Appeasement

The goal of this study was to examine the linguistic correlates of social anxiety disorder (SAD). Twenty-four individuals with SAD (8 of them with a generalised subtype) and 21 non-anxious controls were asked to give speeches in front of an audience. The transcribed speeches were examined for the frequency of negations, I-statements, we-statements, negative emotion words, and positive emotion words. During their speech, individuals with either SAD subtype used positive emotion words more often than controls. No significant differences were observed in the other linguistic categories. These results are discussed in the context of evolutionary and cognitive perspectives of SAD.

Ο κατευνασμός αποτελεί μια απάντηση σε ένα στρατηγικό πρόβλημα. Ένα κράτος αποφασίζει να κάνει παραχωρήσεις προς ένα άλλο με σκοπό να
αντιμετωπίσει τη στρατηγική κατάσταση που έχει διαμορφωθεί. Διαχρονικά ο κατευνασμός έχει επικριθεί ως μια αποτυχημένη στρατηγική που οδηγεί νομοτελειακά στη σύγκρουση. Ωστόσο, τις τελευταίες δεκαετίες πολλοί μελετητές των διεθνών σχέσεων υποστηρίζουν ότι υπό συγκεκριμένες προϋποθέσεις η συγκεκριμένη στρατηγική δύναται να είναι αποτελεσματική. Το βασικό συμπέρασμα της παρούσας διατριβής είναι ότι για να είναι η στρατηγική κατευνασμού επιτυχημένη, δηλαδή να μην εκλειφθεί από το κατευναζόμενο κράτος ως ένδειξη αδυναμίας, πρέπει να συνδυάζεται με μια αξιόπιστη και αποφασιστική αποτρεπτική στάση η οποία θα πλαισιώνεται από κατάλληλες στρατηγικές επιλογές όπως η εξισορρόπηση και η ανάσχεση. Επιπλέον, και με δεδομένο ότι η Ελλάδα δεν έχει ακόμα διαμορφώσει θεσμικά την εθνική της στρατηγική, βασική διαπίστωση της διατριβής είναι ότι η στρατηγική της Ελλάδας έναντι της Τουρκίας, για το χρονικό διάστημα από το 1996 (κρίση των Ιμίων) έως και σήμερα, είναι μια στρατηγική κατευνασμού που δεν έχει αποδώσει, μιας και οι αναθεωρητικές διεκδικήσεις, σε συνδυασμό με την επιθετική παραβατικότητά της, εντείνονται με το πέρασμα του χρόνου.

Michael David-Fox und .deI: deut~ehen faschistisc~en ~echten. Dazu traf ~r sic?, wie .ein Doku~~e~t belegt, personIIch mIt dem Alplall-MItglIed Grabowsky zu ell1er funf-bIS sechsstundIgen Sit_ zung. Grabowsky informierte die Analytiker des Volkskommissariats jür aUsWärtige Angelegenheiten auch über die Ausrichtung der verschiedenen Nationalbolschewisten wobei er sich vor allem auf den Tat-Kreis konzentrierte, aus dem eine Reihe vo~ Alplan-Mitgliedern kam. Die Tat hatte so etwas wie eine Ostideologie entwickelt, die von der Vorstellung eines deutsch-slawischen Zwischeneuropas ausging, das Ost und West teilte.'9 Gerade solche sowjetophilen Tendenzen in der radikalen Rechten Wurden nach der Machtergreifung der Nationalsozialisten 1933 allerdings eingeschränkt und unterdrückt. Dennoch berichtete Politbüro-Mitglied Lazar' Kaganovic Stalin im August 1932 von seiner Lektüre der Gesprächstranskripte sowjetischer Diplomaten in Deutsch_ land. Es ging vor allem um das nationalsozialistische Afplan-Mitglied Reventlowund den militärischen Agenten, Abenteurer und Professor für Militärgeographie, Oskar Ritter von Niedermayer, der als Organisator der geheimen militärischen Zusammencu'_ beit zwischen Reichswehr und Roter Armee acht Jahre in der UdSSR gelebt hatte. Niedermayer habe der sowjetischen Botschaft in Berlin angeboten, Kontakte zu Hermann Göring he~lstellen und damit eine ständige Verbindung zur NSDAP aufzubauen. 3o "Die Mitschriften zeigen", schrieb Kaganovic an Stalin, dass selbst faschistische Elemente uns vertrauen müssen, dass sie die Beziehungen, die zwischen uns entstanden sind, nicht stören wollen. Das ist natürlich äußerst wichtig, weil diese Elemente, wie es aussieht [ ... ], in Deutschland an der Macht bleiben werden. 31 Kaganonvics naive Auffassung vom prosowjetischen Potential des deutschen Faschismus stammt von jemandem, der vermutlich wusste, was Stalin hören wollte. Sie zeigt, dass das Engagement für die konservative Revolution keine Einbahnstraße war, denn Kaganovic extrapolierte zweifellos aus Kontakten zu jenen Teilen der deutschen Rechten, die zur Zusammenarbeit mit den Sowjets bereit waren. Es sollte nicht das letzte Mal sein, dass das Kalkül Stalins und seiner Satrapen bei ihren Erwartungen an Bündnisse mit der entgegengesetzten Seite des politischen Spektrums nicht aufging.

The Cold War  is the term given to the conflict that existed between the USA and the USSR  after the Second World War  between 1945 and 1989. The research question asks: to what extent was ideology  the main cause of the Cold War? This historical investigation focuses on the effects, contribution and background of ideology before and during the Cold War.

The subject of this investigation is ideology during the Cold War, which was caused by ideological differences, opposite aims for Germany, tension produced by the American intervention in the Russian Civil War of 1918-1922 , the USSR’s signing of the Nazi-Soviet pact , Western appeasement of Hitler and disputes over the future of Eastern Europe.

The scope of this essay will encompass the differing beliefs of Communism  and Capitalism , its effect on relations between the superpowers during the war, events crucial to the development of the war and the role played by Cold War ideologies. A summary of evidence will be included in Section B, primary and secondary sources in Section C, analysis in Section D and a conclusion in Section E.

In his contribution, Bernhard H. Bayerlein deconstructs the myth of the anti-fascist Soviet Union, using the example of a secret meeting with the official of the Soviet Embassy in Berlin, Boris Vinogradov, in February 1933.
Bernhard H. Bayerlein dekonstruiert in seinem Beitrag den Mythos von der antifaschistischen Sowjetunion am Beispiel eines Geheimtreffens im Februar 1933 mit dem Pressesprecher der sowjetischen Botschaft in Berlin, Boris Winogradow.

Was wissen Sie über Kosovo? Nicht genug. Nicht genug jedenfalls über objektive, wertfrei vorgegebene Fakten, mit deren Hilfe man verantwortungsethische Bewertungen des NATO-Angriffs begründen könnte. Trotzdem halte ich drei wertende Aussagen über den Kosovo-Konflikt für vernünftig. Sie lauten (in alphabetischer Reihenfolge): Der bewaffnete Kampf der Albaner im Kosovo war moralisch falsch. Die Militäreinsätze der Serben im Kosovo waren moralisch falsch (schon vor Beginn der NATO-Bombardements und erst recht danach). Und schliesslich: Die Luftschläge des Westens gegen Serbien waren moralisch falsch. Insbesondere diese letzte Behauptung ist der Zielpunkt des Aufsatzes. Mein Plädoyer für diese Behauptung verläuft auf einem dritten Weg zwischen der gesinnungsethischen Position pazifistischer Rigoristen und der verantwortungsethischen Position ihrer Kontrahenten. Die grundlegende Richtlinie für meine Untersuchung besteht darin, keine Behauptungen als objektiv auszugeben, die in Wirklichkeit auf Wertungen beruhen. Schon beim Blick auf die Vorkriegs- und Kriegsgeschehnisse im Kosovo kommen wir nicht ohne die Hilfe von Werten aus; und ich plädiere dafür, diese Geschehnisse im Lichte einer verzweifelten Menschenliebe anzusehen: Daraus ergibt sich eine neue Form von Pazifismus.

Subject of the study is a little-known aspect of Chamberlain’s appeasement policy, namely, the propaganda campaign towards the German public from September 1938 until May 1940. Although there is a vast literature about appeasement, Chamberlain’s efforts to reach the German people by way of propaganda have so far received no attention from historians. The thesis reconstructs for the first time the history of British German-language propaganda dur-ing Chamberlain’s premiership. The evolution of the institutional framework, the changing strategies and the contents of this propaganda campaign are described in detail, offering a deep insight into the thinking of the British Government about German society and exposing a naive belief in the power of propaganda.
In the thesis a new methodological approach is adopted by integrating the study of high poli-tics at the diplomatic level with the study of the propaganda campaign towards a foreign pub-lic. Whereas conventional interpretations consider appeasement a foreign policy strategy con-ducted exclusively on the diplomatic stage between the two governments of Britain and Ger-many, the author maintains that appeasement has rather to be viewed as a policy consisting of two equal and complementary pillars. The first pillar was the well-known dual policy of deter-rence and conciliation directed towards the Nazi regime at a governmental level. The second pillar was the propaganda campaign directed towards the German public over the heads of the Nazi regime. The propaganda campaign, while on the whole reflecting Chamberlain’s foreign policy on the governmental level, seems to have been regarded by the British government as an additional deterrent element to the diplomatic pillar: Hitler was to be warned that he would risk serious opposition from his own people if he provoked war, and thus be induced to seek a peaceful solution to his territorial claims. In this sense, the propaganda campaign was a safe-guard for the conciliatory part of appeasement, namely, the readiness to consider favourably Germany’s legitimate territorial and economic claims.
The thesis identifies five phases during which Chamberlain attached varying degrees of im-portance to the propaganda instrument in his dealings with Germany. Thus, the significance of propaganda increased in direct relation to the deterioration of Anglo-German negotiations on the diplomatic level. The propaganda pillar even outlasted the outbreak of war and the col-lapse of the first pillar: After negotiations on an official diplomatic level had come to an end on 3rd September 1939, Chamberlain sought to continue his policy of goodwill towards the German people by means of propaganda in the hope to stir up a revolution against Hitler.
In the end, however, British propaganda proved to be a failure. The author identifies two rea-sons for this. The first was a lack of credibility, i.e. the discrepancy between the picture of events as presented in British propaganda, and the reality as experienced by the German pub-lic. The second, and even more important, reason was, however, a whole host of unrealistic British assumptions about the Nazi state and the character of the German people. In particular, the British political elite unconsciously transferred British democratic traditions onto Hitler’s totalitarian regime. Chamberlain’s propaganda was based on the premise that public opinion did carry some weight in the Third Reich and that the German people, even though living un-der a dictatorship, would cherish similar political ideals of democratic participation and a dis-like of Hitler as British subjects.

Despite Australia’s regional security interests being intimately
involved in the Pacific War, scholarship often portrays the nation
as uninvolved in preparations for the imminent regional conflict.
Rather, Australia ‘suffered from a chronic lack of self-reliance’,
looking instinctively to the British Empire and the security it
afforded. This article proposes that in the years 1937–41, the
Australian government – first under Joseph Lyons and then
Robert Menzies – recognised both the immediacy of the Japanese
threat and the limitations of imperial defence plans and accordingly
responded with a concerted policy for the coming regional
conflict. The principal focus of this article is Australia’s position
towards Japan and the implied pragmatic appraisal by Australia
of the strategic value of diplomacy in maintaining regional stability.
In the context of this growing assertiveness, this article also
considers broader tensions in the Australian–British relationship,
tensions centred on each nation’s respective and divergent position
towards Japan. In this way, this article is more than just an
examination of strategic appraisals, rearmament and diplomacy. It
seeks to comment on Australian geopolitics, its relations with
great powers, and the challenge of balancing national interests.

Canine shelters frequently have inadequate living conditions that affect the behavior of dogs. This study compared fear-appeasement and sociability reactions in shelter and pet dogs when they are confronted by an unfamiliar experimenter. Results indicated that shelter dogs used for this study showed more fear-appeasement behaviordtail down, ears down, and crouchingdas compared with pet dogs. In addition, shelter dogs quite frequently remained closer to the individual, despite showing signs of fear-appeasement, as compared with pet dogs. Finally, shelter dogs remained near the door of the enclosure less often when compared with pet dogs. This difference might be accounted for by the lack of any attachment bonds among shelter dogs toward their caretakers. These results may be associated to the usual stressful conditions and limited interactions with human beings that may be observed in shelters with scarce resources.

Journalists and the media have not only played a role as political actors in Anglo-German relations, which was independent of their governments. Likewise, they have also worked in the service of their states, surrendering more or less consciously their journalistic independence for the ‘national interest’. One such example is the British propaganda campaign directed at the German public during 1938-1939 with the help of the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). The campaign is an interesting historical case that shows the enormous influence a government could exert on the media even in a democratic society. This article examines the relationship between the journalists of the BBC German Service and the Foreign Office and offers an insight into the mechanisms of British propaganda production between the Munich Agreement and the outbreak of the Second World War.

Great powers can pursue deliberate Trojan horse policies to transform rising and threatening states into followers and supporters rather than challengers by altering their domestic political and economic institutions. I contend that a great power can use trade concessions, rather than punishment, to enable a favorable foreign policy coalition in a target country. The intent is to strengthen the political power of state and societal elites who have a stake in deepening international ties, while opponents of such policies will be weakened politically and economically. The societal winners will then apply pressure on the government to support their preferred outward-oriented grand strategy. I term this process the second face of security since it entails a less direct and more nuanced method of creating security. I examine Britain's commercial policies toward Germany and Japan during the 1930s to better understand second-face strategies. I argue that the intent of Britain's industrial and commercial policy was to strengthen conservative business, government officials, and economic circles in banking, light industry, and finished goods, and even heavy industry in order to steer Berlin and Tokyo away from rearmament, extreme autarky, and war.

The goal of this study was to examine the linguistic correlates of social anxiety disorder (SAD). Twenty-four individuals with SAD (8 of them with a generalised subtype) and 21 non-anxious controls were asked to give speeches in front of an audience. The transcribed speeches were examined for the frequency of negations, I-statements, we-statements, negative emotion words, and positive emotion words. During their speech, individuals with either SAD subtype used positive emotion words more often than controls. No significant differences were observed in the other linguistic categories. These results are discussed in the context of evolutionary and cognitive perspectives of SAD.

A brief review of human history reveals that various individuals, groups and nations have used religious dogma as a pretext to engage in aggression against others.  As such, it is no surprise that the Islamic radicalism that fuels the Global War on Terrorism employs what it calls the “true” Moslem religion in order to cloak a lust for domination through despicable expressions of unlawful violence, primarily targeting innocent civilians. 


On the other hand, when it comes to confronting the forces of al-Qa’eda-styled aggression, it is not surprising that democracies like the United States also employ religious ideology and symbolism to support the necessary use of force in self-defense.  What is surprising, though, is that many religious leaders in the West align themselves with anti-war activists and then employ religion as the reason to reject all forms of violence whatsoever, self-defense or otherwise.  For these voices of appeasement, a misapplication of religious belief is used as a justification not to use lawful violence to curtail aggression.


Paradoxically, appeasement—be it in the name of religion or not—cannot long curtail those intent on aggression.  Such wishful thinking simply emboldens the aggressor and inevitably leads to an increase in the butcher’s bill of human suffering.  This is evidenced by an exploration of the historical relationship between religion and world conflict, and illustrates that the forces associated with religious beliefs of whatever brand should not be employed in ways that stand in contradiction to the positive goals and aspirations embodied in the United Nations Charter.

Hungary, like Germany, was a vanquished power after the Great War, and propaganda denouncing the peace settlement was ubiquitous. Slogans condemning the peace permeated public life, politics, education, academia, literature, the press and broadcasting. The mentality engendered by this atmosphere infused the private discourses of families and individuals. The victimhood mentality helped to mould and sustain Admiral Horthy’s interwar regency. The ‘Szeged idea’ – drawn up in the southern town of Szeged in 1919 – remained the binding element of public and private discourse, predicated on anti-liberal and anti-Western principles that would rebuild and govern Hungary along Christian-national lines. In this atmosphere, Hungary’s small liberal elite, who had no sympathy with Hitler’s regime, struggled to denounce the injustice of Munich. An annex of Munich referred the territorial dispute between Hungary and Czechoslovakia to direct negotiations that eventually awarded Hungary southern Slovakia in November 1938 and Subcarpathian Ruthenia in March 1939. Thus Hungary, a country with a largely silent opposition, became a beneficiary of Munich. The politicians’ views are easily decoded, deriving from geopolitical circumstances. However, the absence of dissent by public intellectuals, the press and public opinion points to a deeper crisis in interwar Hungarian political culture. Using a range of non-political publications, journals, literary magazines, private diaries and other sources, this chapter elucidates the social and psychological dynamic behind Hungary’s quiescent and often complicit attitude during the Munich Crisis.

Considering the recent series of events and intensified diplomatic and economic relations, many experts envisage a new Cold War between the two superpowers of the twenty-first century. Although the Chinese-American relationship over the last half-century has experienced some great moments, it has mostly been characterised by less amicable or even hostile attitudes, as well as economically volatile competition. The pragmatic realist approach and diplomatic appeasement of the 1970s and 1980s served mutual interests for the two countries against their common foe, the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, concerning their political values and visions, the democratic US and the Marxist-Maoist People's Republic of China have proven to be two irreconcilable political and social experiments, worlds apart from each other's spheres and paradigms. Within the context of the drastically altered global political milieu of the new millennium, the two great powers have manoeuvred themselves into heated confrontational positions over the last decade, not even excluding the possibility of a severe clash of interests in the future.

Las relaciones hispano-norteamericanas han sufrido aparentemente grandes vaivenes en una etapa histórica clave en nuestra época reciente. Independientemente de las explicaciones basadas en las interpretaciones y afinidades ideológicas, se pude realizar un análisis realista de los intereses de España, las inclinaciones perdurables de la política exterior y la estructura cambiante del sistema internacional, más allá de un análisis basado en los resultados de estas políticas y decisiones. Desde un punto de vista teórico podemos analizar la conducta en política exterior de los gobiernos españoles utilizando dos conceptos: "bandwagoning for profits" y Appeasement. Ambos conceptos pueden ser fácilmente reconocibles en la política exterior española de estos 10 años, tanto en la relación con EEUU, como en la formulación general en la política exterior española, tanto real como percibida.

An earlier article examined the conditions under which it is reasonable to negotiate with rogue states. This article extends the argument to non-state terrorist "villains". Despite the risks inherent in negotiating with terrorists, the risks of following a no-negotiation policy are likely to be more deadly. States need to assess terrorist interests and intentions to find if there are reasonable entry points for negotiation and take advantage of these to transform the conflict.

Although the anti-Jewish pogroms staged by the Nazis on 9-10 November 1938 took place shortly after the start of British German-language broadcasting, British propaganda did not report about Kristallnacht and the subsequent intensification of Nazi anti-Jewish policy. This article analyses the representation, or rather non-representation, of the ‘Jewish question’ in British German-language propaganda during 1938-39 and explores the reasons for the conspicuous absence of reports about the Jewish persecution, and indeed of almost all Jewish topics. Four causes for this absence are identified: foreign and defence policy aims; the fear of playing into the hands of Nazi propaganda; certain British assumptions about the German mentality, in particular about the spread of anti-Semitic attitudes among the German public; and finally, latent anti-Semitic tendencies in the British bureaucracy and fears of stirring up domestic anti-Semitism.