]). The most currently visible cleavage among others is the Kurdish – Turkish conflict (Güvenç and Kirmanoğlu 2009). Main polarization in this conflict is between nationalist and Kurdish traditions while others swung from one side to another a few times over the years. During 2000’s Kemalist tradition was more close the nationalistic ideas than the Islamist tradition. So Kemalist tradition is alone with the center-favored ideas however close to the nationalist tradition with pro-Turkish identity policy. Kurdish tradition is alone with the pro-Kurdish identity politics although being a representative of the periphery. Islamist tradition is allied with the moderate right and nationalist traditions with the pro-religion politics. Since the Kurdish tradition does not have a clear position in this conflict Kemalist tradition is again isolated. TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 Conclusion As explained above Turkey has five major traditions in politics. However the moderate right tradition, which used to be the strongest one, seems to be disappeared. Since 2002 political analysts and sociologists discuss how Ak Parti became the representative of both Islamist and moderate right traditions. Beside the transform of Turkish society over the years, my theory to AK Parti’s success is not different than Riker’s theory for the Congress in India. Ak Parti is the second best choice for the moderate rights voters as well as the Kurdish people with a more moderate acceptable approach than Kemalist and nationalist traditions. While the moderate right tradition descend since the 1983 elections voters canalized to a tradition which is more close to them as Duverger (1970 [1951]) suggested. Ak Parti succeeded to combine Islamist tradition with the moderate right approach especially in economy. As Duverger (1970 [1951]) said, more moderate fraction took benefit of the separation. Therefore it can be said that Turkey now has four political traditions with three major political cleavages. To adopt a two-party system in Turkey number of the traditions as well as the powerful parties in each tradition should be reduced to two. Kurdish tradition in Turkish politics was represented by local parties. Since the tradition only emerged after 1990’s and gain more power and attention year by year it will not disappear like the moderate right in near future. For that reason the future of the Kemalist and nationalist traditions will play the key role for the future of Turkish party system. It is possible that one of these traditions lose its effectiveness in the politics either by mechanical reasons such as plurality voting system or sociological reasons such as major changes in the conflict issues or social transformation. Since Kemalist tradition has no common points with Islamist tradition. However nationalist ideology shares the periphery and religion approaches with the Islamist one and nationalism with the Kemalist tradition. Therefore, I believe that if one more tradition will lose power it will be the nationalist tradition. There are possible scenarios if nationalist approach loses its power. (1) Supporters can shift to the Islamist – moderate right tradition as they have more common points. (2) As a reaction to the Ak Parti’s pro European Union politics and growing Kurdish movement they may merge with the Kemalist tradition. In the first scenario Turkey might face with one-party domination for a very long period as the Liberal Democrat Party of Japan dominated the politics for more than 50 years (BBC 2009). As it can be seen from the Table 4 total votes of the moderate right, Islamist and nationalist parties were between %55 and %71,6 over the years with a mean of %63,7. In the second scenario the proposed two-party system will probably have a better functioning as both traditions and main representative parties of those traditions will have close percentages of the votes. Of course it is possible that Kemalist ideology can disappear because of social transformation, however, I think; such a big change will not be happen in near future. As Rea suggested if a country has strong local minority parties even two-party system is not applicable. Thus even Turkey will try to adopt the two-party system by mechanical ways or one of the traditions will merge within the other there are two options: Oneparty domination and two-and-half-partysystem. A True two-party system, such as Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan mentioned, is not possible in the near future for Turkey. 59 TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 References BBC. 2009. “Japan victor hails ‘revolution.” BBC. Retrieved on April 04, 2011. (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/ hi/asia-pacific/8229744.stm). Duverger, Mourice. 1970 [1951]. Siyasi Partiler. Translated by Ergun Özbudun. Clark, William Roberts and Matt Goder. 2006. “Rehabilitating Duwerger’s Theory: Testing the Mechanical and Strategic Modifying Effects of Electoral Systems.” Comparative Political Studies Volume 39 Number 6. Retrieved on May 01, 2011. (http://homepages.nyu. edu/~mrg217/cps_duverger.pdf). Ete, Hatem. 2008. “Merkez-Sağ Siyasetiniflası ve AKP” SETA. Retrieved on 01May, 2011. (http://www.setav.org/public/HaberDetay. aspx?Dil=tr&hid=6565&q=merkez-sag-siyasetin-iflasive-ak-parti). Güvenç, Murat and Hasan Kirmanoğlu. 2009. Türkiye Seçim Atlası 1950-2009.Istanbul. İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları. Küçükömer, İdris. 1969 [2009]. Batılılaşma ve Düzenin Yabancılaşması. Istanbul .Profil Yayıncılık. Lipset, M. Seymour and Stein Rokkan. 1967. Party Systems and Voter Alignments. New York. The Free Press. Mardin, Şerif. 1973. “Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics” Daedalus Vol. 102 No. 1. Rae, Dougles W. 1971. The Political Consequences of the Electoral Laws, rev. ed. New Haven, Conn. Yale University Press. Resmi Gazete. 2011. “Yüksek seçim kurulu kararı 1070” Retrieved on July 05 2011. http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2011/06/20110623-4.pdf Riker, William H. 1982. “The Two-Party system and Duverger’s Law: An Essay on the History of Political Science.” The American Political Science Review Vol. 76, No. 4. Retrieved May 01, 2011. (http://www.jstor.org/ stable/1962968). Taagepera, Rein and Bernards Grofman. 1985. “Rethinking Duverger’s Law: Predicting the Effective Number of Parties in Plurality and PR Systems – Parties Minus Issues Equals One.” European Journal of Political Research 13. Retrieved on May 01, 2011. (http://www. socsci.uci.edu/~bgrofman/42%20Grofman.%20Rethinking%20Duverger%27s%20Law..pdf). TBMM. 2011. “Siyasi Partiler” Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi. Retrieved on April 30, 2011. (http://www. tbmm.gov.tr/kutuphane/siyasi_partiler.html). Today’s Zaman. 2011. “Erdoğan signals referendum on presidential system after polls.” Today’s Zaman. Retrieved on April 29, 2011. (http://www.todayszaman. com/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?load=detay&new sId=239805&link=239805). 60 Toker, Çiğdem. 2011. “Erdoğan: Evet iki partili system istiyorum.” Akşam. Retrieved April 29, 2011. (http://www.aksam.com.tr/erdogan-evet-iki-partilisistemi-istiyorum-886y.html). TÜİK. 2008. Milletvekili Genel Seçimleri: 1923-2007. Retrieved on April 30, 2011. (https://www.tuik.gov.tr/ IcerikGetir.do?istab_id=152). TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 Turkish Immigrants in the UK and the Ankara Agreement Hilal Şimşek Fatih University, hilal_simsek85@hotmail.com Abstract Turkish immigration to the UK, with the exception of the Cypriot Turks, began with Turkey’s EU (formerly EEC) membership application that started with the the Ankara Agreement (1963) and it’s Protocols. However, the UK has not applied the rules of this Agreement completely and the UK had to start honoring the requirements of this Agreement as a result of the cases which were solved not at the UK’s national level but at the supra-national EU level: the ECJ (The European Court of Justice). Even though the UK has enthusiastically supported Turkey’s EU accession, it still brings problems when it comes to recognizing the EU-based rights of the Turkish immigrants. The study aims to show this problematic aspect of the immigration policies of the UK vis-à-vis Turkish nationals. This article argues that there is a clear contradiction between the UK’s support for Turkey’s accession and the UK’s failure to implement the EU law favourable to the Turkish immigrants, stemming from the Ankara Agreement. Keywords EU, Immigration, Turkish Immigrants, Ankara Agreement. 61 TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 Introduction Turkey’s EU journey began in the late 1950s when she applied for full membership. But it was rejected. Later, in 1963 an Agreement signed between the EU and Turkey to establish an association, the Ankara Agreement. I will analyze this Agreement below in detail. Among the EU members UK support for a long time her accession to the EU. Especially, the Blair (1995-2005), Brown (2005-2010) and the current government (2010-...). Here in this study, I will analyze the relation between UK’s strong support to Turkey’s accession and UK’s implementations about the rules of the Ankara Agreement to the Turkish immigrants. First of all, this study analyzes the Turkish migration to the UK and its occurrence through three waves. The first wave was Turks from Cyprus as a Commonwealth country, the second was Turks from Turkey who migrated for economic and political reasons and the third wave was Kurds from Turkey after the 1990’s because of the Kurdish problem in Turkey and Kurds came to the UK as refugees. This study also puts forward how the UK applied her immigration policies towards Turkish immigrants it membership. This study focuses on the Ankara Agreement, an association agreement between Turkey and the EU. In this study the Ankara Agreement and the UK’s implementations to Turkish immigrants in the Agreement’s framework will be analyzed. After the UK became an EU member it also signed this Agreement. The importance of this Agreement is that it provides free movement of Turkish businessmen and service providers with the exclusion of workers. However, the UK has 62 not applied the rules of this Agreement completely and the discrepancies were solved with cases not at the national level but at the supranational level. Here, it will be argued that UK did not easily apply these Agreement’s rules. This will be shown with the Savas, Tum and Dari cases as examples to define these difficulties. It will be argued that there is a contradiction between the support of the UK for Turkey’s EU accession and the UK’s failure to implement the EU law to the Turkish immigrants in the context of Ankara Agreement. Turkish Immigration to the UK It is appropriate to discuss the Turkish migration to Europe before discussing the immigration to the UK. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, a large-scale migration started from Turkey to Western Europe and it occurred predominantly for economic reasons (Unat 1995, 279). The organized labor migration began in October 1961 when Turkey and Germany signed a bilateral agreement for the recruitment of Turkish workers in Germany. The participation of Turkish workers in post-war labor migration to Western Europe had, at least officially, not taken place before 1961 (Kucukcan 2004, 246). This labor migration from Turkey did not just occur to Germany but also to several other West European countries such as France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden and Britain that received Turkish labor migrants. France, Britain and the Netherlands received significant numbers of migrant workers from their former colonies. But Turkey had not a direct colonial relationship with any of these receiving countries (Kucukcan 2004, 246). TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 I will now focus on the migration to the UK. At the beginning of the 20th century, Turks migrated to the UK. The Turkish community in Britain constitutes three main groups namely the Turkish Cypriots, Kurds and mainland Turks (Communities and Local Government 2009, “Due to the nature of data sources available in Britain, it is not possible to verify the estimates precisely because the census data seem to have failed to measure the Turkish population in Britain accurately” (Yilmaz 2004, 58). It is predicted that there is approximately 300.000 Turkish population and most of them are Turkish Cypriots (Kucukcan 2005, 78). The main origin of the Turks in the UK is from Cyprus which was part of the British Empire in 1914. Hence, Cypriots remained as British subjects and this led them to gain the right to enter the UK freely (Voicu 2009, 73). When Cyprus gained its independence from the British Empire, it became a member of the Commonwealth countries. In 1917, right after the Cypriots gained British citizenship; Turkish Cypriots began to migrate to the UK. In the 1920s many people from Cyprus migrated and a huge percentage was Greek Cypriots, the rest of them were Turkish Cypriots. Turkish Cypriots are the most settled and the well-integrated to the society of the various groups, and approximately two-thirds of Young Cypriots now in Britain were born here (Twigg 2005, 26). The first big wave of Turks’ movement began following the WWII, after the 1940s and the immigration continued in the 1960s. Greek Cypriots and the Cypriot Turks migrated until the 1962 Immigration Act which limited the migration to the UK (Issa 2005, 5). There were several reasons for this such as economic reasons, the conflicts between ethnic groups and the political uncertainties. The second big wave of movement was in 1974 when the violence and the pressure increased in Cyprus (Yilmaz 2005, 154). The reason for this violence was her separation into two regions, a Turkish Cypriot region and a Greek Cypriots. After the intervention in 1974 migration increased to the UK (Gulcan 2005, 61). Many people migrated from Turkey to the UK predominantly for economic reasons but unlike Germany, this migration was not as extensive. Germany had a special agreement with Turkey which was to get workers; this was not the same as the situation with the UK. The labor deficit was filled much more with the Pakistani, Bangladeshi and Indian people as UK’s former colonies in the UK. Tozun Issa noted that there is little information about the migration patterns to the UK (Issa 2005, 8). Followed by the legal worker’s families during the late 1970s and 1980s, the mostly of their population arrived during the 1970s (Issa 2005, 8). As the chain migration was in the other ethnic groups, Turks also applied on this way, and so in the 1970s the Turkish population increased. There were two important factors in the reasons for migration. One was the coup in Turkey which was launched in 1980 and the other was the terror which began in the southeast (Yilmaz 2001, 144). The third big wave of Turks’ movement was in 1990s. Kurdish people migrated to the UK from Turkey because of the disputes and the PKK terrorism in addition to the harsh treatment of some state officials to- 63 TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 wards the people coupled with the socio-economic underdevelopment and high rate of unemployment in the Southeastern part of Turkey (Lytra 2009, 60). Thus, the Kurdish people migrated to more secure and more prosperous places within Turkey or abroad as refugees. One of the countries in which many Kurds seeked refugee status was the UK (Atay 2006, 8-9). Ankara Agreement: Turkey and UK In this part, I will focus on the Turkish immigration to the UK within its EU accession process through the Ankara Agreement because this agreement provided the freedom of movement for businessmen, professionals and service providers. The right of free movement of the persons has formed an integral part, both of the EC Treaty itself and the various agreements such as association agreements, pre-accession agreements and accession agreements signed between the European Economic Community (and later the EC and later the EU) and various third countries (Sharpston 2004, 234). For Turkey, this right was recognized with the Ankara Agreement which provides an association between Turkey and the EU. The partnership relations between EU and Turkey began with the Ankara Agreement. The EEC signed the Ankara Agreement on 12 September 1963 to establish an association with the Republic of Turkey. Through the Council Decision 64/732/EEC of 23rd December 1963, this Agreement was concluded, approved and confirmed on behalf of the Community. Article 2 (1) of the Association Agreement states that the aim of the Agreement is to establish trade and economic relations between the Con- 64 tracting Parties in a continuous and balanced strengthen. Furthermore it includes, in relation to the workforce, “the progressive securing of freedom of movement for workers (Article 12) and the abolition of restrictions on freedom of establishment (Article 13) and the freedom to provide services (Article 14) (Ankara Agreement 2011). This was for improving the standard of living of the Turks and facilitating the accession of Turkey to the EEC in the future. This Agreement would be achieved in three stages: a preparatory stage, a transitional stage, and a final stage (Article 2(3), Ankara Agreement) (Bozkurt 2008, 371). The preparatory stage was to last for 5 years and intended to strengthen Turkey’s economy. It introduced tariff quotas on Turkish agricultural products and it offered 175 million ECU loans to develop the Turkish economy under the Financial Protocol (article 2) (Arikan 2006, 61). On 23 November 1970, an Additional Protocol to arrange the transitional period, as the beginning of this period, of Turkey’s association and the second financial protocol was signed in Brussels (EU-Turkey Relations 2011). In addition, it was approved and confirmed on behalf of the Community by Council Regulation (EEC) No 2760/72 on 19 December 1972 (EU-Turkey Relations 2011). Furthermore, Article 41 of the Additional Protocol, which is in Chapter II of Title II, provides that “the Contracting Parties shall refrain from introducing between themselves any new restrictions on the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services” (Additional Protocol 2011). Later, in January 1973, the “Additional Protocol enters into force, comprehensively setting out how the customs union would be established” (EU-Turkey Relations 2010) by TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 the 31st of December 1995 between Turkey and the EC. During this stage “both sides would prepare for a full Customs Union and Turkey would progress towards the adoption of the Common External Tariff (CET)” (Bac 1997, 57). It included “tariff reductions on textiles, the extension of internal Community status to some agricultural and industrial products, financial assistance and the free movement of workers” (Bac 1997, 57). It is clear that the principle of free movement was one of the cornerstones of the association in “view of the tasks which Turkey had to carry out during the transnational stage” (Aral 1997, 2). Article 36 of the Additional Protocol stipulated that free movement of workers between Turkey and the Community during the period between 1 December1976-1 December 1986 was to be achieved on a progressive basis (Additional Protocol 2011). In addition, according to this Article, an Association Council was authorized to decide on rules about this issue. This Council was established by the Ankara Agreement as the decision making body. Article 38 of the Additional Protocol, mentioned that “while freedom of movement for workers between Member States of the Community and Turkey is being brought about by progressive stages, the Council of Association may review all questions arising in connection with the geographical and occupational mobility of workers of Turkish nationality, in particular the extension of work and residence permits, in order to facilitate the employment of those workers in each Member State” (Additional Protocol 2011). As mentioned above, the progressive stage would have begun in 1976 but the Community had suffered an economic crisis and so it was delayed. After 12th September 1980 coup in Tur- key the Turkey-EC relations were frozen and so the Association Council meeting which was to take place on 1 June 1983 was delayed. In this meeting, criterias about freedom of movement for workers since 1986 as the third and final stage would have been modified, but the meeting was not held. As a result, the relations between Turkey and the EU were not developed as had been previously expected in the transitional period. On 17 April 1987 Turkey applied for full membership to the EU. The EU Commission responded to its application in December 1989 and declared that Turkey is not ready to become a member (EU-Turkey Relations 2010). After 1990s the relations regenerated. As mentioned above, “the first three Protocols entered into force between 1973 and 1980, but the Fourth Protocol was blocked in 1981 for political reasons and was not approved until 1990” (Bac 1997, 59). Turkey-EU Association Council finalized the agreement on the Customs Union, which was invoked on the 1st of January 1996. The Decision No 1/95 of the Turkey-EC Association Council of 31 December completed the final phase of the Customs Union (EU Association Council Decision 2010). Turkey was approved to become a candidate by the EU Council in the Helsinki Summit which was held in 1999. “The Commission’s 1999 Regular Report on Turkey’s progress towards accession, the European Commission recognized Turkey’s status as an applicant country” (1999 Regular Report). The European Council decided to hold negotiations for Turkey in 17 December 2004, and on 3 October 2005 Turkey became a candidate of the EU. After the UK became a member of the EEC in 1973, it signed this Agreement with Turkey and it provided advantages for applications to establish a business for the Turks. 65 TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 In 1973, the foreigners could get indefinite residence permit without establishing their own work. However in the 1980s, the “current Immigration Rules (Rules 200 to 204) set out the conditions that have to be met at the present time where a person wishes to establish themselves in business in the United Kingdom. The requirements were restrictive and they require prior entry clearance and the satisfaction of certain financial criteria, including having not less than £200,000 of the applicant’s own money under his control and disposable in the United Kingdom” (Savas (External relations) [2000] EUECJ C-37/98 2000). At this time, the UK became “bound by the Ankara Agreement on 1 January 1973 the conditions were markedly less stringent and were contained in the Statement of Immigration Rules for Control on Entry (HC509) and in the Statement of Immigration Rules after Entry (HC510)” (Savas (External relations) [2000] EUECJ C-37/98 2000). Case Law As mentioned above, the Ankara Agreement also provided the freedom of movement for businesssmen and professionals. The rules concerning the freedom of movement for workers introduced in the Agreement were improved with the ECJ decisions. It could not be solved at the national level and so it was solved at the EU level with the cases of the Turkish immigrants. The ECJ decisions provided legal arrangements for the Ankara Agreement. “The case law of the ECJ provides that the agreements and acts adopted for their implementation are, so far as the Community law is concerned, an act of one of its institutions within the context of Article 177 (1) (b) of the Treaty (now Article 234) and that their provisions form an integral part of the Community law from their coming into force” (Cicekli, 2004). 66 The Turkish immigrants who worked in the Community and their family members’ cases were accepted through the comments of the Turkey-EC Association Council’s articles. However, one case, the Demirel Case ended unsuccessfully. This case involved to comment on the articles about freedom of movement of workers of the Ankara Agreement and Additional Protocol (Korkusuz, 2004). In the next section I will analyze the Demirel Case. Demirel Case This is the first case (Meryem Demirel v Stadt Schwäbisch Gmünd (Case C-12/86) [1987] ECR 3719) (Shah 2009, 6) concerning the free movement of Turkish nationals and the first decision that the ECJ took about this issue. Mrs. Meryem Demirel, a Turkish national, came to Germany to be with her husband on a tourist visa valid for three months and which was not issued for family reunification. However, after three months she declared that she would like to stay in Germany because she was pregnant and that she had no other means of livelihood. Family reunification, “ it appears from the order of the Verwaltungsgericht that the conditions for family reunification in the case of nationals of non-member countries who have themselves entered the Federal Republic of Germany for the purposes of family reunification were tightened in 1982 and 1984 by amendments to a circular issued for the land of Baden-Wuerttemberg by the minister for the interior of that land pursuant to the Auslaendergesetz (aliens law); those amendments raised from three to eight years the period during which the foreign national was required to have resided continuously and lawfully on German territory” (Sengul, 2006). Mrs. Demirel’s husband came to Germany in 1979 and he had to wait till 1987 TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 for family reunification and he had not fulfilled the conditions of family reunification. The German authorities made a decision to deport Mrs.Demirel (Aksoy 2007, 5). Thus, she applied to the Administrative Court of Stuttgart to appeal against the deportation decision. This court transferred this issue to the ECJ for interpretation of the Ankara Agreement. The Administrative Court transferred it according to the EC Treaty Article 177 (Korkusuz, 2004). The issue was suspended pending the preliminary ruling of the Court under Article 177 of the EEC Treaty. Two questions concerning the interpretation of Articles 7 and 12 of the Ankara Agreement were raised: Do Article 12 of the Association Agreement between the EEC and Turkey and Article 36 of the Additional Protocol thereto, in conjunction with Article 7 of the Agreement already lay down a prohibition that under community law is directly applicable in the member states on the introduction of the further restrictions on freedom of movement applicable to Turkish workers lawfully residing in a members state in the form of a modification of an existing administrative practice? Is the expression «Freedom of Movement» in the Association Agreement to be understood as giving Turkish workers residing in a members state the right to bring children under the age of majority and spouses to live with them?(Meryem Demirel v Stadt Schwabisch Gmuend. (Preliminary Rulings ) [1987] EUECJ R-12/86 1987). The ECJ consequently adopted on 30 September 1987 a decision and “gave answer for the first question that Article 12 of the Agreement and Article 36 of the Protocol, read in conjunction with Article 7 of the Agreement, do not constitute rules of Community law which are directly applicable in the internal legal order of the member states. For the second question she answered that the national Court wishes to establish whether the conditions subject to which the spouse and minor children of a Turkish worker established within the Community may join him are covered by the concept of “Freedom of Movement” within in the meaning of the Agreement” (Meryem Demirel v Stadt Schwabisch Gmuend. (Preliminary Rulings ) [1987] EUECJ R-12/86 1987). The Court denied the direct effect of the free movement provisions in the Association Agreement. Because “in the Court’s view the Article 12 of the Ankara Agreement and Article 36 of the Additional Protocol were in the nature of a ‘plan in action’ and were not sufficiently precise and unconditional to be directly effective” (Aral 1997, 4) The term directly effective “meant that they could be relied upon by Turkish migrants workers before national courts in Germany or elsewhere in the Community” (Aral 1997, 4). The Association Agreement is seen as inseparable from the Community law (Aksoy, 2007, 5). Consequently, Mrs. Demirel’s case was unsuccessful. Sevince Case Mr. Sevince is a Turkish national who was married with a Turkish woman in Holland but when he divorced, he wanted to extend his residence permit which had been granted on 22nd February 1979. Although he had his own business and was working, the Netherlands authorities refused his claim about the extension of his residence permit on 11th September 1980. He put in court to appeal by Raad van State against the Netherlands authorities. The case took 6 years and during this time he continued to work. On 13th April 1987 he applied for a residence permit. “In support of his application, he relied on Article 2(1)(b ) of Decision No 2/76, 67 TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 according to which a Turkish worker who has been in legal employment for five years in a Member State of the Community is to enjoy free access in that Member State to any paid employment of his choice, and on the third indent of Article 6(1 ) of Decision No 1/80, according to which a Turkish worker duly registered as belonging to the labour force of a Member State is to enjoy free access in that Member State to any paid employment of his choice after four years’ legal employment” (S. Z. Sevince v Staatssecretaris van Justitie. [1990] EUECJ C-192/89 1990). This was rejected by the authorities. Finally, they referred to the Court for a preliminary ruling under Article 177 of the EEC Treaty three questions. These questions were on the interpretation of certain provisions of Decisions of the Council of Association established by the Agreement. These were Decisions No 2/76 of 20 December 1976 and 1/80 of 19 September 1980 (S. Z. Sevince v Staatssecretaris van Justitie. [1990] EUECJ C-192/89 1990). The Court held that, not only Ankara Agreement was an integral part of the Community law that had direct effect, but also the Association Council decisions were its integral part and had direct effect. “However, this decision does not touch upon the rights that are indispensable for freedom of movement (entry residence, right to remain, etc.) which means that it is not relevant to the discussion in question” (Aral 1997, 7). Kuş Case Mr. Kuş, a Turkish national man was married to a German woman and worked for two and half years who later got divorce, the German authorities made a decision to deport him from Germany. He applied to a court to appeal the decision and the case was transferred to the ECJ. The ECJ made a decision on 16 December 1992 (C-237/91 Kazım 68 Kuş v. Landeshauptstadt Wiesbaden [1992] ECR-6781). The Court adopted “for a preliminary ruling under Article 177/1 on the EEC three questions on the interpretation of Article 6 of Decision 1/80 of 19 September 1980 of the Council of Association established by the Agreement establishing an indents of Article 6(1) of Decision 1/80 may rely directly on those provisions in order to obtain the extension of his residence permit as well as that of his work permit” (Rogers 2000, 227). “However, the Court again declined to make any reference to the principle of freedom of movement” (Rogers 2000, 8). The court behaved similarly in the Eroğlu Case which I will analyze below. Eroğlu Case In 1980, Mrs. Eroğlu went to Germany for education to stay with her family who were working there. After she finished her education she obtained work permit and began to work. In 1992 she applied to have a residence permit but it was rejected, so she appealed to the courts and this was later transferred to the ECJ. The ECJ adopted the C-355/93 on 5th October 1994 according to the 1/80 decision of the Council of Association. Eroğlu was justified and her work permit was accepted (Korkusuz, 2004). Furthermore, her residence permit was justified related to the work permit “Turkish migrant workers were recognized as having priority over non-EU workers in matters covered by the Association council decisions” (Korkusuz, 2004). On 6 March the Association Council made a decision to establish a Customs union by the end of 1995. “However, under this arrangement, the EU has undertaken no binding obligations in the field of freedom of movement for workers” (Korkusuz, 2004). The decision on this issue only deal with establishing a dialogue and solving the TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 integration problems of Turkish migrants in the EU. It is important now to look at the cases of Turkish nationals within the UK because the UK made problems for the entrance of Turkish nationals in the Ankara Agreement framework. The Ankara Agreement came to the agenda and gained importance with the decision of the European Court of Justice in the Savaş Case (Case C-37/98 2000 ECR 1-2927) (Savas (External relations) [2000] EUECJ C-37/98 2000). The following section will examine the Savaş case in detail. Savaş Case Mr. and Mrs. Savaş obtained tourist visas on 22 December 1984 to enter the UK for one month. This visa had conditions that prohibited them from engaging in any business or profession. Their visa’s expiry date was 21 January 1985 but they remained in the UK. According to the Secretary of State they contravened the immigration Law of the UK. In November 1989 Mr. Savaş established a shirt factory without seeking authorization. “However, by a letter of 31 January 1991, they sought, through their solicitors, to regularize their stay by applying, under the relevant provisions of national legislation, to the Immigration and Nationality Department of the Home Office for leave to remain in the United Kingdom” (Savas (External relations) [2000] EUECJ C-37/98 2000). The Secretary of State rejected that Mr. Savaş “sought to rely on the ‘standstill’ provision contained in the Ankara Agreement and Article 41 of the Protocol, thereby asserting that the correct rules to be applied in consideration of his case were the 1973 Rules” (Savas (External relations) [2000] EUECJ C-37/98 2000). The Secretary of State informed Mr. and Mrs. Savaş of their deportation order. “The Secretary of State, in the exercise of his discretion, considered the application of Mr. and Mrs. Savaş under the ‘long residence concession, whereby a person who has ten years’ continuous and lawful residence in the United Kingdom, or 14 years’ continuous residence, whether lawful or not, may qualify for the grant of indefinite leave to remain” (Savas (External relations) [2000] EUECJ C-37/98 2000). However, according to the Secretary of State, these people did not justify these criteria. On 29 March 1994, Mr. and Mrs. Savaş prepared a case to show that they were against the decision to make a deportation order. A deportation order was served on them on the 31st of August 1995. Until 30 October 1995, all of the Mr. and Mrs. Savaş›s applications had been made according to British national law. On 30 October 1995, for the first time the representatives Mr. and Mrs. Savaş claimed that Article 41(1) of the Additional Protocol prevented the United Kingdom from “imposing restrictions on the right of Turkish nationals to establish themselves on its territory beyond those which existed on the date of the accession of the United Kingdom to the Community” (Savas (External relations) [2000] EUECJ C-37/98 2000). The Secretary of State should “therefore have confined himself to assessing the position of Mr. and Mrs. Savaş under the Immigration Rules in force on that date, 1st January 1973, namely HC 510, and in particular Paragraph 21 of HC 510 which provided: “People admitted as visitors may apply for the consent of the Secretary of State to their establishing themselves here for the purpose of setting up in business, whether on their own account or as partners in a new or existing business. Any such application is to be considered on its merits. Where the application is granted the applicant’s stay may be extended for a period of up to 12 months, on a condition restricting his freedom to 69 TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 take employment” (Savas (External relations) [2000] EUECJ C-37/98 2000). However, the Secretary of State rejected this argument and pointed out that “on the date on which Mr. Savaş submitted his application for regularization of his stay in the United Kingdom, he no longer had leave to remain there and therefore could not in any event benefit from HC 510 as the then current Immigration Rules” (Savas (External relations) [2000] EUECJ C-37/98 2000). lated to starting and doing one’s own business independently, after a series of verdicts related to working as a “worker” (in general terms, with “employee” status). In addition, in case the Council reviews the other articles of the Protocol in this scope in the future, it is considered to be a very useful reference in terms of forming an example and a comparison (Abdulnasir Savaş Kararı 2010). The Savaş case brought Article 41 of the Additional Protocol to the agenda. According to the barrister’s speech, of all Turkish citizens, only Turkish employees were required to have a visa, but Turkish businessmen, tourists or students could enter the United Kingdom with their passports and do business in the country without a requirement for a visa in 1973. They could start business and stay in the United Kingdom only if they are not employees. Moreover, according to that current law, they did not need to have capital stock or capital goods. The only condition to stay in the country without a requirement of a visa was for the person and his/her family (if together) to earn money from his/her business without demanding any benefits from the state (Arslan, 2004). I will analyze two of these cases together because they are similar to each other. Mr. Tüm and Mr. Darı went to the UK by ship. Mr. Tüm went in November 2001 from Germany and Mr. Darı in October 1998 from France. They applied for asylum but it was refused by the Secretary of State and their removal was ordered pursuant to the Convention which was signed in Dublin on 15th June 1990 (OJ 1997 C 254, p.1). This Convention determines “the State responsible for examining applications for asylum lodged in one of the Member States of the European Communities” (Tum & Dari (External relations) [2007] EUECJ C-16/05 2007). However, this was not put into effect because these persons were still in the United Kingdom territory. Finally, the Secretary ultimately referred to solve this case in the ECJ and the Court solved this problem according to the Article 41(1) of the Additional Protocol which attached to the Agreement. “The Court found that that provision was sufficiently precise and unconditional to have a direct effect” (Holdgaard 2008, 291). So, the ECJ reached a decision in Savas on 23 May 2000(Case C-37/98 2000 ECR 1-2927). The most positive aspect of this decision is that this article has a direct effect on the members. It is considered that interpretation of the article, number 41(1), by the Council, is significant in respect that it is the very first verdict re- Mr. Tüm and Mr. Darı concerned that they relied on the Association Agreement, under Article 41(1) of the Additional Protocol. They claimed that “their applications for leave to enter the host Member State should be assessed on the basis of the national Immigration Rules applicable at the date of the entry into force of that protocol with regard to the United Kingdom, namely the rules in force on 1 January 1973” (Tum & Dari (External relations) [2007] EUECJ C-16/05 2007). Then, the Secretary of State left to appeal to the House of Lords. The British Home Office authorities took the decision that was not giving work permit for these 70 Tüm and Darı Case TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 people. The authorities acted according to the current national immigration acts (Gumrukcu 2008). The House of Lords referred this appeal to the ECJ. The ECJ reached to a decision on 20 September 2007 that these people have certain rights under the EUECJ C-16/05 (Gumrukcu, 2008). It must be note that “there was, meanwhile, continued use of the so-called ‘fraud and abuse exception’ to refuse applications by those who had claimed asylum after presence in another European country, where there was clandestine entry, where there were discrepancies in the evidence, or where there was irregular presence in the UK” (Shah 2009, 13). Therefore the domestic case law continued to show that Turkish citizen applicants could legitimately qualify under the standstill provisions was actually quite narrow (Shah 2009, 13). This is obvious in the cases that mentioned above. immigrants. Thus, I have reached the conclusion that there is a contradiction between the UK’s support for Turkey’s accession to the EU and its failure to completely comply with the Ankara Agreement. Conclusion As it is depicted above, Cyprus was a Commonwealth country, so it was dealt with differently from the Turks and Kurds from Turkey. Here, I have examined Turkish and Kurdish immigration to the UK. Furthermore, I have mentioned how the UK acted towards Turkish immigrants within the Ankara Agreement, an association agreement between the EU and Turkey; later within this framework, the participation of UK. It is obvious that the UK did not abide by the rules of the Ankara Agreement as revealed by the Savaş, Tüm and Darı cases show. The UK was forced to give the rights to these people. Even though the UK has a positive attitude towards Turkey’s the EU accession, but it has not applied all the Ankara Agreement’s rules about immigration for Turkish 71 TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 References Aksoy, Murat Ugur. 2007. “Avrupa Hukuku Açısından Türk Vatandaşlarına Uygulanan VizeAlma Mecburiyetinin Değerlendirilmesi Raporu”, Düsseldorf. at http://www.ikv.org.tr/pdfs/murataksoy-15kasim07.pdf Aral, Berdal. 1997.“The Case of Free Movement of Workers Between Turkey and The European Union”, The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations, Vol. 27, No. 1, April, 1-12. 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[1990] EUECJ C-192/89 http://www.bailii.org/cgi-bin/ markup.cgi?doc=/eu/cases/EUECJ/1990/C19289.html &query=sevince+and+ankara+and+agreement&metho d=boolean (20 September 1990)”, “Abdulnasir Savas Karari”, http://www.csgb.gov. tr/csgbPortal/ShowDoc/WLP+Repository/diyih/ disiliskiler/atad_kararlari/abdulnasir_savas (accessed December 25). “Additional Protocol”, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/ smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexplus!prod!CELE Xnumdoc&lg=en&numdoc=270A1123(01)) (20 January, 2011). “EU-Turkey Relations” http://ec.europa.eu/ enlargement/candidate-countries/turkey/relation/ index_en.htm) (07.01.2011). “1999 Regular Report From the Commission on Turkey’s Progress Towards Accession”, http:// ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/1999/turkey_en.pdf (13.10.1999). 73 TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 Winner Pays It All: Who is Loser Then? The Current Parliamentarism In Search of Presidentialism in Turkey Ömer Faruk Ertürk Fatih University, omerfaruk.erturk@hotmail.com Abstract This article mainly presents a general survey of the recent debates on the feasibility of adoption of presidential government system in Turkey. It looks, first of all, at the fluctuating authority tendencies of the executive functions operated under the various constitutional revisions, especially the one in 1982. Changing demographic needs and globalization, adaptation process to EU, socio-political and economic trends, revivals of religious and historical consciousness – all these shape the topic to some extent. The article then tries to find reasonable answers as to why the Turkish governments have long frequently experienced pauses and crises, and to what extent these gridlocks stem from the current Turkish parliamentary system. In this respect, having investigated and compared the cutting edges of the parliamentary and presidential systems, the paper endeavours to disprove the general misconception regarding the latter. Finally, the article raises questions concerning in what way and how a conversion to the presidential system might change, affect and restore the system perversion in Turkey. Keywords Governmental System Debates, Parliamentary System, Presidential System, Turkish Parliamentary Exception, Stable Management, Execution. 75 TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 Introduction The debate on the feasibility of adoption of presidential system in Turkey is not new. In retrospect, the eighth president Turgut Özal, later the ninth president Süleyman Demirel carried the issue to their agendas in 1980s and in 1990s respectively (Kalaycioğlu 2005, 13). Recently, the Prime Minister Erdoğan has reiterated and revived the issue on a live TV interview by uttering “Turkey could adopt a presidential system”.1 Later on, however, both the Prime minister Erdoğan and Ömer Çelik, Justice and Development Party’s (JDP) Deputy Chairman, redirected the issue explaining that it is not in their current agenda. But what was it behind this occasion that engaged the mass media and public opinion’s attraction nearly for a week? Was this a statement prima facie which aimed at challenging the existing democratic and laic regime in Turkey? What was the source of severe reactions of the people who protested the idea, even the rightist pro-government column writers?2 In view of the fact that the general inclination of Turkish society towards the USA has severely declined in the last few decades, one may allege that presidentialism has a negative effect on people’s mind. However, the lack of sufficient information as to the system in recent public opinion in Turkey and its area of applicability dramatically lead to misconceptions and misinterpretations even among the intelligentsia and media. Thus, it is largely assumed that there is no alternative system in governing a country except parliamentarism. This paper does not reveal neck and crop 1 adoption of the presidentialism as it stands in the USA. It will try to find and analyze reasonable aspects of the system taking into consideration of the dramatic problems experienced in the Turkish parliamentary system and discuss how it could compensate and correspond to the urgent needs of Turkish democracy and bifurcation in executive problems. In this respect, I find it quite useful to give specific and clear information regarding the system to construct the general principles which has been successfully applied in the USA. Government Types: Parliamentary, Presidential and Semi-Presidential Parliamentary System in Turkey Mainly there exist two types of governments in constitutional democracies; presidential and parliamentary. As a hybrid derivation of those systems it is possible to add the semi presidential system inasmuch as it is in use in some countries. Parliamentary government is the form of constitutional democracy. In this system, executive comes out from the legislature and accountable to it. Unlike American presidentialism, parliamentary government was not the deliberate institutional design. Rather, it gradually evolved in Britain over several centuries (Glodsworthy 1999, 28). Parliamentary system is mostly chosen system throughout the world especially in Europe than any other systems in the aftermath of World War II (Stepan and Skach 1993, 4). There are fifteen countries which are being ruled by parliamentary in http://www.sabah.com.tr/Gundem/2010/04/19/baskanlik_sistemi_gundeme_gelebilir, Accessed April, 02, 2011. Columnists Nazlı Ilıcak, Şahin Alpay and Taha Akyol. Taha Akyol has the most dissenting opinion among them. He mainly alleged that the presidential system divides the country and it also leads the Kurdish problem into a deadlock since it has essentially federative tendencies Also available at http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/id/25086731/ 2 76 TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 Europe. Given those countries are wealthy and successfully completed industrial transitions and evolution of constitutional monarchies into democracies, it is not stunning to find that they increase the ratio of selection and success of the parliamentary system (Mainwaring and Shugart 1997, 457). Briefly, the system can be described as the executive power which stems from legislative authority and accountable to it (Epstein 1968, 439). Therefore, as understood from this definition, the parliamentary system does not sharply demarcate between the different branches of the state. It is possible to divide parliamentary system into four main categories. These are dualist, monist, rationalized and contemporary. The dualist one of parliamentarism has been in use since 1909 in Turkey. Parliamentary regimes are classified by a number of peculiar and interdependent institutional characteristics. In order to define the parliamentary system, the following items are noteworthy to mention: a) There is a dual executive split between the head of government and the head of the state b) Parliament has formal or informal investiture powers c) Cabinet is a collective decision – making body d) Cabinet Ministers are usually also members of parliament. e) The cabinet is politically responsible to the parliamentary majority f) Parliament has means of control over the cabinet g) The parliamentary majority can force the cabinet resign h) This power is in most cases balanced by the Prime Minister’s power to dissolve parliament (Müller, Bergman and Strom 2003, 3-32). The political existence of the head of the government and the ministers of the state depend on the confidence vote of the legislature. No confidence vote by the legislature may always remove the executive officials from their offices. In that sense, democratic failure is much more apt to happen in parliamentarism (Shugart and Carey, 1992). For example, political disagreement with the government is one of the reasons. According to a survey conducted among the OECD countries, 163 prime ministers out of 291 had to leave their offices without elections between 1946 and 1995 (Cheibub, 1998). In such cases, prime minister bargain with the other parties to develop a coalition to form a government. These disagreements automatically bring about premature and unscheduled elections, which in ,my opinion, contributes to a political instability. Although the facts listed above have the inclination to generalize the main tenets of democracy, it has a conventionally changeable body in the countries where applied. The present government system in Turkey where the president is being elected by the people itself resembles the parliamentary with president to some extent inasmuch as the president has surprisingly extensive authorities as in the case of semi presidentialism or presidentialism (Shugart and Carey 1992, 55). Hence, in many respects, Turkish parliamentary is sui generis which differs from other equivalents. The initial strengthening of presidency office in Turkey dates back to the military coup of 1980. The revising constitution made after the military coup in 1982 has deliberately enabled broad authorities to the president due to the fact that the main actors strongly believed that the reason of unstable condition of the country is just because of the weak executive authority and coalition governments. Yet, this sort of authoritative superfluity in presidential organ normally cannot be seen in the true parliamentary systems. Because in democracies, it is the one who holds the responsibility must also has the authority (Gözler 2000, 28) 77 TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 At this juncture, the contents of the existing government system in Turkey is still at its natural development stage and its main tendency is uniting and merging the executive authority in one hand to maintain stability and eliminate the bifurcations which has long been led to deadlocks, economic and social crisis and vicious circle. Presidential System: A Contradiction Unlike the parliamentary system, presidential system does not have a historically profound background. However it is well known that it is a modified version of the British parliamentary system. In 1787, the system was constructed subject to the decision of delegates who assembled in Philadelphia (Aldıkaçtı 1960, 142). It is a kind of democratic system in which the legislature and the executive exist independently and are elected in the same way (Shively 2005, 334). Unlike in the parliamentary systems presidents have a personal mandate from the voters since they are elected directly to some extent.3 Hence they are able to make more direct personal charge of policy than the cabinet can in a parliamentary system (Shively 2005, 337). However, due to the nature of the system it is difficult to see coalition governments (Mainwaring 1990, 79157). This peculiarity of the system makes the executive branch more mobile and free. On the contrary, a parliamentary cabinet is responsible against its party members for its own existence and they must operate altogether in the parliament. Party discipline is essential. A true democracy is a government in which the powers of government are directly exercised and controlled by the people (Cooke 1997, 19). This is the primary necessity of the representative democracy. Taking the people who know the president candidate they are voting for into account, it is much more representative than is in parliamentarism. After all, it is almost not possible to see personal partitions and opposition parties in representative democracy (Türkbağ 2000, 81). This is usually erroneously supposed that it contributes to limitation of the democratic tenets. In the constitutional systems, the restrictions of the prime minister or the president have already been outlined under the auspices of constitutional acts. As far as Turkey is concerned, the opposition parties’ strong objection is usually just because of their undermining dissensions and hostilities over the party in power. Thus, the general inclination of opposing parties in Turkey mostly impedes the executive power of the ruling party and is far from constructive tendencies. One of the advantages of presidentialism is the executive stability which is based on the president’s fixed term in office. At the end of a certain period (this is 4 years in the USA) one has to leave and stand for the election again. Another advantage of it can be seen as the popular election of the chief executive, because it may be definitely considered as more democratic than the indirect election of the executive power in parliamentary system (Bağce 2002, 151). In presidential systems, government crises that arise from the depose of the prime minister are almost impossible because of the fixed terms a president enjoys (Turhan In the USA two round elections are held but practically it is accepted that the president is directly elected by the people themselves. See also Gözler , Kemal. Cumhurbaşkanı – Hükümet Çatışması. P.8, Ankara: Ekin Kitabevi, 2000 3 78 TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 1992, 157). The only way to interrogate the president is impeachment. However, it is not an easy and a simple process to apply impeachment to the presidents as seen in the case of parliamentarism that involves vote of no confidence. In the USA three impeachment decisions have been applied so far.4 If it had been so, the presidents would always have been exceedingly careful not to lose their authority and support and this would have caused populist approaches and lobbying activities both for and against the president. Under the United States Constitution, impeachment can occur only when the House of Representatives votes to impeach a president for “high crimes and misdemeanours” and the Senate votes to convict the president such dereliction. It has been established that the impeachment of a president cannot occur simply as a result of political disagreement between the branches of government (Sargentich 2010, 580). The central principle in presidential system is that the independence between legislative and executive powers. The executive, legislative and judiciary powers are performing their own duty and this is designated as the separation of powers whereby they check each other. The frames of these powers have been well adjusted that this check and balance system prevents anyone branch from ignoring or overpowering the others. For example, the president has always the authority check the legislature by vetoing a certain measure. However, this action is also balanced by the legislature’s power to override the veto or the judiciary may proclaim an unconstitutional law. In order to balance this check, the president is allowed to appoint members to the courts (Cooke 1997, 13). Contrary to the putative sense which is about the unaccountability of the presidency, there exists a strong device called check and balance as mentioned above. Beside check and balance, separation of powers which is demarcated sharply helps seriously to impede the dominance of government by particular factions and special interests. According to Sargentich, the system which has originally evolved in the United States is substantially much more accountable than the dominant executive model represented by Great Britain. Furthermore he argues that this kind of separation of powers and checks and balances naturally make the governments more responsive to conflicting views in society (Sargentich 2010, 592). The presidential system is much more suitable to the democracy since the head of the execution (president) is determined directly by the people. This peculiarity is immediately related to accountability of the execution which cannot be seen on parliamentary systems. Due to the deprivation of accountability in parliamentarism the actors who share the executive power such as the prime minister, and the other members of the parliament put the blame easily upon each other when there exists an unwanted situation and this might have the possibility of speculation while giving rise to misunderstandings concerning public opinions. Identifiability, in other words knowing whom will be the president in advance is another democratic aspect of the presidentialism. While the electorate knows and consciously votes for the leader whom he/she aspires to see as a president similar to the parliamentary system, it is however improbable to change the nominated leader in presidential system in direct contrast to the parliamentary one. These are Johnson in 1868, Nixon (Watergate) in 1975 and Clinton in 1998. Nixon resigned for fear that he would be found guilty, the other two impeachments decisions remained ineffective, Gözler 2001: 25. 4 79 TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 It is generally a main argument of the opposers that the presidential system might easily shift to dictatorial regime as seen in South American and in some African countries. However, the same thing is viable for the parliamentary system due to the fact that it has more rapid policy delivery than in presidentialism. Therewithal, those dictatorial rules which are erroneously thought mere presidentialism are called “degenerated” version of the one in the USA (Uluşahin 1999, 209). Those regimes are consciously designated to create dictatorial tendencies (Tosun 1999, 83). Thus, it is not the presidential system’s necessity which “derails” the democracy per se; it is the actors and constitutional provisions (Easter 1997, 29). In this regard, bad policies always have possibility to be passed more quickly through party discipline and cabinet leadership in parliamentary system than in presidential system. Hence, it is possible to see in some parliamentary systems that they bemoan the crushing influence of party discipline and corresponding prime ministerial dictatorship and just because of this they put conversion to the presidentialism on their agenda (Mahler 2003, 121). Especially some European countries which could not provide ultimate stability via parliamentarism and underwent oscillations determined to create and adopt a kind of hybrid model of the two, semi presidentialism. The term itself was used by French political scientist Maurice Duverger in order to find stabilizing solutions to the problems of French parliamentarism (Verney 1959, 5774). The French Fifth Republic since 1962 has been the product of this process and still in use in France. Later, different European countries such as Finland, Austria, Ireland, Portugal and many more has adopted the system to surmount the execution and stability problems stemming from the pure ap- 80 plication of parliamentarism. In this system president of the republic is directly elected by the people and he or she coexists with a prime minister (cohabitation) and a cabinet. Unlike the parliamentary system, semi presidentialism is much closer to presidentialism and the president has substantial powers (Turhan 1992, 155). As in the semi presidentialism, after the referendum held in 2007, people in Turkey started to elect its president on its own. However, it does not guarantee to impede the crisis stemming from the two – headedness until the situation in which the president and the prime minister are not from the same party is reached. Accordingly, as far as Örgün is concerned, the current experiences such as above mentioned ones show that semi presidential system is definitely not suitable for Turkey (Örgün 1999, 144). The Weak Sides of Parliamentary System The most criticised and the weak point of parliamentary system is that it contributes to instability (Lijphart 1986, 67). In this system the government in the power never guarantees its position inasmuch as its being always depends on the parliament’s approval. This means that there is always possibility to fall of the government by parliamentary. Another fact leading to instability in Turkey’s parliamentarism is the current multi party system. Contrary to putative estimation, the multi party system does not ensure to represent the different political contributions healthily in the parliament. The fundamental stalemate of the multiparty system is to keep the constitutional democracy and effective execution together. To hold the office and taking decisions are definitely contingent on the social groups and their TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 interests, contentions, passions and agreements (Yavuz, 2000). As seen in our political history, it has been always difficult to build long term coalition governments since the beginning of highly fragmented multi party system in 1950s which ended with several crises. When the coalition governments have been analyzed, it will be seen that they generally consist of opposing parties, which has been seriously undermining each others’ position in both election and political arenas. Therefore, it is definitely impossible to expect them to cooperate harmoniously when they are in power. According to Sartori, the actions which coalition governments can perform is usually seen in the first six month period of the governments in order to give positive impression to the public. Sartori likened this period to a honeymoon. Then, the coalition sides only try hard to extend the time of power they enjoy by staying still (Özbudun 1997, 152). The problem can be surmounted by thinking of two - party system as in the case of the USA type presidentialism. The multi party system should be ousted in order to organize the disarranged structure of the centre - right and centre - left parties (Örgün 1999, 140). In the two - party system, the political sides have to reconcile intrinsically, and this will automatically smooth conflicts and disagreements. It is urgent that the same system be applied in Turkey, especially when both the ten percent threshold and political dissensions are taken into consideration. Besides the instability, the parliamentary system possibly gives rise to weak governments. Firstly, even if the government is constituted out of one party in parliamentary system it never feels secure as much as in presidential one on the ground that there is always a possibility to lose the majority in the next elections. Therefore, it always has to consider the majority in the parliament. This makes the party policies unnecessarily populist rather than preserving and maintaining the urgencies and rational actions. A Prime Minister is only one out of a Cabinet, and his colleagues may keep him straight and supply qualities wanting in him. This can contribute to serious errors especially in case where the prime minister feels beholden his existing position to them. The presidential system leaves more to chance than does the Parliamentarian but everything depends on the character of the individual chosen to be President. He may be strong or weak, wise or short-sighted. He may aim at standing above party and use his authority and employ his patronage with a single eye to the nation’s welfare, or may think first of his own power and his party’s gain, he is the only responsible in the eyes of the public and he is surely well aware of this fact (Bryce 1921, 469). Secondly, the majority government has always risk of incompatibility between the head of the executive and the head of the state as seriously seen in SezerEcevit and Erdoğan – Sezer, periods. This is just because of the two – headedness of the execution organ in Turkey. In this respect it is possible to claim that the main reason of this disagreement in Turkey can be explained by that while the ministers and the prime minister have close ties to the public opinion, the presidents themselves had been much far away to seize the general will of the majority and electorates. Moreover, lawfully the head of the state (president) has no responsibility of his actions in Turkey. Only Prime minister and the ministers concerned are accountable. Contrarily in presidential system, by dividing power between several distinct authorities, it provides more carefully than does the Parliamentary (system) against errors on the part either or Legislature or Executive, and retards the decision by the people of conflicts arising between 81 TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 them (Bryce 1921, 474). Presidentialism has the advantages of executive stability, and more limited government (Lijphart 1992, 1-27). Consequently, especially in terms of accountability and rendering of account, parliamentarism has always problems. However, in the presidential system this kind of bifurcations which has always inclination to fatal economic and social crisis cannot be seen inasmuch as the execution organ belongs to one person. Accordingly it is easy to find a guilty one for a public opinion than in parliamentarism. In terms of democratic qualifications, the parliamentarism is always inferior than presidentialism seeing that the people cannot determine the government. People elect the members of parliament, then, the elected parliament appoints the government (Gözler 2000, 30). The elector is not able to know the deputies’ decision whom they are going to support as a prime minister. Also, the consequences of elections cannot be predicted before, voters has no ability to guess what parties will involve in a coalition government. DSP, MHP and ANAP coalition government in 1999 is a well example to this issue. Many of the right - leaning MHP voters criticised and displayed their discontentedness seeing that their party took part in a coalition with the leftist DSP. Accordingly the parliamentarism is a poor system in terms of identifiability when it is compared with presidentialism. It is usually not wrong to allege that the political culture of the society largely (should) determine(s) the system of gov- ernment and the aim of the tendencies of the leading class. In this respect, it is also intrinsically expected from the ruling political class to mirror and try to correspond the needs of the society to a large extent. Economy is the first and vital determinant of all needs above. As seen in AKP case, people may tolerate odds and ends to some extent and vote for the second time without hesitation due to the economic stability. Even, so - called regime anxiety is subordinate to it. The success of the ruling class and government whether they meet the essential requirements of the society can only be seen in especially economic and social crises. In other words, the admissibility of political systems can be truly tested not in rosy times but in difficult times (Arslan 2001, 125). It is easy to conclude from all accounts that if the existing political system has difficulties in finding rational and permanent solutions for all kinds of social problems,5 the new government system debates is inevitable. Politicians and opinion leaders who strongly oppose the presidential system primarily allege needlessly that the federal system in the USA is definitely not suitable for Turkey inasmuch as it surely gives rise to division of the country (Akyol, 2010) . According to them, the division comes from the federative structure of the presidentialism itself. However, the essentiality and urgency of the system is not subject to federalism. Moreover, federative system may also be adapted under the parliamentary regimes as in the case of Germany (Benz 1999, 55) or Canada and India different from that of the United States (Verney 1995, 83). Correspondingly, the system can be adapted Since the first adoption of the Parliamentary system in 1909, Turkey has gone through many crises stem from economic and ethnic. Particularly the ethnic problem in the East part of the country which is called Kurdish Problem has systematically weakened the politicians authenticity and left helpless the current political systems and it strengthened the hand of the military which has had disreputable impression due to its interruption to Turkish democracy and execution at specific intervals. 5 82 TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 without federalism. Technically, there is no such kind of a prior condition and principle for presidentialism (Turan, 2010; Fendoğlu 2010, 32). France to some extent but the countries such as Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Kirghizstan are well example to this case (Örgün 1999, 115). Accordingly it is useless to state that the system could break the unitary state of Turkey. Turkey needs a novel and innovative constitution to shift to the presidential system which has to be submitted to the plebiscite. Congruity and agreement is important from all parts to internalization. Transition period and research and development (R&D) have crucial importance to analyze the deficiencies, risks and compatibility as well. Turkish Parliamentarism Of course there are countries in which parliamentarism operates successfully than in Turkey. Germany and Britain are the most prominent. However, these countries have already completed their industrial evolution and the peoples living in those societies highly enjoy political culture and education rates unlike in Turkey (Arslan 2001, 132). The nature of Turkish electorates and politicians still has typical eastern and feudal peculiarities far from individual determination and inclinations (Arslan 2001, 128). In addition, the historical background as to the ruling system of the Turkish society for ages should be taken into consideration as well. As Machiavelli addressed there exists compelling correlation between the political systems and the structure of society (Göze 1995, 103), which amounts to the occasion that the system that is appealed to should have conformity with the people’s free will. At this juncture, when the case is Turkey, parliamentarism appears to be inordinate to the general tendency of the people. Rather, presidentialism is more pertinent to the tendency in Turkey. The continuity of the system can be maintained provided that its legitimation lasts properly. The country had been long administered by absolute regime (Sultans) similar to presidency until the parliamentary system was put into practice in 1909. Despite the fact that those sultans’ were appointed by the dynasty rather than by the people, which is anti democratic, still today many Turkish people have profound admiration and esteem to them. Unlike the existing putative estimation, the authority of the Sultan is not so profound as it is thought. Bernard Lewis states and illustrates the case clearly:“.... the Sultan, though despotic in name, had in fact been limited by many checks and restrains, which served the people against tyranny.” (Lewis 2002, 444) The statement by Choiseul – Gouffier, French ambassador to the Ottoman Empire in 1786 and was a member of Academie Française, is highly important. In one of his letters to home he writes: Things here not as in France, where the king is sole master; here it is necessary to persuade the Ulema, the men of law, the holders of high offices, and those who no longer hold them (Pingaud 1887, 82) When it is deeply analyzed, there can be found that the execution of the governor (Sultan) is not totally absolute in the history of the Turkish nation as in many European countries. Also, the mild nature of Islam always impedes brutal and arbitrary decisions to a large extent. The continuity of the state (devlet- i beka) principle shows that the country has profound importance beyond the personal interests. This characteristic tendency displays that the presidential te- 83 TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 nets can be seen in Ottoman Government system in terms of having powerful executive organ. Indeed, it is not difficult to allege that the system is not totally unfamiliar to Turkish political inclination inasmuch as it resembles to the modern and upgraded version of the presidentialism. The term “leader” is important for Turkish people since individual tendencies have not matured enough as in Western societies due to the many social and economic reasons. As a result it can be definitely stated that the general aim of the Turkish society is approval of charismatic leaders. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is the latest example to this perception. Especially when he is abroad for official calls people love the way he poses and self reliance of him towards the other European leaders. Conclusion In Turkey’s parliamentary system, the president’s authority is substantially increased6 and also taking into consideration that the president is currently elected by the people, it also resembles the semi presidentialism to some extent. However, lack of liability of the president in Turkey is difficult to understand. The people occupying the presidential office have no specific place in the system and they have been damaged (except the ones whose power stems from military) by the civil - military arguments (Turgut 1998, 54). In this respect, it is apparent that the system in Turkey is in need of a strong revision. Many crises experienced in Turkey stem from the instable coalition governments which have improvident, self centred and execution management. For example, between 1961 – 1980 period twenty one governments came into power within nineteen years (Turhan 1993, 59). In many of these governments it is highly possible to see nearly the same characters as party leaders, political figures. For example Süleyman Demirel had been a prime minister seven times and a president once. Likewise Bülent Ecevit had been a prime minister five times and a minister many times (Gözler 2000, 29). However, Necmettin Erbakan, Süleyman Demirel, Tansu Çiller, Hüsamettin Cindoruk, Mesut Yılmaz and Deniz Baykal and many more have long been in Turkish political life. Even if they withdrew themselves from active political scenes, they could affect and intervene to the course of political tendencies one way or another. This is the conspicuous proof of the obsessive monarch of the Turkish type of parliamentarism.7 This kind of attitudes can be seen in instable governments. As in Turkey case, in the French Third Republic Poincare had been five times, Briand is ten times presidents. Briand was also foreign affairs minister seventeen times (Laferriere 1947, 821). France could solve this strong but instable custom by designating semi presidentialism which is called French Fifth Republic. As seen above, these kinds of political position ownership can only be seen in parliamentary systems. These political leaders can only relinquish their feudal like offices merely owing to the severe health problems, 6 Between 1923 and 1950 The founder of the system the first president Atatürk and second president İnönü successively had profound authority and effect on the parliamentary. See also Bülent Bal, İstikrarsız Parlamentarizme Karşı Başkanlık Sistemi, İstanbul, 2001 D-R yay. P.98 7 For example, on the approaching eve of 2011 general elections, Mesut Yılmaz, Hüsamettin Cindoruk paid a surprise visit to Turkey’s ninth president, Süleyman Demirel, the founder of the DYP, at his house on Güniz street in Ankara to revise and fortify the right wing 84 TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 or death. Whereas, in presidential system the president is maximally able to hold the office for 8 years which is equal to two terms due to the fixed terms of office. The essential problem of Turkey is the issue of stability. The constitutional amendments have been done seventeen times since 1982 constitution (Fendoğlu 2010, 31). The system has still problems due to the nature of Turkish parliamentarism. Today, the stability problem is not so much in the current agenda due to the majority government in the parliament. But what about tomorrow? Turkey presumably may not have one more chance to regulate the constitutional system amendments and necessities under the rule of instable coalition governments. The alternative political party choices of electorates have definitely decreased in both right and left sides. The general inclination of Turkish people is dramatically changing and the society has long been disillusioned with all of the tested political parties and political actors (Meral, 2010) Turkey needs effective and dedicated leaders to embrace and unite the peoples from all walks of life of the country for the same interests. Obsessively anxious approaches as to the termination of indispensable peculiarities of the state’s unitary, secular and republican mottos are definitely out of question. The only alternative seems adapting and modifying the presidential system rationally considering the society’s urgent democracy and execution needs. 85 TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 References Akyol, Taha. 2010. “Başkanlık Türkiye’yi Parçalar.” Ntvmsnbc, 26.4.2010. Accessed 09.01.2011 http:// www.ntvmsnbc.com/id/25086731/ Aldıkaçtı, Orhan. 1960. Modern Demokrasilerde ve Trükiye’de Devlet Başkanlığı. İstanbul: (Doçentlik tezi), Arslan, Rıza. 2001. Siyasi Sistem Önerisi. Bursa: Vipaş Yay. Bağce, H. Emre. 2002. “The Role of Political Institutions in Tackling Political Fragmentation and Polarization: Presidentialism versus Parliamentarism.” C.Ü. İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Dergisi, Cilt 3, Sayı 1. Benz, Arthur. 1999. From Unitary to Asymmetric Federalism in Germany: Taking Stock After 50 Years. Publius, Oxford University Press Vol.29, No.4, Autumn. Bryce, James. 1921. Modern Democracies. New York: Macmillan. Cheibub, Jose Antonio. 1998. Elections and Alternation in Power in Democratic Regimes. Boston: (Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association) Edward F., Cooke. 1997. A Detailed Analysis of the Constitution. New Jersey: Littlefield Adams &Co. Totowa Publish Epstein D., Leon. 1968. “Parliamentary Government”. New York: International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, Macmillan and Free Press, Vol.11 Fendoğlu, Hasan Tahsin. Kasım. 2010. “Başkanlık Sistemi Tartışmaları.” Ankara: Stratejik Düşünce Enstitüsü Dergisi. Glodsworthy, Jeffrey. 1999. The Sovereignty of Parliament. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Göze, Ayferi. 1995. Siyasal Düşünceler ve Yönetimler. İstanbul: Beta Yay. Gözler, Kemal. 2000. Cumhurbaşkanı – Hükümet Çatışması. Bursa: Ekin Yay. Gözler, Kemal. 2000. Türkiye’de Hükümetlere Nasıl İstikrar ve Etkinlik Kazandırılabilir?: Başkanlık Sistemi ve Rasyonelleştirilmiş Parlâmentarizm Üzerine bir Deneme. Türkiye Günlüğü, Sayı 62. Hacker, Andrew. 2000. Siyaset Biliminin Temelleri: Amerikan Sistemi. Translated by Ahmet Ulvi Türkbağ, İstanbul: DR yay. Kalaycıoğlu, Ersin. 2000. Başkanlık Sistemi: Türkiye’nin Diktatörlük Tehdidiyle Sınavı: Başkanlık Sistemi. Ankara: TBB Yayını Laferrière, Julien. 1947. Manuel de droit Constitutionnel. Paris: Editions Domat-Montchrestien. Lewis, Bernard. 2002. The Emergence of Modern Turkey. New York: Oxford Univ. Press. 86 Lijphart, Arend. 1986. Çağdaş Demokrasiler. Translated by Ergun Özbudun and Ersin Onulduran. Ankara: Yetkin yay. Lijphart, Arend. 1992. Parliamentary versus Presidential Government. New York: Oxford Univ. Press. M., Gerald. Jan. 1997. “Preference for Presidentialism: Post communist Regime Change in Russia and the NISA,” Easter Source, World Politics, Vol. 49, No. 2, 184-211. Mahler, Gregory. 2003. Comparative Politics. New Jersey: Prentice Hall Publications. Mainwaring, Scott and Matthew S. Shugart. July, 1997. Comparative Politics. Vol.29 No.4, p.457 ( Published by: Ph.D. Program in Political Science of the City University of New York) Mainwaring, Scott. 1990. Presidentialism in Latin America. Latin American Research Review,Vol 25,15779 Melo Andre, Marcus. 2009. “Strong Presidents, Robust Democracies?” Brazilian Political Science Review Meral, Ziya. 2010. Prospects for Turkey. London: Legatum Limited. Örgün, Faruk 1999. Dar Gelen Gömlek Başkanlık Sistemi. İstanbul: Bilge Yay. Pingaud, Leonce. 1887. Choiseul-Gauffier. Cited by Bernard Lewis. Paris Sargentich O., Thomas. nd.The Presidential and Parliamentary Models of National Government. International Journal Of Civil Society Law, Vol 8. Sartori, Giovonni. 1997. Karşılaştırmalı Anayasa Mühendisliği. Translated by Ergun Özbudun. Ankara: Yetkin Yay. Shively, W. Philips. 2005. Power & Choice. Minnesota: Mc Graw Hill Press. Shugart, Matthew and J. Carey. 1992. Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Stepan, Alfred and Cindy Skach. October 1993. Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation. Cambridge Univ. Press, World Politics, Vol.46 no.1 Stratejik Düşünce Enstitüsü. 2010. “The Analysis on the Presidential System Discussion.” Accessed 01.01.2011. http://www.sde.org.tr/en/news/1304/ the-analysis-on-the-presidential-system-discussions. aspx Tosun, Gülgün and Tanju. Başkanlık ve Yarı Başkanlık Sistemleri. İstanbul: Alfa Yay. Turan, İlter. “Onbeş Soruda Başkanlık Sistemi.” Milliyet, 21.04.2010. Accessed January 09, 2011. http://www.milliyet.com.tr/15-sorudabaskanlik-sistemi/asli-aydintasbas/siyaset/yazardetay/21.04.2010/1227801/default.htm TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 Turgut, Mehmet. 1993. Başkanlık Sistemi Ordu ve Demokrasi. İstanbul: Boğaziçi Yay.1998. 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Ankara: Seçkin Yay. 87 TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 The Failure of Assertive Secularization Project in Turkey Bahadır Çelebi Fatih University, bahadircelebi711@gmail.com “Turkish Republic was in a way successful, but successful at a price and the price was a kind of amnesia, a kind of trying to forget this past and this past comes back in different forms and I think Islam is one of them.”1 Abstract The assertive secularization project of modern Turkey as a part of broader modernization and Westernization project has failed in some areas. This failure reflected in three different cases. The Alevi issue, the headscarf issue and the use of unofficial Islamic law are these three areas, which show the different aspects of this failure. The aim of this article is to analyze these three cases by exploring the historical background of Turkish way of secularism and by shedding light on the characteristics of Turkish way of secularism. Keywords Secularism, Turkey, Westernization, Modernization, Islam, Headscarf, Alevis 1 Nilüfer Göle, ‘Secularism: The Turkish Experience’, Transcript, By Omer Baristiran, December 2004- Philadelphia. 89 TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 Introduction In the celebration ceremony of the establishment of the Grand Turkish National Assembly in 23th of April 2006, the former Head of the Turkish National Assembly Bülent Arınç made a pronouncement that secularism in Turkey needs a redefinition that is more democratic (Yetkin, 2006). This speech of Bülent Arınç started a discussion in Turkey about the characteristics and nature of the hard-line secularism in Turkey. The rise of Islam in political, economic and cultural sphere since the 1990’s has increased the tension of the debates on interconnection between politics and religion (Keyman 2007, 216). Especially after the electoral victory of AKP in 2002, the secularism issue came into the agenda of Turkish politics again because of AK Party’s National Outlook (Milli Görüş) past and its cadres’ conservative and religious background. The Kemalist elites have always regarded AK Party as a danger to the secular structure of Turkish Republic. For this reason, Bülent Arınç’s statement about the need for redefining the secularism led to hot debates on this issue between Kemalist establishment and some democratic, liberal and conservative groups. The aim of this paper is to show the failure of secularization project of Kemalist founding elites by examining three problematic areas in which secularization project has not been successful. These three cases are the headscarf issue, the Alevi issue, and the unofficial implementations of Islamic law. After providing the brief historical background and giving the distinctive features of Turkish secularism, I will explain why these three cases contradict with Turkish hard-line secularism. The Roots of Secularism in Turkey The modernization process of Turkey, 90 which is also called Westernization, includes the secularization of the state and society as Europe has done during the Renaissance, Reform and Enlightenment processes. This modernization movement can be traced back to the late 17th century Ottoman Empire when the Ottoman administrators realized that they lag behind the Europe in terms of war technology although these first attempts did not aim to change the existing system. The reform attempts in 17th century aimed to re-establish the traditional system (Berkes 1998, 508). The 18th century reformers realized that restoring the existing system is not effective and only in 19th century it was possible for reformers to start transforming the traditional system and order into a new modern secular system (Berkes 1998, 508). The Tanzimat Era was the era of the first fundamental transformations in the Ottoman system. Tanzimat reforms intended to give some concessions to non-Muslim subjects in order to make the two communities equal before the law. The most important reform of the Tanzimat is to restrict the scope of Sharia which is the canon law of Islam to the family law (Zürcher 2004, 61). The crucial judicial developments in the area of secularization during the Tanzimat Era were the codification of Islamic law along the European lines (1865-88), introducing a new penal code (1843), the abolishment of death penalty for apostasy which is a part of Sharia (1844), the creation of secular Nizamiye Courts (1869), the introduction of new commercial (1850) and maritime trade law (1863) and enacting a law which enable the foreigners for the first time in Ottoman history own a land in Ottoman territories (1867) (Zürcher 2004, 61). Beside these judicial developments during the Tanzimat Era, Armenians and Greeks gained an independence from their church and they achieved a degree of secular administration, which TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 were represented by their church under the Ottoman Millet system before (Zürcher 2004, 61). The secularization of education was also one of the notable transformations of the Tanzimat. These changes of the Tanzimat made the Ottoman state more secular by alienating it to its traditional customs. The secularization attempts in the Ottoman Empire continued during the Young Ottoman Era. Ziya Gökalp’s ideas are important in terms of its representation of and impact on Young Ottoman minds (Davison 1995, 189-224). Gökalp believes that although the religion loses its importance, it still has an impact on social sphere and on the other hand the separation between the state and religion is essential to be a member of modern nations (Davison 1995, 191). With this understanding, The Young Turks’ party, Committee of Progress and Union, made some laws for preventing religious control over politics and education. In 1916, the highest religious authority, Şeyhülislam, were removed from the cabinet, in 1917 the Şer’i courts (religious courts) were brought under the control of secular Ministry of Justice and medreses (religious schools) came into the control of Ministry of Education (Zürcher 2004, 122). On the other hand, the inheritance law of Sharia was changed with a law that was imitated from the German Civil law (Zürcher 2004, 122). The developments carried out during the 19th century in the Ottoman Empire were generally aimed to provide equality between non-Muslim and Muslim subjects of the empire. The reformers of the Ottoman Empire sincerely believed that they can only catch up with the level of high civilization of the west by the secularization of their political system and society. Most of them thought that Islam was the reason of this underdevelopment and removing Islam from the state system was the only way of achieving a modernized state and society. The foundation of new Turkish Republic after the World War I, which led to the demise of Ottoman Empire, initiated another movement of modernization, which was the continuation of the reforms of late Ottoman Empire. Ataturk founded the new Turkish state as a secular republic. Ataturk’s secular reforms were similar to Ottoman reformer administrators in the 19th century in terms of their ideas on the functions of religion in society and the methods they used for realizing the reforms (Mardin 1993, 39). During Ataturk reforms (inkılaps) the process of transforming the religious based state in to a highly secular state was completed. As Erik Jan Zürcher correctly pointed out, the secularization project can be divided into three stages. First one is the secularization of state, education and law which, were to some extent realized during Ottoman times, second phase is to change religious symbols with European, like wearing a hat and modern clothing and the third one is the secularization of social life and to attack on popular Islam (2004, 187). Niyazi Berkes claims that the Kemalist secularization reforms can be divided into two parts: The triumph of the idea of a secular state over the idea of an Islamic state produced a series of secularizing reforms within legal, educational, and cultural institutions. The first phase of these reforms was opened with the abolition of the Caliphate. Two more bills, one abolishing the Ministries of Şeriat and Evkaf, the other closing the medreses, unifying education under the Ministry of Education and abolishing the religious orders (tariqas) and their cloisters, were passed together in the next breath. It ended with the secularization of the constitution on November 3, 1928. The second 91 TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 phase lasting from then until 1938 was one in which the previous changes were supplemented, extended, and consolidated (1998, 461) Thus, Ataturk’s reforms made the Turkish Republic a totally secular state. These reforms achieved the required institutional changes. Nevertheless the distinguishing feature of Ataturk’s secularization reforms is that they aimed not only the secularization of the state which remove the religious understanding from state administration and establishing a state which regards all of the beliefs as equal, but also aimed the secularization of the society and removing religion from the daily life. In that sense, during the first 15 years of the new republic some political and legal reforms like abolishing the caliphate or secularization of the constitution were realized beside the reforms which affect the daily life of the people, like the ban on fezzes and turban for men, the restriction on religious attire to prayer services, making the Sundays the official holiday instead of Friday, the closure of tarikats, and changing the Arabic alphabet (Zürcher 2004, 173). These reforms aiming the secularization of the individuals and society as a whole shows that Ataturk’s understanding of secularism, that is the new Turkish political elites, was more than a simple political system. It was more like a way of life and an understanding of civilization. This salient characteristic of Ataturk’s secularization reforms is the subject of the next chapter. The Characteristics of the Turkish Way of Secularism Turkish modernization puts the secularism into its core. Secularism is the building block of the Turkish constitutional theory and political life (Mardin 1993, 37). Therefore, the Kemalist reformers not only aimed 92 to create a secular state but also intended to restrict religion to the conscience of the people thus remove it from the public sphere. As Bernard Lewis asserted in his prominent book, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, The basis of Kemalist policy was laicism, not irreligion; its purpose not to destroy Islam, but to de-establish it- to end the power of religion and its exponents in political, social, and cultural affairs, and limit it to the matters of belief and worship. In thus reducing Islam to the role of religion in a modern, Western, nation state, the Kemalists also made some attempts to give their religion a more modern and more national form (2002, 412) Haldun Gülalp mentioned the Kemalists’ will to remove Islam from public and political sphere and put itself into this realm just as Christian did in Protestant reformation: Because religion occupied the centre of the public and political space at the time of the creation of the nation-state, Kemalism forced itself into that space and specifically attempted to relegate religion into the private realm. The nationalist project regarding religion was to emulate the Protestant revolution of turning faith into a private, personal matter. But this was a project of the political elite, and not internal to the religious community (Gülalp 2005, 352) When we consider these aims of the Kemalist reformers, we can say that the secularization project is more than a political reform. These aims of reducing the role of religion in society and giving religion a modern and national form requires a hardline, anti-democratic and repressive understanding of secularism. The general characteristics of Turkish secularism thus, reflect all of these features. I prefer using the term “assertive secularism”, coined and defined by Ahmet Kuru, in defining Turkish way of TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 secularism (Kuru 2007, 568-594). Assertive secularism is a secularism in which “state excludes religion from the public sphere and plays an assertive role as the agent of a social engineering project that confines religion to the private domain” (Kuru 2007, 571). Moreover, the founder fathers of Turkish modernization believes that religion is “a traditional phenomenon and it will eventually decay in social life as a result of the modernization process, including industrialization, urbanization, and mass education” (Bruce 2002; Norris and Inglehart 2004). Thus, the founders thought that religion and its impact on society will disappear over the time if they implement the assertive secularization project. Beside these characteristics, we should also mention that the secularism of Turkey is a highly state-centric project. Kemalist elites think that modernization, so the secularization project can only be realized by the state therefore the secularization project of Turkey is a state-centric political project (Keyman 2007, 221). The foundation of the Directorate of Religious Affairs was one of the reforms aiming to give the control of religion to the hands of the state. Directorate of Religious Affairs is not an independent religious institution like the vakıfs are in Ottoman times. It is under the control of Prime Minister. It has a total control over the places of warship (cami). It even decides on which topic is going to be covered by imams during the Friday prayer. It also pays the salaries of imams (the directorate of prayers), vaiz (preacher), and muezzin (caller of prayer and assistant of imams) who are all the civil servants of the state. Another problem is Turkish founding elites’ defining Turkish citizens as Muslim Sünni Turks. This definition excludes the Alevis. Thus, the Directorate of Religious Affairs only support the Sünni places of warship (Camii), but not the Alevi Cem houses. The assertive understanding of Turkish secularism discriminates the sects other than the mainstream Sünni denomination. For all of these reasons, Turkish state’s one of the unchangeable characteristics is its willingness to control religion (Sakallıoğlu 1996, 248). As a conclusion, Turkish way of secularism is assertive not passive, discriminative, antidemocratic and state oriented. In order to summarize the general characteristics and nature of Turkish way of secularism, I quote Tarhanlı’s words from Fuat Keyman’s “Modernity, Secularism, and Islam”: …. the separation between the state and religion was so strict in the Turkish case that it involved not only the total removal of religion from state affairs, but also, and more importantly, the absolute institutional and constitutional control of religious activities by the state. Moreover, this control included both the public realm and the private realm. By approaching secularism as a constitutive element of modernity and a political project for the rapid transformation of Turkey into civilized nation, the Turkish state attempted to outlaw the presence of religion in public affairs and eliminate it from private and cultural life preferences and identity formations of its people through initiating a set of regulations, from educational reforms to new dress codes. (Tarhanlı quoted in Keyman 2007, 215-234) Keeping these features of Turkish way of secularism in mind, in the upcoming chapters I am going to discuss three problematic areas in which the secularization project has failed. The Headscarf Issue The headscarf issue is one of the most debated issues between Kemalist secularist elites and conservative and liberal frictions 93 TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 of Turkish society. Since about the 60 percent of the women in Turkish society wear a headscarf (Çarkoğlu and Toprak 2006, 66), the issue has been widely debated in Turkey. As I have mentioned earlier, one of the aims of the Turkish way of secularism and the secularization project is to remove Islam from public sphere. The Kemalist secularist establishment in Turkey perceives headscarf as the sign of religion; therefore, they believe that it should be banned in secular state institutions and even in universities, which are the representative of modernism and positive sciences. This ban on headscarf, which is founded on the Kemalist elites idea, caused severe discussions in Turkey especially after 1980’s. Today this issue has remained a problem in front of Turkish democracy. I will briefly summarize the history of the ban on headscarf and analyze why this ban is the failure of secularization project of Kemalist elites. The headscarf issue has started in 1967 when Hatice Babacan, a student in Ankara University, Faculty of Theology, was expelled from university because she wanted to attend the classes wearing a headscarf (Aköz and Atal 2004). After the 1980 coup d’etat, the Council of Higher Education (YÖK) was founded as a body to control universities. The Council banned the wearing of headscarf in universities in 1982. Although YÖK lifted this ban in 1984, because of the negative reactions in 1987 it prohibited the wearing of headscarf again on the ground that it is against the discipline rules of universities. There were some attempts to abolish the ban on headscarf. Özal government tried to change the law of YÖK, but it was vetoed, then Özal government passed a law in 1988 in order to lift the ban nevertheless, it was struck down by constitutional court. Another law has been made in 1990, but again with the application of SHP, it was denied by constitutional court this time. In 1997, 94 during the presidency of Kemal Gürüz, YÖK banned students wearing a headscarf from entering universities. The AK Party’s coming to power started another struggle for lifting the headscarf ban. AK Party promised to its voters to solve the issue. The Prime Minister and the Head of AK Party Tayyip Erdoğan gave a speech in Spain during the meetings of Alliance of Civilizations in January of 2008. He said, “even though a headscarf is a political symbol, can you ban the wearing of it?” This statement triggered a new process of lifting the ban on headscarf. The two of the major parties, AK Party and MHP (Nationalist Action Party) agreed on to make some alterations in existing provisions of the constitution in order to lift the ban and these changes were accepted in the assembly with the 411 deputies’ votes in February of 2008. CHP and DSP deputies took the amendments to constitutional court on the ground that they are against the principle of secularism and in the June of the same year constitutional court decided that the changes done by the assembly are against the first three unchangeable provisions of the constitution. After this decision the headscarf issue remained a blurred issue. Recently, YÖK has made a decision that the university instructors cannot get a student out of class because of her headscarf. This decision is being implemented by some universities while some others continue to implement the ban on headscarf. Headscarf issue shows that the secularist fractions are strictly against the display of religious symbols in public areas. Despite the danger of being deemed as an anti-democratic, they do not avoid to defend the ban on headscarf. The majority of the Turkish society does not approve the ban (Çarkoğlu and Toprak, 2006). Even in France, which is always likened to Turkey in terms of its hard-line secularist character, headscarf is not banned in the universities. The heads- TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 carf ban also shows the aim of secularist Kemalist elites of shaping the society in a ‘modern’ and western way. The desire for removing Islam from the public sphere as a part of the secularization project of Kemalist elites failed when we take into consideration that the majority of the society still demand the lifting of the ban and think that this ban is anti-democratic and repressive implementation. Turkish society in general has not internalized the ban on headscarf and they see headscarf as a part of their culture and religion. To sum up, the ban on headscarf as a part of the assertive secularization project of Turkey has failed. The Alevi Issue Alevism is a kind of sect in Turkey which bears motives from Turkish culture, Shia understanding of Islam, and also Sünni Islam. Some Alevis define themselves as a part of Islam while some others identify themselves a different culture and belief system. This different understanding of Alevis and their different belief system and prayers caused tension between mainstream Sünni state of Ottoman Empire and Alevis. Ottoman religious authorities labeled them as heretics and infidels (Vorhoff 1998, 229). They were also accepted as rebellions that are against the central control of Ottoman state. Thus, during the Ottoman times, the relationship between Alevis and the state has always been problematic and Alevis developed a negative outlook towards the Ottoman state. This negative point of view of Alevis led them to support the newly emerged Turkish Republic which is against the Ottoman Empire (Vorhoff 1998, 230). Alevis have always supported Kemalist secularism since the very beginning of the republic. After the 1980 coup d’etat the official ideology of state has been reshaped along the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis (Türk-İslam Sentezi) which claims that Turkishness and Islam cannot be separated (Vorhoff 1998, 231). The problem with this thesis is that it accepts only the Sünni understanding of Islam as legitimate and true Islam. Because of this new approach, Alevis felt that they will be assimilated into the officially recognized Sünni Islam (Vorhoff 1998, 231-232). These concerns of Alevis are not impertinent when we look at the implementations of the Directorate of Religious Affairs. The directorate of Religious Affairs as an institution of secular state reflects the understanding of TurkishIslamic Synthesis. The head of the Directorate made a statement that Alevism cannot be separated from Islam and it is without any doubt a part of Islam. This statement of the head of the Directorate drew reactions from some Alevis because the head meant Sünni Islam by Islam. The Alevis demanded from state to be recognized as an independent sect that has their own place of worship, Cem Houses (Assembly Houses), and their own religious leaders, Dedes (grandfather). Since the Directorate of Religious Affairs only recognizes Sünni Islam, it does not recognize Cem houses as a place of warship and it constructs mosques in Alevi villages although Alevis do not attend mosques. It also does not support Cem houses and not pay the salary of dedes like it does for imams in mosques. Another problem is that the religious courses in primary, secondary, and high schools are mandatory and the contents of the religious course include only the Sünni approach. All of the implementations I mentioned above show that the secularism project and its aim to establish a unified Sünni Muslim nation is not espoused by Alevi community. They define themselves as a distinct culture and belief system. They sue the implementations of Turkish state. Their demand from the state and their resistance through the legal ways prove that secularization project 95 TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 of Turkey has failed in terms of assimilating Alevis into the Sünni Muslim sect and it also illuminate that in the eyes of the Alevis the Turkish way of secularism is not legitimate. The Use of Unofficial Islamic Law in Turkey One of the basic tenants of the secularization project is the secularization of the Islamic law-based legal system of Ottoman state. Ottoman reformers and founders of the Turkish republic all made some reforms to serve this aim. The founding fathers of the Turkish Republic thought that the modernization and secularization of the society can be carried out by imposing from above through the power of law (Yılmaz 2002, 120). They see the law as an instrument of modernization and westernization (Hooker 1975, 364). In this vein, the Ottoman reformers started the secularization of legal system during the Tanzimat era. Until the new Turkish Republic, many provisions of Islamic law were changed except the family law, which includes the law of marriage, divorce, inheritance, and custody of children (Yılmaz 2002, 118). In 1926, new Turkish Republic adapted the Swiss civil code into the Turkish legal system and for the first time in the Muslim Turkish history they changed the family law. This replacement of Turkish law with the new Swiss code aimed to achieve complete separation between religion and law. With this law, Islam was completely disregarded. It was relegated to a matter of conscience that was left solely to the private sphere. Citizens could be Muslims in their private lives, yet they could not claim any room for Islam in the public arena.’ (Yılmaz 2002, 119) The legal changes and national, secular, and modern character of Kemalist project could not fill the gap that Islam has left in 96 Turkish society (Mardin 1982, 180-181). Thus, the traditional implementations of Islamic law still continue among the Turkish citizens. There are three main cases which still continue in today’s modern Turkey as a part of Islamic law: the solemnization of marriage and nikah, the polygamy, and divorce and talaq (Yılmaz 2002, 113-131). A marriage under official Turkish law is made in front of the state officials who authorizes and recognizes the nikah and only after the official nikah, the religious marriage is allowed (Yılmaz 2002, 121). The imams who do not act according to this law are subject to punishment (Yılmaz 2002, 121). The couple who perform a religious marriage without an official one is not counted as a married couple and subject to punishment according to Turkish criminal code (Ansay 1965, 122). Although this marriage law is valid in Turkey, there are many couples who perform only the religious marriages. According to one research, 15 percent of all marriages has been made in the religious way and are not recognized as legal by the state (Timur 1971 quoted in Yılmaz 2002, 122). The second case of the use of unofficial Islamic law is to have polygamy. According to traditional Islamic law a man can marry four women at the same time. But this rule of Islamic law contradicts with official law of Turkey which asserts that an already married person’s second marriage is not valid (Yılmaz 2002, 124). Despite the enforcement of this official marriage law, polygamy has been performed, although the numbers are exceptional in especially the eastern part of Turkey. The last case of using unofficial Islamic law is divorce and talaq. Talaq is an Islamic way of divorce. It is performed by saying talaq three times in Sünni understanding. According to official law, divorce can only be possible by the decree granted TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 by an authorized jurisdiction (Yılmaz 2002, 126). The marriages which are done in the religious ways are terminated by talaq, although it is against the official law. As a conclusion, the use of unofficial Islamic law illuminates the fact that the above imposition of secular law is not successful in the secularization of the society. The expectation of Kemalist elites that by implementing secular law society becomes more secular is falsified. Although to some extent it is successful, the whole society does not espouse the rules of secular law which contradict with the traditional Islamic law. The assertive secularization project of Turkey failed in terms of implementing secular law in every segments of the society. The secularization project alienated the Turkey’s public from the state and the history of Turkey showed the tension between this secularist understanding and religious worldview (Yavuz 1997, 64). Thus, the aim of the secularization project of removing Islam from the public sphere has failed. The problem of headscarf shows that the majority of the Sunni population is not satisfied with the secularism in Turkey. Besides, the other major religious fraction, Alevis are not satisfied with the secularization project too. Therefore, apparently, the majority of the Turkish society one way or another has complaints about the assertive understanding of Turkish secularism. This clearly shows that the secularization project has failed in making people internalize the secularism. Concluding Remarks Turkey is the only Muslim country, who was exposed much more to the modern and western political, economic, and cultural impacts than any other muslim country. This effect of western ideas in Turkey has always been controversial in modern Turkish history. The establishment of the Turkish Republic in the 1920’s meant the triumph of western ideas over Islamic Ottoman Empire. During the establishment process, the Kemalist elites who were strictly bound to the modern western ideas carried out severe reforms. Since Turkey is a Muslim country, the Kemalist modernizers put so much emphasis on secularism. They believed that Islam belongs to the traditional past and a successful future can only be possible with a secular state and society. With this understanding, they employed an above-imposed way of secularization project. However, the history of secularism in Turkey demonstrated the opposite trend and Islam has always remained a powerful and dominant ideology in Turkish society (Keyman 2007, 223). 97 TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 References Aköz, Emre and Nevzat Atal. 2004. “Erbakan, Nurcular’ın Ezberini Bozuverdi” Sabah Newspaper. December 24, 2004. http://arsiv.sabah.com. tr/2004/12/22/gnd116.html Ansay, Tuğrul. et al. 1965. The Turkish Criminal Code. London: Sweet&Maxwell Berkes, Niyazi. 1998. The Development of Secularism in Turkey. London: C.Hurst&Co.Ltd. Bruce, Steve. 2002. God is Dead: Secularization in the West. Malden, Mass: Blackwell. Çarkoğlu, Ali and Binnaz Toprak. 2006. Değişen Türkiye’de Din Toplum ve Siyaset İstanbul: TESEV. Davison, Andrew. 1995. “Secularization and Modernization in Turkey: The Ideas of Ziya Gökalp.” Economic and Society 24:189-224. Gülalp, Haldun. 2005. “Enlightenment by Fiat: Secularization and Democracy in Turkey.” Middle Eastern Studies 41:351-372. Haynes, Jeffrey. 2010. “Politics, Identity, and Religious Nationalism in Turkey: from Atatürk to the AKP” Australian Journal of International Affairs 64:312-327. Hooker, M.B. 1975. Legal Pluralism. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Keyman, Fuat. 2007. “Modernity, Secularism, and Islam: The Case of Turkey.” Theory, Culture and Society 24:215-234. Kuru, Ahmet. 2007. “Passive and Assertive Secularism” World Politics 59:568-594. Kuru, Ahmet. 2008. “Secularism in Turkey: Myths and Realities” Insight Turkey 10:101-110. Lewis, Bernard. 1952. “Islamic Revival in Turkey” International Affairs, 28:38-48. Lewis, Bernard. 2002. The Emergence of Modern Turkey. New York: Oxford University Press. Mardin, Şerif. 1993. Türkiye’de Din ve Siyaset. İstanbul: İletişim. Mardin, Şerif. 1982. “Turkey: Islam and Westernization.” In Religions and Societies: Asia and the Middle East, edited by Carlo Caldorola, 171-198. Berlin et al: Mouton Publishers. Norris, Pippa and Ronald Inglehart. 2004. Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sakallıoğlu, Ümit Cizre. 1996. “Parameters and Strategies of Islam-State Interaction in Republican Turkey.” International Journal of Middle East Studies 28:231-251. 98 Tarhanlı, İştar B. 1993. Müslüman Toplum, Laik Devlet. İstanbul: Afa. Quoted in Fuat Keyman. 2007. “Modernity, Secularism, and Islam: The Case of Turkey” Theory, Culture and Society 24:215-234. Timur, Selim. 1971. Türkiye’de Aile Yapısı. Ankara: Hacettepe University Press. Turam, Berna. 2004. “The politics of Engagement Between Islam and the Secular State: Ambivalences of Civil Society.” The British Journal of Sociology 55: 259-281. Vorhoff, Karin. 1998. “Let’s Reclaim Our History and Culture! Imagining Alevi Community in Contemporary Turkey.” Die Welt Des Islams 38:220-252. Yavuz M., Hakan. 1997. “Political Islam and the Welfare (Refah) Party in Turkey.”, Comparative Politics 30:63-82. Yetkin, Murat. 2006. “Zemin Belirlendi: AKP de Rahatsız.” Radikal Newspaper April 26. Yılmaz, İhsan. 2002. “Secular Law and the Emergence of Unofficial Turkish Islamic Law.”, Middle East Journal 56:113-131. Yılmaz, İhsan. 2005. “State, Law, Civil Society, and Islam in Contemporary Turkey.”, The Muslim World 95:385-410. Zürcher, Erik J. 2004. Turkey: A Modern History. New York: I.B. Tauris&Co.Ltd. TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 Is Islam Part of the Problem or Solution: An Australian Immigrant Experience? Salih Yücel Monash University, salih.yucel@monash.edu Abstract Australia is becoming an increasingly multicultural country, yet the relationship of Muslims and Islam with Australia is a relatively long-standing one, reaching further back than actual European presence and settlement in Australia. Research shows that the Macassan and Bugis traders from Indonesia had already established a relationship with the indigenous people of northern Australia approximately 200 years before the arrival of any European settlers. However, the first group of Muslim settlers were the Afghan camel drivers who came in the1860s to assist with interstate transportation. In the 1960s, Muslims began to arrive in waves. With the advent of the first Gulf War Muslim migration took a different turn, and especially after September 11, the issue of Muslim migration received increasing attention from policy makers, media and the general public. The events of September 11 and other terrorist acts also contributed to the ‘othering’ of Muslims in Australia. The emergence of the over-emphasised Muslim ‘other’ is deemed to be undemocratic and ‘clashing’ with the wider Australian cultural standards and norms. This paper will therefore examine the place of Muslim immigrants in Australian society by examining three aspects: a) how Muslims view Australia and their contribution to the Australian economy and multicultural society, b) the role of Islam in the lives of Muslims in Australia – a threat as some critics suggest or a positive factor for integration and for building bridges between Australia and the Muslim world, and c) What lessons might Japan learn from Australian Muslim immigrants’ experience? Keywords Islam, Immigration, Australia, Japan, Discrimination, Integration 99 TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 Introduction The history of Muslims in Australia reaches back 200 years before European settlement. Research shows that Chinese and Malay Muslims arrived on Australia’s northern shores and engaged in trade with the Aborigines. (Haveric 2006, ix-xi) However, it wasn’t until the 1860s that the first Muslims settled on the continent. These were the Afghan camel drivers who assisted major expeditions into uncharted territory. They were pioneers who provided the lifeblood for inland settlements, stations and mines by forging communication routes throughout remote territory.1 While small groups of Muslims arrived after both World Wars, it was not until the late 1960s that significant groups of Turks and Lebanese Muslims arrived in Australia. According to the 2006 census, the total Australian Muslim population is 340,393, made up of groups from more than 70 different countries (Saeed 2003, 2) and accounting for up to 1.7% of the total national population (Australian Bureau of Statistics, ABS). Among Western nations, Australia has the highest population of residents born overseas.2 Questioning Muslim Immigration Historically, race has been a central concept in the formation of the Australian nation. (Stratton 1999, 9) Until the 1960s, Australian Government policy focused on the assimilation of immigrants. This shifted to integration in the 1960s. Once the White Australia policy was abolished by the Labor Party government in 1974, the country changed its policies towards multicultural- ism (Humphrey 2007, 9). While not a direct result of abandoning the White Australia Policy, the agreement with Turkey did represent an important shift in attitude towards Australia’s future (Jeckins, 1993). After September 11, policy aimed to increase social inclusion. (Humphrey 2010, 58) Since their arrival in Australia in significant numbers in the 1970s, Muslims have been regarded as a problem community. (Humphrey 1998, 63)The Iranian Revolution and its European offshoot, the Rushdie affair, the uprising in many parts of the Islamic world and more recently the terrorist attacks on the Twin Towers in New York have heightened the sensitivity of policymakers, opinion leaders and citizens to the presence of Islam in Western nations, (Sunier 2003) including Australia. Before September 11, anti-Muslim feelings were promoted by marginal groups who viewed Muslims as a threat to Australia’s values. Michael Welch writes that in so many ways September 11, 2001 bisects history, altering the way people speak, think and feel the world around them. (Welch 2006, 3) Terrorist acts in New York, Washington, London, Madrid and Bali led to the fear of Muslims spreading throughout the mainstream population, and this caused policymakers to rethink multicultural policy in the West, including Australia. Former National Party Senator, John Stone, believed that Muslim values would not adapt to a nation based on Judeo-Christian values. (Kabir 2004, 324) James Kurt asserts that Muslim immigrants cannot assimilate into Western or American culture without betraying their faith. (Kurt 2008, 1 Australia’s Muslim Cameleers refer to website http://australia.gov.au/about-australia/australian-story/afghan-cameleers retrieved on 03.07.2010 2 Australian Bureau of Statistics, http://www.dfat.gov.au/facts/muslims_in_australia.pdf retrieved on 05.07.2010 100 TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 410) A Member of Australia’s Federal Parliament, Danna Vale, feared that if Muslim immigration continued, Australia would become a Muslim nation within fifty years because “we [non-Muslims] are aborting ourselves almost out of existence”. (Kabir 2006, 194) In 2005, two Liberal Party (Australia’s former leading party) politicians, Bronwyn Bishop and Sophie Panopoulos, stated that wearing the hijab (headscarf) should be banned in public schools. The Federal Education Minister at the time, Brendan Nelson, advised Muslims who were not going to accept Australian values to “clear off” (2006, 193). The leader of the former One Nation Party, Pauline Hanson, viewed Muslims as a threat to national identity and the Australian way of life, and wanted to stop the flow of Muslim immigrants (The Herald Sun, 2007). On the basis of the September 11 events, arguments about the incompatibility of Islam with a secular, multi-ethnic country were on the rise in mainstream media. Linking Islam with extremist ideologies, Herald Sun journalist Andrew Bolt discouraged Muslim immigration to Australia. Bolt posited that Muslim preaching and the role of Islam weren’t suitable in a secular, multiethnic nation like Australia. Denis Atkins, a Courier-Mail journalist, also made stereotypical comments when he linked Islam with fundamentalism (Kabir 2004, 324). The trend of stereotyping Muslims based on the actions of extremists does not extend to other faiths. Executive Director of the Gallup Center, Dalia Mugahed, wrote, “While other religious extremist groups are being betrayed as outsiders of the mainstream, Islamic terrorists are prescribed as representatives of their religion.” (The Herald Sun, 2010). This reflects the ideas of neoconservatives and the ‘religious right’ in the United States. Hence, not only Muslim immigrants, but the entire faith of Islam is seen as being part of the problem in the US national agenda. This view of Islam and Muslims is not universally held. In Australia, for example, some politicians take a more liberal approach to this issue. Democrat Senator for Queensland, Andrew Bartlett stated: If the policies of Pauline Hanson and other political candidates opposing all Muslim migration were adopted, Australia would be denied the benefits that these and many others like them have brought to our country. Australia is a modern migrant country but we have yet to shake off much of our colonial mentality.3 When Islamic schools were being criticized for sowing anti-Australian sentiments, Senator Aden Derek stated, “Like all Australian schools, Australian Muslim colleges teach their students to be proud Australians and to participate positively in building a prosperous, harmonious and safe Australia”.4 On the academic front, Michael Humphrey wrote that depicting Islam and Muslim immigrants as culturally incompatible with the secular West is “highly ideological”. 3 http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/media/pressrel/020P6/upload_binary/020p63pdf;fileType=appli cation/pdf#search=%22Muslim%20immigrants%22 retrieved on 04.07.2010 Senator Andrew Bartlett, Deputy Parliamentary Leader and Democrats Senator for Queensland Australian Democrats spokesperson for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, Dated: 19 November 2007 4 http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display. w3p;adv=;db=;group=;holdingType=;id=;orderBy=;pa ge= 44;query=Muslim%20immigrants;querytype=;rec=6;resCount=Default retrieved on 12.07.2010 Wednesday, 20 August 2003 Page: 14105 101 TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 (Humphrey 2007, 15) It pits the backward, fundamentalist, irrational ‘other’ against the secular, free West which must be defended from Islamic threats (Celermajer 2007, 106). Drawing on the idea of associating a group with negative connotations, Jock Collins pointed out that there is a trend to racialise crime when it comes to issues of Middle Eastern youth (Collins, 2003). Loyalty or Disloyalty Another aspect of the post-September 11 debates is the loyalty of Muslim immigrants to the nations in which they reside. According to a poll conducted by Channel Nine in 2006, when the general public was asked to answer the question “Do you think that Muslims can be loyal to both their country and their religion?” 12% said ‘Yes’ and 88% said ‘No’.(Kabir 2008, 399) This mistrust spreads to the point of charging Muslims with taqiyyah, the ‘Islamic principle’ meaning deceit or disguise of one’s belief to promote the cause of Islam, (Quadrant, 2005) whereas the term itself only relates to the beliefs of a minority of Shiite Muslims, who are already a minority among Muslims. There is also debate about whether Muslims have integrated successfully or not. Other studies show that second generation Muslims consider themselves Australian. Factors that contribute to successful integration are mastery of English, equal opportunity and access to resources and education, intermarriage, strengthening society through community involvement, engaging in sports, cultural acceptance, and practising and respecting majority cultures. According to the 2006 census, the enrolment of Muslims into higher education (13.4%) is double the national standard (7.6%). (Chowdhury 2006, 13)This percentage may even have increased since then. Some Muslim high schools are now in the top 10% of schools with high enrolment rates.5 Other research undertaken as part of the Australian Research Council Linkage project addresses the experiences of 600 Muslim Australians in Australia. Eighty-seven percent agreed that they could be both a “good Muslim and a good Australian” at the same time; 5% felt that being “truly Australian” meant either having British ancestry or drinking beer; wanted to either disagree or strongly disagree with that statement (The Age, 2010). The Head of the School of Social and Political Sciences at the University of Melbourne, Adrian Little, and Yasser Morsi conducted a study which demonstrated that the problem of misconception is a primary concern for many Muslims, including second and third generation Muslims. Young educated Muslims saw themselves as individuals and citizens before seeing themselves as being part of a religious or ethnic community. They did not discuss what it might mean to be abstractly Muslim, and instead provided reflections on their experience as living as a particular Muslim (Little and Morsi, 2009). Evidence suggests that Muslim settlement and integration into Australian society is, by and large, successful (The Age, 2010). Intermarriage rates are increasing in different second generation Muslim ethnic groups. According to the 2006 Census, of the two largest Muslim ethnic immigrant groups, only 51.9% of Turkish men and 36.3% of Lebanese men aged 15-39 marry within their ethnic group (Khoo at all 2009, 15). 5 AFor detail information refer to the websites http://www.isikcollege.vic.edu.au, http://www.sulecollege.com, http://www.mfis.com.au/images/stories/2009_school_annual_report.pdf retrieved 20.08.2010 102 TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 Marriage in country of birth or to same ethnic group (by percentage) children in crèches or childcare, they would have to spend most of their wages on fees if they are not professionals. Most Muslim parents have at least two children. Another factor for lower employment (Men) (Men) (Women) (Women) is discrimination (Foroutan, 2008). Aged Aged Aged Aged Yet Muslim immigrants 15-39 40+ 15-39 40+ serve as a bridge for the naTurkey 51.9 79.0 71.6 84.9 tion’s economy. In 1975, the Lebanon 36.3 78.4 66.1 84.2 Whitlam government courtEgypt 43.0 53.0 73.1 62.1 ed Arab nations in order to Malaysia 39.6 60.1 32.9 50.5 loan money by using Sallay Japan 67.3 70.5 23.1 33.8 Mahomet, a descendant of one of the last Afghan camel If inter-ethnic partnering is a key indica- drivers. The government hoped to improve tor of social integration, as suggested by so- ties through Sallay and the gift of Australciologists, (Khoo at al. 2009) the Japanese ian camels (Stevens 1989, 326). In 1976, The should receive more attention since they Australian Federation of Islamic Councils have a lower rate of social integration than (AFIC) initiated the export of halal meat by Muslims. According to the same research, Australian companies to Muslim countries. 65% of second generation Greeks marry These economic ties have been regulated within their ethnic group. They are the by AFIC since then. This export project has second largest immigrant group after the been contributing billions of dollars to the Italians, but their social integration is not Australian livestock industry (Yucel 2010, questioned. This raises the question of why 114). In 1991, the Australian Government Muslim integration gains more attention. sent a Muslim envoy to Saddam Hussein to secure the release of Australians who were refused permission to leave Iraq. In the early Although the Muslim population has dou- 1990s, Australian Muslim leaders successble the unemployment rate to that of the fully lobbied in Muslim countries to hold the national standard, its contribution to the 2000 Summer Olympics in Sydney. Locally, Australian economy is not insignificant. Turkish businessman, John Ilhan, set up the The higher rates may be due to the fact that Crazy John’s mobile phone retail chain and many Muslim immigrants arrive as refu- earned the title of the richest Australian ungees and unskilled laborers and have higher der 40 in 2003. fertility rates (Westoff and Frejika 2007, 785) so mothers tend to stay at home to The second generation of Muslims is betake care of their children in Western coun- coming more active in the political sphere. tries. Yaghoob Foroutan states that only Both the state parliaments of Victoria and a third of Muslim women work (Foroutan NSW had one self-identified Muslim, with 2008, 63). Unemployment among women Adem Somyurek serving in Victoria and is higher because of their need to look after Shaoquett Moselmane serving in NSW.6 their children. Even if they enrolled their Muslims enjoyed greater representation in 6 Broadcast on 2CH Sydney on 28 Feb 2010 103 TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 local government, mostly in areas with a high Muslim population (Al-Momani at all. 2010). Ed Husic was the first Muslim to be selected as a member of the federal parliament.7 How Muslims View Australia Prophet Muhammad stated that loving one’s country is part of faith. Muslim jurists defined the concept of country in three ways: watan al-asli, the country of origin or birth; watan al-sukna, the country of residence, and watan as-safari, the country you are visiting (Zuhayli 1990, 434). Modern scholars like Tariq Ramadan regard primarily the country of residence as their country. Ramadan believes that Western nations fulfill the following human rights better than Muslim dominant countries: a) The right to life and to a vital minimum b) The right to a family c) The right to housing d) The right to education e) The right to work f) The right for justice g) The right for solidarity These rights form the basic principles of society within Islam. (Ramadan 2001, 40) When these rights are granted, along with security and better economic opportunities, Muslim immigrants remain in the ‘new’ country despite discrimination, stereotyping and cultural differences. Ramadan poses this question, “Are we Muslims in the West or Western Muslims?” The first generation viewed themselves as the former while the second and further generations see themselves as the latter. As long as basic rights and opportunities are provided, Muslims will continue to feel a sense of loyalty and 7 belonging to their country of residence. As Prophet Muhammad said that loving your country derives from faith, he also said “The country where your sustenance is provided is your country.” Echoing these sentiments, a Somali woman living in Australia defines ‘country’ as follows: “The whole earth belongs to God. Wherever I earn my sustenance, feel safe, and can practice my religion that is my country” (McMichael 2002, 171). In order to live in harmony, Muslims have initiated projects to break down stereotypes and engaged in dialogue with members of other faiths. Interfaith and Intercultural Dialogue In response to the changing political atmosphere and prejudice, some Muslims have adopted a reactionary and defensive stance, while others have taken on an active role by engaging in dialogue. Based on interviews I have conducted, I classify Muslims into three groups with regard to their views on dialogue. The first group is against dialogue. To this group, entering into dialogue means compromising religion. This is a minority group and includes Salafi Muslims and some traditionalists. The second group engaged in dialogue due to political and social conditions, not out of necessity. The third group supports interfaith dialogue, believing it to be encouraged in the tradition of Prophet Muhammad. This group accepts that it is necessary to engage in dialogue in the post 9/11 world to reduce Islamophobia and prejudice. Australian Muslims were generally not active in interfaith dialogue before the September 11 terrorist acts. Since then, however, Muslims have understood the need to Thea Dikeos, First Muslim MP http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2010/s2994694.htm retrieved 08.23.2010 104 TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 interact with the greater community and express who they are and consequently set up interfaith organisations and committees. Oxford scholar Tariq Ramadan writes that it is essential for Muslims to engage in dialogue in pluralistic societies (Ramadan 2001, 200). Muslim umbrella organisations, mosques and Islamic schools began engaging in dialogue. The most active groups undertaking interfaith and intercultural dialogue are the Australian Intercultural Society (AIS)8 in Melbourne and Affinity Intercultural Foundation (AIF)9 in Sydney, whose establishment was inspired by the Turkish Islamic scholar, Fethullah Gulen, founder of a transnational faith-based movement. (Barton 2008) I interviewed the director and a few board members of both AIS and AIF. These two organisations have brought more than 50,000 Muslims and non-Muslims together through the following projects: Annual conferences on Abrahamic Faith, national cohesion, climate change, environment, family issues, peace and indigenous issues, interfaith and community issues. AIS and AIF have organized Ramadan iftar dinners with members of parliament, state police and community leaders, study tours to Rome, Istanbul, and Jerusalem, women’s interfaith networks, joint programs for national holidays such as ANZAC Day and Easter, interfaith programs between Muslim, Christian, and Jewish secondary schools, visits to houses of worship, home dinners with prominent persons in politics, academia, religion, media and sport. Some of these Ramadan iftar dinners are sponsored and organized by the state police, local parliament members, banks, universities, churches and NGOs. AIS and AIF also contributed to the establishment of the Jewish Christian Muslim Association in Melbourne and Sydney. The success of these dialogue-rich activities undertaken by Muslim organisations has contributed to social cohesion and reduced misunderstanding and prejudice. What can be Learnt From the Australian Experience? Muslim nations have not experienced any major conflict in their relationship with Japan. The image of Japan in the Muslim mind is more positive than that of other leading nations including Australia. At a Ramadan iftar dinner in Tokyo in 2007 that included Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda and ambassadors of Muslim countries, Qatari Ambassador Riad Ansari said that Japan enjoys credibility among Islamic and Arabic countries because they appreciate Japanese contributions, especially in the Palestinian issue.10 Despite this, Japan is not well known or understood in the Muslim world, nor does it enjoy the same political and cultural influence which countries such as the USA, UK and France do. There is a theory in diplomacy which states that “If you are not strong globally, you are not strong locally.” The number of Muslims living in Japan is small. Currently, there are between 55,00060,000 Muslims in Japan, including international students and temporary workers, which amounts to no more than 0.002% of the total population. An increase in the Muslim population in Japan would hold the following benefits: There are mutual aspects in Muslim and 8 For more information refer to website http://www.intercultural.org.au 9 For more information refer to website www.affinity.org.au Newsletter No. 769, October 17, 2007, Prime Minister Fukuda presides over an iftar, http://shingetsuinstitute. com/newsletter/october2007/october2007n769.htm retrieved 05.05.2011 10 105 TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 Japanese culture, particularly where family values are concerned. Practising Muslims inject spirituality and moral values into an increasingly materialistic society. They prompt others to live by their beliefs and principles, encourage family ties and promote obedience to and care for one’s parents. Muslims in Australia practise these principles that secure family stability and build strong relationships. This enhances social solidarity. Just as Australia and other Western nations have benefitted from Muslim immigrants in the diplomatic, economic and educational sphere, Japan might do likewise by strengthening ties with Muslim nations through increasing the number of Muslim immigrants. For integration to be successful there needs to be dialogue at state, academic and NGO level. If Muslims in Japan and the Japanese engaged in dialogue, it would increase Muslims’ sense of belonging and desire to contribute to Japan. This is important because Muslims are a minority in Japan. As in any community, a small group of Muslims may cause problems, but this does not mean that we should tar all Muslims and Islam with the same brush, as some conservative and right-wing groups in the West are inclined to do. Islam can be part of the solution – a major factor in successful integration of Muslims in Japan, a means of developing Japan’s relationship with Muslim countries and enhancing its international reputation. Finally, an increase in Muslims would bring balance to the large Buddhist and Christian minorities in Japan. Conclusion Throughout history, people have immigrated to other countries in search of a better life or refuge from war or persecution. Nations have sought or accepted refugees 106 for political, economic or humanitarian reasons. Because immigrants struggle to be fully accepted and have fewer resources and rights, they tend to work harder to gain citizenship rights and opportunities. A prime example would be the Jewish diaspora. For thousands of years, Jews did not have a homeland but contributed to their nations of residence in the areas of business and trade, science and arts. There was significant Muslim immigration in medieval times and it gave rise to great centres of learning in North Africa, Spain, Central Asia and Anatolia. Alongside their contributions to the economy, political life, science and the arts, Muslims became part of fabric society. Due to occupation, colonization, persecution and loss of economic opportunity in the 20th century, Muslims immigrated in waves, mainly to Western countries. The success of Muslim immigration and the large-scale contribution made to other nations in medieval times have not yet been replicated by Muslims. There are signs, however, that this will occur in time. In the 1960s and 1970s, only marginal groups in Australia opposed Muslim immigration. After the September 11 terrorist attacks, gradually more of the mainstream population opposed Muslim immigration. Despite this, a conservative Australian government, the John Howard government, approved of the immigration of thousands of Afghans who are considered to be conservative and even extremist by the West. Other Western nations such as Germany and France also accepted Afghan immigrants. This marks a contradiction between national attitudes and government actions which can only indicate that the Australian and other Western governments recognise that Muslim immigration is in the national interest, most likely because they acknowledge that its benefits exceed its shortcomings. TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 Despite the anti-Muslim sentiments, Muslims in Australia, especially the second generation, are gradually making their presence felt in the economy, in politics and social life and contributing to Australia while enhancing Australia’s reputation abroad. Japan could benefit from the Australian version of Muslim immigration. Note: An earlier version of this paper was presented at an international conference titled “Japanese Society Encounter Islam” at Kokugakuin University in Tokyo in 1-2 October in 2010 References Barton, Greg. 2008. Islam, Dialogue and the Gülen Movement in Australia, http://en.fgulen.com/conference-papers/gulen-conference-in-washington-dc/3109islam-dialogue-and-the-gulen-movement-in-australia retrieved 11.08.2010 Jenkins, Alfred, Harry. 1993.Page: 2848, http:// parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/summary/summary.w3p;adv=;group=;orderBy=customrank;page=0;q uery=Turkish%20immigrants;querytype=;resCount=D efault retrieved on 08.07.2010 Celermajer, Danielle. 2007. “If Islam is our other, who are ‘we’?,” Australian Journal of Social Issues 42 (1):106- 118 Al‐Momani, Kais, Dados,Nour, Maddox,Marion, Wise, Amanda. 2010. Political Participation of Muslim in Australia, June 2010 For detail information of the report http://www.immi.gov.au/media/publications/ multicultural/pdf_doc/political-participation-muslims. pdf retrieved 09.13.2010 Chowdhury, Nayeefa. 2006. Presenting Islam: The role of Australia-Based Muslim Student Associations, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 26 (2) :13-22 Collins, Jock. 2003. Immigrant Crime in Europe and Australia: Rational or Racialised Responses? Paper presented to conference entitled The Challenges of Immigration and Integration in the European Union and Australia, 18-20 February .2003. University of Sydney it is available on http:// dspace.anu.edu.au/bitstream/1885/41423/2/collins_ paper.pdf retrieved on 15.07.2010 Herald Sun, 17 March. 2007. Pauline Hanson Muslim warning Kabir, Nahid, A. 2004. Muslims in Australia: Immigration, Race Relations and Cultural History, Kegan Paul , London Kabir, Nahid, A. 2006. “Muslims in a ‘white Australia’: Colour or religion?” Immigrants and Minorities 24(2 ): 194 Dikeos, Thea. 2010. First Muslim MP http:// www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2010/s2994694.htm retrieved 08.23.2010 Kabir, Nahid, A. 2008. “To be or not to be an Australian: Focus on Muslim youth,” National Identities 10 (4):399 – 419 Foroutan , Yaghoob. 2008. Women’s Employment, Religion and Multiculturalism: Socio-demographic Emphasis, Journal of Population Research 25.(1):63-86 Khoo, S. Birrell, B. Heard, G. 2009. “Intermarriages by birthplace and ancestry in Australia,” People and Place, 17 (1):15-28 Haveric, Dzavid. 2006. Australia in Muslim Discovery, Historical rediscovering of Australia by non-Muslims and Muslims, Deakin University, Geelong, Kurt, James. 2008. “Domestic Security and Muslim Immigrants,” Journal of The Historical Society, 2 ( 3-4) :409 – 419 Humphrey, Michael. 2007. Culturalising the abject: Islam, law and moral panic in the West, Australian Journal of Social Issues 42 (1 ):9-23 Little, Adrian and Morsi. 2009. “Liberalism and identity construction for young, educated Muslims in Australia.” (This paper was presented Australasian Political Studies Association Annual Conference , Macquarie University, Sydney, 28-30 September 2009; It is available on http://www.pol.mq.edu.au/apsa/papers/ Non refereed%20papers/Morsi%20and%20Little%20 Liberalism%20and%20identity%20construction%20... Muslims%20in%20Australia.pdf retrieved 19.08.2010 Humphrey, Michael. 2010. “Securitisation, Social Inclusion and Muslims in Australia in Muslims in Australia,” The Dynamic of Exclusion and Inclusion edited by Samina Yasmeen, Melbourne University Press Humphrey, Michael. 1998. Islam, Multiculturalism and Transnationlism: from the Lebanese Diaspora, London, Centre for Lebanese Studies with I.B. Tauris, 107 TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 McMichael, Celia. 2002. “Everywhere is Allah’s Place: Islam and Everyday Life of Somali women in Melbourne,” Australia Journal of refugees studies, 15 (2):171-189 Tariq Ramadan, Tariq. 2001. Islam, the West and the Challenges of Modernity. Trans by Said Amghar, The Islamic Foundation. London Quadrant, Editorial: Why future Muslim migration to Australia must be halted urgently. Spring 2005 Saeed, Abdullah. 2003. Islam in Australia, Allen & Unwin, NSW Salant Jonathan D. 2010. 14 July The Herald Sun, Stevens, Christine. 1989. Tin Mosques and Ghantowns: A History of Afghan Cameldrivers in Australia, Oxford University Press, Oxford Stratton, Jon. 1998. Australia in identity crisis, Pluto Press Australia, NSW Sunier, Thijl. 2003. Explaining the reaction of nations to religious newcomers, Paper to be presented at the workshop ‘Paths of Integration’, Osnabrück, 19-21 June 2003 http://www.polsci.indiana.edu/iwest/blpolsincomingfiles/soper1.pdf retrieved on 07.18.2010 Welch, Michael. 2006. Scapegoats of September 11, Rutgers University Press, New Jersey Westoff, Charles. F. and Frejika, Thomas. 2007. Religiousness and Fertility among European Muslims, Population and development Review 33 (4):785-809 Woodlock, Rachel. 2010. “Muslim the focus of misplace of fear,” The Age, Feb 20. Yucel, Salih. 2010. The Struggle of Ibrahim: Biography of an Australian Muslim, Tughra Books, New Jersey Zuhayli, Vehbe. 1990. Islam Fikhi Ansiklopedisi (Islamic Jurisprudence Encyclopedia) V. 2 Risale, Istanbul, (This piece was translated from Turkish by the author) 108 TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 Instrumentalist Use of Journalism in Imposing the Kemalist Hegemonic Worldview and Educating the Masses in the Early Republican Period İhsan Yılmaz and Begüm Burak Fatih University, iyilmaz@fatih.edu.tr - Fatih University, bburak@fatih.edu.tr Abstract This paper analyses hegemonic use of the press in the process of top-down Kemalist modernization in the early periods of the Turkish Republic that is characterized by one party rule between early 1920s and 1950. In addition to helping Westernization attempts of the Kemalists, the press in this period also was hegemonically engaged in vilification of the past. Moreover, intolerant attitude towards pluralism and plurality of views was the discursive norm of the Turkish press at that time. The journalism and the press in the early years of the Republic had consistently supported the new regime which was committed to social engineering. This issue could unfortunately find little space in political science literature on Turkey. First of all, a theoretical framework concerning Gramscian theory of hegemony vis-à-vis media will be presented in this paper. Then, Turkish modernization history will be covered shortly, and lastly, in a more detailed way, the role of journalism and the press as an instrument in hegemonic modernization process in the early Republican period will be quested. Keywords Gramsci, Hegemony, Turkey, Media, Press, Journalism, Islam, Modernization 109 TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 Introduction: The Media’s Role in Maintaining Hegemony The biggest strength of hegemony theory is its sensitivity to how history, culture and ideology can give rise to forces that stabilize and legitimize authoritarian regimes (Sim 2004, 19). Gramsci (1971) recognized that the stability and cohesion of Western societies could not depend on only fear (Femia 1983, 347). The basic premise of the theory of hegemony is that man is not ruled by force alone, but also by ideas (Bates 1975, 351). Physical domination is not enough; there is a need for spiritual supremacy as well (Femia 1983, 346). The concept of hegemony means political leadership based on the consent of the led, a consent which is secured by the diffusion and popularization of the world view of the ruling class (Bates 1975, 352). Hegemony refers to the consensual basis of any given political regime within civil society, i.e., roughly what Weber meant by legitimation, though with a greater sensitivity to the interweaving of consent and culture (Adamson 1980, 627). Those who obey must, to some degree, share the values and standards of their ‘superiors’, and consent to their own subordination. Hegemony therefore signifies the control of social life (by a group or a class) through cultural, as opposed to physical, means (Femia 1983, 346). Elites attempt to secure consensus so that their rule would appear just and natural. The hegemonic group represents a theoretical self-perception, a ‘philosophy’ (Buckel and Fischer-Lescano 2009, 441). The state is no longer simple coercion, no longer the organized force of the ruling class used to maintain its supremacy over subordinate groups (Fontana 2002, 168). In media studies, ‘hegemony’ refers to the ways in which the media influences in- 110 dividuals’ minds to consent to status quo power structures. Gramsci believed the media had a vital role in inculcating individuals to do things in their everyday lives that would support the establishment. Even though there are some disagreements over the precise nature of hegemony, it is widely perceived “that emphasis is on the cultural and ideological modes produced by the institutions dominated by ruling elites” (Altheide 1984, 477). Media helps perpetuating an economically, culturally and ideologically biased consciousness and all of society is thus effectively dominated by the false logic and consciousness through the instrumentalist use of media (Altheide 1984, 477). The Gramscian sense of hegemony refers to moral and intellectual direction alone, and hegemonic rule should not be confused with rule by coercion (Femia 1979, 482). Hegemony is related to the mechanisms and processes by which knowledge and beliefs are first, produced, and second, disseminated in order to maintain the rule of the elite by gaining the consent of the masses (Fontana 2005, 98). Hegemony is a permanent practice that concentrates on “ideological struggles for recognition, through which moral, political, and intellectual leadership is established” (Buckel and Fischer-Lescano 2009, 442). The ruling elite “is able to clutter the minds of the masses with mystifications and distortions (i.e., establish its hegemony) because it controls this apparatus of transmission” (Femia 1983, 348). From the hegemony theory’s perspective, culture is a site of continuous struggles that result in “no final, once-and-for-all victories and that cannot be reduced to economic determinations” (Cupples et al 2007, 787). The processes of discursive contestation whereby particular ideological formations TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 dominate the public sphere that allows no room for alternative and competing discourses and visions for society (Cupples et al 2007, 787). This domination is secured by the ideological apparatuses of the state like schools, churches, or media that make hegemony more acceptable (Mattei 2003, 5). The media also plays crucial roles in bringing “the overwhelming majority of citizenry into line and to marginalize the dissenters through a campaign of vilification” (Buttigieg 2005, 46) Media has an important role in justifying the establishment rule by supporting its claims to superiority, and in persuading the ruled to consent to the status quo. People who formulate and disseminate ideas (such as journalists, priests, public relations companies, politicians, advisers, and academics) “are constantly engaged in interpreting current events and debates so as to fit dominant conceptions and categories (not always conspiratorially)” (Harris 2007, 2101). Journalists can also unwittingly promote hegemony by using hegemony’s cultural categories and symbols as they do their work, even though in most cases as part of the ruling elite, journalists employ “these codes consciously and strategically to promote dominant ideological interests” (Chaney, 1981,117, cited in Altheide 1984, 478). Turkish Modernization The Ottoman Empire was a bureaucratic empire. The ruling class was strictly controlled by the center. In parallel to that, while the empire was dissolving, the elites who started to build a nation-state and modernize it were not of the bourgeoisie but of the bureaucrats (Keyder 1993, 3). The modernization of the Ottoman Empire emerged with the Westernization of the bureaucrats (Mardin 1973, 179). Thus, in Turkish political culture an elitist aspect has always existed (Frey 1965, 43). As a natural result of this, Turkish modernization has been mentioned together with Turkish intellectuals or elites. After Tanzimat, with the replacement of the Ulema by the modernizing elites, the reforms changed in form and quality, and a series of changes in a ‘top-down’ process affected the whole society. The West’s political, military and economic successes were not recognized until the Ottoman Empire started to decline. Along with the military defeats, the idea of implementing some reforms in the context of technology came into being. While discussing over the issue of “Can the technology be imported without importing the culture of the Western world?” The reforms carried out also revealed Ottoman Empire’s envy for the West in its attempts to get modernized. The point that must be emphasized here is that, modernization was carried out in a ‘top-down’ fashion in Kautsky’s (1972) words by a group of “modernizers”. The intellectuals and artists who in fact must have been analysts owned a collective identity with a view to transform the society and they became ‘ideologues’ (Göle 2000). The Western powers could indirectly and to some extent directly affect the Ottoman modernization through these people. Also, the debts of the Empire were used as a tool in manipulating modernization movements. The Noble Edict of the Rose Garden (Gülhane Hatt-ı Hümayunu) in 1839 can be seen as one of the most radical aspects of the modernization movements. Despite the fact that its rhetoric is totally Islamic, the text has a completely secular character announced by Mustafa Reşit Pasha. Moreover, some Ottoman intellectuals in their novels at that time, conserved the Islamic episte- 111 TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 mology while also putting a passive role on modernity. Another edict (Islahat Fermanı) declared in 1859 brought the idea of “nation-state” into the Empire despite the risk of Empire’s collapse. Meanwhile, the new Ottomans with their publications released from Europe, eclectically defended the ideas of democracy, parliamentarism, constitutionalism, secularism and liberalism. New Ottomans who used Islam as a source of legitimacy struggled to bring new themes and concepts to the Empire. For instance, Namık Kemal tried to reach a consensus between Islam and parliamentarism by showing that consultation (Meşveret) in Islam is harmonious with parliamentarism. The Islamism which was adopted by the new Ottomans had emerged in an ideological form as a result of the interaction between the ideological thinking of the West and traditional values (Türköne 1994, 25). Briefly, the new Ottomans aimed to reach a more modern, secular and Western type of political system (Kara 1994, 62). In this context, it can be asserted that even positivism had been introduced with the new Ottomans (Köker 1994, 222). What the new Ottomans desired, happened in 1876 and a constitution (Kanun-i Esasi) entered into force. However, this step was not seen sufficient and the elites in the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) got the control of political power through a military coup in 1908. Thus, the political power of the bureaucracy and the elites had been established. The Young Turks and the CUP evidently declared that they had been the inheritors of the new Ottomans in terms of modernization (Hanioğlu 1985, 36). The nationalist discourse as one of the effects of modernization was firstly pronounced by the elites, Turkish nationalism was used against the nationalist attitudes of 112 minorities. The publications such as Turkish Association (Türk Derneği), Young Pens (Genç Kalemler), Turkish Homeland (Türk Yurdu), Islam Magazine (İslam Mecmuası) tried to prove that nationalism had been the most rational one in “Three Types of Policy” (Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset) (Mardin 1992a, 275). Besides, the language was simplified, through these simplification attempts with the help of social communication channels, the masses were tried to make mobilized for modernization (Mardin 1992b, 143). Consequently, the elites had strengthened their hands while drifting apart from the society. For example, “The Young Turks started to have feelings of hatred towards the idea of populism and got engaged in elitist attitudes”(Hanioğlu 1985, 613). It is possible to assert that, most of the revolutions carried out in the early years of the Republic including that of adopting the Latin alphabet and abolishing the Caliphate were planned in this era. From this perspective, it can be understood that most of the revolutions seen with the introduction of the Republican Regime do not constitute a radical change. These reforms differ from the previous ones in the context of their ability to exercise sanctions. Unlike the previous decades, in the Republican era the revolutions were imposed to the masses in a ‘top-down’ fashion. In Weber’s words “the bureaucratization of the political authority” had started in as early as in 1908. From then on, the impact of Islam on state was minimized and even folk Islam was controlled. The Kemalist “Republican elite’s passion for modernization, seen as an escape from backwardness, translated itself into a total dislike and distrust of all things associated with the ancient regime and the old way of life. Topping the long list of suspect establishments were religion and religious institutions” (Yilmaz 2005, 387). TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 The reform movements concerning the language were radicalized in the early years of the new regime and with the introduction of the Latin alphabet, a total break from the past was witnessed. In addition, with a new conception of history, a new secular Turkish history was rewritten. After the War of Independence, Westernization was seen as the second goal. The positivist understanding inherited from the Young Turks was kept alive through the revolutions carried out by Kemalist elites. Apart from that solidarism paved the way for the legitimization of the single-party rule (Köker 1994, 234-235). Also, the people appointed for the bureaucratic cadres were chosen from the enthusiastic people towards modernity, because bureaucracy was seen as an important agent for change (Heper 1977, 70). Kemalists did not want to rule Turkish society by means of traditions, and social convictions and symbols and they “preferred to create a new ideology and symbols which would permit Turkey to progress rapidly into the twentieth century” (Ahmad 1993, 56). They were very clear in their minds about the pace of modernization: “to reach the level of contemporary European civilization, the Western way of life had to be espoused and imported with all kind of its institutions including laws” (Yilmaz 2002, 114). In parallel with this, it was also obvious that the opposing elements for the new regime were treated very harshly. The nationalist discourse which Kemalism has tried to establish opposed liberalism and pluralism as well as neglecting the idea of civil society (Göle 1994, 130). Even today, as Yilmaz (2009, 109) puts is succinctly, There are both de jure and de facto constraints in the name of Kemalism limiting a fully functioning democ- racy in Turkey. The 1982 constitution, which was prepared after the Sept. 12, 1980 military coup, severely limits the democratic power of parliament and elected government compared to Western democracies. Until very recently, through the National Security Council the military had direct influence on the government. A parallel military court structure with even a Supreme Court of Appeals which has no equivalent in the West makes even a black-letter civilian control of the military impossible… It is also a fact that there have always been civilian supporters of such a Kemalist autocracy among elite circles such as the media, politics, business and even judiciary. The institutions which produced this socio-political climate tried to transmit the messages of the new regime to the public via education. To serve this aim, the press was used in an effective way. Journalism in Imposing the Hegemonic Worldview and Educating the Masses The mass communication as well as press and publishing have a firm relationship with modernization and Westernization project in Turkey. Publishing, above all, is one of the reform movements following the West; it is known that, publishing has been employed in order to motivate other reforms. However, what is more important is that, while the Republican elites were trying to carry out the social-engineering projects through revolutions in the early years of modernization, they did not just enact laws, but also used mass communication instruments as an efficient tool to make the modernization project get a wide support among the masses. 113 TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 In another sense, the Republican regime like any other regimes, from the very beginning, got engaged in the legitimization of itself and adopting itself to the public. Like any other regimes, it used the press as a tool to serve this aim (Kabacalı 1987, 78). The supreme interests of the State pulled the journalists to getting engaged in shortcuts, and because of the notion of “interest”, the journalists turned into an identity of a civil servant (Kongar 1986, 46). Besides, modernity had been defended, and a consensus had been made about reaching the “level of modern civilizations”. Under the name of “Ottoman”, the traditional had been discredited, and the Western culture had been put in the foreground. The revolutions had been defended and the cultural metamorphosis of the masses had been tried to be effectuated via the press. On the other hand, the antagonists had been accused of being “ignoble” (Kabacalı 1994, 151). Moreover, the antagonists’ rights to have a voice in politics were quite limited until 1946. The journalist-deputies had tried to legitimate the new regime and the political power with their publications, while seeing the demand for a second political party as a divisive behavior. (Güvenir 1991, 70, 74). In addition to that, it was evidently declared that a second political party would pave the way for “reactionary trends”. The period of the Republican era until 1946 witnessed the steering of the press including that of magazines too within the boundaries of the new regime. The starting point of this steering came into being with the trials of the journalist referring to the Caliphate. With the introduction of the “Law of Maintenance of Order” in 1925, the press in Istanbul was put under strict control; the newspapers representing the Islamic stand or extreme left were closed down. Some journalists were sent to exile, and all newspapers adopting liberal or socialist positions were closed 114 down. The magazines published between the years of 1923 and 1950 had the following sub-titles: - Praise to the regime and political authority -Passion for modernity and technology -Empowerment of women -Popularization of upper culture (Oktay 1995, 58-62). Those magazines tried to loosen the ties with the past by emphasizing the superiority of the Western technology and by pushing the masses towards a radical modernization. The issues such as the mandatory Greek classes, skating, employment life and factories, urbanism, nationalist ideology, gymnastics and television were all undertaken by the members of the press (Topuz 1973, 137). During the time of War of Independence, the press had played a major role too. For example, Mustafa Kemal paved the way for the publication of “National Will” (İrade-i Milliye). This journal published in 1919 was used to make the decisions taken in Sivas Congress gain a widespread audience. Moreover, the journal called “New Day” (Yeni Gün) which was published by Yunus Nadi was one of the most important publications that supported the War of Independence. Besides, in most of the Anatolian provinces, national struggle was supported by the press. In 1920, in order to inform the Turkish public and foreign public about the process of national struggle, a news agency called “Anatolian Agency” was founded. Even though Ankara became the capital city after 1923, Istanbul remained as the center of the press. Mustafa Kemal in order to un- TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 derline the key role of the press in the modernization and Westernization process gave a speech to the journalists in 1924: Turkish press should build an iron wall around the Turkish Republic as a reflection of the nation’s real voice and will. A wall of ideas, a wall of mind… Our nation has a right to demand this from the members of the press. It is a must for the whole nation to be in a sincere union and solidarism (Topuz 1973, 142). It was obvious that the modernization project was not welcomed by a majority of the masses. Hence, one of the influential journalists of the time-being – Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın – who was judged in the Independence Tribunals (İstiklal Mahkemeleri), while defending himself said that “Am I not republican? Am I not secular? Am I not progressive? Do I not favor democracy? How can you complain about me?” (Köktener 2004, 68). The new regime had wanted all the new publications to work with the aim to help the modernization project. Also the opposing publications were repressed. After the Sheikh Said Rebellion with the enactment of the law of “Maintenance of Order”, all the opposing press was hushed. A newspaper called “Tomorrow” which was favoring the Free Republican Party was closed down. The experience of the opposing press lasted as long as the life of the opposing political parties at that time. “With the press out of the way, on the advice of the Independence Tribunal the government closed down the Progressive Republican Party on 3 June. According to the tribunal, members of the party had supported the rebellion and tried to exploit religion for political purposes” (Zurcher 2004, 172). All newspapers and periodicals leaning towards the liberal or socialist opposition had been closed down in 1925 and from then on only the government-controlled newspapers appeared since the adoption of a new press law that gave the government to close down any paper that published anything contradicting the “general policies of the country” (Zurcher 2004,180). Even though the press had acted in a monolithic way in supporting the modernization project, some journalists revealed a heavier effort compared to others. For instance, despite the existence of almost the whole press’ support for Mustafa Kemal, the role of the newspaper called “Republic” (Cumhuriyet) had been a distinguished one. (Köktener 2004, 70). That newspaper tried to support each single new law and social change ((Köktener 2004, 69). For instance, when the reform of the alphabet was experienced, the newspaper published an article called “The New Writing” on the very first page and it was emphasized that the adoption of the Latin Alphabet had been the main step towards Westernization ((Köktener 2004, 70). “It must be known that with this reform Turkey will completely resemble to Europe holding the key of civilization.” (Kavaklı 2005, 65) Another newspaper called “The Evening” which was first published in 1918, in its first volume with the new alphabet declared that with this the reform of the alphabet; the country would get rid of ignorance (Kavaklı 2005, 51). It was easily seen that the newspaper called “The Evening” played a key role in making the masees adopt the revolutions and Kemalist principles (Kavaklı 2005, 51). The publishing policy of the newspaper was to educate the masses in the light of Western values and to help the new regime transform the masses in line with Kemalist principles. The radical reform movements carried out in the fields of art, education and economics 115 TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 were placed in the first pages of the newspaper (Kavaklı 2005, 51). As noted, this newspaper had adopted a publishing policy that served the interests of modernization project enthusiastically (Kavaklı 2005, 68). “The newspaper that supported the social change had revealed progressive attitudes by gently focusing on cultural and artistic issues” (Çavdar 1995, 302). The press constitutes the main pillar of the cultural revolutions. The president called the whole Turkish people for a cultural campaign. He declared that they could make the national culture stand in the same level with Western civilizations. The press of Turkey would play a major role in this process (İskit 1939, 224). In the 1930s, radio broadcasting started as a state-run enterprise and was mandated to “define and promote a common and collective agenda for modernization” (Oncu 1995, 55). The radio was used as an instrument of indoctrination (Alankuş-Kural 1995, 105-106). It “acted to reinforce unified understandings and experiences across the nation that could easily be formed and manipulated by those transmitting the messages” (Wuthrich 2010, 221). When the Turkish Press Congress was held in 1935, 116 newspapers and 127 magazines were being published. However, all of these publications were to defend the discourse of the ‘top-down’ modernization process. The opposing elements in the press were not given any right to survive despite being modern and Western oriented. According to the press congress, the newspapers were defined as follows: In 1931, the journal called “The Cadre” was published to legitimize the new regime. The Cadre explained the purpose of itself in the following words: “In this mysterious process that the world is going through, to keep the revolutions alive and strong is our first duty. The Cadre is alive for this reason” (Er 2003, 91). The first press law enacted in 1931 put a heavy pressure on the press. The legal amendments made in 1938, besides censorship brought limitations for the people working in the press. According to the press law, the publications could be abolished any time the council of ministers wanted (Topuz 1973, 152). In this new environment, the state declared what it wanted the press to do in many times: It wanted the press to serve the modernization project (Er 2003, 75). (See also Topuz 2003, 113). With a circular sent to all of the members of the press, the press was declared as the vehicle of the social engineering process: 116 a) The most powerful tool of propaganda in making the revolutions to gain a widespread support among the public. b) A tool of defense against reactionary attitudes. c) A servant for the incumbent governments. d) The most effective school in the political, economic and cultural education of the masses (İnuğur 1992, 108). During the Second World War, some kind of front line similar to that seen in the national struggle was witnessed. Some newspapers were defending democracy whereas some others were on the side of Germany. In 1945, some newspapers that had a leftist tendency were abolished. Contemporary scholars argue that this had been an operation of the deep state. TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 Conclusion The question of hegemony is also a question of new cultural order (Hall 1988, 145). It also focuses on “the question of whose version of reality is being universalized and which alternatives are rendered unthinkable” (Sim 2004, 7). In this sense, in the Kemalist westernization project, which is a top-down hegemonic socio-cultural transformation process, the Kemalist bureaucratic elite that gained the upper hand after 1923 espoused the view that “modernization” and “progress” consisted mainly of the cultural transformation of society. They firmly believed that European-style civilization was “the pinnacle of progress, and they hurried to adopt the symbols of the European civilization” (Karpat 2004, 228). Kemalists, as the main successors of Jacobinist and positivist Young Turks, firmly believed that socio-cultural “change must be imposed from the top and should be directed towards altering the traditional institutions, organizations, and, especially, culture, as these were regarded as the chief hindrance to progress” (Karpat 2004, 217). Kemalists aimed at creating a nationalist “Turkish culture to replace the Islamic culture which the reformers sought to sweep away” (Karpat 2004, 219). The Kemalists viewed themselves as the educator of the masses and established a political tutelage regime “designated to educate the masses in the rudiments of modern politics” (Karpat 2004, 227). This was some kind of a vulgar process of intellectual civilizing (Landy 2008, 129). The realization of this social engineering process “was considered possible only through intellectual conversion” (Karpat 2004, 229). Kemalists wanted radical change first, and democracy only after Turks had come to realize, through Kemalist leadership and education, their true role as patriotic citizens (Dodd 1992: 18). Both the press and the educational institutions were mobilized to implement this project (Zurcher 2004, 181). The press in the early Republican period was used as a socio-political manipulation tool of mass communication. The press had consistently supported the new regime and Western-oriented policies. The journalists reflected the Jacobin and elitist spirit of modernization in their articles and columns. They acted in a monolithic way and gave no permission and “column” to the opposition. Plurality and freedom of press were the two missing links that characterize this era. Another dimension of the media hegemony is that the media frames a negative image of other countries, civilizations, cultures, traditions and religions (cf. Schlesinger, 1978; Beharrell et al., 1976, Gitlin, 1980; Dahlgren, 1982). In the early Republican Turkish case, this was done with regard to the Middle Eastern societies, Muslim cultures, practicing Muslims, Muslim religious functionaries, Sufi brotherhoods, and several public manifestations of Islam which were considered anathema to the Kemalist modernization project. Put it differently, they were made “the constitutive other” of the Kemalist modernization project. In most cases, rather than challenging these directly, the Kemalists made use of an empty signifier: the notion of “reactionarism” (irtica). Kemalist discourse takes the meaning of reactionism as opposition to the existing secular system, but it refers to a social order built on Islamic values, norms and principles (Dursun 2006, 174). What is more, “it has become a signifier for the ‘irrational’ dimensions of Islam” (Dursun 2006, 174). On the other hand, with the victory of United States after the Second World War, the wave of democratization came to Tur- 117 TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 2 No. 1 Summer 2011 key and made it adopt a multi-party system. With the introduction of the democratic political life, the Turkish press and press elites had to transform themselves (for this pseudo-transformation see now Ozden and References Adamson, Walter L. 1980. “Gramsci’s Interpretation of Fascism”, Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 41(4), pp. 615-633. Ahmad, Feroz. 1993. 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