Defence and Strategic Studies

The article concerns the strategy development processes of the South African Department of Defence in South Africa. It intends to identify the probable causes of the observed failure of the South African National Defence Force to develop appropriate departmental policy and military strategy. Military strategy comprises force development, force employment, force deployment and the coordination of these elements in pursuit of national, grand-strategic objectives. (See Dennis M. Drew and Donald M. Snow, Making Twenty-first Century Strategy: An Introduction to Modern National Security Processes and Problems Montgomery, AL: Air University Press, Maxwell Air Force Base, November 2006, 103). Of these four constructs, the article concerns itself only with the first two. The article analyses two complementary approaches to strategy formation: a resource-driven, inside-out model and an interests-driven, outside-in method. The article concludes that the Department is preoccupied with the inside-out method to the lasting detriment of the declared strategic intent of the defence policy.

'Strategy' confuses many. At its core however, it's just a way to solve certain kinds of problems. Strategy’s big idea – and its big attraction - is that it offers the possibility of shaping events rather than being shaped by them. This article discusses small ‘s’ strategy rather than solely examining a specific big ‘S’ historical example. Such an approach allows consideration of aspects of strategy common to all that can be used later in solving strategy problems of your own whether devising new ones or critiquing old ones – and we’ll do just that with Operation Iceberg

Ireland is a thriving modern European state with a buoyant technology sector and ambitions to become a digital world-leader. Favourable corporate tax rates, high quality science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) graduates, access to European markets and other cultural and socio-economic factors have attracted technology giants including Google, Facebook, Amazon, Apple and Twitter to headquarter in Ireland. Ireland has significance in the data centre market with Amazon, Microsoft and others having established footprints and growth plans. Ireland’s digital ambitions demand robust national cyber security response. In examining the efficacy of the existing cyber security strategy, a brief profile of Ireland’s digital capabilities is explored against which risks from threat categories, including crime, cyberterrorism and cyberwarfare are considered. Potential weaknesses are highlighted and 5 key recommendations proposed for improvement of Ireland’s digital security posture.

Security challenges arising from hybrid threats and hybrid warfare, HT&HW, are today high on the security agenda not only in Sweden but across the globe. Despite the attention and the growing body of studies on the subject, there is a lack of research bringing attention to how these challenges can be addressed. This article contributes to such an approach by sharing the findings of a project that brings together practitioners and scholarly perspectives on this subject spanning the threats themselves as well as the tools and means to counter them. The article outlines the Western response to hybrid threats and hybrid warfare. It is argued that there is no single response to HT&HW, nor to building resilience. HT&HW needs to be addressed through a comprehensive, all-inclusive approach. Finally, the article outlines how we address these challenges in practice.

Nous montrons dans cette étude, sur l’exemple américain, que les contrats de vente à l’exportation associés aux obligations d’offsets ont un effet économique net positif sur la base industrielle. Une analyse sectorielle permet toutefois de nuancer ce résultat. Le principal secteur bénéficiaire des contrats de vente à l’international a été celui de la fabrication d’aéronefs. À l’inverse, les secteurs de la fabrication de moteurs et de pièces de moteurs d’aéronefs ainsi que celui de la conception de composants et d’équipements auxiliaires dédiés aux aéronefs ont connu plusieurs périodes de destructions nette d’emplois dues aux transactions d’offset. Ces observations confirment l’hypothèse selon laquelle l’impact principal des offsets
pèse essentiellement sur les fournisseurs et les sous-traitants des entreprises américaines exportatrices. À la lumière des données, malheureusement lacunaires, consacrées à cette question, on peut affirmer que les offsets intensifient la pression concurrentielle subie par les entreprises du pays exportateur et accélèrent effectivement le rattrapage technologique du pays acquéreur. Dans ces conditions ces pratiques peuvent contribuer à la disparition de certains maillons essentiels des chaînes de valeur historiquement localisés dans les pays industrialisés.

Factors as culture, values, and symbols are crucial to understand the evolution of the Italian foreign and defense policy. However, scholars' attention to such variables in the study of Italian defense policies still leaves many gaps. Since the end of the Cold War, Italian troops have been constantly engaged in military operations abroad spreading a " peacekeeper image " of Italy in the international arena. The goal of this work is to investigate the features and the evolution of the main strategic narratives adopted by political leaders to interpret the Italian military involvement in Afghanistan. How have politicians crafted strategic narratives on the Afghan mission? How have these story lines influenced public opinion during the conflict? Has the disproportionate gap between the storyline, based on the traditional values of peace and multilateralism, and the war-torn reality on the ground, affected the level of public approval? Or have the ways in which narratives were built in 2009 played a more significant role? In order to answer these questions, this paper relies on polls, content analysis of parliamentary debates, and public discourse analysis (2001–2011).

Fellow 2015-16 researching and writing a manuscript on contemporary Baltic defense from a strategic and historic perspective at the Changing Character of War programme at the University of Oxford. In 2014 he graduated with his doctorate from the University of Reading, where he studied strategy with Colin S. Gray. His first book, The Evolution of Modern Strategic Thought, is being published by Oxford University Press in 2016.

During the First Gulf War, the period of time between the alert and the missile fall left only a short time in which to take cover, and a need arose to bring the protected space nearer to the users. As a result, in 1992 Israel formed a new defense policy, focusing on 'Mamad's (Apartment Protected Spaces) in every apartment and floor in new buildings. Soon after Israel’s disengagement from the Gaza Strip in 2005, the tensions between Israel and the Palestinian Authority quickly escalated. The Olmart government decided, in 2008, to safeguard residential buildings in the front line of the settlements that are exposed to direct rocket shooting. This included adding 9-meter 'Mamad's to approximately 6,000 residential apartments in the area surrounding the Gaza strip, in all settlements that are at a maximal range of 4.5 km from the border, at a total cost of one billion shekels. In this article we will return to two key steps in the history of the civilian defense in Israel: the transition to defense through 'Mamad's (Apartment Protected Spaces), and the decision to safeguard the settlements in the area around the Gaza Strip.

Much attention in the West has focused on Iran as a problem country. This book challenges the representations of Iran as a hostile regional power led by ideologues, and goes further by discussing how international relations are viewed from inside Iran itself, outlining the factors which underpin Iranian thinking on international relations and considering what role Iran, as a large and significant country in the Middle East, ought to play in a fairly constructed international system.

The book is written by leading scholars and policy makers from inside, as well as from outside, Iran and includes academics with unparalleled access and insights into the world-views of the Iranian leadership. Subjects covered include: the rationale of Iran's Islamic constitution, including its electoral system, and the impact this has on international relations; Iran's view of the ideal international system, including the place therein of ethics, justice, and security; Iran's international interests, including energy needs; and relations with the West, including the clash between Iranian and Western views of the world order.

Devido à crescente complexificação das relações internacionais no pós-Guerra Fria, novas interpretações teóricas foram construídas na área da defesa e da segurança para tornar essa nova realidade inteligível. A transição da bipolaridade, que proporcionava relativa estabilidade ao cenário internacional , para um novo padrão de distribuição de poder, provocou a revisão de conceitos e de teorias nas Relações Internacionais. A partir dessa transição, no âmbito da defesa e da segurança internacional, o debate acerca da revisão do conceito de segurança e da abrangência dos estudos nessa área favoreceu o surgimento de novas teorias e o desenvolvimento de outras até então marginalizadas. A corrente tradicionalista (Traditional Security Studies - TSS), que dominara a agenda desde a Segunda Guerra Mundial, revelou-se cada vez mais inábil para explicar a nova realidade. Dessa forma, dentre as teorias que buscam preencher a lacuna conceitual surgida, duas outras escolas, a abrangente (Escola de Copenhague) e a escola crítica (Critical Security Studies – CSS), passaram a ter maior proeminência.

Australia has long built warships and submarines, albeit on a stop-go basis. However, the shipyard infrastructures for each new build and the associated skills developed during the construction phase have generally dissipated after the project finishes and the ships delivered. No more. The Australian government is determined to create an enduring naval shipbuilding industry, by developing a detailed shipbuilding plan and allocating considerable funding to achieve its goal.

Co-editor of the recently published book which addresses the regional dynamics of the Indian Ocean where the continental-maritime character of the  region presents a fascinating tapestry of history, culture, geography, ethnicity and political structures. The region is also an important oceanic space with political, economic and security imperatives for the global community. The challenges and interests of the stakeholders in this region are unique and their perspectives converge or diverge on different thematic issues. These complexities have and would continue to shape the strategic dynamics in the Indian Ocean.

This volume explores the various strategic dimensions of the Indian Ocean with the aim of evolving an inclusive and cooperative architecture that is tailored to the shared needs, aspirations and interests of the stakeholder community.

Wie hat sich der Schweizer Sicherheitsbereich seit Ende des Kalten Krieges entwickelt? Wer arbeitet heute mit wem zu welchen Gefahren? Basierend auf einer umfassenden und einzigartigen Datenerhebung kartiert dieser Beitrag die Entwicklung des gesamtschweizerischen Sicherheitsbereichs. Die Darstellung der praktischen Arbeitsteilungen, inneren und äusseren Kooperationen, beruflichen Profile und Werdegänge schafft einen analytisch differenzierten und empirisch fundierten Beitrag zu anhaltenden Diskussionen über die landesweite sicherheitspolitische Steuerung.

This article examines the effects which the drone strike campaign in Pakistan is having on Al Qaeda Central. To that end, it constructs a theoretical model to explain how the campaign is affecting Al Qaeda's capacity to carry out terrorist attacks in the United States and Western Europe. Although the results of one single empirical case cannot be generalised, they nonetheless constitute a preliminary element for the construction of a broader theoretical framework concerning the use of armed drones as part of a counter-terrorism strategy.

In Jul 19, China released its new defence white paper, "China's National Defence in the New Era". Notably, the title draws upon the thought developed by President Xi Jinping, “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era”. This brief analyses the document in the context of the seminal geopolitical developments since the last White Paper published in 2015, notably the assumption of the office by the current US President (Jan 17), the India-China Dokhlam military stand-off (Jun-Aug 17), inauguration of China's first overseas military base in Djibouti (Aug 17) and President Trump's enunciation of “Indo-Pacific” concept during his Asia tour (Nov 17).

Kofi Annan: sustainable domestic peace is possible only when conflicts can be resolved through exercise of state sovereignty and participatory governance. There is a need for institution-building and legitimate effective functioning framework of state institutions.

It is observed that the biggest problem or complication that the cyber world is facing at present is not of its being a universal domain but being a domain which is still highly unregulated. For a domain which is clearly three decades old, the existing regulations are clearly not sufficient. Cyber space is replete with conflicts, and threatened by a variety of threats caused by different players like unethical hackers/crackers, terrorists and non-state actors, and also by the use of covert cyber capabilities by nation states. However, the global cyber community is more focussed on enhancing and upgrading the technology in use, rather than taking coherent measures to stabilise and secure the domain, in spite of awareness about the growing threat perceptions. This is evident from the fact that new advances and further upgradation in technology are taking place daily and, as a result, new threats are emerging, while safety and security related developments are put on the back burner, and are not so often in the news. Hence, there is an urgent need to rectify this scenario and a pragmatic solution has to be found to regulate cyber space to the extent possible.

Depois de um ano em que todos os dias tentamos levar aos nossos seguidores o que de mais relevante ocorre no mundo, chegamos agora, com esta edição da PACTA, ao fim do terceiro ano deste projeto, que não pára de crescer e nos faz trabalhar com tanto gosto e afinco. Em Setembro a equipa da PACTA volta com novas ideias para continuar a desenvolver este apaixonante trabalho, de forma a tratar o que de melhor e pior se passa no mundo das Relações Internacionais, e para trabalhar de forma ainda mais intensa no sentido de vos surprender, pois a PACTA não é nossa, é de todos! Para a última edição deste ano lectivo, e seguindo sempre o nosso lema, procurámos oferecer-vos informação com qualidade, pertinência e actualidade. Uma vez mais, temos o orgulho de vos apresentar uma edição recheada de artigos de opinião e uma entrevista, que incidem sobre os principais temas da realidade internacional que nos rodeia.

The evolution process has helped mankind acquire plenty of information and derive enough knowledge from information in all probable fields. The knowledge gained over centuries has, in turn, helped mankind to evolve into a 'technological' being. Yet, it could be stated that "knowledge is free for all, but not all information." The term information means "facts provided or learnt about something or someone" 1 and the term knowledge means "the understanding of someone or something based on the study of facts, descriptions or skills through experience by perceiving, discovering or learning". 2 Therefore, sensitive information such as high-end military technology, business secrets, critical national information, and so on is not to be widely known and, hence, is withheld from circulation.

2021. gads visā pasaulē turpināja ritēt COVID-19 pandēmijas zīmē, tostarp ietekmējot arī Latvijas aizsardzību ziskajā un virtuālajā telpā. Neskatoties uz pandēmiju, aizsardzības nozare turpināja līdzšinējo gadu a īstības virzienu, lai gan nozares problēmjautājumi savu aktualitāti saglabāja. 2021. gadā apritēja arī pirmā desmitgade, kopš Latvijā faktiski izveidota nacionāla mēroga kiberdrošības sistēma. Vienlaikus 2021. gads bija sava veida paradoksu gads. Komandantstunda tika ieviesta, un civilās mobilizācijas mēģinājums notika atbildē uz pandēmiju, bet ne reaģējot uz militāru apdraudējumu. Savukārt bruņoto spēku vienības tika nosūtītas uz robežu ar Baltkrieviju, bet ne uz robežu ar Krieviju. Tas lika vēlreiz pārdomāt gan drošības risku diapazonu, gan arī mūsdienu karadarbības vides transformāciju.

This thesis is an investigation of the factors relating to the translation of United Kingdom strategic direction into military capability. Concentrating on decisions taken below the political level, by the military officers and civil servants in the most senior positions within the Ministry of Defence and at the very top of the armed forces, it answers the question ‘why does the United Kingdom have the military that it has?’ In doing so, this thesis has identified the factors that have shaped capability choices and determined why those choices have had the effect that they have. Its analysis has drawn on historical trends and contemporary elite interviews to assess whether the nation’s current methodology to link strategic direction and the development and maintenance of military capability will fare any better than its predecessors.

History suggests that applying the wrong operational framework to an emerging strategic environment is a recipe for failure. During the World War I, both sides failed to realize that large scale artillery barrages followed by massed infantry assaults were hopeless on a battlefield that strongly favored well-entrenched defense supported by machine gun technology. The Imperial Japanese during World War II never appreciated that continuing to rely on the Bushido warrior ethos – fighting to the death instead of surrendering to fight another day – could not overcome Allied technology and industrial capacity. The failure to adapt had disastrous consequences.

Air power is a big topic and this is a big book. The Routledge Handbook of Air Power features some thirty well-researched, cutting-edge essays written by highly-regarded experts in their particular specialist areas within the broader air power field.  Before delving deeper however...

No Fly Zones and International Security makes an outsized contribution to what is admittedly a small field and not just in terms of discussing no-fly zones. It is one of the few books discussing in a comprehensive, balanced, insightful and well-argued way the application of contemporary air power. The book offers much for military professionals, academics and all concerned with deeply understanding the business of applying air power in the modern world.

Mobilisation occurs during all conflicts with just the degree of mobilisation varying. Surprisingly then, most mobilisation thinking, doctrine and processes focus almost entirely on pre-war mobilisation activities, aiming to ensure that a nation is adequately prepared for an anticipated future war. In reality, this is an overly ambitious undertaking. Wars often arrive unexpectedly, their nature and scope are rarely understood before they start, their duration is unknown, and even the full list of participants is generally in doubt. Deep uncertainty inevitably frustrates thinking about mobilisation.

This paper aims to provide a structured way of thinking about mobilisation policymaking and planning that takes this inherent uncertainty into account. It uses two approaches: alternative futures and historical case studies. By projecting the known past into the uncertain future, the paper generates key insights on national mobilisation issues relevant to defence strategic thinking, doctrine and processes across a range of strategic circumstances.

The participation of the Republic of Angola in the African Peace and Security Architecture represents, in the current sub-Saharan context, the example of a search for strategic affirmation of a rising regional power, through a participatory, influential foreign policy and commitment, bet at strategic balance duality in which the Angolan Armed Forces are an instrument of military cooperation and conflict resolution in Angolan´s conjectural interest space in a context about to be non-permanent member of the Security Council in the United Nations

A participação da República de Angola na Arquitectura de Paz e Segurança Africana representa, no atual contexto subsariano, o exemplo da procura de afirmação de uma potência regional em ascensão, que através de uma Política Externa participativa, influente e de compromisso, aposta numa dualidade estratégica de equilíbrio, em que as Forças Armadas Angolanas são empregues como instrumento de cooperação militar regional e de resolução de conflitos no seu espaço de interesse conjuntural, num quadro geopolítico em que a república de Angola se constitui como membro não permanente do Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas.

This article presents a critical view on the current situation with Non-Lethal Weapons (NLW). It analyzes a set of official documents in an attempt to empathize the reason behind the existing lack of field operationally useful NLW. On the one hand, it points at the significant necessity for less-lethal capabilities formulated by the official vision on future security environment. On the other, it claims that the definition of requirements from current, developing and future NLW misleads military industrial complex from developing NLW that will answer this emerging necessity. The article argues that the current detrimental situation with NLW is not a result of an enormous technological gap, but rather an outcome of the mis-definition of NLW requirements that fail to correspond with defined future threats.

A Szovjetunió felbomlását követően a NATO keleti bővítése szinte végig teljes mértékben az USA és nyugati szövetségesei elképzelései szerint alakult. Az identitás-válságban szenvedő, útját kereső, súlyos gazdasági gondokkal küzdő, gyenge Oroszországot a nyugat részéről meg lehetett győzni arról, hogy a német újraegyesítést követően a NATO keleti bővítése nem fog folytatódni. A továbbiakban a NATO keleti bővítése nem ütközött különösebb ellenállásba vagy akadályba, Moszkva tehetetlenül tudomásul vett mindent. Ez egészen az ukrajnai és grúziai háborús konfliktusig folytatódott, amikor Oroszország először tanúsított érdemi és történelmi következményekkel járó ellenállást, elhalasztva Ukrajna és Grúzia felvételét a NATO-ba.
A NATO keleti bővítése elleni orosz ellenállás radikalizálódásának és új minőségi szintre lépésének mérföldköve a 2021 decemberében az USA számára átadott, majd rövidesen nyilvánosságra hozott orosz biztonság- és védelempolitikai kezdeményezés. Ez radikálisan új helyzetet teremt (!). Minden jel arra mutat, hogy Oroszország alaposan átgondolta az egészet és nem blöfföl.  Moszkva a továbbiakban nem tűri el a NATO további keleti bővítését és nyugati együttműködés hiányában saját katonai-technikai (katonai infrastruktúra telepítése) és katonai eszközeivel (katonai beavatkozás) fogja garantálni érdekei érvényesítését. Az orosz álláspont lényege, hogy a nyugat „vagy arrébb megy” a katonai fenyegetéssel, vagy „arrébb lesz téve.”
Szinte teljesen kizárt, hogy az USA és a NATO elfogadja az orosz kezdeményezésben foglalt, leglényegesebb pontokat,    mivel ehhez a nyugat részéről a korábbi elvek és a gyakorlat teljes felülvizsgálatára,  illetve korábbi „alapelvek” jelentős részének feladására lenne szükség.  Marad tehát az orosz érdekérvényesítés katonai dimenziójának megtapasztalása, mint „végső érv”.  Mindez nem jelent NATO-orosz háborút, ugyanakkor a Szövetség keleti bővítésének végét valószínűleg igen, emellett az eddigiekben nem látott mértékű gazdasági adok-kapok játszmát is valószínűleg igen. Emellett várható a nyugat és kelet harcának további éleződése, aminek többek között az orosz-kínai együttműködés minden eddiginél sokkal szorosabbra zárása valószínűleg következménye lesz.  Ez a küzdelem egy negatív végösszegű játszma, ami a nyugat relatív hanyatlását és a kelet további felemelkedését fogja gyorsítani.

This article explains why Singapore, despite its small size and semiauthoritarian regime, retains one of the best military forces in the Indo-Pacific. It unpacks Singapore's ability to continuously innovate since the 1960stechnologically, organizationally, and conceptuallyand even recently joined the Revolution in Military Affairs bandwagon. Drawing from the broader military innovation studies literature, this article argues evolutionary peacetime military innovation is more likely to occur in a state with a unified civil-military relation and whose military faces a high-level diverse set of threats. This argument explains how the civil-military fusion under the People's Action Party-led government since Singapore's founding moment has been providing coherent and consistent strategic guidance, political support, and financial capital, allowing the Singapore Armed Forces to continuously innovate in response to high levels and diversity of threats.

In the fall of 1987 and spring of 1988, documentary and archaeological research was undertaken in the Fort Boonesborough State Park and adjacent land along the Kentucky River in Madison County, Kentucky. Documentary research included deed research on the Boonesborough area and examination of many primary and secondary documents and sources to outline Boonesborough's history and aid in identifying extant archaeological sites. An archaeological survey and limited excavations confirmed the location of the site of Fort Boonesborough and identified several other historic sites associated with Boonesborough, as well as prehistoric Indian sites.

This is a daring and essential work from one of the discipline's shining lights. Going against type and tradition, the author examines how important more indirect and gradual approaches to battling corruption are, even though such measures tend to be the least appetizing, to both government officials and scholars alike. It is a brave maneuver to attempt to turn a discipline on its head by admitting the well-intentioned desire to see quick and immediate ends to corruption may in fact only exacerbate the situation and cause more harm. More importantly, this book explains how that is and why it is important to pay closer attention and give greater stock to concepts like deep democratization and how to build societies that go beyond the anti-corruption window dressing of electoral or constitutional checks. The book is also a joy to read, sending a reader across the world, from unevenly developing countries to some of the most economically developed and politically advanced states. Additionally, it is not just a volume of fascinating case studies, but research that is firmly grounded by theory and the bigger picture. A major addition to the field.

During the last few years, some donor countries (especially the US and the UK) have been increasingly outsourcing services in post-conflict operations to international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) and private military and security companies (PMSCs). These states have also adopted ‘integrated approaches’ to their policy interventions, contributing to the emergence of an ‘aid and security market’. The article uses ideas from both development and defence studies and re-problematises the contracting states’ relationship with PMSCs and INGOs. It argues that although INGOs and PMSCs are very different types of non-state actors, there are striking similarities in outsourcing practices. Moreover, it demonstrates that the leading contracting states have poorly managed their contracts with both INGOs and PMSCs, and have not seriously reflected on the unintended consequences of their contracting practices on the recovery of war-affected countries.

This essay will delve into the finer aspects of the Third Generation Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) transformation and suggest how the SAF, as an institution, can "change the culture, thinking and behaviour of our people about how they should work together." Only then will SAF soldiers be empowered to be the owners and transformers (agents of change) of the Third Generation SAF.

Russia’s 2010 Military Doctrine highlighted NATO as a military danger to the Russian Federation. NATO was listed explicitly in first place among these dangers - specifically the “striving to ascribe global functions to the force capability of NATO, implemented in breach of international law, and bringing the military infrastructure of NATO member countries closer to the borders of the Russian Federation, including by means of enlarging the bloc”.

Significantly for our interpretation of Russian statements, NATO is listed as a military danger not as a military threat. The distinction in Russian doctrinal lexicon is important – a “danger” is a situation with the potential “under certain conditions” to develop into an immediate military threat, rather than a threat per se. Clear definitions for both military threat and military danger are included in the Doctrine, as well as the distinction between military conflict and armed conflict. Previously to be found in other doctrinal statements, these definitions are essential for a precise understanding of the threat picture as expressed by official Russia.

Other military dangers include deployment of foreign forces on territory adjacent to Russia and its allies, not only on land but also at sea; the creation of strategic missile defence forces; and the development of strategic non-nuclear precision weapons systems.

Development of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) is a fundamental task in deterring and preventing armed conflict, alongside cooperation with other international organisations including, interestingly, NATO. Russia will also contribute forces to the CSTO’s rapid reaction group and for deployment as CSTO peacekeepers. Furthermore, the CSTO’s collective defence provision, similar to but more binding than NATO’s Article 5, is now explicitly included in Russian doctrine.

Despite widespread reporting that the new Doctrine would display increased readiness for first use of nuclear weapons, this provision is if anything subtly rolled back from the 2000 version of the Military Doctrine – instead of first use “in situations critical to the national security of the Russian Federation”, the criterion is now “when the very existence of the State is under threat”. The related provision promising no use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states acting alone has been dropped. But Russia’s precise stance on nuclear use is detailed in a classified addendum to the Doctrine, so remains unclear.

The provision for use of Russian forces overseas “to defend the interests of the Russian Federation and its citizens, and to protect international peace and security” is included. Operations overseas to remove threats or suppress aggression can also be undertaken at the instigation of the UN “or other bodies”.

Preparation for mobilisation receives substantial attention, with several sections retained verbatim from the 2000 Doctrine and others new or re-drafted. These provisions concern both the economy and the military, with no regard to the substantial reorganisation of the military during 2009 towards permanent readiness and away from a mobilisation army.

Information warfare (a concept which largely overlaps with what we might term cyber operations) is largely ignored in the Doctrine, except as a military danger and for the stipulation that the means to prosecute it must be developed. Meanwhile, the largely outdated Information Security Doctrine of 2000 remains in force.