Thick concepts, Implicatures and the Nature of Law
This research has been supported by the Polish Ministry of Science and Higher Education (grant no. DI2012019042).
Abstract: The purpose of the present paper is twofold. First, I investigate the question whether the evaluative component of thick concepts is an implicature, a pragmatic enrichment or is part of the semantics of language. Second, I argue that debating the evaluations adopted by thick concepts will not be decisive in a discussion about the correctness of attitudes usually expressed with the use of a moral predicate. This is because, the ‘dictionary’ evaluations adopted by those concepts are conventional assumptions that reflect merely the majority views and opinions on morality, ethics and normativity in a society. It is true, that the majority usually adopts a definite evaluation for some reason. If this reason convinced so many, then it probably is a reason worth examining. Nevertheless, this does not entail that it could be a decisive reason in the debate about ethics or normativity.
Introduction
Thick concepts and terms are partly descriptive and partly evaluative. For example the term or concept ‘courageous’ describes an action that involves overcoming fear and evaluates the action as something positive. By contrast, thin terms or concepts are entirely evaluative, for instance the words ‘good’ or ‘bad’. Nevertheless, this paper is going to focus mostly on thick terms or concepts. The relation between a thick term and a thick concept is not obvious. Philosophers often assume that: ‘words have meanings whereas concepts are meanings. (Väyrynen 2012, p. 8) Moreover, they argue that one term may be somehow linked
The link usually depends on the theory of meaning assumed. P. Varynen suggests that concepts may be similar to Fregean senses. to various concepts (Väyrynen 2012, p. 8) or, that one concept may be linked to various terms.
While the status of the descriptive components of thick terms has been thoroughly investigated by philosophers of language, the character of their evaluative element remains a riddle. The central question posed by philosophers is whether the character of the evaluative component is semantic or pragmatic.
This debate is illustrated by Allan Gibbard’s paper and Simon Blackburn’ reply to it entitled ‘Morality and Thick Concepts’. Gibbard probably endorses the semantic thesis: ‘How do the two components combine? I can think of three models: that they combine by conjunction, by licensing, or by presupposition. All three models fail, […], because thick concepts have too little descriptive meaning to do the work the models demand. Here, briefly, are the models […]. Conjunctive: he conjoins a descriptive statement and an evaluation. He says that the act is descriptively gopa and gives a positive evaluation. Licensing: he says that the act is descriptively gopa. He is licensed by rules of language to use the term gopa, though, only if he evaluates descriptive gopahood positively. Presuppositional: his statement presupposes a favourable evaluation of acts in so far as they are descriptively gopa. It then says that the act is descriptively gopa. The presuppositions of a statement are the things hearers must accept for straight agreement or disagreement to be possible. (Thus for statements that purport to be true or false, they are the things that must be true if the statement is to be either strictly true or strictly false.)’ (1992, 274)
By contrast, Simon Blackburn seems to be more of a pragmatist: ‘But this is left to the […] theory of what a particular speaker is doing on an occasion by a particular utterance, rather than forged in steel by a prior theory or convention governing the terms. We might expect someone who talks of a house as containing south facing windows to be implying or inviting a favourable attitude to that feature, yet 'contains south facing windows' is not usually thought of as a thick term, and certainly there is no linguistic convention that a house with south facing windows should be favourably regarded.’ (p. 287) The majority view is that it is pragmatically implicated. I will try to depict what difficulties this argument faces.
Semantics is roughly the study of meaning. Therefore, if the evaluative elements were semantic, it would not be dependent on the context in which the thick term is uttered. By contrast, pragmatics is the study of utterances in context. Consequently, if the evaluative element is pragmatic, the context of uttering the thick term plays a decisive role in determining the positive or negative evaluation of the description used.
There are three possible solutions as to the problem posed. First, the evaluative component is a conversational (pragmatic) implicature. The difficulties that this view poses will be presented in the next section. Second, the evaluative element could be merely an impliciture, or pragmatic enrichment.
An impliciture is only a pragmatic expansion of what is said. It cannot be derived as a conversational implicature. Lawrence R. Horn (2012, p. 21-22) defines it in the following manner:
‘[…] some aspects of speaker meaning need not be considered either part of what is implicated or of what is said. Thus consider the following utterances with the typically conveyed material indicated in curly brackets:
(16)a. I haven’t had breakfast {today}.
b. John and Mary are married {to each other}.
c. They had a baby and they got married {in that order}. […]
In each case, the bracketed material contributing to what is communicated cannot be derived as a Gricean implicature, given that it is truth conditionally relevant, but neither can it be part of what is said, since it is felicitously cancelable:
(17)a. John and Mary are married, but not to each other.
b. They had a child and got married, but not necessarily in that order.
[…] in such cases the enriched material may be regarded instead as an impliciture, an implicit weakening, strengthening, or specification of what is said. This permits an intuitive characterization of propositional content, a conservative mapping from syntactic structure to what is said, and an orthodox Gricean conception of implicature […]. Bach retains a neo-classically Gricean semantic characterization of what is said, along with a post-semantic understanding of conversational implicature: it is implicItures, not implicAtures that can determine the relevant truth conditions in such cases. Furthermore, it is misleading to take the expansions in (16) to be explicatures, since there is nothing explicit about them, and indeed the cancelability of such expanded understandings supports their status as implicit..’ Finally, this element could be semantic.
My analysis will be based on several standard assumptions. First, any natural language is based on a social convention. Second, meaning will be considered as a set of conditions, which must be satisfied to fulfill the intention to use a term. (Searle 2009, p. 173) Let me now present the counterargument for the evaluative component of a thick term being a conversational implicature.
Is the evaluative element a conversational implicature?
The truth conditions of what is said are not dependent upon implicated content.
Consider again the term ‘courageous’. The debate between cognitivists (those, who think that evaluative statements can be true or false) and non-cognitivists (those, who think that we cannot attribute truth values to evaluative sentences) boils down a decision whether we can say that the proposition:
‘Being courageous is good’ is true
And
‘Being courageous is wrong’ is false.
In other words, the content of what is said through uttering a sentence gives rise to a proposition. A proposition is a content that is evaluable in terms of truth or falsity. The content of what is implicated through uttering a sentence can also be a proposition evaluated in terms of truth and falsity. However, the content of what is implicated does not influence the truth conditions of the content of what is said. Consider the following example:
A: I am out of petrol.
B: There is a garage round the corner. (Grice, 1975, 51)
The answer given by B gives rise to an implicature that ‘the garage is or at least may be open and has petrol to sell’. This gives a complete and truth apt proposition. However, even if the implicature fails and the garage is closed, you still cannot say:
It is not true that there is a garage station round the corner.
Therefore, the falsity of what is implicated does not entail the falsity of what is said. For this reason, viewing value content as implicated is particularly attractive. (Barker, 2000, p. 269) Regardless of whether you are a cognitivist or non-cognitivists, you can claim that evaluative content is implicated. Consequently, even if it is not truth apt, it does not mingle with the truth conditional proposition uttered. This way we can account for not truth apt content in language, without the need to postulate the existence of two different semantics: one for truth conditional propositions and one for their evaluative counterparts.
Hybrid expressivists claim that implicatures express attitudes toward some properties. They hold non-cognitive views, while having a realistic standpoint toward the existence of moral properties. Nevertheless, they disagree on whether the attitudes are expressed through a conventional or conversational implicature. See (Barker, 2000), (Finlay, 2005), (Fletcher, 2015).
Irony and dual pragmatics
Thick terms are often used ironically in natural language. Nevertheless, if their evaluative component is a conversational, pragmatic implicature, then ironic uses of thick concepts are hard to account for. Consider the following situation:
A and B are standing in the cellar. B notices a spider in the corner and starts screaming.
A: You are so courageous!
The context of the utterance as well as the sarcastic tone in A’s voice indicate that A’s utterance is clearly ironic. Irony on the classic Gricean account is defined as a conversational implicature conveying the opposite meaning than the meaning of the words uttered.
This is the Gricean definitione of irony. There are others such as Sperber and Wilson’s account. Nevertheless, as we are using here Gricean notions such as implicatures, the discussed theory of irony will also be Gricean. Let us assume for a moment that the term ‘courageous’ is a mixture of a description and a positive evaluation in the form of a conversational implicature. Consequently, the ironic use of the term should convey both an opposite descriptive and evaluative content. Therefore, the descriptive content would be the basis for an implicated opposite, ironic content. By contrast, if the evaluative component is an implicature itself, then it remains unclear what could be the character of the opposite, ironic evaluative content. A meta-implicature? A second-order implicature? The application of the Occam’s Razor leads us to a much simpler conclusion: the evaluative component of a thick term is not necessarily a conversational implicature.
Ironic use of a thick term conveys an opposite descriptive and evaluative meaning through an implicature.
standard
ironic
description
Semantic meaning
Act, which involves overcoming fear
Implicature
Act, which does NOT involve overcoming fear.
evaluation
Implicature
positive
Meta implicature?
negative
Thus, if it is not an implicature, it can be either a pragmatic intrusion or it can be semantic (for instance a conventional implicature). Consequently, if the first possibility is to be analyzed, then to explain the ironic uses of the term ‘courageous’ we must resort to the inference scheme proposed by ‘dual pragmatic theories’.
Dual Pragmatic theories state that to achieve propositional content, we need an amalgam of formal and pragmatic processing. They remain in opposition to formal theories and pragmatic theories that deny pragmatic or formal processing respectively. (Borg, 2004, 3-5) The reason for which formal and pragmatic theories merged to form dual pragmatic ones was the discovery of ‘unarticulated constituents’ in sentences.
For a detailed analysis of the subject see F. Recanati „Literal Meaning’ (2004) The basic idea is the following:
‘U utters ‘s’:
linguistic decoding + pragmatics ⇒ explicature (what is stated/said)
what is stated + pragmatics ⇒ what is implied’ (Borg, 2004, 42)
The first step (i) represents the hearer that decodes the pragmatic, evaluative component of the thick concept. The second step (ii) represents the hearer that decodes the ironic implicature on the basis of a thick term with an evaluative pragmatic element.
The alternative explanation for the ironic uses of thick terms is the semantic solution. According to this approach, the ironic conversational implicature is derived on the basis of the meaning of the words uttered (including the evaluative component which can be a conventional implicature) plus the context of the utterance. Consequently, the evaluative, non-ironic content is a conventional implicature. However, the very notion of conventional implicature is problematic. For instance Kent Bach claims that conventional implicatures do not exist. In fact, they are also some form of a pragmatic linguistic occurrence. (Bach, 1999)
Nevertheless, to decide between these two possibilities, I must introduce another typical property of conversational implicatures: their cancelability.
Is the evaluative component cancelable?
It is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for the existence of a conversational implicature, that it is cancelable by the speaker.
Grice claimed that conversational implicatures are reinforceable, indeterminate, cancelable and calculable. By contrast conventional implicatures are only detachable. (Fletcher, 2015) Consider the following example:
A: I am out of petrol.
B: There is a garage round the corner, but I don’t think it is open. (Grice 1975, 51)
While answering A’s question, B has cancelled the implicature created by the first part of her sentence, that the garage is open and sells petrol. Analogously, it may be argued, (Enoch et al., 2012, 6-7) that the evaluative component of thick terms is also cancelable, because it is possible to state that:
‘Her facing up to her boss was courageous, but it was not in any way good.’ (Enoch et al., 2012, 7)
The second part of this sentence is supposed to be a cancellation of the evaluative implicature created by the first part of this sentence. This argument does not seem convincing for two reasons. First, if the evaluative content of ‘courageous’ is conversational implicature then it faces the irony problem. Second, if it is not an implicature, then the second part of the (VII) sentence is not a cancelation of an implicature. Consequently, if it is not a cancelation, then we must answer the question: what is it? There exist many possible answers. Let us focus on one interesting possibility: the meta-linguistic statement.
While uttering the first part of (VII) the speaker has made a choice: to utter a sentence in the English language. The English language is a convention, like any other natural language. Therefore, when speaking that language, the speaker must adhere to its rules, its categorizations and its evaluation. Consequently, the speaker knows that by uttering ‘courageous’ he will be speaking as if he had endorsed the described act and he will be understood as endorsing it. Nevertheless, it is perfectly possible that the speaker personally does not find that acts fulfilling the descriptive conditions for using the word ‘courageous’ are to be praised. He may think that the sentence ‘being courageous is good’ is false and he may be right (depending on whether we adopt the cognitivist or non-cognitivists approach). Thus, the speaker can comment on the convention he is using. He can criticize or discuss it. He can voice his concerns about the evaluative choices contained in the convention. He may even present reasons that will convince each and every user of the English language that the evaluation entrenched in the convention is wrong and the convention must be changed. However, all of the above statements are statements in meta-language. They are statements about the English language. They are linguistically expressed statements about a linguistic convention. Such statements often give rise to confusion because natural languages do not dispose of syntactical markers that would depict the moment where the switch from natural language to meta-language occurs. Nevertheless, this does not mean that there is no switch.
Moreover, meta-language enables us to debate both the descriptive and evaluative conditions for using a term. It is possible to criticize the term ‘courageous’ not only because it praises the act called ‘courageous’, but also because it involves only overcoming fear without for instance overcoming anger. Therefore, we can equally debate whether the descriptive conditions for using the term courageous are sufficient, insufficient, practical, impractical or even inadequate. By contrast, this meta-debate must be distinguished from a debate concerning the extension of the word ‘courageous’. It is possible to argue in English whether some concrete behavior was courageous or not. In other words, whether it matches the dictionary description. If it does, then the sentence ‘this behavior was courageous’ is true. If it does not – the sentence is false.
A similar idea has been developed by Stephen Barker, a proponent of explaining value content through the notion of conventional implicature.
“Disagreement can also be expressed through negation. As ‘T is good’ has both explicature and implicature, it has two forms of negation: explicature based, i.e. truth-conditional negation, and implicature based, i.e. metalinguistic negation. In reply to someone’s assertion that ‘T is good’, U might assert:
(17) Jane is not good. She is often heartlessly cruel.
(18)Jane is not good. Being good does not reside in brutal honesty at all costs.
(17) involves truth conditional negation: the explicature that she is never heartlessly cruel, which is part of the F-property intended by the speaker, is the focus of the negation. In (18) the negation is metalinguistic; the focus of negation is the implicature that a certain F-attitude is shared by speaker and audience: approval of brutal honesty at all costs.” (Barker, 2000, p. 278)
However, if the description of a thick term is satisfied, then you cannot debate whether the behavior was good or bad. This is because the convention does not give you a choice. The convention can be wrong, but then it needs to be changed. The positive evaluation of ‘courageous’ is an assumption that can be changed by convincing all users of the English language in meta-language that it is wrong and must be altered:
If a speaker S:
Uses the linguistic convention of English language.
Speaks about a behavior that fulfills the conditions for ‚courageous’
Then
The convention imposes the practical assumption that the behavior is praised
S is understood by any ordinary user of English as praising the behavior he describes
One could also wonder what happens if a speaker states that he has an example of behavior that fulfills the descriptive conditions for the word ‘courageous’ and the speaker agrees that generally courageous behavior is good. However, according to the speaker, this particular courageous behavior is wrong. Nevertheless, this means that there is something additional that distinguishes this particular instance of courageous behavior from other instances. Even if prima facie the behavior seems ‘courageous’, the ‘all things considered’ judgment is different, because the term is defeasible. It means that there is some additional contextual feature, which contradicts the descriptive conditions of satisfaction. For example someone behaves courageously because he is forced to do so. Consequently, we are not disagreeing upon whether to praise someone for such behavior or not. This disagreement is really about some descriptive elements of the situation. Thus, the discussion is about the extension of the word ‘courageous’. It is whether we can qualify that behavior as an example of courageous behavior in the first place. The decision whether to praise someone for such behavior or not will be parasitic upon the decision whether this behavior is courageous or not. If, despite the contradictory contextual element, we decide to qualify this behavior as courageous, then the convention will force us to praise the behavior. If we decide not to qualify it as courageous, then we can condemn the behavior. As a result, what the speaker really means by saying that ‘this instance of courageous behavior is not good’ is that it is no courageous behavior at all.
We could also interpret (VII) as meaning that the behawior was not good for the individual who faces up the boss because he had to assume some devastating consequences. However, this is not the interpretation that we are intrested here because most of the courageous behaviors are detrimental to the person who behaves courageously. This is because the predicate ‘courageous’ is moslty associated with dangerous, harmful situations.
courageous
Debate about the linguistic convention (meta)
Debate about the extension of the word
descriptive
whether the descriptive conditions of satisfaction of using the term courageous are sufficient/practical/adequate
whether some concrete behavior was courageous or not
evaluative
whether the evaluation adopted by the convention is accurate (debate about ethics in meta-language)
AGAIN: whether some concrete behavior was courageous or not
The fact that the convention of the English language has adopted the assumption that courageous acts are praised is no decisive factor in any (meta)ethical discourse. It is just a practical assumption that facilitates communication. Nevertheless, it does not entail that courageous behavior is good and the sentence ‘courageous behavior is good’ is true. Words are not coined according to universal truths. Quite contrary, the categories they entrench are formed ‘to the best of a society’s knowledge’. They are formed so as to serve some practical, communicative functions. The fact that some convention adopts one evaluation rather than the other is no decisive factor in any debate on (meta)ethics. The only thing it can indicate is that statistically speaking when the word ‘courageous’ was invented, most users of the English language were convinced, for some reason, that courageous behavior should be praised. Thus, the convention was created. If this reason convinced so many, then it may be a reason worth examining in (meta)ethical discourse. By contrast, it cannot be stated that this is a decisive reason in the meta-ethical debate. In a nutshell, the idea is this:
English is spoken by a large population.
The evaluative convention was adopted by so many for a reason.
If this reason convinced so many, then it is worth examining.
However, this does NOT mean, that the choice made by the convention is a decisive argument in the ethical debate.
To sum up, if we endorse the semantic thesis (the evaluation is a conventional implicature), then (VII) can only be read as a metalinguistic negation of the evaluation of ‘courageous’. A negation that could be expressed by a non-moralist or an error theorist. This is a consequence of the fact that a conventional implicature is not cancellable. The problem with this answer is that we are not sure whether conventional implicatures exists at all.
However, if we endorse the full pragmatic thesis (it was a conversational implicature), it could be cancelled because of the ‘amoralist’:
„who sincerely makes assertions about the moral value of things but doesn’t subscribe to those moral standards herself and doesn’t express approval (etc.) by her moral speech acts. Attitudinal content can be cancelled explicitly, if she merely explains that she is an amoralist, or that she is contemptuous or indifferent towards morality. It is contextually cancelled if her audience already knows of her amoralism (…)” (Finlay, 2005)
Nevertheless, we have established that viewing evaluative content as conversational implicature is problematic for ironic utterances. Therefore, a solution could be the claim that evaluative content is a pragmatic enrichment (an unarticulated constituent). Then (VII) would not be a cancelation of implicature but a precisification that the speaker is an amoralist. The problem with this reading is that pragmatic enrichments do influence the truth conditions of a proposition. Consequently to adopt this hypothesis we would either have to be cognitivists or claim that truth conditional semantics mingle with some different semantics of moral language. The latter would substantially complicate the picture.
The character of the evaluative element
If the evaluative element in thick terms is not a pragmatic implicature, then it can be either a pragmatic intrusion or it can be semantic. Nevertheless, there is no need to choose between those two possible explanations. There are several reasons to maintain that the evaluative elements in thick terms have pragmatic roots and semantic outcomes. Therefore, the evaluative component of a thick concept undergoes, over time, an evolution – from a pragmatic intrusion toward a fixed or ‘stable’ semantic element. Let us analyze this evolution step by step in the following subsections.
The pragmatic origin
I would like to suggest a hypothesis that seems to be confirmed by several examples. When a new thick term is coined, it seems to be an objectionable term at first. Some use it to praise the described behavior, some condemn it and some stay neutral. Nevertheless, at some point a decision is taken. A decision, that leads to the formation of a conventional evaluation. A decision that reflects the majority views on morality in a society. It is pragmatic in the sense that there usually is a pragmatic reason, convincing for the majority, which tilts the balance toward adopting either the positive or the negative evaluation. Consequently, the evaluative component becomes a conventional assumption.
Without taking a firm stance in the cognitivist versus non-cognitivist debate, it is not possible to state that:
(I) ‘Being courageous is good’ is true
And
(II) ‘Being courageous is wrong’ is false
By contrast, it is possible to state that:
‘Most people speaking English think that being courageous is good.’ is true
and
‘Most people speaking English think that being courageous is wrong.’ is false
Moreover, from the point of view of a theory of communication, it is possible to state that:
‘When you use the word courageous most people understand that you are praising the act you call courageous.’ is true
and
‘When you use the word courageous most people understand that you are condemning the act you call courageous.’ is false.
As a consequence, there is a moment in the thick term development, when the evaluative component becomes conventional. It is the moment, when sentences (IX), (X), (XI), (XII) become true or false respectively. Once the convention is settled, changing it becomes a challenge. Let us consider an example from ‘The Boston Globe’ describing the negative evaluation conveyed by the word ‘marihuana’ and the strive of activists to shift the term employed to ‘cannabis’, because it is more neutral:
‘Jack Herer’s ‘The Emperor Wears No Clothes,’ a seminal text for the medical marijuana movement first published in 1985, lays out a somewhat sensationalised version of the racist history of prohibition and refers to cannabis as ‘the plant we denigrate with the slang name marijuana.’ Since then, and particularly as legalization battles spread from California in 1996 across the country, ‘marijuana’ has become a shibboleth. ‘If somebody uses ‘cannabis’ it means he’s more or less pro-normalization, and someone who uses ‘marijuana’ is anti,’ Mark A.R. Kleiman, a drug policy expert at UCLA, told me. When Ricardo Baca became The Denver Post’s first-ever ‘marijuana editor’ last fall, he received a flurry of e-mails and Reddit messages begging him to change the title to ‘cannabis editor’ and alter the Post’s style guide accordingly. He and the Post’s copy chief decided not to, because marijuana is still the more common term. But, given activists’ energy, he said, ‘I do think we’ll see more of the word ‘cannabis’ in the coming years.’ (Peterson, 2014)
The above example illustrates how difficult are the attempts to change the evaluation associated with a word. The difficulty is so substantial, that coining a new term with a different evaluation is much easier. The fact, that the evaluation is so rigidly grounded in the term invites the conclusion, that the evaluative component could be context-independent or semantic.
The semantic outcome
To test whether the evaluative component of a thick term can be semantic, let us now address three widely debated examples in the literature concerning thick concepts.
The first one is the thick term ‘lewd’. Philosophers call it ‘objectionable’ because they find the evaluation of the term debatable:
‘Some thick concepts are, somehow, objectionable. Somehow these concepts presuppose or embody values that ought not really to be endorsed. Gibbard (…) mentions lewd as an example: he does not agree on the – prude – view on sexuality which underlies the employment of this concept. Graham Priest (…) in effect argues that sexually perverted is an objectionable thick concept, whose usage presupposes that sexual behavior which does not fulfill a supposed natural purpose is thereby worthy of condemnation.’(Eklund, 2011, 5)
In my view, the term ‘lewd’ is not objectionable in the sense that its evaluation has not yet been decided. Quite contrary, it is a term, which is undergoing the longish and tiresome process of switching its evaluative component. It is a natural, sociological and linguistic phenomenon that conventions evolve and words change their meanings over time. Therefore, ‘lewd’ is not an example of an objectionable term, because some fifty or sixty years ago the prevalent view was the prude view. The fact, that now views are changing and they may slowly outnumber the conservative ones does not mean that the negative evaluation is not a conventional assumption. This is because it has not (yet) been changed. Consider the following sentence:
This year’s carnival wasn’t lewd enough.
Through uttering (XIII) the speaker may be trying to suggest some meta-linguistic conclusion: the evaluation entrenched in the term ‘lewd’ should be changed. Moreover, consider a sentence analogous to (VII):
This behavior is lewd, but I don’t think it is wrong.
Again, the second part of the sentence could be a critical comment on the convention of English language. A convention employed by the speaker in the first part of the sentence. As a result, the term ‘lewd’ may be close to changing its conventional evaluation, because there are numerous ‘meta debates’ about it.
A second widely discussed instance of thick concept is the word ‘blasphemous’. It is linked to an anecdote concerning Oscar Wilde:
‘Oscar Wilde was asked during his trial whether he denied that something he said or did was an instance of blasphemy. And Wilde responded: ‘'Blasphemy', sir, is not one of my words.’ Wilde responded well, for by either accepting or denying that his act was blasphemous, he would have committed himself to the normative judgment underlying uses of the word ‘blasphemous’ – roughly, that speaking against God, the Church, or some religious tenets and teachings is to be avoided – and this is precisely the judgment that Wilde was eager to refrain from committing himself to.’(Enoch et al., 2012, 5)
When uttering the ‘not one of my words response’ Wilde made a meta-linguistic statement, which adopted a critical stance towards both the evaluation and the descriptive categorization carried out by ‘blasphemous’. Therefore, his answer could have been meta-linguistic. It could have been a statement about the term ‘blasphemy’.
Another debated instance of thick expressions is the term ‘fashionable’. Its evaluative element is aesthetic rather than ethical. Nevertheless, it carries out a positive conventional assumption.
‘(…)we can think of judgments about what is and what is not fashionable made by a participant (for whom proclaiming a suit fashionable amounts to some kind of endorsement), and also by a fashion-historian (who refrains from endorsing any standards of fashionableness).’ (Enoch et al., 2012, 14)
What could be problematic in the above quotation is the attitude of the fashion-historian. This is because she decides to use the convention and employ the term ‘fashionable’. Therefore, she utters the word ‘fashionable’ in English. Yet it is clear that she does not commit herself to the positive evaluation conveyed by the term. As a consequence, she utters the word AS IF she endorsed the positive evaluation carried out by the term. Therefore, it is possible for the speaker of any language to decide to use that language, while not endorsing the evaluations that it entails. The speaker acts as if he endorsed the evaluation by uttering the word. She may have some practical reasons to do so. Moreover, the utterer is aware that she will be understood as endorsing the view. This understanding of the speaker can be cancelled by the context of her utterance. For instance, if she utters it as a fashion historian, then the hearer will usually infer that it is not a personal commitment of the speaking person. As a result, she acts as an aesthetic amoralist.
Words or sentences uttered in a specific context can change their meanings. According to Paul Grice, such is the difference between sentence meaning and speaker’s meaning. Consequently, this applies also to thick terms. As a result, there exist contexts in which the speaker will be understood as conveying a different evaluation, than the conventional one. For example, the term ‘communist’ may be differently perceived when uttered in a post-soviet society, than during the meeting of a left-oriented political party. However, this does not alter the fact, that there is some conventional, dictionary evaluation that must be changed by the context of utterance.
In conclusion, the status of the evaluative element in thick terms could be a practical assumption, determined by the convention used. Nevertheless, this assumption becomes settled only when a majority decision is taken. This decision often has a practical, pragmatic reason behind it. As a result, the thick concept has pragmatic roots and a semantic outcome formed over time. The convention is not settled once and for all. It can evolve if the community decides to change it. Yet this requires another decision backed up by the majority of the ordinary users of a language. As we have tried to establish a general view of thick concepts, let us now turn to a pertinent question for lawyers: what are the consequences of considering the normative element in the term ‘legal’ as semantic?
The normative component of the term legal
The consideration in this section will be made on the basis of the following hypothesis:
‘We suggest, then, that ‘legal’ be thought of as a thick term, and the concept legal as a thick concept. The concept’s descriptive content can then be understood in terms of representations of some social facts -- i.e. the social facts in virtue of which some act or practice type counts as legal or illegal. These facts would differ from one jurisdiction to the next, but they may be uniform across jurisdictions on sufficiently high levels of abstraction. But as with other thick concepts, that it has descriptive content does not preclude its being evaluative as well. Indeed, often, or perhaps even necessarily, declaring an act legal (or illegal) would involve an expression of some evaluative or normative commitment. There may be an underlying normative judgment involved here – perhaps something to the effect that the fact that an act satisfies the descriptive criteria for legality is a reason for certain officials to permit them, or perhaps to the effect that the fact that an act fails to satisfy these descriptive criteria counts strongly against these officials permitting it.’ (Enoch et al., 2012, 11)
Thus, the term ‘legal’ could also be composed of a descriptive plus normative component. In their paper, D. Enoch and K. Toh do not commit themselves to a decision whether the normative component is semantic or pragmatic. Therefore, the question arises: does the semantic character of the normative component proposed in this paper entail any particular consequences? Let us define ‘normative’ for the purposes of this paper as giving reasons to act in accordance with the law.
The Oxford dictionary defines the term ‘legal’ as:
‘Relating to the law, appointed or required by the law, recognised by common or statute law, as distinct from equity, permitted by law’ (Oxford Dictionaries)
Therefore, if an element satisfies the descriptive conditions, then it is legal. Consequently, according to the convention, the speaker is given a reason to behave in a way that satisfies the description. Speaking in Hartian terms, the utterer can be either adopting the internal point of view – then he really thinks that the act he calls ‘legal’ gives him one of the reasons he has to act that way, or the external point of view – then by using the word ‘legal’ he pretends or presupposes that it gives him a reason to act that way. If a speaker decides to state that some behavior is legal, then he acts AS IF he had a reason to behave this way. Moreover, such speaker will be understood as having a reason to follow the behavior he calls legal:
If a speaker S:
Uses English language.
Speaks about a behavior that fulfills the conditions of satisfaction of ‚legal’
Then
The convention imposes the practical assumption that S has a reason to act that way
S is understood by any ordinary user of English as having a reason to act that way
Again an ordinary user of the English language may state that:
This behavior is legal, but I do not think you have a reason to act this way.
Again, this sentence can be interpreted twofold. First, the speaker may be pointing out to some additional contextual features of the particular situation that contradict the descriptive conditions of satisfaction of the word. For example, the behavior may infringe some soft law or international law principles that are not directly binding upon the individual. Consequently, the debate is in fact a debate about the extension of the word ‘legal’. It is a discussion whether the behavior is an example of legal behavior or not. The decision whether the individual has a reason to act in the discussed way is parasitic upon the decision whether the behavior satisfies the dictionary description of ‘legal’. The individual will truly have the reason only if he adopts the Hartian internal point of view. As a result, the debate is not about whether the individual has a reason to act or not, but about whether the behavior is legal or not.
Second, if there are no contextual features that could undermine the fulfillment of the descriptive conditions of satisfaction of ‘legal’, then the second part of (XV) is a sentence in meta-language. It is a criticism of the English language. It debates whether the fact that a behavior falls under the scope of the dictionary definition of ‘legal’ is a sufficient reason to act this way. It discusses the practical assumption made by the convention: that if a speaker can describe some behavior as legal then he has a reason to behave in that way. As a result, only this meta-linguistic debate will be a true debate about normativity, free from any conventional assumptions. Assumptions that may be practical but not true in the cognitivist sense. Stating that some behavior is truly normative because the term ‘legal’ applies to it is a weak ethical argument.
legal
Debate about the linguistic convention (meta)
Debate about the extension of the word
descriptive
whether the descriptive conditions of satisfaction of using the term legal are sufficient/practical/adequate
whether some concrete behavior was legal or not
evaluative
whether the fulfillment of conditions of satisfaction gives you a reason to act that way
(debate about normativity in meta language)
AGAIN: whether some concrete behavior was legal or not
In a nutshell, the argument proceeds as follows:
A large population speaks English.
The normative convention was adopted by so many for a reason.
If this reason convinced so many, then it is worth examining.
However, this does NOT mean, that the choice made by the convention is a decisive argument in the debate about normativity.
The debate over the extension of a word and over a linguistic convention again needs not to be confused.
Conclusion
This paper is an attempt to evaluate the pros and cons of viewing the evaluative component of thick concepts as a conversational implicature, pragmatic enrichment or semantic element. Nevertheless, the main idea is that debating the evaluations adopted by thick concepts will not be decisive in a discussion about ethics, meta-ethics or normativity. This is because; the evaluations adopted by those concepts are only practical, conventional assumptions that reflect merely the majority views and opinions on morality and ethics in a society. It is true, that the majority usually adopts a definite evaluation for some reason. If this reason convinced so many, then it probably is a reason worth examining. Nevertheless, this does not entail that it could be a decisive reason in the debate about ethics or normativity. Finally, while D. Enoch and K. Toh in their paper do not provide decisive arguments as to whether the evaluative component of the term legal is semantic or pragmatic, this paper argues that it has pragmatic roots and a semantic outcome.
References:
Bach, K., 1999. The Myth of Conventional Implicature. Linguist. Philos. 22, 327–366.
Barker, S., 2000. Is value content a component of conventional implicature? Analysis 60, 268–279. doi:10.1093/analys/60.3.268
Blackburn, Simon, Gibbard, Allan, 1992, Morality and Thick Concepts, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, Vol. 66, pp. 267-283+285-299
Borg, Emma, 2004, Minimal Semantics, Oxford University Press
Eklund, Matti, 2011, What are thick concepts?, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 41, Issue 1
Enoch, David and Toh, Kevin, 2012, Legal as a Thick Concept: W.J. Waluchow & Stefan Sciaraffa eds., The Nature of Law: Contemporary Perspectives, Oxford University Press
Finlay, S., 2005. Value and Implicature. Ann Arbor MI Mich. Publ. Univ. Mich. Libr. July 2005 5, 1–20.
Fletcher, G., 2015. Moral Utterances, Attitude Expression and Implicature, in: Fletcher, G., Ridge, M. (Eds.), Having It Both Ways: Hybrid Theories and Modern Metaethics, Oxford Moral Theory. Oxford University Press, Oxford ; New York.
Grice, Herbert P., 1975, Logic and conversation: P. Cole & J. Morgan (ed.), Syntax
and Semantics, 3: Speech Acts: 41–58
Horn, Lawrence R., 2004, Implicature: Handbook of Pragmatics, ed. Horn L. R. Ward G., Blackwell Publishing pp. 21-22
Oxford Dictionaries [http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/legal accessed on 09.09.2014]
Peterson, Britt, 2014, This is your language on cannabis As marijuana goes legit, our words for it are changing, too, The Boston Globe, [http://www.bostonglobe.com/ideas/2014/01/26/this-your-language-cannabis/9bguslv7ZkSsHTElfANTTN/story.html accessed on 26.01.2014]
Recanati, Francois, 2004, Literal Meaning, Cambridge University Press
Searle, John R., 2009, What is Language? Some Preliminary Remarks: Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics, XI (2009) 1, pp. 173-202
Väyrynen, Pekka, 2012, Thick Concepts: Where’s Evaluation?: Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 7, Oxford University Press. 235-70
33