The Transboundary Water Issues Between Syria and Turkey

The Transboundary Water Issues Between Syria and Turkey Filippo Verre Topographic maps of Middle East and Iraq Iraqi topography 2 Iraqi topography Iraqi topography 3 Iraqi fresh water reservoirs Lake Buhayrat al-Thartar. Surface: 2,710 km² Lake Milh. Surface: 1562 km² Lake Qadisiyah. Shore length: 100 km. Euphrates River catchment area Estimates of the area of the Euphrates drainage basin vary widely: from a low 233.000 km² to a high 766.000 km² The river catchment area in Turkey is about 125.000 km², 28.2% The river catchment area in Syria is only 7.600 km², 7.1% The river catchment area in Iraq is approximately 177.000 km², 39.9% Topographic map of Syria Syrian topography Lake Assad. Surface: 610 km² The beginning of hydric tensions: the Turkish Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi (GAP) Launched in 1977, the GAP is a huge hydraulic infrastructure project which includes 22 dams and 19 hydroelectric power plants on the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers. 25% of the country’s water potential is located in the GAP region. GAP projection in Turkey The GAP is one of the most prominent irrigation and development ideas in the world. The project was initially designed as a hydropower generation and irrigational development program while, in the late 1980’s, it evolved into an integrated regional development project to increase socio-economic prosperity in South Eastern Anatolia. GAP projection in the Middle East The first skirmishes The Syrian leadership accused Turkey to purposely threaten the water supply of the Arab country, being Ankara the hegemonic riparian State due to its favorable geographical position. GAP hydropower plants On the other hand, the Turks claimed their right to exploit their portion of the river to increase the life standards of its citizens and the economic performance of Eastern Anatolia, which has historically been underdeveloped compared to the Western part of the country GAP hydropower plants The first geopolitical clashes The first serious water related crisis between the Euphrates-Tigris riparian States arose shortly after Syria and Turkey finalized the Tabqa Dam and the Keban Dam, respectively. Tabqa Dam The Turkish activities upstream of the Euphrates had already reduced the flow of the river by approximately 50% Syria, led by the Baathist leader Hafez al-Assad, considered such a reduction very dangerous for its regular requirements, while Iraq assessed this flow cut to be unbearable Keban Dam The first geopolitical clashes 2 At first, the nations involved sought a diplomatic solution and started multiple negotiations, especially Syria and Turkey, which eventually led to an ad hoc established committee: the Joint Technical Committee (JTC). Hydric plants on the Euphrates Nevertheless, no agreement was reached between the regional powers and tension continued to mount, reaching its peak after Syria threatened to bomb the Tabqa Dam and Iraq and Syria moved troops to their shared border in 1974. Hydric plants on the Euphrates Following the diplomatic intervention of Saudi Arabia aimed at moderating the opponents, Iraq and Syria found a peaceful solution when Syria agreed to let 40% of the Euphrates water it received from Turkey run off to Iraq during the initial impounding of the Tabqa Dams reservoir The tensions of the 80s: on the verge of conflict The meetings of the JTC were arranged again in 1980’s. At that time, the agenda of particular concern was the discussion about the Atatürk Dam. This project started in 1983 on the Turkish shores of Euphrates and was completed in 1990. Atatürk Dam Built both to generate electricity and to irrigate the plains in the region, it was renamed in honor of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881– 1938), the founder of the Turkish Republic. As a result, the reservoir created behind the dam, called Lake Atatürk Dam, turned into the third largest in Turkey and one of the most relevant freshwater sources for millions of Anatolian inhabitants Lake Atatürk Dam When the Turks began the initial impounding of the Atatürk Dam’s reservoir in early 1990, Ankara reduced the Euphrates’ flow to about 65 m3/sec in the second half of January and to about 50 m3/sec in the first half of February. As a justification for such a measure, Turkey argued that this massive reduction was necessary for technical reasons The Syrian-Turkish Protocol on Economic Cooperation: 1987 The JTC failed to formalize a comprehensive allocation of the Euphrates’ waters. However, Syria and Turkey reached an agreement in 1987, the Syrian-Turkish Protocol on Economic Cooperation, which in its article 6 required Turkey to maintain a minimum flow of the Euphrates of 500 m3/second at the Syrian-Turkish border The Protocol on economic cooperation signed between Turkey and Syria was an important turning point in terms of addressing the transboundary water issues affecting the Euphrates basin. Topography of Turkey, Syria and Iraq The agreement established between Turkey and Syria had positive outcomes also for Iraq, the third riparian State involved in the matter. Specifically, the two countries agreed that 58% of the water released by Turkey from the Euphrates would be allocated to Iraq Tensions over the Turkish Birecik Dam The Birecik Dam is a large infrastructure upstream of Birecik town, 80 km west of Province of Şanlıurfa in southern Anatolia. The Syrians accused Turkey of both letting untreated polluted water runoff into Syria and constructing dams without consulting the governments of Baghdad and Damascus, as was supposed to occur following the 1987 agreement. The Birecik Dam On the other hand, Turkey openly dismissed these accusations and argued that the Birecik Dam in fact served the interests of the lower riparian States, since it could be used as an after-bay dam to balance fluctuations in the Euphrates’ flow caused by the Keban Dam and the Atatürk Dam The Birecik hydroelectric power plant Hydric-geopolitical tensions: the Kurdish issue In July 1979, Öcalan fled to Syria where he remained until October 1998 in order to escape from Turkish persecution. The diplomatic and political protection granted to the Kurdish ideologist by the Syrian government exacerbated an already complicated relationship between Ankara and Damascus Abdullah Öcalan The water tensions raised over the construction of Turkish GAP and the issue related to the protection granted to a terrorist (according to Ankara’s stances) created the perfect environment for a violent war between two relevant regional powers Abdullah Öcalan in Syria The Adana Security Protocol in 1998: a diplomatic thaw The Adana Agreement was concluded between Turkey and Syria on October 20th 1998 in the Turkish City of Adana and put an end to a period of serious tensions between the two countries Ankara, in order to prevent the Syrians from giving support to Kurdish fighters, during the most intense phases of the crisis with Damascus, threatened to use its dams to reduce the river’s flow by 100%. Because of that, Syria decided to stop its collaboration with the Kurdish leader and interrupted the cooperation with PKK. Following the Adana Protocol, Syria prohibited any activity which could be considered as a threat to the security and stability of Turkey. In addition, Damascus interrupted any form of financial or material support for the group to be delivered via its territory Lax international legislation on water issues Despite the increasing relevance of water resources the international community has hitherto failed to provide a reliable and strong legislation aimed at managing properly the exploitation of the ‘blue oil’ In 1997, the UN attempted to establish a framework convention on the issue, the UN Watercourse Convention but it has not entered into force yet due to the insufficient number of ratifications Legal and diplomatic tensions Both Iraq and Syria have welcomed the UN document, as they are two disadvantages riparian countries located downstream on the course of Euphrates Turkey strongly opposed the UN Watercourse Convention, due to the limitation that it could pose to the realization of its national interests Specifically, Damascus and Baghdad looked favorably to article five (doctrine of equitable utilization), article seven (no-harm rule) and article eleven (obligation to prior notification), since they hoped to maintain a satisfactory share of water notwithstanding Turkish developmental plans. The Friendship Dam on the Orontes River Since 1998, Turkey and Syria established peaceful and pacific bonds that further developed in a positive way between 2000 and 2011. This enabled the two nations to approach water issues in a cooperative perspective. The course of the Orontes river In 2009 Turkey held high-level strategic cooperation meetings with Syria in order to develop mutual projects concerning the construction of hydric infrastructures. On this point, a joint dam between Turkey and Syria on the border on the Orontes River was decided to be constructed: the Friendship Dam. Hatay Province The Friendship Dam on the Orontes River 2 Following the 1998 Protocol, the two riparian countries’ relations improved considerably, both politically and economically. In this respect, on December 22nd 2004 Damascus and Ankara signed two important treaties The Agreement on Avoidance of Double Taxation The Agreement on Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investment In 2009, the Syrian Minister of Irrigation and the Turkish Minister of Environment signed a memorandum of understanding for the construction of a joint dam on the Orontes River under the name Friendship Dam. The Friendship Dam’s project The Friendship Dam was designed to be built on the shores of the Orontes. The latter is a transboundary river that originates in Lebanon. Its relevance is due mostly to geopolitical border divisions, since it forms the current Turkish-Syrian border for 27 km, flowing through Turkey where it unites with the Karasu and Afrin rivers before discharging into the Mediterranean in the Hatay Province. Orontes River The total length of the river is 404 km, of which 38 km are in Lebanon, 280 km in Syria, 27 km run along the Syrian-Turkish border and 59 km are in Turkey. It is along these 27 km on the border where the FriendshipDam is supposed to be built Orontes border Orontes’ topography and course The socio-economic convenience of the dam Turkey’s motivation to build this infrastructure on the Orontes has been nurtured by frequent disastrous floods, which have inundated farmland, settlements and strategic infrastructure (i.e. the airport of Hatay) in the Amik Plain Hatay airport Topographic map of Hatay airport To gather Damascus’ approval for the realization of such a project, Turkey has offered the sharing of hydro-electricity generation to make the dam attractive also for the Syrian economic apparatus. According to Turkish analysts, the hydropower generated following the construction of the dam will provide benefits for both the countries. Turkish officials state that Turkey would bear all investment costs except the costs of expropriating land in Syria, which is to be borne by Damascus, as Syria’s contribution to overall costs. The interruption of the project: the Syrian revolution Unfortunately, the Syrian crisis has altered the political agenda of both the countries. The shared project elaborated since 2004 between Ankara and Damascus has been interrupted following the civil war erupted in 2011. The Friendship Dam constituted an important symbol of political and diplomatic rapprochement between two regional powers that had been fighting severely for decades on multiple matters. The project would provide huge benefits to both countries; Turkey would control the flooding responsible of several damages while Syria would obtain hydroelectric energy produced by Turkish water plans after the construction of the dam.