Christopher Hitchens

Atheism is another form of dogmatism. Atheism believes without solid scientific evidence in macroevolution and natural selection, both of which fails the scientific principles as mentioned in the opening remarks of Part 1. Atheism contends that science is the only way to know truth and this proposition is itself not scientifically valid and that science cannot ascertain moral truths. There are also ways people can know truth whether with certainty or probabilistically such as history, witness, psychological convictions from semantic realizations etc. Atheism gives us an amoral existence, loosely depending on moral zeitgeist which is a clusterfuck of human taste and impulses, often based on irrational thought and intense emotional judgement. I feel I must say atheism is the only ideology which results in a mindset of terrorism and disproportionate death and destruction due to absence of objective moral guidance, a control mechanism and amorality of evolution and natural selection. Atheism makes ignorant claims about religions without knowledge and equates all religions rather erroneously. (Viewers if no preview appears please download the book)

How could an entity, deep-seated in morals and enlightenment, be the root of hostility and cessation of free speech? In January 2009, Christopher Hitchens published an essay titled “Assassins of the Mind” in the prominent monthly magazine Vanity Fair in the United States. In his article, Hitchens, a critic and self-proclaimed anti-theist who regarded all religions as untrue, destructive, and dictatorial (Hitchens, 2005), highlights the unfairness and oppression that Muslims face in Islamic cultures when they seek to speak out against the Koran in any form. The essay details the various hostile events that occurred after Iran's theocratic leader at the time, Ayatollah Khomeini, issued a fatwa, or a legal decree handed down by an Islamic religious leader ordering Muslims to kill a specified group or individual. The decree was given to an Indian-born British-American novelist and Hitchens’ long-time friend, Salman Rushdie, because his penned book, “The Satanic Verses,” asserted that the Koran was written by men and thus was subject to literary criticism. This paper seeks to critically analyze and evaluate Hitchens’ work in terms of academic text components, language and tone, supporting pieces of evidence, and the effectiveness of the arguments given in the text's overall message.

Se ha dicho que el llamado " Nuevo Ateísmo " no es, precisamente, nuevo. Al menos en lo que hace a los argumentos racionales en los que apoyan sus ideas, los " cuatro jinetes " coinciden en postular el antiguo tópico de la incompatibilidad entre la existencia del mal en el mundo y la de un Dios omnipotente y bueno. Consideran, como lo han hecho los ateos de todas las épocas, que sólo un voluntarismo irracional permitiría que la idea de un Dios trascendente sobreviviera a la conciencia del mal que hay en el mundo. En conclusión, los nuevos ateos sostienen que el ateísmo instalaría en la sociedad una actitud menos tolerante para con los males y más eficaz para enfrentarlos. Sin embargo, estos planteos adolecen de cierta superficialidad metafísica. Las consecuencias teóricas de una idea de mal sin Dios han sido asumidas con mayor coherencia por la mayoría de los ateos de la historia. Aun un ateo como el Barón d ´Holbach-arquetipo del ateo panfletario del Iluminismo-era consciente de que la idea de mal en el contexto del ateísmo no puede ser otra que la de un mal ontológico. En otras palabras, la finitud misma se transforma en el mal. Autores como Schopenhauer, Nietzsche o Freud asumieron esta tesis con seguridad y valentía. Ahora bien, esta idea del mal como ontológico, ¿es la única posibilidad que nos ofrece nuestra razón? ¿Es la mejor? La idea de un mal histórico, asumida por las grandes religiones monoteístas, ¿sería menos racional? Un estudio histórico, cada vez más frecuente, podría convencernos de que una teoría del " pecado original " no sería, inclusive, sólo teológica, sino un preámbulo filosófico presente en toda una serie de autores de distintas tradiciones. De esta forma, la auténtica disyuntiva racional respecto del tema del mal sería la de optar entre un mal ontológico, inexorable, trágico, y la idea de un mal histórico (que se introdujo en el mundo por un pecado original), que puede ser derrotado-al menos en el fin de los tiempos-pero que es dramático. Todo planteo que eludiera esta radical alternativa sería racionalmente superficial. El mismo hecho de presentar sin discusión una de estas posibilidades como única para la razón o la filosofía adolecería de la misma debilidad y de una " culpable ignorancia "-la expresión es del filósofo italiano Luigi Pareyson-. Se propone en estas palabras resaltar la importancia teórica y existencial de esta gran alternativa metafísica, y volver a evaluar, a su luz, la cuestión de la racionalidad de la religión en uno de sus aspectos. Por otra parte, se aspira a mostrar que el tema del mal es una clave hermenéutica, muchas veces olvidada, para la filosofía y la teología contemporáneas.

In this paper, the author explores the New Atheism movement in the West and contemporary Western apologetics. The goal of such research is to present the apologetics as a valid answer of the Church to modern science and atheistic conclusions based on it. Apologetics should be reestablished as a separate theological discipline that would help young theologians understand the issues in dialogue between New Atheism and Christianity, which are currently studied briefly in pastoral theology.

Neste artigo temos por objetivo principal apresentar tópicos da obra O Ateísmo no Brasil: os sentidos da descrença nos séculos XX e XXI, de Ricardo Oliveira da Silva, historiador e professor da UFMS (campus de Nova Andradina). Os tópicos que selecionamos para apresentar e comentar foram: "As definições de ateísmo" (2020, p. 14-17); "O ateísmo na historiografia brasileira" (p. 17-29); "O ateísmo materialista na obra de intelectuais comunistas brasileiros" (p. 129-138); "A criação da Revista Ateísta" (p. 198-218); e "Ateísmo e feminismo" (p. 215-218). Como se pode notar, as discussões desta produção perpassam por definições de ateísmo; pela construção historiográfica desse ateísmo; pela chegada desse pensamento ateísta no Brasil; como as pesquisas nacionais estão lidando com essa temática do ateísmo; o movimento ateísta organizado e a criação de meios de divulgação, como revistas e sites; a questão feminina na educação científica e no ateísmo. Para cada um desses temas, criamos tópicos próprios, que serão comentados em nossas considerações no final deste artigo.

Abstract: Humanity has a tendency to move toward dogmatism with regard to ideology. I observe that one of humanity’s enlightened domains of inquiry, natural science, might prove susceptible to this tendency by way of the ideology known as naturalism. Here I ask whether or not contemporary naturalism is leaning toward fundamentalism. I subsequently levy the accusation that there are identifiable instances of fundamentalism in the naturalist worldview, as represented through the New Atheists. Lastly, I conclude with a caution to those who would favor dogmatism regarding the pursuit of knowledge through the natural sciences.

This paper delves into the relationship between George Orwell's novel Burmese Days (1934) and the author's interest in sharing his views about Colonial Burma, particularly emphasizing his rejection of how the British empire and its citizens mistreated local people. Furthermore, John Flory, the main character of the novel pretty much resembles Orwell himself and, by the end of the novel, this character's suicide symbolises Orwell's impotence with regards to being more straightforward when it came to engaging in anti-colonial activism. Authors such as Christopher Hitchens and Raymond Williams, for instance, hold different views about the role of Orwell's writing and his life as an anti-totalitarian subject. The fact that the author addressed mistreatment, inequality and dominant policies is interesting and, at the same time, daring. Orwell's main achievement was becoming universal and everlasting, reminding us to keep our eyes open against prejudice and violence.
http://plci-journal.jimdo.com/abstracts/

한글 초록

본고의 목표는 한국 사회에 팽배한 반기독교 운동과 현상의 본질과 흐름을 살펴보고, 자크 데리다(Jacques Derrida, 1930-2004)와 크리스토퍼 히친스(Christopher Hitchens, 1949-2011)가 전개한 해체주의(deconstruction)의 사상적 연속성과 불연속성의 빛 아래서, 반기독교 사회 분위기를 향한 한국 기독교의 해체주의적 반성점과 건설적 접근 방향성을 신학적으로 탐구, 고찰하는 것이다. 이를 위해 본고는 다음의 세 가지를 주된 연구 내용으로 상정한다. (1) 한국 사회 속에 깊이 내재되어 있는 반기독교적 흐름들을 ‘반기독교시민운동연합’(반기련)의 행보를 중심으로 현상학적으로 분석한다. (2) 앞에서 분석한 반기독교 흐름들을 데리다와 히친스가 전개한 해체주의 속에서 조망한다. 특별히 데리다가 전개한 로고스 중심주의(Logocentrism) 비판과 형이상학적 폭력의 문제, 차연(différance )이나 놀이(le jeu ) 개념, 히친스가 전개한 인본주의적 전체주의(totalitarianism) 문제, 입증 불가능성(unprovableness)과 이성(reason) 사이의 관계성 문제에 집중한다. 이런 분석을 통해서 데리다와 히친스 사이에 존재하는 사상적 연속성과 불연속성을 도출한 후, 이를 바탕으로 한국의 반기독교 사회 분위기에 적용할 보다 더 ‘건설적인 해체주의’의 관점을 분석-도출한다. (3) 앞에서 도출한 건설적인 해체주의 관점을 토대로 반기독교 운동에 대항하는 현 기독교의 모습을 자성하며 보다 더 건설적인 접근 방향성을 상정하여 적용한다.

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is to investigate and contemplate theologically Korean Christianity’s deconstructive self-reflection and constructive approaches toward anti-Christianity in light of intellectual continuity and discontinuity between deconstructionism of Jacques Derrida(1930-2004) and Christopher Hitchens(1949-2011). The study, for doing this, postulates three contents of the research as following: (1) Anti-Christian streams in Korean society will be examined on the basis of ‘the Citizens Coalition of the Anti-Christian Movement;’ (2) Anti-Christian trends in Korea will be surveyed in light of deconstruction of Derrida and Hitchens. Specifically, Derrida’s concepts such as Logocentrism, différance, le jeu, and Hitchens’ ideas such as man-made totalitarianism, the relationship between unprovableness and human reason will be viewed in detail. As a result of this discussion, intellectual discontinuity and discontinuity between Derrida and Hitchens will be disclosed; and (3) Based on the preceding discussions, more constructive approaches toward anti Christianity and a deep theological implication and application will be deduced along with an appropriate application in a Christian life.

Neste artigo temos por objetivo principal apresentar tópicos da obra O Ateísmo no Brasil: os sentidos da descrença nos séculos XX e XXI, de Ricardo Oliveira da Silva, historiador e professor da UFMS (campus de Nova Andradina). Os tópicos que selecionamos para apresentar e comentar foram: “As definições de ateísmo” (2020, p. 14-17); “O ateísmo na historiografia brasileira” (p. 17-29); “O ateísmo materialista na obra de intelectuais comunistas brasileiros” (p. 129-138); “A criação da Revista Ateísta” (p. 198-218); e “Ateísmo e feminismo” (p. 215-218). Como se pode notar, as discussões desta produção perpassam por definições de ateísmo; pela construção historiográfica desse ateísmo; pela chegada desse pensamento ateísta no Brasil; como as pesquisas nacionais estão lidando com essa temática do ateísmo; o movimento ateísta organizado e a criação de meios de divulgação, como revistas e sites; a questão feminina na educação científica e no ateísmo. Para cada um desses temas, criamos tópico...

I came upon the following example of Christopher Hitchens plagiarism in his National Book Award finalist volume, god is Not Great: How Religion Poisons Everything (2007). Hitchens gives himself away by copying the misspelled names of several gods from his plagiarized source (detailed discussion follows the comparative chart). This example of Hitchens's plagiarism came to my attention when I was trying to make sense of his referring to the mother of the Hindu deity Krishna as " Devaka "

It is usually thought that only one being can be all-knowing, all-powerful, and all-loving. Challenging this monotheist conviction, I propose a universe ruled by two deities: ‘day shift God’ oversees the events that occur while the sun is up, whereas ‘night shift God’ oversees the events that occur while the sun is down. I survey objections to this proposal and conclude that the real obstacle is not an argument, but an aesthetic preference.

This is the story of the Universe and Life ...
... arranged in 92 chapters as Three Testaments to honour the supreme achievements of men and women worldwide who together have been unravelling the secrets of the origins of the world and of living things.
Testaments One (Universe) and Two (Life) constitute a true ‘Genesis without Myth’.
Testament Three continues with what is known of the prehistory of humankind and it leads into known history up to the present day.
Together they attest to truths as gained by observation, instrumentation, insight, intelligence, reason, and the application of physical laws, experimental facts and the formulation of harmonious, logical models.
In defining the latest wisdom, they spell out the principles of this wondrous Universe.
Hence, this New Bible is a repository of knowledge, a witness to erudition and enlightenment, a work of rational explanation.
It is testimony and eulogy, in praise of high scholarship and logic—a covenant of improving exactness with the passage of time. Yet despite the successes here narrated about humankind—well enriched by high intelligence and a genetically promising future—the volume draws to a close (Epilogue, page 305) by sadly asking “How did Homo sapiens in the course of 160,000 years of progress get itself into the current predicament?”—referring to the amalgam of authoritarian religions, undemocratic governments, inequality of the sexes, reckless overpopulation, and irresponsible worldwide waste on land and ocean?

The authors are many. They number millions—chiefly scientists probing the mysteries of the Universe and the origins of Life, and prehistorians, ethical historians and well-informed reporters in consideration of the triumphs, events and disasters of humankind.
The assembler of these facts has gathered manifest truths from the works of the most learned and talented people. The result is a compendium of knowledge annotated with honourable intentions for the common good.

Socrates: “There is only one good, Knowledge, and only one evil, Ignorance.”

Jacob Bronowski: “In every age there is a turning point, a new way of seeing and asserting the coherence of the world.” Ascent of Man, Chapter 1, 1973.

René Descartes: “We buy the right to reject only with the effort we make to understand”.

Atheism, as a subject in its own right, has received comparatively little scholarly attention in the past. This study begins by unpacking the term “atheism,” specifying an appropriate timescale and limiting the scope of the investigation to the work of four key authors. Their critiques of religion are considered and common themes under the appellation “dangerous religion” are discerned. The author then pursues a closer reading of the texts, discerning what agenda is promoted in opposition to the heavily criticized “religion,” and discussing contemporary atheism in relation to Enlightenment values. Finally, the author examines why contemporary atheism fails to state its agenda more explicitly. The main players are shown to be individuals, with different foci that cannot be encapsulated by labels such as “Enlightenment.” Indications emerge of a “consciousness raising” agenda, resulting from various factors that make contemporary unbelief a particularly organizationally “precarious” phenomenon—a precariousness enhanced by an implicit ambivalent attitude to certain aspects of Christianity, and a correlation with Enlightenment, Romantic and New Age concerns.

Militant atheism has a long and not notably successful history--punctuated, however, by boomlets that tend to occur after terrible and seemingly inexplicable human disasters. The latest such boomlet owes its popularity to al Qaeda, whose attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001 created an appetite not
only for global explanations but for blame. To our arsenal of defenses against future terrorist attacks, today’s crop of professional atheists urge us to add a mistrust of religion in general, in whatever guise. Thus, according to books by Richard Dawkins (The God Delusion), Daniel C. Dennett (Breaking the Spell:
Religion as a Natural Phenomenon), and Sam Harris (Letter to a Christian Nation), responsibility for an event like 9/11 ought not to be assigned solely or at all to the small group of radical Islamists who perpetrated the attacks, much less to Islam as a whole, but rather ought to be shared among all religions, including the very moderate kinds of religion that exist in the United States and Europe.  Christopher Hitchens’s new book, God Is Not Great, is the most recent and in many ways the most engaging of these exercises, displaying a range of reference and a degree of energy, wit, and learning that the others conspicuously lack. Correspondingly, however, its flaws go much deeper.

I came upon the following example of Christopher Hitchens plagiarism in his National Book Award finalist volume, god is Not Great: How Religion Poisons Everything (2007). Hitchens gives himself away by copying the misspelled names of several gods from his plagiarized source.

Friedrich Nietzsche's madman famously declared to the marketplace, "God is dead! God remains dead! And we have killed him!" For many today the idea of "God" and/or the utility of religion is dead or dying. "God" has come to represent an antiquated relic of an unsophiscated period in human history. Like Zeus and the gods of Mt. Olympus, the "God" of western civilization is best set aside as another myth overcome. In popular culture, politics, and education, "God" and religion have often been neutered to the point of irrelevance and/or demonized as simply dangerous. For some of the participants of the debates about "God" and religious belief, if "God" is not yet dead, s/he should be. How did we get here? What contributed to this shift in western intellectual and cultural history?

The objective for this course will be to consider the intellectual tributaries that have contributed to the current debate about "God." Among other topics, the course will discuss the notion of "God" as it was understood in ancient and medieval times, as well as the intellectual shifts that impacted this understanding as western culture entered the modern period. The discussions will include works from early Christian writers (e.g., Gregory of Nyssa, Ephrem the Syrian), medieval thinkers (e.g., Thomas Aquinas), as well as works from both “classic” (e.g., Hume, Voltaire, et al.) and contemporary atheism (e.g., Richard Dawkins, Christopher Hitchens), as well as theistic responses to those writings (e.g., David Bentley Hart, Ed Feser, C.S. Lewis, et al.). Questions to be discussed include, Who/What do we mean by "God"? Is "God" just another thing in the world? Is "God" the best explanatory hypothesis to make sense of the world? What do we make of religious violence? What is freedom? The primary question guiding our discussion this semester, as indicated by the course subtitle, will be ‘Is "God" dead?’ Given the topic and the authors, both the readings and the discussions should be intriguing and at times entertaining.

Segunda parte de um artigo sobre Neo-Ateísmo. Nesta parte focamos nas obras e argumentos ateus de Sam Harris, Daniel Dennett e Chsistopher Hitchens que, junto com Richard Dawkins, do artigo anterior, se auto-declararam os quatro cavaleiros do apocalipse

Rhetoric and the Responsibility to and for Language: Speaking of Evil relocates the “problem of evil”— the question of why God would allow for the existence of evil—and surveys it as a rhetorical problem. It raises this question: if we speak evil, how shall we speak of evil? When we communicate, we are naming, and evil as the corruption of language plays a central role in that naming. Evil freezes our words, convinces us we have the sole right to their definitions, and generally stifles the dynamic gift of language. By looking at how people in different eras and situations have named evil, this book suggests how we can better take responsibility for our words and why we owe a responsibility to language as our ethical stance toward evil. https://rowman.com/ISBN/9781498578431/Speaking-of-Evil-Rhetoric-and-the-Responsibility-to-and-for-Language

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Perhaps it was a sheer coincidence: my reading of the book The Missionary Position: Mother Teresa in Theory and Practice by Christopher Hitchens (London & New York: Verso, 1995) and the life of Christopher Hitchens came to an end on the same day, to be exact on Thursday, 15 December 2011. While Mother Theresa was perceived to be instrumental in building up the lives of the least and the lost, Christopher Hitchens instrumentalized his life to pull down and destroy the life and associated public image of those personalities who were associated with the same downtrodden and the discarded in the mainstream society by employing his shrewd sophistry. It is quite strange to note that the fame of Hitchens came from the rhetorical flourish and verbal joust that he directed on the lives of those who had sacrificed their lives so that others may have life; to him the lives of great personalities such as Mother Teresa and Mahatma Gandhi belonged only to a " universe of the mediocre and the credulous. " Indeed, as he made his fame and, consequently, a living from his unhindered critique on Mother Theresa and others, she continued her unhindered service for those who were not cared for by anybody. While people of Hitchens' status could relish on " promise and abundance and opportunity " available in an open and ever expanding world of self-realization and self-aggrandizement, the poor and the marginalized, the sick and the dying were only subjects for their intellectual snobbery and meticulously surgical but sterile scrutiny with complicated literary jargons; such intellectual and literary geniuses would argue for the enhancement of the quality of life of others, but would not move even their small finger to transform an iota in others' lives. Any transformation in the quality of lives of the selfsame people, however, was made only by people of Mother Teresa's commitment and availability. The polemic style of Christopher Hitchens and his acumen to target persons of fame made his writings an instant attraction and a business success. Not many, however, seem to have looked into the flaws in the arguments that Hitchens had advanced to attack his targets, Mother Teresa in particular. I feel that if Hitchens' victims were endowed with the wit and wisdom to construct manipulative arguments, especially by employing polemic language, they would have easily pulled down the already questionable and easily challengeable personal and professional life of Hitchens and many of his ill-conceived and unjustifiable arguments. But they were not only least bothered about such overtures, but were all the more intent on their mission of reaching out and spending themselves for the other, as that was the only instance that would bring life and light into others' lives and make their own lives existentially meaningful. Like many other self-styled critics of Mother Teresa, Hitchens was also intent on finding fault with her for almost everything that she did. For example, even the visit of Mother Teresa to the affected areas of Bhopal gas tragedy in 1984 is vehemently criticized by Hitchens as merely a show of sympathy and a 'hasty exercise in damage control'; although no connection between the Union Carbide and Mother Teresa is alluded, the impression given to the readers is that she had something at stake. However, it is clear from the situation that she had no other intention than offering consolation to the victims of this human-made tragedy (but at her own peril, as the area was not yet safe for life) and, if possible, to be of any assistance to them in a moment of helplessness. When she was asked for advice and counsel, she spontaneously advised them to 'forgive', which is also questioned by Hitchens

Primeira parte de um artigo apresentando os principais argumentos do Neo-ateísmo. Neste artigo focamos nas contribuições do ateísmo dadas por Richard Dawkins que por conta  de sua defesa veemente do Darwinismo ficou conhecido como o Rottweiler de Darwin

Descartes holds that the tell-tale sign of a solid proof is that its entailments appear clearly and distinctly. Yet, since there is a limit to what a subject can consciously fathom at any given moment, a mnemonic shortcoming threatens to render complex geometrical reasoning impossible. Thus, what enables us to recall earlier proofs, according to Descartes, is God’s benevolence: He is too good to pull a deceptive switch on us. Accordingly, Descartes concludes that geometry and belief in God must go hand in hand. However, I argue that, while theism adds a layer of psychological reassurance, the mind-independent reality of God would ensure the preservation of past demonstrations for atheists as well.

Religion and Violence has often been associated.  However, is religious belief really a cause of violent behavior?  This article argues that it is a crisis of identity, cultural and religious, that is the cause of altruistic violence.  A proper balance of faith and reason can be the antidote to this pathology.

Mit der „Rückkehr der Religionen“ kommt es auch zu einer Rückkehr der Religionskritik. Diese fällt aber meist weit hinter Marx zurück, der religiöse Inhalte als bestimmten Ausdruck gesellschaftlichen Leids analysierte. Anstatt „[d]ie Forderung, die Illusionen über seinen Zustand aufzugeben“ aber mit der zu verbinden „einen Zustand aufzugeben, der der Illusionen bedarf“ (Marx), begnügen sich die „neuen Atheisten“ wie Dawkins oder Harris mit dem Nachweis, dass religiöse Überzeugungen nicht mit wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnissen vereinbar seien. Nicht nur in ihrem naiven Naturalismus, blinden Eifer und realitätsvergessenen Sendungsbewusstsein nimmt solche Religionskritik selbst religiöse Züge an. Religiös ist sie zudem in dem präzisen Marx’schen Sinn, dass sie das gesellschaftliche Unrecht verschleiert, indem sie dessen Ausdruck bloß wegrationalisieren will.
Auch kritische Theorie aber zeigt sich gegenüber der Religion gelegentlich überraschend wohlwollend. Anders als es Habermas vermuten lässt, erschöpft sich diese Haltung nicht in einem lernbereiten Dialog mit der Religion. Eine Religionskritik, der es mit der Abschaffung des Leids der bedrängten Kreatur ernst ist, muss in einer ganz anderen Weise selbst religiös sein als ein bloß mit negativen Vorzeichen versehener Glaube oder die „diskursive Verflüssigung“ religiöser Gehalte (Habermas). Unter Bezug auf Adorno, Benjamin und Horkheimer soll im Vortrag das Modell einer solchen Religionskritik skizziert werden.

This essay defınes and describes the atheistic voice. Drawing from Thomas Lessl’s “voice” metaphor (“The Priestly Voice”), the logology of Kenneth Burke, and the literary insights of Mikhail Bakhtin, I map out the rhetorical tropes of the atheistic voice by analyzing the rhetoric of Christopher Hitchens, which exemplifıes the atheistic voice as a rhetorical ideal. Hitchens demonstrates
that the rhetorical strategies of burlesque and grotesque rejection are the atheistic voice’s primary means of ridiculing and tearing down the godterms of priestly and bardic discourses. After analyzing these strategies, I point to concerns—some perennial, some contemporary—that the ebb and flow of atheistic voices in a democratic public sphere present.

A critique of the New Atheism, this paper was motivated by the sense that the New Atheists continually fail to live up to the Enlightenment/rationalist  ideals which they so frequently and fervently champion. Insisting that reason must be treated regarded as a *process* rather than as a *possession* (e.g. One that might be held to belong to a given individual simply by her lack of belief in something absurd) I try to show that it is a narrowness with regards to reason even more than a misunderstanding of religion that allows the new atheist to be so easily a tool of irrational and even irrationalist aspects of our present social order.

The neo-atheist movement has enjoyed increased attention since 2001 (Dawkins, 2006; Dennett, 2006; Harris, 2006; Hitchens, 2008). This attention has been fuelled by an increased awareness of ‘Islamic-bred terrorism’ after the 9/11 attacks. The neo-atheist movement has sought epistemological certitude in its Enlightenment-inspired objective to adhere to the scientific method—one based in a materialist empiricism—and articulate their epistemological hegemony by discrediting alternative world views, particularly focused on the monotheistic religions. However, this epistemological critique is actually a result of a deterministic structuralist view on human affairs. I argue that rather than ask epistemological questions, they should refocus their critiques on questions of praxis and extend them to their logical ends. In doing so, I argue they will find that in place of traditionalist approaches to understanding social organization on intersubjective terms, the neo-atheist hegemony favours an institutionalist approach to rational social organization under the state structure. This essay draws on Feyerabend (1978, 1993) to argue that such epistemological bigotry produces a justification for authoritarian practices ostensibly premised on state security, but also furthering a neo-liberal secular capitalist order protected by state violence (Chomsky 1969, 1973, 1978, 1979, 1986).

This paper is a criticism of the so-called ‘new atheist’ movement. It is not, however, intended as a defence of religion, but is instead intended as an intervention into debates about both the meaning and the legacy of the Enlightenment. The orienting principle of the argument is that this legacy sometimes needs defending as much from its soi-disant contemporary ‘inheritors’ as from its obvious (obscurantist) opponents. In this sense, the essay emerges from a larger philosophical project whose purpose is to think the contemporary possibilities of what I call a ‘rationalism of the idea’, by which I mean a rationalism that would (in the spirit of Hegel, Adorno and Badiou) distinguish itself from the prevalent, empirical-pragmatic attitudes that constantly threaten to mistake both the objective conditions and the ideological nostrums of present-day late-capitalist societies for with reality to which reason (apparently qua reason) must perpetually ‘adjust’. In what follows, I argue that the problem with Dawkins, Harris et al. is not so much their nugatory comprehension of theology (a flaw which has been amply demonstrated by others), but rather the way in which their in themselves laudable intentions (for instance: to reject reactionary obscurantism while defending the beauty and grandeur of the natural sciences) are expressed in ways that are too easily put in the service of all manner of contemporary irrationalisms, from providing an implicit justification of the U.S. ‘war on terror’ to exacerbating an already deplorable tendency to portray reason not as a process or a property of ‘generic’ humanity but rather as a kind of treasured possession whose presence is apparently guaranteed by the fairly straight-forward task of not believing in what (we tell ourselves) are the preferred myths of the mad, the bad and the dangerous.

A literature review that revolves around one particular literary magazine—n+1. The review consists of the magazine’s first three issues,—published in 2004 and 2005, 'City by City: Dispatches from the American Metropolis' (a collection of essays edited and published by n+1 in 2015), and selections from n+1’s most recent three issues published in 2015 and 2016.