Air Sea Battle

IDSS COMMENTARIES (47/2006) IDSS Commentaries are intended to provide timely and, where appropriate, policy relevant background and analysis of contemporary developments. The views of the authors are their own and do not represent the official position of IDSS.

: The United States armed services have identified capability gaps in the areas of company-sized raid and sustainment operations in contested littoral environments. Multiple joint platform packages can be employed to provide the required mission capabilities to fill the gap. This thesis identifies the operational, functional, and physical architecture and effectiveness of mission packages necessary to provide capabilities associated with littoral sustainment operations. Physical architecture configurations are evaluated using discrete event modeling. Cost and performance estimates for the mission packages are presented in order to provide the decision maker tools for identifying which alternative provides the most cost-effective solution for the needs of a scenario s stakeholders. This thesis report concludes by identifying potential assets that would provide cost-effective support of littoral operations. Feasible alternatives provide varying levels of effectiveness in terms of aver...

The concept of air dominance is a fundamental pillar of modern military strategy, ensuring that a nation's air forces maintain control of the airspace to carry out offensive and defensive operations. This paper explores the evolving nature of air warfare, examining key strategies and emerging technologies essential for achieving air dominance in the future. The integration of artificial intelligence (AI), cyber operations, hypersonic weapons, and space-based assets is analyzed, along with the challenges posed by advanced air defense systems and geopolitical complexities. The paper also emphasizes the importance of multidomain operations and global presence, highlighting the strategic significance of air force mobility, alliances, and forward-deployed assets. Through the review of historical case studies and the discussion of future trends, this paper provides strategic recommendations for military leaders to prioritize innovation, adaptability, and international cooperation in their air dominance operations.

CONCLUSIONS.
According to our estimates the most important issue in the Iranian - Israeli confrontation is not if Iran has nuclear
weapons but if it already possesses a "critical mass" of them. We argue that the "Armageddon Scenario" (a nuclear
attack by Iran) will take place only as a response to an Israeli nuclear attack against Iran. Iran attacking first Israel
with nuclear weapons will be a suicidal action that will 'wipe it off the map'. It is almost certain that Iran has
already received a plethora of warnings on this issue from friends and enemies.
In the above context of assumptions, Israel will exhibit a calculated restraint in its military responses to Iran. Again,
according to our estimations the strategic pursuit of Israel is to weaken economically and politically Iran, creating at
the same time tensions between the Iranian government and the leadership of Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps
(IRGC) with the aim to significantly reduce its influence in the strategic decision making sphere of the country. In
such a case we estimate that Israel has already prepared plans for understanding and peace with Iran on the lines of
"Abraham Accords

In the post-Cold War world, Host Nation Support is a very useful concept around which British overseas force deployments can be built. However, the uncertain nature of this modern world means that such host nation support cannot be relied upon. With the new Government's emphasis on Britain's 'internationalist' role, British forces will need to be able to operate overseas with the guaranteed availability of basing options. Taken together, this means that Britain must rely on sovereign assets to support its pursuit of its overseas interests. This in turn means basing joint force capabilities around sovereign, maritime power.

: The United States armed services have identified capability gaps in the areas of company-sized raid and sustainment operations in contested littoral environments. Multiple joint platform packages can be employed to provide the required mission capabilities to fill the gap. This thesis identifies the operational, functional, and physical architecture and effectiveness of mission packages necessary to provide capabilities associated with littoral sustainment operations. Physical architecture configurations are evaluated using discrete event modeling. Cost and performance estimates for the mission packages are presented in order to provide the decision maker tools for identifying which alternative provides the most cost-effective solution for the needs of a scenario s stakeholders. This thesis report concludes by identifying potential assets that would provide cost-effective support of littoral operations. Feasible alternatives provide varying levels of effectiveness in terms of aver...

Air Force plays an important role in the security system of each country and alliances. The importance of the Air Force determines the high potential of modern air force and air defense, multiplicated by rapid development of technology, particularly the increase of combat capabilities through the use of precision-guided weapons. These features make the Air Force the most predisposed mean of struggle to resolve the contemporary crisis in the international environment. Therefore, this article identifies mission scenarios that can be fulfilled by Polish Air Force (PLAF), declared force level and proposed structure of the air component task forces foreseen to be used outside the country.

New Strategy Center publishes a new study, this time dedicated to France’s security policy in the Black Sea and Mediterranean area. Starting from Paris’s involvement in the two regions, the study addresses the issue of France’s influence as a holder of territories in various parts of the world and a key player in the Euro-Atlantic security architecture.

The study examines France’s current role in the Mediterranean, with an important role in maintaining a balance between Turkey, Cyprus and Greece, and as an initiator of negotiations with North African countries, particularly in the context of the energy crisis. The security of the Black Sea is seen as interlinked with that of the Mediterranean. Thus, the importance of the French military presence in Romania in the Black Sea area is stressed, especially in the new security context created by the war in Ukraine.

“France’s Security in the Black Sea and the Mediterranean” was written by Mr. Quentin Jalabert from France, who recently joined the New Strategy Center team as a Non-Resident Associated Expert.

In a flat or shrinking defense budget, resources for the joint capability of sea basing will become contentious. However, a prudent strategy for the United States in uncertain times is to balance long-range capabilities based in the continental United States with highly maneuverable and well defended sea bases

From Sea Control to Out-of-Area Operations With the confrontation between the two superpowers relegated to the pages of history, most of Europe's leaders were quick to interpret these events as nothing less than the end of great-power rivalry� No longer bound to the parochial contingency plans postulated by the United States and NATO, the majority of Europe's navies began shifting toward a peacetime posture� The United Kingdom: Shifting of Priorities. For the British Royal Navy (RN), the most distinguished and most powerful among Europe's naval forces, the Cold War by and large ended on a high note-followed almost immediately by a shifting of priorities� Apart from the U�S� Navy, only the Russian navy-slowly rusting away in what used to be credible sea bastions-exceeded the fleet carrying the white ensign in size and capabilities� The Falklands War a decade earlier had provided the RN with painful yet invaluable insights, and substantial improvements had been made to existing platforms and operational procedures to address the apparent shortcomings� 7 Furthermore, a number of large-scale navalprocurement projects were under way� These included replacement of the navy's ballistic-missile submarines (with four of the new Vanguard class), introduction of the capable Type 23 antisubmarine warfare (ASW) frigates, and development of a common air-defense destroyer among France, Italy, and the United Kingdom (the Horizon project, later the Type 45 for the RN)� On the other hand, the RN also faced some serious challenges� First and foremost, defense spending plummeted from nearly 4 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 1991 to 2�5 percent in 1998� In other words, the military budget was cut by more than 20 percent in real terms� 8 Second, the new strategic environment no longer required a fleet of nearly fifty surface combatants and twenty-two submarines (both nuclear and conventionally powered)� "[Britain's] Cold War mission of hunting Soviet submarines had vanished, and along with it the chief justification for large chunks of the Fleet� " 9 Throughout the 1990s, the RN had to accept incremental reductions to its force structure, as well as curtailment of acquisition programs� To save money, the number of personnel was decreased from 69,000 to 50,000 within ten years� Still, the RN fared somewhat better than its sister services� One reason was the RN's importance as a key enabler of Britain's effort to "prevent or shape crises further away [from home] and [its ability] to deploy military forces rapidly before they get out of hand, " as the Strategic Defence Review published in 1998 empha-sized� 10 The procurement of two larger aircraft carriers to replace the three existing smaller ships underscored the continued relevance of the RN as an effective tool of foreign policy�

This text was previously published in French as "Entre ciel et terre: Le débat air-sol et les défis de l'appui-feu", Focus stratégique, No. 35, February 2012. Traditionally, maneuver units are designed for mobility and control of the ground, while supporting forces (artillery, aviation) deliver fires to protect the former and ensure their freedom of action. As a result of the introduction of mobile artillery in the XVIII th Century, and even more so with the development of an effective tactical aviation, fire support has played a crucial tactical role in the major conventional conflicts of the XX th Century. No longer subject to the marginalization imposed by the nuclear era, fire support has now come to the crossroads: while Close Air Support often proved decisive during operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, practical experience has nonetheless shown that artillery and mortars remain essential. The future of fire support will therefore depend on both budgetary constraints and strategic considerations: armed forces will have to define a new joint balance that takes into account the various components of fire support and is politically and financially sustainable. Les forces de manoeuvre ont pour fonction traditionnelle la mobilité et la maîtrise du terrain, là où les forces d'appui (artillerie, aviation) ont pour mission d'appliquer les feux assurant la protection et la liberté d'action des premières. Suite à l'introduction de l'artillerie mobile au XVIII e siècle, et plus encore avec le développement d'une aviation tactique performante, l'appuifeu a été un facteur tactique crucial lors des grands conflits conventionnels du XX e siècle. Récemment sorti de la marginalité imposée par l'ère nucléaire, l'appui-feu se trouve aujourd'hui à la croisée des chemins : si, en effet, l'appui aérien (Close Air Support) a pu jouer un rôle décisif dans les opérations en Afghanistan et en Irak, la pratique a démontré que l'artillerie et les mortiers demeurent souvent indispensables. L'avenir de l'appui-feu se jouera ainsi à l'intersection des contraintes budgétaires et des considérations stratégiques : il va donc s'agir pour les armées de définir, entre les différentes composantes de l'appui-feu, des équilibres interarmées qui soient politiquement et financièrement tenables.

Beginning in 2016 Iran's naval posture in the Persian Gulf changed from a defensive-offensive strategy, which had been in effect since 2001, to an offensive one. This was reinforced in 2019-2020, when, in response to the Trump administration, Iranian military strategists determined that any potential confrontation with the country's adversaries is likely to take place at sea rather than on land or in the air. After the end of the Iran-Iraq war, Iran's naval strategies can be divided into three, each coinciding with different periods: defensive (1988-2001), defensive-offensive (2001-2016) and offensive (since 2016). The intensification of the US military presence in the Persian Gulf and issuing threats against Iran have played a central role Tehran's adoption of an offensive naval strategy. Features of this new strategy include the development of ballistic and cruise missile programmes; development and deployment of drones in naval manoeuvres; the use of air defence in supporting naval operations; deepening Iran's military presence in Persian Gulf islands; ensuring the ability to disrupt the flow of energy; conducting naval manoeuvres in collaboration with trans-regional powers and continued use of proxy warfare. Tehran believes the new strategy will help it better prepare for international threats.

Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. Navy has made profound changes in its strategic concepts, operating structures, naval doctrines and combat systems to adapt its forces both to the changing security environment and to achieving a Revolution in Military Affairs that promised to transform war at sea. This article examines those changes -firstly oriented towards littoral warfare, later to achieve the revolution and nowadays to secure its access to any point of the globe by contributing to the Air-Sea Battle -aimed at maintaining the relevance of the U.S. Navy in American foreign policy. Defining the US Navy in the 21st Century had proposed years previously -suggested that network warfare was the essence of the RMA, the Navy immediately endorsed this idea and it became the apex of the naval revolution. Expeditionary vocation, littoral warfare, network operations, oceanic supremacy and controversial air-sea battle -recently raised requisites, with the United States fearful that countries like China could challenge their control of the sea and deny access to certain zones of interest in the world-constitute the axes of a naval transformation conditioned by the inheritance of the War on Terror and the grave economic crisis affecting us. Bearing this in mind, we shall take a panoramic view of the technological, operational and organic changes developed by the U.S. Navy since the end of the Cold War, so as to successfully face the uncertain challenges of the 21st Century. Historically speaking, the Navy has been one of the main springs of American foreign policy. During the Cold War, it played a central role in military strategy, 3 protecting lines of sea communication between the United States and its allies, stalking the Soviet fleet while denying it control of the sea and safeguarding the missile-launch submarines, the most fearful element of the nuclear triad. 4 3 A complete analysis of the U.S. Navy during the Cold War can be found in: MAROLDA, Edward: "Cold War to Violent Peace", in HOLLAND, William (ed.): The Navy, Washington DC: Naval Historical Foundation, 2000, pp. 105-132). However, it is important to recall that the founding principles of the present-day U.S. Navy were established in the 1980s when, in order to counter-attack the Soviet naval strategy devised by Admiral Gorskhov, the Reagan Administration proposed the construction of more and better vessels; that was when the 600-ship Navy was proposed, with the integration of elements of the fleet and the Aegis combat system and the debut of the Tomahawk cruise missile and an aggressive strategy aimed at denying the Soviet fleet control of the sea was implemented, obliging them to reposition their missile-launch submarines to their own coasts or those of the Black Sea, thereby facilitating their destruction in the case of nuclear war. (HATTENDORF, John: The Evolution of the U.S. Navy's Maritime Strategy, 1977-1986, Newport: Naval War College, 2003). 4 This concept came into existence in The United States during the Cold War to define the three vectors -land-based ballistic intercontinental missiles (ICBM), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) and nuclear-capable strategic bombers. Relying on this nuclear triad guaranteed the survival of atomic weapons in the case of a preventive strike, enabling the capacity for counter-attack and thus strengthening their deterring force. Besides, the difficulty in detecting submarine missile launchers and their capacity for launching missiles any point of the ocean, turned the SLBM into a weapon of reprisal or counter-attack and the most feared element of this nuclear triad.

Introduction. News in the Indian-Pacific Ocean Region have been dominated in the past couple of weeks by Beijing's 23 November announcement of an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East-China Sea. 1 Four aspects are particularly relevant. First, it covers Japan's Senkaku Islands, 2 which China claims under the name Diaoyu. Second, it includes the waters between Japan and Taiwan. Third, it requires aircraft flying through it to provide information, regardless of whether they are China-bound. Fourth, it has been accompanied by renewed speculation about a similar move in the South China Sea. The official announcement required all "Aircraft flying in the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone" to provide "flight plans … maintain the two-way radio communications, and respond in a timely and accurate manner to the identification inquiries", maintain "transponder identification" and "clearly mark their nationalities and the logo of their registration identification", following Chinese instructions. The text also warned that "China's armed forces will adopt defensive emergency measures to respond to aircraft that do not cooperate in the identification or refuse to follow the instructions." and stated that the ADIZ would come into force that same day. 3 Commenting on Beijing's move two days later, Andrew S. Erickson (US Naval War College) explained that the Chinese Air Force "soon conducted its first patrol in the zone, with two large reconnaissance aircraft monitoring the area, early warning aircraft supporting and fighters providing cover", adding that "despite boilerplate disclaimers to the contrary, Beijing's action appears targeted precisely at stoking tension between China and Japan, and putting pressure on the U.S.-Japan alliance". Erickson believes that "particularly problematic is the fact that official Chinese statements imply that Beijing intends to use military force if necessary to ensure that all aircraft comply with Beijing's instructions within its declared ADIZ", stressing that "this is an unrealistic expectation, as an ADIZ is not synonymous with national airspace". 4 Professor Tomohiko Taniguchi, senior adviser to Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, considered Beijing's move to lead to "a whole new game", and stressed an aspect of China's ADIZ which has attracted much criticism, namely that in contrast with other such zones planes traversing them but not heading to "Announcement of the Aircraft Identification Rules for the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone of the

German V-1 rockets raining over London and Russian self-propelled Katyusha rockets pulverising German forces on the eastern front are enduring images of the Second World War. After 1945, it seemed the rudimentary technologies embodied in these projectiles were poised to take off. Instead, it would take several decades for these rockets to transform into smart and lethal battlefield weapons. Cruise Missiles: Evolution, Proliferation and Future traces the emergence and evolution of this unsung weapon system, and makes a timely and useful contribution to contemporary security literature. With the onset of the missile age in the 1950s, it was the ballistic rather than the cruise missile that raced ahead. Aside from technological constraints, there were doctrinal reasons that ensured the cruise missile played second fiddle to the ballistic missile throughout the Cold War. Strategic deterrence was the primary goal of the US and Soviet military planners and the ballistic missile became the...

With or without regime change in Iraq, the U.S. military posture toward the Persian Gulf will require significant adjustments over the next decade. The future of Iraq-and the outcome of U.S. efforts to effect regime change and Baghdad's compliance with United Nations Security Council resolutions-will be the key driver of the size and character of these changes. Regardless of how regime change occurs in Iraq-whether it happens quickly and decisively or is protracted and messy-and whatever type of post-Saddam regime finally emerges, the United States will need to diversify its dependence on regional basing and forward

A earlier article ("Naval Warfare: Defense Development and Acquisition," National Defense, November-December 1978) discussed the entire naval warfare mission area from the perspective of the Office of Naval Warfare. Here we will focus specifically on naval antiair warfare (AAW), not because it is more vital than other aspects of naval warfare, but because it is an area in which there are rapid and continuing changes, which have resulted in confusion in the minds of many. As pointed out in the previous article, antiair warfare is not an end in itself but is, rather, a necessary means to permit us to carry out positive naval missions such as the support of land campaigns (either directly or by independent strike warfare), defense of friendly territory from maritime attack, or protection of ocean commerce. Aircraft carriers, as the main striking arm of the U.S. Navy, will undoubtedly be the principal targets of any air attacks, so that their protection must be the first prior...

Strategic Appraisal: United States Air and Space Power in the 21st Century operations. Strategic Appraisal 1997: Strategy and Defense Planning for the 21st Century dealt with the challenges the U.S. military faces in meeting the changing demands made upon it in a changing world. Strategic Appraisal 1996 assessed challenges to U.S. interests around the world, focusing on key nations and regions. The views expressed here are those of the authors. They do not necessarily reflect those of RAND or its clients. The research described here was conducted before the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States and the subsequent U.S. campaign against Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups.

For a few years, we have heard a lot about asymmetric warfare. Most of the time, the question of asymmetry is however reduced to the instrumental aspect of the problem. If you really want to understand the complexity of asymmetry you need to dig further. The purpose of the article is to understand some other characteristics of asymmetry, namely the ontological, cultural, moral facets of asymmetry. These are the forgotten dimensions of asymmetry in the public debate. Therefore we must recognize asymmetry as a general strategy that needs to be counterbalanced by a grand/integral strategy.

This book examines air and space power in light of the challenges and opportunities that are emerging from increased demands for these assets and in light of technological and social change. Change--in international relations, in technology, and in society as a whole--has become the idiom of our age. One example of these changes has been an increasing recognition of the value of air and space assets for handling nearly every contingency from disaster relief to war and, consequently, increasing demand for such assets. These developments have created both challenges and opportunities for the U.S. Air Force. This, the fourth volume in the Strategic Appraisal series, draws on the expertise of researchers from across RAND to explore both the challenges and opportunities that the U.S. Air Force faces as it strives to support the nation's interests in a challenging technological and security environment. Contributors examine the changing roles of air and space forces in U.S. national s...

The gradual development of the US missile defense shield from Europe to the Persian Gulf region over the past decade and the deployment of radar components and defenses of this project, both in the Persian Gulf region and in its floating zone, have plenty implications for regional and international systems and has aggravated the fragile security of the Persian Gulf region. Some issues such as the beginning of the arms race, the collapse of the balance of power, the blurring of relations and regional instability, and most importantly the tripartite Arab, Israeli, and American alliances can be seen from the security implications of establishing the project in the Persian Gulf region. Accordingly, the purpose of this research is to investigate the reasons for the formation of the missile defense shield, its extension to the Persian Gulf region and its impact on the security of the area. The analysis is based on the descriptive-analytical method and data collection with the library tool.

To the Editors (William D. O'Neil writes): Caitlin Talmadge's analysis of the threat of Iranian action to close the Strait of Hormuz is not only timely but provides many valuable insights. 1 Several aspects of this complex issue call out for further clariªcation, however.

To the Editors (William D. O'Neil writes): Caitlin Talmadge's analysis of the threat of Iranian action to close the Strait of Hormuz is not only timely but provides many valuable insights. 1 Several aspects of this complex issue call out for further clariªcation, however.

In the paper the author examines the dilemma of establishing military bases abroad in order to wage war, maintain presence or
secure the interests of a state. The study concerns the Loss-of-Strength Gradient, advantages and disadvantages of overseas presence of
armed forces and the characteristic of an overseas military base.

Air Force plays an important role in the security system of each country and alliances. The importance of the Air Force determines the high potential of modern air force and air defense, multiplicated by rapid development of technology, particularly the increase of combat capabilities through the use of precision-guided weapons. These features make the Air Force the most predisposed mean of struggle to resolve the contemporary crisis in the international environment. Therefore, this article identifies mission scenarios that can be fulfilled by Polish Air Force (PLAF), declared force level and proposed structure of the air component task forces foreseen to be used outside the country.

NATO currently finds itself in an increasingly competitive international environment, with potential adversaries who field, among other things, progressively capable ballistic and cruise missile capabilities. This is particularly the case with Russia, which has proven itself capable of fielding conventional long-range strike capabilities that can reach far into NATO territory. Russia's ballistic missiles, such as the Iskander system, are also a key part of its growing anti-access/area-denial networks. In the Kaliningrad enclave, for example, the deployment of Iskander missiles represents a real threat not only to NATO members in the region, but also to potential forward basing locations needed for US and NATO reinforcements in a crisis, as well as deployed US and allied forces in the field. This issue brief takes a broad, non-NATO approach to the growing challenge of ballistic missiles for the United States and its allies and considers new technologies and methods to meet the threat. While the approach is global, many of the considerations and recommendations in this issue brief are of relevance to the Alliance and its members as NATO pursues options on how to provide credible collective defense and deterrence in a newly insecure Europe.

The Commandant of the Marine Corps stated in his planning guidance that sea denial was going to be a core mission of the Marine Corps in the future.  Instead of trying to reinvent the wheel, the USMC should find forces who already do this well, and use their example as a starting point.

This study hypothesizes that armed escort is required to protect special operations lift helicopters inserting, extracting, or resupplying SOF ground teams deep in the enemy rear. It compares the escort doctrine and tactics utilized by conventional air assets with current special operations tactics in light of the rapidly increasing threat among lesser developed nations.
Beginning with the historical perspective of armed escort, then examining the current and projected threat, this study concludes that armed escort is indeed required to counter the increasingly capable and proliferating air defense threat. Based upon Phase One of the Concept Based Requirements System, Concept Formulation, this thesis proposes an Operational Concept for armed escort.

In the past few decades the Middle East has been one of the most militarized regions in the world. The reasons of this high level of militarization varied depending on the time period and particular country. During the Cold War many of the region’s countries played a role of the client states of the United States or the Soviet Union and took part in the proxy wars waged by the two sides of this conflict1. This has made them a major recipients of the American and Soviet military assistance as well as significant buyers of their weapons2. The Middle Eastern arms race was an offshoot of the great Cold War arms race between the East and the West, but it had also its own conditions and specificity. The states of the region strengthen their military potential and capabilities not only to get a stronger position in the Cold War rivalry, but also to realize their own regional goals and ambitions, to settle some old grudges with their neighbours or to solve some internal problems.

Hybrid threats have now joined a growing suite of alternative concepts about the ever evolving character of modern conflict. Here and abroad, the hybrid threat construct has found traction in official policy circles despite its relative novelty. It has been cited by the U.S. Secretary of Defense in articles and speeches, and by policymakers now serving in the Pentagon. Heretofore, the rapidly growing hybrid threat literature has focused on the land warfare aspects of the threat. Modern hybrid threats, including Hezbollah and Iran, have demonstrated the ability to employ irregular tactics and advanced naval capabilities along with illegal or terrorist activity. Thus, the hybrid threat is applicable to naval forces and the U.S. Navy needs to dust off lessons learned from its last experience in the Persian Gulf in the late 1980s to better prepare for an even more challenging future.

An institutional perspective on nuclear deterrence cooperation within alliances has the potential to fundamentally reorient how we think about analyzing nuclear and deterrence decision-making between nuclear patrons and non-nuclear clients. It comes at a time when the presidency of Donald Trump is sure to test many of the core claims and assumptions in security studies, especially relating to bargaining and credibility within alliances. This article surveys questions that will be core to the research agenda involving alliance institutions and nuclear weapons during the Trump presidency and beyond.

The article explores the legacy of Obama's foreign policy based on the administration's engagement towards the defined 'core' foreign policy regions, aimed to renew the contemporary American identity. It argues how Obama's rhetoric in Asia-Pacific to rebalance the region has resulted to the adoption of an assertive and belligerent stance of China, with suspicions aimed at possible US coerciveness to undermine China's regional order and ambitions especially in the South China Sea. It further argues of Obama's failure to fully embrace the concept of American Exceptionalism in handling the contemporary power dynamics and anarchy of the Middle East, defying traditional US missionary policies with foreign policy elements of inconsistencies, cautiousness, and skepticism. Finally the article concludes of Obama's legacy with the continual regional disorders spurred by America's retreat in the Middle East, and China's belligerent rise in Asia.