William of Ockham, Wittgenstein and Fodor on Mental Language

William of Ockham, Wittgenstein and Fodor on Mental Language Introduction William of Ockham’s idea of the mental language was first brought to the fore in his magisterial Summa Logicae (Spade, 2002). It is, among William’s concepts, one of the most academically discoursed subjects in the field of scholastic philosophy (Panaccio C. , 2010, p. 184). It is from this concept’s genesis that William of Ockham has been credited for, arguably, being the first philosopher to provide a fine-grained analytic of its semantics since Boethius and Aristotle. In addition to that, his attention to the importance grammar to the analytic of mental language (along with written and spoken language) was an achievement to those who place a high premium on the structural analysis of propositions in logic. From 20th century eyes, it is an achievement ahead of its time (Spade, 2011). Mental language, to those unfamiliar with the concept, seems like a curious concept however. Indeed there is spoken and written language, and most if not all are aware of their social function as languages. In a word (no pun intended), they can be “experienced” by another. But what of mental language? What is mental language? And perhaps another inquiry of paramount importance might be whether or not it does count as a language. These questions shall be addressed in this paper. With this into account, any exposition or elucidation on Ockham’s mental language must begin with what he himself meant by the concept. For this purpose, I shall begin with a discussion of what mental language is, and how it differs from spoken and written language. In this section will also be an account of both spoken and written language. Next, I shall discuss how mental language can, in a sense, count as a language. Mental Language vs Written Language and Spoken Language In the Summa Logicae, William of Ockham enumerates three types of terms: the mental, spoken and the written. But a question worth asking is “why is the demarcation created between mental language, and both written and spoken language”? To answer this question, it would be worth explaining what written and spoken language both have in common. William of Ockham explicitly states that written and spoken language (viz-a-viz terms) signify conventionally (Adams, 1978, p. 451). What this means is that within both written and spoken languages are terms which signify mental content (which will be discussed later). Therefore, the signification effected by such terms in the two languages effect meaning in a way contingent to common linguistic practice. For example, the written or spoken word, “horse” means what it means in a place or community where “horse” is thought by all as a an animal with four legs, runs, etc. Essentially, it is worth noting that convention as such, there is a social component involved in the capacity of written or spoken words to signify. This can be seen in how a spoken or written word like “horse” means “kabayo” in the Filipino language. This is a case where one word signifies not the concept itself, but by virtue of a community that licenses meaning, signifies another (Lahey, 1998, p. 112), more so where different languages exist simultaneously (Spade, Mental language, 2002). Many mediaevals were impressed by the fact that not only are spoken and written language “conventional” in the sense that Latin differs from French - that is, not only in the sense that there are interlinguistic differences that are explained by convention - but even within a single conventional language, one could give special meanings to certain utterances or inscriptions for certain special and perhaps temporary purposes (Tabarroni, 1989, p. 210). It has now been established that what both written and spoken language have in common is that these signify or effect meaning via convention. Now what then sets mental language apart from the previous two mentioned? Mental language according Ockham signifies naturally (Yrjonssuri, 1997). This means that the terms in mental language, or concepts as Ockham calls them, signify not through convention. In a word, it is a “canonical” language where both the written and the spoken are subordinate and follow (Panaccio C. , 1992, p. 133). This is not to say spoken and written languages are inferior to mental language. It is just that mental language is prior. All three have the capacity for signification in that they can signify the same entities. For instance, “dog”, be it mental, spoken or written, is ultimately just “dog”. As established, the only difference is that signification for written and spoken are, in a way, experienced by a recipient (i.e. being seen by the bodily eye for written; being heard by the bodily ear for hearing), subject to the vicissitudes of convention and institution (Panaccio C. , 1992, p. 126). Thus far, it has been established that the essential difference between mental, and spoken and written language is that mental language is natural, and spoken and written languages are conventional. Mental language occurs prior to both the spoken and the written. The latter two signify just as mental language does. Also, spoken and written language can be experienced and comprehensible in a way that is tangible to hearing and sight. This does bring one conveniently to the issue of whether or not a language can still be considered a language even if no writing nor speaking takes place. One only needs to fast forward to the period of later Wittgenstein to see that this is a legitimate issue. The next section will focus on to what extent and in what sense Ockham’s concept of a mental language can count or pass-off as an actual language. Mental Language as a Language It has been established in the previous section that mental language can be understood as the idea that there exists in the mind (or the “soul”) a language of conceptual terms, corresponding to the language of written and spoken terms. Mental terms are the “mental words” that Ockham says, quoting Augustine, do not belong to any language because they remain only in the mind and cannot be spoken outwardly. Spoken and written terms are thus thus subordinate to those of the mental. (Adams, 1978, p. 452). But when thought of in this way, it may leave on to question whether or not mental language can be a language by its own merit. More specifically, is mental language a legitimate language prior to being “translated” into written or spoken language? What will follow is a discussion that answers this question. Mental Language as a Private Language The thought that mental language may require translation into spoken and written language exposes one to the idea that on its own, it may not count as a language. Granted that language can be thought of as at least using words to represent subjective concepts or impressions in a person’s mind, spoken and written language do fit this function as these languages in Ockham can be heard by the bodily ear and seen by the bodily eye, respectively (Yrjonssuri, 1997, p. 21). Being capable of reception by another person’s senses, it is in a word public and hence conventional (Adams, 1978, p. 457). On its own then, mental language may very well be a public language. One philosopher who has written on the subject of private language is Ludwig Wittgenstein. According to Wittgenstein, all language is public (Simoni-Wastilla, 2000, p. 421). Language is public in the sense that all acts of verbalization (even those which apply to our private impressions and experiences) is objective, universal and publicly available (Findlay, 1970, pp. 155-156)- in the same exact way Ockham describes written and spoken languages. So in theory, a language in the Wittgensteinian sense of the word is learnable and open to public use. And its capacity for public use and learnability necessitates that its subjects are open for observation in the public sphere. For instance, one can point to a flower pot to a toddler and say the word “flower pot”. No attempt is made to have the toddler imagine the object prior to some sort of “pointing” and “naming” based on convention (i.e. English). Also, an important thing to take note of is that a flower pot can be pointed to. This is not the case with what Ockham calls “impressions of the soul” or what are broadly and contemporarily known as mental events (Arregui, 1996, p. 319) . With this in mind, this exposes one to the fact that Ockham’s concept of a mental language prior to translation is not a public language, but a private language. To Wittgenstein, a private language is not possible for the reason that all language is public. Therefore, viewed in this way, the idea that Ockham’s mental language is absolutely a legitimate language is implausible. It is however worth arguing that William of Ockham presents mental language as having the capacity for signifying or representing (Adams, 1978, p. 448). So at the subjective tier, it may in fact be a language for this reason. And to ameliorate this point further, a brief discussion of Jerry Fodor’s “Language of thought hypothesis” will follow. The Language of Thought Hypothesis In 1975, Jerry Fodor introduced the language of thought hypothesis. In philosophy of mind, the language of thought hypothesis (LOTH) put forward by American philosopher describes thoughts as represented in a language that allows complex thoughts to be built up by combining simpler thoughts in various ways. In its simplest phraseology, the theory states that thought follows the same rules as any kind of formal language. Thought’s language has both syntax and semantics (Fodor, 1978, p. 47). The Language of Thought Hypothesis is so-called because mental representations are like sentences in a language in that they have a syntactically and semantically constructed structure (Fodor, 1975). If extended to Ockham’s mental language, mental language may be considered a language in its own right. Appropriating Fodor, mental language as put forth by Ockham can be a language for the simple reason that mental language has at the atomic level mental terms or what Ockham calls “concepts”. Being terms, they have the capacity for signification. Mental concepts then are encapsulated or represented in a language, whether they are translated into spoken and written languages, or not. For the very reason that mental terms signify and represent, mental language has semantics as with other formal language. Syntax is a feature of any formal language (Fodor, 1975). And mental language is no exception. To illustrate, one can imagine a red ball. In this simple act of imagining, there are two concepts: “ball” and that of “redness”. “Ball” is a noun while “red” is an adjective. There is a compartmentalization that takes place in the form of a “S is P” proposition (Fodor, 1978). In this case, the proposition may very well be, “the ball is red”. Such a compartmentalization into parts of speech and their arrangement in a proposition constitute the syntactical aspect of mental language. Contrary Wittgenstein therefore, Ockham’s concept of mental language can be considered a legitimate language because like all language, it has both semantics and syntax. Conclusion William of Ockham occupies an important place in the history of scholastic philosophy as the first philosopher to approach the subject of mental language via logic and structural analysis with an analytically rigorous attention to the importance of grammar. According to Ockham, mental language is a collection of mental terms or concepts. Mental language is similar to both written and spoken language in its capacity for signification. A term in all three languages has intentional capacity in that it points to something. However, what separates mental language from both written and spoken language is the absence of institution or meaning by convention. To Ockham, mental terms signify naturally, while signification in written and spoken language require some form of convention or common practice among speakers or users of the language to effect meaning. Mental language is subjective, while written and spoken languages are publicly available. Thought of from the perspective of later Wittgenstein, mental language as a subjective language prior to translation into spoken and written languages is tantamount to a private language. If all language is public, then mental language cannot be legitimately a language due to its tangibility solely to the thinking subject. However viewed from Fodor’s perspective, mental language counts as a language because like all other formal languages, it shares the common traits of syntax and semantics. Works Cited Adams, M. M. (1978). Ockham's theory of natural signification. The Monist, 61, 444-459. Arregui, J. (1996). Descartes and Wittgenstein on emotion. 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